U.S. SENATE,
                                                                                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM,
                                                                                                                COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
                                                                                                                              Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:24 a.m., in room 2228, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jeremiah Denton (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Staff present: Joel S. Lisker, chief counsel and staff director; Bert W. Milling, Jr., counsel; and Fran Wermuth, chief clerk.

Senator DENTON. This hearing will come to order.

I want to welcome our witnesses, Sergio Pinon and Daniel Benitez, special agents with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, who, in the midst of the press of urgent duties, have found the time to come to Washington, D.C., and testify in front of the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism. They will be testifying on terrorist and intelligence activities of the Cuban Government in south Florida.In an April 24, 1981, hearing entitled "Terrorism: Origins, Direction and Support," this subcommittee undertook an overview of the problems of worldwide terrorism. From the outset, the involvement of Cuba, its intelligence officers and its agents in international terrorism has been repeatedly cited. It is not my intention now to detail again the testimony that was offered on that occasion.Last Friday, February 26, 1982, Gerardo Peraza, a former senior official of Cuban intelligence, the DGI, appeared before this subcommittee. Mr. Peraza joined Fidel Castro's rebel army in 1958, rose through the ranks of Cuban intelligence, and received training in Moscow.

His final assignment was at the DGI center in London as a member of the Cuban embassy staff, with the cover title of Second Secretary. In 1971, Gerardo Peraza sought refuge in the United States. His testimony before the subcommittee was his first public appearance since leaving Cuba.

Before going any further, I would like to welcome Jose Delgado, a Third Secretary of the Cuban Interest Section, who is attending the hearing this morning.

[Delgado was seated in the audience at the press table.]

Mr. Peraza testified that between 1958 and 1970, the Cuban DG1 and the Soviet KGB cooperated on intelligence collection. In 1968, a committee of chiefs of the intelligence service personally offered intelligence that the DGI had collected in the United States to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, and other countries in the Soviet Bloc.

Beginning in 1970, the Cuban intelligence service was placed under the direction of the KGB. It was directly supervised by a Soviet colonel, Viktor Simenov. Prior to Peraza's departure for his assignment in London, he was required to discuss his operational plans with Simenov, who controlled the expenditure of funds for operations. Before 1970, intelligence plans were approved by the Cuban chief of intelligence. After 1970, the DGI budget was prepared by Simenov and was sent to the Soviet Union for approval.

Before 1970, Cuba lacked adequate resources to mount a major intelligence offensive against the United States. However, in 1970, with financial resources furnished by the Soviet Union, the DGI was able to recruit about 100 intelligence officers in 2 weeks.

A substantial amount of Soviet money was used to buy vehicles and technical equipment and to pay for the expenses of placing the agents. In effect, the DGI now had what amounted to an unlimited budget.

Each of the 100 intelligence officials who left Cuba in 1970 for assignment abroad had to provide a copy of his infiltration plan to a Soviet officer. In addition, the DGI officers had to provide Soviet officers with the true names of all their agents working in the United States. Prior to that point, only the pseudonyms of the agents had been provided to the U.S.S.R.

Mr. Peraza also stated that the DGI is in no way a partner of the KGB; it is a subordinate entity, taking its direction from agents of the Kremlin.

Mr. Peraza stated that, in exchange for financial support of its intelligence apparatus, Cuba was required to direct its operations toward collection of intelligence information of interest to the Soviet Union. This included intelligence, military, economic, and political matters. According to Peraza, the Cubans were more readily able to obtain this type of information than were the Soviets, for the Cubans were not so easily detected.

Mr. Peraza said that during the late 1960's and early 1970's the DGI exploited weaknesses it perceived in the U.S. intelligence community to install agents in the United States. He further indicated that the United States could not detect that activity and that all Cuban intelligence forces were ordered to prepare penetrations against the United States in any country in which there was an identifiable U.S. intelligence target.

He testified that DGI agents in Great Britain had the principal mission of spying on British citizens in order to penetrate the U.S. activities in the United Kingdom. DGI operatives in Spain spied on citizens there, with the principal objective of penetrating the United States.

Mr. Peraza confirmed that even the Cuban involvement in Angola was seen primarily as a step toward the defeat of the United States, which is the ultimate and exclusive target of all Soviet and Cuban operations.

Peraza stated that he was personally aware of successful infiltration of high-ranking DGI agents into the U.S. Government. He claimed even the U.S. Senate had been penetrated.

In the testimony to be received today, we turn to an investigation of Cuban Government-sponsored terrorist and intelligence activities in south Florida. Earlier testimony and many public sources point to a large Cuban intelligence presence in the Miami area. This is due, in part, to the geographical proximity of Miami to Cuba, the Caribbean, South and Central America, and to the large Cuban American population in that area.

We hope to get a better understanding of the Cuban intelligence apparatus and of the threat it presents to the national security of the United States through an examination of its methods and operations in this major American city and surrounding area. The preliminary indications of the size and scope of these activities are most alarming. It is vital that we know the reality of what is going on so that our Government can take appropriate countermeasures.

It is a pleasure to welcome our witnesses, Special Agents Sergio Pinon and Daniel Benitez of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, who are presently stationed in Miami. Among their primary duties are intelligence gathering, supervision of informants, and investigation of terrorist and bombing incidents.

They also conduct major investigations of narcotics and organized crime, and since this subcommittee has the oversight of the Drug Enforcement Administration, we are also interested in their insights in these areas. Both these officers are highly capable career policemen with extensive experience in dealing with subversive and terrorist groups in the Miami area. They are working level investigators who are close to the problems that we will examine today.

As respected members of the Latin community, they also bring to the subcommittee valuable insights into the feelings and perspective of the Miami Cuban community toward Castro's efforts.

Before you begin your opening statement, I want to make it clear for the record that the testimony you will present represents your personal views and not necessarily the views of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement.

Before I ask you if I am correct, I will swear you in. Would you stand and raise your right hand, please?

Do you swear that the testimony which you are about to give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. BENITEZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. PINON. Yes, sir.

Senator DENTON. Please be seated.

Am I correct in my premise that these are your views and not those, necessarily, of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement?

Mr. BENITEZ. Yes.

Mr. PINON. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DENTON. Agent Pinon, do you have an opening statement?

Mr. PINON. Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DENTON. You may proceed with your statement.

Mr. PINON. Mr. Chairman, on behalf of Commissioner James W. York of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, who, by being cognizant of the special problems facing the State of Florida, has provided an atmosphere where the investigative initiative of field personnel is respected and valued; also, on behalf of Special Agent-in-Charge Joe H. Clark of the Miami Operations Center, who, in recognition of the special problems in Miami, has consistently afforded us the time and special resources necessary to do in-depth investigations and intelligence gathering in the areas of criminal activities and terrorism which have so much affected south Florida; and, further, on our own behalf, we would like to thank the subcommittee for the opportunity given us to appear here today and to make this presentation. Our presentation will relate to this subcommittee's area of interest: terrorism and national security.

As members of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Special Agent Benitez and I have obtained a first-hand knowledge of the problems of terrorism and subversive activity occurring in the United States and, more specifically, in south Florida where we are currently assigned.

Due to the nature of our law enforcement assignment, the ability to obtain a total picture of these activities has been established. Our experience includes service with law enforcement agencies of other political subdivisions within the State of Florida. This has given us the background and insight of the problems face to face, and this now allows for an expanded, broad view of the regional problems.

The problem is the fact that a large amount of criminal activity occurs in south Florida, and this activity is, in part, of a terrorist nature and, in part, of a subversive nature. We will address the terrorist nature of the problem first.

During the last 10 years, a large number of bombings, shootings, and homicides, many still unsolved, have taken place in south Florida. Much of the activity has taken place in Dade County, although other neighboring counties have been affected. The largest number of incidents within Dade County have been reported in the city of Miami.

Approximately 59 percent of the population of the city of Miami is Latin, most of Cuban origin, and the total population hovers at around 11/2 million. Population figures are not constant due to the tourist trade and the transient nature of tourism.

The terrorism problem is based on a divergence of opinions as to how to achieve a common goal, which is the removal of Fidel Castro from Cuba; on the other hand, there are a multitude of self professed anti-Castro organizations fighting for position within the community along with other organizations which claim to be anti-Castro, but are, in fact, anti-American socialists in their ideals.

These groups have taken advantage of the popular notion that being anti-Castro is synonymous with being anti-Communist, anti-Socialist and pro-American. The ability of these groups to exist, solicit funds, influence the political process, et cetera, is mostly based upon the partial ignorance of the public at large.

Some segments of the local and Federal Government disagree as to what its organizations do, how they do it, and who its members are. Some groups are only in agreement that Castro should be gotten rid of, and they believe that socialist-Marxist theories will work if someone other than Castro were to implement them. Their struggle is not with the system, but with the system manager, and their goal is to replace the manager with one of their own choosing.

The second part of the problem in the area of subversion is closely linked to what we just spoke of--groups using their anti-Castro posture as their only credential in order to obtain the much-needed acceptance and funding.

If one accepts the premise that the United States has funded, trained, and protected several anti-Castro groups, one must also accept that other foreign powers would fund, train, and support their groups. These groups by publicly taking a strong anti-Castro posture were accepted with open arms in the Cuban community in the United States, and especially in south Florida.

The social, economic, and political intercourse in an open and democratic society like ours will allow crossing over of ideas but, more importantly, personnel. The effects of this phenomenon over a number of years will yield a maximum penetration of the large segment of the real anti-Castro groups. The legitimate anti-Castro groups' infiltration chronologically coincided with the withdrawal of support by the U.S. Government of some anti-Castro groups.

Left without any active groups to infiltrate and subvert, the full attention was diverted to subverting the whole Cuban community, the plan being that once the Cuban community was totally penetrated and once polarization of groups and ideals occurred, this same Cuban community would then serve to polarize and split the larger Anglo communities in south Florida.

The approach was simple and direct: First, split the Cuban groups as to different methods to carry out their goals; example, military actions as opposed to dialog; conducting raids against Cuba and Cuban targets in other South American countries, as opposed to carrying out urban disruption in major metropolitan area under the guise of hitting Castro targets in the United States.

Another example, the FLNC, which is the Cuban National Liberation Front, during the mid-1970's--as to disruption of their anti-Castro war, several groups were expelled by the majority of the groups with the FLNC coalition. The groups started to break up over ideological reasons. This, coupled with all the common problems of working towards a common goal, made it easier for the breakups to occur.

Without direct government funding and a lack of central control, some groups came up with goals and directions as varied and diverse as the people within the groups. When the factor of Latin personalities and machismo are thrown in, the result was that some groups were involved in almost open warfare in the streets of Miami.

An example of the lack of cooperation was the agreement that was reached for three groups to jointly carry out a bombing. The group that built the bomb set it to explode prematurely. The group that provided the manpower lost a man, Juan Felipe De La Cruz. In this way, one group beat another in making the press release. The mere fact that the groups were in turmoil within themselves served as a basis to confuse the Anglo community.

Persons who, all of a sudden, were propelled to public life and who came up with easy and definite solutions to complex problems were able to gather support within the Anglo community. They were able to use that community support to achieve professional infiltration.

Due to the problems involving the public use of names of persons or businesses, we have picked from the best-known examples--the ones in which arrests, indictments, convictions or public records can be used to prove the incidents mentioned.

During the year 1980, the Reverend Manuel Espinosa denounced Fidel Castro and his government. He also publicized his own association in covert work for the Castro government. Because Espinosa was the only exile whom Fidel Castro made public reference to, Espinosa's ability to penetrate Cuba's inner sanctum was well established.

Espinosa's revelations have for the most part been proven and stood the test of time. During his conferences, Espinosa named nurnerous persons as being Castro agents and denounced them as alleged infiltrators into government agencies.

