Washington, March 24, 1958.
The question of sales and shipments of arms to Cuba was referred to you for decision on January 17 (Tab A [2]). At that time you concurred in ARA's recommendation that Ambassador Smith, in his discretion, inform President Batista that certain pending Cuban requests for the purchase of arms were being approved, but that delivery would depend on conditions in Cuba at the time the equipment was ready for shipment. The Ambassador was also authorized to suggest certain measures to President Batista which might help to create an atmosphere conducive to a peaceful solution through elections. In line with these suggestions, President Batista restored constitutional guarantees
throughout most of Cuba on January 25.
Although this temporarily brought an improvement in the Cuban atmosphere the Government failed to take further constructive steps, and intransigent revolutionaries began a new campaign of terrorism. Efforts by the Catholic Episcopate and a subsequent National Harmony Committee to mediate in search of a peaceful solution were unsuccessful and President Batista suddenly announced on March 12 that constitutional guarantees were again being suspended. Simultaneously, he ordered a 35 percent increase in the armed forces and told our Ambassador of his plan to move masses of people out of areas of combat in Oriented Province in a major effort to wipe out the rebels. (A similar mass movement early last year having unfortunate consequences for the rural population of that province failed to enable the Government to overcome the Castro forces.)
The inability of the Batista Government to convince the Cuban people of its intent to hold a fair election with adequate guarantees, and its recourse to intensified police measures have considerably darkened the prospect of a peaceful solution. A period of armed conflict as well as terrorism on both sides seems likely to ensue. ARA considers that the continued shipment of combat arms to Cuba at this time would bring sharp criticism from both houses of Congress which presently are considering an extension of the Mutual Security Program and might increase bloodshed in Cuba resulting in adverse criticism from both the U.S. and Cuban public and press.
Factors entering into this opinion are enumerated in Tab B. [3]
The Department already (March 14) has suspended temporarily a shipment of 1,950 Garand rifles which had been purchased by the Cuban Government (Tab C[4]), and requested the Defense Department to prevent any further arms shipments from moving forward for the present. Neither of these actions has been made public but some press elements are expected to publish the story, despite our precautions, and certain members of Congress are apt to praise us but the unintended effect upon Cuba may be to accelerate the downfall of the Batista regime.[5] Despite this last possibility, we have taken the position described on a temporary basis and so notified the Cuban Ambassador on March 18.
Recommendation:
Your approval is requested of ARA's decision, made after consultation with other interested offices of the Department and the Department of Defense, that further shipments of combat arms to Cuba not be authorized until Cuban conditions improve to the point where arms furnished will be dependably used for hemispheric defense and not used up internal strife.[6]
NOTES:
1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3-2458. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Leonhardy and Snow. Wieland and Little obtained clearances from H, P, MC, and W/MSC. G was also informed of the memorandum. Earlier drafts of the memorandum, dated March 19 and 20, are ibid., 737.00/3-1958 and 737.00/3-2058, respectively.
2. None of the tabs was attached to the source text. Tab A is printed as Document 5.
3. See footnote 2, Document 36.
4. Not further identified.
5. This sentence was revised in an unidentified hand. It originally read: "Neither of these actions has been made public but Time Magazine is expected to publish the story this Wednesday, despite our precautions, in which event the U.S. press and certain members of Congress are apt to praise us but the unintended effect upon Cuba may be to accelerate the downfall of the Batista regime."
6.The last part of this sentence was revised in an unidentified hand. It originally read: "to the point where arms furnished can be considered to be within the U.S. public interest and will not jeopardize our Mutual Defense Program in Latin America which has been given increasing Congressional attention because of the Cuban imbroglio."
Dulles initialed his approval of the recommendation on the source text. In a note to Snow dated March 26 and attached to the source text, however, Joseph N. Greene wrote:
"The Secretary does not approve relating the decision to suspend shipments of arms to Cuba to the Congressional progress of the Mutual Security legislation. In the Secretary's view the suspension should remain in effect until we can be sure arms furnished the Cuban Government will be dependably used as provided in our agreement with the Cubans, that is for hemispheric defense, and not used in internal strife.
"The Secretary suggests that if there are other elements in the situation which would tend to invalidate this decision, you resubmit a new study and recommendations."