

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN THE CUBAN REPUBLIC,
1944-1958

By

ENRIQUE A. BALOYRA

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TO THE MEMORY OF GLADYS
KAMMERER AND CHARLES FARRIS:
...humanists, scientists,
and Southerners...

TO MY WIFE:...source of in-
spiration...

TO MY FALLEN COMRADES OF THE
DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO
ESTUDIANTIL:...who tried to
construct a better Cuba...

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PREFACE

It is very difficult for a native Cuban to become involved in a study like the present one and convince people that he is not biased or prejudiced about his subject. This study is concerned with a seemingly forgotten aspect of contemporary Cuban politics, namely, the type of political system that prevailed in pre-Castro Cuba. Obviously, the topic is not as incandescent as the topic of the Cuban Revolution --at least among Cubans--but its direct relevance to the latter cannot be denied. Moreover, concrete political implications accrued from the elucidation of this topic since many of the more prominent actors of the last fourteen years of the Cuban Republic are still active in politics--inside and outside Cuba--and they have a vested interest in their own interpretation of the politics of this period.

But the interpretation of the politics of this period is not a parochial enterprise because this study shows that if there is such a thing as "a classical pattern of Latin American politics," a concrete example of this pattern obtained in the Cuban case. Such an interpretation benefits from two concrete developments: one, the revisionist current that is sweeping the field of Latin American politics, and second, the utilization of the perspective of leadership in order to create a relevant point of reference in the utilization of the systems model--and/or structural-functional analysis--in comparative political analytics.

The study has been divided into four parts: Apology, Description, Analysis, and Conclusion. The utilization of the perspective of leadership, the controversy about community power, and the methodological problems created by the nature of the problem account for the first part and the four chapters into which this part was subdivided. Essentially, Part I is merely a statement of the problem, a description of the method, and--above everything--a defense of the selection of the problem and the use of the method.

Part II serves the function of what traditional comparative political scientists used to identify as "the land and the people," "population and resources," or by some other similar title that implied that the chapters bearing such a title contained a historical description that was considered necessary and/or factual information that was deemed relevant. This part has been called description because of this, but the chapters included in them are also apologetic and analytic. These chapters are apologetic because they show the shortcomings of the use of a macroanalytic framework--such as the relationship between voting statistics and socio-economic indicators of large aggregates--in the case of the Cuban Republic and indirectly support the choice of the conceptual framework utilized in the study. Finally, these chapters are analytic because their description of the context of political leadership in Cuba is conducted in a systematic and not in a purely narrative fashion.

The chapters included in Part III constitute the core of the study. The hypotheses of the study are tested in them, and the results

of these tests allow for the verification of most of these hypotheses. Some indirect tests of these hypotheses are conducted in Chapter V and the results are very ambiguous. Consequently, these hypotheses are deleted from the rest of the analysis, although the three leading hypotheses of this group are implicit in much of the analysis of Part III.

There are no excuses about the "tentative nature" of the study. There are no suggestions concerning "the need for further research." These things are so obvious that they hardly require any comment. Probably the greatest shortcoming of the study is that it does not include the role and function of American interests in the power structure of the Cuban political system. The reason for this exclusion is that the required documentary sources for this aspect of the analysis are not available, and that the specific actors who could have been interviewed to throw further light on the subject are not readily accessible--at least to a doctoral candidate in political science.

It may seem striking that a Latin Americanist utilizes the literature of American politics to a greater extent than the literature of Latin American politics in his treatment of the case of a Latin American Republic. But the fact is that the "American case" has received the greatest attention in the discipline and that its treatment by American scholars has produced a wealth of theory that cannot be discarded. On the other hand, although the Americanists may not recognize this, they are essentially comparative political scientists and their work may be utilized by their fellow comparativists. Finally, the treatment of the

subject of political leadership and its implications for the quality of democracy has received more attention in the literature of American politics than in any other area. Consequently someone concerned with this problem, as it applies to Latin America, may find it very convenient to depart from the frameworks elaborated by the Americanists and broaden the perspective of these frameworks to include the Latin American experience, an experience that has been predominantly concerned with this question.

Gainesville, July 26, 1971

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Abstract of the Dissertation Presented to the
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POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN THE
CUBAN REPUBLIC, 1944-1958

by

Enrique A. Baloyra

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Chairman: Andrés Suárez
Co-Chairman: O. Ruth McQuown
Major Department: Political Science

The research question of this study refers to a neglected area of comparative politics: the relationship between political leadership and political system performance. The study combines the systems model and the frameworks developed in the literature of community power in order to produce a typology of political leaders and political regimes.

The study utilizes the case of the Cuban Republic to show that (1) democratic and dictatorial regimes may exist under practically the same types of political power structures in Latin America, (2) that these regimes may be differentiated in terms of the prevalent patterns of role relationships within the regime and between the regime and the political power structure, and (3) that these patterns of role relationships determine whether the style of the regime will be democratic or dictatorial.

Two different regime styles are differentiated and described in terms of a simplified statistical model that incorporates all relevant

sources of role differentiation. These sources include: socio-economic and institutional correlates of political status, individual capabilities and value orientations, and reputational characteristics of the 320 political leaders included in the sample.

The study relies on intensive content analysis of documentary sources, elite and specialized interviewing, and the use of a panel of experts to obtain the necessary data. The analysis of these data is conducted with the combined use of contingency table analysis, factor analysis, Guttman scale analysis, and multiple regression techniques. The proposed models of democratic and dictatorial regime styles are selected from several alternative causal models that may be derived from the intercorrelations between the final panel of research variables.

PART I: APOLOGY

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This study is an outgrowth of the present writer's discontent with two theoretical pitfalls: the "lack of fit" between the behavior of political leaders and the performance of national political systems; and the "developmental" interpretations of Latin American politics. The former has been identified elsewhere as a widening chasm between macrotheories and microapplications.¹ The latter has come under fire because politics is not, by definition, an obstacle but ". . . a process that has to do with how authority and power will be used in a society."²

Recent titles in the literature of comparative politics seem to indicate that this sub-field of political science is undergoing a reorientation. There is the feeling of a need for focus,³ the desideratum to move ahead toward more solid ground,⁴ and the satisfaction with the present balance between systemic analysis and areal organization of knowledge.⁵

¹ Joseph LaPalombara, "Macrotheories and Microapplications in Comparative Politics: A Widening Chasm," Comparative Politics, I, 1 (October, 1968), 52-79.

² Charles Anderson, Politics and Economic Change in Latin America, The Governing of Restless Nations (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1967), iii.

³ Roy C. Macridis, "Comparative Politics and the Study of Government: The Search for Focus," Comparative Politics, I, 1 (October, 1968), 79.

⁴ Gabriel Almond, "Determinacy-Choice, Stability-Change: Some Thoughts on a Contemporary Polemic in Political Theory," Government and Opposition, V, 1 (Winter, 1969-1970), 22-40.

⁵ Ralph Braibanti, "Comparative Political Analytics Reconsidered," Journal of Politics, XXX, 1 (February, 1968), 25-65.

The systems model, which is prevalent in the field of comparative politics today, has been increasingly criticized by scholars such as Giovanni Sartori, Dankart Rustow, and Joseph LaPalombara. Insofar as the present effort is concerned, the main theoretical grudge against the systems model is that it does not really incorporate political leadership as an aspect of the performance of political systems.

In their classic study, Almond and Powell outlined three different levels of system performance: capabilities, conversion, and system maintenance and adaptation functions.⁶ They vaguely related leadership to capabilities and also to socialization and recruitment but apparently failed to consider leadership in the context of "conversion."

If one accepts the definition that politics is the authoritative allocation of values,⁷ then one also has to accept that there must be a functional linkage between leadership behavior and system performance. What needs to be established empirically is the nature of the relationship between system performance and those characteristics of political leadership related to the conversion process. Almond and Powell obviously incorporated Easton's definition into their own work but failed to emphasize the function of leadership. However, they are not to be criticized for this omission. In the first place, Almond and Powell were concerned with a general model that could describe and classify the performance of contemporary political systems. Precisely because of this

⁶Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics, A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966).

⁷David Easton, The Political System (New York: Knopf, 1966).

they could not really emphasize the particular ways in which values are allocated in different societies. All they could do was describe the functions that the political system performs in a society. It was the task of those who applied the model to particular systems to specify in greater detail the "how" in the performance of functions.

Much of the work that followed Almond and Powell has focused on the relationship between ecological factors and system outputs, almost ignoring the impact of the conversion process. That style of research orientation " . . . produced a glut of typologies and models of political systems . . . that squeezes out the role and impact of political leaders."⁸ Therefore the initial ambiguity of the systems model with respect to the function of leadership became a constant feature of most of the case studies that made use of the model. The work of Edinger⁹ is probably one of the few and outstanding exceptions to this.

Second, the Almond and Powell version of the systems model was an explicit attempt to describe the performance of national political systems in a developmental context. This made the model more relevant to the analysis of long-term patterns of system performance. Naturally, the impact of the behavior of individual actors on system performance is lost in the analysis because it is extremely difficult to trace this impact over long periods of time.

Third, the systems model was, after all, an explicit attempt to shift the predominant concern of political science away from normative

⁸Stanley Hoffman, "Heroic Leadership: The Case of Modern France," Paper Delivered at the Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association, 1966.

⁹Politics in Germany (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1968).

questions. Almond and Powell merely followed Easton's prescription in this matter.

Finally, one need not be a resolute advocate of the systems model to realize how difficult it is to reconcile "macro" and "micro" in comparative theorizing. Moreover, the empirical analysis of the relationship between both may be frustrating. Most of the available indicators of leadership behavior are nominal data; and, because the emphasis in political science in general is toward the more sophisticated aspects of quantification, many scholars prefer to work with those aspects of system performance for which "hard data" can be secured. The models developed in this fashion are easier to verify and consequently more amenable to formalization; however, they all exclude a fundamental aspect of the authoritative allocation of values.

In summary, comparative political analysis has yet to move beyond the Almond and Powell version of the systems model. The research that has been conducted following this formulation has failed to clarify the initial ambiguity of the model with respect to leadership. What is needed is further elaboration of the model with respect to this aspect of political system performance. This study purports to offer such an elaboration.

The Research Setting

The present writer's second source of discontent--the "developmental" interpretations of Latin American politics--accounts for the selection of the empirical referent to be used in this study. Those interpretations include one or more of the following aspects: (1) a group conception of

politics and an "elitist" interpretation of political power; (2) the assumption of a polarized and intense confrontation between the forces of development, democracy, and revolution--students, labor, the middle classes, and the intelligentsia--and the forces of traditionalism, dictatorship, and imperialism--the Church, the landowners, the military, etc.; (3) a concern with Latin America's "failure to develop" and how politics, the main "obstacle" for development, may be neutralized; (4) a condemnation of the violent and irrational nature of Latin American politics, and (5) an overall conceptualization of the situation in Latin America as a "permanent crisis."

Many recent events suggest that the theoretical and empirical basis of these formulations are shaky, for we are currently witnessing the emergence of new phenomena--revolutionary priests, reform-minded military oligarchies, urban guerrilla warfare, and an ongoing constitutional revolution--that seem to challenge much of what passes as the "conventional wisdom" concerning the politics of the area.

But also, in the same manner that comparative political analysis generally is undergoing a reorientation, political science research in Latin America is ". . . in a state of flux as never before."¹⁰ Although it is very difficult to summarize the new trends that seem to be emerging, one definite characteristic of a segment of the current literature is its dissatisfaction with many of the premises of the developmental interpretations.

¹⁰ John D. Martz, "Political Science and Latin American Studies: A Discipline in Search of a Region," Latin American Research Review, VI, 1 (Spring, 1971), 73-99.

From a theoretical standpoint, José Nun argues that only sociology and critical marxism offer any real possibilities for the development of political science.¹¹ In a separate effort Nun identifies the middle classes as the instigators of military intervention in Latin America.¹² Jacques Lambert's recent contribution challenges the desirability of stable systems and questions the validity of many of the accepted area-wide generalizations.¹³ In a similar vein, Charles Anderson advances the proposition that it is more important to understand the intricate pattern of forces that make up the Latin American political processes than finding a viable formula for the resolution of conflict.¹⁴ These and other recent works seem to indicate that a reappraisal of the "conventional wisdom" about the politics of the area is underway. The present study attempts to take advantage of this revisionism and examine the relationship between leadership and system performance in the context of a Latin American political system.

The Problem

If one were to take issue with the developmental grudge about the area's failure to develop, one would look for a case that would be representative of the "classical" political processes that have been

¹¹"Notes on Political Science in Latin America," in Manuel Diegues and Bryce Wood (eds.), Social Science in Latin America: Papers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 67-120.

¹²"A Latin American Phenomenon: The Middle Class Military Coup," in James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin (eds), Latin America, Reform or Revolution? (New York: Fawcett Publications, 1968), pp. 145-185.

¹³Latin America, translated (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).

