SUBJECT

Use of MAP Equipment in Oriente Province

Mr. Leonhardy called Ambassador Smith to determine whether he had received a reply from Minister Guell to his oral inquiry of yesterday regarding the use of the MAP-equipped battalion in Oriente Province. The Ambassador replied that he inquired of Minister Guell several times yesterday about this matter but the latter had been unable to see President Batista because he was meeting with a number of Cuban politicians who were in Habana. He said he would keep pushing far an answer, however, and would inform the Department as soon as he had received one.

Mr. Leonhardy explained to the Ambassador that a reply[2] had been received last evening to the Department's Note of March 3, [3] on this subject and that the GOC considered that it had not violated the Bilateral Military Assistance Agreement of March 7,1952. He said the Department was giving consideration to informing the Cuban Government of the definite evidence now available of a violation. The Ambassador asked that this action be withheld until he had an opportunity to obtain an official reply to his latest request. Ambassador Smith called later in the morning to inform Mr. Leonhardy that he had had a brief conversation with Minister Guell who had not been in touch yet with the President on this matter. The Minister indicated his willingness to get out a statement that the Cuban Army was using equipment purchased not only from the U.S. but from other areas also. The Ambassador told him that such a statement would be of no use and that he suggested to the Minister that the GOC should take some action to sterilize the battalion in question. The Ambassador told Mr. Leonhardy he would keep pressing for this type of solution but was not too hopeful.

During the afternoon Ambassador Smith called Mr. Leonhardy to state that he still had no answer from Minister Guell but that he had learned, apparently from our Army Mission,[4] that the MAP-equipped battalion was not fighting as a unit but had been dispersed and had been integrated into other units. He said that it would be almost a physical impossibility to reorganize and separate this unit from the others in the area. He mentioned also that it would be difficult to segregate "grant" aid from purchased military equipment. In response to this latter statement Mr. Leonhardy suggested that if an identical number of like units were confined to hemispheric defense training purposes it would probably not be important whether they were originally obtained under grant or reimbursable aid.

Ambassador Smith in this last conversation pointed out, as he had previously, that the MAP-trained soldiers are the best Cuba has and that withdrawing them even though the number may be small (750) would result in a serious handicap to the fighting forces and a psychological set-back. The Ambassador suggested that we might compromise by not sending any more "grant" aid equipment to Cuba but permit that already forwarded to be used in Oriente.[5] Mr. Leonhardy reiterated his previous explanation that a treaty violation had occurred and could not be overlooked.
 
 

NOTES:

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.5-MSP/6-458. Confidential. Drafted by Leonhardy. 7 No copy of this reply has been found.

2. See footnote 2, Document 27.

4. The question of the end use of MAP units and equipment in Cuba was analyzed in depth in a memorandum of June 4 from the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Cuba, Colonel Leonard D. Dysinger, to Ambassador Smith, which was prepared in response to the Ambassador's request. The memorandum was sent to the Department of State as an enclosure to despatch 1012 from Havana, June 5. (Department of State, Central Piles, 737.5-MSP/6-558)

5. In telegram 818 from Havana, June 5, Smith summarized his recent conversations with Guell and elaborated on a possible compromise solution:

"(A) GOC to give US assurance that they will sterilize MAP battalion.

"(B) GOC to accept without objection that all sales of arms to Cuba will be suspended during any period of active domestic hostilities. This would mean placing private sale of arms in same category as MAP.

"(C) US then either to offer to eliminate unworkable provision of bilateral agreement or refrain from trying to invoke it." (Ibid.)