By HOMER BIGART
Special to The New York Times.

HAVANA, April 14--Unrealistic planning, poor coordination and shockingly inadequate communications were mainly responsible for the collapse of the Cuban revolutionary strike.

According to the rebel time-table the general strike that began last Wednesday should have upset the regime of President Fulgencio Batista by tomorrow.

Instead, the strike collapsed after a few hours in Havana.  It was effective only in Santiago, Cuba's second largest city, where economic life was paralyzed for two full days.

Yet even in Santiago, always a focal point of discontent, the followers of rebel leader Fidel Castro failed to threaten the Government security forces seriously.

As a result, President Batista is stronger today than at any time since Senor Castro, military commander of the 26th of July Movement, launched his guerrilla war in the Sierra Maestra of Oriente Province.

The President now appears to have a good chance for bringing off his plan for general elections Nov. 30.  He is not a candidate for re-election, but he is confident that the Government coalition ticket will win and that he will be able to continue as the "strong man" in Cuba, possibly assuming the role of commander in chief of the armed forces.

As for Senor Castro, his chances of winning are now at lowest ebb.  He can continue to inflict minor harassment of Government forces in Oriente Province by small-scale guerrilla raids from the Sierra Maestra.  But unless there are heavy military defections, he cannot risk a stand-up fight against the Cuban Army in the plains.

Military observers say it would take 30,000 well-trained soldiers to boot the guerrillas from the mountains of Oriente.  President Batista has decided that the job is not worth the effort.  The dictator may, however, launch an offensive against the Sierra del Cristal, where a rebel column under Fidel's brother, Raul, has not had enough time to establish a firm base.

This rebel column, probably fewer than 400 men, left the main base in the Sierra Maestra two weeks ago with the object of extending guerrilla operations through central and eastern Oriente.  It achieved considerable success in closing all highways leading to Santiago for several days.  It even seized for twelve hours the airstrip of the United States-owned Moa Bay Mining Company.

But neither this column nor the main rebel force in Sierra Maestra ever had the strength to seize and hold any sizable town.

In Santiago the general strike was tightly effective through Thursday.  Then, as word spread of the fiasco in Havana, employees began drifting back to work.

The rebel national directorate had agreed that the revolt would be won or lost in Havana.  In the general strike of last August, Havana failed to respond.  Since then the rebel underground has tried to establish cells in all labor unions.

Senor Castro was told that the Havana organization was strong enough to pull out the workers and make the strike call stick.  There were some in the national directorate who advised delay, but the majority apparently felt the psychological moment was at hand and that any postponement would dull the enthusiasm of the "action squads."

Rebel ultimatums designed to build up tension in the capital gave the Batista regime a useful blueprint of rebel operational plans.  Knowing that the strike would come within a few days, security forces were poised.

"To see our victory, it is necessary to have faith," Senor Castro told this correspondent last February.  Evidentially, there was more faith than realism in planning for Wednesday's rising.

In Havana, some cell leaders never received word of the strike.  Action groups waited in vain at designated points for a scheduled distribution of arms.  These arms had not been delivered beforehand because of the fear that one of more groups might use them prematurely.

From the outset, security forces held the initiative.  Even in Santiago, where the rebels had assumed that the Army and the police would retire to a few central strong points, Government patrols moved boldly and aggressively.

In Havana, several members of the Young Men's Federation of Cuban Catholic Action were slain.  Among these was Luis Moralses Mustelier, a member of the federation's national council.  His death--he was reported to have been mutilated by the police before he was shot in the head--has caused much bitterness among the Catholic clergy.  It may set back hopes held by some United States citizens in Havana that the Church would launch a new attempt to mediate peace.