No. 1060
Havana, March 23, 1959
Subject
Military Causes for the Collapse of the Batista Regime
Summary:
By the end of December, 1958 the military situation of the Batista regime was on the point of collapse in the three eastern provinces of Oriente, Camaguey and Las Villas. The Army has no reserve strength to reverse that trend. Transportation by land has been severed in Las Villas Province. The economy of those provinces was nearly paralyzed. Censorship and lack of communications and transportation prevented the public from knowing the situation. The revolutionary forces were better informed, but their communications were deficient and they were not aware of the magnitude of the victories within their grasp. Baptist knew the situation, and realized that his regime would soon collapse. He left rather than attempt a hopeless defense.
The precipitate departure of Fulgencio Batista and the resultant collapse of his regime on January 1, 1959 have since been themes of conjecture and speculation. The opinion most generally held among observers of the Cuban scene had been that the tide was running strongly in favor of the revolutionaries, and that it was probable that the Batista regime would fall in the fairly near future. It had also been felt that Batista would make every effort to stay in power until the completion of his presidential term on February 24, 1959. Most observers thought that he had a fairly good chance of doing so, and that the critical period, probably including the disappearance of his regime, would occur in the days immediately following the inauguration of his successor, Andres Rivero Aguero. The collapse of the regime was expected and predicted, but the timing and rapidity of the event came as something of a surprise. The reasons which impelled Batista to act when he did were not then clear. Since then, the writer has developed information bearing on this question from a number of sources, both in Habana and on an extended trip throughout the country, and has formed the following conclusions:
1) The true situation existing in Cuba during the last months of 1958, particularly as it developed rapidly during December, was not clearly know either inside or outside the country. Batista himself may not have been fully aware of it until the last, because of erroneous reports from local military commanders. The various revolutionary forces, operation on widely dispersed fronts, were only incompletely informed concerning developments in areas other then their own. The general population was largely unaware of the actual situation other than the fairly accurate picture they could form of events in their immediate locality from word-of-mouth reports.
Basic cause of this situation was the strict censorship maintained by Batista, and the resultant difficulty in obtaining accurate information. Contributing causes, which assumed increasing importance as the situation worsened, were the deterioration of the normal means of communication and transportation within the country. The Army had its own system of radio communications, which apparently functioned efficiently throughout. The system of radio communications and broadcasting stations established by the revolutionary forces was of course of great assistance to them, but was far from efficient or reliable.
2) By the end of December 1958 the military situation confronting the Government of Batista had deteriorated to the point where the collapse of the position of the Government in the Provinces of Las Villas, Camaguey and Oriente was imminent. There were increasing disturbances in Pinar del Rio. The government would shortly have been reduced to control of Habana and the surrounding area, with defeat inevitable. Morale in the Army was low and declining. Batista could expect no help from abroad. Faced with that situation, he decided to depart. The decision was hasty due to the rapidity with which his position had worsened.
The developments leading up to the events of late December 1958 are already known to the Department. Those events themselves have not heretofore been presented in one picture, and many of them were not known with accuracy. The following account, as they have since become apparent, is submitted as of possible interest and value.
The Army's offensive of July 1958 finally ended in failure. It came much closer to success than was known at the time. Members of the revolutionary troops who were with Fidel Castro in the Sierra Maestra say that his force was finally reduced to 280 men, fighting on two fronts separated at the narrowest by only three kilometers. Fortunately for them, the Army offensive lacked sufficient drive, and the force attacking from the south surrendered when supplies and reinforcements were not forthcoming. Raul Castro's forces on the "Second Front" had a somewhat similar narrow squeak in a series of engagements inland from Guantanamo. These would not have destroyed the entire Second Front operation, but they were of sufficient danger for Raul Castro to attempt to hold at all costs. Able defensive fighting, coupled with a lack of drive by the Army, stopped the offensive when rebel ammunition is now said to have reached a critically low point.
There was then a period which might best be described as regrouping, with little pressure on the revolutionaries by the Army. At some time during this period, Fidel Castro decided that his forces were sufficiently strong to enable him to undertake offensive actions. He sent columns under the command of Ernesto "Che" Guevara and Camilo Cienfuegos from the western region of the Sierra Maestra, through Camaguey Province and into Las Villas Province. According to eye-witnesses and participants, these columns were quite small. Guevara had 150 men, Cienfuegos about 120. Guevara's group reached the mountains in west-central Las Villas virtually intact. Cienfuegos, operating in more open country in that are of the Province to the north of the Central Highway, had a harder time, but still got through with nearly all his men. He and him men displayed exceptional endurance and mobility.
