No. 29 Santiago de Cuba, September 29,1958.

SUBJECT

Remarks of General Eulogio Cantillo y Porras

On September 25 I made a courtesy call on General Eulogio Cantillo y Porras, the new commanding officer of the Moncada Barracks in Santiago as well as of military operations in Oriente. I had not met him previously because of being out of town during the change of command ceremonies last week. The general was ostensibly most friendly and he volunteered a number of remarks extending the conversation to beyond the limits of such a call. He spoke English most of the time. The remarks thought to be of interest are briefly summarized.

Negotiations between Army and Rebels

Possibly of greatest interest was an unsolicited statement concerning negotiations between General Cantillo and Fidel Castro, although it is not believed that anywhere near the full story was told.

Following the "defeat" of the rebels in August, and because of it, Fidel Castro sent messages to Gen. Cantillo asking him to meet him for a conference on how the situation could be resolved. Gen. Cantillo, after receiving three or four messages, finally sent a "colonel" to the Sierra Maestra to talk to Fidel. The colonel "talked" to Fidel for three days or so but nothing resulted from this. The rebels had nothing to offer, and they wanted the impossible (not clearly stated). He said that the talks must have been as wearing as the prolonged negotiations at Panmunjom in Korea.

The colonel returned and Castro sent further messages down with the "Red Cross commission" but there was nothing that could be discussed further. The general also said that he continued to receive messages from Fidel Castro from time to time even "via some townspeople in Santiago?", but there was no basis for negotiation. He started looking through some papers for a recent example, but did not "find" it on his desk.

Rebel Tactics and Strength

General Cantillo said that the rebels were in a weakened position at the present time, although some of his statements were somewhat equivocal. When the Army made a frontal assault against Fidel Castro in the Sierra last month, the Army killed "three hundred" rebels. Fidel found it impossible to keep the city troops up in the hills after this, and, for this reason, he has now sent a lot of them down in small groups to harass the countryside. These groups can not compete with the Army out of the mountains and are being chopped up as fast as the Army can catch up with them.

This calls for new tactics, however. Previously the Army was working on the basis of containing the rebels in the mountains and gradually moving in on them. Now it is necessary to split up and fight over a considerable territory. The rebels hope to prevent elections by terrorist tactics directed at communications and utilities. Guerrilla warfare is hard to fight, especially since the Cuban Army has never had a war on its hands and has been mostly a garrison or police army. The Army has to learn and fight at the same time.

Where Fidel Castro formerly had 2,000 men in the Sierra Maestra, he now has only two small groups composed mostly of Goajiros. [2]

Whenever the rebels feel strong, according to the General's remarks, they come out of the mountains and in the cities and plains they can accomplish nothing of significance. This statement is somewhat contradictory in comparison with other remarks here quoted. At the same time, however, it might have been deduced from his remarks that it was a tactic of the Army to permit the rebels to become bold so that they could be defeated more easily.

Gen. Cantillo volunteered the information that the rebels had made excellent propaganda but that the falsity of this became evident during the April attempts at strikes. The military force of the Castros is decreasing, he said. I asked him if the rebels are as strong or stronger than in April. The General replied that he did not think they are as strong. He hinted that he expected significant developments in ten days or two weeks, and that these would presumably be favorable to the Army.

Situation in Santiago

General Cantillo stated that he had found Santiago unusually quiet, and he repeated this statement. He then said that it seemed almost too quiet and he implied that he was suspicious of or did not care for this situation. He gave the impression in his remarks that the city might not remain quiet and that he was trying to be prepared for anything, although it was difficult to deduce exactly what he had in mind.

Stay in Santiago

Gen. Cantillo, when asked about his family, said that he had not brought his wife and daughter to Santiago, because he did not know how long he would be here. The length of his assignment is very indefinite and there would be no use in displacing his family until it is determined that he will be here for a long period. He said that under the present circumstances he preferred the freedom of action that having his family elsewhere permitted. The general gave the impression that he did not expect to remain here for any length of time.

Comment;

I do not know General Cantillo's personality nor how to assess his remarks. While his English seemed generally good, I received the impression that his choice of words was occasionally faulty so that statements might have been subject to some misinterpretation.

General Cantillo adhered to the official Cuban Army line on the subject of the rebels and their weakness. Some remarks seemed somewhat contradictory, however. He was vague about the future developments which he seemed to expect, although this was probably on purpose.

While the rebels are presumed to be suffering some losses, the general's statements do not fit in with apparently augmented rebel strength and increased activities in Oriente and elsewhere. He did not offer any explanation of why Fidel Castro's force was not eliminated if it had suffered so heavily in the August fighting.

While the total of Gen. Cantillo's statements pointed to rebel weakness and early defeat, I somehow received the impression that he might not have been fully confident of this.

Park E Wollam

NOTES:

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9-2958. Confidential. Drafted by Wollam. Copies were sent to the Embassy in Havana and the Office of Naval Intelligence at Guantanamo.

2. Peasants of the Sierra Maestra.