SUBJECT:

Cuban Exile Comments

Mr. Artigas called by appointment today to tell me that General Garcia was in touch with a number of Cuban armed forces officers and wished to emphasize that he and they shared the opinion that the only solution to Cuba's political crisis is for the United States to encourage a military coup with civilian support in Cuba.

He emphasized that the Castro forces are growing stronger almost daily and that a Castro victory would result in a chaotic situation in Cuba for many years to come with serious adverse consequences for the United States. He said that the recent election has worsened instead of improving the Cuban problem. He added that if either Batista remained in office or was succeeded by Rivero Aguero, the present revolution would increase in intensity.

He said that the only solution which now appears possible is for some of the still "unstained" officers in the armed forces to revolt to throw out Batista and at the same time to circumvent Castro. In this connection, he told me that the General Garcia was planning to return to Cuba regardless of the possible personal consequences. He said that the General would contact some of the better elements in the army, but in order to succeed should have some "slight moral support" from the United States.

I asked him to explain what he meant by "slight moral support". He replied that what the United States would be expected to do would be to pass the word "discreetly and informally" to our Military Mission in Havana to inform Cuban officers at Campo Columbia that there should be a change in government.

He said that several members of the United States Armed Forces Mission have been discussing the political situation in Cuba with some of the military who have indicated their desire to stage a revolt to end the present undesirable situtation.

I told Artigas that this Government had no intention of intervening in Cuba's struggle; that any solution reached would have to be one worked out by the Cubans themselves; and that the United States had no intention whatever of violating its international commitments by even considering any scheme to impose any formula for changing the Government of Cuba.

Artigas attempted to insist that the United States act, remarking that any indication by us of a desire for change would "solve Cuba's problem in seven minutes". I replied that any situation which would result from United States violation of its obligations would result in a situtation that would take more than a century to solve.

Artigas again painted the Cuban picture in the darkest possible terms and asked if we could give him no hope to take back to General Garcia. I replied that his best hope was to use whatever influence he and his principals could mobilize to secure a constructive solution by the Cubans themselves.

He then told me that General Cantillo (commander of Government troops in Oriente Province) had told General Garcia that he had been weighing the various alternatives with emissaries of the 26th of July movement, as well as other revolutionary groups, but had refrained from making any decision to turn against the Government and would act immediately in any foreseeable future only if he got "word from the United States Government". I told Artigas to tell General Garcia that we certainly were not considering sending any such order to groups in Cuba or anywhere else.

Artigas concluded the conversation by telling me that General Garcia wanted me to know that while it was impossible for him to regard complacently any effort by Batista to remain in power, he was also carefully refraining from involving himself in any revolutionary activities in this country. He said General Garcia wanted me to know that he was not even communicating with any political elements, but was limiting his activities here to correspondence with fellow officers in the Cuban armed forces.

NOTES:

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11-1858. Confidential. Drafted by Wieland. Artigas was a close associate of exiled General Garcia Tunon.