Guevara
ERNESTO
"CHE" GUEVARA, THE RESTLESS REVOLUTIONARY from Argentina, joined
Fidel Castro in Mexico in the mid‑fifties, and from then on Guevara's
star was in the ascendancy. Eventually he would become one of the most colorful
lights in the Communist galaxy.
Guevara's
activities during a turbulent ten years have been fully recorded, by himself as
well as by others: the expedition to Cuba, the struggle in the Sierra Maestra,
final victory, and then the many positions Guevara occupied in the new Castro
regime. But after this came mystery, a period of two years when Guevara slipped
completely from public sight. Guevara had made a lengthy trip which carried
him from the United Nations to Africa, to Europe, to Asia, and then back to
Cuba‑where he promptly disappeared. Historians, newspapermen, and
intelligence agents have delved into the puzzle, but as yet only partial
fragments have come to light.
In
Paris, I was able to learn some of the missing pieces of information, details
regarding Guevara's ill‑fated attempt to lead a guerrilla war in Africa,
and his later, final adventure in Bolivia. That Guevara had secretly returned
to Africa after his previous, well‑publicized trip was first learned when
Ciro Roberto Bustos, an Argentinian who joined Guevara in Bolivia and was later
captured by Bolivian troops, made a detailed statement to Bolivian Intelligence
which included the gists of conversations Bustos had had with Guevara. Guevara
had believed, according to Bustos, that revolutions could be engendered in
Africa and South America, with the advantage in favor of Africa because of its
greater distance from the United States and its greater logistic possibilities
(Soviet Union, China, United Arab Republic, Algeria). During his extensive
voyage through Africa and Asia before disappearing from Cuba, Guevara arranged
for his incorporation in the struggle in the Congo, that is, he chose Africa.
But the experience turned out to be negative, because, he said, the human
element failed. . .
What
had happened in Africa?
One
of the collaborators with Cuban Intelligence in Paris was a Cuban doctor,
Rodrigo Alvarez Cambra (who used the nickname "Kiko"). Cambra had
obtained a scholarship for advanced studies in his field, orthopedics, and
spent about a year in Paris, during which time his intelligence tasks consisted
primarily of working among university students. Cambra visited the chancellery
for romantic as well as professional reasons: he was dating a French girl,
Anik, employed there as a secretary and translator.
Cambra
had been in the Congo with Guevara, and in conversations with me he revealed
what had happened there. For Guevara and a group of Cubans who were with him
this had been an odyssey of frustration. They had endured severe privations,
and little had been accomplished. Rather than leading a guerrilla campaign,
they found themselves giving their African allies rudimentary military
training, and when not occupied thus, they were busy trying to keep the tribes
from fighting among themselves.
In
one combat, Cambra related, a Cuban and several Africans were killed, and a
number of Guevara's African allies had fled in terror. Later the tribesmen who
had not retreated demanded that the others drink the blood of slain enemies in
order to regain their lost valor. For good measure, the Cubans were expected to
do likewise, and this they refused to do.
There
were angry arguments, and the tribe that was expected to drink blood rebelled
outright. Guevara and his Cubans had to flee through the jungles, pursued by
enemy troops and their former allies. It took them a month to get to safety,
and Guevara remarked in disgust that it would be another hundred years before
the Africans would be ready to receive help in winning their
"liberation."
Cambra
revealed that the Russians had been against Guevara's African adventure,
warning that the Africans were not yet sufficiently developed for a movement
of this type. Fidel Castro had not agreed, and there had been friction between
him and the Russians over the matter. As it turned out, events proved the
Russians to be right, and the affair ended in a near‑farcical fiasco.
Guevara
eventually slipped back into Cuba, there to prepare his Bolivian adventure‑he
was now accepting his second choice of a target area, since Africa had failed.
Toward the end of 1967 he secretly entered Bolivia, and there launched a new
guerrilla movement. Despite initial successes, the guerrillas soon suffered
setbacks because of the lack of cooperation of the local peasantry and persistent
pursuit by the Bolivian army.
The
Intelligence Centro in Paris performed a support role for Guevara. While he was
in Africa, groups of eight to twelve soldiers would arrive periodically in
Paris from Cuba. All were Cuban Negroes, and the Centro had to find hotel accommodations
for them before they could be sent to Africa. Their rugged appearance caused
French eyebrows to be lifted, particularly in view of their pose as
"technicians" and other "professional" people. Even after
Guevara's adventure had ended, Cuban Negro soldiers were still being sent to
Africa as Castro persisted in attempting to establish his influence there. A
substantial Cuban military mission was accepted and set up at Brazzaville.
