Havana, November 30, 1958 - 1 p.m.

565. Deptel 307, Embtel 564.[2] Dispatching Cuban Navy personnel to protect aquaduct is not contingent upon points (A) (B) (C) but GOC will require cooperation USG.

Point (D) is essential. I hope State Department has already asked Navy Department make available necessary radio communication equipment to afford communication between aquaduct, GOC, local military HQs and USGTMO navy base.

Cuban Navy troops at aquaduct will be isolated and GOC will have trouble supplying food. Batista asks US cooperation by supplying food for personnel, which GOC will pay for.

I recommend that I be authorized to discreetly discourage Batista soonest from dispatching Cuban troops to protect aquaduct for following reasons:

(1) Troops will be bait for rebels to attack.

(2) It is questionable whether designated troops are sufficient to protect aquaduct.

(3) Pant may be severely damaged during fighting.

If plant remains unprotected and rebels again shut off water supply, I concur with Admiral Fenno that US Marines be dispatched to guard aquaduct.

I have obtained from GOC clear agreement Marines may assume guard if necessary as is in accordance with Deptel 307 (subject only that base notify local military commander).

Smith

NOTES:

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56337/11-3058. Confidential; Niact. Passed to the Commander of the U.S. base at Guantanamo.

2. Regarding both telegrams, see supra.