Havana, March 16, 1958 - 2 p.m.

544. When Church decided to mediate in political problems Cuba, I was hopeful and relieved. Hopeful Church could obtain peaceful solution because of its tremendous prestige and influence. Relieved because Church and not US would take blame if Batista were overthrown.

After rejection of Harmony Commission peace gesture by Castro, conditions were such that GOC might have fallen. Church was consistently reminded that it would be blamed for ensuing bloodbath and chaos, which would surely prevail if Batista fell. Church realized it would be blamed by GOC, sympathizers of GOC, and by many who suffered from the consequences.

The Cardinal's fear of this was confirmed to me by the Papal Nuncio. Realization of this may have been deciding factor in Church decision to withdraw from active political participation.

Psychological effect of steps US is taking may bring about overthrow of Batista. (Reference note to Campa March 3 [2] and Deptels 492[3]-493.[4])

If Batista falls after such steps have become public knowledge, I am now concerned that US and not Church will be blamed for overthrow of GOC with resulting chaos and bloodshed.

Unfortunately there is yet no individual or group in sight strong enough to preserve law and order. If Batista falls, present top command of army cannot survive. Before any military junta could take over, army might be fighting amongst themselves. Fidel Castro has publicly stated that he intends to control army; that he, Castro, will be dominant figure.

US will be blamed, even though unjustly, whether Batista survives or whether Batista falls (unless Church should again take steps to relieve us of such responsibility).

In my opinion we should continue use our influence to bring about favorable atmosphere for elections-postponement of elections will make this possible-and to ensure elections are free and open. This we may continue to do without giving either side opportunity to accuse us of intervening.

Smith

NOTES:

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3-1658. Secret; Priority.

2. See footnote 2, Document 27.

3. Document 36.

4. Dated March 15, telegram 493 informed the Embassy in Havana that the Department planned, only if necessary, to release a statement to the press that day indicating that a small shipment of rifles purchased by the Cuban Government had been temporarily held up in New York. The statement was to note that this temporary suspension was in accordance with the "normal U.S. practice" to study carefully such shipments when conditions became tense in any area of the world. (Department of State, Central Files)