Dear Mr.Chairman:

I am enclosing additional material related to your March 15 request for information on the subject of Cuban support for terrorism and insurgency in the Western Hemisphere (Assistant Secretary Enders testimony of March 12).

The data which we are now providing was promised in our initial submission of April 7 in which we responded) to your seventeen questions on this subject and requested additional time to research some of the answers. we regret that in sane instanced, we have still been unable to come up with the requested data. We will, however, continue to furnish material as it becomes available.

We are also enclosing copies of two docents which you had requested during the March 12 hearing and which Ambassador Enders offered to provide. They consist of copies of public statements made by four Guatemalan guerrilla groups and copies of a secret agreement uniting Guatemalan guerrilla groups. Ambassador Enders also offered to make available copies of documents captured from a Costa Rican "people's prison" and copies of documents captured by Honduran authorities which include classroom notebooks used by guerrillas. We are in the process of obtaining the latter documents, and will provide them under separate cover as soon as we receive them.

I hope that what we have provided will be of use. If I can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.

With cordial regards,

                                                                                                                        Powell A. Moore
                                                                                                                        Assistant Secretary
                                                                                                                        for Congressional Relations

Enclosures: As stated.

The Honorable
Jeremiah Denton, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism,
Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate.
 

6. Q. How does the size of the Cuban diplomatic staff in countries in Latin America compare with diplomatic staffs from pro-Western countries or with the U.S.? In Southern Africa? Elsewhere in the world? Is the same true of diplomatic staffs of the Soviet Union and other communist countries?

A. We regret that we are unable to provide an answer to this question due to the lack of a data base.

8. Q. How many Cuban diplomats, embassy personnel, mission or consulate personnel or UN personnel or other Cuban members of international organizations have been expelled from the United States for intelligence activities since 1959? For any other reason? Soviet, pro-Soviet, or other Eastern Bloc diplomats, Embassy personnel, mission or consulate employees or UN personnel?

A. We do not have a complete compilation of Cubans who have been expelled from the United States. A search of our records, however, indicates that the following Cubans have been expelled from the U.S.:

Mr. Mario Monzon Barata (CMUN), July 4, 1982 for violation of Trading With the Enemy Act. Also identified as head of Directorate General of Intelligence (DGI) at the Cuban Mission to the United Nations.

Mr. Jose Rodriguez Rodriguez (CMUN), July 4, 1982 for violation of the Trading With the Enemy Act. Also identified as attache and secretary for Mr. Monzon Barata.

Mr. Ricardo Escartin (CUBINT), February 11, 1981 for violation of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations issued under the Trading With the Enemy Act. Mr. Escartin was also identified as an intelligence agent who engaged in intelligence gathering activities while in the U.S.

Mr. Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez (CMUN), October 9, 1970. Mr. Orlando Prendes Gutierrez, (CMUN), October 9, 1970.

We noted in our previous correspondence that 52 Soviets have been expelled from the United States since 1950.

We also have on file that 18 Eastern Europeans nave been expelled from the United States since 1949. This statistic includes: 7 Poles, 4 Czechs, 4 Romanians and 3 Hungarians. We are continuing research to see if there are other Eastern Europeans expelled from missions to the United Nations and other International Organizations.

As we receive more information on this subject, we will forward it to the subcommittee.

12. Q. What is the status of the discipline, morale and effectiveness of the Cuban troops in Angola and Ethiopia? Have there been defections and desertions from the ranks? The Cubans have said that the first military contingents to reach Angola were elite Ministry of Interior Units. What has become of these units? Please furnish the subcommittee with the Department's complete assessment of Cuban involvement, military and otherwise, in Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Botswana, Zaire and Ethiopia. Please give a separate answer to each country.

A. Angola
The elite Ministry of Interior units (Tropas Especiales--Special Troops) that were hastily introducted into Angola in November 1975 were the first Cuban combat units sent to fight there. Their immediate mission was to prevent the South African and local forces from overrunning some 2,000 Cuban military technicians and advisory personnel who had arrived in Angola in late September and early October to assemble and maintain the large amounts of Soviet weapons that had been pouring into Angola since March and to train the MPLA in their use. The ultimate objective of Cuban military involvement was of course to install a pro-Soviet/pro-Cuban faction in power.

This initial group of about 2,000 advisors-apparently made up primarily of cadets in their final year at Cuba's military academies--was to provide advice and technical assistance, not engage in combat. Rapid and unanticipated changes in the battlefield situation, however, found this group caught literally in the front lines within days of its arrival and the Castro regime was faced, in late October, with the decision of either writing it off, trying to evacuate it, or reinforcing it heavily.

President Castro could not write it off. The First Party Congress was coming up in December 1975 and he could not admit to the Congress that he had abandoned the graduating classes of the military academies. Neither could he evacuate the force. He had no shipping in the area to accomplish an evacuation. He, thus, chose to reinforce, and he used the most combat-ready troops -- also the most readily transportable--available in Cuba, which were the Special Troops. They were airlifted to Angola in November with the mission of buying time until other Cuban combat units, composed largely of reservists, could be sent by sea and air. By the time the Special Troops came home sometime in the spring of 1976, Cuba had shipped some 36,000 military personnel to Angola.

The Special Troops seem to provide a variety f unique services from protecting Castro himself o fighting secretly alongside the Sandinista forces n the latter stages of the revolt against Somoza n Nicaragua. They are the troops Castro has used, for example, to storm foreign diplomatic missions n Havana that have been seized by armed Cubans stilling to use desperate measures to emigrate. The pecial Troops are in excellent physical condition, re trained in a broad range of weapons and tactics, nd most are karate experts. Although critical circumstances required their deployment as combat nits in the Angolan experience, they apparently ire normally intended to be used in small teams. They probably are headquartered in the Havana area and we suspect a number of them are used to train foreign insurgents in the skills of guerrilla warfare.

