SECTION
III WAS THE "ILLEGAL SECTION" OF D.G.I. ITS basic duty was to carry
out espionage and counterespionage in the United States, Canada, and Mexico. A
major function was spying on the C.I.A. and Cuban exile organizations engaged
in anti‑Castro activities. The offices of Section III were located in a
gray, three‑story house on Linea Street in the Vedado suburb of Havana.
Nothing indicated the nature of the work conducted inside the building. In
order to camouflage its activities, the section had a sign across the front of
the building which proclaimed, Prevencion de Incendios (Prevention of Fires).
There was no fire‑fighting equipment to be seen, however.
The
subsection located in the upper portion of the building was in charge of
operations at the Intelligence centers in Mexico, Canada, and the United
Nations. It also handled the training of officials assigned to serve at these
centers. The grounds and first floors were occupied by the Buro C.I.A. y
Contrarevolucion. Technically one bureau, in actuality there were two separate
units, and eventually D.G.I. did split them into two distinct bureaus. The Buro
CLA. y Contrarevolucion was headed by "Demetrio," a onetime teacher,
who had formerly worked in a section of G‑2 which kept watch on the foreign
embassies in Havana. Under him was "Menendez," who also acted as
chief of the counter‑C.I.A. section. Another official,
"Candido," headed the contrarevolucion section, which spied on the
activities of Cuban exiles.
The
work within the various sections often overlapped, and at times there was also
involvement with G‑2, whose task was to uncover and eliminate anti‑regime
activities inside Cuba. Liaison was maintained with G‑2, and when G‑2
caught someone who had been infiltrated into Cuba, or had knowledge of
infiltrations, copies of the tapes and transcripts of the interrogations
carried out by G‑2 were tuned over to D.G.I. If D.G.I. wanted particular
information from a prisoner, a request was made to G‑2, which would then
try to elicit the data required. Of special interest were details about the
operations of a vessel named the Rex, which was known to bring infiltrators
to Cuba. Through information that had been gathered, D.G.I. had been able to
build up a description of this vessel, which during the daytime appeared to be
a commercial ship, but at night became a well‑armed warship. Small, fast
boats were believed used to carry infiltrators from the Rex to the Cuban shore.
D.G.I.
also on occasion sought the cooperation of the Comites de Defensa de la
Revolucion, neighborhood vigilance committees which keep watch on the
citizenry. If D.G.I. needed information about a certain person ‑ perhaps
someone who had lived in Cuba but was now involved in exile activities in the
States ‑ an official would question members of the C.D.R. in the place
where that person had resided. A small problem was presented by the fact the
D.G.I. was - and still is ‑ virtually unknown in Cuba, and the security‑conscious
C.D.R. members cooperated only with G‑2. C.D.R. offices had lists of G‑2
agents to whom they were authorized to facilitate any requested information.
When D.G.I. needed data, the tactic was adopted, therefore, of having an
official go to the C.D.R., tell them he was new at G‑2, and ask them to
check with G‑2 headquarters. G‑2 would already have been advised by
D.G.I. that one of its men was going to see the C.D.R., and so when the check
was made, G‑2 would vouch for the individual. The committees did not know
that in reality they were dealing with the Intelligence service.
Upon
leaving the D.G.I. school, I was assigned to work in the contrarevolucion unit
of Section III. My tasks amounted to counterespionage by remote control. The
unit was concerned with infiltrating and spying on exile organizations operating
out of Miami. I was given the expedientes (dossiers) of a number of key exile
figures, and my task was to build up information about these persons with the
view of finding a way to place a D.G.I. informer close to them. As a case
officer, I had to delve into the background and relationships of not only the
target individual, but also his relatives, friends, coworkers, and
acquaintances. As this detailed information was gathered, I watched for
possible opportunities which D.G.I. could exploit (a friend of the target
individual known to be in need of funds and perhaps susceptible to bribery, a
co‑worker with a relative still in Cuba and therefore subject to
coercion, and so on).
