284. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter‑American Affairs (Holland) to the Secretary of State[1]

Washington, May 8, 1956.

SUBJECT

Cuban Political Situation

The abortive armed civilian attack on Cuban Army barracks near Matanzas[2] on April 29 culminated a series of events which have weakened the position of President Batista. Nevertheless, there appears to be no immediate danger of the overthrow of his Government. The President remains firmly in control, but he has been forced to adopt stern measures including the suspension of constitutional guarantees for forty‑five days and a sweeping reorganization of the armed forces from which he derives his major support. The injection of military dissension into the opposition picture for the first time poses for Batista his most serious political test to date. Furthermore, there is danger that a resort to stronger measures may consolidate public opinion, which heretofore has been apathetic, against the regime. The past month in Cuba, prior to the Matanzas affair, witnessed the uncovering of an Army plot to overthrow the Government, resulting in the court‑martial of 13 officers and the arrest, dismissal and retirement of over 100 others; student manifestations throughout the Island which resulted in the closing of all secondary schools and universities and the violation by the National Police of the hitherto respected autonomy of the University of Habana; and accelerated activities by opposition political forces, particularly by ex‑President Prio and his followers. While the Communists have tried to identify themselves with these anti‑government activities, they have had little success except for some infiltration in the ranks of the students.

Against this troubled picture, and weighing in Batista's favor, are the following factors which would tend to assure his continued control: (1) the present economic prosperity in Cuba; (2) public apathy toward political events; feuding within opposition factions whose leaders are generally discredited; (4) overall continued government support from the Army; and (5) the desire of labor leadership for a peaceful solution of Cuba's internal political problems.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/5‑856. Confidential. Drafted by Leonhardy.

[2] A province in northcentral Cuba just west of La Habana province.