U.S. SENATE,
                                                                                                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM,
                                                                                                                COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
                                                                                                                                                                          Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, in room 2228, Dirksen Senate Office Building, commencing at 10:43 a m., Senator Jeremiah Denton (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding

Also present: Senator East.

Staff present: Joel S. Lisker, chief counsel and staff director; Bert W. Milling, Jr., counsel; and Fran Wermuth, chief clerk.

Senator DENTON. This hearing on the terrorist and subversive activities of the Cuban Government in Latin America and Puerto taco will come to order.

Senator East has indicated that he would be here this morning. I wish to welcome our first witness, Ambassador Thomas O. Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and Mr. Daniel James, journalist and specialist in Latin American affairs, who will be our second witness.

I have a brief opening statement. Then I will ask Ambassador Enders for his statement.

Today the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism concludes its initial hearings on the issue of Cuba and its activities as a proxy of the Soviet Union. This relationship, as we have seen, extends from the use of terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy to the targeting of U.S. persons or interests for purposes of intelligence collecting.

Today's session will conclude the first series of hearings on this subject however, the subcommittee will hold subsequent hearings on this issue as additional information becomes available. Specifically we plan a closed session to examine allegations made by Gerardo Peraza, a former DGI officer, concerning Cuban penetrations of the U.S. Senate and other government institutions.

In his address to the OAS on February 24, President Reagan reminded us of the importance to our own country of the security of other Western nations, particularly those in Central America.

The President said, "In the face of outside threats, security for the countries of the Caribbean and Central American area is not an end in itself, but a means to an end."

Because that sentence contained the first step toward a basic understanding of the issues in the region, I repeat his statement. The President's observation corresponds to my own personal view and I am sure this is the view of our first witness today.

It is only when a nation is secure--free of both Communist tyranny and terrorism--that the application of the principles of democracy can develop and grow. When terrorism is rampant, the Government must try to take whatever action is necessary to end the terror. Communist states are ruled by terror, so the presence of externally applied or sponsored terrorism is nearly impossible, virtually a contradiction in terms. But for a non-Communist government, more or less democratic, whatever action is necessary to end the terror leads to repression; repression often leads to revolution. And, I must emphasize that revolution, world revolution, incrementally, nation by nation, is the ultimate goal of the Soviet Union, its allies, and its agents.

The Soviet Union is well on the way to its goal. Moscow employs a routine technique, which is not only evident, but boringly evident to any reasonably objective student on foreign affairs. Part of that technique is based on the simple observation that if there is repression then the road to revolution, nation by nation, is relatively more easy.

This tactic is not a randomly employed tactic around the world. The tactic is made clear in the all-purpose "Mini-Manual for Urban Guerrillas" published in 1969 by Carlos Marighella. You can find this urban guerrilla handbook in New York, Detroit, Vienna and in the Sudan. You can find it all over the world.

The author, Marighella, was an apparatchik in Brazil's pro Moscow Communist Party for 40 years. I want to quote his words that are known by heart by those who use this handbook, the terrorists around this globe.

It says: "The urban guerrilla must use revolutionary violence to identify with popular causes, and so win a popular base."

I would interject that there are many popular causes in Central America, South America, with which one could identify violence.

Then, the quote:

The Government has no alternative except to intensify repression. The police roundups, house searches, arrests of innocent people, make life in the city unbearable.

The general sentiment is that the government is unjust, incapable of solving problems, and resorts purely and simply to the physical liquidation of its opponents. The political situation is transformed into a military situation, in which the militarists appear more and more responsible for errors and violence. When pacifiers and right-wing opportunists see the militarists on the brink of the abyss, they join hands and beg the hangmen for elections and other trips designed to fool the masses.

These are Marighella's words and these words were almost the same as Castro's quoted yesterday.

I continue Marighella's quote:

Rejecting the so-called political solution, the urban guerrilla must become more aggressive and violent, resorting without letup to sabotage, terrorism expropriations, assaults, kidnaping and executions, heightening the disastrous situation in which the government must act.

These carefully articulated steps, concludes Marighella, are bound to end with "the uncontrollable expansion of urban rebellion."

In Claire Sterling's book entitled "The Terror Network," she reminds us that the Tupamaros were the first group outside Marighella's native Brazil to apply his words literally.

We should keep in mind throughout this hearing today that almost every country in Central America, as well as Italy and Turkey, which are fairly large countries, have been subjected to this technique. The United States has not yet been subjected to it but other countries have been. In Latin America, the results of this technique are very much in the minds of those that are in the diplomatic or governmental fields. The question of what will happen if this kind of terrorism is instituted again, whether it be in Argentina, Brazil, or other countries that have been on the brink due to terrorism, is uppermost in their minds as they decide what they will say and what they will do with respect to situations like Nicaragua.

So we can see that if terrorist-caused revolution results in a left-wing or Communist government, the nation is easily and shortly absorbed into the Soviet orbit. It is lost to the free world and to any prospect of freedom for its people.

More specifically, if such a revolution results in a left-wing government, that probably short-lived government is held up for world denunciation, castigation by its friends as well as by its enemies and the application of further terror which is characterized as a struggle against an antidemocratic force. This often succeeds in bringing about that government's overthrow and replacement by a left-wing regime, sometimes with the unwitting or shortsighted assistance of those whose best interests clearly mandate that they staunchly oppose exactly that result.

Among those who seem blind to this routine technique are our media in general, who seem oblivious to this fundamental and essential fact. If you are a liberal, examine this fact. It is much easier to replace or to influence a left-wing dictatorship, which has only limited local resources, than it is to replace or even influence a left-wing dictatorship, supported by a Moscow-Eastern Europe-Havana supply of weapons, training, money and propaganda.

Now why cannot this fact sink in the minds of our people? I do not regard liberals as enemies. I regard them as a point of view which is absolutely necessary to the survival of this country. If you are a liberal, why can you not understand the obvious fact? What is so superficially attractive about these people's regimes that it blinds us to the stark realities of what happens once the Communists seize power. Who speaks for the human rights of the Miskito Indians forced by the Sandinista regime into resettlement, or worse? There are the teams of human rights observers in North Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Yemen, Afghanistan Cuba, and even Poland? What of yesterday's shocking revelation, at least to me, that thousands of children are being removed against their parents' wills, from the Continent of Africa and out to the former Island of Pines, now the Island of Youth--and there reindoctrinated with Communist propaganda. Why was that not printed by the press? Suppose Argentina had done that? I would have been on the front page, the top headline.

In a recent interview, Alexander Solzhenitsyn spoke of this problem when asked why is it so fashionable to praise the regimes ir Nicaragua and Vietnam and the partisans in Salvador?

He replied:

That is the fatal historical mistake of liberalism--not to see the enemy on the left to consider that the enemy is always on the right, and that there is no enemy or. the left. It is the same mistake which ruined Russian liberalism in 1917. They overlooked the danger of Lenin. And the same thing is being repeated today, the mistake of Russian liberalism is being repeated on a worldwide scale every day.

Those who think they are helping the poor by supporting the Communist-sponsored rebellions are not helping the poor. Their position, that rationale, is understandable but wrong. They are unthinking opponents of imperfect governments without considering the consequences or the alternatives.

Our most serious problem, in my opinion, as a U.S. Senator, and I think this is one of the reasons I ran for this office, stems not from a lack, a basic lack of will, but from a lack of understanding. Since our experience in Vietnam, we have been progressively paralyzed by misinterpretation and misinformation. We suffer an inability to do that which has to be done to protect American interests. What I call the "Vietnam syndrome" is largely responsible for the decline in our ability to protect ourselves and our allies from Soviet aggressions and adventurisms.

For a long time, man has hoped that the crocodile will eat him last, after it has eaten his brothers. A hundred years from now will men conclude that we fed our friends to the crocodile for delay but in the process also assured our own demise?

Yesterday we heard the excellent and illuminating testimony of Dr. Fred Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Today we have as our first witness, Thomas O. Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Inner-American Affairs, a career Foreign Service officer who has served in the Foreign Service since 1958 through eight administrations.

Ambassador Enders might be suffering from jet lag. He only yesterday returned from Chile and we greatly appreciate his appearance today.

We will also be hearing from Daniel James, a journalist and specialist in Latin American Affairs.

I would like to swear both of you in at the same time, gentlemen if you will.

So if you, Mr. Ambassador, will stand, and Mr. James.

Please raise your right hand.

[Whereupon, Ambassador Enders and Mr. James were sworn in.]

Senator DENTON. Please be seated.

Ambassador Enders, you may proceed with your opening statement.

TESTIMONY OF AMBASSADOR THOMAS O. ENDERS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

Mr. ENDERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I very much appreciate the opportunity to come testify before the subcommittee.

The administration shares your concern about the growth of terrorism and violence in today's world. I very much welcome this opportunity to address the issue of Cuban terrorism and the promotion of violent revolution in Latin America and the Caribbean.

I have a statement, Mr. Chairman, which is not as short as I wish it and yet this is a substantial topic and, with your indulgence, I will move through it as quickly as I can.

For some 10 years following the death of Che Guevara on an Andean hillside, Cuba attempted to portray itself as a member of the international community not unlike others, carrying out state to-state relations through embassies and emphasizing trade and cultural contacts.

It is true that Cuba never stopped glorifying violent revolution and during an entire generation, Cuba had carefully nurtured agents and contacts with groups committed to violence in the Americas, often providing ideological and even military training to several groups in the same country.

But in 1978, almost without notice at the time, Castro began to implement a new strategy, a strategy of uniting the left in the countries of the hemisphere for the purpose of using it, a resulting unified movement, as a tool for the violent overthrow of existing government and the establishment of more Marxist-Leninist regimes in this hemisphere.

In 1978, Cuba helped unite the three Sandinista factions, then committed itself militarily to the rebellion in Nicaragua.

At first, it was not apparent to many that a new Cuban strategy was in operation, for Nicaragua seemed like a unique case, but then Cuba began to try the same thing in El Salvador, in Guatemala, in Colombia; now it is repeating the pattern in Honduras, and Costa Rica is exposed to the threat of externally backed terrorism.

Now, it is quite clear, Mr. Chairman, that Cuban intervention is not the only source of terrorism in the hemisphere. Violent conflict in Latin America has many origins, including historical social and economic inequities which have generated frustrations. Especially in the Caribbean Basin, economic crises have recently subjected fragile institutions to additional stresses, increasing their vulnerability to radicalism as well as violence.

However, Cuba's readiness to foment violence to exploit such situations imposes serious obstacles to economic progress, democratic development, and self-determination.

I delivered to Congress a special report on Cuban covert activities in key countries.! What I would like to do today is review and update some of the specific cases with new evidence.

Senator DENTON. Ambassador Enders, would you care to submit that report to which you just alluded?

Mr. ENDERS. Yes. The immediate danger, obviously, is in Central America. But the pattern is also present in South America as well.

In Chile, for example, Cuban training of MIR guerrillas has increased substantially in the past 18 months. In January, the Chilean Communist Party leadership met in Havana. A handful of senior Cuban officials attended, and pressed hard for unity of all opposition forces in Chile and intensification of all forms of struggle, including violence.

But the most prominent South American case, however, is Colombia. In February 1980, Colombian M-19 terrorists seized the Dominican Embassy, holding 18 diplomats--including the American, Mexican, and Venezuelan Ambassadors and the Papal Nuncio--and they held them hostage for 61 days. As part of the negotiated settlement, the terrorists were flown to Cuba and given asylum. That summer, Cuban intelligence officers arranged a meeting among M-19 members with representatives of two other Colombian extremist organizations, the ELN and the FARC. Full unification was not achieved, but practical cooperation increased. In November 1980, the M-19 sent 100-200 activists to Cuba for military training. This group was joined by M-19 terrorists already in Cuba, including Rosenberg Pabon Pabon, the leader of the Dominican Embassy takeover. The Colombians were trained by Cuban instructors in explosives, automatic weapons, hand-to-hand combat, communications, and rural guerrilla tactics.

Then about a year ago, in February 1981, their Cuban training completed, these guerrillas infiltrated into Colombia by boat along the Pacific Coast. The attempt of these urban terrorists at an armed uprising in the countryside failed. Pabon himself was captured. Cuba denied involvement in the arming and landing of the M-19 guerrillas, but not in training them.

But there was clear evidence of Cuba's role and that led Colombia to suspend relations with Cuba on March 23. President Turbay commented in an August 13 New York Times interview:

. . . when we found that Cuba, a country with which we had diplomatic relations was using those relations to prepare a group of guerrillas, it was a kind of Pearl Harbor for us. It was like sending ministers to Washington at the same time you are about to bomb ships in Hawaii.

In an interview published in September 1981, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, the Cuban Vice President, told the German news magazine, Der Spiegel: "We did not deny that we trained the M-19 guerrillas." This, he said, "holds true for the Salvadorans as well."

Neither the anger of President Turbay nor the M-l9's failure has deterred Cuba. A new and sizable group of M-19 guerrillas are today in Cuba receiving military training. We do not know that they will go back to Colombia to attempt new acts of terrorism, perhaps directed against the Presidential elections this coming May, but it seems to us a reasonable speculation.

The M-19 has already gone on record--in a declaration distributed to the media in January--condemning the elections and claiming that "civil resistance, popular combat, and armed warfare are the only roads left open to the people." This document, which was distributed under the signatures of the M-l9's national directorate, pledged that the M-19 would oppose the elections "with all our force." This statement was repeated in late February when M-19 leaders rejected the government's latest amnesty proposal

For the first time, Mr. Chairman, we now also have detailed and reliable information linking Cuba to traffic in narcotics as well as arms. Since 1980, the Castro regime has been using a Colombian narcotics ring to funnel arms as well as funds to Colombian M-19 guerrillas. This narcotics ring was led by Jaime Guillot Lara, a Colombia drug-trafficker now in custody in Mexico. He has admitted to working for Havana in purchasing arms for the M-19. We have information that Guillot traveled twice to Cuba since October 1981 and that on the second visit he received $700,000 from the Cuban Government to purchase arms for the M-19 guerrillas. Last October, he played a principal role in transferring the arms he purchased from a ship to a Colombian plane hijacked by the M-19. In addition to arms, Guillot reportedly also transferred funds to the guerrillas through an employee of a Panamanian bank. He maintained contact with the Cuban diplomatic mission in Bogota, including the Ambassador, until that mission was closed.

In return for Guillot's services, the Cubans facilitated the ring's trafficking by permitting mother ships carrying marihuana to take sanctuary in Cuban waters while awaiting feeder boats from the Bahamas and Florida. According to a relative of Guillot, one such mother ship detained by Cuban authorities was released when Guillot protested to the Cuban Ambassador in Bogota.

Guillot himself has also admitted that a future shipment of arms was to be sent to an unspecified group in Bolivia. These arms, according to Guillot, were to be supplied by an individual in Miami named Johnny. Johnny has been identified as Johnny Crump, a narcotics and arms trafficker now detained in Miami on narcotics charges.

We will continue, Mr. Chairman, to follow this case with extreme interest since it is the first firm information we have which implicates Cuba in narcotics trafficking. It also confirms through an independent source what we have suspected, that despite Cuban denials, Cuba has provided arms to the Colombian M-19 guerrillas in addition to training them.

In Central America, the pattern we know well from Nicaragua and El Salvador can be seen now from Guatemala to Honduras and Costa Rica.

Guatemala exemplifies Cuba's systematic efforts to unify, assist and advise Marxist-Leninist guerrillas. In the fall of 1980, the four major Guatemalan guerrilla groups met in Managua to negotiate a unity agreement, Cuban and Sandinista officials attended the signing ceremony. We have obtained copies of the actual secret agreements which make clear that the four guerrilla groups consider themselves a Revolutionary Vanguard, and believe that Marxism Leninism establishes the ideological parameters of the Guatemalan revolution.

The secret agreements emphasize the importance of creating a national front, whose leadership would be approved by the self-proclaimed Revolutionary Vanguard, and the necessity of building international solidarity for the Guatemalan revolution. They spell out the intention of the guerrillas to control decisive political and military power, and fundamental economic power, should the Guatemalan Government be overthrown.

Later last fall, the leadership of the four Guatemalan guerrilla organizations were called to Havana to work further on developing effective unity. In January 1982, they issued a public statement to the people of Guatemala and world opinion, calling for a broad National Patriotic Unity Front. They laid out a deceptively moderate program for a new revolutionary government which would be non-alined, guarantee freedoms of expression, and respect the people's right to elect their own representatives. But the front, they made clear, would be under their leadership as the Revolutionary Vanguard.

Now it is interesting that the Marxist-Leninist parameters of the Guatemalan revolution laid out in the secret accords are not mentioned in this declaration. Nor is the intention of the Revolutionary Vanguard to control decisive political and military power. It does not take a great deal of imagination to see why the class struggle and Marxist-Leninist ideas so prominent in secret agreements were deleted from the public declaration.

A similar process appears underway in Honduras: The Cubans currently are using Honduran leftists to transport arms and pro. vice support to insurgents in El Salvador and Guatemala. Nevertheless, the Cubans are looking to the day when guerrilla warfare can be initiated in Honduras itself. Honduran authorities raided several guerrilla safehouses in late November 1981. Captured documents and declarations from detained guerrillas, including several Nicaraguans, revealed that the group was formed in Nicaragua at the instigation of high-level Sandinista leaders, its chief of operations resided in Managua, and members of the group had received military training in Nicaragua and Cuba. Among the captured documents were classroom notebooks from a 1-year training course held in Cuba in 1980. The documents also revealed that one of the three guerrilla bases discovered was responsible for transporting arms and munitions from Esteli, Nicaragua into Honduras. We can expect to see the familiar ritual repeated in an effort to bring down the new democratic government which was inaugurated barely 2 months ago.

In Costa Rica, terrorism had been virtually unknown until March 1981 when a vehicle bearing three U.S. Embassy guards was blown apart. In June, three Costa Rican policemen were shot down.

