SNIE 85-58

THE SITUATION IN CUBA [2]

Washington, November 24,1958.

The Problem

To analyze the present situation in Cuba and to estimate probable developments for the next few months.

Conclusions

1. The 3 November national elections and the prospective inauguration of Rivero Aguero on 24 February have had little effect on the political and military impasse in Cuba. Rebel leader Fidel Castro is continuing his guerrilla warfare campaign, but his movement, in combination with other existing opposition groups, probably cannot overthrow the government in the next few months. On the other hand, the Cuban armed forces cannot suppress the guerrilla movement unless they become better trained, supplied, and equipped, and more strongly motivated, and unless the rebel forces are effectively isolated from external supply sources.

2. The Cuban armed forces remain, however, the most important element capable of breaking the political deadlock, by deposing the regime and establishing a junta. A group within the military would be likely to take such action if there were a sharp increase in popular or labor opposition to the regime. A military-dominated junta almost certainly could not restore peace to Cuba within the period of this estimate unless its membership and actions were such as to convince the revolutionary opposition that it was prepared to accord it a significant influence in the provisional government. [3]

[Here follows a detailed discussion of the subject, under the following headings: (A) The Strengths and Weaknesses of Fidel Castro's "26th of July Movement", (B) The Role of the Cuban Communists, (C) The Role of the Cuban Military, (D) The 3 November National Elections, and (E) The Outlook for the Next Few Months.]

NOTES:

1. Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet indicates that the following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: the Central Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff. The estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and was concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on November 24. Concurring were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, the joint Staff; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction. Published in full in Declassified Documents, 1984,1510.

2. Title of this estimate when used alone should be "For Official Use Only." [Footnote in the source text.]

3. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, would have conclusion 2 read: "The Cuban military remains the most important element capable of breaking the political and military deadlock and restoring order in Cuba. Politically this might require deposing the regime and establishing a junta. A group within the military would be likely to take such action if there were a sharp increase in popular or labor opposition to the regime. Except through military operations, which would require early receipt of extensive military aid and assistance, a military-dominated junta almost certainly could not restore peace to Cuba within the period of this estimate unless its membership and actions were such as to convince the revolutionary opposition that it was prepared to accord it a significant influence in the provisional government." They would further add a third conclusion to read: "We are unable to identify any prospective leadership in the Cuban Army competent to overthrow the Batista regime within the period of this estimate." [Footnote in the source text.]