In early November Castro moved down from the Sierra Maestra in the general direction of Bayamo with a force which appears to have been somewhat more than a thousand men. The Army met this force in and around the town of Guisa, the road head, with approximately similar numbers (a Cuban battalion of 600 men, with reinforcements), plus aircraft and tanks. There were skirmishes and fairly heavy engagements over a period of eleven days. Army casualties appear to have been lighter than rebel, but the Army was unable to achieve victory, disengaged and withdrew on [to] Bayamo on November 26.
Castro then shifted his forces eastward, and made his headquarters at the sugar central "America", near Contramaestre. By December 6 his forces had succeeded in surrounding a Cuban battalion at the small town of Maffo, some six kilometers south of Contramaestre, and besieged it. In this engagement the revolutionaries used captured mortars, fifty-caliber machine guns, and one tank. The also improvised armored trucks from equipment at Central "America". The Army apparently made no determined effort to relieve the beleaguered garrison, which was supplied for a while by parachute drop. The Army strong-point was in the center of the town, which was heavily damaged by both Army and revolutionary fire and by Air Force bombing directed at rebel positions. The Army garrison surrendered on December 26. There is a story, firmly believed by the rebels, that the final surrender came after the rebels brought a fire truck from Palma Soriano, hauled it up toward the Army defenses, and announced that it was loaded with gasoline which they would spray on the Army positions and then set afire unless there was immediate surrender. The town appears to have about 250 families, and some 15 to 20 houses were damaged or destroyed in the engagement. There are craters which appear to have been made by 500-pound bombs.
By mid-November, Castro had ordered the other forces under his command to take the offensive. Juan Almeida commanding the "Third Front" forces holding the eastern Sierra Maestra, cleaned out what remained of Army forces in the area. His men were principally responsible for taking Palma Soriano. The Army barracks, held by some 240 men, were outside the town. It appears that a commando-type operation drove the military forces from the town around December 20-22, and the garrison itself fell the 27th. Further to the east, at the small village of Dos Palmas, there was a hard fight. The garrison of some sixty men stuck it out to the end, aided by the Air Force. The rebel attack was pressed with determination for several days, and the garrison was over-run on December 22. During the fight the village of some 70 families was almost totally destroyed. Percentage of destruction was as high or higher than that suffered by any other town in the country.
Raul Castro, commanding the Second Front, had been ordered to undertake an offensive on all fronts, directed principally at Mayari on the north, San Luis on the south-west, and Guantanamo on the south-east. The northerly offensive was obviously the least important, and failed to achieve success. Mayari held, the town of Sagua de Tánamo further eastward was severely damaged and apparently remained in Army hands until the end, and Holguin to the west was not threatened. It is possible that at the end the Army was mounting a local counter-offensive along that line, but this is not clear.
Some of the hardest fighting of the entire rebellion took place along the southern perimeter of the Second Front. At the extreme eastern end, the Castro forces isolated and eventually captured the garrison at Baracoa. The garrison at Imias was captured on November 14, after a rather sharp fight. The small garrisons at the outlying sugar centrals fell or were abandoned fairly readily. The revolutionaries apparently never attempted to take the city of Guantanamo, which was heavily garrisoned. There were hard fights at La Maya and Alto Sogo, both of which changed hands more than once during November and early December, and were very heavily damaged. San Luis was left to the last, and was taken fairly easily.
Thus, at the end of December the Batista Government faced the following situation in Oriente: The forces based on Holguin were intact, had beaten off or seriously damaged rebel offensives, and were capable of offensive action themselves. Bayamo was held by the remnants of forces which had been unsuccessful at Guisa and defeated at Maffo, and were not capable of offensive action. From there eastward, everything was in rebel hands except the cities of Santiago and Guantanamo. The commander at Guantanamo was begging for reinforcements, fearing an imminent rebel attack in overwhelming force. Santiago, the key city of the Province, was surrounded by rebels on line running roughly from El Cobre through Puerto Boniato and the foothills above El Caney and Siboney. The strong Army forces in the city had been unable to break through the encirclement for several weeks. An all-out attack on the isolated Batista military forces in the city was clearly imminent, and Batista apparently could not spare additional reinforcements.
What of the situation confronting Batista elsewhere in the country? In Camaguey, the next westward Province, the capital city of the same name was firmly held by the Army, but there were rebel columns moving with increasing freedom in the countryside, and rapidly gaining in strength. Commander Jamie Vega Saturnino had followed behind Cienfuegos with 90 men, intended to strengthen the forces in the Cubitas hills north of Camaguey. He had disobeyed orders and been ambushed by the Army at Macareño, losing over thirty killed or later shot. He had been courtmartialed and temporarily reduced in rank and relieved. His place had been taken by Commander Rolando Orozco Basuto, who had a force of over 200 men by the end of the month. Commander Victor Mora was operating in the southern part of the Province, increasingly close to Camaguey. His forces occupied the city when the Army surrendered on January 1. Rebel forces had set up a partially successful road block near Victoria de las Tunas, utilizing the Jobabo River on the border between Oriente and Camaguey, which was seriously interfering with all traffic, even military convoys, on the Central Highway. Rail traffic eastward of the junction of Marti had long since ceased.
