Washington, December 29, 1958.

SUBJECT

Problem

Plan for Settlement of Cuban Civil Strife

For the past two years Cuba has been the victim of a civil war that daily grows worse. The rebel forces of Fidel Castro, which have been carrying the brunt of the fighting, are gaining strength. Other opposition groups, disorganized, have aided Castro but now, with possible victory in sight, they fear that Castro wishes to overthrow President Batista's Government on his own and set up a regime controlled entirely by his 26th of July movement. Cubans do not entirely trust Castro's motives, nor do we, and the desirable course of events, if Batista is to be overthrown, is the formation of a Government of National Conciliation made up of representatives of all anti-Batista sectors. If there is a possibility that Batista's hand-picked President, Andres Rivero Aguero, has the support of the population, this fact should be ascertained and Rivero given a chance to assume power when Batista's term ends in February, 1959.

Discussion

Fidel Castro's success in starting with a group of 13 men and building his forces to their present size indicates that a large part of the Cuban population supports him, or is anti-Batista. In the past few days the 26th of July forces claim sensational successes in Oriente and Camaguey provinces, while Fidelista and Organizacion Revolucionaria armed bands are threatening to cut the island in half by capturing Santa Clara, the capital of Las Villas Province. If the rebel forces are successful in all they claim they are doing, the Batista regime may fall. If it does not topple, the stalemate will continue with more killings, which number every day in the scores, or maybe hundreds. If the regime does fall, a struggle for power among the opposition factions may result, thus postponing a return to any semblance of normality.

Should Batista successfully resist immediate overthrow, or bickering results among opposition forces if the regime falls, the following described plan could be inaugurated at any time:

1. Encourage the formation of a small informal group of Latin American OAS Ambassadors to study the Cuban situation.

2. After a brief time to allow discussion, encourage the group to ask Batista to invite it to visit Cuba for a first-hand study.

3. If this permission is granted, interview Batista and submit to him this plan:

a. If his Government and the Castro and other opposition

forces were agreeable, an immediate truce would be called. Order would be maintained by the Cuban armed forces, commanded by officers not involved in any brutalities under the surveillance of United Nations observers. b. Once a truce were called, the United Nations would supervise a plebiscite of all Cuban citizens of voting age.

c. This plebiscite would call on the people to vote on two

propositions, to wit:

1. Are you satisfied with the results of the election of November 3, in which Andres Rivero Aguero was elected President and do you favor his taking power on February 24, 1959? If the majority favors his taking power, the other candidates elected in November will take office.

2. If you do not favor the election of Dr. Rivero, would you favor the formation of a Government of National Conciliation, made up of representatives of the 26th of July Movement, the traditional political parties which opposed Batista (Communists excluded), civic organizations, Accion Catolica, students and other qualified groups? If the majority favors this alternative, the Government of National Conciliation will call general elections for President, etc., before the end of 1959. The United Nations will supervise or observe the elections to assure their honesty and impartiality.

d. If Batista agreed to this procedure, the committee would

immediately seek the agreement of Castro'~ movement and other organizations mentioned in c (2). Overtui '-s, in fact, might be under way while Batista's approval was being sought.

4. If there was general agreement for a truce and the procedure outlined, the committee would seek Batista's consent and then ask the President of the Council of the Organization of American States to call a meeting. The Cuban representative might receive instructions to ask for the meeting.

5. At the meeting, the committee would justify its action on humanitarian grounds and urge the Council to request the United Nations to be seized of the Cuban problem, suggesting the solution described above.

Regarding Point 1, it is believed that Ambassador Arias of Panama, Foreign Minister Andrade of Bolivia, and others are in favor of trying to solve the Cuban dispute through mediation or some other means. As an ex-President, Ambassador Arias would act with considerable authority as a member of a committee and might be the person who should chair the group. Ambassador Arias did not do badly as chairman of the OAS special committee that effected the NicaraguaHonduras cease-fire. Parenthetically, his chances of being the next President of Panama would be greatly enhanced if the committee was successful and our feeling toward this eventuality would have to be considered in considering him for an important role. The United States, in my opinion, should not be a member of the committee.

Concerning Point 2, a brief lapse of time would allow members of the committee to think out loud, and to explore reactions of the various Latin American countries, the United Nations Secretariat and nonAmerican nations toward a solution of the type envisaged. The committee would leak details of the settlement so that it would gain publicity everywhere, including Cuba. If asked, the United States would be able to state that it favored the plan as a means of settling the Cuban problem, with the people of the country having a direct say in the method of solution. The way would thus be prepared for requesting Batista's permission for the committee to enter Cuba and study the situation.