This year an investigation by the police uncovered at least 20 terrorist cells of the Central American Party of Revolutionary Workers, one of which was involved in an attempted kidnaping in January of the Salvadoran businessman Roberto Palomo. Also uncovered was a "people's prison," well supplied with arms, food, and other stores. According to documents found during the investigation, the purpose of the terrorists was to undermine Costa Rica's democratic institutions. Two Salvadorans and one Costa Rican were arrested; they told police they had been given extensive training in Nicaragua and false identity documents.

I think if I could put this in perspective, Mr. Chairman, the covert strategy for exporting armed revolution and terrorism is more sophisticated than Cuban efforts in the 1960's. The new Cuban approach no longer centers support solely on armed forces, but combines support for revolutionary groups with propaganda, youth training courses, scholarships, and bilateral economic/technical assistance. They have some flexibility in tactics but the main spring of Cuba's policy remains the development of strong para-military forces in target countries like Colombia to provide the muscle for revolutionary groups regardless of the path to power they choose.

Of course, Nicaragua is now collaborating in the attempt to impose new Cuban-style regimes in Central America. Such regimes are so incompetent, economically, and so repressive of individual liberties that their citizens will see their only hope in flight, often to the United States. The rapidly growing number of Indian refugees--now more than 12,000--who have fled Nicaragua to Honduras are just the most recent manifestation of the despair which moves people to abandon their communities for safety elsewhere.

We know the human tragedy of refugee movements. We also know the enormous social and economic burdens they place on the societies which receive them. We ourselves have seen the crime, the skyjackings, the huge welfare costs and social tensions the Mariel migration brought to the communities of this country. For small countries in Central America or even Mexico, the consequences could be too much to accommodate. The pressures can easily destabilize the weak, creating the chaos that gives revolutionaries new opportunities. Whether or not it is part of the design to export revolution, it at least serves that purpose.

I think it is worthwhile remembering that Cuba's investment of energy, money and agents would not be possible without Soviet help. Soviet assistance, now totaling well over $3 billion a year, which is the equivalent of a quarter of Cuba's GNP, enables Cuba to maintain the second largest and the best equipped military force in Latin America and to channel significant resources to insurgencies and terrorism abroad. Cuba's new offensive since 1978 has been accompanied by ever-increasing Soviet arms buildup in Cuba including Mig-23 Floggers and 66,000 tons of supplies in 1981 alone. Having such a sophisticated military establishment enhances Cuba's ability to foster and export revolution.

We must be clear about Cuba. It is a Soviet surrogate. Its support for subversion derives from its own deeply based ideological conviction. It is a fundamental tenet of the Cuban revolution.

The Cuban leadership today is made up largely of the veterans who 23 years ago came to power through violent revolution. They have developed "armed struggle" into an ideological precept and way of life. Promoting "armed struggle" is not just a tactic of foreign policy, it is what reassures them that they are still revolutionaries.

This deep-seated drive to re-create their own guerrilla experience elsewhere is strengthened by hopes of creating allies and keeping Washington's attention focused away from Havana. Hoping that the United States will be domestically and internationally hamstrung on El Salvador, Cuba seeks to compound our problems by creating new ones--for example, in Guatemala or Colombia. This drive, however, makes Cuba increasingly prone to rash decisions and tactical mistakes, and more willing to sacrifice the lives and resources of foreign guerrilla groups in operations that may prove disastrous to the guerrillas but advantageous to Havana.

We must make no mistake: The Castro regime has made a business of violent revolution. Our response is also clear. We will not accept, we do not believe the countries of the region will accept that the future of the Caribbean Basin be manipulated from Havana. It must be determined by the countries themselves.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate your patience and tolerance in letting me use my entire statement.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. That was most illuminating. I recognize with pleasure Senator East, my distinguished friend and colleague from North Carolina and offer him an opportunity to make any remarks at this time.

Senator EAST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will just wait until I have an opportunity for some questions.

Thank you.

Senator DENTON. As the chairman of the subcommittee, I have been learning a great deal. I had no idea that the Soviet-Cuban activity to promote world revolution was as all pervasive and as active as it is. Your statement today adds to my education.

Having visited Panama recently and having gotten a briefing from the unified commander in that area and having attended a reception which was attended by diplomats from all over Latin America, I have added to my understanding of these issues. What you say today makes me even more alarmed about what is going on and about the vast difference between what is actually taking place in Central America and what our public perceives and understands about that situation.

In Panama, it was estimated by the business community, by left" wing political functionaries and aspirants for government positions, that the Soviets are subsidizing at least 1,000 Panamanian students at their university in Moscow.

In previous hearings, we have brought out that the KGB normally and without any attempt at disguise runs the DGI, the Cuban intelligence agency.

You have put in perspective the amount of aid that Cuba is getting from the Soviets--did you say $3 billion a year?

Mr. ENDERS. Yes; $3 billion a year.

Senator DENTON. One-third of Cuba's gross national product?

Mr. ENDERS. One-quarter, sir, is what we estimate.

Senator DENTON. When we combine that with the report yesterday from Dr. Ikle of how that translates into advisers, military equipment, and so forth, it is mind boggling to me the difference between that which is really going on and that which is perceived.

One thing all of these diplomats from South America emphasized to me was the U.S. failure to follow through on commitments such as in Vietnam. Diem is a good example, whose assassination we effectively acquiesced in.

Chou and his government is another example. After we did win a military victory there and got a four-point agreement, by virtue of pressures which were unremitting both from the media and from Congress, we managed not to follow through on our commitment to him. We permitted the North Vietnamese divisions to crush South Vietnam and to take over their country with the resulting economic and sociological consequences.

The South Americans are not unaware of what happened to Diem and the Shah of Iran. In the case of Iran, the prophet, the great bearded Ayatollah, who in Paris was portrayed as the savior of the situation, has not improved the situation in Iran, has not improved U.S. interests in Iran. The South Americans are well aware of this unrealistic and disturbing element of U.S. foreign policy.

Mr. Ambassador, with reference to the four major Guatemalan guerrilla groups that met in Managua, you mentioned having copies of the actual secret agreements made during that meetings

Could you furnish the subcommittee----

Mr. ENDERS. With pleasure

Senator DENTON Without objection, these documents will be entered into the record. I did mention that there has not been terrorism in the United States like that which has occurred in other nations. But for your information, Mr. Ambassador, in our second to last hearing we had two policemen, special agents, from the Miami area who testified concerning Cuban Government involvement in drug traffic into the United States. They also testified that they knew of 240 U.S.S.R.-manufactured grenades in the Miami area alone. When you think what a man with a pistol and one or two shots can do in a hotel in Washington, D.C., and start thinking about the thousands of Cuban agents that are in the Miami area alone, one can see the potential for terrorism and the potential for destruction in the United States. Thank God it has begun to become more widely understood.

Have you seen any evidence, sir, that guerrilla training of insurgents targeted against Central America has occurred in Mexican territory and, if so, would you describe the nature of such training and the nature of such evidence?

Mr. ENDERS. Mr; Chairman, could I first comment a bit on your first remarks about the problem of the left-wing and the left-wing dictatorial or violent regimes. Obviously, one of the most difficult problems in foreign policy--I think we have all been impressed by the fact that Nicaragua has swung from a repressive left-wing regime to a repressive left-wing regime and seems, in spite of all of the efforts of the United States and a number of other countries to, say, present economic assistance and political connections--after all, Nicaragua has received, over the last 2 years, $600 or $700 million of economic assistance from the free world countries, including a $125 million cumulative from the United States. But it has marched steadily toward a one-party state without any remission. I think a great many Americans see this as a dilemma for our foreign policy.

I would say this, that when you have in front committed to a right-wing or strong military ruler, such as the Shah, and you then urge him on toward reform, it is quite possible that sometimes you weaken rather than strengthen him and it would be arguable this is what happened in Vietnam or arguable that this is what happened in Iran.

Senator DENTON. Weaken in what way, by pushing him too fast or by just the conspicuousness of our apparent help?

Mr. ENDERS. Very often our effort to get such a ruler to embrace our values, our political values, makes him--undermines the basis on which he holds power. But that, I say, is when a commitment has been made. But when you have a country that wants to change itself--and this is the case of El Salvador--wants to change itself by reforming, to get out of the dilemma of the extreme right or extreme left, you move away from an old-line military regime, then you have a different situation. I say El Salvador is different because the old-line military regime, not unlike that of Somoza, not unlike that of Guatemala, came in determined to implement a land reform on a very broad scale and political reforms and to create democratic institutions. We got behind those reforms under the last administration and under this one. We did not impose them. We did not organize the reforms for them. We did not tell them I they should do it. But we got behind them giving them economic I and military aid because the revolution speared reforms and the I immediate reaction from the violent left was to go into and act as insurance agents.

In another case, Mr. Chairman, Central America, Guatemala where the polarization is much greater, we have refrained from active and substantial support to the Guatemalan Government. We know that that Government is being challenged by a Marxist Leninist organization. It is organized and supported in Cuba. We know that civil strife has been going on in that country for 25 years and that this is the third wave of it, third and very dangerous wave.

On the other hand, we have told the Guatemalan Government repeatedly that we do not see how they can ultimately stabilize the I situation if it appears in their own country that everybody that is I not actively for them is potentially regarded as an enemy by them I and that the situation polarizes and those who wish to develop an alternative in the center are not permitted to move forward. We take the Guatemalan situation very seriously. But we have not committed the government in the way we have in E1 Salvador.

So I think it is important in thinking about the dilemma that you speak of, Mr. Chairman, to see where we are going before we commit a great country like the United States because we should carry through on commitments once they are made; therefore, we have to be particularly careful before in fact we engage ourselves.

Senator DENTON. I by no means meant to imply that the Shah of Iran and Duarte were comparable. Duarte is far from a left-wing leader, which is another mystery to me, as to the way he is being portrayed. He has been trying to institute reforms. He is far left in his orientation from what we would choose to have, I would imagine. He is certainly not considered a left-winger down there and the way he is portrayed in the American press astounds me. I just meant that the consistency of Americans following through on commitments to back certain rulers trying to deal with difficult circumstances, such as rampant terrorism, is a dismaying situation

Mr. ENDERS. Well, I think the Cuban revolutionaries and the Soviet revolutionaries behind them want to put us in that dilemma I and they want to have us in the position in which it is either--we I either stick with Somoza or we have to take the Sandinistas. We I should not permit ourselves to be locked into that choice. I think the fundamental objective of our policy in the region should be precisely to give ourselves the alternative choice of some social and political change.

Senator DENTON. Would the Department's position be to see that the relatively young nations of Central and South America, with their revolutions coming in the late 19th century and early 20th century still going on, to see that they provide for the land and social reforms necessary to permit a sense of public confidence or assurance that their government is doing the best they can. Is that not generally the wish of the United States?

Mr. ENDERS. Yes, it is, Mr. Chairman. But I think we have to be aware that the countries are very different. There were three countries with traditional military style left-wing authoritarian governments: Guatemala, Nicaragua, and in the past, El Salvador. But Costa Rica is very different. You know, it overthrew such a military government 30 years ago and has had 30 years of model democracy. Honduras had a military government for the last 12 years. But in an election with 80-percent turnout, pretty good figure from an American point of view, 80-percent turnout, they elected a moderate center democratic regime. The small country of Belize, just now independent, is a democracy. Panama is a country of mixed institutions but not a repressive country. So each country has different problems. There was a particularly harsh land problem in El Salvador, partly because it is the most heavily populated country in the area and the man-to-land ratio is very unfavorable and partly also because so much of the land was in the hands of a relatively small number of people, creating an explosive social situation. Similar but not so severe conditions existed in Nicaragua. Thus, each of them have to be taken differently.

But you have, on the one hand, while trying to deal with economic and social problems of those countries as they mature, the problem of outside interference that has got to be dealt with too. Not only Cuba engaging in uniting the left and organizing the threats against the government, as you and I have both described, but also what you might call the ripple effect in Central America.

When the challenge was being mounted against Somoza in Nicaragua, the Cuban consulate in San Jose, the capital of the neighboring state of Costa Rica was used as the commander in control post and it was from there that the orders, the communications, and the logistics were organized.

Now that the struggle is going on in El Salvador, it is in Managua, the capital of Nicaragua, that the commander and control apparatus is present and the logistics is organized and the training is organized.

As you mentioned earlier, we have given the evidence which we have for this, which we regard as irrefutable, to the two Intelligence Committees, and the chairmen of the two intelligence committees have testified to its convincing character

Senator DENTON. I will turn this over to Senator East but before I do, I did not mean to characterize the governments as all right-wing, all in need of that much push by us to reform. What I meant to draw out is that the United States is not simply in favor of a bunch of rich autocratic dictators staying in place so that we can capitalize on trade with them at the expense of the poor peasants.

\\e are, in general, inclined toward the same view as the liberals are with respect to that area and we must recognize that there are countries down there doing almost superhuman--making almost superhuman achievements in that direction.

The big point I was trying to make, that this outside supply of military equipment, terrorist propaganda, technique, wherewithal, must be cut off.

Senator East.

Senator EAST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate your coming this morning, Mr. Secretary, and sharing your thoughts with us.

I would just like to make several quick observations and pursue them with you, pertinent to your recent trip to Chile.

First, I would like to commend the Department of State and the Secretary of State for what I think has been a very effective and forceful statement of our position in Central America and E1 Salva" don I took the liberty the other day to call the Secretary of State and tell him personally I thought he was articulating this very well and that it needed to be done and he had the forum to do it and I wished him Godspeed in continuing to do it.

So I think the State Department has shown good leadership, and personally I support the administration on the general thrust of that policy in E1 Salvador at this time.

I would like to underscore to you that frequently it might be un clear how much support in the Congress the State Department enjoys. I would submit to you it might be infinitely more than what might appear on first blush because frequently our colleagues, as distinguished as they are, in the House and the Senate, who do go down there with a position that is contrary to yours, receive, and perhaps understandably so, a great deal of attention.

Those of us who are in perhaps a more conventional role of supporting the ad ministration do not quite enjoy that kind of exposure. Again, I am not suggesting any great conspiracy against us. Perhaps it is looked upon as particularly newsworthy because you are stating that position and then there are the critics and so they are trying to give some sort of balance that way. And I appreciate the dilemma the media find themselves in. Though I think one component that is inadvertently left out is perhaps a failure to communicate to the American people that there is strong support in the U.S. Senate, in the House of Representatives, for the general thrust of the administration's policy in Central America and, frankly, in many other parts of the world as well.

So I would like to take the liberty here simply to stress to you, you do not stand alone in terms of the State Department-administration versus a unanimously hostile Congress. It is just simply not true and it would not be an accurate understanding of the situation.

I find, of course, enlightening and useful your evaluation of the Soviet-Cuban connection and what it suggests for the world as a whole as well as Central America and Latin America, and as I have understood the facts and seen them and they keep gushing out, it is a sound analysis. I do not think it can be denied. One wants to keep an open mind but, again, I think your general analysis of what is occurring in the world is realistic. It is accurate. It is not an exaggeration. It is not overblown. It is not simplistic. It comports with the real world of international relations as I see it and understand it.

And Cuba has grown increasingly as a surrogate of the Soviet Union to represent, I think, a genuine threat to peace and stability and freedom in the world, in so many parts of the world, not only Central America but Africa, the Middle East--Cuban troops in South Yemen and even in Afghanistan.

So the patterns are there. I am reminded of Senator Fulbright who at the time was chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in the Senate who used to remind us that Cuba was no more than a nuisance and one that we ought not to be worried about. Certainly one cannot say that today. In our time it has played a major role as a surrogate for the Soviet Union and its designs in the undeveloped parts of the world.

Having made those general observations, just to give you a little feel for my general sympathy of what you are trying to do and my general position, one thing I would like to pursue with you, I have some questions about, is the so-called human rights test that I noticed in the Post this morning, an article about your trip to Chile. This human rights test has become a component of our foreign policy in many parts of the world.

As I understand it, the point seems to be that it came out of the Carter administration to encourage countries on the road to some sort of model democracy, I guess, of pluralism, of diversity, that we are willing to have relations with the country along the way provided they are showing some improvement and moving toward that general direction.

I would like to state as concisely as I can some reservations that I have about that, and I would appreciate your response to it because it seems to be a very significant facet of the State Department's and administration's policy in Latin America as well as the rest of the world. I have no quarrel with wanting to encourage countries, be they of the left or right, of moving toward greater pluralism and diversity. But there are enormous limits to that, frankly, in the real world of international relations. Democracy is a concept, an institution that is rare and fragile. We are used to it in the Anglo-American tradition and, to some extent, in Western Europe. But, candidly, it is not a uniformly understood or accepted form of government. When you get into the problems of culture and history and tradition--it reminds me of that famous play, "The Teahouse of the August Moon," where the Department of the Army sent in troops with manuals to instruct the local natives on how democracy works. The point was that it was ludicrous because we did not understand the local culture and the history and the tradition.

So I first question, as a practical matter, however desirable it is, you could impose democracy in so many cultures in the world, whether it be tribal cultures in Africa or cultures of great history and tradition in Central America or Asia.

So I question whether it is not a somewhat naive goal, as desirable as it might be. But in the real world of international relations one has to handle that with a great deal of the sense of realism about what is attainable and what is practical.

Then I question whether we do not apply that with a very selectively double standard. It is frequently pointed out--for example, we are trying to continue improved relations with Communist China, yet I do not see any human rights policy being applied there, but they must show progress to a model democracy in Communist China before we will continue to increase trade.

Other examples with Egypt under Sadat. As former president of Egypt, he was not a model of democracy and generally understood not to be so, but we continued to improve relations there. We are trying to do it with Saudi Arabia. With all respect to the Saudis, democracy is not part of their culture, history, and tradition. I do not see any human rights policy there. We are trying to improve relations with Jordan and Hussein. I do not quarrel with that or of trying to build a consensus in the Middle East. But clearly you could not go in and lecture King Hussein or the Saudis, you could not have lectured Sadat, and I gather we are not lecturing the Communist Chinese on the model of democracy and the need for them to move in that direction before we would improve relations with them, diplomatic relations, let alone military.