Lourdes DoPico, also known as Lourdes Rey DoPico, had an active participation in the running, ownership and management of the firms Cuba Travel and Canaveral Travel. Both of these travel, agencies were providing tours to Cuba from the mainland of the United States of America. Both of these corporations were under investigation until late February 1982, when Canaveral Travel was indicted for Trading With the Enemy Act violations.

According to newspaper articles published as a result of those indictments, Lourdes DoPico was indicted on the same charges, and also charged with illegally transferring funds to Cuba.

Lourdes Dopico and her husband, Vicente Dopico, were also members of the Areito magazine, a socialist-communist publication, printed in New York City, and allegedly funded by Cuba. This publication is distributed in the United States.

According to Espinosa, while working at Jackson Memorial Hospital, a county-owned hospital in Dade County, Lourdes DoPico was getting information of patients in their mental ward. The person who provided information for transmission to Cuba is alleged to be Elsa Prieto. Due to the nature of mental illness these records are protected by State laws and Government guidelines, and usually only upon court order or personal waiver and release, can the information be obtained by a third party. The access of this type of information to suspected or actual Castro agents is of a great concern to all. Imagine if you will, what a fantastic tool for extortion or manipulation a foreign government would have by having this information. Let us ask you, how would you feel if you, your relatives, or assistants had a history of mental illness, and if this information was leaked to Cuba or any other country? Can you imagine the pressure that they could exercise over you?

Elsa Prieto was identified by Manuel Espinosa during his first conference on January 31, 1980 as a member of the Antonio Maeco Brigade. The brigade openly admits to its communist ideals. The Antonio Maceo Brigade has had several of their members allegedly involved and linked with convicted black activist, Al Featherston, convicted during the early 1970's for teaching young blacks to firebomb schools in the black community. He recently was indicted by a grand jury on aggravated assault charges stemming from the shooting of some Mariel refugees at his home.

The Antonio Maceo Brigade has been active at Florida International University in Dade County in attempts to recruit and sign up persons to avoid the new draft laws issued by President Reagan.

Featherston is a self-proclaimed Marxist. While we are talking about infiltration into professional fields, several other examples come to mind. Again, Lourdes DoPico was involved in working at Central Credit, a credit-rating firm for businesses. According to Espinosa's disclosures, an effort to obtain information in reference to the credit potential and buying ability of exiled Cubans in Miami was underway by the Castro government.

Reverend Espinosa himself has stated that he worked at Equifax, which is a retail credit-reporting firm. The ability of a foreign government to establish the financial abilities of its exiles is of value to them to determine what requests can be realistically made of those exiles. The fact that the-United States had an economic blockade as well as a trade embargo against Cuba, both of which are openly violated, makes knowing the economic potential of exiles in the United States of value.

For example, we have seen during the Mariel boatlift, the establishment of price ranges was in accordance with the real financial abilities of these exiles. If too high a price was asked for the release of relatives still held in Cuba, the boatlift would have failed, since most exiles would have been excluded. By making it affordable for a large majority of Cuban exiles, the large number of persons participating would create public opinion favorable to going through with the boatlift. The impact on the economic picture of south Florida, having hundreds of thousands of dollars in embargoed trade goods taken to Cuba, would cause the exiled community to be in total debt.

Second, once the Mariel refugees were in the United States, the exiles responsible for bringing them were economically unable to support them, having spent all their savings and exhausted their loan capacity to bring them in the first place. These newly arrived "Marielitos" would now become a burden not supported by the Cuban exiles. They immediately became city, county, State and Federal problems, thus creating a drain of U.S. funds and resources which was unplanned and unbudgeted.

As you can plainly see, the consequences of a few well-placed agents in the professional fields can eventually, if allowed to operate, cause a serious financial drain to the community and the Nation during a time when such a drain can adversely affect our national security.

Other benefits were also accrued by Castro. For example, the previously good name of exiled Cubans as hard-working individuals was besmirched by the actions of several thousand newly arrived Cubans. Individuals with serious criminal backgrounds and inmates from mental institutions were released to the United States by Castro for the very reasons stated above.

Let us look at the reasons that the Mariel boatlift was able to get such a good reception in the Cuban community in Miami. In order to do this, one must go back to the late 1960's when an earlier boatlift had been tried with very little success. This attempt was called Camarioca.

It is reported that the reasons why the exodus failed were economic and political. The newly arrived exiles did not possess the financial means to fund, on their own, a massive exodus. Due to their short time in the United States, most exiles were still struggling to get on their feet financially. Exiles did not have the political clout to cause the elected officials to subsidize such an undertaking. Although several thousand were swindled with promises of having their families brought over, no great boatlift occurred. Because of this failure in the past, the knowledge of the exiled community's economy was essential.

Twelve years later, the exile community was economically and politically mature enough to support such an undertaking. Any person who saw the Mariel boatlift developing could have predicted t; we, in fact, did.

Similar attempts had been made in the past--at one time, one by a Cuban exile, Ramon Donestevez, the then-owner of Pirahna boats. The exile climate was not ready for Donestevez' open talks with the Castro government. Although hidden in the best of motives--that of family reunification--Donestevez was denounced as a Castro puppet by the community, and as a result, Donestevez was the victim of several bombing attempts and two detonated bombs. Donestevez became the victim of a terrorist-style murder which still remains unsolved. Donestevez bodyguard for several years was a man by the name of Rafael Contreras, who was the owner of a small TV repair shop located in Hialeah, a city with the second largest Cuban exile population in Dade County.

During the late 1970's, after the Donestevez murder, the Reverend Manuel Espinosa was one of the few who dared to again propose the reunification of Cuban families, but this time the climate in the exile community was much more liberal and this type of political view was shared by many.

However, it is not coincidence that Espinosa had as one of his bodyguards the same Rafael Contreras. Several years later, Reverend Espinosa, during his denunciations, admits having been a principal player in a Cuban-organized and controlled plan to cause the exile community to travel to Cuba. Espinosa plainly admits to having been doing Castro's bidding. Castro, in one of his speeches, urged Cubans in the United States to follow Espinosa's guidance. So, we can plainly see that the same persons move with each others in the same roads to reach present goals within the United States.

Espinosa's bodyguard, Rafael Contreras, was publicly identified by Espinosa as a lieutant in the Cuban intelligence service. Contreras was later convicted in criminal court of making threatening phone calls to persons in Miami. One of those calls was made by him from Cuba and in it he threatened the Reverend Espinosa with Cuba's retaliation if Espinosa did not desist of his treachery, by publicly denying Castro's plans to cause chaos in the United States. While this was happening, several companies were opened to travel to Cuba. Some offered the exile tours to Cuba for an amount paid in full in advance, while it offered a much cheaper fare for the same tour to American citizens of non-Cuban descent. Here again we see the polarization of Cuban and Anglo communities in order to exacerbate already tense relations. The old adage of divide and conquer seems to be at work here; only in a more subtle manner but just as effective. The division of the community and the polarization still continues today.

Let us examine the companies that offered these tour packages to Cuba beginning with a brief history of Havanatur. In 1979, it was expelled from the United States for doing illegal business with Cuba and for being an illegal agent of Fidel Castro.

The owner of Havanatur was Carlos Alfonso Gonzalez. He has been identified by the U.S. State Department as a Cuban intelligence agent. Havanatur's president, Charles Romeu, has along with Carlos Alfonso Gonzalez, been indicted by a Federal grand jury for violations of the Trading With the Enemy Act.

Once expelled, Havanatur changed its operation to a company named Travel Services; it was also expelled and it left its concessions to American Airways Charter. American Airways Charter is owned by Fernando Fuentes Cova and Roger Dooley. Both have been indicted by Federal grand juries in Miami for violations of the Trading With the Enemy Act, according to public records.

Canaveral Travel, Cuban American Enterprises, and several other corporations held or owned by those already named were also involved.

Let us not belabor the point; suffice it to say that these companies, their ownership and ties to Cuba were on several occasions publicly denounced by Reverend Espinosa and others.

One of the points we wish to make is that the operations of these companies were in no way secret. The whole community knew they existed; they knew what was done by these companies. Still, they were not only tolerated, but also heavily patronized.

If we are to stop this kind of activity, new and strong legislation must be enacted to not only prohibit these companies from trading with Cuba, but also to provide for legal sanctions for those who choose to patronize them.

Gentlemen, let us not be fooled by thinking that a few indictments of these companies have solved the problem. The fact is that many more companies and persons are still in business. Due to the legal restrictions placed on law enforcement at all levels not only in the investigative arena but within the intelligence gathering and information dissemination areas, most of the information cannot be collected, recorded or disseminated. Therefore, we cannot publicly provide you with names of persons or corporations unless these persons have been arrested or convicted or are a matter of public record.

Other persons who assisted in setting up the stage for the boatlift were named by sources of our department. One of these persons is Hildo Romeo, currently a convicted felon and Federal fugitive for his fraudulent activity in the Mariel boatlift. Romeo was denounced as a Castro agent by Espinosa during his interviews. He also made admissions about his Cuban intelligence connections at the time of arrest.

Romeo operated with such impunity that it is almost incredible. For example, he would set up meetings in strange areas and demand that the U.S. currency be brought to him in paper sacks as payment. He often gave no receipts or gurantees. Whenever pressed for receipts, he would draw initials or a star or similar item upon a small postage stamp size piece of paper and would issue this. The payments were to obtain his help in gaining release of Cubans from Cuban jails, et cetera. After his arrest, Romeo admitted having diverted hundreds of thousands of U.S. dollars to Cuba.

Romeo is a good example of the openness and total disregard for our laws that Castro agents working in this country exhibit. During his first arrest, Romeo, while in handcuffs at the police department building and facing several felony charges, was brazen enough to threaten me and Special Agent Benitez. He said, "You guys should be nice to me, and be careful because Cuba is going to come after you for bothering me." When reminded he was the one in handcuffs and we were able to go home after we booked him, he said, "You cannot hurt me; I am too big for you."

The point is that Romeo is not the most brazen; he, in fact, is a quiet man compared to some of the others we have dealt with. If one really looks at it, he really did beat us. We convicted him in court; he fled, served no time, and is in some other country, or even in the United States, enjoying the money he stole, perhaps waiting for others to do it again.

Romeo made the following statements to us during an interview immediately following his third arrest on worthless checks and fraud charges. Mr. Romeo stated that the Mariel boatlift was a plan conceived by Cuba and carried out by agents of Cuba's Directory of General Intelligence, DGI, working within the United States.

Romeo pointed out that the Mariel boatlift was led by Napoleon Vilaboa, a captain of Cuba's intelligence, and others working within Havanatur Travel Agency, operated by Colonel Carlos A1fonso, also of Cuban intelligence. Mr. Romeo confirmed working for Cuba's intelligence, but denied being an actual officer, unlike the following persons which he identified as being actual agents of Cuba that were involved in the Mariel boatlift: Col. Carlos Alfonso of American Airways; Col. Jorge De Bassa; Lt. Col. Fernando Fuentes Cobas, American Airways Charter; Capt. Napoleon Vilaboa, DGI, and boatlift coordinator; Capt. Eduardo Lastra, heading covert operations in the United States and the Caribbean; Col. Charles Romeo, American Airways Charter; Juan Carbonell, Cuban Interest Section in Washington; Lt. Eduardo Rueda, DGI, and assisted in the boatlift; Lt. Col. Jose Ignacio Marquez, DGI in Cuba; Rafael Correa, DGI, and assisted with the boatlift; Marcos Raul Correa, DGI, and assisted in the boatlift; Albor Ruiz, DGI, and also a member of the Antonio Maceo Brigade; Estevan Martin, DGI, and photographer, and also assisted in the boatlift; Orestes Aleman, DGI, Cuban American Enterprises.

Romeo requested that this information be kept confidential due to Cuba's infiltration within many Federal and State law enforcement agencies. The above information had already been received by other sources and, in fact, several of the above individuals have already been indicted by a Federal grand jury for trading with the enemy; others are still under investigation.