The
most important of my expedientes was that of Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo. Menoyo had
been one of the leaders of a sizable guerrilla organization that had fought
the Batista regime during the Revolution. Once the rebels had won, the
organization was dissolved. Subsequently, Menoyo assisted in uncovering a
major conspiracy aimed at toppling Castro, but later turned against Castro and
fled to the United States. He helped set up an exile organization named Alpha
66, which became known for its raids against shipping off Cuba.
D.G.I.
believed that Menoyo was in the process of bringing weapons to isolated spots
on the Cuban coast and concealing them there, to be picked up and used at a
future date. Reports received from Miami indicated that Menoyo himself planned
to infiltrate into Cuba, and therefore D.G.I. and G‑2 were conducting an
investigation to ascertain which of Menoyo's friends in Cuba might be making
preparations to assist his eventual arrival. It was felt that Menoyo would need
the help of a "reception team" of local fishermen in order to be able
to come ashore without being detected by the authorities, and likely fishermen
were also being investigated.
I
did not work in this section of D.G.I. long enough to see completion of the
Menoyo expediente. Menoyo did infiltrate into Cuba in an effort to launch a new
guerrilla campaign, and he was captured and imprisoned. By this time, however,
I had been transferred to another department.
Another
file which I handled was that of Andres Nazario Sargen, also a top figure in
Alpha 66. The Sargen family was from Matanzas Province, and an investigation
was under way to determine whether a connection could be found with any
fishermen in that area. D.G.I. and G‑2 were seeking to ascertain who
might be serving, or might in the future serve, on "reception teams"
for Alpha infiltrators or for weapons that were being buried on bays and near
beaches. The investigators were also trying to find out whether Sargen was in
contact with any friends inside Cuba. The file was being built up, and eventually
a plan would be prepared for consideration by the chief of D.G.I., Manuel
Pineiro. This plan would suggest methods by which it might be possible to
penetrate Alpha, perhaps to place a spy or informer close to Sargen.
A
third case on which I worked was that of a doctor, an orthopedist, who had
participated in anti‑Castro activities in Cuba and had been found out,
but had managed to escape to the United States. In Miami the doctor was again
active in the anti‑Castro movement. As was the usual procedure, a
detailed study was undertaken of relatives and friends of the doctor who were
still in Cuba, and out of this study two possible approaches were being
developed. A brother of the doctor was serving a prison term, and consideration
was given to offering his release in return for cooperation by the doctor with
D.G.I. If he would secretly supply Intelligence with information about exile
activities, his brother would eventually be released ‑ or so he would be
told. The second approach would involve another relative who had applied for
permission to leave Cuba. The permission would be granted ‑ provided the
man agreed to spy on the doctor for D.G.I. What if the man acceded and then
reneged once he was in the States? This presented no problem: D.G.I. would
simply keep his wife and children in Cuba as hostages. And if the man were to
decide that, under the circumstances, he did not wish to go to the States,
after all? That was no problem, either: he would be confronted with evidence
that he had been involved in clandestine activities and told that he would be brought
to trial unless he did cooperate. Thus does a police state "recruit"
unwilling agents.
I
handled four cases in the short time I served in Section III. The fourth file
was that of Miguel Diaz Isalgue, a veritable Scarlet Pimpernel who was
believed to have made numerous secret trips in and out of Cuba. Isalgue was
well‑experienced in this type of work: while in exile in Miami during the
Batista dictatorship he had run weapons into Cuba for the Castro rebels. Later
he had turned against Castro, as had Menoyo, and begun working against Castro's
regime. Isalgue had succeeded in setting up a clandestine network in Cuba, and
had even recruited an Army comandante as a member. D.G.I. and G‑2 knew
that Isalgue had reception teams composed of fishermen in Matanzas Province,
and possibly Las Villas Province also. An effort was under way to infiltrate
agents into these teams.