So I am troubled when I see a human rights policy in Central America or Latin America being applied, obviously rather selectively, to governments perceived to be to the right, whether it is the Duarte government or others, the government in Chile.

You say we have opted out of Guatemala. Why? It seems to be a polarized situation. I just query, if that is the basic thrust of our human rights policy, evolving out of the Carter administration and not being substantially altered in the Reagan administration, I ask the question, and would appreciate your reflection on it, whether it is soundly analyzed, frankly, as a matter of political theory, as a realistic understanding of international relations.

In World War II we were allies with the Soviet Union under Stalin. Certainly, in doing that, the Roosevelt administration was not endorsing the government of Josef Stalin. No democrat with a little "d" could possibly do that. Nor was there any evidence that Stalin was moving toward a pluralistic society, which Russia has never known and is never likely to know.

Why would we do that? We were doing it to overcome a great evil at that point, namely, the threat of Nazi Germany. Going back in history, it has been a cycle, a pattern where you have to enter into relationships with countries and leaders, and it does not mean you are endorsing every whit and little of their government. It simply means those are the realities you are confronted with in terms of defending your security and your national self-interest This human rights concept I find sometimes funny in terms of its naivete, but it does pose enormous problems for us if we seriously pursue it, because I think it will lead to our undoing in many parts of the world, where we will not accept allies to the right of center or in the center unless they run model democracies. That is not going to occur and, obviously, it means then you cut yourself off from that potential side of support and have to deal strictly with the left or left of center, and it plays right into the hands of the

Marxist guerrillas. So it is self-defeating. In short, we are hung up on the weakness of our own policy, it occurs to me.

Mr. ENDERS. Let me make several remarks. First, in the United States we have always been a government of values, of human and political values, as well as a government of interests. We have both in the world. I do not think that the concern for democracy and human rights is a concern which should be identified with one American administration only. Indeed, I think that it was the Congress that took the lead very vigorously at the start of the 1970's in promoting human rights policies and this Government, this administration, has recognized human rights policy as a permanent interest, the phrase used, of the United States. I think that is really common ground for all of us. I agree with you.

Senator EAST. Excuse me. How would we, for instance, describe our desire to continue to improve relations with Communist China?

Mr. ENDERS. Perhaps I could go on.

Senator EAST. Go ahead.

Mr. ENDERS. The second thing I would say about that is, I would agree with you here, is that it is nonsensical to over value our influence abroad, to believe that our views on what kind of political institutions one should have, our particular social arrangements, are the model to which everybody else must comply. Sometimes in the past, Americans have had that kind of assurance. I would agree with you that it is wrong to have that.

That said, I would say--and the third remark I would make, that with regard to Latin America, that the idea of democracy is a very strong one in the Americas. That two-thirds of the countries in the area are democracies in some form and almost all of those that are not feel they must recognize democracy as the ideal. Exceptions, of course, are Cuba which does not feel that it must recognize that as the ideal and we feel now Nicaragua, becoming every day a more repressive state.

But others, even when they are not democracies, feel they must recognize that the rule of law and democratic institutions are an ideal and people want to return to that.

The fourth thing I would say is that we agree very much that we should not attempt to use our relationship as somehow a kind of pressure point on human rights issues. There is a kind of internal inconsistency here. Somehow you say that 'you know, that if you are interested in changing human rights patterns in a given country, if you do not--if you are not present, if they have no stake in the relationship with you, there are no common goals, no sense of commitment one to the other, that it is very hard to achieve the kind of improvement that as one goal of our policy we have been seeking in human rights.

So, in contrast to some of the tactics applied earlier, we have, in fact, cultivated the relationships we have throughout the continent and I did not mean to suggest earlier that we are not cultivating our relationship, diplomatic and political relationship with the Guatemalan Government or other governments in the hemisphere, that we are trying to keep them at arms length. Only by doing so, it seems to us, that countries will feel that they have a commitment to the United States, that there are common goals and when we make observations, as we have in a number of countries, that human rights issues, do we have some chance of having people react that there is some reason why we should pay attention to what the United States has to say.

In other words, we have attempted to create relationships of solidarity in which these problems can be addressed rather than antagonistic ones.

I would share very much your view that the United States does not have the influence, does not have the power, does not have the authority to dictate and should not attempt to dictate to other countries what their practices will be. But it is a permanent value of this country and, therefore, we do pursue it in relationships with many of the countries in which problems exist.

Now I would, finally, agree with you very strongly that, and I would like to talk about my area only, that human rights violations by left-wing governments must be as vigorously exposed by the international community and human rights organizations as those by left-wing governments. That has not always been the case in the past and it is one of the reasons why we have felt it necessary to go to such efforts on the Miskito Indians. The chair man mentioned that at the start of the session, because it was not becoming clear that in fact a massive repression was underway against an ethnic group in Nicaragua, an ethnic group that could not threaten Managua.

Of course, all the Miskito Indians were not going to take over the country. They wanted to be left alone and also to be free to not agree with the government in Nicaragua, the Sandinistas, to do what they wanted to do. Twelve thousand refugees crossed the border into Honduras, as a result of the repression.

So, yes, the human rights violations on all sides must be known.

Senator EAST. Then I would simply make this point: I can apple elate your area is Central America and Latin America and you are not going to be expected to speak for the rest of the world in terms of the administration's policy. But it strikes me the administration today, as well as the Carter administration, runs into some very' very difficult problems with the so-called human rights test. I think as a composite of a whole lot of other things to consider it is useful, but to make it the litmus test of a viable relationship between our country and other countries, I would submit, as a matter of political reality in the world, is hopelessly unworkable. Again, I do not see it being applied in the Middle East as regards Saudi Arabia and Jordan. I do not see it being applied in the Far East, as regards Communist China.

It seems to be applied very fully and selectively in a very high profile in your area of Latin America and Central America and I am not sure, Mr. Secretary, to our disadvantage in that we are asking for the impossible. We are asking for the unworkable, that which has never been, and, unknowingly, unwittingly, it works clearly to the advantage of the very thing you say we have to be concerned with in terms of the security of this country, which this subcommittee is concerned with, namely, the Soviet-Cuban connection in Central America and in Latin America.

Then I will end on this note; not to place all of the blame, ii blame is the right word, on this administration--I think they are part of the policy that evolved out of the previous administration, to some extent, somewhat a captive of it.

But I notice the Mexican Government continues to build its relationship with Cuba or with the Sandinistas and I do not see it is insisting on human rights--granted, you are not representing the Mexican Government. But suppose they were working with Mexico to achieve those ends that we see that the Mexican Government is seeking to attain, utilizing that standard. They utilize it with respect to the governments they see to the right. As for those to the left, Portillo embraced Castro.

Candidly, it strikes me that it is very selectively applied and always to those governments perceived as being right of center. I think, if the human rights concept is not to bring itself into a position of a totally laughable concept, it will have to be universally applied and to Communist China, for example.

I submit, once you start to do it, it will be as clear as a bell that it is totally unrealistic. The realities of international relations cannot be reduced to a slogan such as human rights and elevated into the first principle of foreign policy.

I think in the real world of international relations, it will come to our undoing and I think to some extent it has contributed to the undoing, in Latin America.

Mr. ENDERS. Senator, I meant to say we were a government both of value and interests. After your last remarks, I would say we were a government of interests as well as values too. We must have both together and I think we must have both together for the reason that there is in fact great political strength in the development of democratic values and human rights but that cannot be the only concern of our foreign policy. One of the things that in the past might have happened in Latin America, we have had an a la carte approach. We deal with countries in the area on the basis of one item that we are particularly interested in and then we ignore all of the rest of the concerns, including a lot of their concerns.

We ought to have policies with countries that address them as countries, as well as address some single category of relationship and I would agree that vou must put them all together and, above all, you should have the cultivation of a relationship over a long period of time as an important goal and that applies to something on both sides about what can be done in relationship with a country.

Senator DENTON. Thank you. I certainly understand the importance of the principle that this country has interests in the sense of vital national interests, selfish interests, which are of great importance, which we try to apply in international affairs. I think that is the best possible heading that could be placed upon such important anomalies as our dealing with Red China because in the long term our policies are all contributing toward that which is pragmatically conducive to the preservation of our own freedom in this Nation and to the longer range threat to freedom possible throughout the world. I believe occasionally we have to make arrangements which, on the face of it, and taken in isolation, appear to be counter to human rights, such as whatever interests we might have with Red China at this time.

But, over the long term, for one pragmatic reason or another, it seems we serve both ends but it is often not obvious. I hope that is not totally cryptic.

Mr. ENDERS. I understand very well.

Senator DENTON. Turning to my earlier question, which you adroitly avoided, regarding terrorist activity in Central America-- terrorists operating in Central America being trained in Mexico, I realize that we have a very sensitive set of relations around the world, including those with Mexico. To the degree that there may be any terrorist activity or any terrorist training in Mexico, I would ascribe it to Mexico's leadership's feeling the necessity to walk a tightrope, similar to that which Torrijos was walking. So I do not ask you that question with an intent to bruise our relations or to assign guilt to Mexico, but we do have the situation in which they are asking for sort of unconditional negotiations with the rebels in E1 Salvador. In addition, we have our Secretary of State saying, well, he can go along with the serious discussion about that but it does--from the Mexican point of view, it does omit one of the important policy requisites of ours, namely, that the external aid from the Moscow-Havana thing be cut off.

I would be interested in any comment you would care to make with regard to what you know about terrorist activity, terrorist training in Mexico because it looks like a double-tongued position we are taking.

Mr. ENDERS. Well, I would not wish to suggest, Mr. Chairman, that there are any activities which are being fostered or supervised by the Mexican Government. I take it that your question did not refer to that.

Senator DENTON. Not necessarily, no, sir

Mr. ENDERS. But it is a fairly open society and that we have in fact had reports that this open society and fairly open territory have been used in the past for the passage of arms certainly to some of the revolutionary movements in Central America, in neighboring Guatemala. But also some further indeed, there are such reports, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DENTON. As an experienced Foreign Service officer, how would you estimate the impact of the success of terrorist technique which Marighella outlined? Suppose the terrorists were to be successful in E1 Salvador? What would be your assessment of its impact regarding Latin America?

Mr. ENDERS. Well, two things: I think, first of all, the pressure on the neighbors would be enormous and immediate. You know, Costa Rica has no army. So if you have got two states associated with Cuba in the central part of Central America, you would find that it would not be long before you would get a progressive, I am sure it would be called, social-political change in Costa Rica, although the great majority of the--practically everybody in Costa Rica would be against that.

It is not very far, as we know, to Panama with its canal. It is not very far to cross Honduras which has suffered from a severe economic problem, as has Costa Rica. It is not very far across there to Guatemala where there is a major insurgency underway. So there would be no obstacle for that insurgency almost immediately and, of course, Guatemala is on the southern border of Mexico and shares its--its people share many of the languages and ethnic traits of the people in southern Mexico.

So you have a--I spoke earlier of a ripple effect. You would have a ripple effect of some real power underway

I think the second thing that would be said would be that the United States has shown the will or the power to influence events to outcomes which are compatible with United States interests and they would draw the conclusion from that that the way in which they regarded the United States and their willingness to identify with and work with the United States. I think that they would then begin to recalculate their own interests.

Senator DENTON. The testimony yesterday from Dr. Ikle indicated that the time schedule of these shifts in military power as well as, say, the psychological effect of the installation in E1 Salvador of the Nicaraguan-type government--you said the military situation there seems to be on the verge of great changes; in other words, the balance of power in that area, even with respect to the U.S. capacities to deal with it we effectively have a 1 1/2ocean navy for a 3-ocean commitment. If you have the Caribbean and the Gulf, we have a 11/2 navy for a 4-ocean commitment. Such things as Soviet Mig's utilizing runways now under preparation and so forth, I believe, from a military point of view, would represent another factor of great importance other than the psychological effect which you just mentioned.

Mr. ENDERS. Yes. You know, we have never had to be worried about a major threat on our borders, either north or south. This has been a uniquely favorable geographic position which of course is not shared by the Soviet Union. It has to be worried about its southern border and indeed it has 1 million men on the Chinese border. The United States already must be concerned about the buildup in Cuba. We are well aware of the fact that if in fact there were a crisis in Europe, that the resupply of Europe would have to be largely through the Gulf and the Caribbean area and that there is the possibility that it could be challenged or threatened by Cuba and that the diversion of resources would be required for that, substantial resources.

If, in fact, we were to face the same kind of buildup in Central America, the impact on our military situation would be yet graver.

Senator DENTON. I believe that in one of the hearings I attended in the Senate Armed Services Committee last week, Admiral Hayward testified that 40 to 50 percent of the seaborne traffic necessary to reallocate, redistribute the military climate of our forces, 40 to 50 percent of that would have to flow through the Panama Canal were there to be such a European development. With the change in military balance, which seems pending within the next matter of a few months, I am amazed at the context in which this whole matter is being placed for the American public's consumption by those who are the sole transporters of perspective.

You have said that the Department of State has evidence that the Cuban Government has engaged in drug smuggling activities in the United States, citing the case of Jaime Guillot Lara, a Colombian now in jail in Mexico, who claims to have funneled arms and money to Colombian leftist groups in shipping arms shipments to the United States. You described that in your opening statement.

Can you talk more about the evidence apart from the Jaime Guillot Lara case? There have been press reports that Guillot received $700,000 from Raoul Castro himself. Does the Department of State have any evidence as to who gave Guillot arms or anything else you can state with regard to this?

Mr. ENDERS. Mr Chairman, we do not have further information to put in the public record. However, we would be happy to work with members of the subcommittee on a classified basis.

Senator DENTON. We shall submit other questions in that vein and look forward to receiving the responses.!

I referred in my opening remarks to a New York Times article about Cuba's school for exporting communism. The article referred to the Isle of Youth, formerly the Isle of Pines. As you know, it is a small island 30 miles off the southwest coast of Cuba.

According to the article, since 1977, some 26,000 children from Cuba, Africa, and Central America have been brought to this island, this Cuban island, for controversial work and study programs that are a mixture of study and Communist indoctrination. There have been reports for several years that not all of the children on the island, especially those from Africa, are there voluntarily.

General Simon stated that many children are abused and sent to the island without the knowledge or consent of their parents.

Do you have any information to be furnished concerning this island and the allegations that some of these children were abducted? Yesterday, I inserted a copy of this article into the record and we did receive an affirmative response from Dr. Ikle saying these were not just rumors. These were facts.

Do you have anything to add to that?

Mr. ENDERS. Well, I think it is probably quite true, and as far as we can tell, in a number of cases has been true, that young people have been taken to the island without the consent of their parents. Whether they have in fact been taken there without their own consent is less easy to determine. But we have heard reports of that. But I am on much surer grounds on the former from what I know, Mr. Chairman, than on the latter.

Senator DENTON. The ages of those children range from 9 years old up. We will be having hearings beginning March 22, which will be revelatory regarding some of the Communist activities in Africa and how "humane" some of these activities are.

In view of your schedule, Mr. Ambassador, we will submit the rest of our questions to you for the record. We thank you very much for your most informed and enlightened testimony.

Would you please furnish the subcommittee with copies of the documents you mentioned in your statement concerning insurgency in Honduras and captured documents and declarations which demonstrate the true motive and origins of the guerrillas there. You mentioned a school book from a 1-year training program held in Cuba in 1980. We would very much appreciate inclusion in our record of those documents and reports.

Mr. ENDERS. We will.

Senator EAST. I too would like to thank the Secretary for coming. We appreciate your patience and being very helpful.

Mr. ENDERS. Thank you, Senators.

Senator DENTON. You have been sworn in, Mr. James. We want to welcome you again to this hearing and ask you if you have an opening statement.

Mr. JAMES. Yes, Mr. Chairman; yes, I do.

I will present only a summary of the statement I have submitted in writing and that you and your staff have in their possession.

I appreciate very much this opportunity to appear before you on the crucial question of terrorist and intelligence activities conducted in the United States by intelligence and security organs of the Cuban Government.

Cuban-directed and Cuban-inspired terrorism and intelligence activities in this country are increasing, unfortunately, and constitute a grave threat to it.

Less than 3 weeks ago, on February 28, four bombs were exploded on Wall Street. They were thrown by the FALN--the Armed Forces of National Liberation--a Puerto Rican terrorist group, which claimed responsibility for the bombings. It calls them "a strike against the imperialist forces that are suppressing the Puerto Rican people."

The FALN, Mr. Chairman, is a creature of the Cuban Government's General Intelligence Directorate, or DGI, which organized that terrorist group on American soil in 1974. The DGI, in turn, is a satellite of the Soviet intelligence service known as the KGB

I learned of the FALN's true origin during a trip I made to Puerto Rico last November. I also learned then that President Reagan has been singled out for assassination by the island's proliferating terrorists. The FALN, it was believed by knowledgeable informants in Puerto Rico, was the terrorist group most likely to be entrusted with that dastardly assignment.

I had gone to Puerto Rico, I should explain at this point, to continue a study of DGI activities underwritten by the Fund for Objective News Reporting, which provides grants for investigative research and the reporting of major news events. No strings were attached. Some news reports have been syndicated by the Scripps

Howard organization known as the Independent News Alliance of New York, and I am asking that two of those articles be inserted in the record, if you please, Mr. Chairman. One is from the Chicago Tribune of August 28, 1981, and the other is the copy as sent to newspaper editors by INA dated December 11, 1981.

Senator DENTON. Without objection, that is ordered.

