The Honorable Jeremiah Denton, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism,
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter of March 15 to Ambassador Enders requesting additional information related to testimony before the Subcommittee on March 12 on the subject of Cuban support for terrorism and insurgency in the Western Hemisphere. I know Ambassador Enders welcomed the opportunity to lay out in some detail the nature of the threat as we view it. We also welcome this opportunity to expand on those activities.

I am enclosing our answers to your questions for the public record. While we have tried to be forthcoming, we were unable to answer certain questions due to the sensitive nature of the information. In those cases, we have indicated our willingness to provide the Subcommittee a classified briefing. On some other questions, we have indicated that we are continuing our research and will forward complete answers under separate cover as soon as research is completed.

If I can be of any further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.

                                                                                                                        Sincerely,
 

                                                                                                                        Alvin Paul Drischler
                                                                                                                        Acting Assistant Secretary
                                                                                                                        for Congressional Relations

Enclosure.

1. Q: Information has come to my attention that Soviet transport planes are stopping in Gander, Newfoundland to refuel. they then proceed directly over the east coast of the U.S. to Managua, Nicaragua, with military equipment and supplies. Apparently, the Soviets have the option of running these supplies through Cuba or dealing directly with the Nicaraguans themselves. Please comment upon this report.

A: We do not have evidence that the Soviets are shipping arms to Nicaragua via Gander and the East Coast of the United States. Reports on shipments of arms to Nicaragua involve sensitive collection methods and sources. We would be pleased to arrange a full briefing on this subject at your convenience.

We do know, however, that the Soviets have shipped some military equipment directly into Nicaragua, although most is transmitted via Cuba and other third countries.

2. Q: Reference has been made to the civilian advisors that Cuba has sent in large numbers to countries like Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua and Grenada in addition to military personnel. What duties do these civilian advisors perform? In what areas do they function in host countries? Is it not a fact that many of these so-called civilian advisors are intelligence agents or military personnel operating undercover as advisors?

A: Most Cuban civilian advisors in developing nations are involved in technical assistance programs such as public health, road construction, agricultural assistance and other infra structural projects and establishing ministries and bureaucracies This includes political advisors and teachers as in Nicaragua and elsewhere. Such assistance promotes Cuban influence and Cuban policies, and often sets the stage for Cuban military and security advisors. While undoubtedly some of these civilian advisors are intelligence and military personnel, it is difficult to determine to what extent civilian advisors are involved in intelligence activities. We are prepared to give you a classified briefing on that subject, if you so desire.

3. Q: Do the 70 Russian military advisors in Nicaragua carry rifles? How about the more than 2000 Cuban advisors? The East Germans? The members of the Palestine Liberation Organization?

A: We are unable to confirm at this point whether any of the above groups carry rifles in their daily activities. However, in the past the modus operandi of the Soviets, Cubans and East Germans has been to carry arms.

4. Q: Please give the Department's assessment of the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, D.C. How many personnel does it have? How many are actually intelligence agents of the DGI or other Cuban intelligence services? What restrictions are placed on the activities of these personnel while in the United States?

A: The Cuban Interests Section in Washington, D.C. has been very effective in establishing journalistic, academic, and     congressional contacts as well as in its contacts with other diplomatic missions in Washington. It has been effective also in making contacts with minority groups elsewhere in the U.S. Members of the Cuban Interests Section are not restricted to Washington.

Under bilateral agreement between the United States and Cuba each nation is limited to 20 personnel in its respective Interests Section. The Cuban Interests Section is not always up to full strength. As to how many of the members of the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, D.C. are suspected intelligence agents, I have to refer you to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. There are no special restrictions on Cuban mission personnel in Washington other than those which apply to all diplomats, namely that they must abide by the terms of their visas and not conduct business incompatible with their diplomatic status. Violation of that status by Cuban or other diplomatic personnel car, result in expulsion or revocation of visa. One diplomat assigned to the Cuban Interests Section, First Secretary Ricardo Escartin, was expelled in February 1981.

