SUBJECT

The Situation in Cuba and the Possibility that the New President-elect will Endeavor to Form a Government of Reconciliation

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Earl E.T Smith

Assistant Secretary R.R. Rubottom, Jr.

Deputy Assistant Secretary William P. Snow

Director of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs, William A. Wieland

Deputy Director, Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs, Edward S. Little

Mr. Terrance G. Leonhardy, Officer in Charge, Cuban Affairs

Mr. Robert A. Stevenson, DRA

Ambassador Smith began the conversation with a brief review of the situation in Cuba which he described as essentially a political and military impasse, with the army unable to put down the rebels and the rebels unable to inflict a major defeat upon the army. Between the contending forces, he feels, are the vast majority of Cubans who are generally anti-Batista but not pro-Castro and desire, above all, the reestablishment of peace and order. For the first time he has heard reports of economic difficulties, stemming from the rebel activities in the Oriente and elsewhere, which promise to become a major problem for the new Rivero Aguero administration. Furthermore, American business interests are likely to suffer increasing economic and physical harm from the continued unrest and rebel depredations.

With the above situation mutually in mind, Ambassador Smith and Rivero Aguero held a recent conversation (November 15, 1958)[2] in which the latter declared to Ambassador Smith his sincere desire to bring about a return of peace and order to Cuba. To that end, upon his inauguration or soon thereafter, he said he is willing to call for elections to a constituent assembly and to go along with plans for a new presidential election at the discretion of such assembly. Batista, he states, upon the completion of his term, would retire completely from public and political life. If Rivero Aguero moves ahead along these lines he wonders what support he might expect from the United States, particularly whether the United States would make at least a token shipment of arms to his administration as a gesture of support for his efforts. Ambassador Smith mentioned that in addition to Rivero, he has also discussed the above matter with Rivero's confidant, former Cuban prime minister Jorge Garcia Montes, [3] who is presently in Spain but willing to return immediately if the United States will indicate support for the above course of action.

Mr. Rubottom asked a few general questions regarding the newly reported clouds on the economic horizon and then addressed himself to the above proposition as follows:

The United States is sincerely sympathetic to Rivero Aguero in all constructive efforts which he may make designed to bring peace to Cuba. Nevertheless, we view the problem as a Cuban internal matter for which only the Cubans, in the end, can provide the solution. The initiative must be theirs. If Batista should retire completely from the political scene, if Rivero makes approaches to various civic groups and wins their support, if the non-revolutionary opposition agrees to go along with the plan, if the Church will support it, if the military agrees-in short, if the country at large, and not necessarily including Castro and the 26th of July Movement, shows itself to be behind Rivero's efforts, the U.S. Government would be disposed to show its good will and support for him. This it could do in a variety of ways other than by a resumption of the shipment of arms. Admittedly this single step might have the most effect psychologically with the Cuban government, but not necessarily so, and it could be a problem with regard to public opinion in the United States and in Latin America. If Rivero hopes to have any success in his efforts, it would seem that he should begin now a series of steps designed to lead to results such as those mentioned above so that by the time of his inauguration on February 24th the way might be prepared for the establishment of a government of reconciliation.

The question of Batista's future role was then thoroughly discussed. Ambassador Smith said that Batista had told him[4] that he does not plan to leave the country because he does not want to give even the appearance of having deserted his loyal supporters; but that he will retire completely from politics. Mr. Snow and Mr. Wieland were both firm in their stated belief that it would be essential for Batista to leave the country, even if only for a few months, if Rivero's plan were to have any chance of success. Mr. Rubottom supported their opinion on this point and asked if Rivero had cleared his ideas with Batista. Amb. Smith said that he had thought it unsuitable to query Batista directly on this point, but that in view of Rivero's close association with Batista, he could only assume that Rivero's efforts have Batista's blessing. Mr. Wieland cautioned that the Rivero administration must act on its own and not by direction from us and that our future policy can only be guided by the results obtained and not by hypothesis.

Regarding Rivero's character, Amb. Smith commented that he finds him a pleasant and sincere man, although seemingly not a strong character, particularly in comparison to Batista. Nevertheless, he believes him to be intelligent and able and suggests that once inaugurated he may prove stronger and more resolute than he now appears to be.

Later, at lunch, Mr. Wieland suggested to Amb. Smith the advisability of keeping in close touch with his Latin American colleagues in Habana regarding their views on a possible solution to the Cuba dilemma. He stressed the importance of Latin American acceptance of any solution (in addition to that of the United States) from the standpoint of hemispheric public opinion.

Following lunch Mr. Rubottom was able to review again with Amb. Smith the situation in Cuba. He reiterated the points he had made in the earlier discussion and assured Amb. Smith that the Department would be very dismayed at the prospect of a 26th of July take-over in Cuba. Nevertheless, he could see no prospect of change in our present policy regarding Cuba unless the government there is able to bring about developments within Cuba which would make changes possible and merited.[5]

NOTES:

1. Source: Department of State, CCA Files: Lot 70 D 149, Pending Statements. Confidential. Drafted by Stevenson. In his memoirs, Smith indicates that he went to Washington on November 23 for consultations. He describes in particular a meeting, whose date is unspecified, in the office of Deputy Under Secretary Murphy. (The Fourth Floor, pp. 160-161) No record of such a meeting in Murphy's office has been found. Ambassador Smith left Havana on November 17 and returned on November 23.

2. See Document 154.

3. Smith was apparently referring to conversations which Braddock had with Jorge Garcia Montes on November B and 11. Memoranda of these conversations were sent to the Department as enclosures to despatch 500 from Havana, November 12. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11-1258)

4. See Document 131.

5. In telegram 539 from Havana, November 24, Smith wrote that when he talked with Rubottom on November 22 he did not have the opportunity to mention that the "carefully planned sabotage program of the railroads and hiways, which has recently been instituted to disrupt economy of Cuba, is the most significant development in rebel strategy." Smith further remarked that "this new tactic leads one to believe that they are now receiving professional direction along these lines." (Department of State, Central Files, 837.00/11-2458)