New York Times

February 27, 1958. p. 10.

Castro Declares He Will Win Soon

In Interview, Rebel Leader With Battle Force of 400 Is Certain of Victory

By Homer Bigart

Special to The New York Times

HAVANA, Feb. 26—A rebel leader capable of throwing into battle only 400 riflemen boasts that within a few months he will oust the Batista dictatorship and occupy all Cuba.

This assertion by Fidel Castro, military leader of the 26^th of July Movement, provokes no scornful laughter in Havana. Many Cubans believe it could be done with the help of a paralyzing general strike and the sabotage of utilities by the rebels’ urban underground.

Still unexplained, however, is the question of how Señor Castro can fight his way out of the Sierra Maestra in the southeast tip of Cuba. How could he defeat the Government forces, equipped with tanks, armored cars and artillery? His only anti-tank weapons are a few bazookas.

To break out onto the plains, Señor Castro would have to rely on major Cuban military defections. But his program offers no attractions for power-hungry officers. On the contrary, the rebel leader has said he will tolerate no military junta.

No rational solution for his dilemma was obtainable during this correspondent’s fifteen days in the sierra.

“To see our victory,” Señor Castro said at one point, “it is necessary to have faith.”

One harsh fact stands out: 400 men is the maximum combat force Señor Castro can safely commit at this moment against the Government troops ringing the sierra.

Our Biggest Battle

Señor Castro himself disclosed this figure in an interview last week as he rested after an action that he described as “our biggest battle.”

The action at Piña del Agua on Sunday, Feb. 16, will never make an addition to Sir Edward Creasy’s “Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World.” But Señor Castro seemed convinced that the outcome had shaken the regime of President Fulgencio Batista.

In setting a trap for Government forces at Piña del Agua, Señor Castro used 300 riflemen. This was the largest rebel group to see action since the rebels’ sierra campaign was launched fifteen months ago.

The rebel chief said his sierra force today consisted of 1,000 adequately armed fighters. Naturally not all of these could be thrown into one attack—it would be necessary to hold about 600 in reserve against possible attack in some other sector of the sierra.

Señor Castro’s plan of attack at Piña del Agua followed a classic guerrilla pattern. Under cover of darkness two rebel columns, one led by Señor Castro and the other by a young Argentine physician, Ernesto Guevara, were to make their approach from heavily wooded ridges east and west of the village.

They were to open fire at the first light on the permanent army garrison that was lodged in two buildings on a hilltop fortified by trenches and machine-gun emplacements. By rebel estimates the garrison consisted of fewer than 100 men.

A third column, led by Señor Castro’s younger brother, Raul, was to make a long detour east of the village and lay an ambush along the road between Piña del Agua and Bayamo, headquarters of the Cuban Army forces in Oriente Province.

Señor Castro’s plan was to open the dawn attack with moderate fire—just enough to pin down the garrison and prompt its commander to send frantically for reinforcements. Then, the rebels felt, Government troops would rush from Bayamo in trucks and tanks and stumble into the ambush.

Raul Castro had disposed his men in depth. There were to be at least six ambuscades and the road was to be mined with charges of TNT salvaged from some 250-pound bombs that had failed to explode when dropped from Government planes in previous actions.

The rebel’s primary objectives were to inflict heavy casualties on Government troops and force the evacuation of Piña del Agua, the army’s last toehold in the sierra. The village had some strategic importance: the rebel chief feared the army might use it as a base for pushing southward to the sea, thus severing his communications with the eastern sierra.

Finally Señor Castro probably felt compelled to stage a spectacular blow. The movement’s urban section for “action and sabotage” had stepped up its sabotage operations as part of the general design to cause enough trouble so President Batista would have to scrap his plans for general elections June 1. But in the mountains there had been little action for weeks.

Army Unit Destroyed

At the outset, the battle went according to plan. The first group of army reinforcements that tried to reach Piña del Agua came from a near-by garrison and was quickly destroyed at Oro. This consisted of only sixteen men under Second Lieut. Evelio Laferte.

Lieutenant Laferte and his men had advanced a short distance outside Oro when they came under sudden fire. Ten of his soldiers were killed and three wounded. Lieutenant Laferte was captured and only two men escaped.

Back at Piña del Agua, the columns of Señor Castro and Dr. Guevara stormed the village at 9 A.M. But the garrison force was able to escape to the woods, leaving only four dead. The rebels’ casualties in this phase of the action were three killed and four wounded.

Meanwhile, the third column under Raul Castro, hiding in the forest along the road to Bayamo, waited patiently for the approach of trucks and tanks. Hours passed and nothing happened.

Rebels’ Plan Balked

When Government forces did show up they came warily and on foot. On the basis of an early report from his brother, Señor Castro charges that the Government soldiers “walked behind a screen of women and children.” Apparently there was not much action.

Clearly this phase of the rebel plan failed to come off well. Four days after the battle, Señor Castro said, he had not yet received a full report from his brother. The rebel communications are primitive, most messages being transmitted by courier, and Raul Castro’s trail back into the sierra was long and devious.

Nevertheless, Fidel Castro said he was pleased with the over-all result. He said the army had lost fifteen killed and ten wounded while the rebel casualties were four killed and four wounded. Arms captured included five machine guns, 313 rifles and more than 1,000 cartridges.

Asked what he had done with the prisoners, Señor Castro said three wounded soldiers had been placed in a house at Oro, given first aid, food and cigarettes and left behind for recovery by army forces.

So the only army prisoner retained was Lieutenant Laferte. Señor Castro’s aides were eager to show that Lieutenant Laferte was being well treated. He was brought out, wearing a leather jacket lent by a rebel soldier against the chill mountain air.

Recruitment is no problem, Señor Castro said.

“I could have 10,000 men here today if it were not for supply shortages,” he said. “What we badly need are arms of all types, especially automatic rifles, bazookas and mortars.”