5. Q: Please give us the Department of State's assessment of the Cuban Mission to the United Nations. How many personnel does it have. How many are actually intelligence agents of the DGI or other Cuban intelligence services? What restrictions are placed upon the activities of these personnel while in the United States? Does the number of members of the Mission remain constant during the year or does it fluctuate at times? If it does fluctuate, please give specifics and give the Department's assessment of why this occurs.

A: The Cuban Mission to the United Nations (CMUN) has a 45 person diplomat staff and is the fourth largest such mission in New York. This representation, disproportionate to Cuba's size as a nation, reflects, at least in part, Cuba's active involvement in the Non-Aligned Movement and other multilateral bodies and the fact that the Cubans accredit all their personnel, including service staff, on the diplomatic list. Other missions to the United Nations rate the Cubans as very active and effective, particularly on procedural questions. We share that assessment.

We refer you to the Federal Bureau of Investigation on how many members of the Cuban staff may be suspected intelligence agents. There are no travel or other restrictions on the Cuban Mission to the UN. They are, however, subject to the conditions of their visas since they are admitted to perform UN diplomatic duties in New York. As with all UN missions they are not supposed to violate their status. The number of members present at the CMUN fluctuates according to how many issues of concern to Cuba are before the international body at any given time. As with many countries, Cuban representation swells during the General Assembly session.

6. Q: How does the size of the Cuban diplomatic staff in countries in Latin American compare with diplomatic staffs from pro-Western countries or with the US? In southern Africa? Elsewhere in the world? Is the same true of diplomatic staffs of the Soviets Union and other communist countries?

A: We are currently researching that subject and will deliver a study to your committee under separate cover as soon as it is complete.

Q: What is the size of the U.S. Embassy staff, diplomatic and otherwise, in Moscow? Are these all Americans? What is the size of the Soviet staff in Washington? Are they all Soviets?

A: The American staff at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow numbers 162. Of this number, 128 are recognized by the soviet Government as having diplomatic rank. The remaining 34 Americans are members of the Embassy's Marine Security Detachment and government contractors working on the construction of the new Embassy in Moscow. Under the terms of a bilateral agreement we have with the Soviet Union, the Marines and contractors are accorded full diplomatic privileges and immunities by the Soviet Government. The U.S. Embassy in Moscow employs 190 Soviet nationals. These Soviet employees fill non-sensitive positions in the Embassy, working as maintenance men, drivers, charwomen, clerks, etc.

The staff of the Soviet Embassy in Washington total 263. The State Department lists 136 of these employees as having diplomatic rank. Under the terms of the same bilateral agreement referred to above, members of the support staff enjoy full diplomatic privileges and immunities in the United States. The Soviet Embassy employs no Americans.

A number of factors contribute to the disproportionate number of Soviet employees at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. The Soviets elect to bring all of their own support personnel to the U.S. Consequently, a large number of the Soviet Embassy's support staff serve in such jobs as maintenance men, mechanics, charwomen, etc. The Department of State, for convenience as well as financial reasons, has a world-wide policy of employing local nations in non-sensitive positions in its diplomatic missions overseas. This policy has been extended to our missions in the Soviet Union. To replace the Soviets now employed at our Embassy in Moscow with Americans would not only result in far greater operating costs, but would also require far more housing than the Embassy presently can obtain. Moscow has a housing shortage, and our Embassy has a continuing problem in obtaining adequate apartments for the staff that is already assigned to Moscow. Recruitment and hiring of US citizens to serve at our Embassy in the Soviet Union in these employment categories would, in addition, raise considerable practical and policy difficulties (e.g., the Department does not have positions, hiring authority, or career possibilities for hiring personnel overseas in such categories.)

7. Q: It is alleged that the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. is located on the highest point geographically in the area whereas the U.S. Embassy in Moscow is located on the lowest point.

Please compare the relative facilities and locations of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow with those of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. How did this situation occur? Please furnish the complete background on this deplorable situation.