It
was learned that Isalgue had utilized his mother's home in Havana as a secret
meeting place with his contacts in the area. The home was placed under close
surveillance: all correspondence was opened and checked, the telephone was
tapped, phone calls to and from the States were tape‑recorded. Isalgue's
friends were being investigated to see whether any were working with him.
Despite the extensive effort made by the authorities, however, they did not
succeed in capturing the elusive Isalgue.
In
the course of gathering information for my various files, I had occasion to
talk with a Cuban woman who had worked as a spy in Miami for the Cuban
government. Marta A. Gonzalez, a divorcee with a fair face and figure, in her
thirties, had been trained by "Menendez" in intelligence work and had
been sent to the States. She had entered the country as a refugee in April of
1962. Becoming a part of the exile milieu, she presumably dispatched such
information as she could gather about the activities of anti‑Castro
organizations. About a year and a half after her arrival, she returned to
Cuba. There she published a book, Bajo Palabra (Under Oath), a caustic account
of the life of Cuban exiles in the States. The book said nothing about the
authoress being an Intelligence agent.
In
her book, Marta Gonzalez indicated that disillusionment with the United States
was the cause of her return to Cuba. She told me a different story, however.
She had been working under orders from Chafik Homero Saker Zenni, chief of the
Intelligence Center within the Cuban delegation to the United Nations. Although
travel of Cuban diplomats was restricted by the U.S. government to New York,
Saker came to her one day and told her she had to leave, evidently because he
suspected that the U.S. authorities were on to her activities and might be
about to arrest her. He took her in his car and drove to Texas, where, posing
as an American, she crossed into Mexico, from there to return to Cuba. (In her
book, Mrs. Gonzalez said that she went from the United States to Canada, and
from there returned to Cuba.)
I
was in Section III for three months. Subsequently I was transferred to the
personnel selection department, where my work was not much different than it
had been in the C.I.A. and counterrevolution bureau. My function was to put
together reports of men who had been chosen as possible members of D.G.I. The
selection was made by party and governmental organizations which had been requested
to submit the names of their best men. All the information that could be
obtained about these candidates was put together, and this was studied to see
whether the men were suitable material for D.G.I. My job was to gather the various reports on each individual, and
then to write an account summarizing what I had found regarding the
individual's good and bad points. Final selection was made by the departmental
chief.
I
worked in the personnel section for only two and a half months. I was then
transferred to Section II‑2. My chief had asked me if I would like to
change positions, and I had replied, yes, I would prefer to be engaged in
intelligence work rather than the desk job I was now doing. Section II‑2
had been set up as a result of the breaking of diplomatic relations with Cuba
by all of the Latin American countries except Mexico. Cuba then established
Intelligence centers in France, Spain, England, and Italy whose function was
not only to handle espionage activities in Europe, but also to serve as a
liaison between Havana and its agents in Latin America.
At
Section II‑2 I learned that I was to be sent to Paris, a fact which
thoroughly delighted both my wife and me.
Headquarters
for Section II‑2 was located in what had once been the large, two‑story
home of a private family in the city of Marianao, adjoining Havana. The
building was also where oficiales received their final training before being
sent to European posts. By having headquarters and school in the same building,
students were enabled to study the actual operations of the centers to which
they were being assigned. Thus, I had access to messages sent to and from the
Paris Center, and in this way became acquainted with the work carried out there.
Chief
of Section II‑2 at this time was Alberto Boza‑Hidalgo Gato, an
affable individual whom I had first met when Boza‑Hidalgo had made
occasional trips to the Intelligence school. Boza‑Hidalgo's career in
D.G.I. followed a rocky road. After I went abroad to serve in France, I heard
that Boza‑Hidalgo had suffered disciplinary action, evidently because of
a lack of sufficient enthusiasm for his work, and perhaps also because he was
not as ideologically militant as was deemed desirable. Despite these failings,
Boza‑Hidalgo managed to reinstate himself in the good graces of his
superiors and was sent to serve in the Intelligence Center within Cuba's United
Nations delegation. There he became involved in espionage against the United
States, and as a result, upon taking a trip to Cuba, he was barred by the U.S.
government from reentering this country.