Mr. JAMES. FOUR invited me to do a study of the DGI because of my special background, as an author and journalist who has been covering events in Latin America since 1953. My interest in Cuban intelligence, in particular, dates from 1961, in the course of researching and writing a book, ``Cuba: The First Soviet Satellite in the Americas." I then learned that the Castro regime had made contact with Soviet intelligence as early as July 1959, when it sent the head of the rebel army's intelligence section, G-2, on a secret mission to Mexico to meet with the Soviet ambassador and KGB officers there. That emissary was Ramiro Valdés Menéndez, who today controls all Cuban security and intelligence activities as Minister of Interior. Valdés' contacts with the Soviets, when the Cuban Revolution was scarcely 6 months old, effectively disposes of the myth that we "pushed" Castro into Moscow's arms by such unfriendly acts as the trade embargo, which, of course, had not yet been initiated.

My study of the DGI began with its activities in the continental United States, and what I learned essentially is that Cuban President Fidel Castro has been following a two-track policy with regard to this country, One track, which a DGI defector named Genaro Perez described to me as "Plan Alfa," "or A", calls for the normalization of United States-Cuban relations while the other, "Plan Bravo", or "B", is aimed at destabilizing the United States should normalization fail to come about.

Plan A was followed by Cuba during most of the Carter administration, when the normalization process reached its highest point to date with the establishment of "Interest Sections" in each of the two nations' capitals. They were manned, respectively, by U.S. diplomats in Havana and Cuban diplomats here in Washington. The Cuban Interests Section in Washington, however, turned out to be largely a cover for intelligence operations with the "vast majority" of its 20-member staff, and I am quoting a State Department source, consisting of intelligence agents. The section's very chief, Ramon Sánchez Parodi, doubles as head of the DGI in this area and reports to the DGI's overall chief in the United States, Mario Monzón.

A central objective of plan Alfa was also to split the Cuban" American community in the United States and that, unfortunately, has been largely achieved.

Much of the DGI penetration has been done by front groups organized by Cuban intelligence or persons cooperating with them. Among them are the Center for Cuban Studies, the Cuban-American Committee for the Normalization of Relations with Cuba, and the Antonio Maceo Brigade.

Cuban intelligence, aided and abetted by persons who may not be agents but are at least willing dupes, also penetrated respectable American organizations such as the Latin American Studies Association. I attended its 10th national meeting in Washington, DC, only last week, and I was struck by the overwhelming degree to which this once respected professional group has been infiltrated by pro-Castro elements. Even Cuban officials are regularly given a platform by the LASA.

Our business community, as well, is penetrated by DGI agents and supporters who seek to influence it to violate the trade ember. go against Cuba. To encourage normalization, President Carter, in February 1977, announced that he would lift the embargo if Castro would withdraw his troops from Angola. That galvanized the DGI, through the Cuban Interests Section here, to woo U.S. businessmen with special ardor, and they began visiting Cuba in droves. In fact, the Cuban Interests Section was so aggressive in pursuit of U.S. businessmen to encourage them to violate the embargo that the Carter administration, desirous as it was to encourage normalization, became upset. It threatened the DGI officer in charge of that operation, one Sergio Martinez, with deportation but Martinez voluntarily departed these shores before action was taken.

One DGI agent in the Interests Section who did get caught was Ricardo Escartín, who held the rank of First Secretary. Formally charged with being an intelligence officer engaged in violation of the embargo, he was expelled by the U.S. Government in February 1981. Nonetheless, the DGI remained undeterred. Last summer it incorporated in Panama a business front called Comercial Muralla which, operating outside of normal trade channels, manages to smuggle into Cuba U.S.-made auto parts, radios, TV sets, and heavy equipment. Recently a Miami grand jury indicted several business fronts engaged in illicit travel and other illegal transactions with Cuba.

Senator DENTON. If I may interject, Mr. James, this subcommittee's hearings are frequently visited by a man whom I neglected to welcome on this occasion, Jose Delgado, from the so-called Cuban Interests Section, the second secretary

Mr. JAMES. I noted with interest his presence at this hearing.

Senator DENTON. He was here but appears to be no longer with us.

Mr. JAMES. Unfortunately for him. He will miss something.

The DGI normalization drive was almost crowned with success in 1977, with the formation of a group of prominent Cuban-Americans calling themselves the Committee of 75. Its real organizer and manipulator was a DGI colonel named Jesus Arboleya Cervera, who was at the time listed as Second Secretary with the Cuban Mission to the United Nations.

One leader of the Committee of 75, Rev. Manuel Espinosa, went to Jamaica to deal with the DGI station chief there. This was when Prime Minister Michael Manley, a friend of Castro, was in power. He was personally recruited into the DGI by the Cuban consul, Juan Carbonell, who was really DGI's station chief.

Subsequently, a Cuban-American banker named Bernardo Benes led a Committee of 75 delegation to Havana, to negotiate with Castro himself for the release of 3,000 political prisoners. That was eventually achieved, bringing normalization even closer. But there was one big obstacle. Castro, notwithstanding some sort of assurance to the Carter Administration that he would withdraw his troops from Angola, reneged. The administration retreated from the normalization process. Thus the DGI failed to achieve its main objective through the Committee of 75 and other fronts.

It did, however, attain the objective I indicated before, and perhaps this is more important in the long run, of splitting the Cuban American community here in the United States in its opposition to Castro. Younger members of the community, who had never suffered personally the rigors of life under the Castro dictatorship, rejected their parents' assessment of the dictatorship as tyrannical and some even became pro-Castro.

The second track of Cuban policy, plan B, went into operation following the failure of plan A. Castro launched went into operation a massive effort to destabilize this country and at the same time relieve himself of an unwelcome segment of the Cuban population, when he shipped to these shores 130,000 Cubans from the Port of Mariel in April of 1980. The impact on Miami and South Florida of that boatlift is too well known to dwell upon. I understand you have had witnesses testifying to that effect.

I should like to touch now on another little-known aspect of the DGI effort to destabilize this country, and that is the use of Puerto Rican terrorists to create trouble both on the island and here on the mainland. By trouble, I mean practically nothing is excluded, including threats to the lives of the President of the United States and other high U.S. officials. Such a threat was actually uttered in public last July by the reputed "godfather" of Puerto Rican terrorism, 72-year-old Juan Antonio CorretJer. Corretjer denounced Mr. Reagan as having "tortured" and "bribed" a member of the FALN, Alfredo "Freddy" Méndez, to squeal on 10 other FALN members who were being tried for seditious conspiracy in Chicago and were ultimately convicted to long prison terms. Instead of condemning Méndez, who squealed, Corretjer, said he pitied him. In public he stated, and here I quote from Corretjer:

Who deserves contempt? Who deserves punishment? Poor Alfredo Méndez? No. The President of the United States, the CIA chiefs, the FBI chiefs, the warden of Pontiac [Illinois] prison, the public prosecutors Margolis and Sullivan in the Federal office of the Chicago District Attorney, and the detectives and police of Chicago.

Corretjer denounced the President as "humanity's worst enemy."

Intelligence officers in Puerto Rico consider Corretjer's utterance as a call to assassinate the President and the others he mentioned. They note that Puerto Rican terrorists have been known to take revenge before for real or fancied acts against them.

The same Corretjer applauded, for example, the killing of 2 Navy officers and the wounding of 10 other Navy personnel at Sabana Seca Communications Center by terrorist groups as avenging the alleged murder of, member of his socialist league, Angel Rodriguez Cristobal, in a Tallahassee jail.

The FALN, some intelligence officers hold, was "connected" with the attempted robbery last October of a Brink's armored truck near Nyack, N.Y., by the Weather Underground and black terrorists. Two policemen and a guard were killed. FBI agents working on the case suspect that "foreign organizations" may have been linked to that attempt which some take to mean the DGI.

The fact is that the FALN was organized by a Puerto Rican agent of Cuban intelligence named Filiberto Inocencio Ojeda Ríos who is wanted on the island for jumping $2,000 bail. In 1967, Ojeda founded the first of Puerto Rico's new terrorist groups, the Independent Armed Revolutionary Movement, or MIRA, whose members received training and arms in Cuba. After a series of bombings, the police finally broke up MIRA and Ojeda was arrested. dumping bail, he headed for New York and was assigned to the DGI station there operating under cover of the Cuban Mission to the United Nations and organized the FALN with remnants of the old MIRA group.

The Cuban Mission to the United Nations, Mr. Chairman, is honeycombed with DGI and other Cuban intelligence personnel. An estimated 75 percent of its normal 50-person staff, which is itself unusually large for a country the size of Cuba, is estimated to belong to the DGI and other Cuban intelligence agencies such as the Americas Department, the Cuban Institute for Friendship with People (or ICAP), and so on.

At least two Cubans listed as "political counselors" to the mission are, in fact, DGI officers. One is Mario Monzón, who heads the DGI in the United States, and the other is Alfredo Garcia Almeida, who runs the Americas Department in this country. Almeida works for the man Castro has entrusted with organizing and/or aiding and abetting revolution in the Americas, primarily in Central America just now, who is Manuel Piñero Losada, long known as Redbeard. He heads the America Department in Havana and once ran the DGI.

As you know, the State Department has issued a research document lately, I think it was back in December, which detailed the activities of Mr. Piñero and his aides throughout Central America But Monzón, the man in New York, is not the sole boss of Cuban intelligence in the United States. Besides reporting, of course, to his own Cuban superiors in Havana, he must also answer to the KGB station chief in New York who is in charge of Soviet intelligence operations in this country. Thus, the two intelligence services, Cuban and Soviet, work hand in glove with each other but with the Cuban subordinate to the Soviet service, even as Cuba itself is a satellite of the Soviet Union. There is, however, a division of labor between them which is significant.

The DGI concentrates on wooing Third World members of the United Nations, who constitute the overwhelming majority of that body and can be decisive there. One of its special U.N. missions is to line up votes for the independence of Puerto Rico in the U.N.'s Committee of 24 or so-called Decolonization Committee. It has succeeded for the first time in getting the Puerto Rican issue placed on the General Assembly's agenda this fall.

DGI agents, of course, possess the distinct advantage over other Soviet satellite intelligence services, as well as the KGB itself, of being indistinguishable from millions of U.S. citizens and residents of Latin descent. Thus they can pose, with relative ease, as Nicaraguans and can mingle more freely with our population than Soviet or Polish or East German agents.

Because of their Latin ethnicity, these Cuban DGI personnel are being used, according to Genaro Pérez to incite Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and blacks, as he told me in an interview.

Needless to say, it would be very much in the interests of the Soviet Union to have Cuban agents incite Americans of black or Latin origin to riot, to stage demonstrations, to commit acts of sabotage and terror in our key cities.

Aware of these and other uses of the DGI, the KGB began to restructure the Cuban intelligence service quite early in the game. It is structured along the lines of the KGB and I describe that in the statement that has been submitted to you.

The DGI and other Cuban intelligence and security organs enjoy a very high priority in Cuba, Mr. Chairman--one much higher than, say, our intelligence services enjoy here. Those organs appear to be supervised closely by the very top leadership of the Cuban Government, meaning President Fidel Castro and his brother Raúl who is heir apparent as First Vice President of Cuba and is also Minister of the Armed Forces, and meaning also Ramiro Valdés, who besides being Minister of Interior is a Vice President of Cuba. These three men, Mr. Chairman, are officially ranked among the top five in Cuba, and head the list of the 16 members of the Cuban Communist Party's Politburo as well as the National Assembly, Council of State, and Council of Ministers of the Cuban Government.

Through Raul Castro, whose decisive role has been grossly underestimated, there has always been a close link between the Cuban Armed Forces and the Ministry of Interior, which controls the country's intelligence services. In a very real sense, Cuba's formidable intelligence/security apparatus is basically his creation although his older brother, Fidel, always has the last word, of course. To facilitate his control over that apparatus, Raul was instrumental in organizing in 1961 the Ministry of Interior, under which all intelligence/security units were put. He then had named as head of the new Ministry his old friend, Ramiro Valdés, who continues to occupy that post today after a hiatus during which he held other important government jobs.

Cuba has set up what is in effect a high command of the Latin American revolution, in the form of an organization called the Coordinating Revolutionary Junta, in Havana. The JCR consists of the DGI and the Americas Department, making it a joint enterprise of Government--the DGI coming under the Ministry of Interior--and Party--the Americas Department being an arm of the Cuban Communist Party. The JCR is in charge of providing arms, training, guidance, and intelligence to revolutionary organizations throughout Latin America.

I have a chart here, Mr. Chairman, which provides as complete a breakdown as can be obtained of the far-flung machinery Cuba has organized to generate and support revolution throughout the West ern Hemisphere, not excluding the United States, and which de scribes the role of the JCR and the Cuban Communist role. I would beg your permission to insert this in the record.

Senator DENTON. It shall be so inserted.

[The following chart was received for the record:]

Mr. James. Perhaps most alarming of all for the United States is that Cuban intelligence has also succeeded in uniting some eight of nine terrorist groups in Puerto Rico, following the same pattern it has been pursuing in Nicaragua, Guatemala, E1 Salvador, and other Latin American countries. Specifically, the Puerto Rican DGI agent I mentioned earlier, Filiberto Inocencia Ojeda Rios, was the one who united the Puerto Rican Terrorist groups under a Joint operations command--Mando de Operaciones Conjuntas (MOC)--according to my informants. "He was the genius behind , as one of them put it. He was at that time in charge of Caribbean activities for the Coordinating Revolutionary Junta.

Ojeda's career illustrates the overlapping between DGI and Americas Department activities, as well as the inner workings of Puerto Rican terrorism and the grave threat, grossly underestimated by some elements of our own intelligence community, that it represents to the United States.

He organized the FALN, from his vantage point as a member of t e Cuban UN Mission, in early 1974. He trained the FALN's first cadres m handling explosives and urban guerrilla tactics, but never commanded the organization. By the spring of 1974 the FALN going operational, "reopens the second front of the struggle by bringing the armed struggle for Puerto Rican national liberation to within the borders of the United States, at a higher level," according to the terrorists own Chronology of Armed Struggle in Puerto Rico and the U.S., 1967-1980." The "reopening" of the "second front' took the form of firebombing three New York City department stores on as many consecutive days. Then, in September and October of that year, the FALN bombed the Newark, N.J., City fall and Police Headquarters, and five more prominent places in Ojeda met with several extremist leaders, including Juan Antonio Corretjer, the "godfather" of Puerto Rican terrorism, as I called him before--the same one that publicly threatened President Reagan--and returned to Cuba to report that armed struggle on the island was a feasible objective. He then went back to Puerto Rico for further meetings with Corretjer and other extremists, as a result of which the Revolutionary Commandos of the People--or CRP--was formed in 1976 to conduct urban guerrilla warfare. I am aware that in your previous remarks you quoted Carlos Marighella, the Brazilian expert in urban guerrilla warfare, and you said something to the effect that this so far has not been introduced into the United States, which is true of the mainland; unfortunately, I think this has already begun to happen on the island of Puerto Rico.

Senator DENTON. For your information, another Carlos, "Carlos the Jackal," is reported to have been arrested yesterday in Mexico.

Mr. JAMES. Well, this morning's television news said that is not so.

Senator DENTON. I have a dateline writer's dispatch. I have no idea what credence to put on it. It is the other Carlos, "Carlos the Jackal," for your information, which over half of the members of a committee in this Congress which should know Carlos, when being briefed on the fact that he might indeed be in the United States in connection with the Libyan hit teams, not one member of that committee had ever heard of Carlos. One of these gentlemen is prob ably going to be running for President.

Mr. JAMES. Are they waiting for him to write a book?

Senator DENTON. It is amazing it is not a byword on the lips of every schoolboy in the United States, yet I can understand why it is not.

Mr. JAMES. That is extraordinary.

By the way, Ojeda, the organizer of the FALN, also went to Paris where this joint coordinating command had headquarters, and there he did meet "Carlos the Jackal" as well as leaders of the PLO. So there you have some connection between Puerto Rico and Cuban terrorism and our friend Carlos and the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Mr. Chairman, 1976 was a banner year for the proliferation of terrorist groups in Puerto Rico, chiefly as the result of the defection of 3,000 members of the Popular Socialist Party, led by an admitted Marxist-Leninist, Juan Mari Bras, who I interviewed in Puerto Rico last November. They defected following their disillusionment in the PSP's abysmal showing in the gubernatorial election. An estimated 600 of that batch had had varying degrees of guerrilla training in Cuba and now turned to urban guerrilla war fare. Soon thereafter, the principal terrorist groups operating today surfaced in connection with violent acts of one kind or another.

The first to be organized was the Armed Forces of Popular Resistance, or FARP, which promptly engaged in such activities as robbing banks and shooting up places frequented by U.S. Navy personnel, such as La Hacienda near Roosevelt Roads.

FARP's organization was soon followed by that of one of the most notorious of all Puerto Rican terrorist groups, Los Macheteros, formally called the Boricua Popular Army (EPB), after Puerto Rico's original Indian name, Borinquen. At least 11 of the original Macheteros had received training earlier from Chile's far leftist MIR during the rule of Salvador Allende, and later at a Cuban camp located between Havana and Pinar del Rio for 4 months. In August 1978, soon after their return from Cuba, they launched their first operation, in which they killed a policeman. Acknowledging that act, they revealed for the first time their identity as Los Macheteros.

Among Los Macheteros' most notorious exploits was the Sabana Seca ambush of a Navy bus in December 1979, which they carried out together with the FARP and still another terrorist group, the Organization of Volunteers for the Puerto Rican Revolution (OVRP). A Soviet-designed AK-47 automatic rifle was found by Federal officials among the weapons used to fire on the bus. It was the first time in his experience, an FBI spokesman said, that the AK-47--which is usually made in Czechoslovakia--had been used in Puerto Rico.

In January 1981, the same three groups teamed up to firebomb nine Air National Guard jets, worth $45 million, at Isla Verdes Air Base near San Juan. I have seen a videotape of the Macheteros' preparations for the firebombing, produced by them for publicity purposes, which they claim was carried out in only 7 minutes, 40 seconds--ample testimony to the terrorists' high level of precision and efficiency.