In the Department's view, what are the relative merits and demerits of this apparently inequitable situation?

What recommendations does the Department have to correct the inequities which exit in location staff, and facilities of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow relative to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D C.?

A: During the 1960's the U.S. and Soviet Governments held a series of negotiations to exchange properties so that new Embassy complexes could be built in the respective capitals. A site in the Mt. Alto area of Washington was made available to the Soviet Embassy here. and we received a similar area of land in Moscow on which we are now constructing a new Embassy complex. All U.S. Government intelligence agencies concerned were consulted before a decision to offer the Mt.Alto site to the Soviets was made. Both plots of land were offered and accepted by each country on a rent-free basis for a period of 85 years. Since the initial decision was made, a continuing and close liaison between the Department of State and the Intelligence Community has been maintained regarding the sensitive security-related aspects of this project.

Of the various properties viewed by the Department officials in Moscow, only two sites were considered satisfactory -- the present site and a second one located a considerable distance from the center of Moscow. The decision to select the present site was made primarily because of its closer location to the Kremlin, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and other Soviet Government agencies. Intelligence Community views were included among the factors which led to this decision. The selected site is situated approximate! 100 yards west of our present Embassy location, which is within the central Moscow business district. In the immediate vicinity of the site of our new Embassy are located the headquarters of the Council of Mutual Economic Aid (CEMA) and the recently constructed building which houses the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic Council of Ministers.

Disparities in the circumstances of our Embassy in Moscow relative to those of the Soviet Embassy in Washington are the subject of continuing review in the State Department, in liaison with other Government agencies. The purpose of such review, based on the principle of reciprocity, is to improve the circumstances of the Embassy and staff in Moscow while striving to preclude any unilateral advantage. The Soviet Act, which is presently before both Houses of Congress, will contribute significantly to the Department's ability, in conjunction with other agencies, to impose tighter restrictions on the Soviet Embassy and its operations here, as directed by the principle of reciprocity.

8. Q: Could you explain whether the hierarchy of the Cuban foreign service has been coopted by the DGI. To what extent? Please describe how the DGI and other Cuban intelligence services use diplomatic cover to gather intelligence, posing as diplomats, military attaches, journalists, trade representatives, scientific specialists, etc.

A: The Department will provide you a classified briefing on that subject if you so desire.

Q: Soviet personnel expelled from the U.S.

A: Public records reflect that 52 Soviets have been expelled from the United States since 1950. These include persons assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, the Soviet Mission to the UN, and persons employed at the UN. We are compiling data for pro-Soviet and Eastern Bloc personnel.

Q: How many Cuban diplomats, embassy personnel, mission or consulate personnel or UN personnel or other Cuban members of international organizations have been expelled from the United States for intelligence activities since 1959? for any other reasons? Soviet, pro-Soviet, or other Eastern Bloc diplomats, Embassy personnel, mission or consulate employees or UN personnel?

A: We are researching this question with regard to the UN and will have an answer for you shortly. Ricardo Escartin, Cuban Interests Section First Secretary, was expelled in February, 1981 for encouraging covert business relationships with Cuba in violation of Cuban Assets Control Regulations issued under Trading With The Enemy Act in addition to engaging in intelligence activities.

9. Q: Does the Department have information indicating that the Cuban or Soviet intelligence services have offices or agents or other personnel working in the U.N. or any of its various organizations?

I have to refer you to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Q: Please give the Department's assessment of the U.N. Human Rights Commission. Include an analysis of its membership and indicate whether it has become a pawn or moughpiece for the Soviet/Cuban, Marxist-Leninist point of view.

A: The Human Rights Commission completed its 38th session on March 12 after successful passage of a resolution on Poland which reflected worldwide concern over the human rights situation in that country. The resolution called for the end of measures restricting human rights and fundamental freedoms, release of prisoners detained without charge, and a review of sentences proposed under martial law. The resolution also requests the Secretary-General to undertake a study of the human rights situation in Poland for presentation to the next session of the HRC.