¹⁴Op. cit., p. iv.

identified by the developmentalists as the main "obstacles" to change in Latin America.¹⁵ Consequently, one would seek a case that offers a wide variety of what the literature of comparative politics identifies as the crises that underdeveloped systems undergo;¹⁶ a case which would offer instances of political violence, insurrections, military intervention, administrative corruption, legislative immobilisme, systems of patronage, and legitimacy crises.

If it could be shown that this disarray of seemingly disparate violent events follows a pattern that is basically the result of the strategies utilized by political leaders; if it could be shown that these leaders accept conflict as an ingredient of political life and utilize conflict to maximize their capabilities; if it could be shown that the power structure of the system remains unchanged in spite of the turmoil; if it could be shown that a rational calculus is utilized by groups and individuals in an attempt to gain access to and control over national decision-making; if all these could be shown, then the "obstacles" and "crises" could be examined in a more acceptable theoretical fashion. The fundamental question here is not whether or not the Latin American political processes fail to conform to the developmental models, but rather what are the main dimensions of conflict and change that allow the Latin American political systems to function the way they do.

It is precisely the performance of the system, from an input-output standpoint, which needs to be correlated with political leadership

¹⁵Claudio Véliz (ed.), Obstacles to Change in Latin America (London: Oxford University Press, 196).

¹⁶Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966).

structures in order to determine the conjunction between these and different patterns of recruitment, different levels of system capabilities, and different styles of popular participation. For instance, a convenient way to differentiate between Latin American dictatorial and democratic regimes would be to examine their similarities and differences in terms of the aforementioned categories. Obviously, a comparative analysis of aggregate socio-economic data is no substitute for this.

Finally, the elucidation of these relationships would put the "obstacles" and the "crises" in proper perspective. The same could probably be said about the gap between macro- and micro-politics and about the models that "squeeze out" the function of leadership. Clearly the contention here is that the analysis of political leadership is the most adequate point of departure for the understanding of how a society utilizes authority and power.

The Case

It can be shown that the Cuban Republic--between the years 1944 through 1958--offers a very good example of the classical pattern of Latin American politics. A chapter of this study will be devoted to this task but probably more important is the fact that this case also offers the analytical advantage of a clear-cut discontinuity in the pattern. The political order with which this investigation is concerned was crushed by one of the more important political events of our time: the Castro Revolution.

In June, 1944, the Auténtico party came to power in Cuba. This was a party of the "democratic left" that had a reformist platform and a social welfare orientation. The party elected doctors Ramón Grau San

Martín and Carlos Prío Socarrás to two consecutive presidential terms. In March, 1952, President Prío was ousted by a bloodless coup staged by a retired Army General, Fulgencio Batista. Batista stayed in power until December of 1958, and his final years were marked by repression and civil strife.

So this is a case in which differences in system performance between two polar types of political organization--democracy and dictatorship--might be expected; a case in which relevant comparisons could be made between these regimes in terms of the more fundamental dimensions of leadership and an attempt could be made to relate them to other differences in system performance.

It will be shown also that these fourteen years witnessed no major changes in the ecological setting of the Cuban political system, that the more important macroeconomic factors remained relatively stable; and that, consequently, this case offers a very good opportunity for the development of a model in which politics is not the "ever dependent variable." From a purely methodological standpoint this is a fortunate situation in the sense that the variability of the research variables --leadership and other dimensions of system performance--may be great while the influence of extrasystemic variables may be minimized.

In conclusion, a study of this period of the Cuban Republic offers the following advantages: (1) a representative case of the "classical" pattern of Latin American politics that has been identified by the developmentalists as the main obstacle to change in the area; (2) the opportunity to compare two polar types of regimes and produce a typology that may account for their basic similarities and differences; (3) the

possibility to relate these similarities and differences to dissimilar outcomes and capabilities that may be found; and (4) the opportunity to examine and clarify the political patterns that prevailed in Cuba before the Castro Revolution.

CHAPTER II

CONCEPTUALIZATION

The conceptualization of this study follows from two major premises. The first relates to the proposition that the analysis of political leadership is a prerequisite for the understanding of any social order.¹ The second is that political leadership is the single most important element of the rule-making function of national political systems.

Conversion, Elitism and Leadership

Almond and Powell defined conversion as ". . . the processes which transform the flow of demands and supports . . . into a flow of extraction regulation, distribution and the like . . ." [italics added].² Their definition implies that several "conversions" occur in the flow: demands are converted into articulated demands, articulated demands are aggregated, and so forth. Yet, if all of these conversions are functionally necessary, they are by no means equally important. Ultimately, the flow must include a decisional stage and we refer to this stage as rule making. Therefore, the most important "conversion" occurs at this stage or it does not occur at all. Rule making is the dividing line between "haves" and "have nots," between a "decision" and a "non-decision." Consequently, in

¹William Welsh, "Methodological Problems in the Study of Political Leadership in Latin America," Report from the Laboratory for Political Research # 30, mimeo (Iowa City: University of Iowa, 1969).

²Almond and Powell, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

order to focus the analysis on the more important aspect of "conversion," conversion is defined here as "the flow of interactions and decisions involved in rule making."

This definition implies that conversion is the process in which the more influential and powerful political actors must participate in order to secure favorable outcomes. This means that such actors may be identified, in any system, by their involvement in the set of relationships formed around conversion.³ Moreover, the scope and nature of this involvement would be an appropriate indicator of the power and influence of the actors. The implication is, therefore, that power is relational and that it can be measured by the role structure of conversion.

However, this interpretation does not advance anything on the locus of conversion. Furthermore, it is necessary to determine the overlapping between the different stages of the "conversion" processes that precede the decisional stage and the decisional stage itself. In a similar manner, it is also imperative to say something about the substantive nature of the roles involved in the process, and about the individual and institutional correlates of such roles.

Different interpretations have been advanced to clarify these questions. For instance, the Marxian view postulates that ". . . in all pre-socialist societies the owners of the means of production (economic elites) will in fact constitute the ruling element . . ."⁴ Obviously an unqualified

³Carl Beck and James M. Malloy, "Political Elites: A Mode of Analysis," Occasional Paper of the Archive on Elites in Eastern Europe, mimeo (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, n.d.), p. 6.

⁴Constantine Menges, Ruling Elite Theories and Research Methods: An Evaluation (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1968), p. 10.

endorsement of this position would dismiss the questions since all that would be required would be to determine the type of economic class structure.

On the other hand, a group of European theorists, usually identified as the "classical elitists," offer the thesis that ". . . there may exist in any society a minority of the population which makes the major decisions in the society . . . [this] minority gains its dominant position by means beyond ordinary election . . ." ⁵ Moreover, the elitist thesis "does not merely assert that the minority makes decisions and the majority obeys . . . The elitist argument is a much stronger one. It is that the dominant minority cannot be controlled by the majority, whatever democratic mechanisms are used." ⁶

Therefore, the classical elitists did not confine this dominance to an economic elite nor did they perceive politics as a mere reflection of the economic class structure. However, they insisted on the existence of an organized minority that makes most of the decisions and they interpret this as a constant feature of all societies. In general, they showed that a number of social, psychological, and organizational factors could be used to acquire a dominant decisional status and that the possession of such status was the dividing line between rulers and ruled. Probably, their most important contribution was to show the existence of de facto power outside the formal apparatus of the state.

⁵Geraint Parry, Political Elites (New York and Washington: Praeger, 1970). The "classical elitists" are Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, and Robert Michels.

⁶Ibid., p. 31.

The main implication of the elitist position is that there is a "ruling elite" that controls the decisional process denying the access to the process to other groups in society. Obviously, this always looms as a possibility, and it is also probably true that a minority makes most of the decisions in all systems; however, it is necessary to determine the cohesiveness and the common purpose of such a group to prove the argument about the existence of a "ruling elite."

Two American scholars, James Burnham and C. Wright Mills, tried to reconcile the Marxian and elitist arguments about the identity of the actors who control rule making. Burnham adopted a quasi Marxist position yet he deviated from strict Marxian orthodoxy in the sense that he identified the managerial class, and not the owners of the means of production, as the dominant economic elite.⁷ On the other hand, Mills perceived the operation of institutional linkages, which ease the interchangeability of roles between different institutional sectors.⁸ What sets Mills apart from the rest of the elitist is his interpretation of power as an institutional phenomena and not as an attribute of a person or class.

But it was really Floyd Hunter, an American sociologist, who updated the elitist interpretation with his study of Regional City. Two of the more important conclusions of this classic study were: (1) that in Regional City--Atlanta--the upper class dominates local community life; and (2) that political leaders were subordinate to this class.⁹

⁷The Managerial Revolution (New York: John Day, 1941).

⁸The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956).

⁹Community Power Structure (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953). Hunter's main concern was with the roles through which power is exercised in community decisions.

Dissatisfied with these and other similar findings produced by the numerous replications of the Hunter study, a group of political scientists "undertook empirical studies of urban politics beginning with a pluralist set of assumptions and found that their research conclusions contrasted sharply with the broad trends of thinking resulting from the community power structure studies done by sociologists."¹⁰

The leading figure among the sponsors of the "pluralist" interpretation was Robert A. Dahl, a political scientist who showed that in the case of New Haven, the community he chose in order to replicate Hunter, the postulates of the elitist approach were not confirmed.¹¹ The controversy that ensued between "elitists" and "pluralists" has been going on for some fifteen years and a wealth of reviews coming out from each side have specified the similarities and differences between the two approaches.¹²

Although most of these reviewers took sides in the controversy, their main contribution was to specify the particular areas in which

¹⁰Menges, op. cit., p. 13.

¹¹Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).

¹²Probably the best such reviews are: Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "The Two Faces of Power," American Political Science Review, LVI (December, 1962), 947-952; Charles Bonjean and David M. Olson, "Community Leadership: Directions of Research," Administrative Science Quarterly, VIII (December, 1964), 278-300; John Walton, "Discipline, Method, and Community Power: A Note on the Sociology of Knowledge," American Sociological Review, XXX (October, 1966), 684-689, and of the same author, "Substance and Artifact: The Current Status of Research on Community Power Structure," American Journal of Sociology, LXXXI (January, 1966), 430-438; a classic by Peter Rossi, "Power and Community Structure," Midwest Journal of Political Science, IV (November, 1960), 394-401; and finally Roy Forward, "Issue Analysis in Community Power Studies," Australian Journal of Politics and History, XV, No. 3 (December, 1969), 26-44. An outcome of this intensive process of replication, critique, and subsequent refinement of both methods has been the conclusion that they should have used in combination. Numerous studies have made use of such a combination but they have also failed to settle the issue. It

pluralists and elitists disagreed, and they also outlined the leading assumptions, research methods, and conclusions of the two approaches. However, only a few reviewers like Thomas J. Anton were bold enough to ask the question of whether or not pluralists and elitists were studying the same thing.¹³ Anton advanced the proposition that they were not, because

. . . The sociologist understands power as one aspect of all human action and closely related to other aspects; the pluralist thinks of power as a substance, separated from other substances and therefore capable of being weighed and measured. The basic unit of analysis for the sociologist is the role, composed of repeated actions of persons in the system; the basic unit of analysis for the pluralist is the actor-individual, whose actions are seen as basically unique and repetitive. On these bases alone it is possible to join in Polsby's doubt that sociologists and pluralists do, in fact, study the same phenomena.¹⁴ [Italics added.]

Insofar as the analysis of political power is concerned, this study assumes that there is a structure of political roles that are present in every political system but it is also assumed here that the individual and institutional correlates of this structure of roles may vary ". . . in different communities or in the same community over time . . ." ¹⁵ Therefore, the unit of analysis here is the role, and an attempt will be made to specify the individual and institutional correlates of the roles that may be found in the conversion process of a national political system.

seems very hard to believe that if neither the elitists nor the pluralists have been able to discredit each other it is solely because of differences in their particular conceptions of power. A more plausible interpretation is that both methods measure different aspects of power which have a very specific empirical referent that can be measured.

¹³ "Power, Pluralism, and Local Politics," Administrative Science Quarterly, VII (March, 1963), 425-457.

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 445-446.

¹⁵ Bonjean and Olson, op. cit., p. 290.

An Eclectic Position

This study does not enthusiastically subscribe either of the two approaches. As a matter of fact, neither of the two can be endorsed without a number of qualifications, and the literature offers ample room for criticizing the two approaches; insofar as the present effort is concerned an attempt has been made to combine the best that the two methods have to offer.

For power, in its more generalized form, exists in many aspects of social, economic, and cultural life. In this sense, one can talk about "economic power," "social coercion," and "cultural norms." However, in the same manner that an individual actor may play a political and other social roles he may have political and other, more generalized, forms of social and economic power. What seems to be unwarranted is the elitist conclusion that power is cumulative and that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the amount of economic or social power an actor may have and his political influence. Skill, motivation, and situational factors influence the "conversion rate" of other forms of power into political power.

