No. 463

Habana, December 7, 1957.

Policy Recommendations for the Restoration of Normalcy in Cuba

Problem:

A state of acute tension, accompanied by recurrent acts of violence, exists in Cuba, resulting from the harsh discipline imposed by a dictatorial government and from the conspiratorial and terroristic efforts of a disorganized opposition to unseat it. The situation threatens the continuation of democratic institutions in Cuba, and possibly the safety of American lives and property. If the government falls, a period of chaos and anarchy is likely to ensue which Communist elements within and outside Cuba may be expected to exploit to the maximum extent of their ability. Should the United States try to correct this situation, and if so, how?

Discussion:

For this unhappy situation both the Government of President Fulgencio Batista and the diverse forces opposing him are responsible. Beginning with the coup d'etat of Batista in 1952, action and counter-action have followed each other in close succession, with many excesses on both sides, until now it will be very hard for either, unaided, to check the train of events that is carrying Cuba toward disaster.

President Batista whose term is scheduled to expire in February 1959, has called general elections for June 1, 1958. The opposition is united only in a determination to get rid of Batista; it is disorganized and suffers from personal rivalries and from disagreement as to the methods to pursue in accomplishing its objective. The opposition is unable to agree on a leader or program. Responsible oppositionists would prefer to defeat Batista at the polls, but fear that the elections will not be free and honest and that Batista will arrange the election of his approved successor and will retain the power behind the government.

There is evidence to support their fears. The elections of 1954 were marred by intimidation and corruption. Recently approved legislation is generally interpreted as providing for Batista to assume command of the nation's armed forces including the police, when his term ends. Some opposition leaders have been harassed and intimidated. Constitutional guarantees including freedom of speech, press and assembly have been suspended for seven of the past eleven months, and are still suspended.

A considerable portion of the opposition now advocates and practices violence to overthrow the regime. Their principal leaders are Carlos Prio and Fidel Castro. They do not advocate elections. Their immediate interest is the early downfall of Batista, through any means possible. The Cuban Government accuses Castro of being a Communist, but has not produced evidence to substantiate the charge. In 1953 Castro publicly advocated a socialistic program including nationalization of public utilities. (American owned)[2] He has since modified his views but probably not abandoned them.

There is constant conspiracy against the Government, both inside Cuba and by Cuban political refugees in other countries, including our own. In the past twenty months there have been two unsuccessful conspiracies within the armed forces. (Barquin conspiracy[3] and Cienfuegos uprising.) A rebel force led by Fidel Castro has held out in the mountains of Oriente Province for the past year, in spite of determined efforts of the armed forces to eliminate it. Some oppositionists, including Castro's supporters, now engage in terrorism. Formerly limited to Molotov cocktails and bombings, this has recently been extended to include the burning of sugar cane fields and tobacco barns in an attempt to overthrow Batista by seriously damaging the national economy.

The Government has resorted to increasingly harsh countermeasures in its efforts to eliminate terrorism and violence and destruction of property. Several military and police figures have become notorious for the extreme brutal measures they have adopted.

Some civic and professional institutions, unsuccessful in their attempts to bring Government and opposition together, are disheartened and have registered their protest.

The Government appears incapable of overcoming the perpetrators of violence among the opposition, and the revolutionary groups appear incapable of overthrowing the Government. Unless the trend is arrested, we may expect a continuation of the present unhealthy and explosive situation. The overthrow or assassination of Batista or fraudulent elections might well result in a time of chaos and anarchy. It is to be expected that the communists would step up their efforts to exploit such a troubled period.

If Batista continues his present course and is successful in imposing a continuation of his regime, the result will be a dictatorship, with Batista as the strong man. Sooner or later, there would again be an eruption of violence, terrorism and bloodshed.

Neither of those prospects is desirable for the United States. A time of bloodshed chaos and vandalism, marked by weak, ineffective and short-lived governments, would represent a grave danger for American lives and property. A dictatorship would further weaken the democratic institutions of the nation (which already exist more in form than substance), and threaten their continued existence.

Our interests, and those of Cuba, would best be served by the continuation in office of the present government until the end of its elected term or at least until after elections; by the holding of free, open and honest elections at an early date, as prescribed by the Constitution; and by the emergence of an administration which would have the support of a majority of the people and be able to maintain law and order, and fulfill Cuba's international obligations. Because of the unsatisfactory and dangerous alternatives we should take all feasible and necessary measures, short of intervention, to achieve that outcome. It is consonant with our objectives in Latin America, both as expressed in our own studies and as set forth at various places in our Inter-American commitments, perhaps most specifically in Article 5(d) of the Charter of the Organization of American States, reading: "The solidarity of the American States and the high aims which are sought through it require the political organization of those States on the basis of the effective exercise of representative democracy".[4]

To achieve the results we desire, actions by both the Cuban Government and the opposition groups would be necessary. As a first and essential step, Constitutional Guarantees would have to be restored at an early date. The Ambassador is attempting to promote their restoration through conversations with Batista. Batista has privately indicated to the Ambassador that it is his purpose and intention to restore all guarantees during January, 1958, but has made no public comment in that regard. The Foreign Minister has repeatedly told the Ambassador he believed the President would restore all guarantees by the middle of January. Batista was noncommittal on a suggestion from the Ambassador that it would be helpful to the President's position in Cuba and public relations in the United States if he were to make a statement in the near future of his intention to restore guarantees in time to assure free, open and honest elections. Since Batista finds the restoration of Constitutional Guarantees difficult and risky as long as terrorism and conspiracy threaten his Government, we should continue and if necessary intensify pressure on oppositionists in the United States, including particularly Carlos Prio, by the Department of Justice.