The Department considers passage of the Polish resolution a notable victory. It was the first time in its 38 years that the HRC has spoken out on human rights violations in an East European country, demonstrating that Poland is not merely an East-West issue, but a matter of worldwide concern. The success of these efforts reflected strong Western cohesion, and a commitment to reaching out to Third World countries which won out through three difficult procedural resolutions and the final substantive vote.

The Human Rights Commission is composer of 43 States Members of the United Nations. Michael Novak was appointed by President Reagan as head of the U.S. delegation, with Richard Schifter and Warren Hewitt acting as his principal alternates. The chairmanship of the Commission rotates each year among the five regional groups. This year Bulgaria provided the Chairman representing the Eastern European region. Membership in the 38th session of the Human Rights Commission (which is elected by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations) including 11 African states, 10 countries from Western Europe, 8 from Latin America, 5 each from Eastern Europe and East Asia, and 4 countries representing the Near East region.

The record of achievement by the 38th session of the Commission included a broad range of items, most of which were carry-overs from previous sessions. These included items relating to human rights in the Israeli-occupied Middle East territories, human rights in Chile, E1 Salvador, Bolivia, and Guatemala, human rights in South Africa, and a general item relating to the realization of economic human rights and a so-called right to development. USG efforts toward greater evenhandedness in international bodies were rewarded by the HRC vote of 37(US)-7-4, an improvement over last year's vote, on a resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan and for a political settlement based on that withdrawal. It also voted 28-85 for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of foreign forces from Kampuchea, and called for free and fair elections under UN supervision.

During its last week the HRC also voted on a resolution dealing with E1 Salvador. Although we lost that vote (25-5 (US)-13), several countries changed their "yes" votes to abstentions on a resolution which the US considered was intended to undermine the electoral process in E1 Salvador. Within days of passage of the resolution, Venezuela called for a special session of the OAS Permanent Council to complain about UN interference in a regional matter. The USG hopes that this move is a precursor of greater willingness by regional bodies, such as the OAS, to undertake responsibility for significant issues which now primarily confront the United Nations.

In general, the HRC remained critical of human rights conditions in Latin America, criticizing Chile, Guatemala, and Bolivia in the public sessions, in addition to the resolution on E1 Salvador. The US strongly supported a resolution to have Chile moved from a separate agenda item to inclusion under Item 12, the general umbrella item for consideration of human rights violations anywhere in the world. Many delegations equated US interest in inscribing Poland as a separate agenda item with continuing Chile in a similar category. There is, however, growing sentiment in Western delegations to eliminate the separate agenda item on Chile. A Uruguayan amendment to this effect was defeated 13(US)-22-7; a similar proposal by the FRG last year was rejected 12(US)-19-12. The Commission then adopted 128-ó(US)-8, a resolution once again extending the mandate of the public Special Rapporteur. A strong resolution on Guatemala passed 29-2-12(US), and a balanced text on Bolivia was passed without a vote.

The USG continues to be troubled by HRC treatment of the right to development issue, questions dealing with apartheid, and the Middle East. The Human Rights Commission considered two Arab resolutions on the Middle East dealing with the Golan Heights and alleged human rights violations in occupied Arab territories.

US success in gaining passage of the Polish resolution, passage of the Pakistani resolution on Afghanistan, and a resolution dealing with Kampuchea, reflects a movement, albeit slow, toward evenhandedness with regard to human rights violations throughout the world. We look forward to carrying these gains through to the Spring session of ECOSOC, which must approve the financial implications of the Polish resolution passed by the HRC.

10. Q: What is the Department's assessment of the UN Decolonization Committee? Are there any restrictions on the members of the U.N. Secretariat? How many members or staff are from Soviet, Cuban, Eastern bloc or pro-Soviet countries?