The elitists are probably right in assuming that those who have other forms of power have an advantage over the rest and although the functional relevance of a group--political (Mosca and Michels), economic (Burnham), or institutional (Mills)--may be a necessary condition, for the members of this group, to secure access--the possibility to participate in rule making--this may not be a sufficient condition to secure control over rule making--control being defined as the ability to bring about desired outcomes and prevent the implementation of undesirable ones.

Moreover, one may expect that in a sufficiently complex society, political leaders will be constrained by a number of social, economic, and cultural parameters, but this does not mean that these parametric constraints pre-determine the nature of their decisions. Rossi has argued that ". . . the professionalization of political roles and electoral competition in a diverse electorate lead to an independence of government actors from economic influence . . ." ¹⁶ The counter-argument would have it that this may not be necessarily so because there may be groups or individuals who are able to control the rule-making process ". . . long past the period of their functional relevance." ¹⁷

Therefore, the obvious sequel is not that "nothing categorical may be assumed about power in a community," ¹⁸ but that nothing can be definitely said about the power structure of a political system until the identity and other characteristics of the incumbents of rule-making roles is determined. In this sense, one may define political leaders as "the incumbents of rule-making roles." In a similar manner, political elites may be defined as "the incumbents of roles that are functionally related to conversion." Both of these definitions do not exclude the possibility that the incumbents of such roles may be professional politicians, military officers, or conservative oligarchs. These definitions will be reformulated and operationalized in Part III (see Chapter IX, pp. 209-220).

¹⁶"Community Decision-Making," Administrative Science Quarterly, 1 (1957), 415-443.

¹⁷Beck and Malloy.

¹⁸Nelson W. Polsby, "How to Study Community Power: The Pluralist Alternative," Journal of Politics, XXII, No. 3 (August, 1960), 474-484.

Following these definitions the power of an individual actor may be measured in terms of (1) the specific role(s) the actor occupies, (2) his role behavior in rule making, (3) his role behavior in other aspects that are functionally related to rule making, and (4) the way in which incumbents of relevant counter-positional roles perceive the actor's power and conform their expectations to it.¹⁹

The definition of political leaders and political elites, together with the definition of conversion offered above, suggest that there is a patterned set of interactions (1) among political leaders, (2) between political leaders and political elites, (3) between political leaders and lower participants, and (4) between political elites and lower participants. This pattern of interactions is what really constitutes the power structure of a political system. Therefore, the power structure of a political system may be defined as "the pattern of role behavior of the incumbents of roles that are functionally related to the processes of political decision-making." Consequently, the political power structure not only includes the patterns of role behavior related to "conversion" but also the patterns of role behavior related to other aspects of political decision-making such as the mechanisms that political leaders utilize to secure and maintain their positions.

But, because the political power structure is such a complex aspect of system performance, one may not be able to account for the variation in the style of conversion by using the concept of political power structure

¹⁹"Roles," and "role behavior" here are used following the analytical framework developed by John C. Wahlke *et al.*, The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior (New York and London: John Wiley and Sons, 1962), and Neal Gross *et al.*, Explorations in Role Analysis (New York and London: John Wiley and Sons, 1958).

as the sole analytical dimension in comparative analysis. Different styles of conversion may be obtained for basically the same type of political power structure and this variation may be lost in the analysis. Also, a turnover of political leaders may introduce changes in the rule-making strategies and the policy outcomes of the system may be changed as a result of this.

The concept of political power structure may help us differentiate major types of political organization but it may not lend itself too well to further discriminations within these major types.²⁰ Therefore we need to focus on regime style which may be defined as "the pattern of role behavior of political leaders that is exclusively concerned with rule making," in order to be able to make more powerful comparisons. Regime style maximizes the variation in system performance when no fundamental changes are taking place in the political power structure.

Furthermore, the analysis of the relationship between regime style and political power structure can improve our understanding of what is involved in political change. Since, by definition, changes in regime style cannot radically alter the political power structure, the political power structure must be changed first, in order for fundamental changes to occur in the authoritative allocation of values. Obviously the agent of this kind of change must be exogenous to the political power structure. The main implication of this interpretation is that revolutionary change must necessarily include changes in the political power structure. All other kinds of changes are incremental, gradual, or evolutionary.

²⁰For instance, one may wish to discriminate between different types of democratic systems. See Arend Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems," Comparative Political Studies, 1 (April, 1968), 3-44.

So one fundamental difference between regime style and political power structure is that although changes in the former may bring about changes in system capabilities and output, only a radical change in the political power structure will be able to produce a basic transformation in the performance of the system.

Finally, even though a dominant group may lack cohesion and a common purpose, the group--interpreting "group" in the loosest possible sense-- may be shown to be dominant if it controls the rule making stage of conversion,²¹ or if it is able to control the stages of conversion that lead to rule-making or both. Obviously, the possibility of the existence of such a group cannot be entirely dismissed as an "elitist fiction," for after all it is an easily verifiable fact that a minority makes most of the decision in all systems. The problem is to determine the basic role orientations of this minority, the possibility of its being removed from its dominant status, and the impact that their decisions have on the polity and the society. Therefore, the ultimate test for the determination of whether or not a system is pluralistic is not merely provided by the verification of competition between a few elites but by the whether or not power is shared in such a system between the state and the maximum possible number of groups and individuals.²²

In the light of the foregoing discussion this study adopts the following premises with respect to the controversy about community power and the "best" way to approach the problem:

²¹Robert Agger *et al.*, The Rulers and the Ruled (New York, London and Sydney: John Wiley and Sons, 1964), pp. 40-57.

²²Parry, op. cit., p. 125.

- (1) There is always a political power structure and nothing can be said about it until a number of empirical tests have probed its more salient dimensions.
- (2) Conversion is one of such dimensions. Conversion is the inner core of the political power structure, the role structure of power and leadership, the main dimension of what can be identified as a regime. Access to and control over conversion may give any group a dominant status and this group may be called the political leadership group. Other groups who, on the basis of their ability to convert other forms of power into political influence, have access to conversion compose the political elite.
- (3) Accepting the contention that a minority always makes most of the decisions everywhere, the test for the existence of a ruling elite must include the role orientations and the role behavior of political leaders, their identity, and their particular patterns of interaction with other groups and actors in the system. The test for how democratic a political power structure is can deal not only with the existence of competition among a few groups but also with the closeness of the political leadership group to other groups in society, the possibility of its removal from a dominant position, and the universality with which the group rules--for itself or for all of society.

The Hypotheses

The basic premises supporting most of the hypotheses enunciated

below are that between 1944 and 1958 significant changes occurred in the performance of the Cuban political system, that these changes were related to changes in regime style, and that these changes did not radically alter the political power structure of the system.

The first set of hypotheses concerns the nature of the changes which occurred in recruitment and the relationship between recruitment, regime style, and political power structure. The leading proposition here is that (HYPOTHESIS #1) RECRUITMENT CHANGES ARE A NECESSARY BUT NOT A SUFFICIENT CONDITION TO BRING ABOUT FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL POWER STRUCTURE. The corollary of this proposition is that RECRUITMENT CHANGES MAY BE A SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR CHANGES IN REGIME STYLE.

Research Hypotheses.- During the last fourteen years of the Cuban Republic,

RH 1a: "Recruitment was an independent factor of changes in regime style throughout the Auténtico period; however,

RH 1b: "Recruitment had no noticeable impact on regime style during the Batista period."

The differential impact of recruitment on regime style throughout the period may be accounted for by the intervention of a third factor: the autonomy of the recruitment process itself, that is, the degree of control that a particular group or individual may have over the process. Therefore, one may expect that (HYPOTHESIS #1A) RECRUITMENT WILL HAVE AN IMPACT ON REGIME STYLE WHENEVER THE RECRUITMENT PROCESS ITSELF IS NOT EXCLUSIVELY CONTROLLED BY ANY ONE GROUP OR INDIVIDUAL.

The second set of hypotheses concerns the nature of the relationship

between regime style and political power structure. The nature of this relationship seems to indicate that (HYPOTHESIS #2) REGIME STYLE AND POLITICAL POWER STRUCTURE MAY NOT VARY TOGETHER, ALTHOUGH SOME KINDS OF REGIMES ARE PROBABLY INCOMPATIBLE WITH CERTAIN TYPES OF POLITICAL POWER STRUCTURES.

Research Hypotheses. - Because it is assumed here that no fundamental changes occurred in the power structure of the Cuban political system for the period 1944 to 1958, attention must be focused on the changes in regime style. One would expect to find that between 1944 and 1958,

RH 2a: "Three different types of regimes prevailed in the Cuban political system."

RH 2b: "The specific political roles that had a greater functional relevance in rule making were different for the three regimes."

RH 2c: "Participation in rule making also differed in terms of the number of political leaders who had access to and a certain amount of control over conversion."

RH 2d: "The functional groups that had greater access to the process were not the same during this period."

RH 2e: "The areas over which the incumbents of formal rule making roles exercised control differed."

RH 2f: "A constant feature of all regimes was the control that formal political leaders had over rule making."

With respect to the stability of the political power structure and the changes it underwent during the period, it can be said that,

RH 2g: "The most important changes that occurred in the other aspects of the political power structure were the changes in the strategies utilized by the incumbents of formal political positions to maintain their status."

RH 2h: "The distribution of power among these formal positions changed throughout the period."

However,

RH 2i: "The normative context of the interaction between political leaders and political elites remained constant."

RH 2j: "The normative context of the interactions between political leaders and lower participants was not altered, although the frequency of these interactions dropped."

RH 2k: "The same functional groups were represented in the political power structure."

The third set of hypotheses concerns the relationship between regime style, the political power structure, and the capabilities and outcomes of the system. The leading proposition for this set of hypotheses is that (HYPOTHESIS #3) THE POLITICAL POWER STRUCTURE CONDITIONS THE CAPABILITIES OF THE SYSTEM INsofar AS THE AVAILABILITY AND USE OF THESE CAPABILITIES IS CONCERNED. This is especially important in the sense that the responsiveness of conversion to changes in the environment or in other levels of system performance is affected by the political power structure. But regime style also has an impact on capabilities, because (HYPOTHESIS #3A) THE OUTPUTS OF A PARTICULAR REGIME AFFECT THE CAPABILITIES OF THE SYSTEM THROUGH THE OPERATION OF SYSTEM FEEDBACK. Finally, although one

may not expect that different types of political power structures have peculiar policy outcomes (HYPOTHESIS #3B) REGIME STYLE AND A STRONGER POLICY ORIENTATION TOWARD CERTAIN OUTCOMES ARE CLOSELY RELATED.

Research Hypotheses. - Between 1944 and 1958,

- RH 3a: "The performance of the Cuban political system showed a very low responsive capability."
- RH 3b: "Increases in this capability were related to the overall policy orientation of the three regimes."
- RH 3c: "Differences in the policy orientations among these regimes were significant in the areas of regulative and distributive policies; no significant differences are expected in the aggregate pattern of orientations of the individual leaders participating in the regimes."
- RH 3d: "Differences in the policy outcomes of the three regimes induced changes in the regulative, distributive, and extractive capabilities of the system."
- RH 3e: "These differences also had an impact on the symbolic capability of the regime; however, the greatest change in this respect was a direct result of the very nature of the Batista regime."

It may also be hypothesized that, as a result of the overall decrease in system capabilities during the final years of the Batista regime, the system could not return to a point of dynamic equilibrium without a radical transformation of the political power structure.

CHAPTER III

DATA SOURCES

The operationalization of the research design of this study called for a longitudinal analysis of the performance of the Cuban political system during the period of 1944 to 1958. The main strategy of analysis was to compare differences in system 1944 through 1951, and 1952 through 1958. These differences were to be related in an attempt to determine the linkage between leadership behavior and system performance.

The Research Variables

The conceptual framework of the study suggested the utilization of six broad panels of variables: (1) environmental economic variables; (2) recruitment variables; (3) regime style variables; (4) political power structure variables; (5) policy outcome variables; and (6) system capability variables. The first panel of variables was utilized to test the assumption that no major macroeconomic changes occurred during the period with which this investigation is concerned. The results of this test are reported in a later chapter.

The uses of the other five panels of research variables can be inferred from the hypotheses enunciated in the preceding chapter. Following these hypotheses the five panels of variables may be classified as: (1) intervening variables; recruitment and political power structure; (2) independent variable: regime style; and (3) dependent variables: system capability and policy outcomes.