The
Paris Centro continued to lend support when Guevara was in Bolivia. Isolated as
he was in the Bolivian jungles, Guevara had difficulty in communicating with
Havana. This problem was partially solved by having Guevara send written
messages to an agente buzon in Paris, who then turned them over to the Centro.
These messages were transmitted in sealed envelopes. From Paris the envelopes,
still unopened, were dispatched by courier to Havana, where they were subjected
to laboratory tests to find out whether they might have been tampered with at
any point in their long journey.
A
major service performed for Guevara by the Centro was the recruitment of a
writer to go to Bolivia to gather material for what was to have been the first
public revelation of Guevara's presence in that country. Havana had requested
that a trustworthy and ideologically suitable writer be found, and to this end
Lopez, the chief of the Centro, contacted Francois Maspero, a French editor and
publisher with whom Intelligence had had dealings. Maspero, in turn put Lopez
in contact with Regis Debray, a French writer of lesser note. A number of
conversations ensued, and Lopez succeeded in recruiting Debray for the task.
Lopez, in talking to me, described Debray as impulsive, determined, highly
cooperative, and "considers himself very brave." Debray was sent to
Cuba, and from there made his way to Bolivia and Guevara's guerrilla
encampment. Bu romantic dreams in Paris did not jibe with the realities of a
harsh bush existence in Bolivia, and Debray was soon eager to leave t
guerrillas. He did so, was captured, brought to trial, and given thirty‑year
prison sentence.
Cuban
Intelligence did not lose interest in Debray. In Paris, the Centro continued to
maintain contact with his mother.
Guevara's
Bolivian effort ended in complete failure. Guevara and the remnants of his
group were tracked down, and Guevara was taken prisoner and shortly afterwards
executed. The story did no end there, however, for the Intelligence Center in
Paris. Guevara had kept a daily diary in Bolivia, and this had been captured by
the Bolivian army. Newspapermen and publishers' representatives from around the
world sought to buy or otherwise obtain copies of the diary, but the Bolivian
High Command delayed in reaching a decision on this ‑ and then a
startling event occurred. Fidel Castro announced that Cuba had secured a copy
of the diary and was publishing and releasing it for worldwide distribution.
How
had Cuba obtained the diary? It was soon revealed that copy had been sent to
Cuba by a most unlikely person, Anton Arguedas, Minister of the Interior in the
Bolivian government, was head of the Bolivian police had played a major role in
breaking the clandestine apparatus which was to have provided support for
Guevara's guerrillas. Had Arguedas been a Castro agent all along? The answer
seems to be no, for the Cuban government appears to have been as surprised by
his actions as were the Bolivians. The Central Principal of Intelligence in
Cuba sent an urgent message to the Centro in Paris instructing it to send two
officials to make contact with Arguedas, who had fled to Chile. These officials
were to find out if Arguedas wanted to go to Cuba, and if so, to assist him in
getting there. They were also to ascertain whether he had any additional
documents he wished to turn over to the Cuban government.
Roberto
Alvares Barrera (code name "Remigio") and I were selected to go to
Chile. Ambassador Castellanos, who maintained friendly relations with other
Latin American diplomats in Paris, was requested to obtain Chilean visas for
us and this he accomplished promptly. The person we were instructed to contact
for assistance in Chile was a sympathizer toward the Cuban Revolution, Senator
Salvador Allende, now president of Chile. Just as we were about to depart, a
new message from Havana called the whole thing off. Arguedas was talking
wildly, and Intelligence now thought better of trying to contact him.
One
last chapter of the Guevara affair remained. Three Cubans survived Guevara's
final battle with the Bolivian Rangers who had been pursuing him. Realizing
that further fighting was futile‑"This is finished" they said ‑
they had decided to flee rather than risk their lives further. In Chile,
Senator Allende sent a number of Bolivian scouts fanning out to see if they
could make contact with any guerrilla survivors. Two of these guides
eventually found the three Cubans and began guiding them to Chile.
