3. Crisis Situation

    (a.) Cuba

Mr. Arneson[2] noted that the Army's report[3], although classified F-3, appears authoritative. He predicted that Batista will not take the alternative of a safe conduct departure from the country as long as he has the support of the troops at Camp Columbia. Nevertheless, Batista is faced by continuing strikes and a mounting opposition, indicating that his chances of political survival until the June 1958 election may be slight. General Schow[4] noted that despite the opposition to Batista, the President, as matters now stand, faces no great likelihood of ouster, but he agreed that the future actions of the Military will be the decisive factor . . . . General Cabell [5], . . . stated that . . . information received is difficult to evaluate and quite general. General Collins mentioned the possible effect of the "band wagon" psychology generated by the momentum of the opposition. General Cabell pointed out that the opposition would want to be sure of success before striking to avoid the psychological set-back failure.

NOTES:

[1] Source: Department of State, INR Files: Lot 58 D 776. Secret. Extract. Drafted by Jay P. Moffat, Division of Biographic Information, Office of the Special Assistant-Intelligence.

[2] Deputy Special Assistant, Office of the Special Assistant-Intelligence.

[3] Not found in Department of State files.

[4] Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Army General Staff.

[5] Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.

[6] On June 20 Joaquin Meyer told Willard Beaulac, Ambassador to Argentina in Washington for consultation and former Ambassador to Cuba (1951-1953), that there had been a general repudiation of Batista throughout Cuba. In his memorandum of conversation of June 20, Beaulac recorded Meyer's belief that the Cuban leader had lost his instinct for doing the right thing and no longer felt relations with the United States were important. Meyer stated that committees of opposition to Batista had been created in all cities throughout Cuba, although they were uncoordinated and non-ideological, and that Castro might rise to be president if he survived. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/6-2057)