Washington, December 23, 1958.

SUBJECT

Cuba

With the advent of the sugar harvest, and the rapidly deteriorating position of the Batista Government, which has lost control of the Eastern third of Cuba, except for three or four relatively large cities, the Department has been giving increased attention to the Cuban problem and what, if anything, this Government might appropriately do to encourage a solution short of the blood bath which could result there. We are consulting regularly with the Director of CIA and his staff in an effort to develop courses of action which might lead to a viable solution.

Batista seized power by a bloodless coup in 1952 and, despite his having been elected (without opposition) to a regular presidential term in 1954, the Cuban people seem not to have forgiven him his interruption of democratic processes there, despite the bad reputation of the Prio Government which he overturned. Notwithstanding Batista's strongly entrenched position and his control of the Cuban military forces, he was unable to snuff out the Fidel Castro-led rebellion following a landing in which only twelve rebels survived in November 1956. At the same time, Castro has been unsuccessful so far in his efforts to overthrow Batista, despite his increasing control of the Eastern third of the island. Two general strikes announced by Castro were failures and, up to the present, the Cuban Confederation of Labor continues to support Batista.

Both the Government and the rebels have used harshly repressive measures against the public, with resultant hatreds against both, but more especially against the Government. Last summer the Castro forces kidnapped 30 U.S. seamen assigned to our naval base at Guantanamo plus some U.S. civilians, and held them for three weeks; in late November they interrupted the water supply at the base several times; and there are other clear indications that irresponsibility and a degree of anti-American sentiment are characteristics of the Castro movement.

We also know that the Communists are utilizing the Castro movement to some extent, as would be expected, but there is insufficient evidence on which to base a charge that the rebels are communist dominated. Hence there seems to be no basis for invoking the Caracas Resolution of 1954, [2] which would call the OAS into action. However, we have consulted with the other American Republics regarding the Cuban problem. They have expressed interest in the matter, but except for Ecuador, none of them has expressed willingness to take any initiative. In fact, the Organization of American States does not have clear-cut authority to move into an internal problem like that in Cuba, although it has repeatedly demonstrated its capacity for effective action in disputes involving two or more countries.

On March 29th of this year, sixteen months after the rebellion started, we suspended the shipment of combat arms to the Cuban Government, [3] in accordance with our policy not to ship arms to countries beset by such political tension as that existing in Cuba. In our best judgment, we could not continue to supply weapons to a government which was resorting to such repressive measures of internal security as to have alienated some 80 percent of the Cuban people, by all reports, as well as public and official opinion in most of the other American Republics, not to mention important elements of press and congressional opinion in the U.S. However, we have retained our Army, Navy, and Air Force Missions in the country, and have shipped some non-combat equipment, such as communications items.

On November 4 (3?) elections were held in Cuba under a state of siege, in which the Batista-backed candidate, Rivero Aguero, was elected President by an overwhelming majority. He is generally considered a puppet of Batista and great concern is felt as to whether he could maintain himself in power without strong military support following his inauguration now scheduled for February 24. Any hopes that the elections might ease the tensions in Cuba were dashed by the circumstances under which they were held.

Throughout the past two years this Government has had to contend with a very difficult public relations problem in so far as Cuba is concerned. The U.S. press and the Latin American press have been overwhelmingly anti-Batista and have been critical of any evidence adducing U.S. support of him. Some of the papers, particularly in Latin America, are pro-Castro, but this is not a uniform pattern. Ambassador Gardner was widely considered to be overly friendly to Batista, and his successor, Ambassador Smith, after being almost declared persona non grata following an incident in Santiago shortly after his arrival in Cuba, which evoked a public statement from him deploring brutality, has gradually become a target of criticism for any dealings he has with the Batista Government. It must be recognized that any U.S. representative would find it virtually impossible to avoid criticism under present conditions in Cuba. The Congress has manifested widespread interest in the Cuban problem and, during the hearings while it was considering the Mutual Security Bill early last session, the questioning revealed strong feeling against U.S. arms shipments to that country. In fact, it was the Cuban situation, along with our somewhat strained relations with the Dominican Republic, which led to the so-called Morse Amendment, [4] calling for an annual determination by you as to whether arms may be granted to Latin American Governments.

For the past five years and more, the Department has been in frequent touch with the Department of justice at all levels in connection with the persistent illegal activities of Cuban political exiles in this country. One result has been the indictment twice (in 1954 and 1958) of ex-President Prio Socarras for violation of the neutrality laws, as well as a number of seizures of arms and arrests of men destined for Cuba. Former Attorney General Brownell presided at one large conference with our officers just a fortnight before his resignation. [5] We have repeatedly urged all U.S. enforcement agencies to make a maximum effort to curb violations of the neutrality statutes, with special reference to Cuban violators.

The Department has concluded that any solution in Cuba requires that Batista must relinquish power whether as Chief of State or as the force behind a puppet successor. He probably should also leave the country. Many responsible Cubans share this view. The Department clearly does not want to see Castro succeed to the leadership of the Government. It believes that the majority of Cubans likewise share that view. [1 sentence (4 lines) not declassified] We hope that Batista can be made to see the desirability of this course of action, and Ambassador Smith has held one discussion with the President toward this end. [6] In addition, we sent an American private citizen of high standing who has known President Batista well for 30 years, to Havana earlier this month, where he spent several hours, without attribution to the U.S. Government, pleading with Batista to adopt a constructive political solution to the current crisis.[7] It is too early to see how these approaches will work out but Batista may have been moved slightly away from his present firm posture to stay on until the bitter end. Batista's well-known qualities of personal courage and intense loyalty to his friends and cronies is a dominant factor which has to be reckoned with in this situation.

The Papal Nuncio in Havana has sent word to Ambassador Smith of his continuing desire to see peace restored. We have instructed Ambassador Smith to talk to the Nuncio and to indicate our interest in the possibility of a Christmas Day appeal to all Cubans by the Church. [8]

Ex-President Arias of Panama, presently Ambassador to the United States and to the OAS, is in touch with ex-President Galo Plaza of Ecuador to see whether the latter would be interested in joining him, and possibly a third ex-President from Latin America, in an offer of good offices to the Cuban people. We prompted Arias to consider such a move as this. [9]

In sum, we do not believe that Batista can possibly establish his successor firmly and peacefully in office on February 24, 1959. We are therefore seeking, by all available means short of outright intervention, to bring about a political solution in Cuba which will [less than 1 line not declassified] see the hated elements of the Batista regime effectively removed from power, will enable President Batista and his family to withdraw safely from the Cuban scene, and will result in a government broadly based on popular consent and support. Above all else, we want to help avoid the appalling mob violence which attended the fall of Machado in 1933, and which Cubans fatalistically expect to occur again.

Christian A. Herter

NOTES:

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series. Top Secret. Initialed by the President. Another copy indicates that it was drafted by Rubottom and Snow. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, U.S. Policy Toward Latin America)

2. Adopted by the Tenth Inter-American Conference, March 28, 1954. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1950-1955, vol. I, pp.1299-1300.

3. The suspension occurred on March 14. News of the suspension appeared in the press on March 28. See Documents 36 and 44.

4. This amendment was incorporated in Sec. 103 of the Mutual Security Act of 1958 (PL. 85-477) enacted June 30, 1958. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp.1566-1583.

5. Presumably a reference to a meeting held on October 14, 1957; see Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, vol. vi, p. 858.

6. Presumably a reference to Smith's conversation with Batista on December 17; see Document 185.

7. See Document 173.

8. See Document 187 and footnote 2 thereto.

9. See Document 178.