In all, from 1975 through 1981, Puerto Rican terrorist groups have perpetrated 260 acts of violence on the island and up to 100 on the mainland, most of the latter by the FALN. Something like 9 Puerto Rican terrorist groups have proliferated over the past 15 years--an average, Mr. Chairman, of about 1 per every 400,000 inhabitants of Puerto Rico--and that incredible total may not be complete. Only five of them are considered truly important: CRP, FARP, OVRP, Macheteros, and FALN. These are the groups which OJeda appears to have unified under a single joint operations command (MOC), which in turn comes under the Coordinating Revolutionary Junta run by the DGI and Department of Americas out of Havana.

I have here another chart showing the layout of these different Puerto Rican terrorist groups which come under this command that they have set up, if you would be so inclined as to insert this in the record.

Senator DENTON. We shall insert it into the record.

[The following chart was received for the record:]

Mr. JAMES. Allied ideologically with the terrorist groups, and forming, in effect, a substantial support force, are an estimated 10 "open" political organizations--organizations, that is, which unlike the clandestine terrorist units, participate overtly and legally in the political life of Puerto Rico, some of them even putting up candidates in elections. The principal ones are the Puerto Rican Communist Party (PCP; pro-Moscow); the Puerto Rican Socialist Party (Marl Bras' PSP; oriented toward Havana); Partido Nacional de Puerto Rico (PNPR, formed by the old nationalist Albizu Campos); Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSR, orthodox Leninist); Puerto Rican Socialist League (Corretjer's LSP); Internationalist Workers League (LIT; Trotskyist); Moviemiento Socialista Popular (MSP; followers of Che Guevara). These organizations are reckoned by intelligence officers to have a total membership of between 12,000 and 17,000--a formidable support army for the terrorists in a total population of only 3.5 million.

The motive force of all the groups I have mentioned here, both clandestine and "open," is independence--all of them want, demand, independence from the United States, even though all to "ether they represent less than 6 percent of the Puerto Rican electorate, according to the 1980 gubernatorial election returns. The latter, however, do not tell the whole story. Independence possesses a certain mystique for many Puerto Ricans who might have voted against it as a political solution; to them, it is a cultural banner to emphasize and protect their Hispanic origins and to enable them to resist what they regard as an Anglo-Saxon cultural invasion. The vast majority of Puerto Ricans, including even the far left, accept, of course, such American exports as medical science, technology, industrial know-how and even fast food outlets; but they do not do so entirely without reservations, fundamentally fearing what the "invasion might do to their language, their literature, their folk ways. The Puerto Rican people suffer, at bottom, from an almost permanent crisis of identity, at one and the same time wanting profoundly to be Americans yet feeling a strong pull toward their Latin heritage--and their Latin neighbors. Consequently independence, though perennially a big loser at the polls, is potentially an explosive issue, one which the terrorists and their accomplices in the "open" organizations constantly exploit as do the sinister forces behind them, in Cuba.

In fact, Mr. Chairman, it is a misnomer to speak of terrorist groups in the strictest sense, for although they exist to commit acts of terror and violence, it is also true that they do so within an ideological framework that transcends pure terror: "national liberation." Considered from that point of view, Puerto Rico's so-called terrorist groups are really--and this is how they regard themselves--as the armed forces which they believe will "liberate" the island from "Yankee imperialism," and so they act as though they were in a state of war with the mainland and that any means are justified to win that war, as is the case in all war. Bombings and assassinations are, then, simply acts of war and not of terror, and they are resorted to at this stage of the struggle because conditions are not yet ripe for conventional acts of war or even irregular warfare like that in El Salvador. But, as they see it, they are approaching that stage, and so they consider themselves to be in a state of urban guerrilla warfare, as Corretjer explained it to me.

They spend their every waking hour studying and absorbing the teachings of all the experts in insurrection and urban guerrilla warfare, ranging from Friedrich Engels to V. I. Lenin to Che Guevara to Carlos Marighella, the late Brazilian author of the famous "Mini Manual on Urban Guerrilla Warfare." A manual called The Urban Guerrilla, produced by Corretjer's LSP in 1980 and based largely on the Marighella work, goes into considerable detail on strategy and tactics. So then, Mr. Chairman, what we are talking about in Puerto Rico when we discuss the so-called terrorist groups and their DGI mentors is not something out of "Carlos the Jackal," but, much more significant, the training of a guerrilla army which intends to do battle on a large scale with the United States both on the Island of Puerto Rico--in itself a strategic objective with its vital location and naval installations--and on the U.S. mainland. We are speaking, in other words, of a two-front war, with Fidel Castro aspiring to be the generalissimo directing it from Havana.

Such a prospect obviously could be far more menacing to the United States than even the current hostilities going on in Central America. It is time, I believe, that not only the American intelligence community but the administration at its highest levels begin to understand, prepare for, and meet the threat posed by the Cuban General Directorate of Intelligence and particularly its Puerto Rican spearhead.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DENTON. Thank you.

Your testimony and your background, what I know of it, remind me of Claire Sterling.

Would you describe your political orientation as you came along in life, as liberal or conservative?

Mr. JAMES. I am neither, Mr. Chairman. I happen to be an independent. I am an eclectic as well, as you can gather from my writings and from what I said here today. I am, of course, utterly against communism. I regard it, in the words of that recent convert to our cause, Susan Sontag, as equivalent to fascism, and I do think we regard it as revolutionary. It is not. It is reactionary.

Senator DENTON. That is the confusion that I would give my life to eliminate in this country, and we do not have much time.

Much of what you have brought forth is in greater detail than we have ever received before. We have had similar testimony from Gerardo Peraza, Claire Sterling, Judge Webster of the FBI, and Robert Moss, another journalist.

I cannot help reflecting that having lived in one of those societies which is ruled by terrorism, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam-- North Vietnam in those days--as the Soviet Union is ruled by the KGB, I was more sympathetic toward the plight of the citizens, even the soldiers, particularly the female soldiers whom I observed, than I was toward my own prisoner colleagues. I am not wearing my POW experience on my sleeve. I am simply saying I lived among them for almost 8 years, and every colleague of mine shared the same sympathy.

I wish to see fewer human beings falling under that type of tyranny and I hope the United States avoids that fate. But I am not particularly optimistic.

You have mentioned Alamar Associates, a Washington consulting firm, specializing in investing in Cuba. This is Kirby Jones. Are you aware of that?

Mr. JAMES. Correct, sir, yes, I am.

Senator DENTON. Could you give us a fuller description of the activity of Alamar Associates conducted on behalf of Cuba, and do you see those activities as falling rather specifically under Plan Alfa as you have outlined?

Mr. JAMES. Well, I am not sure of the extent to which Alamar Associates is active today. But during the Plan Alfa period, when the mobilization drive was on, it was quite active and it helped to organize visits of businessmen to Cuba for purpose of investing in the country and, in effect, really circumventing the trade embargo which was still on at that particular time. I am not saying that Alamar Associates was deliberately out to violate the embargo, but the effect, in preparing for investment and other economic involvement in Cuba, was a violation of the trade embargo. Furthermore, I do happen to know that sessions conducted by Alamar Associates for the purposes of orienting U.S. businessmen as to their opportunities in Cuba--he invited the head of the Cuban Interests Section here, Ramón Sánchez Parodi, to deliver orientation. I have identified Mr. Sánchez Parodi.

Senator DENTON. Do you know of any connections of Kirby Jones with any officials of our Government in the past?

Mr. JAMES. No, sir, I do not know of any specific connection. But I imagine he must have been working with somebody in the administration.

Senator DENTON. In your prepared testimony and elsewhere, references have been made to Mexico in discussing Cuban activities. For example, Mexico was the site of the first meeting between the Cubans and Soviet intelligence services in 1959; Castro and his men set sail for Mexico in November 1956, in the "Granma", to begin the Cuban Revolution; Mexico's diplomatic ties and friendly relations with Castro and Cuba, recently and in the past; and last night, the reported arrest of "Carlos the Jackal" there, as well as our allegations that Mexico is the site of training and safe houses for various Cuban-supported groups. The previous witness has associated that kind of history with the fact that Mexico is a relatively free society and these types of things can take place in a free society.

Would you give us your assessment of the role Mexico has played in the past and plays now vis-a-vis Cuba's plans and activities in Latin America and elsewhere? In other words, what part does Mexico play in the Cuban scenario?

Mr. JAMES. Mr. Chairman, I resided in Mexico for 22 years and I covered Latin America from there, and I have two children that were born in Mexico. I think it is stretching it a bit to call Mexico an open society. I think it is moving in a certain direction but, after all, it is a kind of one-party state. The party in power has been there since the early twenties, officially and formally since -1929, and is called the Institutional Revolutionary Party. It is not, however, a monolithic party but, rather, a coalition of factions of one sort or another. But the PRI, nevertheless, has governed Mexico consistently since 1929 without interruption, and all of the Governors of all of the states of Mexico are members of the party, as are usually all the senators and practically all of the members of the lower house of the legislature.

I submit that this is hardly the visage of an open society. The press also is very much under the control, directly and indirectly, of the government.

At the same time, I would not classify Mexico, as a totalitarian dictatorship. It is something sui generic. It is a unique creation of its own. I do not think we ought to knock it, but I do not think we ought to admire it, and we ought to be very realistic about it.

From the point of realism, and as a result of living there, I do know that the Soviet Embassy in Mexico is one of Moscow's largest embassies in the world, and this Embassy has a large contingent of KGB personnel. This is all very well known. I am not saying anything people in Mexico do not know. They engage in overt as well as covert activities. At various times, members of the KGB have been thrown out of Mexico for stepping over the bounds.

I also know that Fidel Castro himself started his revolution from the base he organized in Mexico. Obviously, the Mexican Government must have known about it. Certainly leaders of the dominant Mexican party knew about it, and Lázaro Cárdenas, former President of the country, actively aided and abetted Castro, who trained his guerrillas at a camp just outside Mexico City. I have documented this in a book that I wrote, "Cuba: The First Soviet Satellite of the Americas."

Before and since that time, all kinds of revolutionary groups have found haven in Mexico. During the regime of President Luis Echeverria, after Allende was overthrown in Chile, all kind of Chilean Marxists came to Mexico and were even given jobs in the government. This was the subject of open complaints on the part of

Mexicans. They resented the fact that these foreigners would come in--most of them Marxists-Leninists or other kinds of radicals-- and spend their time not working for the Mexican Government but trying to organize for their return to Chile, hoping to overthrow the regime of General Pinochet.

The Nicaraguans have always had bases in Mexico, bases in the sense that they could meet and organize and funnel arms and money back and forth from Mexico City to Nicaragua. This is also well known. We know now, for example, that the Salvadoran democratic Revolutionary Junta (FDR)--a complete misnomer since it is neither democratic nor revolutionary--has its headquarters in Mexico City. So does the FMLN, the Marxist-Leninist guerrilla armed force, of which the FDR is the political arm. Those guerrilla leaders go in and out of Mexico frequently in order to confer with Guillermo Ungo, the figurehead FDR president, and, I suspect, confer with others who are not Salvadorans and are probably Mexicans. Through the dominant party, the PRI, Mexico has been funneling all kinds of support to the Sandinistas, and I think--this is only my informed guess--also and to the Salvadoran guerrillas. This is part of the PRI's function as a member of the Socialist International.

So you have had and continue to have, Mr. Chairman, a great deal of activity in Mexico City on behalf of foreign Marxist-Leninist movements. I daresay it is probably the major headquarters outside of Managua for the guerrilla insurrectionary and terrorist activities going on in Central America.

Senator DENTON. I was impressed with the complexity of Somoza. He was perceived by many who could be called relatively neutral observers to be an obnoxious ruler. The support that was given to the Sandinistas included some rather remarkable countries. There were some pretty realistic reasons to want his overthrow. But the tragedy was that in his overthrow, there resulted therefrom the destruction of the institution from which democracy could have been promoted, developed and nurtured. We forfeited the opportunity again entirely to the Moscow-Havana-now Managua line. That is a travesty.

Is that an oversimplification? Would you comment on it?

Mr. JAMES. It is a very complex thing. You have in me a person that is not sympathetic to Somoza. Quite the contrary. Over the years, I have written many articles criticizing him and his family. I knew him, his father, and an older brother, and I think they were greedy, too greedy, too cruel, too repressive, not moderately repressive. Of course, extreme feeds extreme and, sometimes a moderate ly repressive regime can open a window toward democracy, but sometimes it can lead to something worse, more repressive, like a totalitarian Communist government. This, I think, is the unfortunate state that Nicaragua may yet experience. This is the tragedy. I blame Somoza for the Sandinistas. If Somoza had, during all the years when there was no Castro around and the Communists were not a serious force, tried to make something democratic in Nicaragua, tried to make its economy viable, did not steal the people blind but tried instead to raise their standard of living, not a single Sandinista would be in power today, sir. I think the way we have to analyze the situation is that of course, if I had been given the choice at that time, of whether to live under Somoza or communism, I would have had to prefer Somoza; but I would not wish to be put into the position of having to choose between the lesser and the greater evil since, after all, they are both evils.

I am afraid somewhat the same situation is rapidly developing in Guatemala. The Guatemalan military are so blind, so stupid, so ignorant, so greedy, that they are going to pave the way for communism. You know, communism was destroyed there back in 1954. I covered that period as a newsman, and it saddens me to see how they, the Guatemalan military, have wasted the past 28 years. They had ample opportunity to make a delightful country out of Guatemala which has rich natural resources. They have messed it up, and now we are left with the unenviable task of trying to pick their chestnuts out of the fire. That is what it amounts to.

Senator DENTON. How do you regard the efficacy of a policy which purports that security is means to the end? In other words, is it not true that prospects for democratic governments and peace in Central and South America will have a better chance for favorable results if we were to interrupt the flow of terrorist direction, arms, supplies, and so forth, from Cuba and/or the Soviet Union?

Mr. JAMES. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think we must utilize every means at our disposal, without involving ourselves in a war, to halt the flow of arms and money and terrorists into the countries to the south of us. I think we run a risk, yes, of being forced into situations which we would not welcome. They must be avoided. However, I do think that we ought to use whatever influence we have, for example, in the case of Guatemala, to try to drum some sense into the military people there and get them to broaden their government, to form some sort of coalition, to bring civilians into it, to initiate a series of reforms, not extreme radical reforms but reasonable ones that will bring the Maya Indians into the mainstream. Now they are being alienated. This is one of the most serious situations in Guatemala and may degenerate into a racial war.

Senator DENTON. Moving from Guatemala to El Salvador, do you believe that Duarte has done that which might be expected under the realistic conditions in El Salvador, considering that he is being confronted with the terrorist technique outlined in the beginning? Do you think he has made a reasonable effort?

Mr. JAMES. I believe he has. I have interviewed Duarte here and read a good deal about him. I think he has done as well as can be expected under the circumstances.

Senator DENTON. Well, from what I have learned, and I have truly talked to more left-wingers down there, that is not the impression that is being transported to America. Democracy cannot function, perhaps survive, without an informed electorate, without an informed consensus upon which foreign policy can be based. And that is my concern at this moment.

You, in your prepared statement, appear to have relied to some extent on information from Genaro Pérez, a DGI defector. Please give us a description of him and his background.

Mr. JAMES. Mr. Pérez worked for a Castro travel agency called Havanatur, and he was one of the top executives in Havanatur. This operated a couple of years ago during the time of the release of the political prisoners and then the normalization campaign.

And he had a lot to do with getting Cubans in and out of Cuba and was exercising surveillance over Cubans when they were there. He himself was very often subjected to surveillance by the DGI, even though he worked with them. He told me that his room, and I think he always got room 14 in the Havana Libre Hotel where they have all the machinery set up so they could listen to everything he said, eavesdrop on him. Pérez also told me that, as a general rule they would put certain Cuban visitors in rooms which were bugged keeping them under constant surveillance. Now that operation is not direct responsibility of the DGI, because the DGI operates only externally, but rather of the ICAP, the Institute for Friendship with Peoples and, probably to some extent, the Americas Department. They come under another part of the Interior Ministry, the Department of State Security, an internal organism. And so they would bug these rooms and use the information they gleaned to threaten or pressure Cuban visitors and make them work for the DGI, once they got back to the United States. So that many Cuban residents of this country--we do not know exactly how many, and I do not think Perez knew exactly either--who visited Cuba and re turned here became, either willingly or unwillingly, dupes or informers and even agents of the DGI.

Senator DENTON. You have testified of the recent 10th national meeting of the Latin American Studies Association held in Washington, D.C., on March 4, 1982, where members of the Castro regime and of the Soviet Union were panelists.

Can you tell the subcommittee in a little more detail of your experiences there?

Incidently, I know one of the gentlemen who attended, Dr. Arias, who is the president of the Christian Democratic Party in Panama and serves as president of a growing number of Christian Democratic Parties in Latin America. He gave me a very interesting perspective on the region.

Could you tell the subcommittee a little more of your experiences there at that meeting?

Mr. JAMES. Well, I spent the day there just exactly 2 weeks ago I think it was, and, of course, after all these years of being in Latin America and writing about communism and interviewing lots of Communists from one end of the area to the another, you develop a sense of smell and you know that what walks like a duck and talks like a duck and quacks like a duck must be a duck. As you went through the lobby of the Shoreham Hotel here in Washington, you saw there were an awful lot of ducks there. Then, when you went into the area, a large one, where there was a great display of literature, you came across all kinds of literature, pamphlets, books, professional papers, you name it, all serving one pet cause or another of the Marxist-Leninists in one Latin American country or another.

I picked up a stack of these things, which I still have in my pos session, a stack about this high [indicating], and they did not come cheap. But I think it was well worthwhile as it enabled me to gain a further insight into what these people are up to. There were American front groups such as the North American Committee for Latin America, and others such as the Washington Office for Latin America which lend themselves, perhaps unwittingly, to extreme left fist causes, each of them with their literature on stands they had rented, and they predominated. So it was quite clear, judging from the program and the general tendencies and by the literature and by checking with people, that you have a very large infiltration. I do not say that LASA is controlled but it is heavily infiltrated by pro-Castro people, and probably a good number of intelligence agents.