Data Acquisition

The first procedural problem of the study involved the acquisition of the data. Documentary sources that were utilized included biographical dictionaries,¹ official publications,² yearbooks,³ statistical abstracts,⁴ newspapers,⁵ and national magazines.⁶ These sources provided the data concerning individual characteristics of political actors, their role behavior, budget figures, relevant pieces of legislation, background information about the situational context of specific decisions, electoral statistics, and relevant statements by groups or individuals. The specific collections consulted for the retrieval of the data were the Latin American Collection of the University of Florida Libraries, the Hispanic Foundation Collection at the Library of Congress, and the Periodicals Section of the University of Miami Library. It was determined early in the conduct of

¹ Fermín Peraza, Diccionario Biográfico Cubano, I-XI (La Habana: Ediciones Anuario Bibliográfico Cubano, 1954-1960); XII, mimeo (Gainesville, 1966); XIII-XIV, mimeo (Coral Gables, 1968). Also, Fermín Peraza, Personalidades Cubanas, I-IX (La Habana: Ediciones Anuario Bibliográfico Cubano, 1957-1959); X, mimeo (Coral Gables, 1968). Finally, Ronald Hilton (ed.), Who's Who in Latin America, Part VII, Cuba, Dominican Republic and Haiti (3rd ed rev and enlarged; Stanford and Chicago, 1951).

² República de Cuba, Gaceta Oficial; also Banco Nacional de Cuba, Memoria, 1949-1950 - 1958-1959 (La Habana: Editorial Lex, 1950-1959); Cámara de Representantes, Legislatura Fecunda (La Habana, 1951); República de Cuba, Código Electoral de 1943 (La Habana: Editorial Lex, 1943).

³ Cuba Económica y Financiera, Anuario Azucarero de Cuba, 1944-1958 (La Habana: Cuba Económica y Financiera, 1945-1959); Ministerio de Hacienda, Anuario Estadístico de Cuba, 1956 (La Habana: P. Fernández y Cía., 1957).

⁴ Dirección General de Estadística, Resúmenes Estadísticos Seleccionados (La Habana: P. Fernández y Cía., 1959).

⁵ Diario de la Marina, El Mundo.

⁶ Bohemia, Carteles.

the investigation, that all of the necessary data would not be available, but an effort was made to retrieve all the data available in the continental United States. Any deficiencies arising from missing data are reported in the findings.

However, a significant portion of the data pertaining to regime style and certain aspects of power structure had to be secured from other sources, because many of the more relevant dimensions of these variables are not a matter of public record or news media coverage. These dimensions specifically refer to features of the conversion process such as behind-the-scene bargaining, private consultations, the perspectives of the actors themselves, arm-twisting techniques, etc.

This kind of data was obtained from intensive interviewing conducted with a "panel of experts" whose task was not only to identify the "powerful" but also to describe how specific decisions were made and who participated in them. Therefore, the data output of these interviews consisted of a set of rankings pertaining to the power of individual political actors, and "oral histories" concerning specific decisions or relevant events.

Identifying the Powerful

The more standardized aspect of the interview situation concerned the reactions of the interviewees to a list of Cuban politicians who were politically active--more specifically, who held office--between the years 1944 and 1958. This list was drafted in advance and the criterion for including individual leaders in the list was based on the relative success that these leaders had in gaining and maintaining a public office. Therefore the list was drafted following a "positional"

criterion.⁷ The basic assumption of the technique, that those holding positions of authority actually make the key decisions, is one of the hypotheses of this study " . . . rather than an a priori assumption."⁸ The contention is that in the analysis of a national political power structure this is the most plausible point of departure.

The interviewees were asked to rank the individuals included in the list on an arbitrary five-point scale of political power.⁹ The interviewees were asked to base their rankings on the following three-fold criteria: (1) the relative importance of the positions that the individual occupied during the period of analysis; (2) the individual's participation in national decision-making; and (3) the individual's effectiveness in securing his personal political goals. The interviewees were given the option of adding new names to the list. Only two interviewees chose to do so.

The positions whose incumbents were to be included in the list were determined in a previous investigation that this author conducted during the spring of 1969.¹⁰ Following Schlesinger's work,¹¹ the main goal of the study was to describe the "structure of opportunities" of the Cuban

⁷For a description of this technique see Bonjean and Olson, op. cit., pp. 280-283.

⁸Ibid., p. 282.

⁹Power is assumed here to be a "continuous" variable the range of which is arbitrarily fixed to allow statistical manipulation.

¹⁰Enrique Baloyra, "La dirigencia política cubana," unpublished manuscript (Gainesville, 1969).

¹¹Joseph Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).

political system and identify its "base," "transit," "penultimate," and "goal offices."¹² The study concluded that outside of the Presidential office complex, the Senate was the most sought goal office and that the Representative and Ministerial offices stood out as the most frequent penultimate offices. Finally, the most frequent base offices were, again, the office of Representative and the office of Governors and Mayors of provincial capitals.¹³ This evidence served as the main criterion for selecting the positions whose incumbents would be included in the list. These were: (1) the offices of President, Vice-President, and Minister; (2) the offices of Senator, Representative, National Leader of a national political party, Member of the Consultative Council, Provincial Leader of a national political party, Governor and Mayor of a provincial capital if they were occupied at least twice; and (3) any combination of these offices.

The reasoning behind the use of this formal approach was that it would produce a list of "successful" politicians; success being defined as "the ability of the individual to penetrate and circulate through the structure of formal political offices." Obviously the expectation was not that all the politicians included in the list would be "key influentials," or "top decision makers," but rather that the "top political leaders" would probably be included in the list together with a number of "political elites" who occupied formal political office, and that significant differences would obtain for both groups.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Baloyra, op. cit., Chapter 6.

Following this criterion, a total of 320 Cuban politicians were included in the list. This number was fairly high given the fact that the interviewees were to be asked to evaluate all of them but the decision to maintain the list at this size was made in order to insure the possibility of comparing the politicians in terms of the ranking they received, and also to increase the likelihood that a typology of political leaders could be developed. The list of the politicians included in the study appears in the Appendix.¹⁴

Finally, this group of politicians was not considered a "sample" in any rigorous statistical sense. Certainly a criterion of stratification was included in manufacturing the list but this is hardly defensible. Also, since only two interviewees added any names to the list, these names were not included in the investigation. It seems plausible to interpret this as a result of the length of the list which undoubtedly was a factor increasing the duration of the interview. Probably a much shorter list would have elicited more names, but, again, a concerted effort was made to increase the probability of representing different segments of the "formal" political power structure.

Selecting the Interviewees

Availability and willingness to be interviewed were the two key factors in gaining access to the prospective interviewees and securing interviews with them. Two "intermediaries" were used to secure interview appointments. With the exception of three cases they provided this researcher the access to all the interviewees included in the investigation.

¹⁴See Appendix A, The List.

The intermediaries were given a brief overview of the scope and nature of the investigation. Next, they were asked to contact the people whom the researcher himself selected from a list produced by the intermediaries on the basis of their familiarity--that of the prospective interviewees--with their own functional area, the national political scene, and the general pattern of influence in Cuban society. Constraints such as the limited amount of financial resources and time limitations cut down the number of interviews to fifteen. At least five persons could not be interviewed because of this.

Only one of the prospective interviewees approached by the intermediaries refused to be interviewed; the rest accepted the invitation, sometimes consenting to be interviewed on the same day they were approached. In general, because of their own personal characteristics, they represent a balanced group in terms of their membership in the Auténtico party, the parties of general Batista, or an independent status with respect to the basic cleavage of pro- and anti-Batista opinion. Also, they cannot properly be considered "knowledgeable"¹⁵ in their great majority in the sense that nine of the fifteen interviewees were themselves included in the list. Of the remaining six, five were functional eminents in journalism or labor, and the sixth was one of Batista's ablest and most trusted lieutenants. Therefore, there is no doubt that they were prominent actors themselves.

Yet the definite selection of the interviewee, and his final

¹⁵The term refers to the people who are selected to identify top community influentials following the "reputational" approach. See Hunter, op. cit.

inclusion in the "panel of experts"¹⁶ occurred during the interview situation itself. Because the interviewees were supposed to rank the politicians included in the list, their inability to identify at least 60 per cent of them was taken as an indication that they could not meet the assumptions that would justify their inclusion in the "panel of experts"¹⁷ of the investigation.¹⁸ Only one of the interviewees did not meet this requirement although in this case he reviewed the list and simply declared he did not know most of the people in it. One interview was terminated before completion and a follow-up could not be scheduled so a total of thirteen interviewees were selected for the panel.

The Composition of the Panel

The thirteen members of the panel were not, therefore, selected following the Form-Miller technique,¹⁹ but a check on the functional areas they represented reveals that the composition of the panel approaches the Form-Miller criterion. Table 1 represents a summary of these character-

¹⁶This is also a standard feature of the "reputational" approach. For a brief discussion see Bonjean and Olson, op. cit., pp. 283-287.

¹⁷Again, the usage of the term pertains to the reputational approach. Probably one of the scholars who has used the term more consistently is Delbert C. Miller. See his International Community Power Structures, Comparative Studies of Four World Cities (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1970).

¹⁸All the people included in the list who could not be identified by a particular judge automatically received a zero ranking. Therefore, in order to minimize the overlapping of these zero rankings and the zeroes awarded by the judges themselves an arbitrary limit had to be set for cases of "no identification" in order to avoid statistical complications.

¹⁹William H. Form and Delbert C. Miller, Industry, Labor and Community (New York: Harper, 1960).

istics and also some data pertaining to the political status of the judges themselves. In terms of the said criterion some of the functional areas that may be deemed important and are not represented in the panel are the Church, civic groups, and the industrial sector. Members of these functional areas evidently had some access to national decision-making in Cuba, but their influence was far from decisive. Labor may seem to be over-represented, however, outside the military--who were ignored by the Auténticos and were subordinated to Batista during his administration--labor was undoubtedly the most powerful interest group in Cuba. Probably the hacendados and colonos--representing the sugar mill owners and planters associations respectively--are the most under-represented in the panel. These economic elites probably enjoyed an advantage over other functional groups in terms of the probability of their successfully converting their functional power into political influence, however, the point under discussion is that without the intention of doing so, some of the most important functional groups in the Cuban political system are represented in the panel. After all, the primary consideration in selecting the interviewees and the panel members was their ability to identify and rank the politicians in the list. Therefore, the overriding criterion was the individual's ability to perform this task.

Conducting the Interviews

All interviews were conducted in Miami with the exception of one which was conducted in a Maryland suburb of Washington. All interviews were held in the private residences of the interviewees with the

TABLE 1
COMPOSITION OF THE PANEL

Political ^a affiliation	f/f	Political status				Functional area outside politics						
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Auténticos	4	2	2	-	3	2	-	-	1	-	-	3
Batistianos	4	4	2	-	3	3	1	1	-	1	-	1
Both	2	2	1	-	1	1	1	-	1	-	-	-
Other ^b	3	1	-	2	-	1	-	-	1	-	2	-
Total	13	9	5	2	8	7	2	1	3	1	2	4

Key to symbols: (1) Legislators
(2) Ministers
(3) No governmental office, 1944-58.
(4) Included in the List

(5) Lawyers
(6) Lawyers representing agricultural interests
(7) Lawyers representing corporate interests
(8) Labor leaders
(9) Military officers
(10) Journalists
(11) Not ascertained or ambiguous^c

^aPolitical affiliation is not understood here in the sense of "party affiliation" but in terms of a recognized identification of the judge with the Auténticos or Batista administrations.

^bIncludes one individual who was generally taken as a representative of Catholic interests and campaigned for office--winning a seat in the Chamber--in terms of this image.

^cIncluded here are those judges who held public office throughout the entire period with which the investigation is concerned and/or had some sort of small private business of their own managed by a friend or relative.

exception of one which was conducted in the chemistry lab of a Jesuit Prep School in Miami.

This researcher began all interviews by making it clear to the interviewees (1) that the aim of the study was to determine who had political power in Cuba, (2) that this researcher had no concern whatsoever for the moral implications of the way in which the people identified as politically powerful exercised their power, and (3) that this researcher was not trying to uncover some sort of sensational story in order to sell a book. Usually, this introduction relaxed the atmosphere quite a bit since it convinced the interviewee that neither he nor his peers were "on trial." Immediately following this introductory remarks the interviewer explained that the use of the tape recorder which he had brought for the interview was indispensable in order to increase the communication and reduce distractions pertaining to the taking of notes. The interviewees were also told of their right to request the deletion of any portion of the conversation from the recording. Only one interviewee refused the use of the tape recorder. The retrieval of the data of this interview and those pertaining to the portions deleted on request by the rest of the interviewees was conducted following the suggestions of Alexander Heard.²⁰

Two things were weighed very carefully before each interview. The first concerned the situation of an ". . . interviewer confronted with genuinely prominent people . . . [who] is unlikely to feel he can insist on their hewing to a standardized line of discussion."²¹ Obviously, the standardized line of discussion was, in this case, the actual evaluation

²⁰"Interviewing Southern Politicians," American Political Science Review, XLIV (1950), 886-896.

²¹Lewis Anthony Dexter, Elite and Specialized Interviewing (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 6.

and ranking of the people in the list. Because of the fact that the list was long, the necessity to reduce the number of specific questions, their spacing throughout the interview situation, and the particular nature of the questions became the second item that had to be considered very carefully.