A: While we have placed travel controls on certain Missions of the United Nations, including the Soviet Mission, there are no travel controls on Secretariat Personnel. These employees are the responsibility of the Secretary General. Their official duties often require that they travel throughout the world. We have considered it inappropriate to restrict the movement of international civil servants, and we doubt the value of such restrictions in terms of U.S. national security.

Below are United Nations statistics on numbers of Secretariat officers and staff in New York for the Soviets, the Cubans, and the East bloc countries.

Soviet Union      254
Cuba                   34*
Poland                 13
Romania              11
Yugoslavia           10
East Germany        6
Czechoslovakia     4
Hungary                4
Bulgaria                3

*This figure may be misleading. 13 of these have "professional" status (statisticians, lawyers, etc.) and another 14 have "General" status (clerks, secretaries). Some of the "P" and "G" status members as well as an additional 6 maintenance personnel may be Cuban-born (exiles) rather than residents of Cuba. We are trying to get an accurate breakdown and will forward it to the Subcommittee.

The UN Special Committee of Decolonization, known as the Committee of 24 (although it now has 25 members), is mandated by the General Assembly to carry out the "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples" contained in UN Resolution 1514 and adopted by the UNGA on December 14, 1960. The US and UK, original members of the committee, decided to leave in 1970 after changes in the makeup of the committee resulted in its adoption of increasingly radical positions on decolonization. Since then additional changes in the governments of some of the long-time members of the committee have tilted the balance even further. The more moderate members of the committee, however, still command respect, and since most of the committee's decisions are reached by consensus, the moderates still play a significant role in the committee's work. For example, the Australian and Scandinavian representatives (one seat rotates among Norway, Sweden and Denmark) have modified resolutions in the drafting stage to make the less objectionable to the US. During votes, however, most of the moderates tend to abstain on certain resolutions rather than to appear to oppose the principle of decolonization.

Cuba has frequently used the Committee of 24 to attempt to embarrass the US, particularly in regard to Puerto Rico. The vote in '981 on a hostile resolution on Puerto Rico reveals the current complexion of the committee vis-a-vis the US. In the chart below, negative votes favor the US, positive votes are against the US:

Yes: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Tanzania, USSR (1l)

No: Australia, Denmark (2)

11. Q: Please give the Subcommittee the benefit of your assessment of the present status of the refugees from those countries in which Cuba and Cuban-sponsored or supported insurgents are active in trying to take over the government. Does DOS have any information showing a flow of refugees into any of these countries where a Marxist-Leninist totalitarian government is in power?

A: E1 Salvador and Guatemala are the two source countries in Central America for refugees fleeing violence at least in part caused by Cuban-supported insurgents. Most Salvadoran refugees have fled to Honduras, although some have gone to Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Mexico, Guatemala, Belize, and Panama. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) administers camps in Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica. We estimate that there are some 60,000 to 75,000 Salvadoran refugees outside of E1 Salvador in Central American. (The UN Human Rights Commission uses a higher figure of 200,000 Salvadoran refugees. That figure includes all Salvadorans out of the country, whereas our figures include only those who left specifically for political motives.)

Honduras is presently home for about 13,500 Salvadoran refugees, down from 18,500 three months ago. The decrease in numbers~is apparently due to the UNHCR - Government of Honduras effort, which we support, to resettle the refugees from the border area with E1 Salvador to a safer site further inland. Some refugees have apparently decided to return to E1 Salvador rather than be resettled away from the border area. The resettlement effort is designed to protect the refugees from any spill-over from the violence in E1 Salvador, while ensuring that future arrivals will be protected through the establishment of refugee reception centers, staffed in part by UNHCR representatives, at key points along the border. The Department has urged the UNHCR to complete the movement of the refugees as quickly as possible. To date some 4,800 Salvadoran refugees have been relocated with perhaps 2700 more yet to be moved in one area. An additional 5-6,000 refugees do not require immediate relocation. Refugee resettlement away from the border will also reduce the Honduran Government's concern that the Salvadoran insurgents may be obtaining support from the border refugee sites.