Senator DENTON. But you would not necessarily assign evil motive by appearance at such a meeting by someone apparently objectively interested in developments in Latin America such as Dr. Arias?

Mr. JAMES. No, not necessarily at all. One thing I deplore, Mr. Chairman, and I think this ought to come up for consideration before the appropriate Government body at some point or another, is the extent to which the few Latin American departments we have in educational institutions, especially institutions of higher learning, are just riddled with people of these tendencies, and this does not bode well for the future. And they are behind a lot of the protest movements. They are behind the formation of public opinion in this country against policies of the Government which may be good policies, which I believe is the case at present.

Senator DENTON. That reminds me of the thousand, at least, scholarships the Soviet Union is giving to Panama. I found out that the Soviet Union, as is characteristic of their strategy, chooses to concentrate in areas where there are opportunities.

On a related matter, it has been alleged that one of the successful fronts used by the Cubans in its plans to destabilize the United States and other target countries has been the academic community, especially the university setting. Using the University of Puerto Rico as an example, will you describe how this works, the purposes it serves and how effective the infiltration of the academic community has been?

Mr. JAMES. The Federation of Pro-Indendence University Students [FUPI] who favor independence, as its name makes clear, has played an active role as a spawning ground for terrorists and, in general, for the far left in Puerto Rico. It has been a powerhouse and still is. When I was there last November it was conducting a strike at the University of Puerto Rico over tuition fees, and, had nothing to do with wanting to run the university at that moment, anyway--or with putting forward any political demands of any kind. Nevertheless, the FUPI succeeded from the beginning of the school term until well after I left, in paralyzing all academic activities on the campus of the University of Puerto Rico and even affecting Puerto Rican life in general. Now a man who is a known Communist, everyone knows him as such, and who was then president of the FUPI was the leader of that strike. The FUPI has conducted similar activities over a long period of time, 25 years, as a matter of fact. It just celebrated its With anniversary. I repeat, this is the spawning ground of extreme leftism, probably the most important, in Puerto Rico. I do not know what can be done about that. After all, there is academic freedom. But there is something wrong with a situation where academic freedom is constantly abused by the far left to serve its particular ideological aims, not the alms of academic freedom.

Senator DENTON. So with 5 or 6 percent, you say, of the population interested in their independence, we have a disproportionate emphasis in the academic world of even terrorism, in that connection.

Is that correct?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir, less than 6 percent voted for independence in the last election.

Senator DENTON. You have spoken of the close ties between Cubans and Puerto Ricans, especially the FALN. Do you have any specific information concerning the training of Puerto Rican terrorists by Cuba, in Cuba or elsewhere, and what is the specific information and the source of that information?

Mr. JAMES. Well, for years now, Mr. Chairman, there has been a lot of traffic between Puerto Rico and Cuba. Little of it known in this country I spoke with Juan Marl Bras, the leader of the Puerto Rican Socialist Party, and he confessed himself to be a Marxist Leninist--the word Socialist in the party's name is just an euphemism. He enjoys the closest relations with Cuba and has sent any number of his youthful members there. I mentioned in my testimony that some 600 of them received training of one sort or another in Cuba. Those 600 have now become dispersed among the various terrorist groups on the island of Puerto Rico.

Much of this information, Mr. Chairman, comes from the intelligence community in Puerto Rico and they have followed it for the last few years.

Senator DENTON. Is Genaro Pérez the only source of your information?

Mr. JAMES. No, sir. I am saying the intelligence community has much information on this.

Senator DENTON. Do you know anything about Puerto Rican terrorists having been trained or supported in any way by the Soviets, Libyans, PLO's, East Germans, or Czechs?

Mr. JAMES. I know of contacts. I mentioned this man Ojeda who was the organizer of the FALN. There was a friend and comrade of his who came out of one of the earlier terrorist groups, called Pagan. He was working at the time for the Western Hemisphere section of the East German Security Police. There have been various other contacts because many of these people do find their way to East Europe and even to Moscow. Again, I would refer you to intelligence sources if you require any further details.

Senator DENTON. I, like you, would not like to be in a position of having to choose between a Somozan Government or a Somozan like government and a Communist government. I see the United States in realistic perspective historically as having had to deal with Latin America more from principle than from vital national interest in terms of its priorities. its involvements, World War I World War II, Vietnam, NATO alliance that sort of thing. I have been through years of trying to sort out priorities in considering, as you say, the rather limited resources we have in the U. S. offers to deal financially, stick and carrot wise, with these nations.

Now with our own principles driving us more toward liberalization year by year, free enterprise, compacts, reacting to friction in terms of the rights of blacks, the rights of women and so forth, and all this being a generally rough but progressive road--I see the United States turning toward the South now with much more interest than principle. In other words, the Secretary had said that we are a Nation of principle, we are a Nation of interest. We now would be turning there more with interest than principle. We have to turn there now as a matter of necessity. I think President Reagan's Caribbean initiative plan is a manifestation of that. As you know, we have had one President after another make some sort of gesture to the area. We should remind ourselves that we freed Cuba after freeing them from Spain. We are not an imperialistic nation. We do have principles that have been applied. My Communist guards, as I say this again, in times of true candor--they had to admit that they never knew of a more compassionate administration in international affairs but now we are thinking more of compassion. You have said that you agree that we must do that which is prudent and necessary to preserve the security of those nations as a means to an end. You have said that you thought we should lean on the military governments there, such as Guatemala, to bring more sense to them. You have heard the Secretary say that sometimes when we lean on them we do not have much effect and then sometimes we lean on them and it brings the opposite effect or brings them to disadvantage.

So it seems to me we do face a complexity in terms of choices, but it seems to me the one thing we must see as an obvious necessity at the moment is to do that which is prudent and I hope that which is economic and diplomatic, to keep those nations secure as the means to the end.

You do not have any particular disagreement with that, do you, sir?

Mr. JAMES. No, sir. I do not. I would simply add this: I agree with Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick who has said that she regards Central America and Latin America in general as the most important part of the world to us. I have held that opinion now for nearly 30 years. I am glad to welcome Ambassador Kirkpatrick aboard I think perhaps the fundamental problem we have faced, and continue to face, is our lack of understanding and therefore of involvement in Latin America, understanding the culture, the nature of the people down there, their institutions, and taking all of them seriously and putting the area on a much higher priority basis than it exists now.

We have too often tended, Mr. Chairman, to be what I call Europocentric and, by extension, that has led us into those adventures in Asia that have been so ill-founded. I think it is time we formulated an American policy, thinking in terms of the Western Hemisphere first and foremost. This does not mean I am advocating neo-isolationism and forgetting about our interests and commitments in the Middle East and Europe; but I think it is time that we did set up a list of what our priorities in the world are and that we put Latin America very high up on that list where it belongs. From that would flow a series of actions on the part of our Government, and that means not just the administration that happens to be in office today but any U.S. administration, because what we need is a bipartisan policy and what we need is a long-term policy and a consistent one that will be operative no matter who is President and what party happens to be in power. I say these are the needs we are faced with now and, yes, you are right, necessity may be the mother of that new policy, necessity meaning our national security is very much at stake.

Senator DENTON. We will submit further questions to you, sir, and ask that the replies be addressed to me in written form within the next 20 days-'

I want to thank you for your most illuminating testimony. I hope we maintain contact. I consider you an extremely valuable source of information on this subject.

[The prepared statement of Mr. James follows:]

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to appear before your subcommittee on the crucial problem of terrorist and intelligence activities conducted in this country by intelligence and security organs of the Cuban Government. Unfortunately, as ' shall indicate in some detail, those activities are increasing and constitute a grave threat to this country.

Less than two weeks ago, on Sunday, February 28, four bombs were exploded at as many different locations on Wall Street. Although minimal damage was done and nobody was killed or injured, luckily, the bombings clearly represented a concerted effort at terrorizing America's financial community. They were committed by a Puerto Rican terrorist organization known by its initials as the FALN, which stand for Armed Forces of National Liberation. The FALN claimed responsibility for the bombings in a note it left for the Associated Press in a New York City telephone booth, which characterized them as "a strike against imperialist forces that are suppressing the Puerto Rican people."

The FALN, Mr. Chairman, is a creature of the Cuban Government's General Intelligence Directorate, or DGI, which organized the terrorist group on American soil in 1974. The DGI, in turn, is a satellite of the Soviet intelligence service known as the KGB. That, Mr. Chairman, is the bottom line of my testimony today.

I learned of the FALN's true origin during a trip I made to Puerto Rico last November. I also learned at the time that non other than President Reagan has been singled out for assassination by the island's proliferating terrorists. The FALN, it was believed by knowledgeable informants Puerto Rico, was the terrorist group most likely to be entrusted with that dastardly assignment. It boasts the dubious distinction of being the principal Puerto Rican terrorist organization operating on what is called "enemy territory" -- the continental United States.

I had gone to Puerto Rico, I should explain at this point, to continue a study of Cuban DGI activities underwritten by the Fund for Objective News Reporting. The Fund -- or FONR, to use its acronym -- was established for the major purpose" of providing "grants to deserving journalists for the investigative research and reporting of major news events," according to its prospectus. FONR "assists in financing the type of investigative reporting now being done solely by the mass circulation media,)' its prospectus continues, naming as examples of the latter the New York Times and the Washington Post. Needless to add, no strings were attached to FONR's generous grant, and I have been completely free to undertake the study and write about it exactly as I please; FONR, that is to say, exercises absolutely no influence over the study and of course the conclusions I have reached are my own. These have been published in newspaper articles syndicated by the Independent News Alliance of New York, a Scripps-Howard organization. I would request that copies of two of them be inserted in the record once it appeared in the Chicago Tribune on August 23, 1981, the other as it was sent out to editors by INA on December 11, 1981, for which unfortunately I do not have a clipping. suppose that FONR invited me to do a study of the DGI because of my special background, as an author and journalist who has been covering events in Latin America since 1953. My interest in Cuban intelligence, in particular, dates from 1961, when in the course of researching and writing a book, CUBA: THE FIRST SOVIET SATELLITE IN THE AMERICAS, I was fortunate to obtain, and be able to publish, data on the DGI's origins based on first-hand information supplied by some of the first defectors from the Cuban Revolution, all of them once Castroites. The Revolution's first intelligence service and precursor of the DGI functioned under the innocent title of the Rebel Army'sInformation Office -- DIER were its initials in Spanish which was in reality its secret service. DIER then became G-2, Rebel Army Intelligence, and was headed by one of Fidel Castro's most trusted aides and a particular protege of his brother Raul, named Ramiro Valdes Menendez. I mention Valdes' name here, Mr. Chairman,

not only because he is one of the tight inner circle that runs Cuba today and heads off of its intelligence and security agencies as Minister of Interior, but primarily because he was the earliest link between Cuban intelligence and its Soviet master. In my book, I was able to document the fact that Ramiro Valdes made the Castro regime's very first contact with the Soviets, back in July 1959, when he flew secretly to Mexico City to meet with the Soviet Ambassador and KGB officers there. This fact needs to be emphasized here, Mr. Chairman, to establish two points: one, that Cuban intelligence commenced its relationship with Soviet intelligence when the Cuban Revolution was little more than six months old; and two, the Castro government was never "pushed" into the arms of the Soviets by allegedly inimical U.S. policies such as the trade embargo -- which of course had not yet been initiated -- but sought ties with the Soviet Union from the very beginning, impelled by its own (then secret) ideological affinity with Marxism-Leninism.

My FONR-supported study of DGI activities started, of course, with what the DGI has been up to in the continental United States. What I learned, essentially is that Cuban President Fidel Castro has been following a two-track policy toward this country, involving the DGI and other Cuban intelligence agencies. One track, which a DGI defector named Genero Perez described to me as Plan Alfa," or "A," calls for the normalization of U.S.Cuban relations, while the other, "Plan Bravo," or "B." is aimed at destabilizing the U.S. if normalization failed to come about.

Plan A was followed by Cuba during most of President Carter's term of office. Symptomatic of the apparent desire of both the Carter Administration and the Castro government to normalize relations was the establish;ne;;t, in each nation's capital, of "Interest Sections" manned, respectively, by U.S. diplomats in Havana and Cuban diplomats in Washington. Not quite legations, they were seen as a kind of halfway house on the road toward restoring full diplomatic relations.

The Cuban Interests Section in Washington, however, turned out to be more of a cover for intelligence operations than a true diplomatic representation, the "vast majority" of its 20-member staff -- in the phrase of a State Department official -consisting of intelligence operatives. The Section's very chief, Ramon Sanchez Parodi, doubles as head of the DGI in the Washington area -- again according to State Department sources -- and reports to the DGI's overall chief in the United States. The latter is Mario Monzon, whose cover is "political counselor" to Cuba's Mission to the United Nations in New York, about whose activities I shall have more to say later.

Sanchez Parodi is typical of a new breed of Cuban intelligence agent who is radically different from the old. U.S. intelligence officers say they could almost always detect a Cuban counterpart because he was usually uncouth, with little formal education, revolver conspicuously bulging through his ill-fitted suit, capable of roughing up an adversary but not good at work requiring some subtlety and discretion. Now all that has changed. Sanchez Parodi, for example, is slim, sleek, well-dressed, well-educated, quiet mannered, almost scholarly in speech, sociable -- the very antithesis of the old DGI officer. Yet he has been a dedicated Communist since his youth and knows how to, and when, to get tough. His varied talents have gotten him invitations to capital cocktail parties, and even one to President Reagan's Inaugural. During the heyday of Plan Alla, he lobbied Republican and Democratic legislators with equal fervor, trying to sell both parties the normalization line. He "works a lot on blacks, particularly the Black Caucus in Congress," I was informed by a State Department source. It goes without saying that he and his staff make a particular effort to cultivate Hispanics above all Cubans, who live here.

Indeed, one of Plan Alfa's central objectives was to split the Cuban-American community in the United States, and that has largely been achieved. Once almost monolithic in its opposition to Castro and Communism, that community today contains groups and individuals of some importance who are openly pro-Castro or at least tolerant of his dictatorship, thanks to penetration of it by DGI agents and informers.

Much of the DGI's penetration of the Cuban-American community has been done through "front" groups organized by Cuban intelligence officers or persons cooperating with them. Among these are the Center for Cuban Studies, the Cuban-American Committee for the Normalization of Relations with Cuba, the Cuban Coalition, the Circulo Cubanode Dultura and the Antonia Maceo Brigade, in addition to such recognized Cuban organisms as the Casa de Americas and the Venceremos Brigade. Further information on these groups appears in an article of mine published in the October 31, 1981, issue of Human Events, which I would request be inserted in the record.

Cuban intelligence, aided and abetted by persons who may not be agents but are willing dupes, at least, has also penetrated respectable American organizations such as the Latin American Studies Association. I attended its 10th National Meeting in Washington, D.C., héld on March 4-6 of this year, and was struck by the overwhelming degree to which this once-respected professional group has been infiltrated by pro-Castro elements including members of the Castro regime itself Thus a session on "Socialist and Non-socialist Perspectives on Revolutionary Change in Central America and the Caribbean" was sponsored -- and so listed in the formal program -- by Areito, a clearly pro-Castro magazine which catalyzed the Antonio Maceo Brigade, in turn a Castro front headed by a known DGI agent. Among the panelists were two representatives from the Center of Studies on America, in Havana, a Cuban governmental organism, as well as one from the Latin American Institute, Academy of Sciences, USSR. As an example of how cleverly Castro followers disguise themselves, the Coordinator of the session, Max Azicri, was identified as follows: "Political Science, Edinboro State College, Pennsylvania"; no mention was made of the fact that he is a member of the Board of Directors of Areito. Another panelist was Nicaragua's alternate permanent representative to the United Nations, making a total of four out of five speakers (not counting the Coordinator) who were identifiable as Marxists.

Indicating that Castro has not quite given up Plan A, seeking nornalization of U.S.-Cuban relations, one panel at the Latin American Studies Association meeting sponsored by the Instituto de Estudios Cubanos, another front, dealt with "The Dialogue Between the Cuban Government and the Cuban Community Abroad." Confirming that impression was the fact that the president of the Cuban American Committee for the Normalization of Relations With Cuba, Manuel R. Gomez addressed another panel of "Hispanics and United States Foreign Policy in the 1980's"

Booths displaying books, magazines and other literature on Latin America at the LASA meeting were dominated by left-wing publishers and organizations, which openly propagandized in favor of such pet causes as Sandinista Nicaragua, E1 Salvador's Marxist Leninist guerrillas, as well as Cuba of course. Prominently displayed were books, pamphlets and even films praising Castro's efforts to educate his people, liberate Cuban women, and fight "Yankee imperialism." There one could find the magazine Areito which, as I have indicated, is used to penetrate the Cuban American community and a new companion publication, Cuba Times.

Our business community, as well, is penetrated by DGI agents and supporters who seek to influence it to violate the trade embargo against Cuba. At the height of the normalization campaign in this country, in February 1977 President Carter announced that he would lift the embargo, as a major step toward normalization, if Castro withdrew his estimated 25,000 troops from Angola. That galvinized the DGI, through the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, to woo U.S. businessmen with special ardor and they began visiting Cuba in droves, looking for opportunities for investment and -unfortunately -- for circumventing the embargo pending normalization of bilateral relations. Their visits were usually arranged by a Washington consulting firm specializing in Cuba called Alamar Associated. Its head, Kirby Jones, would brief businessmen desirous of exploring business opportunities in Cuba on such subjects as, "U.S. Business and the Future of Trade with Cuba," with such Cuban officials as Sanchez Parodi, head of the Cuban Interests Section, invited to give talks. Even as late as 1981, with the chances of normalization under the new Reagan Administration considerably dimmed, front groups such as the Cuban-American Committee for the Normalization of Relations with Cuba, supported by such innocent-appearing publications as Cuba Times, were singing siren songs of the attractions of trade with Cuba. "U.S.-Cuba Trade: Possible and Profitable," was the title of a typical propaganda piece circulated by the Committee through its quarterly newsletter, U.S.-Cuba Bulletin, reprinted by Cuba Times and other publications tied into the Castro propaganda network in this country. Cuba Times claimed that the Committee's newsletter "goes to the House and Senate, hundreds of business, civic and religious leaders" in the United States, and "supplements contacts with Congressional leaders as well as participation in public talks, roundtables, local and national television interviews and the printed media." If the Chairman is so disposed, I offer here a copy of the Summer 1981 issue / Cuba Times with the aforementioned article for insertion in the record

The Cuban Interests Section in Washington -- dominated, remember, by DGI agents beginning with its head, Sanchez Parodi -vas so aggressive in its pursuit of U.S. businessmen to violate the trade embargo that the Carter Administration, desirous as it As to encourage normalization, grew upset. It threatened the DGI officer in charge of the operation, Sergio Martinez, with expulsion, but Martinez voluntarily departed from these shores in December 1980 before the Administration could act.

