By WAYNE S. SMITH
WASHINGTON--Those who had hoped for something new
in Cuba policy were deeply disappointed by the measures
the Clinton administration announced last Tuesday. What had been
called for was a thorough review of policy that would lead to
sweeping changes. What we got instead was a series of unimportant
small steps, some impractical, others a timid augmentation of what
we are already doing, but none that alter policy in any significant
way. Still, even timid steps forward are better than none at all, and
the hard fact that the policy has failed may yet force a more
substantial change of course.
Thirty-nine years after the U.S. embargo was first imposed, Fidel
Castro is still in power. The embargo has accomplished nothing, but
neither did it cause serious problems with the rest of the
international community. No one country is obligated to trade with
another. Hence, while regarding our refusal to trade with Cuba as
eccentric, other countries also saw it as none of their business.
Ironically, however, it was then that Washington went beyond a
simple embargo. With the Cuban Democracy Act in 1992,
Washington began telling companies incorporated in other countries
that they could not trade with Cuba. In the Helms-Burton Act of
1996, it threatened to haul foreign companies into U.S. federal
courts if they "trafficked" in expropriated property in Cuba and
warned foreign banks not to provide credit to Cuba. Helms-Burton
has caused serious problems with our closest friends and trading
partners and generated a strong rejection of U.S. policy toward
Cuba on the part of the international community.
It was against this background of a failed policy that, last October,
a distinguished group, largely made up of Republicans, called on the
president to appoint a bipartisan commission to conduct a thorough
policy review.
Coming as it did from Sen. John W. Warner (R-Va.) and 24 other
senators, and from former Cabinet members of GOP
administrations, including former Secretaries of State Henry A.
Kissinger, Lawrence S. Eagleburger and George P. Shultz, the call
for a bipartisan commission would have provided the president with
effective political cover. He could not have been attacked by
conservative Republicans for going along with an idea that
essentially came from their own ranks.
At first, the administration seemed amenable, but conservative
members of Congress, led by Sen. Robert G. Torricelli (D-N.J.),
and the right-wing Cuban exiles in Miami and New Jersey voiced
strong opposition. Reportedly, one Cuban American congressman
warned Vice President Al Gore that appointing a bipartisan
commission might jeopardize his chances of winning the presidential
elections in 2000.
This was somewhat of an empty threat, given that it was mostly
Republicans behind the commission idea. It was a matter of the
exiles saying to Gore, "If you do what these Republicans are
suggesting, we won't vote for you." But for whom would they vote?
The candidate of those who had put the idea forward?
Nonetheless, the administration caved. It announced there will be
no commission and no policy review. There was no need for one,
the administration asserted, because there was a strong consensus
in favor of the existing policy. But if that was true, why did
respected people from both sides of the aisle insist a review was
needed? Why did the idea have strong support from the
foreign-policy establishment?
As a sop to those who had hoped for more, on Jan. 5 Clinton
announced measures he said would expand contacts with the
Cuban people and show support for them, but also keep the
pressure on the Cuban government. The number of charter flights
carrying Cuban Americans to visit family in Cuba will be increased
and will be routed from other cities besides Miami and Havana.
Processing of visas and licenses will be streamlined, and there will
be more cultural, academic and sports exchanges, including
exhibition baseball games between a Cuban team and the Baltimore
Orioles. The latter is the only thing that could be termed a
breakthrough: More than 20 years ago, Castro suggested a baseball
game.
The other measures, however, are not likely to increase appreciably
the flow of people between the two countries. Still, any increase is
better than none. The same could be said of the increased
remittances that will be allowed. Cuban Americans currently can
send $1,200 per annum to family members; under the new rules,
any U.S. citizen can send that much to private citizens or entities on
the island. A church in Los Angeles, for example, that has a
relationship with a church in Cuba can now send money.
Presumably, Americans could also send money to Cuban friends to
help start small business, say, a private restaurant. Any increase in
the flow of dollars to Cuba's hard-currency-short economy will be
helpful.
The proposed sale of food to private institutions, the sale of
fertilizers and farm implements to private farmers and cooperatives,
and the proposal to begin direct mail service between the U.S. and
Cuba will be more difficult to implement. Neither private restaurants
nor farmers have any means of buying such goods. The importation
of goods and the system for distributing them are in the hands of the
government. So unless U.S. firms can sell to government entities, or
unless Cuba modifies its means of importation, few sales are likely
to be made. As for direct mail service, the Cubans have long taken
the position that it will require regularly scheduled air service, not
charters. That would require a civil air agreement between the two
countries.
The administration's proposal for increased funds for Radio and TV
Marti is just absurd. Radio Marti was moved to Miami in violation
of its mandate and has become another vitriolic exile station, paid
for by U.S. taxpayers. Given its stridency, Radio Marti's listnership
in Cuba has plummeted. More money won't help. As for TV Marti,
over the years, the U.S. taxpayer has wasted some $120 million on
it, even though it is never seen nor heard. Talk about throwing good
money after bad.
So, an opportunity has been lost. A bipartisan commission could
have recommended effective changes in policy and won public
support for those changes. Short of that, Clinton could have opted
for more meaningful steps. He might, for example, have indicated
the administration's support for legislation to lift the embargo on the
sale of foods and medicines, might have removed all travel controls
or announced the closure of TV Marti and the transfer of Radio
Marti back to Washington, where it can be brought under the
effective control of the Voice of America.
Most important, the Jan. 5 announcement might have been couched
in different terms, terms designed to indicate our readiness to enter
into a more constructive relationship with the Cuban government.
People-to-people contacts are useful, to be sure, but it is an illusion
to think we can deal only with private entities and citizens in Cuba.
Sooner or later, if we want to encourage the government to move
ahead with reforms, we must deal with that government. But that is
a message that has not yet registered with the Clinton
administration.
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Wayne S. Smith, a Senior Fellow at the Center for International
Policy, Served as the Chief of the U.s. Interests Section in
Havana From 1979 to 1982