Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Middle

American Affairs (Wieland) to the Assistant Secretary of

State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) [1]

Washington, January 17,1958.

SUBJECT

Conversations With Ambassador Smith Regarding Cuban Situation

Ambassador Smith arrived on January 14 for consultation principally to discuss the appropriate steps already taken and to be taken in an effort to influence President Batista to hold elections acceptable to the Cuban people on June 1.

The Ambassador reported that President Batista promised him early this month (January 12)[2], a that he would restore constitutional guarantees around January 27, when the present 45-day period of suspension terminates. Ambassador Smith and the Department share the feeling that restoration of guarantees is a necessary step before other moves can be made to induce the Batista regime to hold proper elections.

Assuming that President Batista will restore guarantees and not suspend them until after the elections, Ambassador Smith felt that the United States should give him additional bargaining power in his discussions with Batista by authorizing the sale of 20 armored cars to the Cuban Government. The Cubans have shown particular interest in acquiring this equipment. It was agreed that excessive brutalities by certain Cuban officials should be curtailed, some of the more violent and sadistic officials of the army and police be removed, and/or a strict order come from the President calling upon the armed forces to apply the law impartially and in a strictly legal manner. A general amnesty would be desirable, to include political prisoners and possibly the bulk of the forces fighting with Fidel Castro in the Sierra Maestra mountains. The opposition, of course, would have to respond to these moves with a high degree of responsibility since the revolutionary forces therein are also partly responsible for the violence which today besets the country.

At all times during the various discussions, the extreme difficulty of reaching the desired objectives was recognized, but it was felt that the only logical solution of the Cuban crisis would be achieved by an orderly transition of power based on elections, the conduct thereof and results being acceptable to a majority of the Cuban people.

In discussions, in which you participated, it was recognized that a powerful bargaining point would be removed if the United States told Batista at this time that he could have unconditionally 20 armored cars. The United States already has cooperated with the Cuban Government by launching an investigation into the activities of ex-President Carlos Prio at Batista's request, and indictment is said to be in the offing. However, public and congressional opinion against sale of arms, especially heavy equipment, to a dictatorship is strong. The first anniversary of the delivery of a number of tanks to the Batista regime is nearing, and armored cars resemble tanks so greatly that announcement of their sale would immediately recall the previous sale.

It was agreed that Ambassador Smith is to have authority, subject to the Secretary's approval, to advise President Batista that the schedule of delivery of the armored cars is being adhered to. On May 29, 1957, a letter of offer was sent to the Cubans and on June 4 they advised us of acceptance. At that time they were told that delivery would be effected between nine and 12 months after their acceptance of the sale offer. Earliest delivery, then, would be March 4,1958.

However, delivery will not be made until the Department has reevaluated the situation at the time the shipment is ready, or before, if developments make such a move necessary. Sale of equipment such as armored cars would not be feasible if President Batista had not restored and left in effect constitutional guarantees, taken additional steps toward ending violence in the country, and otherwise generally created conditions conducive to an acceptable election on June 1. If these conditions were not met to our satisfaction we would cancel the sale.

Thus, at the conclusion of the discussions with Ambassador Smith, it is decided that when he returns to Cuba he may tell President Batista that we are proceeding on schedule with the delivery of the armored cars and other less controversial arms. Our hopes concerning the President's cooperation with us to provide conditions facilitating the delivery and concerning acceptable elections will be expressed to the President by Ambassador Smith. Should President Batista fulfill our hopes appropriate cognizance would be made by the Department in a public statement. When the time arrives for the delivery of the armored cars we shall review the situation and, on the basis of the Cuban Government's record in returning the country to some semblance of normalcy and holding acceptable elections, decide whether to make the armored cars available to Cuba. We already have an agreement with the Department of Defense calling for such a review, and it is applied in the case of all arms shipments to Cuba.

NOTES:

1. Secret. Drafted by Stewart. Copies were sent to the Embassy in Havana, to S/S, and to MID/C.

2. See footnote 2 above.