The
group encountered Guido ("Inti") Peredo Leigue, who had been the
Bolivian guerrilla chieftain under Guevara. Peredo was also fleeing, and he
demanded the right to get to Chile first, with the Cubans to follow later. The
Cubans heatedly stated that they were foreigners who had come to fight for
Bolivia, and it was their prerogative to leave first, and that at any rate
Peredo could wait because he knew the land better. The Cubans continued on
their journey, prepared to battle with Peredo if he attempted to stop them.
Thus ended ignominiously the comradeship Guevara had sought to develop between
Bolivians and Cubans. (The following year Peredo was killed by Bolivian
police.)
Before
reaching the Chilean frontier, the Cubans and their two Bolivian guides arrived
at a town frequented by border smugglers. They sought food and rest, and were
taken to the home of a local official, who greeted them in apparent friendship.
They realized, however, that he was setting a trap to capture them. To make
their escape they had to shoot their way out of the town. As they were leaving
they heard Bolivian transport planes circling overhead, presumably carrying
paratroopers. The troops were evidently unable to jump because of the night
darkness.
Once
into Chile the five men hid in a cave, where they listened to a transistor
radio they had somehow obtained along the way. When news reports convinced them
that Chile would not be hostile to them, they surrendered to the Chilean
authorities. The men were granted safe ‑ conduct to leave the country.
Havana contacted its Embassy in Paris, which made arrangements for the five
men to fly to Tahiti and then to Paris. The French acquiesced to this provided
that the Cubans made no public statements while on French soil.
Ambassador
Castellanos and the second in command of the Intelligence Centro, Alberto Diaz
Vigo (who doubled as consul), flew to Tahiti to meet the guerrillas and escort
them to Paris. I was among the Cuban officials who greeted them at Le Bourget
Airport and took them to Orly Airport, from whence they flew on to Prague,
Moscow, arid Havana. In conversing with the men, I learned the details of their
escape and obtained new insights into the Guevara affair in Bolivia. For one
thing, I was told, Bolivia had never been Guevara's primary goal. He had
planned to use it merely as a springboard. From Bolivia the guerrilla movement
was to have fanned out into adjoining countries, creating what Guevara hoped
would become "two, three, or many Viet Nams" in the Western
Hemisphere.
One
of the reasons the guerrilla movement floundered was that it failed to receive
expected reinforcements. Additional men trained in Cuba were to join Guevara,
but upon arriving in La Paz they would meet with Mario Monje, a Bolivian
Communist leader who had broken with Guevara over the issue of Cuban as against
Bolivian leadership of the guerrillas. Monje, I was told by the Guevara survivors,
would inform the new arrivals that the movement was "a disaster, a
failure," that they would not be able to reach the guerrillas. He would
convince them to turn back.
There
has been puzzlement as to why Guevara persisted in remaining in Bolivia‑
when it became evident that his group faced inevitable defeat and destruction.
The survivors revealed that this was not so, that actually Guevara had decided
to leave Bolivia. He remained those final‑and what proved to be fatal‑days
because he was attempting to locate a guerrilla remnant that had become separated
from the main body, and which he did not want to abandon. (Guevara was unaware
that that group had already been wiped out by the Bolivian army.)
58
The
Ernesto Guevara of those last, desperate days was not the flashing figure of
legendary fame. He was "wasted physically, totally destroyed,"
according to the survivors. Realizing that defeat was imminent,
"everything bothered him, exasperated him‑he had a temper of all the
devils upon him." Not only had Guevara suffered decisive military defeat;
worse, his hopes had evaporated and his dreams forsaken him. The long and
arduous road he had chosen to travel had ended in complete failure.
There
was a footnote to the story of the Paris Centro and Guevara. Months after
Cambra, the doctor who had been with him in Africa, returned to Havana from
Paris, a German lady came to the
Cuban
Embassy. A secretary inquired of her, "What do you wish? " "I am
the wife of Dr. Alvarez Cambra," the woman answered, "and I want to
ask about him, I want to see him." She was clearly in an advanced state of
pregnancy.
The
secretary informed me, and I then spoke to the woman, asking her again what she
wanted. She repeated impatiently, "1 am Dr. Cambra's wife, and I haven't
heard from him in two or three months, and I want to see him."
I
told her that Cambra had returned to Cuba, whereupon she staged an emotional
scene, crying that she had been abandoned. I
later
learned that the woman had obtained travel papers and had gone to Cuba to seek
Cambra. This led to amused speculation in the Intelligence section: the staff
knew that Cambra already had one wife in Cuba.