Washington, September 23, 1957.

SUBJECT

Deferral of Action on Cuban Government Request for Purchase of Tanks

Background

In a note of May 8, 1957, the Cuban Embassy asked for our approval for the purchase by the Cuban Army of eight (8) M-4 A-3 medium tanks.[2] The note did not indicate what these tanks were to be used for but our Army Mission in Habana stated that they were to be added to seven (7) like tanks already on inventory to form a tank company. A decision on this request was delayed pending a clarification from the Cuban Government on its then pending order for six (6) light tanks which our Army Mission in Habana considered unwarranted. The latter order was finally cancelled in July and in response to the Department's request, Embassy Habana recommended that the medium tank order be approved subject to the Department's review prior to delivery. As payment on acceptance of such an order is required, the Department with the concurrence of the Department of Defense considered that it was not feasible to comply with the Embassy's recommendation.

Since the receipt of this request last May, the Department has been under constant pressure from the Cuban Embassy for a favorable decision on the grounds that it had President Batista's personal support. In the aftermath of the recent revolt at Cienfuegos (September 5 and 6), which was quelled by the use of tanks and MAP furnished and/or supported aircraft, Cuban pressure to approve this request increased and it became apparent that an immediate decision would have to be made.

Our Government was subjected to bitter criticism both in the United States and in Cuba in January of this year when seven (7) M-4 tanks purchased in this country were delivered to the Cuban Army amid considerable publicity and fanfare. During the repeated internal political crises which have occurred in Cuba subsequent to the delivery of these tanks, we have been under almost constant criticism for supplying arms to bolster the Batista regime. This criticism became more acute when MAP equipment was used by the Cuban armed forces in quelling the Cienfuegos revolt in direct violation of Article I, section 2 of our MDAP Agreement of March 7, 1952, with Cuba.

A position paper calling for deferred action on this tank request was prepared by ARA on September 12, 1957, (Exhibit A)[3] after the matter was deliberated thoroughly within ARA and discussed with the competent officials of the Department of Defense. This position had the concurrence of the latter Department as well as of our Embassy in Habana. In addition to concurring with our position on political grounds, the Department of Defense officials voiced some doubt that Cuban Army technicians actually could operate and service these tanks.

Accordingly, I informed the Cuban Ambassador on September 19 of our decision stating that I thought approval at this time would be contrary to the best interests of both our countries because of the adverse publicity that was sure to follow. The Ambassador objected that our action would certainly be interpreted as a change in our attitude toward his Government.[4] A resume of this conversation in the Deptel 175 to Embassy Habana is enclosed (Exhibit B).[5] In a subsequent telegram to the Embassy, 179 of September 20 (Exhibit C)[6] Ambassador Smith was instructed to explain to President Batista why it was to the mutual interests of both countries to defer action on this request for tanks at this time.

It has been clear from the inception of this request that it was the intention of the Cuban Army to use these medium tanks for "internal security" purposes. In view of the recent use by the Cuban armed forces of MAP equipment to suppress the Cienfuegos revolt and the continuing internal unrest, I am convinced that to approve the sale of these tanks at this time would result in serious criticism from Congress and the United States public. I believe, therefore, that our only logical course was to defer action on this request. I am hopeful that a thorough explanation of our reasons for doing so will be understood and accepted by President Batista.

In this connection, I should point out that in May, 1955 the Department under similar circumstances revoked an export license for napalm bombs which were purchased by the Colombian Army as it was apparent that they were to be used against Colombian guerrillas.

NOTES:

[1] Source: Department of State, Rubottom Files: Lot 59 D 573, Cuba. Confidential. Drafted by Leonhardy. An uninitialed handwritten note across the first page of this memorandum reads: "Covered in talk with Murphy."

[2] Not printed. (Ibid., Central Files, 737.561/5-857)

[3] Drafted by Weldon Litsey of the Office of Inter-American Regional Economic Affairs, this paper was sent to Snow through Wieland, Turkey and E. Glion Curtis, Officer in Charge of Inter-American Security and Military Assistance. It recommended that the Cuban Ambassador be told "that in conducting our foreign policy with Cuba and other friendly nations we cannot ignore certain internal political problems and situations which arise and which affect the conduct of our relations with other nations; that he is undoubtedly aware of the criticism to which our military assistance policy toward Cuba is being subjected at this time; that Mr. Rubottom (or Mr. Snow) does not feel that it is in the interest of either of our countries to take action on this request at this time and that we therefore plan to defer any action on the Cuban request for tanks until same future date." It also recommended that the Ambassador be told that the Department had received reports from various sources "that Cuba has used equipment supplied or supported with United States Military Assistance Program funds to put down recent internal disturbances. If such reports should prove to be true, it would appear that Cuba has violated Article I, Section 2 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of March 7, 1952, which provides that Cuba would not, without prior consent of this Government, use the assistance furnished her, for purposes other than to implement 'defense plans, accepted by the two Governments, under which the two Governments will participate in missions important to the defense of the Western Hemisphere.' If it should be found that in fact Cuba has violated the agreement in this way, public reaction in the United States against continued military assistance to the Cuban Government could be expected to increase, possibly to the extent of jeopardizing United States military assistance programs to Cuba."

[4] A September 19 memorandum of conversation by Wieland summarizes this discussion. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.561/9-1957)

[5] Sent on September 19. (Ibid., 737.00/9-1857)

[6] Not printed. (Ibid., 737.00/9-2057)