You can plainly see the infiltration by Cuban agents who are planted not only to gather information but also to cause distrust and fear of Cuban exiles within the United States.

For example, let's look at infiltration into the Government service area. It has been alleged, although not independently corroborated by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, that the affirmative action program has been used successfully by suspected Castro agents using race as a hiring criteria. This provides access to Government jobs when other criteria for employment is lacking, such as job knowledge, and other skills.

Let's examine advisers to boards and other quasi-governmental agencies. During 1979, while the Rev. Manuel Espinosa was working with Castro agents and reporting directly to Cuba, he held the 26th of July party at this residence. The 26th of July is one of the biggest Cuban revolutionary holidays and is only equal in pomp and might to the May Day parade in the U.S.S.R.

The guest list at Espinosa's 26th of July party was noteworthy. Attending the party were two of the highest ranking Cuban exiles within a major political party. These men were not only fundraisers but also served as advisers to some of the highest political figures in the south Florida area. It has been alleged that when consulted as to the possibility of stopping the Mariel boatlift, these persons provided high Government officials with statements that the Cuban exile community would riot, if not allowed to go to Cuba and bring their relatives. The power of these types of statements coupled with the recent riots that had rocked Miami during the same period provided an atmosphere conducive to community sentiment. It is easy to see why nothing was done to stop the boatlifts.

Let's focus our attention to other areas of equal importance. Earlier, we spoke of anti-Castro groups who flaunt their anti-Castro credentials, thus creating the illusion of being anti-Socialist and anti-Communist. For argument sake, let's just see if any group of such political or ideological persuasion should be allowed to become involved in such a legitimate government function as census taking.

A group know as Abdala was involved in the taking of 1980 census with the city of Miami. It is still not known if Abdala, as a group, was contracted or if merely a large group of its members were individually contracted on a personal basis because of existing friendships and/or political connections. Regardless of the group's ideology or how the contract was awarded, questions have arisen. There exists a serious doubt as to the accuracy of the census in some areas of Dade County. This is according to census supervisory personnel contacted. Litigation is pending over the accuracy of the figures reported. One must wonder if it was not planned for this group to be involved and possibly precipitate doubts as to the census' accuracy? Could it have been an accidental happening, the sole work of coincidence? No one will ever know. The traditional Federal and local intelligence gathering units did not know it or predict it. Investigations are not in progress to find out more about it.

Gentlemen, if the possibility exists that the census can be sabotaged and, therefore, the balance of State and local government adversely affected, does not this tie directly to national security? We believe that it does, but you, ultimately, must be the judges.

We can only present the facts as they are known or reported to us. We do not reach conclusions from these facts.

At this time, we would like to present several examples of how well-planned and well-coordinated use of infiltrated agents and collaborators has helped to create chaos in our society.

The first example we would like to present is the Mariel boatlift. Let us first say that any of these examples we have chosen, due to their magnitude and significance, can serve to illustrate several points. Even so, they were chosen to represent a picture of a specific area of concern.

The Mariel boatlift included all types of problems in the criminal area. It comprised conspiracy to defraud, larceny and even attempted murder. Politically, it created a new voting bloc by raising the potential bloc from 54 percent to 59 percent within a geographic area.

Approximately 2 months before the actual boatlift took place, sources of our department provided the information that certain travel agencies had received orders to contact Napoleon Vilaboa to start with the plans for a boatlift. Right after this, the rumors began to circulate that Cuba would begin to release prisoners to the United States.

The rumor came by telephone calls and letters received from Cuba. The majority of these telephone calls and letters named persons within the Cuba exile community. These persons, for a certain fee, would use their contacts in Cuba to obtain the release of Cubans still held in Castro's jails.

The rumors hit the exile community like wildfire. The persons named were allegedly Napoleon Vilaboa, who fled; Hildo Romeo, who was convicted; Estevan Martin, who fled; Rafael Correa; Armando Rodriguez; Sandra and Jaime Franco, who were indicted; Nelly Gonzalez, Sandra's mother; Marcos Raul Correa; and three reverends who were later indicted by a U.S. attorney.

These persons were instantly transformed into extremely powerful figures; they were sought by exiles to assist them in getting their relatives to the United States. Store fronts were opened to accommodate the large crowds that wanted to pay these people to bring relatives back. Frequently, transactions were made on a cash basis only; no receipts were given. A flaw in Florida law was taken advantage of. This flaw precluded the use of a future promise not fulfilled from successful fraud prosecution. As a matter of fact, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement through legislative liason, requested and obtained an introduction of corrective legislation after the Mariel experience.

After the investigtion commenced, the victims were told by the person involved in the fraudulent activities that they (the victims) were committing a Federal crime by conspiring to bring unregistered aliens to the United States; that if arrests ensued from the transactions, it would be a one-on-one situation and they could equally be prosecuted. Victims were also told that police, judges, and politicians had been paid off, so no one should be trusted, as they worked for the Castro agents. This was a lie, but it created such distrust that no one would come forward to testify for several months after the end of the Mariel boatlift.

While this was ongoing, marches and rallies were held. The Spanish media and the new Cuban self-styled leaders appeared on radio shows and were featured in public meetings in the written Spanish press, all urging the people to go to Cuba and pick up their beloved ones.

All this went on for several weeks. At the end, Castro announced that he would release anyone who was requested in person through intermediaries, but only if the request was made by someone willing and waiting to take the persons from Cuba to the United States. The statement brought Cubans from as far as New Jersey, Puerto Rico, and California, to Miami. Everyone wanted boats to go to Cuba--all sizes, all shapes, no matter the cost.

For 15 days, the boats left and headed for Mariel harbor in Cuba. Boats could be seen everywhere in south Florida. Highway U.S. 1 to Key West was jammed by vehicles towing boats to be used to go to Cuba and bring back relatives, friends, et cetera. The Florida Keys motels were booked solid by Cubans to await their relatives' return. A routine 4-hour trip from Miami to Key West took more than 1 day to complete due to the jammed-up streets. This was the biggest wave of humanity to have hit south Florida.

Due to the airlines being booked solid and because no one was able to drive, Special Agent Benitez had to rent a plane to fly to Key West, along with a department pilot and other agents, in order to report back to supervisors and coordinate some State efforts. When the Marielitos started arriving, the situation became impossible, as twice the amount of people were now jammed into the Florida Keys.

The stories of the boatlift can fill books as to the reasons and the aftermath. However, a few well-placed persons at the right time had unleashed a community that had been underestimated as to its ability and resourcefulness to violate the law. After the first few days of the boatlift, the President declared it unlawful to go to Cuba to bring unreported aliens. The boatlift continued for over 1 month after that order. The aftermath is well known, from the detention camps to the high criminal activity that the boatlift left in ts wake.

Attempts to prosecute the guilty were almost impossible. Enough legal research had been done to permit persons to be exempt from the laws as they were written, although they were clearly included by their acts in that the spirit of the law had been broken--the manner of operating was a fraud.

Persons paid in cash for the release of their relatives still held in Cuba. Of course, the Cubans never came; instead, Cuban prisoners, inmates from mental hospitals, unskilled laborers, the sick, and some of the criminal elements were sent by Castro to thé United States.

Enough of the wanted relatives and ax-political prisoners were released by Cuba to preserve the hope and expectations of the Cuban exiles waiting for their relatives. Many of the ones that came were hard-working, decent persons who availed themselves of the quickest way out. Once they had arrived in the United States, they quickly became productive citizens.

Due to the community outcry over the wide scope of the reported fraud, the Department of Law Enforcement undertook an intense investigation concentrated on the investigation of suspects, victims, and monetary value of the reported fraud. Extensive resources were permitted to the investigation which resulted in the identification of numerous suspects and hundreds of victims with an approximate monetary value exceeding $1 million. The investigation was coordinated jointly with other Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies. Prosecution was through both State and Federal courts which resulted in the convictions of several individuals for violations of Federal and State laws. However, it should be noted that successful prosecution was not obtainable in all cases due to lack of prosecutable evidence and defects in the applicable Florida statute. Some prosecutions were successfully instituted, one against Hildo Romeo, one of the largest violators.

During the boatlift all types of problems were encountered from lack of forms and supplies to register the new immigrants, to lack of food, beds, phones, manpower, et cetera. Even persons to interview these newly arrived exiles were lacking. Many were given the address of U.S. Immigration and a date to report for processing, then let go without further screening.

Government agencies had been warned; they chose to ignore the problem and completely underestimated the ability and willingness of the Cuban community to bring back who they thought were their relatives, in spite of legal threats not to do so.

A year and a half later there is talk of a second Mariel or possibly an airlift, this time to Orlando, Fla., area, home of Disneyworld. That community has almost one-half of the resources available that Dade County had for the Mariel boatlift which nearly bankrupted Dade County because of its sheer magnitude.

Let us now turn our attention to another problem which is well know in south Florida as well as in the rest of the United States. This problem is drug trafficking. For several years law enforcement agents in south Florida have received information of Castro ties to the illegal drug traffic in the United States.

The people who can provide the information are trade criminals, many with standing convictions; their credibility and motive can be questioned. Second, the other problem is the protection of potential court material. It is a commonly known fact that within the underworld, the Government and law enforcement can only pose as obstacles to criminal activity. The code of the underworld is much more strict and more effective; it provides no appeal and is just as far reaching as our Government. These problems present great obstacles to those who seek to provide an incentive to persons in the know who could assist law enforcement by their cooperation. In very simple words, they fear the Government but they are more fearful of other criminal elements and, as a result, witnesses stay quiet.

The effort to overcome these obstacles has taken several years to bear fruit, but at this time, sources known to the Department of Law Enforcement have provided information which links some of the drug traffickers to Cuba. For example, intelligence information indicated that Cuba has guaranteed the Colombian drug shipments to persons who the Castro government will from time to time designate. Not having to pay for the drug shipment and being able to sell it on consignment enables well-chosen drug dealers to become rich, powerful, and influential quickly at small risk and without a large capital investment. The immediate advantage of this activity gives the new drug smuggler a great potential for fighting over this preferred treatment. At any time, one new group could be told to wipe out an existing group for any reason, and then take its place. We have not seen the beginning of drug wars should this happen.

Sources also state that Castro provides safe haven and harbor to those mother ships loaded with drugs traveling through Cuban waters. Allegations are also that he charges a toll for the use of Cuban waters, Cuban patrol escorts, and the unlawful use of Cuban flags to prevent boarding and seizure by U.S. authorities.

We have sources that not only have reported this information but also claimed to have been involved in their planning and execution.

The problem is that these witnesses and sources are very fearful for their lives and the lives of their families due to the widespread corruption as well as the violence.that drug smuggling organizat~ons are known to take.

Before progress is made, law enforcement must regain the confidence of the public. We will provide a copy of a transcribed tape obtained by Special Agent Benitez and me from a source who was involved in some smuggling operations and its connections in Cuba. Other sources have stated that Cuba is currently harvesting marijuana to provide some competition to Colombia and Jamaica. This information is not verified but if it is true, it would point to a larger involvement by the Cuban Government than previously thought. Although no more concrete proof can be presented at this time as to Cuban ties to narcotic traffic in the United States, we are hopeful that what we have presented will be used as the basis to provide resources and manpower in order to properly investigate this alleged activity of the Cuban Government. By so doing, the solutions to this problem can be implemented.

In 1979, a known anti-Castro revolutionary Cuban exile, Reinol Rodriguez, was shot at by an unknown assailant from a moving vehicle as he approached his home. The shots were fired from a silenced machine gun, but missed the victim, Rodriguez, as he dove down to the floor of his vehicle.