Most Cubans who have served in Angola in the armed forces are reservists and many have served more than one tour there. The losses Cuban units sustained in Angola in late 1975 and 1976 caused them to reduce their role in combat--a reaction that has been the source of some friction with the Angolans. Cuban forces remain well disciplined but morale reportedly is low. Conditions for Cubans serving in Luanda especially are grim and relations with the Angolan population in general are not good. Conditions for troops in the field, although primitive, are acceptable. There have been only a few defections by Cuban personnel. There are not many opportunities to defect. Personnel (both military and civilian) are transported to Angola by Cuban aircraft; the one refueling stop--Cape Verde--is very secure. There are always Cuban security personnel interspersed with the regular "internationalists" and soldiers, which keeps defections to a minimum.

At the present time we believe there are 20,000 - 25,000 Cuban troops in Angola. There was an increase last fall after South Africa launched Operation Protea. The Cubans have established a defensive line in southern Angola to protect against South African incursions deep into the country. However, South African forces operate at will against SWAPO guerrillas south of this line, and Cuban forces have not been directly involved in combat against South African forces.

Cuban forces play an important role in providing logistical and direct combat support to Angolan forces in the ongoing struggle with UNITA. Cuban forces may have become more involved in combat against UNITA forces during the past few months, and the Cubans are apparently taking and increasing number of casualties. Cuban civilian presence in Angola is believed to be between 5,000 to 9,000. This number is expected to increase during 1982. These personnel are construction workers, transportation workers, teachers, and medical personnel.

Ethiopia
There are now between 11,000 - 13,000 Cuban military personnel in Ethiopia. The military presence is down from a high of about 17,000 troops in early 1978, when Cuban forces played a decisive role in the successful Ogaden campaign. After completion of these operations, Chairman Mengistu tried to persuade Havana to help Ethiopia with the fighting taking place in Eritrea. Castro refused, partly because he wanted no further casualties and partly because he believed the political costs would be too heavy and cause friction with Cuba's radical Arab allies. (Havana also had had ties with the Eritrean Liberation Front for many years.) The Cuban military presence was reduced in late 1978 and remains at about 11,000 - 13,000 today. Cuban forces do not see much action now, play mainly support and logistic-support roles and remain in garrisons most of the time.

Havana would like to increase its civilian role in Ethiopia, mainly to earn hard currency, but so far these efforts have been unsuccessful. There are several hundred (perhaps 600 - 700) Cuban civilians in Ethiopia.

Zaire
In January 1981, Havana appointed it's first ambassador to Zaire since 1977. (At that time, President Mobutu suspended diplomatic relations after accusing Cuban military personnel of leading an invasion force into Zaire's mineral-rich Shaba province from Angola.) Because of the underlying distrust of Havana by Mobutu, the relationship is a wary one. The Cuban presence in Zaire is small although it expanded in 1981 with the arrival of the ambassador and several staff people. Although Zaire maintains a very healthy distrust of Cuban activities and goals in Africa in general, and Zaire in particular, Zairian-Cuban relations superficially could be described as a thawing somewhat from the earlier freezing point. As a result of the Cuban presence in neighboring Angola and Cuba's continued support of the FLNC, Zaire keeps a very close watch over the Cuban mission in Kinshasa. Despite this climate, Zaire received a delegation of Cuban technical experts last fall for exploratory discussions on possibilities for bilateral cooperation in agriculture, sports, culture, etc. No agreements were signed.

Zimbabwe
After Zimbabwean independence and after the election of Robert Mugabe, Cuba has been very cautious in its dealings with the government. Havana's support during the revolutionary struggle for Mugabe's rival Joshua Nkomo put Cuba under a cloud as far as Mugabe was concerned. Because of this support, and probably because of Mugabe's underlying suspicion about Cuban intentions, the relationship between the two countries can now be described as friendly but not especially close. Havana has attempted on several occasions to broaden the relationship, but so far has been unsuccessful. There is a small Cuban diplomatic mission in Harare and there have been a few low-level visits exchanged, but there is no Cuban technical or military presence in Zimbabwe.

Zambia
Cuba and Zambia have had diplomatic relations since 1972 and there is a Cuban diplomatic presence of about 20 in Lusaka. There are no Cuban civilian or military advisors in Zambia.

The visit in February of a senior delegation from Cuba's Communist Party and Havana's recent decision to fill its long-vacant ambassadorial post in Lusaka reflect a modest warming in relations. Bilateral ties declined after Cuba intervened in the Angolan civil war in 1975 and sided against a faction Zambia supported. In the past few years, Zambian-Cuban relations have gradually improved as Lusaka has come to accept the Cuban-backed regime in Angola. Presidents Castro and Kaunda, moreover, have made common cause on a number of Third World issues in recent years, including that of majority rule in Southern Africa.

Botswana
Cuba and Botswana established diplomatic relations in 1977, but an ambassador was not actually accredited until 1979. He is resident in Lusaka, Zambia. We have no information on other bilateral matters. There is no Cuban military or civilian presence in Botswana, and none is foreseen.

Mozambique
Relations between Cuba and Mozambique are cordial. The two countries established diplomatic relations on 25 June 1975, the day Mozambique became independent. There has been a Cuban civilian technical assistance program in Mozambique since 1976. The program has increased over the years to include public health, education, fishing, agriculture, communications, and transportation technicians. We estimate there are at least 500 Cuban civilian personnel in Mozambique.

In addition, there are at least 2,000 Mozambican students studying on Cuba's Isle of Youth, and a few hundred more are in Cuban universities and technical schools. The two Chiefs of State are personal friends. President Machel has made two visits to Cuba, most recently in late May 1982.