Essentially, all interviewees were nice people who, in varying degrees, wanted to speculate on their own a little bit and render their own particular version of Cuban politics. Some talked for the duration of four or five long-playing cassettes; others barely made it through one. Their conversational style was different, some said more with their eyes and hands than in their speech. Most had very definite ideas about "what went wrong in Cuba." The attempt was to create a situation in which ". . . two reflective men . . . [try] to find out how things happen(ed), but the less informed and experienced one (the interviewer) . . . [defers] to the wiser one."²²

Usually, the interviewees associated events and situations with the names of the people in the list and talked about them relatively freely. All except one accepted the criteria offered to them to evaluate the people in the list.²³ They took their time in assimilating the criteria without having the interviewer repeat it to them--usually the first 10 or 20 evaluations were the slowest--and then they moved on to perform their task. In general--and this can be seen reading the

²² Ibid., p. 56.

²³ The exception was a labor leader who said, "No . . . I see your point of view but in order to be fair to the country I have to rank these people in terms of what they did for the country." Interview #12. He went on to give a zero to almost everybody in the list.

interview transcriptions--they would not rank more than three or four people in a row without producing comments about them or volunteering additional information on the individuals in question.

Basically, the specific substantive questions were tailored to the particular background characteristics of the interviewee such as their direct knowledge or participation in a specific event or decision, and the intimacy of their relationships with the people included in the list. These specific questions were always introduced as an invitation to speculate; " . . . Since you knew . . . so well, what is your impression of the man . . . ?"; or " . . . Being a prominent participant in . . . do we really get an accurate picture of what happened by reading the newspapers . . . ?" Most of the time, however, the interviewee himself took off on his own. The interviewer carefully listened to these elaborations because " . . . in an elite interview, an exception, a deviation, an unusual interpretation may suggest a revision, a reinterpretation, an extension, a new approach."²⁴

There were some interruptions during the conduct of the interviews; a phone call, children returning from school, one of the relatives of the interviewee bringing Cuban coffee or a drink, or simply a friend who dropped by--one interview was secured in this way when the friend who dropped by happened to be a politician that turned to be a very good judge and an excellent informant. There was also one case in which two people, besides interviewer and interviewee, were present for the last half hour of an interview; they made themselves inconspicuous until the interview was finished.

²⁴Dexter, op. cit., p. 6.

The interviews themselves uncovered a number of significant dimensions which had escaped the attention of this researcher at the time the study was designed. The following chapter is entirely devoted to explore these dimensions trying to determine the effect they may have on a study of this nature, and describing the changes they led this researcher to introduce in the present effort.

Finally, two interviews required an extra-session in order to complete the rankings. In both cases, the follow-up could not be immediately scheduled and it was necessary to repeat the introductory remarks about the aims of the study at the beginning of the follow-up.

The Interview Data

Two kinds of data were thus produced in the interviews: a set of rankings pertaining to the judges' evaluation of the politicians included in the list, and "oral histories" concerning specific decisions, events, and individuals. The first procedural problem referring to the use of these data was essentially ethical. Obviously, one does not put a man before a microphone giving him all the assurances in the world that his information will be confidential just to disclose it at the first opportunity. On the other hand, one does not go to all the trouble involved in interviewing not to make any use of the data. This dilemma can be solved by disclosing the information and maintaining the source anonymous. This may diminish the credibility of the information but it does insure that the identity of the source is shielded from public curiosity and/or the wrath of any third party who may be affected in some way by the disclosure.

Therefore, all references are made to the "interview number" which does not necessarily follow the sequential order in which it was conducted. This may seem exaggerated but given the fact that some of the interviewees are still active in politics the precaution seems justifiable. Moreover, as it will be seen in later chapters, the nature of some of the oral history data warrants the precaution.

This researcher played back the entire recording of the interviews immediately following their completion. Notes were made on the nature of the deleted portions detected in the recording. These portions were recorded by the researcher at the end of the final tape of the interview in question. Some comments were usually added in order to describe the researcher's impression of what was accomplished in the interview and chances and desirability of a new appointment. Transcriptions of these recordings were completed--by the researcher himself--for the first two "waves" of interviews. The transcriptions are verbatim of tape contents and, therefore, they have not been edited. They preserve all the inflections, terminology and "colloquial" Spanish generally used by adult Cuban males who have lived most of their lives in Cuba. Unconventional, shorthand transcriptions were made for the last waves of interviews and, because of time considerations, they will not be completed until this study is finished. As of the time of this writing, only six full transcriptions have been completed.

Individual copies of the list were made for each interview and the rankings recorded in them. All cases of "no identification" were left blank during the interview. Upon the completion of the interview these blanks were tallied to see if they amounted to less than 40 per cent

of all cases; if they did not reach that arbitrary limit zero rankings were assigned to these subjects and the whole set of rankings was recorded in a general tally sheet. This sheet contained all the rankings produced by the judges, and they were eventually punched in IBM cards for the analysis.

Data Analysis

The greatest problem involved in the analysis of the data concerned the discrepancies in the level of measurement. This was the result of the fact that the variables included in the panels of recruitment, regime style and political power structure could only be measured nominally, and that the variables pertaining to policy outcomes and system capabilities could be measured at ordinal and interval levels. The only feasible solution was to reduce all the internal variables to the ordinal level and try to transform the nominal variables into ordinal variables. This undoubtedly diminished the range of available analytic technique, but there was no other recourse in sight.

The first thrust of the analysis was to determine those variables for which statistically significant differences obtain for the Auténtico and the Batista periods into which the period of analysis has been dichotomized. This is the case with respect to the data of system capabilities and policy outcomes. One-way analysis of variance was the main analytical technique used for this purpose. (See Chapter V.)

A somewhat different strategy was followed in the analysis of the data pertaining to the individual characteristics of the politicians included in the list. The intention here was to determine the clustering of these characteristics in order to develop multidimensional typologies

of leadership which could be treated as aggregate data. These typologies constituted the main dimensions of the typologies of regime style and political power structure which were then compared following essentially the same procedure utilized with the capabilities and outcomes data. As it will be shown in the next chapter, a set of additional "reputational" characteristics of leadership was added to the original "objective" leadership characteristics in order to add one significant dimension previously missing in the analysis.²⁵

These two independent analyses are essentially a test for the plausibility of HYPOTHESIS#2 and the host of research hypotheses deriving from it.

The second thrust of the analysis is basically an attempt to check the validity of the remaining hypotheses, measuring the strength of the relationships between the variables with which these hypotheses are concerned.

The final outcome of the investigation is, hopefully, a model that describes the relationship between recruitment, regime style, political power structure, capabilities, and policy outcomes.

Finally, as a summary to the discussion of this chapter, Table 2 presents the more salient features of the research design of the study. The table basically tries to characterize the research orientation and the points where the study departs from standard methodological practices.²⁶

²⁵See Appendix B, Indicators of Leadership Characteristics and Appendix C, Codebooks for a description of the operational definitions utilized, the theoretical basis for the inclusion of every variable in the study, the indicators that were used in order to measure them, and the categories into which their hypothetical ranges were broken down.

²⁶The policy outcomes are listed in Appendix E. The problem is to determine the pattern of role relationships that led to them.

TABLE 2
RESEARCH DESIGN FEATURES

I) General characteristics

1. Overall design: longitudinal
 2. Units of analysis: individual and systemic
 3. Research variables: 6 panels, as follows
 - a: dependent variables: capabilities and outcomes
 - b: independent variable: regime style
 - c: intervening variables: recruitment and political power structure
 - d: control variables: environmental economic factors
 4. Levels of measurement: nominal, ordinal, interval
 5. Techniques of data retrieval: consultation of documentary sources and "elite and specialized interviewing."
-

II) Special characteristics

1. Use of a combined positional, two-step reputational and issue decisional techniques to identify powerful political actors.
 2. Incremental, two-by-two comparisons of individual leadership characteristics to develop typologies of leadership.
 3. Use of these typologies of leadership to develop typologies of regime style and political power structure.
-

III) Analytical Techniques

1. Comparison of every panel for each of two periods
 2. Data reduction of leadership characteristics
 3. Comparison of leadership characteristics
 4. Correlation of leadership and systemic indicators for which statistically significant differences obtained
 5. Specific techniques: one-way analysis of variance, contingency table analysis, factor analysis, and correlation analysis.
-

IV) Outcomes of the investigation

1. A model describing the relationship between variables
 2. A multidimensional typology of political leadership
 3. A typology of regimes and political power structures
 4. A typology of Latin American political regimes
-

CHAPTER IV

PERCEPTIONS OF POWER AND LEADERSHIP

An increasing number of community power studies are relying on combinations of the positional, reputational, and issue-decisional approaches. The underlying assumption is that today ". . . no one would deny the existence of different patterns of leadership in different communities or in the same community over time."¹ This goes together with the impression that ". . . the type of power structure identified by studies that rely on a single method may well be an artifact of that method . . ."² The prescription is to use ". . . a combination of research methods as protection against this source of bias."³ This is probably correct but the interaction of the biases introduced by each particular method cannot be adequately measured. Moreover, there is no clear-cut evidence showing the effect of this interaction of biases on the outcome of the research.

Some of the studies have integrated the different methods into one;⁴ but others have simply used two or more methods independently ". . . each

¹ Bonjean and Olson, op. cit., p. 290.

² Walton, "Substance and Artifact," op. cit., p. 438.

³ Walton, "Discipline," op. cit., p. 689.

⁴ Agger et al., op. cit.; also Miller, "International Community Power Structures," op. cit.

of which has provided useful checks against the characteristic inadequacies of the other(s) . . .⁵ However, in some cases, the independent use of several procedures " . . . did not converge on a single set of individuals."⁶ What this shows is that a simultaneous and independent use of different techniques essentially leave the researcher at the point where he started.

But if a compromise on techniques is possible and desirable, there is no way in which the basic postulates of 'classical elitism'--read Mosca, Pareto, Michels, Burnham and Mills--and 'democratic elitism'--represented by Dahl, Polsby, Wolfinger, etc.--may be reconciled. The only viable alternative seems to be the use of an analytical framework which incorporates those aspects of the two schools that have been confirmed by research.

This study rejects the universality of the existence of a 'ruling elite'--a cohesive, conspiratorial and self-conscious group--but it does not rule the existence of such a group as a possibility. In the other hand, the framework of the study accepts the premise that a minority makes most of the decisions in all systems but it withholds any description of the power structure in which this minority operates until such a structure is carefully analyzed. Finally, the methodology of the study integrates the positional, reputational and issue-decisional techniques in a longitudinal design. The first method--the positional--was used to

⁵Robert Presthus, Men at the Top (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 62.

⁶Linton Freeman et al., "Locating Leaders in Local Communities: A Comparison of Some Alternative Approaches," American Sociological Review (October, 1963), pp. 791-798.

manufacture a list of Cuban politicians drawn from formal governmental positions. These positions were selected on the basis of their being descriptive of the structure of opportunities of the Cuban political system. The second was used to determine power differentials among the individuals included in the list. So the combined use of the first two roughly yields an approximation of what is termed the "two-step reputational method" in the literature.⁷ Finally, the third method was used as the best way to measure the individual's participation in national decision-making. This chapter comments on the effect that this combined approach is likely to have on the outcome of this investigation--the reliability of the rankings and the decisions utilized in the study. The chapter also comments on the modifications introduced in the research design of the study as a consequence of these and other factors which will be discussed in short.

Reputation and Reality

There is a wealth of criticism against the "reputational method" in the literature. The greatest sources of irritation stem from: (1) respondent bias; (2) the lack of a common definition of power shared by subject and investigator, and (3) the accuracy of the respondent's perceptions.⁸ However, doubts about the ultimate relevance of this

⁷Charles Bonjean, "Community Leadership: A Case Study and Conceptual Refinement," American Journal of Sociology (May, 1963), pp. 672-681.

⁸Raymond Wolfinger, "Reputation and Reality in the Study of Community Power," American Sociological Review (October, 1960), pp. 636-644.

method for the study of power seem exaggerated. It is probably true that reputational rankings are not exactly accurate, that extreme care has to be exercised in phrasing the questions that will elicit the rankings and/or nominations, and that respondents may use their own definition of power. Yet all this does not disqualify the method simply because if it can be ascertained "that the way in which people perceive . . . power . . . affects the way in which they behave . . . then surely we are dealing with very meaningful and very useful considerations."⁹ Consequently, even if what is being measured in the reputational approach are opinions about and perceptions of the power structure, and not the objective (?) dimensions of it, these opinions and perceptions cannot be dismissed as irrelevant.

In this study, a panel of thirteen judges were asked to rank a number of politicians. The panel was selected in order to perform the task of identifying and rating a list of Cuban politicians. The selection of every individual judge was made after he had shown that he could perform the task. It was hypothesized that the effect of this selection criterion would be to produce a panel, the members of which would be politically prominent. Moreover, it was also anticipated that the use of a panel with such characteristics would reduce the problem of a shared definition of power and minimize perceptual distortions because of the fact that these individuals had played rule making roles or other roles that were related to them.¹⁰ Moreover, the operational definition of power utilized in the

⁹Howard J. Ehrlich, "The Reputational Approach to the Study of Community Power," American Sociological Review (December, 1961), pp. 926-927.