The Florida Department of Law Enforcement has received several unconfirmed reports from sources that Cuba holds Mr. Reinol Rodriguez responsible for the assassination of Carlos Muniz, a suspected Cuban agent who was also involved in a travel agency which sponsored flights to Cuba and Puerto Rico. The assassination of Carlos Muniz was credited to Omega-7, a secret, anti-Castro terrorist organization in the United States and Puerto Rico

According to reliable sources, a retaliation plot was in effect on the man Cuba thought had been directly responsible for the incident. During a press conference held by Jenaro Perez on February 15, 1980, Perez denounced many Cuban agents whom he had met while covertly working as head administrator of Havanatur Travel Agency, which was forced to close down after being identified by Federal agents as being a Cuban intelligence operation front.

Jenaro Perez makes reference to a conversation between himself and Col. Charles Romeu that shortly after the shooting attempt at Reinol Rodriguez, Mr. Romeo stated that Cuba has begun to settle its accounts, meaning the attempt was carried out by orders of Cuba

It should be noted that Mr. Charles Romeo was one of the individuals indicted for trading with the enemy, and the State Department has confirmed that Mr. Romeo was, in fact, a Cuban intelligence official.

At this time, I would also like to read a newspaper article which appeared in the Miami Herald on February 19, 1982, regarding four firms, or I can submit it for the record.

Senator Destroy. You may submit it for the record and it will be published. l

Mr. PINON. This newspaper article includes the indictments of the eight persons by the Federal grand jury in Miami involving the travel agency. This article clearly shows that some of those same individuals that were identified by Reverend Espinosa and Mr. Jenaro Perez as being Cuban intelligence agents were, in fact, investigated for those charges and the investigation was brought to a successful conclusion.

Some of the same witnesses and sources used can be made available to this committee in furtherance of this investigation.

Let us go on to other incidents. In November 1980, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement uncovered an alleged plot by Cuban agents to assassinate Reverend Espinosa for his betrayal of Cuba by the series of denouncements which he made beginning on January 31, 1980. One of the three agents was apprehended by me during an ongoing surveillance of Reverend Espinosa, and this same subject subsequently turned informant. During the debriefing, the source made statements confirming that he was an agent of the Cuban Government, trained in subversion and terrorist tactics, and sent abroad to the United States to infiltrate the young anti-Castro revolutionary organizations.

This subject explained that Castro would not forgive Reverend Espinosa and had given orders to kill him. This individual also brought out an interesting point about the Peruvian Embassy takeover in Havana which later led to the Mariel boatlift. He stated it was, in fact, an effort to divide the Cuban exile community, creating havoc at a difficult time nearing a recession.

The subject pointed out that at first, the plan was meant for the Venezuelan Embassy, but was suddenly changed. This is in direct conflict with the community's belief that the Peruvian Embassy takeover was a spontaneous incident instead of being part of a well-organized plot instigated by the Castro government.

Three separate polygraph examinations were administered by a police officer and polygraph examiner of the Miami Police Department, thus confirming the veracity of the above information.

I have a copy of a newspaper article which came out in the Miami Herald in regard to the above-described incident. I have it here and I would like to include that, also, in the record.

Senator DENTON. So ordered.

Mr. Pylon. To further illustrate the links possessed by foreign agents in south Florida, we will refer to other cases made by other agencies involving the illegal sale of weapons to persons or corporations who will make them available to governments unfriendly to the United States. This specific information was received from Joseph Benitez, the coordinator of the President's Task Force of Florida Crime chaired by Vice President George Bush. Joseph Benitez is currently assigned to the Treasury Department. Due to the sensitivity of these cases, only very general information will be released at this time. However, more complete information can be released during an executive session. A certain gunshop linked to Cuba has been involved in the illegal sale of guns and machine guns to foreign countries. Indictments of both Cubans and Americans have been obtained for conspiracy to deal, ship, and transport firearms from Miami, Fla., to foreign countries between August 1, 1979, and January 29, 1979, without being properly licensed. The firearms ultimately were sent to Nicaragua leftist guerrillas. Information was also received involving a Russian agent who was involved in buying and shipping over 150 firearms to a leftist group attempting to overthrow the present government of Jamaica.

On January 13, 1982, I assisted Special Agent Juan Perez of the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration in the recovery of two explosive devices. Upon arriving at the scene, we noted that the devices were two oval-shaped grenades, steel casing, smooth finish, with a seam in the middle--fully active explosives with unidentifiable content weighing 9 ounces each. The grenades were identified as being U.S.S.R. ROD-5 hand grenades made in 1976. Intelligence sources reported that the grenades were brought into the United States by an alleged Cuban DGI agent who was also involved in smuggling narcotics via Cuba, from Colombia to Miami.

[Photographs of Russian grenades follow:]

Mr. PINON. According to sources, these grenades were part of a shipment of over 200 that were brought into the United States. Sources further indicated that the agent is involved with the M-19 Colombian terrorist organization and has taken shipments of weapons from Cuba to leftist guerrillas in E1 Salvador and Nicaragua. One source reported that the illegal profits of narcotics was being used to finance subversive and terrorist activities.

At present, we have had three separate bombings in the city of Miami involving Russian ROD grenades, and a possible fourth incident still not positively identified. The first bombing occurred on October 2, 1980, at Eloy Motors, 1479 Southwest Sixth Street, Miami, Fla., at approximately 4:05 a.m. I have copies of those reports and photographs which I also would like to submit for the record. Here is a copy of the original incident report made by the Miami Police Department, and included with this are the photographs of the bomb scenes, which I also would like to include in the record.

Senator DENTON. So ordered.

[Submitted incident report and photographs are being retained in subcommittee files.]

Mr. PINON. The second bombing occurred on September 29, 1981, at a bar at 2898 Northwest Seventh Ave., Miami, Fla., at approximately 2:45 a.m. But this time, a person inside the bar received numerous lacerations and wounds throughout the body and was subsequently transported to the hospital for treatment. I also have that report right here, including the photographs, describing the scene.

The third bombing occurred on February 22, 1982, at a private residence located at 2740 Northwest Sixteenth Terrace, with damages to a parked vehicle. I have the report here, and also photographs of the scene, which I would like to include into the record.

Mr. Pylon. These cases are still under investigation by the Miami Police Department.

These incidents were allegedly perpetrated by assailants under the guidance of Cuban agents for no apparent reasons, but positively to cause the authorities to concentrate on anti-Castro groups, thus enhancing their capability to continue their intelligence work. There is still in excess of 200 Russian grenades somewhere in the United States to be used any time in the future for the sole purpose of creating death or destruction.

In closing we would like to say that we have made several observat~ons:

One, how some of the anti-Castro groups were infiltrated.

Two, the ability of persons who work for foreign governments to penetrate not only professional fields, but also Government agencies, as well as other social service agencies, allegedly including law enforcement agencies.

Three, we have seen how a few persons given the right timing and the resources, can precipitate incidents that will cost millions of dollars to the taxpayers and produce problems that will take years to solve.

Four, the access to the Latin media and the manipulation, by certain self-professed leaders and other persons of questionable motives of this medium has been shown. The ability of members of the Spanish media to shape public opinion is very real.

Five, the Cuban connection to drug traffic, and how the moneys derived from this lucrative business can establish social empires with real political clout.

Six, finally the connection of Cuban agents who are able not only to do Castro's bidding openly with the United States, but how they have the capability to bring to the United States certain Russian made explosives.

Never before has such open criminal behavior been carried out by agents of foreign governments. This concludes our statement.

We have other materials which we can provide to the committee. I have a copy of the report which I made when I recovered the grenades, when I went along with the special agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration, and I also have the photographs describing the grenades. I have nine photographs showing the grenades that I recovered, fully active [indicating]. 1

We will now answer questions of the subcommittee.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, Mr. Pinon. I notice that there have been rhetorical and grammatical corrections, and some omissions from the original prepared statement which was given to us last evening.

Could you explain the reason for these changes?

Mr. Pinon. Well, the first statement that we made was actually a rough draft of what we wanted to present, and it had not been reviewed by our legal counsel and our department. Therefore, there were many errors found in grammar and they corrected some of it and asked us to make the corrections.
 

Senator DENTON. Well, I will be asking you some questions that are taken from the earlier statement which was submitted to the subcommittee.
 

For example, we had previous testimony before this subcommittee to the effect that Fidel Castro had boasted that he could cause a race riot in the United States at any time and in any place of his choosing. In your original prepared statement, you had a statement to the effect that the Antonio Maceo Brigade has been active at Florida International University in Dade County in attempts to recruit and sign up persons to avoid the new draft laws issued by President Reagan.

You mentioned a man named Featherston as being connected with this operation, and you say that Featherston was convicted for teaching young Miami blacks to firebomb schools in the black community.

Are those true statements that I just made?

Mr. PINON. Yes, sir.

Mr. BENITEZ. Senator, if I may, I had a little bit of involvement with the Featherston case earlier in my career. The statements and the allegations that have been made and information that we have received are that members of the Antonio Maceo Brigade are actually not only at Florida International University. We mentioner that one because it is a State-supported university.

Senator DENTON. Would you put the microphone closer to your mouth, please, sir?

I have Florida International University; that is the only one.

Mr. BENITEZ. Yes, sir, Florida International.

Senator DENTON. OK.

Mr. BENITEZ. There are other members of the Antonio Maceo Brigade that attend other schools, and they are actually engaged in trying to get people not to sign up for the new draft law, or the proposed new draft law, if and when it becomes implemented.

Mr. Featherston was, in fact, convicted and was released from jail approximately 3 or 4 years ago. He is currently under indictment for another incident in which he was involved in shooting some Mariel refugees that were at his residence.

As a matter of fact, there was a rather extensive article in Tropic Magazine, which is the Miami Herald's Sunday edition magazine, dealing with Mr. Featherston and some of his claims and some of his ideologies. We would like to introduce that to the committee for inclusion in your records

Senator DENTON. Thank you, Mr. Benitez.

This testimony is mind-boggling to me, and I thought I knew something about terrorist activity in the United States. We have a case here of a man who is a DGI affiliate, if not an agent. He is engaged in teaching young Miami blacks to firebomb schools in the black community, and is also associated with an institutionalized effort in more than one university to recruit people not to sign up for the draft, is that correct?

Mr. PINON. That is correct.

Mr. BENITEZ. Yes, sir, it is.

Senator DENTON. Reportedly, the Department of State has evidence that links the Cuban Government to drug smuggling activities in the United States. They cite the case of Jaime Guillot Lara, a Colombian now in jail in Mexico, who claims to have funneled arms and money to a Colombian leftist group in return for Cuban aid in smuggling marihuana shipments to the United States.Have you, in the course of your investigations, come across evidence or information indicating that Cuba is actively involved in any way in drug smuggling into the United States? If so, would you please describe that evidence or information?Mr. PINON. Yes, Mr. Chairman. We have one source whom we arrested on narcotics charges. This source was involved, also, in the Mariel boatlift with subjects that we arrested. He has made several trips to Cuba. This same subject provided information advising us that narcotics trafficking was coming via Cuba from Colombia.

Specifically explained, when the boats left Colombia, they left with the Cuban flag in order to let the Cuban Government know that they were coming in friendly. The Cuban Government boats would come to the mother ships to escort them into the Cuban key, which is called Cayo Paredon Grander that is the name of the key. The mother ship will be escorted there and it is met by Cuban officers, who will then view the exchange when boats coming from the United States would come to Cayo Paredon Grande to transfer the narcotics from the mother ship into the smaller vessels.

Those boats are escorted to a limit close to the United States, possibly around the 10-mile limit, where they will take the Cuban flag and throw it into the water. The Cuban Government has advised these drug smugglers that as long as they fly the Cuban flag, the U.S. Coast Guard will not interfere so as not to cause an international incident.

Senator DENTON. Let me see if I have this straight. A ship comes from Colombia loaded with marihuana and passes around to the north side of Cuba. Is not Cayo Paredon Grande on the north side?

