Oil inflames Colombia's civil war
Bush seeks $98 million to help Bogotá battle guerrilla pipeline saboteurs.
By Martin Hodgson | Special to The Christian Science Monitor
ARAUCA, COLOMBIA - From the air, the Caño Limón pipeline
is invisible. The 480-mile tube is buried 6 feet below ground, but its
route
through the rolling Colombian prairie is marked by a swathe of black oil
slicks and burned ground, the result of repeated bomb attacks by
leftist rebels.
The pipeline, which links the oil field near the border with Venezuela
to a port on Colombia's Caribbean coast, has been punctured so many
times in the last 16 years that locals call it "the flute." Some 2.9 million
barrels of crude oil have leaked into the soil and rivers - about 11
times the amount spilled in the 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster.
Now the US government is seeking Congressional approval for $98 million
to provide equipment and training for a new Colombian Army
brigade to guard the oil duct. If approved, it would mark a major shift
in US policy, allowing direct support for counterinsurgency operations
against guerrilla saboteurs.
Oil is Colombia's biggest foreign-currency earner, and US officials say
the aid is essential for the Colombian government, a key ally in the
US war on drugs. But critics say it is still unclear whose interests are
being served.
Last year, 170 bomb attacks disabled the pipeline for most of the year.
It cost Occidental Petroleum, which runs the field, $75 million in
profits - and cost the government $430 million in oil revenue.
"We're talking about something which is fundamental for the economy of
the country. Of course there is a US interest, but [with the
attacks] it is Colombia which is losing out," says an Occidental spokesman.
As the country spirals deeper into civil war, some fear that the aid package
signals that the Bush government is more concerned with
protecting the interests of American companies than in helping to end a
38-year conflict.
"It's a way of saying that US interests trump everything else. There are
real and legitimate reasons to protect the pipeline, but given all that
Colombia needs, is this really a priority?" says Robin Kirk, a Colombia
analyst at Human Rights Watch.
Most of the rebel attacks occur in the first 75 miles, where the duct passes
through the wild frontier zone of Arauca state, which has been a
rebel stronghold for decades.
Colombia's two largest guerrilla armies, the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN),
oppose foreign involvement in the nation's oil industry and, according
to the Colombian military, the rebels hope that the pipeline attacks will
weaken the government by depriving it of foreign earnings.
"The intensity of the attacks shows that the pipeline is a fundamental
strategic target," says Brig. Gen. Carlos Lemus, commander of the
18th Brigade, and the man who will oversee the new unit if and when it
is formed.
The brigade's badge shows a soldier guarding an oil well under a blazing
prairie sun, and according to General Lemus, two-thirds of
Colombia's troops are already dedicated to defending the oil infrastructure.
But the Army is incapable of protecting the entire pipeline, which
can be punctured with a relatively small explosive.
"We need mobility and the capacity to react fast. With the right equipment we could defend it, but our resources are limited," says Lemus.
The general doesn't even have his own helicopter, and with the roads often
blockaded by guerrillas, Lemus must cadge a ride on an
Occidental helicopter to visit troops along the pipeline. Under an agreement
with the government, Occidental provides "nonlethal" aid to the
Army such as fuel, food, and transport, but Lemus believes it could do
more.
"I think that the company hasn't done enough to apply modern technology.
We've been asking them to install some kind of early-warning
system with sensors. At the moment, the only sensors are our soldiers,"
he says.
Troops on motorbikes patrol the access roads around the Occidental compound,
while a Colombian Army surveillance plane circles
overhead. This year, the troops have foiled some 17 attacks already, but
according to one officer, the region's problem cannot be solved by
military means alone.
"Even if we had the entire Colombian Army guarding the pipeline, with a
soldier every 500 meters, we couldn't prevent every attack," says
Maj. Edgar Delgado, commander of the Army base at the oilfield. "We don't
need more aircraft or more weapons," he says. "The [military]
aid should come with progress - education, health clinics, and roads."
Before the first prospectors struck oil, Arauca was a sparsely populated
cattle-ranching region, mostly ignored by the central government.
Royalty payments and company handouts brought electricity, roads, and some
jobs, but the oil boom also caused a population explosion,
inflation, and the decline of local agriculture.
Local officials say that most of the profits have been siphoned off by
corrupt politicians. The state capital, also called Arauca, is dotted with
costly white-elephant building projects such as a velodrome, which was
used just once and is now flooded and abandoned.
"Whenever there is a boom, people think it will solve all their problems,"
says Oscar García, president of the local chapter of the Colombian
oilworkers union. "We had very big expectations, but we weren't prepared
to handle this much money."
Ironically, the rebels have grown rich on oil money, using threats and
intimidation to force officials to use companies with guerrilla ties, and
regularly charging a 5 percent "tax" on every government contract.
Local government depends on royalties to meet its budget, and so every
bomb attack means less money for the region's schools and
hospitals, says Arauca Mayor Jorge Cedeño. But unemployment and
the thin state presence mean that the guerrillas still offer an
alternative for the disaffected rural poor.
"If they have to reinforce security, let them do it, but there must also
be social development. If we don't solve the social problems, the war
will continue."