¹⁰Wolfinger states that "people who are active in public life are not much better informants"; and he cites Key (1950) and Rossi (1957) to support this contention. Wolfinger, op. cit., p. 641.

study was explained to each interviewee and, with one exception, they all agreed to utilize it.

However, the problem of respondent bias is not likely to be controlled by any method. Furthermore, some examples in the literature suggest that prominent people are not invulnerable to perceptual distortion. For instance, Presthus found that his panel, including "the most sophisticated members of the community" tended to identify "behind-the-scene leaders" that could not be detected by the decisional method.¹¹ A more extremist position is adopted by Wolfinger who refuses to accept the premise that political leaders may be considered reliable informants although the two instances he uses in order to support this claim did not essentially rely on a strict reputational technique.¹² And it seems an oddity that the more fervent supporters of the decisional method misjudge the research potentialities of the use of active politicians as "experts" while they are willing to utilize reporters and other City Hall "hang arounds," as Dahl and his associates did in New Haven, to get unstructured background information.¹³ Presthus takes a more constructive and realistic approach in trying to answer the question of why "men judged to be powerful . . . failed to manifest their power overtly."¹⁴ Evidently he does not shun the evidence off but tries to face the problem directly. This contrasts with the pluralist mistake of discarding unmeasurable elements as unreal¹⁵ and

¹¹ Presthus, op. cit., p. 422.

¹² Wolfinger, op. cit., p. 642.

¹³ Dahl, op. cit.

¹⁴ Presthus, op. cit., p. 422.

¹⁵ Bachrach and Baratz, op. cit., p. 952.

their tongue-in-cheek conclusion about the contention that all the reputational method shows is that there is an elite that may be able to identify the elite.

All in all, accepting the fact that the reputational rankings are "biased" estimates of "real power"--whatever that means--the most pertinent questions seem to be, How can a researcher reduce, control, and optimize this biased measurement? How can a researcher produce and interpret clusters of opinion manifested by the rankings? Can he detect the presence of specific sources of bias in these clusters? And, finally, what summary measures can a researcher use in order to represent and control the sources of bias detected in the rankings? Should he use means, standardized scores or total sums of scores for the individuals in questions? And, more important, why and when should he select one measure over the rest? The community power literature is remarkably silent on these questions.

Dimensions of Bias in the Panel

The more salient individual characteristics of panel members, as described and discussed in the preceding chapter, were: (1) political affiliation--characterized by active participation in the Auténtico or Batista regimes; (2) political status--measured by the whether or not they had been included in the positional list; and (3) occupation--dichotomized into law and other. The question here is, assuming that one could take each of these characteristics and form "cohort groups" with the judges, is it likely that statistically significant differences will be obtained between the groups? A positive answer may uncover a direct and simple relationship

between the rankings--the dependent variable in this case--and the particular characteristic--the independent variable used as a criterion to form the cohort group.

In order to test the validity of this question the mean rankings produced by each judge were alternatively grouped following the three dimensions, and a one-way analysis of variance was performed for each characteristic. The evidence, as presented in Table 3, seems to indicate that these three characteristics, operating independently of one another, are not powerful enough to produce differences in the magnitude of the rankings. Batistianos, auténticos and other judges do not differ in their tendencies to give high or low scores. Lawyers cannot be differentiated from judges representing other occupational groups in this sense, and the same holds true for judges with a higher--formal--political status when compared with the rest.

Also, because of the fact that the judges were interviewed in three different "waves"--September 1970, December 1970, and February and March of 1971--it is possible that some procedural differences were inadvertently introduced by this investigator thus contributing to some sort of bias which could basically follow the order in which the judges were interviewed. Again, a one-way analysis of variance was performed and the answer is that there is no detectable influence from this source.¹⁶

However, a different type of bias may be uncovered and explain why no relationship was found between individual characteristics and the magnitude of the scores. The bias pertains to the tendency to exaggerate

¹⁶The F-Ratio was in this case 1.8938, with 2 and 10 degrees of freedom. This value is smaller than the critical value of F for $\alpha = .10$, for 2 and 10 degrees of freedom, which is 2.92.

TABLE 3
ANALYSIS OF THREE SOURCES OF BIAS

Headings for the Analysis of Variance Results	Criterion for Cohort Groupings		
	Political Affiliation ^a	Political status ^b	Occupation ^c
Number of groups	3	2	2
Means	1.3620 1.4475 1.5500	1.1340 1.6412	1.5529 1.3217
Standard Deviations	0.5555 0.6760 0.9031	0.8058 0.4989	0.5142 0.8212
<u>Mean Squares:</u>			
Between Groups	0.0393	0.7917	0.1727
Within Groups	0.5053	0.3945	0.4508
F-ratios	0.077	2.0069	0.3831
Degrees of Freedom	2,10	1,11	1,11
Value of Critical F-ratio for Alpha = .10	2.92	3.28	3.28
Inference	NS	NS	NS

^aGroup categories: Batistianos, auténticos and other

^bGroup categories: In list, not in list

^cGroup categories: Lawyers, others

NS = results are not statistically significant

Note: Although a level of significance of .05 is customarily utilized in the Social Sciences, the lowest level of significance to be utilized in this study will be .10.

the power of high influentials and diminish the power of the rest who are perceived as "also-rans." In this case, this would affect all judges, regardless of background, and consequently it would not show up--as it could be hypothesized that happened in the results reported above.

To check for this source of bias the research list of 320 politicians was split into two groups: high influentials (n = 88; mean score received = 3.00) and low influentials (n = 232; mean score below 3.00). Means and standard deviations were obtained for the rankings given by each judge to the individuals in each group. Next, the judges themselves were ranked in terms of how severe they had been in their ratings. Thus, rank-order scores were obtained for each judge for the two subgroups and the general group.¹⁷ The contention was that, if this source of bias was affecting the ratings, the consistency of the judges would be low when compared--through the use of Spearman's rank-order correlations--for the three cases. The results of Table 4 indicate that this was not the case, that the judges were consistent and that they neither became over-impressed by high influentials nor did they change their criterion in order to rate low influentials. "Tough" judges were tough with everybody and the same is true of lenient judges.

In summary, the analysis of this section shows that when judges are grouped in homogeneous categories of political affiliation, political status, occupation, or just the order in which they were interviewed the magnitude of their rankings does not differ significantly. Also, if the

¹⁷Rankings of "severity" for the judges were obtained taking both the mean and standard deviation of his ratings into consideration. The lowest rank--one--was assigned to the toughest judge, the next to the

magnitude of the rankings is interpreted as an index of the "severity" with which the judges rated the subjects, and the subjects themselves are split into high and low influentials, the judges are shown to be consistent.

Dimensions of Agreement in the Panel

But the fact that there is no evidence to indicate that these factors do not have an independent effect on the rankings is no conclusive proof to asser that (1) the interaction of these factors has no impact whatsoever on the rankings, and (2) that there is a high degree of agreement among the judges. After all, no evidence has been offered to show that auténtico judges did not rate the members of their party higher, or that lawyers did not do the same with respect to other lawyers. In order to check for this source of bias a multivariate criterion would have been required so as to form cohort groups which incorporate two or more dimensions. However, such an analysis cannot be approached in this way because the small number of judges would produce a high incidence of empty categories and the test statistics required by the analysis--such as chi-square or Fisher's exact measure--would not be reliable.

next-toughest, and so on. For instance, two judges with means of exactly 3.34 and standard deviations of 1.81 and 0.54 were assigned giving a rank of "tougher" to that with the smallest standard eviation.

TABLE 4
 CONSISTENCY OF RANKINGS

Explanation for table values	Comparisons between groups		
	General and "high"	General and "low"	"High" and "low"
$\frac{6 \sum D_i^2}{N(N^2-1)}$	0.08241	0.01648	0.12637
R_s (Spearman's r)	0.91759	0.98352	0.87363
Significance (P. less than)	0.005	0.005	0.005
Value of Z statistic	3.1786	3.4070	3.0263

But a multivariate analysis of the clustering of opinion in the panel is possible if the zero-order correlations between set of rankings produced by each judge are examined. Moreover, this correlation matrix can be factor-analyzed in order to determine the substantive nature of each cluster of opinion in the panel.

Three correlation matrices were formed with the zero-order correlations between judges for the general list and the two sub-groups of high and low influentials. These matrices are presented in Table 5 and a cursory examination of them reveals the low degree of agreement between the judges in all three cases. This indicates that while judges, as a group, may tend to be consistent in identifying high and low influentials they tend to disagree, on an individual basis, on the relative importance of different individuals within the same group. What this means is that although the judges may be able to produce a common set of influentials they give them different ratings. Also the "severity" with which they evaluate them probably has an impact on this. Therefore, the inspection of the size of the correlation coefficients is insufficient and a more careful examination of the clustering is in order.

However, before such an examination of the clusters is conducted-- with the purpose of deriving inferences about their substantive nature in terms of the traits represented in them--some further comments about the relationships described by the correlation matrices are in order. First, panel agreement is higher for the high influentials group. Second, none of the coefficients is, in any case, greater than .70. This may not only be a consequence of disagreement among the judges but also the result of scoring cases of "no identification" as zero, introducing

TABLE 5 (cont.)

5(c): Agreement for the Low Influentials Group

Judge number	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
1	.39	.38	.41	.29	.32	.19	.37	.28	.03	.37	.50	.37
2		.48	.34	.36	.36	.16	.34	.51	.10	.32	.36	.38
3			.39	.31	.38	.22	.30	.40	.15	.41	.45	.28
4				.36	.30	.18	.31	.27	.15	.26	.49	.36
5					.19	.20	.19	.37	.14	.12	.29	.28
6						.42	.24	.31	.12	.33	.51	.32
7							.24	.21	.11	.34	.42	.26
8								.30	-.00	.33	.49	.26
9									-.02	.21	.46	.25
10										.29	.04	.06
11											.35	.27
12												.40

Table values are Pearsonian correlation coefficients.

Note: It is interesting to observe the relationship between judge #10 --the "ideological judge" who refused to accept the ranking criteria and gave a zero to almost everyone in the list--and the rest of the panel. The magnitude of the agreement between this judge--who is, of course, the "toughest" judge--and the rest is always the lowest. Notice that the relationship between this judge and judge #8--the most lenient judge--is always the lowest. Both of these judges belong to the same party but one of them is a labor leader not included in the list, while the other is a lawyer included in the list. This is probably the first indication of interaction between two characteristics--occupation and political status. Therefore, it could be hypothesized that at least two dimensions are interacting thus raising the expectation of at least two clusters and a maximum of four. Whether this is a correct interpretation or not will be seen in the ensuing discussion.

a source of error in the total variance of the rankings. Third, the fact that this possible source of error is reduced in the case of the rankings pertaining to the high influentials group may be a correct interpretation; however, this only confirms the low degree of agreement which may be a reflection of the political conflict prevailing in the Cuba of the fifties. Chances are that the judges incorporated some sort of moral criterion into their evaluations. Finally, the reduction in the magnitude of the coefficients from Table 5b to Table 5c is by no means uniform. This is interpreted as the effect of a partisan bias in the evaluations since the cases of greater reductions affect pairs of judges of different political affiliation.

The Clustering of Opinion in the Panel

The next step was to factor analyze these correlations in order to determine the number and substantive nature of the clusters of opinion in the panel. As an introduction to the discussion in this section, the "factor patterns"¹⁸ obtained for three factors using four different types of rotation are presented in Figure 1. Vanishing loadings were interpreted as those below .30, therefore, only those above this arbitrary cut-off point are represented.

The patterns of Figure 1, together with the concrete results obtained in each type of rotation,¹⁹ seem to indicate the existence of the following factor structure:

¹⁸L. L. Thurstone, Multiple-Factor Analysis (6th printing; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 191.

¹⁹Results for these of the other rotations reported in this chapter may be found in Appendix D, Rotated Factor Matrices.