Mr. PINON. Yes, sir. There is an area between the Bahamas-- about a 12- to 17-mile area between the Bahamas and Cuba, and that is where that key is located.

Senator DENTON. As a signal, that ship, which is Colombian, hoists the Cuban flag to indicate that it is friendly, and is escorted into the rather protected waters of the key, Cayo Paredon Grande. Other smaller craft come alongside; the marihuana is transferred to them.

Is there something that goes from the smaller craft to the Cuban Government? These smaller craft are coming from the United States. Are they giving up anything?

Mr. Pinon Yes, sir. At times, the smugglers will provide the Cuban officials with goods coming from the United States, such as televisions, Betamax machines. Anything that they will request from them, they will bring them to the government officials in Cuba.

We do not know if that is part of the payment or if that is just a compliment to continue their operations.

Senator DENTON. Are there ever any weapons, small arms, included in that?

Mr. PINON. According to our sources, as soon as they get near the Cuban waters, when the two Cuban boats come to escort them in, they have to surrender their weapons. When they leave Cuba and they get escorted away up to the proximity of the United States, which is approximately a 10-mile limit, or probably a little further away, they will give the weapons back and they will come to the United States.

Senator DENTON. SO, there are no shipments of small arms included in that, per se--no shipment of small arms?

Mr. BENITEZ. Mr. Chairman, if I may answer that, according to the knowledge of this particular individual, we do not know of other shipments.

I would also like to see if you would accept for introduction a translation and transcription of a taped interview which I took of this person on June 30, 1981. I have a rough copy, but I will pronde the actual translation and transcription for inclusion in your record, in which some of these questions are asked and a reply is given.

Senator DENTON. Thank you. We will accept that and insert it in the record. l

Do these ships leave Colombia with the Cuban flag, or do they only hoist that Cuban flag as they get near Cuba?

Mr. PINON. That is correct. When they get near Cuba, they put up the Cuban flag.

Senator DENTON. Who unloads these ships? Who oversees the unloading? Are there any Cuban officers present?

Mr. BENITEZ. It is alleged that there are Cuban patrol boats present all the time, but they do not get involved in the offloading; they merely watch it. It is also alleged that they charge money for the actual amount transferred. They weigh it, or they supervise its being weighed, and then they charge accordingly.

Senator DENTON. In other words, the Cuban Government allegedly is receiving money for overseeing and permitting that operation?

Mr. BENITEZ. That is correct; providing safe harbor and, at the same time, charging a toll.

Senator DENTON. Do you have any idea what kind of money is involved, how much?

Mr. BENITEZ. Yes, sir. There is a figure that was quoted to us; I would have to take a minute to look for it. Excuse me. [Pause.]

I have found it. The figure of $50,000 for any vessel which is larger than 10 tons--excuse me, no larger than 10 tons--is what I have on my notes.

Senator DENTON. Fifty thousand dollars for a 10-ton vessel, more or less?

Mr. BENITEZ. More or less.

Senator DENTON. Ten tons is pretty small. Are you talking about the mother ship which is bringing the marijuana or the smaller vessels which are coming from the United States?

Mr. BENITEZ. It is not exactly clear, but I believe that the smaller vessels are the ones that pay as they are loaded. By "smaller vessels," we mean yacht-size vessels, as opposed to mother ships.

Senator DENTON. That could be a pretty good sum on just one operation. Could it not?

Mr. BENITEZ. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DENTON. In connection with these offloadings and loadings, have you heard the names of the following Cuban officers:
 

Colonels Angel and Gustavo?
 

Mr. PINON. Yes, sir, Angel and Gustavo.
 

Senator DENTON. What do you know about them?
 

Mr. BENITEZ. They are alleged to be agents in Cuba of the Ministry of State, and these are the code words that the vessels radio to obtain a Coast Guard patrol boat escort when they get near Cuban waters.
 

Senator DENTON. What role did the source who gave this information play in the operation?
 

Mr. BENITEZ. He has been directly involved in at least two offload operations and the planning of several others.
 

Mr. PINON. He was the boat captain.
 

Mr. BENITEZ. He was the boat captain, and he has been involved in other smuggling operations.
 

Mr. PINON. Mr. Chairman, if I may, also, this same source was also involved with Mr. Romeo, so he had established a relationship with these two colonels. Now, he only knew them by first name; he did not know them by last name. But he had met with them on several occasions.

Senator DENTON. Mr. Peraza indicated that one of the aims of the DGI was to attack institutions in the United States; "all institutions," I believe were his words. Did this informant overhear any Cuban official indicate that the Cuban Government was trying to sponsor, not only for profit but for other means, the introduction of drugs into the United States?

Mr. BENITEZ. I believe he made a comment about it, but it is not a part of the tape transcript that I brought and I would rather not go into it at this point.

Senator DENTON. Would you describe your respective involvements with the people who came into the United States during the Mariel boatlift in 1980? What percentage, in your opinion, of the people were DGI agents, hardened criminals, mental patients, homosexuals?

Mr. BEATEN. There was a rather large amount of difficulty in establishing the figures because the persons were being handled at several points and by several different groups due to the amount of people that came in at any given time. They had many teams working on them around the clock, and it is hard to put together what these teams obtained.

Also, the only statements that we have is their actual admission that they were at the time they were interviewed. And you have to realize that due to the volume of people that came, only a few minutes were allotted per person for debriefing and interview.

Senator DENTON. I am not as well read on the subject of the Mariel boatlift, I am sure, as most of the people who live around Miami. Would you confirm or negate the validity of these impressions I have received?

There was much fraud involved; in other words, after the Cuban community got to a certain size, having escaped from Cuba, their financial means were deliberately estimated by the DGI. When it looked as if there would be enough money involved to make it interesting, and also for the purpose of hitting the United States with a massive exodus from Cuba of undesirables who would cause a financial burden to the Federal and local governments as well as provide a massive crowd in which to immerse agents, Castro deliberately imposed this upon the United States. Is that generally true?
 

Mr. BENITEZ. That appears to be the trend or the pattern that was set, Mr. Chairman. Some of the people were, in fact, lied to and told that they would have their relatives returned from Cuba if they paid money. The actual collection of the money was usually done on street corners or in some of the private residences of the persons involved in the fraud. They took advantage of a flaw within the State law that allows you to make an unfulfilled promise as a contract and you cannot be charged criminally for it. That has been corrected.

Mr. PINON. Mr. Chairman, if I may, during the debriefing of Mr. Romeo, he explained to us that the Cuban Government was charging $1,500 for each person that was coming to the United States from Cuba. Mr. Romeo was charging approximately $2,000, making a $500 profit on each person.

He also explained that depending on the person, the price may go up. If it was a doctor or somebody in a professional field, then the price would go up. One particular individual paid $12,000 to get a brother out of Cuba, who was a doctor.
 

Senator DENTON. A good deal of this money went to the Cuban Government?
 

Mr. PINON. Yes, sir. Mr. Romeo explained that he delivered cash to Cuba. He took it in airplanes and on boats to the Cuban Government. He delivered cash, U.S. dollars, which is a violation of the trade embargo. Mr. Romeo also sent many goods to Cuba--he admitted to that, also--tires and many, many other appliances which the government requested from him.

Also, there were other people known as Sandra Franco, Dr. Jaime Franco, and Nelly Gonzalez. These people were interviewing the Cubans in the community that wanted their relatives to be brought to the United States, and they made threats to the people by saying that they were backed by the Cuban Government; that if they made any statements to the authorities in the United States their families would be killed in Cuba and they would be dealt with here in the United States because they had connections with authorities here in the United States, and people were afraid to talk.

When we began the investigation and made the arrest of Hildo Romeo--and I have the newspaper article here--when we made the arrest of Romeo, then people began to come forward, and we received numerous, numerous calls. We had something like an approximate figure of close to a million dollars that people had been defrauded of, that they had given to these people to bring their families over. In fact, their families were never brought.

Senator DENTON. Now, that figure is only those who were defrauded. Were some actually rewarded by the relatives arriving?

Mr. Pylon. That is correct. Well, the people that reported this fraud were the people whose families did not come to the United States. They had paid the amount, and they were told that the person they paid the amount to did not have control over it; that the Cuban Government would send other people in the boat, and that they tried it and they did their best at it. But these people that paid the money never got the services.

Senator DENTON. So, we do not know the sum of money involved in those who did get relatives back, because they would have no reason to complain or admit they effectively bribed a foreign government to send them in. Is that generally true?
 

Mr. PINON. That is correct.
 

Mr. BENITEZ. That is correct, and one other thing; it was explicitly brought out to them that they were involved in a conspiracy to smuggle in illegal aliens; therefore, the persons were very, very fearful of being arrested and charged so they would not come forward.

If they were lucky enough to get a relative in, they just more or less forgot about it. On several occasions, we found out about it, and we tried to interview them, and they really did not want anything to do with law enforcement agencies or Immigration or any body else. They just wanted to be left alone.

Senator DENTON. And this Romeo is the man who was arrogant enough to essentially thumb his nose at you and say he was bigger than you are. And although the evidence against him was massive, he eventually did prove able to get out from under, as it were. What did he do, jump bail?
 

Mr. BENITEZ. Yes, sir.
 

Mr. PINON. Yes, after the third arrest.
 

Mr. BENITEZ. He is currently a State and a Federal fugitive.
 

Mr. PINON. The threats took place during the first arrest. When we arrested him the second time and the third time is when he finally gave us a statement and he wanted to cooperate with us. We could not make any deals with him because of the number of people he had defrauded. We had over 300 persons that were witnesses against him, and we could not make any deals. So, he bonded out and fled the country.

Senator DENTON. In your statement, you referred to Russian grenades being exploded and found in Miami within the last year. Do you have any information on these Russian grenades? Were any recovered, and where and by whom?

Mr. BENITEZ. There have been some recovered by Special Agent Juan Perez and my partner, Special Agent Pinon of our department. Agent Perez, by the way, is an agent with the Drug Enforcement Administration. They recovered them intact from some persons within the community that had access apparently to many more, and who now have gotten rid of some of them. And they floated through the community to a point where we were able to locate some and retrieve them.

Senator DENTON. Prior to the recovery to which you refer, was any law enforcement agency given notice of the existence of those hand grenades, and if so, with what response did that law enforcement agency react to that notification?
 

Mr. BENITEZ. To the best information we have, there were allegations that other agencies were aware of it. What response they gave, I do not exactly know, but they were, in fact, retrieved by other agents at a later time.
 

Senator DENTON. Did the Drug Enforcement Administration have prior notice?
 

Mr. BENITEZ. Part of the allegation states that they did.
 

Senator DENTON. And what is your knowledge of their action in response to that notification?
 

Mr. BENITEZ. Well, I do not have an actual response. What I do know is that they were retrieved almost a year later by members of the Drug Enforcement Administration and members of my own department.
 

Senator DENTON. Why was there such a long time lag of 1 year, considering the notification?
 

Mr. BENITEZ. I am not personally acquainted with the intricacies of the investigation on the Drug Enforcement side. I will ask Mr. Pinon to see if he has any more knowledge on that aspect.
 

Mr. PINON. Mr. Chairman, the only thing I can really state is that as soon as the informant informed the special agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration, Juan Perez, of the grenades, he immediately called me and asked me to respond and assist him, due to my expertise in bombs. And together we responded immediately and recovered them.

The informant was the one that made the allegations that he had already advised other agents in the past about it, but we do not have any direct knowledge of that.
 

Senator DENTON. Did he offer any reason for the grenades not being taken at that time?
 

Mr. BENITEZ. To my knowledge, Mr. Chairman, if there was any reason, it was not offered for our benefit.
 

Senator DENTON. How did the grenades get into the country? Do you know?
 