One DGI member of the Interests Section involved in the businessmen's operation who did get caught, however, was Ricardo martin, who held the rank of first secretary. He was formally charged with being an intelligence officer engages in violating the embargo, and expelled in February 1981.

The DGI, nonetheless, remains undeterred. Last summer, it incorporated in Panama a business front called "Commercial Muralla" which, operating outside normal trade channels, manages to smuggle into Cuba U.S.-made auto parts, radios, TV sets and heavy equipment. In the past few weeks, a grand jury in Miami has indicted several other business fronts engaged in illicit travel and other illegal transactions with Cuba; I understand, Mr. Chairman, that IOU have already heard ample testimony in that regard.

The DGI's normalization drive was almost crowned with success in 1977, with the formation of a group of prominent Cuban-Americans calling themselves the "Committee of 75." Its primary purpose was to initiate a "dialogue" with Cuba -- a term said to have originated with Fidel Castro himself, as a ploy to encourage normalization -and specifically, to secure the release of some 3,000 political prisoners in Castro's jails.

Although headed by respectable Cuban-Americans, including two clerics and several businessman, the Committee was inspired by the DGI. Its real manipulator, behind the scenes, was a DGI colonel named Jesus Arboleya Cervera, who was then listed as a "secondary secretary" with the Cuban Mission to the United Nations. Arboleya had served the DGI in the United States perhaps longer than any other known Castro agent, and as of last fall was reportedly attached to the Cuban interests section in Washington. Interviews with DGI defectors suggest that the "dialogue' may have started concurrently in two countries, Jamaica and Panama. One of the defectors, the Rev. Manuel Espinosa, has revealed that he made several trips to Jamaica -- then ruled by pro-Castro Prime Minister Michael Manley -- to work out arrangements with the DGI's station chief, Juan Carbonell, officially accredited as the Cuban Consul in Jamaica. Espinosa states that in fact he personally was recruited into the DGI in Jamaica, and served it as an agent until he broke early in 1980. Meanwhile, a Cuban American banker, Bernardo Benes, went to Panamato confer with the late strongman, Gen. Omar Torrijos.

Subsequently, Benes went to Havana at the head of a six-man commission of the Committee of 75, to negotiate with Fidel Castro himself. After a number of one-on-one meetings with Castro, Benes, by late 1978, had succeeded in obtaining the release of the 3,000 political prisoners from jail. This made everyone happy -- the Carter Administration, Castro, the prisoners, their families, and the Committee of 75 -- and normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations seemed about to become a reality.

But two obstacles made that impossible. The first was that Castro, notwithstanding some sort of assurance to the Carter Administration that he would withdraw his troops from Angola, refused to do so: obedience to Soviet policy requirements, above all the need to continue using Cuban armed forces as a spearhead of Soviet expansion in Africa, took precedence over an understanding with the United States. The second was that Benes -- unjustly, as it turned out -- was suspected by leading Cuban-Americans of being in reality a Cuban intelligence agent since he enjoyed such intimate ties with Castro. Actually, the banker had conducted the negotiations with Castro with the full knowledge of the FBI, to which he reported his activities all along, and of the State Department. Indeed, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance seems to have tacitly approved Benes' dealings with Castro, writing Benes later to thank him for his "services."

Thus Arboleya and the DGI failed to achieve normalization through their Committee of 75 -- a severe disappointment to Castro, for the Cuban economy was being severely hurt by the trade embargo, as the Cuban dictator himself admitted in a speech before the Cuban Communist Party in December 1979. They did, however, achieve the objective, perhaps more important in the long run, of splitting the hitherto united Cuban-American community over the issue of normalization and a range of other questions, some of them philosophical, hence deeper, involving an ideological reevaluation of the Castro regime. Younger members of the community who' never having suffered personally the rigors of life under the Castro dictatorship since they were born or raised in America, rejected their parents' assessment of the dictatorship as tyrannical and unjust, they preferred to think that it had many "good sides" and could be the "best thing" for the Cuban people.

The second track of Cuban policy, or "Plan Bravo," surfaced to the forefront following the failure of "Plan Alfa," to achieve normalization Plan B. never exactly quiescent but never fully activized, either, was now put into operation. It called for the destabilization, as already noted, Mr. Chairman, of the United States.

The instrument selected by Castro to launch a massive effort to destabilize this country was the more or less openly disaffected segment of the Cuban population itself, those Cubans who were so fed up with Castro that they would run any risk to leave the country. We now know most of the details of the unhappy story of the 130,000 Cubans who left cube for these shores, in April 1980, via the port of Mariel -- the famous Mariel boatlift -- so there is no need to go into them here. I understand, further, that you have taken testimony as to Castro's ulterior motives in unleashing those tens of thousands of Cubans upon us -- that is, to destabilize the United States -- so I need not dwell upon that. Instead, I shall touch upon another aspect of Castro's destabilization plan which goes beyond its effects upon the Miami area, and South Florida in general, and that is the prong of it that would utilize Puerto Rico in two ways to achieve the same end.

During my trip to Puerto Rico last fall, I learned that Castro's twin objectives are to create unprecedented turmoil on the island, and make it too hot a potato for the United States to handle, and at the same time use the Puerto Rican extreme left to create trouble on the U.S. mainland. When I say "trouble," I mean literally nothing is excluded, even the assassination of high public figures, beginning with President Reagan himself.

In my December 1981 syndicated piece offered here for the record, Mr. Chairman, I produced evidence that Mr. Reagan and other high U.S. officials are on a Puerto Rican terrorist hit list. My article suggested that the Puerto Rican terrorists are more to be feared, perhaps, than Muammar Qadaffi's, who at the time were also threatening the President's life, because the former would be far more difficult to detect than the Libyans since they look like millions of other Hispanics who are law-abiding people. I was glad to learn that the Secret Service, as it developed in a phone call one of its members made to me subsequently, took substantially the same view (while by no means dismissing the Libyans' hit capabilities) and have taken the necessary precautions.

The pertinent aspect of the threat I would like to highlight here is that the FALN is at the heart of it. Eleven members of the FALN were found guilty by a Chicago grand jury, in February 1981, of seditious conspiracy, and were sentenced to long prison terms. The case concerned the armed seizure, in March 1980, of President Carter's campaign headquarters in Chicago and GOP Presidential candidate George Bush's in New York City, on the same day, allegedly by FALN members. All but one of the latter, Alfredo "Freddy" Mendez, denied belonging to the FALN and refused even to defend themselves in court on the ground that they were "prisoners of war" and were therefore entitled to be judged by an international tribunal.

The only one of the "Chicago 11 who admitted to being an FALN member, Freddy Mendez, cooperated with the authorities in the hope of having his sentence reduced. Specifically, they sought information from him on an alleged FALN "bomb factory" in Queens, L. I., which exploded in 1978 and was said to have supplied bombs for 31 unsolved bombings in Manhattan possibly committed by the FALN. Curiously, instead of being condemned by fellow terrorists for "singing," Mendez was pitied by them as an alleged victim of "torture' and "bribes" committed personally by none other than President Reagan himself, to force him to confess. Crazy as this sounds, the charge was uttered by the reputed "godfather" of Puerto Rican terrorism, 72-year-old Juan Antonio Corretjer, in a public speech, in July 1981, several months after the "Chicago 11" were sentenced. It should be recalled at this point that Corretjer, in his youth, was the secretary and devoted disciple of Pedro Albizu Campos, founder of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico and intellectual author of attempts on the life of President Harry Truman and members of Congress in the 1950s. Corretjer, who told me in a taped interview, "I am a Marxist-Leninst, a Communist," has been advocating terrorism for the past fifty years and believes that Puerto Rico is engaged in a "people's war" against the United States in which no holds are barred. His accusation that President Reagan personally "bribed" and "tortured" Mendez was designed to lay the philosophical basis for charging that the United States is a "fascist' state engaged in "genocide" against the people, and therefore its leaders must be summarily disposed of. Thus, in the speech referred to above, he thundered:

"Who deserves contempt? Who deserves punishment? Poor Alfredo Mendez? No! The President of the United States, the CIA chiefs, the FBI chiefs, the warden of Pontiac [Ill.] prison [where the FALN seditionists were held], the public prosecutors Margolis and Sullivan in the federal office of the Chicago district attorney, and the detectives and police of Chicago!''

The President, he continued, is "humanity's worst enemy."

Intelligence officers I interviewed in Puerto Rico regarded the Corretjer speech as a call to Puerto Rican terrorists to summarily "punish" the President and the law enforcement officials Corretjer listed -- which was, in effect, a hit list. They noted that Puerto Rican terrorists have committed acts of vengeance before.

Thus in December 1979, three terrorists groups ambushed a U.S. Navy bus en route to Saoana Seca Communications Center, near the capital of San Juan, killing two petty officers and wounding 10 other naval personnel. In a communique they issued claiming responsibility for the shootout, they said they were avenging the alleged murder of a comrade, Angel Rodriguez Cristobal, who was found hanging in a Tallahassee, Florida, prison cell and listed as a suicide." Corretjer exulted publicly, after the Sabana Seca killings, "His [Rodriguez Cristobal's] death is avenged."

Now it is believed by some in the U.S. Intelligence community that Puerto Rican terrorists will try to "avenge" the "bribing" and "torturing" of Freddy Mendez by attempting to kill the President and/or other top U.S. officials.

It should be kept in mind, Mr. Chairman, that still at large as a suspect in the Chicago case is the FALN's bomb-making expert, William Morales, currently a fugitive.

The FALN, some U.S. intelligence officers hold, was "connected'' with the attempted robbery last October of a Brink's armored truck near Nyack, N.W., by Weather Underground and black terrorists. Two policemen and a guard were killed in the shootout following the attempt. The FBI's No. 2 man in New York, Kenneth P. Walton, stated at the time that the joint Federal-New York City Terrorism Task Force he heads is looking into possible links between the Brinks robbers and the FALN and "possibly some foreign organizations" as well.

The "foreign organizations" are regarded by intelligence sources to mean Cuba's General Intelligence Directorate, or DGI. The fact is, Mr. Chairman, that the FALN was organized by a Puerto Rican agent of Cuban intelligence named Filiberto Inocencio Ojeda Rios, who is wanted on the island for jumping $2,000 bail. In 1967, Ojeda founded the very first of Puerto Rico's new terrorist groups, the Independent Armed Revolutionary Movement, or MIRA. MIRA's members received training and arms in Cuba and became operational early in 1969, when they bombed a police station, a bank, and other enterprises.

After many more bombings -- it is credited with 35 in New York alone in 1970 -- MIRA was finally broken up by the police and Ojeda was arrested Jumping bail, Ojeda headed for New York, was assigned to the DGI station there operating under cover of the Cuban Mission to the United Nations, and organized the FALN with remnants of the old MIRA group.

It is pertinent to note here, Mr. Chairman, that the Cuban Mission to the UN, like the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, is honeycombed with DGI and other Castro intelligence | personnel. In the first place, the Mission staff normally totaling about 50 -- and rising to 80 persons on special occasions such as General Assembly sessions -- is the second largest in the UN, although Cuba ranks among its smallest member countries. Why such a large mission? Cuba scarcely needs upwards of 50 people to perform functions at the UN that bigger countries do with half or less that number. The truth is that an estimated 75 percent of those accredited to the Mission are not diplomats at all but agents and other personnel belonging to the DGI and other Cuban intelligence or security agencies.

Some are officers of, for example, the Department of State Security, or USE, the counterpart of the DGI inside Cuba which controls internal security; they perform no discernible diplomatic function. Others belong to the Department of America and the Cuban Institute for Friendship with Peoples, or ICAP, intelligence agencies which handle visitors to Cuba and there maintain them under surveillance; they scarcely qualify as diplomats, either. Consequently, it should not be surprising that many of the DGI, DSE, ICAP and America Department people on the Cuban Mission's roster of personnel don't bother to show up for regular UN duties.

One of the persons listed as a ''political counselor" of the Mission, a highranking post, is in fact the chief of all DGI operations in the United States. He is Mario Monzon, a handsome man over six feet tall -- taller than the average Cuban -- about 38 or 39 years old. Another "political counselor" is also in reality a top intelligence officer, Alfredo Garcia Almeida, who heads the American Department in this country; he is thus the right arm here of the man Castro has entrusted with chief responsibility for organizing revolution in the Americas, primarily in Central America, Manuel Pineiro Losada, otherwise known as "Redbeard," who runs the America Department in Havana. Although both men are of apparently equal diplomatic rank, Monzon has authority over Almeida, indicating that in the United States the America Department may be subordinate to also directs, of course, the the Cuban Interests Section effect, the Section itself, Parodi, is also in charge of

But Monzon is not sole Boss of Cuban intelligence in the United States. Besides answering, of course, to his Cuban superiors in Havana he must also answer to KGB station chief in New York, who is in charge of Soviet intelligence operations in this country. Thus the two Intelligence services, Cuban and Soviet, work hand in glove with each other, but with the Cuban subordinate to the Soviet service -- as it has been for many years -- even as Cuba itself is a satellite of the Soviet Union., There is, however, a division of labor between them which has major significance for this country.

The DGI, notwithstanding the fact that it is rated among the five best intelligence services in the world and its officers are considered "very professional" by their U.S. counterparts, is not entrusted with such key tasks as military or industrial espionage since it lacks the technical capability for them. The DGI concentrates, rather, upon wooing Third World members of the United Nations, who constitute the overwhelming majority of that body and can be decisive in making policy and spreading propaganda, to follow Soviet policies in opposition to the West. Another one of its special UN missions is to line up votes, year after year, for the independence of Puerto Rico in the UN's Committee of 24 or so-called decolonialization committee; there, it has succeeded for the first time in getting the Puerto Rican issue placed on the General Assembly's agenda this fall. At the same time, the DGI plays the double role of organizing and instigating such Puerto Rican terrorist groups as the FALN, as part of its "Plan B" to destabilize the United States.

DGI agents, of course, possess the distinct advantage over other Soviet satellite intelligence services, as well as the kGB itself, of being indistinguishable from millions of U.S. citizens and residents of Latin descent. Thud they can pose, with relative ease, as Nicaraguans,or Mexicans,or Puerto Ricans or Salvadorans -- except in the presence of such nationals, who can readily spot differences in accent and mannerisms -and can mingle more freely with our population than Soviet or Polish or East German agents. U.S. intelligence officers are particularly worried over the DGI's capability, because of its Latin ethnicity, to stir up trouble among not only Puerto Ricans but also other Latin members of the U.S. community. They are equally concerned about its capability, since a fair number of Cubans are of African origin and black in color, for stirring up trouble among U.S. blacks. That is a crucial part of the design of "Plan Bravo," according to the defector Genaro Perez.

"They [the DGI] are going to incite Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and blacks, Perez Told me in an interview. "Especially blacks."

Needless to say, it would be Very much in the interests of the Soviet Union and the KGB to have Cuban agents incite Americans of black or Latin origin to riot, to stage demonstrations, to commit acts of sabotage and terror in our key cities and in key industrial areas containing defense-related plants.

Aware of these and other uses of the DGI, the KGB began to restructure the Cuban intelligence service along its own lines quite early in the game. In 1962, reportedly at the request of Fidel Castro himself, the Soviets named as their first ambassador to Cuba a senior XGB officer, Alexander Alexeyev -- whose real name is said to be Alexander I Shitov -- and he brought with him to Havana five KGB comrades to make over the DGI in the image of their own organization.

Like the KGB, the DGI is structured functionally into seven lineas -- "lines" -- or departments. Operations in the United States, the DGI's No. 1 target, come under the Political and Economic Intelligence Division, or linea, which also embraces the United Nations, Canada, Mexico and Puerto Rico. Although nominally the Division's basis function is to collect political and economic information -- mainly through the Cuban UN Mission and the Cuban Interests Section in Washington -- such information is used of course for carrying out the DGI's central objective of destabilizing this country through acts of terror, sabotage and subversion.

The DGI and other Cuban intelligence and security organisms enjoy a very high priority in Cuba, Mr. Chairman -- one much higher than' say, our intelligence services. Those organisms appear to be supervised closely by the very top leadership of the Cuban government, meaning President Fidel Castro and his brother Raul, who is heir apparent as First Vice President of Cuba and is also Minister of the Armed Forces, and meaning also Ramiro Valdes, who besides being Minister of Interior is a Vice President of Cuba. These three men are officially ranked among the top five in Cuba, and head the list of the sixteen members of the Cuban Communist Party's Politburo as well as the National Assembly, Council of State and Council of Ministers of the Cuban government.

Raul Castro, whose decisive role in Cuban affairs is usually overlooked by observers, has made intelligence virtually his own preserve. He may well be the Kremlin's key man in the Cuban heirarchy with respect to intelligence as well as to policy. He was a dedicated, Moscow-lining Communist in his youth and recognized as such from the beginning of the July 26th movement, the predominantly middle-class organization Fidel created to bring about the Cuban Revolution. Raul, along with Che Guevara -- the two known Communists in the then ruling triumvirate headed by Fidel -- then proceeded to destroy the July 26th movement and recreate in its stead the hitherto moribund Cuban Communist Party, once the Revolution was won. It was early in the process of thus communizing Cuba that Raul dispatched to Mexico City his trusted aide, Valdes, to contact, for the first time, the Soviets and specifically the KGB. Raul was then chief of the Rebel Army and Valdes head of G-2, its intelligence arm.