The actions of the Justice Department against Prio have placed us in a strong position, and we should take advantage of this. The Ambassador believes that without any intervention he can now obtain a promise from Batista and a public statement from Batista to restore guarantees in January, if he is given the authority to proceed.

Further steps will probably then be necessary. In order to allay the fears of the opposition, those police and military figures who have come to symbolize Governmental excesses may have to be replaced by the Government of Cuba. Clearly, the Government would expect some concrete indications from the responsible opposition that terrorism will be abandoned.

From that point, all interested parties could negotiate a mutually acceptable arrangement for holding elections, in which at least the bulk of the opposition would participate. This would be a complicated and confused matter, since the opposition is badly divided, with a great number of spokesmen. Almost certainly, the opposition would require that the Government agree to an amnesty for those accused or convicted of committing political offenses, whether civilians or military. In return, the opposition would have to renounce its expressed determination to wreck eventual vengeance on many Governmental figures, including Batista. The Government might permit Castro and his principle lieutenants to leave the country, and give amnesty to his followers. The Government should affirm its intention to hold honest elections, under the observation of representatives of the world press. All parties would have to agree, tacitly or otherwise, to accept the results of the elections. In any such negotiations, the views of the Government, the various responsible opposition groups, the Army, civic and professional institutions, and organized labor would have to be considered.

The United States should carefully watch the progress of the foregoing program, and endeavor to insure its success by appropriate statements and actions as required. A public statement by a high official, perhaps the Secretary, might be issued once guarantees were restored and a more tranquil atmosphere achieved.

Should either side endanger the program, the United States should consider bringing pressure to bear as necessary; firstly, by friendly reminders of adverse reactions within the United States; secondly, by reminders of the steps which might be taken; and as a last resort such steps could be taken. But we should bear constantly in mind that our objective is not only to restore peace and tranquility in Cuba but also to avoid any violent overthrow of the Government of Cuba which would lead to bloodshed and chaos. Our aim is for the installation of an administration which represents the wishes of the majority of the Cubans, has the support of the people, and can maintain law and order.

Recommendations:

1. That the United States intensify its efforts to bring about an early restoration of constitutional guarantees in Cuba.

2. That the United States intensify its efforts to bring about a cessation of terrorism and counter-terrorism in Cuba.

3. That the United States attempt through pressure and persuasion, short of intervention, to bring about an agreement between the Government and the responsible opposition groups for the holding of free and open elections.

4. That the Ambassador be authorized immediately to proceed in accordance with Recommendation 1.

Earl E.T. Smith

NOTES:

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12-757. Confidential. Drafted by Smith, Braddock, and Topping. This despatch replied to MID's request for comment on a November 21 memorandum by Wieland and Stewart entitled, "Possible United States Courses of Action in Restoring Normalcy to Cuba." The MID officials wrote that if the United States decided to make efforts to bring Batista and the opposition together and these efforts failed, three alternative courses of action suggested themselves. One was to return to a policy of aloofness from Cuba and allow internal political forces in Cuba to run their course with possible chaotic consequences. Another was to diminish the brutality of the Cuban armed forces by warning Batista that if he did not discipline his troops, the United States would suspend all military supplies and equipment to Cuba. The third was to adopt harsher measures to curtail the revolutionary activities of the anti-Batista Cuban exiles in the United States if they should refuse to negotiate with the President of Cuba. Wieland and Stewart recommended, "That we attempt to explore the situation to determine whether there is a possibility of Batista and the opposition reaching an agreement to hold free elections. If not, we should then determine whether to take any of the measures suggested above, or alternative action, and to clarify publicly our position in the Cuban crisis. This should be done in close consultation with our Embassy in Cuba and with any Cuban leaders deemed appropriate." (Ibid., 737.00/11-2157)

[2]In a speech on October 16, 1953, Castro supported grants of land to small planters and peasants, with indemnification to the former owners; the rights of workers to share in profits; a greater share of the cane crop to all planters; and confiscation of all illegally obtained property. His land reform advocated maximum holdings for agricultural enterprises and the distribution of remaining land to farming families; it also provided for encouragement of agricultural cooperatives for the common use of costly equipment, cold storage, and a uniform professional direction in cultivation and breeding. In addition, the speech expressed the intention of nationalizing the electric and telephone companies. For text, see What Happened in Cuba? A Documentary History by Robert F. Smith (New York, 1963), pp. 254-259.

[3] Colonel Ramon Barquin of the Cuban army, with the help of Justo Carrillo, who headed a civilian organization of business and professional men, led an unsuccessful coup d'etat against Batista in April 1956. Documentation is in Department of State, Central File 737.00.

[4] For text of the Charter, April 30, 1948, see 2 UST (pt. 2) 2416.