Mr. PINON. Yes, sir, they were brought in by an individual who was a suspected agent of the Cuban Government. We would like to refrain from identifying him because of ongoing investigation still pending. But according to the informant, this individual is also involved in large-scale narcotics smuggling into the United States and the informant specifically stated that this individual has been taking shipments of weapons to El Salvador and Nicaragua during the former government of Somoza, supplying leftist guerrillas with weapons.

The source also informed us that this subject went to Cuba on several occasions with him and actually obtained weapons from the Cuban Government, and these grenades were brought into the United States some time in 1979 by this same subject.

Senator DENTON. Would it be fair to infer from what you know that there is a large-scale Colombia-Cuba connection on marihuana introduction into at least southern Florida and that there are prob" ably many more weapons than you have specific knowledge of; and with the training which you know about and the subversion in terms of not registering for the draft and the subversion in terms of teaching youth to bomb schools, that there is a growing and much greater potential in that area for terrorism than has been so far demonstrated?

Mr. BENITEZ. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I would think that there is a much greater potential than has been demonstrated at this time.

Mr. PINON. Mr. Chairman, I will also add another interesting point that became known to us through a separate source who is still out there in the field working for us. He advised us that presently, the Government of Cuba has been providing marihuana to the smugglers that has been grown in Cuba, and the Cuban boats are using a radar system to detect the U.S. Coast Guard in order to find a clear way into the United States to assist them in the smuggling. And this source is still working for us out in the field.

Mr. BENITEZ. Mr. Chairman, I would like to add that this information is unverified at this time and we have it as an allegation only, and because of the budgetary, manpower, and jurisdictional restraints placed on State policing, we are unable to verify it further at this time.

Senator DENTON. What would you ascribe as the purpose for the hand grenades and that sort of weapon? Would it be as protection within the drug-running racket, or for terrorism?

Mr. BENITEZ. Mr. Chairman, it has been my experience in deal ing with explosive devices that hand grenades are strictly an anti personnel device, and unless they are projected at a fairly good distance, the person doing the throwing will also be involved in the explosion, or be at the center of the explosion. They would best

serve a terrorist-type operation rather than a narcotics-type operation, in which they usually use rifles, shotguns, and the traditional handguns for protecting their investment and protecting their loads.
 

Senator DENTON. Does the informant indicate that he was directed by the DGI to attempt to blow up any public facilities?
 

Mr. BENITEZ. I am unaware of that. Maybe Mr. Pinon----
 

Mr. PINON. That is correct, sir. The informant reported that he was not given any reasons as to why he was to throw the grenades. He simply complied with the request of his superior, which was this agent. He was told to throw it at the specific location which it was thrown; he complied.
 

Senator DENTON. Was a public park one of those locations?

Mr. PINON. That is correct; it was an empty parking lot. Excuse me; that was a different incident. I was referring to the empty parking lot in which a grenade was thrown and there was nobody there.

The informant was also told to throw a grenade at a public park which is at Southwest Eighth Street and 13th or 14th Avenue; it is called the Domino Park. In this park, there are usually 50 or 60 elderly persons that sit there and play dominoes and play cards. And the informant was told to throw the grenade at that, apparently to create destruction and put blame on the anti-Castro groups, which were the ones that had been doing most of the bomb senator KENTON. No, there is a pattern, not only of these racial incidents, which can cause black/white tension, but also of major efforts to discredit the anti-Castro elements or to accredit them with activities which they did not perform. This is a pattern which you have noticed throughout. Is that correct?
 

Mr. PINON. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
 

Senator DENTON. Do you see any correlation between the increased hijackings which occurred subsequent to Mariel and the people who came into the United States at that time?
 

Mr. BENITEZ. Mr. Chairman, I would think the only correlation is, because of the increased numbers and possibly the fact that displaced persons were not able to actively become involved in the pursuit of work and their own home life, they decided to go back and avail themselves of this means of hijacking to return.

Senator DENTON. In your professional judgment, based on your training and experience as intelligence officers for the State of Florida, did the Cuban DGI play a role in guiding or directing the Liberty City riots in Miami, which occurred immediately prior to the Mariel boatlift, or in guiding or directing the riots in Dade County which occurred immediately after the Mariel boatlift?

Mr. BENITEZ. Mr. Chairman, I cannot give you a definite answer on that. We do know, and we have allegations, of some contacts between members of the black community, some of which were involved in the rioting, and members, for example, of some of the Cuban community; for example, Mr. Featherston and the Antonio Maceo Brigade. Outside of that, it would be supposition or guesswork on our part.

Senator DENTON. Are you aware of any attempt by the Cuban Government to obtain radio tapes or other materials showing the Liberty City riots for the purpose of retransmission to achieve propaganda objectives?
 

Mr. BENITEZ. Yes, sir, I was particularly impressed by that. I had a person working within the news media that had been involved in filming the Mariel exodus from the Cuban mainland, and this person was approached by persons unknown to him and asked if he would provide them with the film clippings and the material that his station had on file on the riots; that they would give him unrestricted access to filming the Mariel boatlift from the Cuban side.

Of course, he declined, and so did his network, but he came to me and advised me that the offer had been made.

Senator DENTON. I am going to ask several questions which Senator Thurmond has submitted. Before I do that, just a general question: In your overall experience in law, do you consider the situation in the Miami area extremely alarming, and do you think that the law enforcement people and the legislation now in existence-- how would you rate it in its sufficiency to cope with or eliminate the problem?

Mr. BENITEZ. Mr. Chairman, I would liken it to finding termites in a building. By the time you see the first termites, they have already been there several years and have done a lot of damage.

If, after you see them, nothing is done, you will have further damage. We are now beginning to see some of these people and some of their activities surface, and I am of the belief that they have been here for a while and that they have been setting the stage for what they would like to do in the future.
 

I am of the opinion that a more concentrated effort is going to have to be made to stop them.
 

Senator DENTON. Mr. Pinon, do you agree with that?
 

Mr. Pylon. Mr. Chairman, I would like to add something to that. I did a report as to the homicide rate in Dade County, and we found that since the Mariel boatlift, the homicide rate has gone up 50 percent, and crime as a whole has gone up approximately 50 percent.
 

[A breakdown of homicides in Dade County follows:]
 
 

53
 

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
 

P.O. BOX 1489

JAMES W. YORK TALLAI!,:SSEE 32302 TELEPHONE
 

COMMISSIONER 483-7880

M E M O R A N D U M
 

TO:
 

VIA:
 

FROM:
 

SAC Joe 11. Clark

Miami Operations Center
 

Chain of Command
 

SA Sergio Pinon

Squad "B"
 

SUBJECT: Breakdown of
 

Homicides in Dade County
 

¡Dade Miami Hialeah Miami Beach
 

1980 1981 1980 1981 1980 1981 1980 198
 

JAN 32 46 15 24 0 2

FED 36 64 12 25 3 1

MAR 39 60 11 27 8 1

APR 27 60 9 18 1 2

MAY 65 56 28 19 6 0

JAN 53 41 24 16 2 0

JUL 53 49 28 18 4 6

AUG 51 56 19 21 4 2

SEPT 60 51 35 13 3 2

OCT 42 45 15 15 4 1

NOV 65 52 20 10 2 3

DEC 49 39 28 19 3 0
 

TOTAL 572 619 244 225 40 20
 

Dade County Medical Examiner's Office shows a total of 614 homicides during 1982, thus conflicting with Dade County Public Safety's total of 619. The difference of 4 is due to unclassified deaths by the Medical Examiner's Office.
 

Dade County shows an increase of 47 deaths or 12 percent since 1980.
 

City of Miami shows a decrease of 19 deaths or 12 percent since 1980.
 

It should be noted that in 1979, there were only 365 homicides in Dade City thins possibly attributing a high increase rate of approximately 59 percent i15 compared to the figure of 572 in 1980.
 
 

Senator DENTON. These questions are from Senator Thurmond. In view of the significant problem caused Florida State law enforcement officials by the Cuban intelligence service, how often does the FBI provide counter intelligence briefings to you?

Mr. BENiTEz. Senator, the FBI has a particular problem with dissemination of information. They are precluded by law and by certain policies, either of themselves or placed upon them by other agencies that they work for; as a result, they do not have a lot of information that they can give us.
 

Senator DENTON. So, effectively, never?
 

Mr. BEn~TEz. Well, I have been to very few in the last few years myself.
 

Senator DENTON. And the information received has not been that helpful?
 

Mr. BEATEN. It has been helpful in some instances, but like I said, I have not been to that many in the last few years. They are precluded by law from divulging most of their information.
 

Mr. Pylon. That goes the same for myself.
 

Senator DENTON. In connection with the Soviet grenade incident you have described--and this is another question from Senator Thurmond--please state for the record whether any Federal law enforcement official was aware of the presence of Soviet grenades in Miami prior to the information coming to your attention; and, if so, identify that official and state what action he took with respect to the prior knowledge he had obtained.
 

I realize that that is similar to a previous question I asked.
 

Mr. BENITEZ. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I would like to decline answering that question and would defer its answer to executive hearing, if you may accept that.
 

Senator DENTON. We will plan an executive hearing, then, with you, as well as with Sr. Gerardo Peraza.
 

Again, two more questions from Senator Thurmond; first, based on your professional judgment and on your experience and training, do you see a pattern in the bombing incidents which have occurred in Dade County, and specifically in your professional judgment, is there a pattern of activity which suggests that the Cuban DGI may be planning a series of arbitrary terrorist attacks in retaliation, perhaps, of U.S. efforts to establish Radio Free Cuba, which is Radio Marti, or to combat Cuban Soviet-sponsored communist terrorists in Central America?
 

There are other parts to that question; I will pause at that point.
 

Mr. BEN~TEz. Mr. Chairman, we have received sketchy information. There are allegations at this point--they have not really been verified--that there is projected in the future to have groups involved in random violence. We do not have enough information to assess the actual objective. This has been stated to US as one of the objectives by persons we speak with. It is very difficult to assess it without more information.
 

Mr. Pylon. Mr. Chairman, however, I would like to point out that the pattern of anti-Castro organizations up until now has been that when they commit any terrorist acts, they do claim responsibility for their acts. And there have been numerous incidents where no one has taken credit for those incidents.Up until now when we have found these Russian grenades and we have done investigation into them--now the possibility exists that other incidents might have been caused by other groups.
 

Senator DENTON. Senator Thurmond's question goes on. Does the presence of over 200 Soviet grenades somewhere in the Miami area suggest to you, in your professional judgment, the possibility that the Soviets, through the Cubans, are planning terrorist activities to counter U.S. opposition elsewhere in the hemisphere?
 

Mr. BENITEZ. Mr. Chairman, that would be judgment on our part, or guesswork on our part, but it does make you think that it could be the intention.
 

Mr. Pylon. That would be our opinion.
 

Senator DENTON. This is the final question from Senator Thurmond. Please identify for the record the name of the intelligence and counter terrorist coordinator for the Drug Enforcement Administration in the Miami area.
 

Mr. BENITEZ. I am aware that there is one. I would like to defer answering that question for executive session, if I may.
 

Senator DENTON. I thought that that would be a matter of public record.
 

Mr. BENITEZ. It may be; I do not know. I would not like to disclose the name unless I have been given prior clearance from the Drug Enforcement Administration. It may place the person in personal jeopardy or professional jeopardy.
 

Senator DENTON. Do you have any information which indicates that the DGI has been successful in penetrating law enforcement agencies in the Miami area?
 

Mr. PINON. We have basically received information from sources which was actually confirmed by other sources and through persons that we have used as informants after arrest, such as Mr. Romeo, for example. He made statements to us that the police departments had been infiltrated and were working for the Government of Cuba--several agents.
 

We have seen some connection between some agents and some of the travel agencies that are sponsoring these trips to Cuba. However, there is no definite information that we have or any proof; otherwise, we would have taken action already. We do have merely allegat~ons.
 

Senator DENTON. Are you aware of any efforts by the DGI to recruit law enforcement officers and support personnel?
 