In Las Villas Province, the Batista Government had launched what local people state was announced as a major offensive on December 2-3, based on Santa Clara and driving south from the Central Highway at Esperanza. It was apparently aimed at the forces of the "Second National Front of the Escambray". Local inhabitants state that the offensive was heralded as containing at least two battalions -- some 1,200 men. However, less than half of that force actually moved out, and this broke and retreated rapidly when it encountered ambush and sniper fire between Ranchuelo and Potrerillo. The Minister of State repeatedly told the Ambassador that a government offensive was imminent in Las Villas, and toward the end of December that it was successfully under way. Careful inquiry of local inhabitants throughout Las Villas just over a month later revealed no knowledge of any such offensive. The opposite appears to be true, with the revolutionary forces advancing steadily throughout the Province.
On December 25-26 the forces of the "Second National Front of Escambray" occupied Central "Soledad", about 1,200 strong. This central is approximately eight miles from Cienfuegos, over paved road. A similar force moved into the nearby town of Caonao. Rail transportation to Cienfuegos had been sporadic at best for some time past, and was then definitely severed by destruction of bridges. At the same time the one remaining highway link with the rest of the country was broken, by a series of bulldozed ditches and burning of two bridges. The garrison in Cienfuegos had been reduced to a few hundred and the revolutionary forces thus were able to take the city when they wished. They planned to attack on January 1, 1959, and were actually moving out when word of Batista's flight was received.
Trinidad had been invaded by a combined operation of Directorio Revolucionario and Escambray forces as early as December 3, and held by them for several hours. That force, reinforced, took and held the city December 28. Sancti Spiritus had been raided sporadically by a combined force of 26 of July, Escambray, and Directorio Revolucionario men from about December 15. On December 23 the forces stayed, and only a handful of the original Army garrison was still holding out, besieged but not under heavy attack, at the end of the month. The Central Highway had been thoroughly severed at that point, with four large bridges to the east of the city and another large on to the west destroyed. One month later it was still necessary to make a forty kilometer detour to travel either way. The destruction of a railroad bridge at Zaza del Medio had stopped all east-west rail transportation. Thus, land transportation had been effectively and permanently severed on a line across eastern Las Villas.
Developments in and around the city of Santa Clara had a decisive effect. The only action which might be considered to form part of the offensive by the Batista Government mentioned earlier, of which the Minister of State told the Ambassador, was the despatch of an armored train from Habana, through Cruces to Santa Clara, with several hundred men. The route through Cruces was round about, since the main line had been broken by destruction of a bridge at Santo Domingo, west of Santa Clara. The train had trouble near Cruces, and was delayed for a day or so, but eventually go through to Santa Clara. It was derailed there by the revolutionaries, less than a mile from the garrison fort, and the soldiers took refuge in the fort with the force already there. Santa Clara was attacked by a combined force of 26 of July and Escambray men beginning December 27. The defenders based themselves on the fort, on the outskirts of the city, and fought a delaying action through the city. The Air Force attempted to attack the revolutionary forces as they advanced, and finally bombed the armored train when the revolutionaries began using it as a strong point. The aircraft strafed and bombed, but contrary to the widely-published statements of the revolutionaries, damage to the city was slight. By count, three bombs fell in the built-up sections of the city. One destroyed a garage alongside the train, and two destroyed several small houses about four blocks from the train. The revolutionary force was poised for an attack on the garrison, by then forced back within the fort, on January 1, 1959.
And this was not to be the end of the westward push. Santo Domingo was clearly the next objective of the revolutionaries, and people in the countryside as far westward as Colon had reported meetings with revolutionary patrols.
From talking with people throughout the country it has become clear that the revolutionaries knew that things were going well for them but did not realize the scope of the successes they were on the point of achieving in Oriente, Camaguey and Las Villas Provinces. Because of the strict censorship, the public was also unaware of the true situation. But Batista knew. The military situation of his forces in those areas was on the point of complete collapse. In addition, the disturbances throughout the country, and the dislocation of transportation, were having increasingly serious effects on the economy which was then rapidly declining. It was time to go, and he went.
For the Ambassador:
Daniel M. Braddock
Minister-Counselor