1963 CIA report on Cuba has familiar ring
DON BOHNING
Herald Staff Writer
A secret Central Intelligence Agency ``status report'' on Cuba concludes
that the
Castro government's position is eroding, leading it to the imposition of
``increasingly harsh measures to maintain control.''
At the same time, says the CIA memorandum, the ``situation in Cuba is
characterized by economic stagnation, depressed living conditions, the
loss of
revolutionary impetus, and the disillusionment of an increasingly large
majority of
the population.''
It ascribes Cuba's problems to ``innate economic deficiencies,'' a hurricane,
the
government's own ineptitude and ``the U.S. policy of economic and political
isolation, and other harassment and sabotage.''
The date: Dec. 12, 1963, nearly 35 years ago. The hurricane: Flora, not Georges.
The eight-page memorandum -- apparently prepared for a possible statement
on
Cuba by President Lyndon Johnson in the weeks following President Kennedy's
Nov. 22, 1963, assassination -- was among more than a 1,000 pages of
declassified Cuba-related documents released by the Kennedy Assassinations
Review Board as it went out of business Sept. 30.
Excepting the fact there is no current indication of officially directed
U.S. sabotage
directed at Cuba as there was then, the memorandum reflects little change
in either
the assessments of the situation on the island or U.S. policy toward it
more than
three decades later.
`Low risk, low return'
The stated objective of U.S. policy then was ``to isolate Cuba from the
Western
Hemisphere and the rest of the Free World and to exert maximum possible
pressures, short of open and direct U.S. military intervention, to prevent
the
consolidation and stabilization of the Castro-Communist regime.''
``We believe that apathy and resentment are now widespread in Cuba,'' says
the
report, adding that ``while they might complicate Castro's problems, they
do not
represent a serious threat to him or his regime.''
``In sum,'' adds the CIA assessment, ``our present policy can be characterized
as
one of low risk and low return: We are unlikely to experience a direct
confrontation with the U.S.S.R. or to engender political strains with allied
or
neutral nations. On the other hand, we are still far from accomplishing
our
objectives of toppling the Castro regime.''
The document acknowledges that ``current U.S. programs at their present
levels
are not likely, barring unforeseen events such as the sudden death of Castro,
to
result in the early overthrow of the Castro-Communist regime . . .''
Avoiding confrontation
To achieve that, says the memo, ``it would seem timely to examine what
additional
covert and overt measures can be taken to quicken the pace of events.''
At the same time, the memo warns, while any such actions would be less
risky than
either an invasion or a blockade of the island, they would involve ``a
substantially
higher `noise level' and risk of confrontation with the Soviets than those
presently in
effect.''
The agency's existing covert action program, said the paper, ``was close
to making
maximum use of CIA's resourses and policy authorization''; it then recommended
that ``consideration should be given to expanding and intensifying the
category of
sabotage and harassment at least for the next year.''
It suggested two possibilities:
``Relaxation of the present policy banning all independent [non-CIA controlled
or sponsored] Cuban exile maritime raids and airstrikes against targets
in Cuba
from U.S. and urge the British to do likewise for Bahamian territory.''
``Authorization to conduct CIA or autonomous group controlled airstrikes
against selected major economic targets such as the power plants and oil
refineries.''
Isolating the island
On the overt side, the memo notes that the ``main emphasis of U.S. programs
against Castro is to complete the economic, political and psychological
isolation of
Cuba from Latin America and the free world and to build defenses against
Castro-Communist subversion in Latin America.''
The paper credits such measures as being ``largely responsible for Castro's
current
economic distress'' and suggests ``additional effective economic warfare
measures
could be taken.''
After citing the advantages and disadvantages of both stepped-up overt
and covert
programs, the paper concludes that ``the courses of action suggested .
. . will
increase Castro's problems and might thereby hasten his downfall.''
But it acknowledges that ``in the last analysis, however, there are only
two courses
which would eliminate the Castro regime at an early date: an invasion or
a
complete blockade. Both of these actions would result in a major crisis
between
the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. (in Cuba and/or Berlin) and would produce substantial
strains in the fabric of U.S. relations with others countries -- allied
as well as
neutral.''