Mr. PINON. Well, I do not have any direct information as to that. However, I have found through my experience working in the field that most Cuban agents, or at least the ones that we know, do want to become informants, for the simple reason that in the process of giving us information, they can also obtain information. And these same agents believe that if they do work for the authorities, they have a certain type of protection. They can also justify their existence in their fields.
 

If they were to be questioned by another agency as to what they were doing, they would come up and say, "I am working for such and such, with another agency, and they would justify their existence. At the same time, they will use it as a tool to withdraw information from the agents that they are working for.

Senator DENTON. SO, in playing sort of a double agent, they get indications of what information you have by judging your questions and by assessing the scope and thrust of your questions. Is that what you mean?

Mr. PINON. Yes, sir. Also, it is my personal opinion--again, I have to state this on my own--that these individuals also are involved in disinforming agencies in order to create problems between the agencies, and distrust, and in order to divide and conquer; that is basically it. They want to divide the agencies from cooperating with each other.

If they create a cloud on me or a shadow of a doubt, then the other agent will not talk to me and will not pass the information on to me. They have been pretty successful.

Senator DENTON. SO, disinformation, which is a Soviet-originated term, is used in an attempt to deceive members of respective agencies to cause distrust among them?

Mr. Pinon, this is another question on Senator Thurmond's behalf. Do you have any information which, in your professional judgment and based on your own experience, would cause you to believe that the Government of Panama, through Panamanian intelligence, was or is involved in supplying weapons to Communist terrorists in Nicaragua or El Salvador, or other locations in Central America?
 

DO YOU feel, based on your experience, that there is an arrangement between Panama and Cuba? If so, what is the nature of that arrangement?

Mr. PINON. Sir, I was involved in a particular operation involving a major sale of weapons on behalf of the Panamanian Government to be sent to the guerrillas in El Salvador and Nicaragua. This is going back to 1978 or 1979.

This investigation did not have positive conclusions due to certain problems that we had. However, I did meet with agents of the Panamanian Government and we did establish the weapons that they wanted from us, and it was going to be an approximate deal for $10 million of weapons which was going to be sent to El Salvador.

However, I would request that any further information can be supplied in an executive hearing due to the sensitivity of this case and other agents involved.

Senator DENTON. I am aware that it would probably be errone" ous, due to the complexity and the changing situation in Panama to make a categorical statement that the Panamanian Government is in favor of this or that with regard to El Salvador, because the Panamanian Government is composed of a number of different individuals with different inclinations, and these inclinations change as time goes by. I imagine the same thing could be said about other Latin American countries.

This is the impression I got from a visit to Panama last week and from continuing discussions with people informed on it. I appreciate the fact that it is a sensitive subject and we would have to dis cuss it in executive session.
 

Mr. PINON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
 

Senator DENTON. The Committee of 75, an organization of businessmen and clergy with significant representation of members of the Cuban community, attempted to coordinate and encourage better relations between the United States and Cuba, hopefully culminating in trade and economic exchange.
 

There have been some allegations that the Committee of 75 is, in fact, a DGI operation. Do you have any information or opinion on this?

Mr. Pylon. Yes, Mr. Chairman. We have--Mr. Benitez has also been involved in this with me--sources that were members of the Committee of 75. I can give you an approximate estimate of at least five that were members of the Committee of 75. These sources have reported to us that the Committee of 75 was actually a committee formed by the Cuban Government and approved by the Cuban Government, and they selected and approved the personnel to be involved in this.

I have documents which were turned over to me by sources which clearly state that the Committee of 75 was formed in Cuba, and it was signed by the Prime Minister, Fidel Castro, himself, plus other members of the state council.

In these documents, it clearly shows the purpose and the way they were supposed to operate. I have those documents; I do not have them with me right now, but I could make them available to the committee at a later date.
 

Senator DENTON. Please submit these so we can insert them in the record. l
 

Mr. Pylon. Yes, sir.
 

Senator DENTON. With your experience with disinformation and recognizing the sophistication with which one must address information such as you have just mentioned pertaining to the Committee of 75, how would you assess the likelihood that the documents discrediting the committee are a disinformation effort or, on the other hand, an actual indication of proof that the committee is indeed a Cuban operation?
 

Mr. Pylon. I am not really sure I understand the question properly, sir.
 

Senator DENTON. Do you consider the evidence that it is a Cuban Governmentffponsored organization to be valid?
 

Mr. Pylon. Yes, sir.
 

Senator DENTON. Please describe any information you have pertaining to DGI propaganda efforts in the Miami area, such as radio and television broadcasts, including short wave? To the extent possible, identify the broadcasting media involved. ~
 

Mr. PINON. They have publications which are printed and distributed within the United States, one of them being Areito. There is another publication by the name of Granma. Granma, according to our information, is printed in Cuba and is brought into the United States and distributed in the United States, and specifically, I believe, at Miami University.
 

Mr. BENITEZ. Yes, it is available at the University of Miami.
 

There is another publication that has not been published since approximately 1974 or 1975, but it was available for a while, and that is called Cuba Va, meaning "Cuba Goes." And several persons that are involved in quasi-government jobs and quasi-political positions have been involved in writing for some of those magazines or periodicals.
 

Senator DENTON. How about electronic media--radio, for example?
 

Mr. BENITEZ. During some of the incidents that we have had, it has been reported that the electronic media--basically, the Spanish media--has been involved in adding something to the mood of the public or to the mood of the people involved, rather than objectively reporting what is actually happening.
 

Mr. PINON. One of the Latin media, in my opinion, was advocating violence during these particular incidents, and right now is under investigation.
 

Senator DENTON. I am going to have to excuse myself for a few moments. I will turn this over to Mr. Joel Lisker, my staff director
 

Mr. LISKER. Can either of you gentlemen identify the electronic media involved--the call letters of the radio stations?
 

Mr. PINON. I would like to defer that to the executive session due to the fact that they are being investigated right now.
 

Mr. LISKER. I see. These are Spanish-language stations broadcast" ing to the Cuban population in Miami?
 

Mr. PINON. That is correct, sir.
 

Mr. LISKER. Prior investigation and testimony has disclosed that much of the intelligence collected is collected by so-called "front groups"; that is, organizations which have an ostensible legitimate purpose, but in reality have a more sinister purpose.
 

Could you describe any organizations--you have already men" tioned the Committee of 75, and I presume that your characterization leads you to conclude that that is a front.
 

Mr. PINON. Yes.
 

Mr. LISKER. Could you describe any other organizations of which you are aware that actually are fronts for the DGI?
 

Mr. PINON. Well, for example, the Antonio Maceo Brigade; we believe that that is specifically sponsored and headed by the Cuban DGI. There may be members of the brigade that may not know exactly what their purpose is, but it is being led by them.
 

There are other brigades, like the Venceremos Brigade, which is also sponsored and led by the Cuban DGI. We have BAMM, which is the Black Afro Militant Movement. This group is headed by Alfred Featherston. Although there are basically American blacks involved, members of this group have been meeting with members of the Antonio Maceo Brigade, as witnessed by us during surveillances.
 

They have met, and we have received reports from informants that they have received money from the Antonio Maceo Brigade to supply the blacks with their militant movement.
 

Mr. LISKER. In your opening statement, you mentioned Havanatur, American Airways Charter, Cuba Travel, et cetera. Those are also----.
 

Mr. PINON. That is correct, sir. Central Travel, which was one of the agencies--it is a retail credit front which was used to funnel money to Cuba. That firm is being indicted right now for trading with the enemy.
 

Mr. LISKER. Mr. Benitez.

Mr. BENITEZ. Yes, sir. I wanted to say there was another group that was involved in sending young students to travel to Cuba for religious reasons. They were called the Ismaelillo Brigade, if I am correct. This no longer exists, but some of the members are still in the community.
 

Mr. LISKER. Is there any coordinated intelligence effort--and this relates to a question Senator Denton asked a few moments ago--is there any coordinated intelligence effort among the various law enforcement agencies to keep current on the groups active in Miami?
 

Mr. BENITEZ. At this time, I do not believe there is a coordinated effort, no, sir.
 

Mr. LsKER. How many law enforcement groups with overlapping jurisdictions are in the south Florida area?
 

Mr. PINON. In Dade County, there are 27 municipalities.
 

Mr. LISKER. Twenty-seven municipalities, each with their own police department?
 

Mr. PINON. That is correct.
 

Mr. BENITEZ. Most of them with their own police department. Some of them receive support in some of the detective or investigative functions, such as narcotics investigation, intelligence-gathering, bombings or homicide investigation, and laboratory work and other types of assistance, from a larger department or the sheriff's of lice.
 

There are in excess of 40 agencies with total jurisdiction, being State, Federal, county, city, involved in the south Florida area.
 

Mr. LISKER. How do these agencies coordinate on matters of mutual interest?
 

Mr. BENITEZ. Well, that is basically a management problem and it is handled at a higher level than we are involved in.
 

Mr. PINON. Basically, at our level, we do communicate; at the agent's level, we do communicate and get assistance from each other during different incidents. We are talking about State level now.
 

Mr. LISKER. Based on what Agent Benitez has said in describing the dearth of briefings he has received from the FBI over the last several years, in your personal opinion does the FBI have current information on the various terrorist groups in the Miami area?
 

Mr. PINON. Yes. In my opinion, they do have current information, just as we have current information.
 

Mr. LISKER. As I understand it, you furnish your information to the FBI; it just does not work the other way.
 

Mr. PINON. At times, yes, we do furnish the information that we think that they do not have. We do receive certain information from them, although we do not receive as much as we think they probably know. This has been the problem.
 

Mr. LISKER. So, in your view, the FBI has current information on all of the groups now operating in the Miami area?
 

Mr. PINON. I would say so.
 

Mr. LISKER. I think you alluded to this in your opening statement, but what impact, if any, has the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act had on the ability of local law enforcement to gather intelligence information on terrorist groups from your perspective?

Mr. BENITEZ. It has definitely curtailed--for example, the Pr cy Act curtails a lot of the gathering of information that we can We have some rulings that we have to abide by not only in coil ing, but storing and disseminating the information.

We have, for example, deadlines as to purging of information. We also have a problem with the Freedom of Information Act, in which this information is available on request to some of the persons that we are engaged in investigating.
 

Mr. LTSKER. This is under the State Freedom of Information Act?
 

Mr. BENITEZ. Well, they can request any information that we have shared with other agencies, and therefore have access to us. Once that agency says, "We have that information," then they can come after us and get it.
 

Mr. LISKER. In a previous public hearing, the FBI testified that there was no evidence, no indications, of Cuban training of Puerto Rican independence people. Now, from what you said earlier, it appears that one of your sources, at least advised you that such training does take place, or at least he believed that such training does take place, in Cuba.
 

Could you explain the basis of that belief?
 

Mr. BENITEZ. One of the persons that has provided information to our department in the past at one point stated that he had been advised by Cuban agents or Cuban Government personnel that they were indeed looking for Puerto Rican citizens or Puerto Rican descendants to train in Cuba. This information has not been verified. I personally could not ask the Cuban Government to verify it at my level.
 

Mr. LISKER. But the information that was communicated to you by the source was that such an offer was extended to the source?
 

Mr. BENITEZ. That is correct. The source has been reliable in the past and I have no reason to doubt this part of the information.
 

MA LISKER. Well, is this a source that would not be ordinarily available to the FBI?
 

Mr. BENITEZ. I would not know if it would be available or not to them. I do not know if they have contact with them or not.
 

Mr. LISKER. Did you disseminate to the FBI the information that the source disseminated to you about the offer to train him in Cuba?
 

Mr. BENITEZ. I believe I did, in general conversation.
 

Mr. LISKER. Do you have any understanding as to whether that information was communicated by the Miami field office to the FBI headquarters?
 