We consider that the UNHCR is doing a credible job thus far, although we have told its representatives that a greater effort needs to be made to speed up the resettlement of the refugees. The Honduran Government deserves praise for its unselfish and generous acceptance of the refugees desite its own economic problems.

Our estimates of Salvadoran refugees in other countries of the region are as follows: Nicaragua - 12,000 to 15,000; Costa Rica - 12,000; Belize - 4,000 to 5,000; Guatemala and Mexico - 12,000 to 15,000; Panama - 1,500. all but approximately 400 in Costa Rica and 600 in Nicaragua are outside of camps and rely on the local economy and donations from private and UNHCR sources of subsistence needs.

The UNHCR may shortly begin providing emergency food and medical assistance for some 6,000 Guatemalan refugees located in the Mexican state of Chiapas in addition to the aid it now supplies to about 800 Guatemalan refugees in Honduras.

Q: What do you predict the refugee problem to be if the Soviet/Cuban bloc is successful in spreading their form of Marxist-Leninist totalitarian rule in Central America?

A: Secretary Haig pointed up the significance of refugee flows from Communist regimes and terror in his testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 2 and in his address before the National Governor's Convention on February 22 when he addressed the impact of totalitarian regimes in Central America where there are unprecedented flows of immigration. The Secretary pointed out that in 1980 alone there were 1.5 million undocumented emigres, most fleeing communism, and expressed concern at levels which might be reached if radicalization of the Hemisphere were to continue with the advent of additional totalitarian States. Secretary Haig concluded that the U.S. has an important responsibility to deal with the social, economic, and humanitarian aspects of the crisis--the human misery--which outside powers exploit.

The imposition by force of Marxist-Leninist governments in Central American could lead to massive flows of people from this region to the United States. Cuba is a good example. Since Castro came to power in 1959, 1 million Cubans have emigrated out of a population of ten million and perhaps as many as two million more Cubans would leave given a chance to do so. In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas came to power promising free ! elections and a pluralist society. Consequently, the majority of Nicaraguans who had taken refuge in nearby countries from the violence of the civil war returned to their homes. As the Sandinistas move closer to the consolidation of a totalitarian state modeled on that of Cuba, we are watching closely the effects this may have on migration. Should the private sector of the economy fall to state control and political freedoms continue to erode in the face of the emergency decree, we could expect to see an exodus first of the middle class and then, as the economy worsens under state control, of the working class intent on finding better economic opportunities. The size of the exodus would depend in part on the ability and desire of the Nicaraguan Government to control its borders.

We have already seen some of the effects of Nicaraguan Government attempts to restrict traditional rights enjoyed by the Miskito Indians. Some 12,000 Miskitos have fled to Honduras rather than submit to a new government imposed resettlement scheme.

Elsewhere in Central American violent Marxist-Leninist takeovers could produce massive flows of people; some fleeing political reprisals for their association with previous governments, and others pushed on by the repression of a violent totalitarian government and the deterioration of the economy.

12 Q: What is the status of the discipline, morale and effectiveness of the Cuban troops in Angola and Ethiopia? Have there been defections and desertions from the ranks? The Cubans have said that the first military contingents to reach Angola were elite Ministry of Interior Units. What has become of these units? Please furnish the subcommittee with the Department's complete assessment of Cuban involvement, military and otherwise, in Angola Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Botswana, Zaire and Ethiopia. Please give a separate answer to each country.

A: The Department is preparing a detailed answer to this question for the subcommittee.

13. Q: Are you aware of any evidence that the Communist Chinese are assisting any of the insurgent movements in Central America, and, if so, please describe the extent and nature of that assistance and the naure of the evidence of the same. How about personnel from North Vietnam, North Korea, Angola, Mozambique?

A. We have already dealt with this question to some extent in our reports on E1 Salvador. The Department is prepared to provide the subcommittee with a classified briefing on this subject

14. Q: What role is the French government playing, if any, in supporting communist terrorism in Central America? Please describe that role in detail.