1(a) <u>Varimax Criterion</u>				1(b) <u>Communalities Criterion</u>			
Factors				Factors			
<u>Judges</u>	I	II	III	<u>Judges</u>	I	II	III
12	+	+		12	+		+
7	+		+	7	+		
8	+	+		13	+		+
13	+	+		8	+		+
6	+			6	+		+
1	+	+	+	1	+		+
11	+		+	11	+		+
2		+		10		+	
5		+	+	2			+
9	+	+	+	9	+		+
4	+	+		5	+	+	+
3	+	+		3	+		+
10			+	4	+		+

1(c) <u>Reliabilities</u>				1(d) <u>Centroid Method</u>			
Factors				Factors			
<u>Judges</u>	I	II	III	<u>Judges</u>	I	II	III
12	+	+		12	+	+	
13	+	+		8	+	+	
7	+		+	7	+		+
8	+	+		13	+	+	
6	+	+		6	+	+	
1	+	+	+	1	+	+	+
2	+	+		11	+		+
9	+	+	+	2	+	+	
5		+	+	5		+	+
3	+	+	+	9	+	+	+
4	+	+		3	+	+	+
11	+		+	4	+	+	
10			+	10			+

Figure 1.--Factor Patterns Resulting from Four Different Rotations of Three Factors

1. First factor: a "common factor" of seven judges, all of which have a complexity of 2--except for judges 6 and 7 which have complexity 1 in two cases. This factor includes most of the judges with high political status--five of the eight in the list; it also includes most of the lawyers--five of the seven--but all of these five lawyers held public office. This factor almost reaches the capacity of a "general factor" in all cases and, without exception, it is the greatest contributor to the proportion of explained total variance. This factor includes the type of opinion which this study tried to tap, that is, a pragmatic expert opinion. The fact that most of the judges "load" on this factor means that they all incorporated the ranking criteria suggested to them--except No. 10, of course--and distorted the criteria in different ways.

2. Second factor: a "common factor" of five judges, most of whom have complexity 2. The factor includes three of the four Batistiano judges and two of the four Auténticos. It also includes two independent judges who leaned to the latter. Also almost all judges of this factor "load" on the first factor. The factor is perceived as reflecting a partisan expert opinion.

3. Third factor: a "unique factor" exclusively composed by the "ideological judge" who never "loads" on the first factor thus corroborating once more that his use of the ranking criterion suggested to him was minimal. This judge represents an ideological expert opinion.

The labels of the factors may seem arbitrary but they can be interpreted as a combination of two dichotomies: (1) evaluative orientation, characterized as "pragmatic" or "ideological" and (2) universality of severity, which is the consistency with which each judge was severe or lenient with (a) all subjects, or (b) just the members of a different faction or the people with a different political affiliation. Since all the opinion is considered "expert,"²⁰ the inclusion of this qualifier is probably redundant and it will be dropped from the rest of the discussion. However, the term was introduced at this point in order to dramatize the fact that if any "general factor"²¹ can be detected underlying all ratings

²⁰ See above, Chapter III, "Selecting the Interviewees."

²¹ Thurstone, op. cit., pp. 121, 182.

it is precisely a factor representing an expert pragmatic opinion.

The idea behind the use of four different principles of factor rotation stems from the warning that the Varimax criterion should not be used alone unless ". . . structure is known to be nearly orthogonal, or factor structure is of no interest."²² The ratings themselves are presumed to be independent of one another in a "causal" sense. However, this is no justification for treating the resulting factor structure as orthogonal. Moreover, factor structure is precisely the objective of the analysis.

Table 6 presents a summary of the results for the rotations except the centroid. The centroid rotation was performed as a check on the other procedures but it has been argued that its only virtue is computational ease.²³ Since all the rotations were obtained with the use of computer programs this type of rotation does not really contribute anything and its results have been deleted from the table. The table indicates the inefficiency of extracting more than three factors, but since these three factors do not produce an entirely satisfactory "simple structure,"²⁴ it may seem advisable to explore a little bit further.

A Solution Set

There is no universal and unambiguous criterion that indicates when to stop adding more factors through rotation. However, it is generally accepted that

²²Wilson H. Guertin and John P. Bailey, Jr., Introduction to Modern Factor Analysis (Ann Arbor: Edwards Brothers, 1970), p. 142.

²³Ibid., Chapters 6 and 8.

²⁴Thurstone, op. cit., Chapter 14.

TABLE 6

SUMMARY OF RESULTS FOR THREE DIFFERENT
ROTATIONS OF THE COMPLETE SET OF RANKINGS

6(a): Results of Varimax Rotation

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Eigenvalues	7.34	.90	.81	.60	.56	.49	.41	.40	.37	.34	.31	.28	.20
Explained variance	.56	.63	.70	.74	.78	.83	.85	.88	.91	.94	.96	.98	1.00

6(b): Results of Communalities Rotation Criterion

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Eigenvalues	7.03	.69	.56	.27	.21	.15	.12	.10	.04	-.00	-.02	-.03	-.08
Explained variance	.54	.59	.64	.66	.67	.69	.70	.70	.71				
Explained common variance	.77	.84	.90	.93	.96	.98	.99	.99	1.00				

6(c): Results of Reliabilities Rotation Criterion

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Eigenvalues	6.91	.44	.27	.14	.13	.03	.00	-.04	-.09	-.11	-.12	-.15	-.18

Explained variance	.53	.57	.58	.59	.61	.61	.61
Explained reliable variance	.87	.93	.96	.98	.99	.99	1.00

Definitions:

Eigenvalue of a factor is the sum of the squared loadings of all variables on the factor (Guertin and Bailey 1970:77).

Communality of a variable is the sum of its independent common variances (Fruchter, 1954:47).

Reliability of a variable is the complement of its error variance (Thurstone, 1961:84).

rotating too few factors causes the compression of too much variance in under-dimensional common factor space so that uncorrelated tests develop high loadings on the same factor . . . [On the other hand] rotating too many factors causes the dispersion of common factor variance into too many dimensions . . . [Therefore] when most of the variance in the principal axis has been accounted for and the next principal axis is small, it and subsequent ones need not be carried along into rotation.²⁵

Inspection of Figure 1 and Table 6 indicates that the results of the principal component rotations evidence that (1) an inordinately high number of factors--nine out of thirteen--is needed to account for most of the total variance--Table 6 (a); (2) that the three factors produced by principal component account for 90 and 96 per cent of common and reliable variance--Tables 6b and 6c; and (3) that the factors patterns obtained by principal components are probably the result of the restriction of orthogonality. Therefore, in order to approach a "simpler" structure the removal of this restriction would allow for a more parsimonious explanation of the presence of bias in the rankings.

Following this line of reasoning the three factors were rotated using an "oblique" criterion and inserting communality estimates in the principal diagonal. The resulting factor patterns for "primary" and "reference" factors are depicted in Figure 2. These patterns undoubtedly produce a more parsimonious explanation and allow for a more meaningful interaction of the dimensions identified by the principal component solutions.

Obviously, the three factors produced by this criterion are almost identical. The two factor patterns differ in the sense that when the factors are rotated attending to the reference axis the judges with complexity of 2 disappear. Therefore, the patterns are interpreted to

²⁵Guertin and Bailey, op. cit., p. 121.

2(a) <u>Primary criterion</u>				2(b) <u>Reference criterion</u>			
Factors				Factors			
<u>Judges</u>	I	II	III	<u>Judges</u>	I	II	III
12	+			12	+		
11	+			11	+		
2	+			2	+		
5	+			5	+		
10	+			10	+		
13		+		13		+	
3		+		3		+	
9		+		9		+	
4		+		4			
1	-	-		1			
6		+	+				
7			+	7			+
8	+		+	8			+
				6			

Figure 2.--Factor Patterns Resulting from an Oblique, Simple Loadings Rotation of Three Factors

be representative of a "simple structure" which is a situation that occurs when both factors and tests depend upon a minimum number of sizeable loadings for their description.²⁶

As to the variation in the substantive nature of the factors, the following observations about the new pattern are indispensable:

1. no specific factors appear in the pattern,
2. a combination of the two basic dimensions--evaluative orientation, and universality of severity--are still perceptible although in a different arrangement,
3. and the three factors may now be characterized as follows:

First Factor: a common factor of five judges, representing an ideological-general component of opinion.

Second Factor: a common factor of six judges, representing a pragmatic-partisan opinion.

Third Factor: a common factor of two judges representing a pragmatic-general opinion.

Therefore, the conclusion is that the members of the panel of judges were subject to two sources of distortion in rating the list of politicians submitted to them. These sources of distortion did not operate independently but they interacted with one another to create three different--but related--clusters of opinion in the panel. It seems to be clear that these clusters represented the adoption of a pragmatic or ideological criterion, from the part of the judge himself, which interacted with this being consistent in treating friend and foe alike. However, there are absolutely no basis, insofar as the results of the analysis of bias are concerned, to claim that these distortions are the result of "misperception," or the judges' inability to assimilate an

²⁶ ibid., Chapter 6. Also Thurstone, op. cit., Chapter 14.

operational definition of power. Moreover, the presence of these sources of bias in the panel are interpreted as an indicator of the fact that prominent political actors perceive one another at least in terms of these two dimensions. Finally, these results basically substantiate that prominent political actors are well-suited to perform the task of a reputational panel.

Perceptions of Power and Leadership

It was reported in Chapter III that the judges would not--and probably could not--rate more than three or four individuals in a row without producing some comments about one of these individuals. The comments ranged from details about the personality and moral character of the individuals to their participation in some event or decision of national scope. Initially, this investigator interpreted these comments as a device utilized by the judges--each of which had a few hundred interviews under their belts--in order to gain some time and make sure that they were giving an adequate rating to the individual under consideration. However, as the investigation progressed, it became increasingly clear (1) that the judges were using a number of "labels" in order to typify the individual in the list, (2) that these labels, although they were not always applied to the same individuals, were used with a great deal of regularity by most judges, (3) that the same labels were used to identify essentially the same types of individual politicians, (4) that the judges were able to compare different individuals in the list in terms of the labels, (5) that they utilized these comparisons in order to locate the individuals in a continuum, (6) that they also used these labels to correct themselves in case they had given very different ratings to two

individuals identified with the same level, and (7) that the labels were used to describe friends and foes alike. It is also worth mentioning that they were able to give concise definitions of the labels when this investigator invited them to do so.

On the basis of these findings an intensive content analysis of the interview recordings was made and the more frequently used labels were identified. These labels are:

1. a bombín: literally a "tall hat." The exact connotation implies a figure head of really no great personal or political value, who aspired to an appointive political position--usually a cabinet portfolio or a top-flight administrative job--based on a status of functional eminence. The term dates back to the Cuban Revolution of 1933 when a bunch of "bombines" were brought into a cabinet formed immediately following the overthrow of General Machado.²⁷
2. a know-nothing about politics
3. a nobody
4. a product of relatives or friends
5. an accident, a product of an unusual situation
6. a man manipulated by others
7. an eléctrico: colloquial; refers to somebody who comes out of nowhere
8. a sargento: literally a sergeant and essentially the same type of political actor identified in the U.S. as a precinct captain or ward heeler.
9. a subordinate of somebody else
10. a man of fortune
11. a man with an illustrious name
12. a self-made man

²⁷For a more sophisticated interpretation see Jorge Mañach, "El bombín y sus adversarios," Bohemia, XLII, No. 4 (January 22, 1950), 61, 107.

13. a professional politician
14. a traditional politician
15. a machine politician
16. a clientele politician
17. a cacique: literally a chieftain
18. a magnate
19. a potence
20. an asamblea politician: literally an "assembly" politician, meaning a politician who controlled the local and/or provincial nominating structures of his party.
21. a manengue: colloquial; refers to the most popular conception of the politician in Cuba during the Republic and basically a fat, lazy, sensuous, corrupt and inscrupulous one. Cartoons of manengue may be found in any Cuban publication of the period.
22. a factor
23. a local factor
24. a determinant factor, a preponderant factor
25. a decidor: actually an idiomatic barbarism. Refers to a decision-maker with final word on a number of issues.
26. a popular figure
27. a dispenser of favors, a serviceable fellow
28. an ambitious man
29. a son-of-a-bitch, a man responsible for many of the evils that prevailed in the Republic
30. a violent man
31. a professional conspirator
32. a formula man, an idea man
33. a man capable of anything
34. a man of action

35. a valiant and absolutely fearless man
36. a decent and honorable person, a gentleman
37. a great figure, man of stature
38. a great Cuban
39. a man with impact, with punch
40. a brilliant man
41. an astute and shrewd man, capable of intrigue
42. a componedor: colloquial. Refers to a politician who could bring a number of dissimilar things together thus creating a problem or a solution for a problem
43. a heavy or dense guy, jerk

Not all the labels were included in this list and probably a few of those included are functional synonyms. Moreover, the list was not composed attending to the relative frequency with which the judges used the labels but trying to put together those that referred to similar things, such as character types, power resources, professional style, etc. Finally, the content analysis of the newspapers and magazines of the period revealed that these labels were not confined to the leadership group in Cuba but were utilized by journalists and consequently it is very probable that the politically active population was aware of them.

The majority of these labels were incorporated in the study, so as to have a concrete index of the way in which Cuban politicians were perceived. It was also assumed that the labels would be useful in developing leadership types in terms of orientations, resources, and other relevant criteria. The rationale behind this assumption was the

hypothesis that the judges were perceiving different aspects of the personalities, resources, etc. of the individuals they were evaluating. Therefore, if the labels they were utilizing in helping themselves evaluate the subjects have any theoretical relevance, they must necessarily be related to each other in some way.