Mr. BENITEZ. I have no knowledge of how they operate and how they communicate.
 

Mr. LAKER. When did you disseminate that information to the FBI?
 

Mr. BENITEZ. Approximately at the time I got it, within a few weeks, I would say, in general conversation, I made the statement to agents.
 

Mr. LISKER. When would that be in point of time?
 

Mr. BENITEZ. It would be approximately 1 year ago, or perhaps a little less.
 

Mr. LISKER. The FBI testified 3 weeks ago that they had no information or indicators relating to this kind of training. That would at least be at variance with what you furnished the FBI field office in Miami.
 

Mr. BENITEZ. I have no explanation. Perhaps they do not believe the information, or they have not been able to follow it up or verify it on their own.
 

Mr. LTSKER. OK, thank you.
 

In the early part of your statement, you discuss the infiltration of the Anglo community. Could you elaborate with respect to who is doing the infiltrating, which organizations are being infiltrated and which agencies are being infiltrated, and, in your view, how extensive and effective this infiltration has been?
 

Mr. BENITEZ. Could you repeat the question?
 

Mr. LISKER. Yes, in the early part of your statement, you discuss infiltration of the Anglo community, or you mentioned it, rather. Could you elaborate on, from your perspective, who is doing the infiltrating--I presume you mean the Cuban intelligence service-- what organizations and agencies are the targets of the infiltration, and, in your judgment, how extensive and effective this infiltration has been?
 

Mr. BENITEZ. In my opinion, all segments of government and our community at large are the target of it. There have been some groups that have been involved in and have access to the larger community outside the Cuban community in south Florida, and these groups have made contact with other groups and with members of other ethnic backgrounds.
 

An example is the Antonio Maceo Brigade at the university. They will recruit anybody who does not wish to register for the draft for this purpose.
 

Mr. LISKER. At the Federal level since 1976, the FBI has had foisted upon it a set of guidelines known popularly as the Levi guidelines, or, among law enforcement agents, unpopularly as the Levi guidelines.
 

Are there guidelines at the State level which obstruct, in your opinion, the adequate collection of intelligence by your agency or any other Florida law enforcement agency with respect to terrorist activities?
 

Mr. BEATER. The guidelines in effect are based on State law, and the State law is fairly broad and general in that respect. We have to be careful of what we do and that we do it according to State law; it is reviewable by several other systems or mechanisms within government.
 

Mr. LTSKER. Are these guidelines found throughout the State code, or are they collected or compiled in one place? Do you have a book with a set of regulations in it called Guidelines?
 

Mr. BENITEZ. No, sir, not per se, not in that fashion pertaining to intelligence gathering.
 

Mr. LISKER. So, you simply mean that you cannot violate the law in carrying out your investigative objectives?
 

Mr. BENITEZ. That is correct. There are some laws that particularly apply to intelligence-gathering and the conduct of investigations.

Mr. LISKER. Well, is there a law that says if a group has not yet engaged in terrorist activity, but espouses the rhetoric of overthrow of the Government, that it can be investigated under Florida law?

Mr. BEATER. I believe under Florida law, it could be investigated, but we have to be able to examine and determine that there is a violation of the law of some sort being performed by this group or by members of the group. We cannot independently decide to investigate one group and start doing so.
 

Mr. LISKER. So that if an organization says we should all get guns and go and kill blacks, or we should all get guns and go and kill whites or we should all get guns and go and kill Anglos, that would not serve as a predicate for you to investigate that organizat~on?
 

Mr. BENITEZ. It could serve as a predicate. It depends on where and how they say it, and to the intent we can predict on their potential future actions based on their past actions.
 

Mr. Lisper. Well, does there have to be evidence that a crime has been committed? Does the language itself inciting individuals to commit criminal activity serve as a predicate for an investigation or not?
 

Mr. BEATER. I am not an attorney, but I would not think so.
 

Mr. PINON. In my opinion, at the State level, now, if a particular group is not involved in any violations of law, we are really not empowered to investigate. That would be up to the Federal authorities, and on that I am not really sure of the law either, but I believe that they have to be involved in some particular act.
 

Mr. LISKER. Thank you.
 

There have been assertions that some of the terrorist organizations maintain intelligence files on law enforcement officers in the Miami area. Has your experience led you to conclude that that is a true statement?
 

Mr. BENITEZ. I am aware of a personal incident in which I was involved--the arrest of a young Latin man involved in a series of bombings. As a matter of fact, our department at the time and the FBI did a joint investigation and executed Federal search warrants upon the house of that person. And from that house, a lot of information was brought out in files.
 

This person had kept, for example, copies of arrest reports and other such material that he could get as public documents, to more or less identify the police officers and the departments that were engaged in arrest and investigation of these persons.
 

Mr. LISKER. Do they photograph law enforcement officers? Is there an interchange of information among organizations?
 

Mr. BENITEZ. Not belonging to one, I cannot tell you that there exactly is. I have been advised that they do photograph and that they do--in fact, I have seen several attempts to photograph other agents and myself when we are working some of these meetings and crowds.
 

Mr. LISKER. In your opening statement, you gave an example of activity, and you mentioned the name of Lourdes DoPico. Do you remember that?
 

Mr. Pylon. Yes, sir
 

Mr. LISKER. Is her maiden name Lourdes Casals? Do you know her maiden name?
 

Mr. Piston. Her maiden name is Lourdes Rey.
 

Mr. Lisker. Rey?
 

Mr. PINON. Rey.
 

Mr. LISKER. Thank you very much.
 

In a 1976 hearing held by another subcommittee dealing with the problem of terrorism in the Miami area, testimony was received indicating that dynamite and explosives were readily accessible in Miami. Now, you have given the example of the 200-or-so hand grenades. Is that still the case with respect to the dynamite and other explosives, C-4, and so forth?

Mr. BENITEZ. Yes, sir, if I may be permitted, I was personally involved in some of the investigations as part of my duties involving the oversight of laws designed to control the explosives used in the trade.

South Florida is a very large area in which rock quarry-type of work is done--the digging of canals and lakes, and what not. And being a very rocky area--basically, all coral rock--it requires a high amount of explosives to be on hand to deal with this problem. These explosives sometimes fall into the wrong hands; that is a fact.

There are some laws designed to prevent this, and sometimes they are violated by others, and they do have access to the explosives and do get on the street.
 

Mr. LISKER. Well, are there large caches of explosives maintained by terrorist groups?
 

Mr. BENITEZ. In the recent past, I cannot remember any seizures I have been involved in myself. There were several seizures in the past 10 years in which fairly large amounts were seized.
 

Mr. PINON. We can go back to 1976-77. We knew that the groups had members of the organization who were working in construction companies and they had access to the explosives. Recent information, we do not know because there have been a lot of changes in these organizations and they have formed new groups. Members that were formerly friends have split into other factions, and we really right now at this time do not know.
 

Mr. LISKER. At one time, there was an antiterrorist target committee, staffed by Federal, State and local agencies, to combat terrorism particularly in the Miami area. Is this organization still in operation?
 

Mr. PINON. No; it is not.
 

Mr. LISKER. Do you know why it no longer exists?
 

Mr. PINON. I do not know. I was part of the task force at the time, and Agent Benitez was also part of that task force. It included the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Customs, the Miami Police Department, and the Dade County Public Safety Department. The task force ran for 1 year and after that, it was dissolved.
 

Mr. LISKER. When was it dissolved?
 

Mr. PINON. I believe it was 1978.
 

Mr. LISKER. Has terrorism and terrorist activity increased or decreased in Miami since that time?
 

Mr. PINON. I would say it has--it is hard to say. The hardest years we had were 1976 and 1977. After that, terrorism in Miami has gone down a bit, but we still have a high level of incidence.

Mr. LISKER. Let me ask you this. In your dealings with the Federal agencies involved in the areas of your jurisdiction--that is, dealing with subversion and terrorism--is it your judgment that the representatives of those agencies with whom you deal and who, in turn, deal with the people directly involved--that with regard to their nationality and their own background, they are competent people in the field?

Let me give you an example. I do not think it is any secret that the Cubans in Miami have a disdain for Mexican Americans, so that if I were an FBI supervisor, I would probably be using bad judgment, or could be accused of using bad judgment, to send a Mexican American agent who spoke Spanish to interview a Cuban. That is the illustration that I am giving.

In your judgment and from your experience in dealing with these agencies, is this an unusual problem or is it an isolated problem?

Mr. Phlox. Well, as far as we know, within the local State agency, the units which are responsible for the investigation of those terrorist acts or any intelligence work are basically staffed with different members of different groups, such as the public safety department, the Miami Police Department, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. They all have Cubans that are members of these units in order to be able to penetrate and deal with the community.
 

I believe--I am not sure--that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has two agents stationed in Miami that are Cuban.
 

Mr. LISKER. Two agents to deal with these problems in all of Miami who have a Cuban background?
 

Mr. Phlox. Yes; to the best of my information, they only have two Cuban agents stationed in Miami. I could be wrong, but that is as far as our knowledge is concerned.
 

Mr. LISKER. Does it make a difference in the quality of the relationship that exists between the agent and the source if the agent is of non-Cuban background?
 

Mr. Phlox. Yes, sir, it does.
 

[Senator Denton returned to the hearing.]
 

Senator DENTON. I will ask you to submit a list of terrorist incidents, of which you are aware, that have occurred since 1976, the date of the last Senate hearing on this topic by the Internal Security Subcommittee--May 6, 1976--giving a description of each incident and the name of the groups or individuals claiming responsibility or believed to be responsible.

I do not want to unduly overburden you with that, and you can take as much time on it as you want, but just for bringing this subcommittee into a better position in terms of documentation, it would help if, from your vantage point, you would supply us with information.
 

Mr. PINON. Yes, sir, we cannot for all of the incidents.
 

Senator DENTON. I want to thank you both very much for coming. I realize and acknowledge again the tremendous work you are doing and the integrity with which you are doing it.
 

Do you have any closing comments that you would care to make?
 

Mr. PINON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to bring out one more point that I did not go into during the statement. I have three statements here which are the press conferences given by Reverend Manuel Espinosa, and I would like to put that into the record for the subcommittee's reviews

Also, I would like to make reference to the second conference. Mr. Espinosa related a conversation which took place between him and another gentleman in California, identified by the name of Ruben. And a conversation took place between them, and I would like to relate to it because there was an incident that we would also like to put into the record.

Senator DENTON. All right. You do not have to name those; I will accept them and they will go into the record, because the rules now require, with a live quorum call back to the Harrison Williams case, that we not be conducting any hearings at this time.2
 

We will receive any other information you care to submit in writing, and we will be transmitting additional questions to you in writing.
 

Again, gentlemen, thank you very much.
 

Mr. BENITEZ. Mr. Chairman, in closing I would like to say one thing. I do not personally wish to create either by direct statement or by allusion--that the persons in charge of law enforcement in the south Florida area, whether they be of State, city, county or Federal agencies, do not care or are not doing their job.
 

The problem is big. The restrictions placed upon us at all levels are very, very burdensome. We have a lot of hard-working persons at all levels, and we have managers and supervisors that are caring and are knowledgeable of the problems. We also have a lot of other crime problems equally as pressing and we have to divide our resources in order to account for that.
 

So, any of the statements we have made here are not to cast aspersions on any individual agent or any agency that they may work for. It is merely to illustrate the problems that we have had in the past and that we continue to deal with in our everyday contacts.
 

Senator DENTON. I appreciate that, and I can assure you that there is no intent on the part of this Senator to do that either. I recognize that all of our law enforcement agencies are overburdened. I think you probably have one of the most, if not the most, overloaded and volatile situations in the country, and I respect very much the way you are going about your duties.
 

We will recess these hearings until Thursday, March 11, at which time the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Dr. Fred C. Ikle, will testify.
 

This hearing stands in recess.
 

[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene on Thursday, March 11, 1982.]