SUBJECT

Visit of Senator Javits for the Purpose of Discussing the Cuban Situation

PARTICIPANTS

Senator Javits

ARA-Mr. R. R. Rubottom, Jr., Assistant Secretary

CMA-Mr. William A. Wieland, Director

CMA-Mr. Robert A. Stevenson, Officer-in-Charge, Cuban Affairs

Senator Javits had requested an appointment with Mr. Rubottom to "discuss the Cuban situation," He opened the conversation by stating that several months ago his friend, Herb Matthews, had tried to interest him in Cuban developments and at that time he had made rather a searching inquiry among businessmen and other knowledgeable persons concerning the Cuban scene. One person had told him that probably 90% of the people were anti-Batista but that perhaps 75% to 80% were anti-Castro. This, and other information, had led him to the conclusion that the issues there were not well-defined and that he would not, therefore, attempt to bring the Hill into the matter.

In recent weeks, however, Senator Javits had again become concerned with Cuba and the possibility of a general breakdown of the government there with accompanying bloodshed and misery and loss to U.S. interests. He now feels that perhaps he will have to take up the question on the Hill, but before doing so he desired to discuss it with the State Department. He said he appreciated the fact that the matter is very sensitive and complicated and that he does not want to do anything which might further complicate it or make a solution more difficult.

Mr. Rubottom told Senator Javits that the Cuban situation is indeed most delicate and complicated and thanked him for coming to the Department to discuss it. He assured him that State desires to cooperate with him and the Congress in every way that it can and that we share with him the serious concern with regard to Cuba.

The basic trouble in Cuba, "Batista's Achilles heel," Mr. Rubottom said, is the fact that Batista seized power illegally in 1952 and has not been able to cleanse himself of that stigma by any subsequent actions. Through overconfidence or by design he ignored the Castro rebellion when it was insignificant militarily, and at the same time he refused to take steps which might have broadened his base of support or at least have created support and hope among the non-revolutionary opposition for a solution at the polls with a concomitant isolation of Castro. During all these months the U.S. has subtly but persistently sought to persuade him to seek a constructive solution which might bring peace to the island. It has had to be extremely careful to avoid any appearance of intervention because a charge of U.S. intervention would be damaging to us throughout the hemisphere and particularly in Cuba in view of our past relationship. As Batista continued to ignore our suggestions and as public opinion in the U.S. and Latin America became more hostile to him, it was deemed necessary in March of this year to suspend temporarily a shipment of rifles destined for Cuba under the reimbursable aid program and which had been paid for by the Cubans.

At this point Senator Javits interjected a question, asking how the question of arms now stands. Mr. Wieland answered stating that the U.S. has continued its suspension and has made it applicable to all combat arms and equipment, although it did not extend to non-combat items.

Mr. Rubottom said that Batista's response to our suggestions continued to be disappointing and that the elections when finally carried out as they were, with constitutional guarantees suspended, seem to offer little hope of a solution. Nevertheless the President-elect, Rivero Aguero, has said that his first concern will be to seek a way to bring peace to the island and has indicated an awareness of the need to form a "national administration". The U.S. continues to encourage him in these efforts and only recently Ambassador Smith was in the Department to discuss and consider additional steps which the U.S. might take. [2]

Senator Javits thanked Mr. Rubottom for his summation of U.S. policy and said that he had three questions to ask, the first one being: "Why have we dealt with the rebels at all?"

Mr. Rubottom replied that we have not treated or dealt officially with the rebels; that our Consul in Santiago de Cuba, in accordance with his duty to seek protection for American citizens abroad, had sought out the rebels in order to obtain the release of American citizens who had been kidnapped by them. However, he refused to discuss any subject except the return of the kidnappers and he was eventually successful in obtaining their release with no conditions discussed or accepted. He added that the Department has been concerned with the rebel lack of responsibility and occasional anti-American statements and the possibility of communist infiltration and influence. In fact, he said that for more than a year he had followed closely the reports of the intelligence community on this subject but that he has seen nothing which would lead him to conclude that the Castro Movement is communist controlled. Mr. Wieland confirmed this point and added that although we have reports that Raul Castro visited behind the Iron Curtain and is accused of communist sympathies, we also have reports that he went there not as a delegate but as an anti-Communist private citizen, at his own expense, and while there made a speech critical of communism.

Senator Javits then asked if the Department has considered using the OAS as a vehicle by which meaningful mediation in Cuba might be attempted. Mr. Rubottom replied that the Department has indeed been exploring this very possibility but that the charter does not seem to offer any avenue by which this might be done unless, of course, OAS assistance might be requested by the Cuban Government. Nevertheless we are continuing to consider what the OAS might do and are seeking the

views of the other members.

Thirdly, Senator Javits asked what plan does the U.S. have in the event the USSR recognizes the rebels thus creating a state of belligerency in Cuba under international law. He amplified his question by stating that business interests in New York were very much concerned by this possibility as it would void all their insurance; also, that it might just suit the USSR as it would create an awkward situation for the U.S. and would be another case where the Russians had seized the initiative.

Mr. Rubottom replied that he considers this to be a rather remote possibility, but that it is a question to which he will have to give more thought. He doubted very much that Castro would want USSR recognition as it might very well cost him the majority of his present supporters.

Senator Javits said that he would continue to study the Cuban situation and will particularly look into the possibility of using the OAS; that he thinks something will have to be done on the Hill. He added that as a liberal he has no use for Batista, but that he does not want to see him replaced by something as bad or worse. Mr. Rubottom mentioned that he had talked with Senator Morse regarding Cuba and that Mr. Snow and Mr. Wieland had made an appearance before informal executive sessions of both Senate and House Foreign Affairs Committees. [3]

Before leaving, Senator Javits, with a smile, said that he would make two suggestions, namely; that much as he loves the New York Times the Department should not let it run or influence our policy on Cuba; and, that the Department should consider publishing a White Paper on Cuba as soon as possible, and before the situation collapses there. With regard to the latter suggestion he said that he intended to speak about it with Secretary Dulles and with Mr. Herter. [4]

Mr. Rubottom assured him that we have not been guided by the New York Times and that he would give serious consideration to the Senator's suggestion regarding a White Paper. He said that the Department would like to cooperate with Senator Javits in every way that it can on the Cuban question and that he hoped Senator Javits would continue to give us the benefit of his views.

No record has been found of a conversation on this subject involving Rubottom and either Dulles or Herter. On December 29, however, Herter directed that a White Paper on Cuba be prepared. See Document 193.

NOTES:

1. Source: Department of State, CCA Files: Lot 70 D 149, Cuba-Political. Confidential. Drafted by Stevenson on December 30 and revised on January 8,1959.

2. See Document 175.

3. Not further identified.