By Douglas Farah

The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency has concluded that Colombia's
military, battling a Marxist insurgency financed by millions of dollars from
the cocaine and heroin trade, could be defeated within five years unless the
Bogota government regains political legitimacy and its armed forces are
drastically restructured.
 

The report, one of the bleakest assessments to date of Colombia's fragile
security situation, asserts that Colombia -- one of the largest countries in
South America and the one with the oldest tradition of democracy --
would turn into a "narco-state" if the insurgents continue to grow and the
government ceases to function effectively.

A summary of the report, prepared in November, was obtained yesterday
by The Washington Post, while two sources with direct knowledge of the
full text provided details not included in the summary.

The DIA, the principal U.S. military intelligence service, estimates the
number of Marxist insurgents in Colombia at more than 20,000 --
markedly higher than previous, widely held estimates of 15,000 -- divided
between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), with
about 15,000 members, and the National Liberation Army (ELN), with
about 5,000. While the two groups occasionally coordinate tactics, they
usually operate independently.

The DIA assessment notes that the guerrillas now have small aircraft for
surveillance operations and for moving rebel leaders and munitions around
the country, as well as surface-to-air missiles and sophisticated heavy
weapons bought with drug money from countries of the former Soviet
Bloc.

At the same time, according to the report and senior U.S. officials, the
Colombian military has proved to be inept, ill-trained and poorly equipped.
Of the 120,000 armed forces members, only 20,000 are equipped and
prepared for combat, according to U.S. intelligence sources. Standard
military doctrine holds that a regular army needs a 10-to-1 advantage in
size to defeat a well-equipped and steadfast insurgency.

The guerrillas have been fighting the government for the past three decades
but have never before evinced the strength now attributed to them.
According to U.S. and Colombian officials, the rebel groups control more
than 40 percent of Colombia. Ten years ago, according to Colombian
intelligence officials, the guerrillas maintained a presence in 173
municipalities; now, sources say, they are operating in close to 700.

About two-thirds of FARC units and half of ELN units are involved in drug
trafficking, according to U.S. and Colombian intelligence sources,
providing the two groups with tens of millions of dollars to finance their
operations.

The pessimistic assessment of the situation in Colombia, which produces
80 percent of the world's cocaine and a growing share of the heroin
consumed in the United States, was echoed by Gen. Charles Wilhelm,
chief of the U.S. Southern Command, which is responsible for U.S.
security in Latin America.

"The primary vulnerability of the Colombian armed forces is their inability
to see threats, followed closely by their lack of competence in assessing
and engaging them," Wilhelm told a congressional hearing on March 31.

In an April 6 letter to Gen. Manuel Jose Bonett, commander of the
Colombian military, Wilhelm said that "at this time the Colombian armed
forces are not up to the task of confronting and defeating the insurgents. . .

Colombia is the most threatened in the area under the Southern
Command's responsibility, and it is in urgent need of our support."
Bonett, who made the letter public, agreed, saying the Colombian armed
forces are in "a position of inferiority" to the rebels and adding that he
would gladly accept U.S. military aid, even "atomic bombs."

The deteriorating situation in Colombia has sparked a growing debate
within the Clinton administration and the Pentagon over how to deal with
the threat. Although the United States provided about $100 million to
Colombia last year for anti-drug operations, the administration has tried to
keep Colombia from using the aid directly for counterinsurgency purposes.

However, because of guerrilla involvement in drug trafficking, such a
distinction has become difficult to make. Moreover, there is growing
pressure in the Congress, led by Rep. Dan Burton (R-Ind.), for the
administration to provide the Colombian army with Black Hawk
helicopters and other more sophisticated military aid.

A senior State Department official said U.S. policy in Colombia "is to
assist in fighting narcotics production and trafficking. . . . When our
personnel and equipment are attacked during counter-drug operations,
they will return fire. We do not, however, provide assistance for offensive
counter-guerrilla operations."

According to U.S. military sources, there are about 200 U.S. military
personnel in Colombia. About half are assigned to operate and protect two
large radar bases that were installed in recent years to track flights of
planes piloted by suspected drug traffickers. The rest are involved in a
variety of training missions, the officials said.

The administration is debating whether to supply Colombia with
sophisticated communications equipment and intelligence support, but the
possibility of increased aid has raised concerns among human rights groups
because of the Colombian military's abysmal human rights record in recent
years.

"There is no magic line" between counter-drug and counter-insurgency aid,
said Carlos Salinas of the human rights group Amnesty International, and
the growing congressional pressure on the administration to give Colombia
more military aid with fewer restrictions "could unwittingly fuel human rights
violations."

But F. Andy Messing of the Washington-based National Defense Council
Foundation, which studies guerrilla warfare, warned that unless Colombia
receives sustained U.S. military and economic aid, the insurgents would be
unbeatable. "When one side has the advantage, there is no stopping them,"
Messing said. "The guerrillas have the big Mo [momentum], so why not go
for the whole enchilada?"