Through Raul Castro, there has always been a close link between the Cuban Armed Forces and the Ministry of Interior, which controls the country's intelligence services. In a very real sense, Cuba's formidable intelligence/security apparatus is basically his creation although his older brother, Fidel, always has the last word, of course. To facilitate his control over that apparatus, Raul was instrumental in organizing in 1961, the Ministry of Interior, under which all intelligence/ security units were put. He then got named as head of the new Ministry his old friend, Ramiro Valdes, who continues to occupy that post today after a hiatus during which he held other important government jobs. Valdes was given one of the most sensitive positions in the Cuban Government, because, in addition to his other attributes as a professional intelligence officer, he is one of only 13 survivors of the original expedition that set sail from Mexico in the "Granma", in November 1956, to make the Cuban Revolution; thus belongs to a very special clique that in some respects is above party and government. When Valdes became Minister of Interior, in 1961. various units which had been engaged in intelligence abroad, such as G-2, and in internal security at home, were merged into a Department of State Security, or USE. Foreign intelligence was assigned to a General Directorate of Intelligence -- DGI -or "Department: M," as it was known in the Interior Ministry.

Powerful as the DGI is, and though in many respects it is the Cuban counterpart of the KGB, it nevertheless does not enjoy with respect to the Cuban regime and Cuban policy the power that the KGB does with respect to the Soviet government and its policies. If Raul Castro and Ramiro Valdes are leading figues in Cuba, it is not because of the DGI; rather the contrary, the DGI commands power and respect to the degree that the younger Castro and Valdes desire it to. Considered in those terms, the DGI must be evaluated as certainly a powerful foreign intelligence arm of the Cuban Government but not the only one: competing with it, though also cooperating with it is, above all, the America Department, and further below in importance the ICAP.

Cuba has set up what is in effect a High Command of the Latin American Revolution, in the form of an organism called the Coordinating Revolutionary Junta (JCR), in Havana. The JCR consists of the DGI and the America Department, making it a joint enterprise of Government -- the DGI coming under the Ministry of Interior -- and Party -- the America Department being an arm of the Cuban Communist Party. The JCR is in charge of providing arms, training, guidance and intelligence to revolutionary organizations throughout Latin America.

I have a chart here, Mr. Chairman, which provides as complete a breakdown as can be obtained of the far-flung machinery Cuba has organized to generate and support revolution throughout the Western Hemisphere, not excluding the United States. It might be useful if inserted in the record.

Briefly, it shows that the JCR maintains close liaison and in many cases probably supervises revolutionary groups, including guerrilla forces, in four of the five Central American republics -Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras and E1 Salvador -- in at least four Caribbean island countries -- Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico,Haiti and Guadalupe -- and in seven of the ten South American republics -- Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Bolivia, Peru, Venezuela and Colombia. The JCR also has its tentacles in Mexico and the United States, in the latter primarily through four Puerto Rican terrorist organizations including the FALN.

Further, as the chart shows, the JCR maintains contact with the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and East Germany, the DGI having, of course, its own direct line to the KGB and the Czech and East German intelligence services.

The State Department, in a research paper on "Cuba's Renewed Support for Violence in Latin America," presented to the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs on December 14, 1981, provides much detail on how Cuba coordinates its aid to Latin revolutionary movements through such covert agencies as the DGI and America Department. Though it claims, mistakenly in my judgement, that it is the America Department which "brings together the expertise of the Cuban military and the General Directorate of Intelligence," rather than the joint Coordinating Revolutionary Junta, it does stress that they run "a farflung operation that includes training camps in Cuba and abroad, and sophisticated propaganda support t' Nowhere is the evidence more blatant, particularly in the field of propaganda, than in Central America. Typical of the whole effort was the operational base Cuba's intelligence personnel established in Costa Rica, which funneled arms and other military aid to the Sandinista in Nicaragua on such a vast scale that that may well have decided their ultimate victory over Somoza.

It should be stressed that arms alone did not decide that victory. A key ingredient of it, and indeed a pre-condition for receiving military aid from Cuba, was the unification of the various guerrilla factions in Nicaragua which Fidel Castro insisted upon and which, according to the State Department, was carried out in person by his national-liberation chief, Manuel Pineiro, "Redbeard." Pineiro subsequently unified the warring Salvadoran guerrilla factions using the raw power of Cuba, after which the latter turned on the spigot that produced the arms flow to the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front. More recently, Cuban intelligence, in the person of Pineiro again, has repeated the same performance in Guatemala, which today boasts a new National Patriotic United Front embracing four different guerrilla factions

Perhaps most alarming of all, for the United States, is that Cuban intelligence has also succeeded in uniting some eight or nine terrorist groups in Puerto Rico. Specifically, the Puerto Rican-born DGI agent I mentioned earlier, Filiberto Inocencia Ojeda Rios, was the one who united the Puerto Rican terrorist groups under a Joint Operations Command -- Mando de Operaciones Conjuntas (MOC) -- according to my informants. "He was the genius behind it," as one told me. Ojeda was then in charge of Caribbean activities for the Coordinating Revolutionary Junta.

Ojeda's career illustrates the overlapping between DGI and America Department activities as well as the inner workings of Puerto Rican terrorism and the grave threat, grossly underestimated by some elements of our own intelligence community, that it represents to the United States.

Ojeda organized the FALN, from his vantagepoint as a member of the Cuban UN Mission, in early 1974. He trained the FALN's first cadres in handling explosives and urban guerrilla tactics, but never commanded the organization. By the Spring of 1974, the FALN going operational, "reopens the second front of the struggle by bringing the armed struggle for Puerto Rican national liberation to within the borders of the U.S., at a higher level," according to the terrorists' own "Chronology of Armed Struggle in Puerto Rico and the U.S., 1967-1980." The "reopening" of the 'second front" took the form of firebombing three New York City department stores on as many consecutive days. Then, in September and October of that year, the FALN bombed the Newark, N.J., City Hall and Police Headquarters, and five more prominent places in New York City including Rockefeller Center.

"The intelligence community feels that Ojeda really sent the FALN on its way," a Puerto Rican intelligence officer of long experience with terrorism told me. "He is the father of the FALN."

Subsequently, Ojeda was transferred to the Department of America, under Pineiro, and put in charge of Puerto Rican terrorist groups. In December 1974, he was sent into Puerto Rico clandestinely -- he was still wanted by the police for having jumped bail -- to organize acts of sabotage during a strike at the government's Aqueduct and Sewer authority staged by extremists. The union which had organized the strike was controlled by the Popular Socialist Party, a legal party which officially eschews terrorism and sabotage as means of winning political power. It's leader, Juan Mari Bras, freely admitted in an interview with me that he is a Marxist-Leninist with close ties to Cuba.

What Mari Bras did not acknowledge, I might add parenthetically, is that, under the pseudonym "Alfonso Beal" (the surname is an acronym of the two independence movement heroes, Betances and Albizu), he had formed his own Armed Commandos of Liberation (CAL) back in 1965. Nor that CAL members received guerrilla training in Cuba as members of the Venceremos Brigade and that when they returned to Puerto Rico they proceeded to bomb U.S. companies located there and a U.S. Governors' Conference. They also killed a U.s. Marine, in retaliation for the alleged murder of a comrade, and sabotaged five military helicopters. But in 197Z, Mari Bras announced he would thenceforth try to gain power through electoral means and in the following year disbanded the CAL.

Ojeda met with several extremist leaders, including Juan Antonio Corretjer, the "grand old man" of Puerto Rican terrorism, and returned to Cuba to report that armed struggle on the island was a feasible objective. He went back to Puerto Rico for further meetings with CorretJer and other extremists, as a result of which the Revolutionary Comandos of the People -- or CRP -- was formed in 1976 to conduct urban guerrilla warfare. The CRP almost immediately submitted itself to the supervision of the Coordinating Revolutionary Junta and designated Ojeda as its representative on that body. In that capacity, Ojeda traveled to Paris, which the JCR was using as a meeting place. There he met with "Carlos the Jackal," the infamous international terrorist born Carlos Ilich Ramirez in Venezuela, got to know leaders of the PLO, and touched base with an old Puerto Rican comrade, Roberto Todd Pagan, who was then in charge of the Western Hemisphere desk of the East German intelligence service, SSD.

Now made head of the JCR's Caribbean activities, Ojeda came into contact with Dominican Republic revolutionaries interested in working jointly with their Puerto Rican counterparts, since-the two islands are only 60 miles apart. The principal Dominican terrorist organization, Dominican Resistance -- or RD -- joined the JCR in Paris and Ojeda coordinated its activities with Puerto Rican terrorists. In 1976;three RD members arrested by the Puerto Rican police admitted that they had received training from the PLO and were conducting combined operations on the island with Puerto Rican terrorists. One of the three, Victor Morales Santana, who had been in personal contact with "Carlos the Jackal," is still in prison serving a 12-year sentence for armed robbery.

1976 was a banner year for the proliferation of terrorist groups in Puerto Rico, chiefly as the result of the defection of 3,000 members of the Popular Socialist Party following their disillusionment in the PSP's abysmal showing in the gubernatorial election. An estimated 600 of that batch had had varying degrees of guerrilla training in Cuba and now turned to urban guerrilla warfare. Soon thereafter, the principal terrorist groups operating today surfaced in connection with violent acts of one kind or another.

The first to be organized was the Armed Forces of Popular Resistance, or FARP, which promptly engaged in such activities as robbing banks and shooting up places frequented by U.S. Navy personnel, such as La Hacienda near Roosevelt Roads.

FARP's organization was soon followed by that of one of the most notorious of all Puerto Rican terrorist groups, Los Macheteros, formally called the Boricua Popular Army (EPB), after Puerto Rico's original Indian name, Borinquen. At least 11 of the original Macheteros had received training, earlier, from Chile's far-leftist MIR during the rule of Salvador Allende, and later at a Cuban camp located between Havana and Pinar del Rio for four months. In August 1978, soon after their return from Cuba, they launched their first operation, in which they killed a policeman. Acknowledging that act, they revealed for the first time their identity as Los Macheteros.

Among Los Macheteros' most notorious exploits was the Sabana Seca ambush of a Navy bus in December 1979, which they carried out together with the FARP and still another terrorist group, the Organization of Volunteers for the Puerto Rican Revolution (OVRP). A Soviet-designed AK-47 automatic rifle was found by Federal officials among the weapons used to fire on the bus. It was the first time in his experience, an FBI spokesman said, that the AK-47 -- which is usually made in Czechoslovakia had been used in Puerto Rico.

In January 1981, the same three groups teamed up to firebomb nine Air National Guard jets worth $45 million, at Isla Verde Air Base, near San Juan. I have seen a videotape of the Macheteros' preparations for the firebombing, produced by them for publicity purposes, which they claim was carried out in only seven minutes, 40 seconds -- ample testimony to the terrorists' high level of precision and efficiency.

On July 14, 1981, Los Macheteros destroyed three F M navigational stations and a Coast Guard navigational beacon with bombs, disrupting air traffic between the United States and Latin America. An exception to the understanding that the mainland is FALN "territory," Los Macheteros have carried out at least one foray into the United States setting off six simultaneous bomb explosions in Puerto Rico and Chicago, in October 1979.

In all, from 1975 through 1981 Puerto Rican terrorist groups have perpetrated 260 acts of violence on the island and up to 100 on the mainland, most of the latter by the FALN. Something like nine Puerto Rican terrorist groups have proliferated over the past 15 years -- an average, Mr. Chairman, of about one per every 400,000 inhabitants of Puerto Rico -and that incredible total may not be complete.- Only five of them are considered truly important: CRP, FARP. OVRP. Macheteros and FALN. These are the groups which Ojeda appears to have unified under a single Joint Operations Command (MOC), which in turn comes under the Coordinating Revolutionary Junta run by the DGI and Department of America out of Havana.

Allied ideologically with the terrorists groups, and forming in effect a substantial support force, are an estimated ten "open" political organizations -- organizations, that is, which unlike the clandestine terrorist units participate overtly and legally in the political life of Puerto Rico, some of them even putting up candidates in elections. The principal ones are the Puerto Rican Communist Party (PCP; pro-Moscow); the Puerto Rican Socialist Party (Marl Bras' PSP; oriented toward Havana); Partido Nacional de Puerto Rico (PNPR, formed by Albizu Campos); Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSR, orthodox Leninist); Puerto Rican Socialist League (Corretjer's LSP); Internationalist Workers League (LIT; Trotskyist); Moviemiento Socialista Popular (MSP; followers of Che Guevara). These organizations are reckoned by intelligence officers to have a total membership of between 12,000 and 17,000-- a formidable support army for the terrorists in a total population of only 3.5 million.

In addition, the terrorists can find support and sympathy among nominally nonpolitical groups of a radical nature such as the electrical workers' union, UTIER, which is Communistcontrolled and a breeding ground of terrorism. Last year it conducted a protracted strike that strained Puerto Rico's electric-power facilities to a disturbing degree. The strike, curiously enough, was backed by the Macheteros and other terrorist groups, who frequently bombed power plants and caused blackouts in San Juan.

An even more important example is the Federation of Pro Independence University Students (FUPI), which recently celebrated its 25th anniversary as the principal spawning-ground for Puerto Rico's far-left revolutionaries. Recently, it inspired a student strike at the University of Puerto Rico, the leader of which was a known Communist.

The motive force of all the groups I have mentioned-here, both clandestine and "open," is independence -- all of them want, demand, independence from the United States, even though all together they represent less than 6 percent of the Puerto Rican electorate, according to the 1980 gubernatorial election returns. The latter, however, do not tell the whole story. Independence possesses a certain mystique for many Puerto Ricans who might have voted against it as a political solution; to them. it is a cultural banner to emphasize and protect their Hispanic origins and to enable them to resist what they regard as an Anglo-Saxon cultural "invasion." The vast majority of Puerto Ricans, including even the far left, accept of course such American exports as medical science, technology, industrial know-how and even fast-food outlets; but they do not do so entirely without reservations, fundamentally fearing what the Invasion" might do to their language, their literature, their folkways. The Puerto Rican people suffer, at bottom, from an almost permanent crisis of identity, at one and the same time wanting profoundly to be Americans yet feeling a strong pull to their Latin heritage -- and their-Latin neighbors. Consequently independence, though perennially a big loser at the polls, is potentially an explosive issue, one which the terrorists and their accomplices in the "open" organizations constantly exploit as do the sinister forces behind them, in Cuba.

It is a misnomer to speak of 'terrorist'' groups in the strictest sense, for although they exist to commit acts of terror and violence it is also true that they do so within an ideological framework that transcends pure terror: "national liberation." Considered from that point of view, Puerto Rico's so-called terrorist groups are really -- and this is how they regard themselves -- as the armed forces which they believe will "liberate" the island from "Yankee imperialism," and so they act as though they were in a state of war with the mainland and that any means are justified to win that war, as in the case in all war. Bombings and assassinations, then, are simply acts of war and not of terror, and they are resorted to at this stage of the struggle because conditions are not yet ripe for conventional acts of war or even irregular warfare like that in E1 Salvador. But, as they see it, they are approaching that stare and co they Schneider themselves to he in a state of urban guerrilla warfare, as Corretjer explained it to me.

Corretjer's Socialist (by which he means Communist) League has designated the present stage of the so-called "struggle against Yankee imperialism" as one of urban guerrilla warfare His LSP, and other "open" organizations who think the same way, spend their every waking hour studying and absorbing the teachings of all the experts in insurrection and urban guerrilla warfare, ranging from Friedrich Engels to V. I. Lenin to Che Guevara to Carlos Marighella, the late Brazillian author of the famous "Mini Manual on Urban Guerrilla Warfare." They also study and absorb the lessons of both successful guerrilla movements, wuch as the Sandinistas, and unsuccessful ones, such as Uruguay's Tupamarus, not to speak of the experiences of the father and hero of Puerto Rican terrorism, Pedro Albizu Campos. Their absorption in such studies is by no means purely theoretical: they focus, essentially, on military and paramilitary strategy and tactics. A manual on "The Urban Guerrilla," produced by Corretjer's LSP in 1980 and based largely on the Marighella work, goes into considerable detail on strategy and tactics. So then, Mr. Chairman, what we are talking about in Puerto Rico when we discuss the so-called terrorist groups and their DGI mentors is not something out of "Carlos the Jackal" but, much more significant, the training of a guerrilla army which intends to do battle on a large scale with the United States both on the island of Puerto Rico -- in itself a strategic objective with its vital location and naval installations -and on the U.S. mainland. We are speaking, in other words, of a two-front war, with Fidel Castro aspiring to be the generalissimo directing it from Havana.

Such a prospect, obviously, could be far more menacing to the United States than even the current hostilities going on in Central America. It is time, I believe, that not only the American intelligence community but the Administration at its highest levels begin to understand, prepare for, and meet the threat posed by the Cuban General Directorate of Intelligence and particularly its Puerto Rican spearhead.

Senator DENTON. Before I would recess this hearing, I want to announce 5 days of hearings beginning on March 22, 1982. These hearings will disclose the role of the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Cuba in fomenting terrorism in Southern Africa. We will have as witnesses former members of the African National Congress and SWAPO regarding their training in the Soviet Union and East Germany. The stories of these young people, all black Africans, should convince even the most skeptical of the true intentions of the U.S.S.R. and their surrogates.

Some of these witnesses are on death lists ordered by the African National Congress and SWAPO. Rather elaborate security precautions will be needed and, for this reason, their names will not be released prior to the time of their testimony.

The hearing is now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:06 p.m., the subcommittee recessed to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]