A: French policy toward Central American has differed from ours, but the French government is not supporting communist terrorism there.

15. Q: A Reuters news article dated March 8, 1982, states that two Nicaraguan pilots defected to Honduras by flying a C-47 transport there to protest the Marxist-Leninist course that Nicaragua's Sandinista leaders had taken. They claim that Fidel Castro rules Nicaragua through advisors, giving as an example that each of the nine members of Nicaragua's ruling National Directorate have two or three Cuban advisors, whose instructions are followed unquestionably.

Can you furnish the Subcommittee with more complete information on this incident? Are there any comments you care to make?

Do the allegations line up with information that DOS has concerning the extent of Cuban involvement and control in Nicaragua?

A: On March 7, Octavio Barrera and Gustavo Quezada, pilots in the Sandinista Air Force, took a C-47 on a test flight and defected to Honduras. Accompanying them were Quezada's wife Julia and his 3-year-old daughter Martha.

It is difficult to determine the extent of Cuban influence on the Sandinistas. However, it is clear that Cubans occupy key positions as military and security advisors, and that relations between the FSLN and Cuba are excellent. There are currently approximately 1800-2000 Cuban military and security advisors in Nicaragua plus an additional 3500 Cuban civilian advisors and Cuba has been actively involved in arming and training the Sandinistas.

16. Q: Let us assume that the Soviets and Cubans are successful in their efforts to install totalitarian Marxist-Leninist governments which are aligned with or controlled by the Soviet/Cuban bloc in E1 Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and other countries in Central America.

I know you have touched on this in your opening presentation,but please elaborate on what the consequences are for the United States, in terms of our national security, if this expansionism, this slow constant creep of Communist domination progresses unchecked.

What are the economic consequences?

Were the assumption posed to become fact we would have to develop a costly military shield where today we have none. This would impose heavy new burdens on our defense budget or force us to divert American defensive strength from Europe and somewhere in the world.

Economically, it is important to realize that nearly half of our crude oil imports--in fact nearly half of all our exports and imports--pass through the Caribbean sea lanes which would be threatened by the extension of Soviet military power implied in the assumption stated in the question.

17. Q: Please describe the present status of travel between the United States and Cuba? What restrictions exist on travel to Cuba and to what category of people do these restrictions apply? Have these restrictions been modified recently? Please explain? What restrictions exist on travel to the US by citizens of Cuba?

For the years 1977, 1978, 1979 1980, 1981 and 1982, list the number of US citizens and permanent resident aliens who have travelled to Cuba and the reasons for such travel. For the years listed above, give the number of Cubans who travelled to the U.S. and the reasons for such travel.

A: The Department of State places no restrictions on travel to Cuba by American citizens at this time. We advise Americans visiting Cuba that they are subject to Cuban law while in that country. the United States Government may restrict the travel of Americans citizens to designated countries for reasons of the safety of the traveler, or to enforce U.S. law or regulations pertaining to such travel.

The travel of Cuban citizens to the U.S. is governed by the Immigration and Nationality Act. Security name checks are conducted on all Cuban applicants. Cuban officials are presumed to be ineligible for U.S. visas under Section 212 (a) (28) of that law, and thus require waivers to enter the U.S. Under the McGovern Amendment to the Immigration Act, the Secretary of State should recommend to the Attorney General that he grant a waiver so that the visa may be issued, unless the Secretary determines that the entry of a specific alien is contrary to the security interests of the U.S. In such cases he notifies the Speaker of the House and the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

We are currently researching the number of Cubans traveling to the U.S. for the years in question. Following are U.S. Government figures for U.S. citizen and U.S. resident travel to Cuba from the United States.

1977     14,865
1978     23,864
1979   176,594
1980     74,923
1981     38,134

More than half of these are Cuban-Americans resident in the United States. Family reunification visits by Cub Americans, resumed in 1977 after a fifteen year gap, have been destabilizing to the Castro regime in that they disp propaganda about the United States fed by the Castro government to the Cuban people.