If Batista refused it seems likely that his position would be greatly weakened, because the great majority of his people want to see the present chaotic and bloody situation come to a speedy end. It is evident that Batista cannot dominate the rebels and he does not appear to have enough control over the situation to enable Rivero Aguero to begin his term with prospects of peace. On the other hand, if Batista sees the handwriting, this method gives him a dignified out; he will permit the Cuban people to decide again what kind of a government they want. He can always say Castro prevented all the voters from having their say in November.

If Batista permits the committee to visit the island and accepts its proposal, he will probably do so believing Castro will turn it down. The remaining opposition groups, with the possible exception of the Orthodox, logically would be expected to favor the plan. The proposition of the Catholic Church in March had widespread appeal and it will be recalled that its overtures for a peaceful solution were torpedoed by Castro and a then much-stronger Batista.

Should Castro spurn the proposal, he would turn a large segment of the Cuban population against him and if he triumphed in the end over Batista and imposed his government on his people, he would have serious troubles eventually.

As for Cuban aversion to outside interference in the affairs of the country, it will be recalled that Antonio Varona, the leader of the Autenticos (the largest party in Cuba) has insistently been calling for OAS intervention in the Cuban tragedy.

As for a truce, this presents the most serious deterrent to the success of the plan. It would be absolutely necessary that Batista's commanders be removed and I envisage that they, along with Batista, would have to leave the country under the protection of committee or UN observers, under ideal circumstances, or as best they could within a period of say 24 hours. It would be difficult to work out a plan acceptable to the Fidelistas, but again, the other opposition groups might assist the committee in establishing a procedure in order to put an end to the confusion and bloodshed. It is inevitable that some of Batista's more brutal commanders would be killed but this should not deter the plan. Their fate will be worse if Castro overthrows Batista.

Men such as Colonel Barquin, etc., could be released from prison to take over commands in the Army. They would take these commands with the understanding that they would maintain order, avoid widespread slaughter and generally create a situation propitious for Cubans of voting age to go to the polls anywhere on the island, be it in the Sierra Maestra or in Habana, and ballot freely.

No registration of voters would be necessary, each person's carnet de identidad establishing the age. Multiple voting by an individual could be avoided by marking each voter's hand with a stamp using indelible ink.

The role of the United Nations as supervisor of elections is not new; it played this part successfully in Greece and in colonial Africa. Thousands of observers were used in Greece and several hundred persons would be needed in Cuba. The Latin American diplomatic corps and volunteers from nearby countries could be pressed into service, their expenses to be paid by the Cuban Government. It would probably be advisable to keep the Army's role as minor as possible, retaining the bulk of the troops in barracks, subject only to call in event of disorder. If the 26th of July Movement attempted to sabotage the election this action would bring down on Castro's head the wrathful public censure of most of the democratic world.

As for Point 4, it seems unlikely that many countries would oppose the plan in the Council of the OAS, since Batista would be a party to it. The Dominican Republic might oppose the plan for fear of setting a precedent. Once taken before the UN, it would undoubtedly gain the support of most of the democratic countries. Opposition might develop from the Soviet bloc, the UAR, Iraq, Sudan and other countries ruled by military dictators. But they would be outvoted handily and probably might consider it politic to go along with the majority.

Some of the advantages of this plan are;

1. The danger would be reduced of the United States becoming involved alone in the settlement of the Cuban problem.

2. The danger of a complete Castro takeover would be minimized.

3. If the plan were successful there is a possibility that most of the 1959 sugar crop could be harvested, thus eliminating the possibility of a shortage which would increase prices in the United States with inevitable political overtones.

4. While we would let the investigating committee, the OAS and the UN take the credit for effecting the solution, it would inevitably become known that we first proposed the plan. If it failed, the repercussions would be shared equally by all.

5. The solution of the Cuban problem would set a precedent for the settlement of similar situations throughout the world by an ideal method, i.e., by the votes of the people of the country involved under the aegis of the United Nations. Future failure of a dictator to accede to such a plan would probably hasten his downfall.

6. The United States would be lauded for contributing to the humanitarian solution of a difficult hemispheric problem.

The disadvantages:

1. The plan would be inaugurated by an informal committee operating within the framework of the OAS but without specific authorization of the Council of the OAS.

2. If any one step in the plan could not be implemented it would fail. However, public disclosure of the attempt and a detailed description of the plan might still have an indirect effect in settling the Cuban problem.

3. Since certain Latin American individuals would be vital for the success of the attempt, their failure to come through might tempt them to place the blame on the United States.

4. The United States would be accused of indirect intervention no matter what the results obtained.

NOTES:

1. Source: Department of State, CCA Files: Lot 70 D 149, Testimony. Secret. Drafted by Stewart. Also addressed to Wieland who initialed the source text.