Part
of the training I underwent in Section II‑2 amounted to a refresher
course on what I had learned at the Intelligence school. Studied again were
such matters as how to arrange a clandestine meeting with another person, how
to pass messages from one person to another, how to spot and evade anyone who
might be following you. A large portion of my instruction, however, was
directly related to the position and work I would assume in Paris. I was
briefed on diplomatic rules, behavior, and protocol, and I delved into the
French language, French politics, French economy, and information in general
about Paris and the country. At night I attended classes on the arts at the
National Council of Culture. Since I could not identify myself as being with
the Intelligence service, my "cover" was that I belonged to the
Foreign Commission of the Communist Party.
I
was told that all friendships I might make in Paris had to be reported to the
jefe of the Centro. In the Intelligence viewpoint, one did not have private
friends abroad: acquaintanceships were supposed to have some bearing on the
Intelligence work one was doing. Conversely, people who approached Intelligence
personnel with a view to establishing a relationship were open to suspicion:
they might be planted by the local counterintelligence service. The jefe had to
be informed of any approach that was made, who had made it, how it was made,
and the apparent intentions of the person involved.
The
trainees were warned to beware constantly of counterintelligence services. We
were told that every diplomat was an object of interest to counterintelligence,
and for an Intelligence official everything outside of the Centro was a
potential threat, a possible trap. We were especially warned about
relationships with women, no matter how casual these associations might be,
since the women might be working for counterintelligence.
Practical
training at II‑2 consisted mainly of planning and carrying out contact
work on the streets of Havana. Two students would prepare a plan for meeting at
a specified place at a certain hour.
They were supposed to do this without being seen by anyone who might be
following either of them. To make this practice highly realistic, actual
surveillance was carried out by agents of G‑2. We would work up a contact
plan and then submit it to our chief, who would usually inform G‑2. G‑2
was not always told, but we did not know when it was or wasn't. As part of the
exercise, we were required to report later whether we had been under
surveillance, and if so, to provide details about the men and the vehicles that
had followed us. On one occasion a trainee reported that he had spotted five G‑2
cars. Later, to his chagrin, he learned that that day G‑2 had not
followed him at all.
Ordinarily,
an official had to undergo about one year's practical training before being
sent abroad, but in my case this was cut to three months. The Paris Centro was
shorthanded and in need of a new official. One phase of my training that was
eliminated was a period of work at the Ministry of Foreign Relations, where I
would have learned at firsthand the functioning of Cuban diplomacy. The purpose
would have been to enable me to pose more knowledgeably as a diplomat while
abroad.
Before
leaving for Paris, I went before the Party Commission within D.G.I., composed
of Communist Party members in D.G.I. All officials going abroad had to be
investigated ‑ "processed" was the preferred word ‑ by
the commission. Approval by this group amounted to granting membership in the
Communist Party. It was felt that only persons acceptable for Party membership
were fit to serve Cuba abroad. I was subjected to several days of
interrogation. Questions ranged from my knowledge of Marxism and views on Viet
Nam to my role in the Revolution and the political positions of my relatives
and friends. I was asked about my wife's opinions regarding the Revolution. I
was careful not to reveal that a few years earlier, before we were married,
she had applied for permission to leave Cuba and go to the United States.
Although this was an official record, apparently no one in D.G.I. had checked
back and discovered this.
I
won approval from the commission. Actually, this "processing" was
little more than a formality, since the commission members knew that for a
person to have come this far, he must already have been well‑investigated
and able to prove his worth. I was further aided by the presence on the
commission of two men who had studied with me at Intelligence school.
Official
papers from the Ministry of Foreign Relations, a last chat with the section
chief, and a farewell dinner at the Mandarin Chinese Restaurant (which served
Cuban food; Chinese food, like many other things, was lacking in Cuba), and I
was ready to take up my post in Paris.