After extensive manipulation of possible relationships among these labels, nine Guttman scales were constructed. Figure 3 presents a summary of the characteristics of these nine scales. The specific meaning of each particular scale will be discussed within the appropriate section of the text, although, for instance, the bombinism and manenguism scales were explained in the preceding discussion.²⁸ The scale pertaining to formula participation will be discussed in the next section and the discussion of the rest will be postponed to later chapters.

The fact that the majority of the items are scalable--a total of 38 out of 44 "reputational" items included in the investigation--speaks of the reliability with which professional politicians and/or prominent political actors may be utilized in the study of political power. Obviously, these judges are not invulnerable to bias or distortion, however, their knowledge of the individuals involved in the interactions formed around authoritative decision-making, and their own experience and participation in this political process are a tremendous asset to the student of political power.

²⁸See note 27. The raw reputational characteristics, and the nine scales--recorded as the particular type to which every actor conformed--were punched in a third deck of cards. See Appendix C, Codebooks. Each individual was assigned a "Yes" if two or more judges identified him with the characteristic. Otherwise, he was assigned a "No" code.

Scales	Number of Types	CR.	MMR.	Main patterns	freq.				
1. Bombinism	5	.94	.78	+	+	+	+	7	
				+	+	-	+	29	
				-	-	+	+	7	
				-	-	-	+	125	
				-	-	-	-		
2. Dependency	5	.96	.70	+	+	+	+	9	
				-	+	+	+	85	
				-	-	+	+	42	
				-	-	-	+	125	
				-	-	-	-	110	
3. National visibility	5	.96	.81	+	+	+	+	10	
				-	+	+	+	6	
				-	-	+	+	66	
				-	-	-	+	78	
				-	-	-	-	156	
4. Manenguism	6	.95	.58	+	+	+	+	+	71
				-	+	+	+	+	33
				-	+	-	+	+	37
				-	-	+	+	+	40
				-	-	-	-	+	1
				-	-	-	-	-	134
5. Decision-making	5	.98	.82	+	+	+	+	17	
				-	+	+	+	13	
				-	-	+	+	18	
				-	-	-	+	159	
				-	-	-	-	109	
6. Personal use of violence	6	.97	.86	+	+	+	+	+	11
				-	+	+	+	+	15
				-	-	+	+	+	10
				-	-	+	-	+	13
				-	-	-	+	+	47
				-	-	-	-	-	220
7. Formula participation	5	.93	.77	+	+	+	+	19	
				-	+	+	+	51	
				-	-	+	-	10	
				-	-	-	+	69	
				-	-	-	-	167	

Scales	Number of Types	CR.	MMR.	Main patterns	freq.			
8. Style of local control	5	.95	.80	+	+	+	+	3
				-	+	+	+	59
				-	+	-	+	4
				-	-	-	+	45
				-	-	-	-	205
9. Personal liabilities	5	.95	.77	+	+	+	+	5
				-	+	+	+	31
				-	-	+	+	88
				-	-	-	+	107
				-	-	-	-	85

CR. = coefficient of reproducibility
MMR. = minimum marginal reproducibility

Note: The frequencies only add up to 316 subjects since four of the individuals included in the list failed to elicit any comments from the judges.

Items included in each scale, by their columnar order, are:

Scale 1: bombinism

bombin
know-nothing about politics
man with illustrious name
group or class representative

Scale 2: dependency

a nobody
an accident
a product of relatives or friends
a subordinate of someone else

Scale 3: national visibility

a great Cuban
a great figure, man of stature
a popular figure
a local factor

Scale 4: manenquism

a manengue
an asamblea politician
a dispenser of favors
a clientele politician
a machine politician

Scale 5: decision-making

a determinant factor
a man with impact
a decidor

Scale 6: Personal use of violence

a professional conspirator
a man capable of anything
a man of action
a violent man
a valiant and fearless man

Scale 7: Formula participation

a formula man
a componedor
an astute, shrewd, and intrigant man
a brilliant man

Scale 8: Style of local control

a sargento
a cacique
a magnate
a potence

Scale 9: Personal liabilities

a heavy or dense guy, jerk

a son-of-a-bitch

an ambitious man

(reversed): a decent person

Figure 3.--Cumulative Dimensions of Perceived Reputational Characteristics

Decisions and Formulas

In the same manner that the elitists have been thoroughly criticized for their unrefined utilization of reputational rankings, the pluralists have been blasted for their unstructured approach to the selection of the "issues" that they utilize in order to identify the powerful.²⁹ Therefore, since this study also utilizes some features of the decisional approach, it is necessary to clarify the criterion utilized in order to select the issues.

The research design of the study initially included a standard question that was to be administered to every interviewee, namely, "What were the most important decisions taken during the Grau, Prío, and Batista administrations?" The idea behind the question was to obtain a list of these decisions and compare this list with another list of decisions identified in the literature as the most important.³⁰ Obviously, the common set of decisions included in both lists would have served as the operational criteria to be utilized in order to measure the scope and intensity of the subject's participation in national decision-making.

The first few interviews revealed that the judges agreed with the decisions identified by the secondary sources but that they were interpreting the importance of these decisions in a very particular manner. That is, they did not think these decisions were important because of

²⁹Probably the best review article concerning this point is Forward, op. cit.

³⁰Specifically by Mario Riera, Cuba Política, 1899-1955 (La Habana: Impresora Modelo, 1955), and of the same author, Cuba Libre, 1895-1958 (Coral Gables: Colonial Press, 1968).

their "communityness," their "salience," the type of "participation" they elicited, or their "representativeness."³¹ They intuitively used this type of reasoning but what made these decisions important in their own eyes was the fact that they were all the result of the successful application of a political formula.

According to the judges, the very own nature of the Cuban political system implied that the decisions could not be rigorously interpreted in the sense of the "authoritative allocation of values."³² They thought that, in Cuba, the most important decisions were taken by the President and his closest associates--not necessarily his ministers--bringing into the decisional process a number of groups and individuals of their own choice. Naturally, there were groups and individuals who had to be counted in--depending on the issue--but the important point was that, normally, the President and his closest associates were already committed to a particular course of action before they went out to whip support--read articulate and aggregate interests--for their views. This process of organizing support for the preferred courses of action took the form of a consultation, the net outcome of which was to give an idea of the alignment of the forces, the amount of required payoffs, and the nature of the coalition that was necessary for a successful implementation of the policy in question.

Therefore, the judges interpreted the need to produce a formula as the best indicator that the decisions themselves were important, and

³¹ Ibid.

³² Obviously, none of the judges had heard about David Easton, but the systems terminology is included to ease the description.

that they were indeed national, salient, etc.

In a general sense, a formula may be understood as the basis for an agreement or compromise that facilitates the settlement of political conflict. For instance, the Pacto de Sitges was a political compromise that ended la violencia in Colombia or, better, that redefined the rules of the game and facilitated the termination of the conflict. The Frente Nacional was the formula behind this agreement.

Formulas are ad hoc, they imply negotiations, consultation, and bargaining between contending--but not necessarily warring--parties, and although they may create new institutions or facilitate the institutionalization of a system they are not, in and of themselves, institutional. They come about precisely because the available and existing institutional framework does not allow for the resolution of the issue, demand, or conflict in question. Furthermore, this ad hoc characteristic prevents the universal application of a specific formula. For instance, a federal republic may have been an adequate formula for the U.S. but not for the smaller agricultural democracies of Northern Europe. Finally, although the rationalization or legal principle invoked or created by the formula may be used at a later time in the same system, the formula itself may fail because of the principle of anticipated reaction.³³

³³For instance, Batista came out of the turmoil of the thirties as Cuba's strongman. In order to increase the legitimacy of his regime and allow for the reincorporation of the opposition groups he had crushed, he convened a Constituent Assembly. This was called the "legalidad" and it helped him stay in power until 1944, when he graciously accepted the defeat of his Presidential candidate by Dr. Grau. After the 1952 coup, however, Batista could not repeat his legalidad formula nor could Grau and a few Auténticos remove Batista from power for a second time by electoral means.

This was the sense in which the judges understood the concept of formula, that is, as an ad hoc solution to a problem that could not be worked out 'within the system' or, better, that the system could not really cope with. In general they thought that formulas were primarily elaborated to reduce stress in the system although they also conceived the elaboration of an opposition formula that aimed to create stress.³⁴ They also gave the term a historico-causal bent in the sense of some formulas being possible because of the implementation of previous ones. For instance, some judges thought that the Batista coup of March, 1952, could not have been possible without the implementation of some formulas elaborated by the Grau and Prío administrations that alienated a considerable amount of public opinion.³⁵

They also perceived that a degree of mass support was needed in order to implement the decision, while they did not overlook the fact that the strategy and payoffs of the formula--the covert aspect of the decision--that made the decision possible required the creation of a coalition of prominent participants. Finally, it is obvious that the judges thought that formulas were applicable to any types of issues --distributive, regulative, etc.--but that most problems had no readily available formula³⁶ and that the likelihood that a decision could be implemented depended upon the formula on which this decision was based.³⁷

³⁴Interview #8.

³⁵Interview #10.

³⁶Interview #1.

³⁷See Manuel Bisbé, Sin fórmulas políticas (Habana, 1951).

In summary, the judges showed their familiarity with the most important decisions taken during the period with which this study is concerned. They intuitively used a criterion similar to the usual criteria presented in the literature,³⁸ but the important point was that they applied such a criterion to the formulas that made the decisions possible and not to the decisions themselves. The judges were using three separate criteria in giving their ranking to the individuals included in the list, and in doing this they guided themselves by other related aspects of the individuals and the situational context in which these individuals were involved. As many as nine separate dimensions of the reputations of the individuals may be described in terms of the labels utilized by the judges. In conclusion, the pluralists contention about the fact that prominent political actors make no better judges than inside dopesters is simply untenable and the data offered in this chapter reinforces this point of view.

³⁸Forward, op. cit.

PART II: DESCRIPTION

CHAPTER V

TAXING AND SPENDING IN REPUBLICAN CUBA: 1944-1958

In Chapter I it was stated that the case of the Cuban Republic, between the years of 1944 through 1958, offers a very good example of what is usually identified as the "classical pattern of Latin American politics." It was also stated in that chapter that this case offers the advantage of two contrasting types of political organization in the context of a relatively stable economic environment. This chapter tries to justify the second of these assumptions, and at the same time, initiates the analysis of the similarities and differences between the "democratic" period of the Auténtico party, and the "dictatorial" regime of Fulgencio Batista.

A Similar Economic Environment

It is an established fact that Cubans have always depended on sugar for a living. The traditional Cuban economy relied very heavily on sugar export sales to the U.S. and the political, economic, and socio-cultural implications of this fact have been thoroughly examined.¹ The important

¹The standard works are: Julián Alienes Urosa, Características fundamentales de la economía cubana (Habana: Banco Nacional, 1950), and of the same author, Tesis sobre el desarrollo económico de Cuba (Habana: Molina y Cía., 1952); Raúl Cepero Bonilla, Política Azucarera, 1952-1958 (México: Editora Futuro, S.A., 1958); Ramiro Guerra, Sugar and Society in the Caribbean, trans. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964); Gustavo Gutiérrez, Presente y futuro de la economía cubana (Habana: Junta Nacional de Economía, 1950); Julio LeRiverend, Economic History of

point, insofar as the present effort is concerned, would be to determine if there are clear-cut differences in the more salient dimensions of the Cuban economy that would help explain away differences in the capabilities and outcomes of the Auténtico and Batista administrations. This point is important because the literature of political development has put a great deal of emphasis on ecological explanations of the developmental process. Moreover, it was also hypothesized in the first chapter that this type of explanation was inadequate because it ignored the role and impact of leadership. Therefore, the first obvious step will be to examine the more salient dimensions of the Cuban economy during the period of analysis.

Basically, the operation of the traditional Cuban economy has been described as follows:

In the old Cuban economy, autonomous changes in exports replaced investment as the main source of fluctuations and growth . . . Proceeds from sugar exports fluctuated between 70 and 85 per cent of total exports earnings. Exports were independent of national income; a rise in Cuba's income and imports failed to affect significantly the total exports, income, and hence imports of the United States, the island's chief trading partner . . . A rise in Cuban exports increased national income by an amount equal to the rise in exports. The expansion of income raised domestic spending by roughly 25 per cent less than the rise in income itself. The propensity to import consumer goods was about 15 per cent; another 10 per cent of income was channeled away from the stream of domestic spending into savings . . .² Both the import and savings function were unusually stable . . .

Therefore, the main dimensions of this economy could probably be characterized by the following indicators: national income, value of

Cuba, trans. (Havana: Ensayo, 1967); Henry Wallich, Monetary Problems of an Export Economy, The Cuban Experience, 1914-1947 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), and the most comprehensive and oldest of all, José Antonio Saco, Papeles científicos, históricos, políticos y de otros ramos sobre la isla de Cuba, Vol. II (Paris: D'Aubussin y Kugelmann, 1858).

²O'Connor, op. cit., pp. 34-36.

sugar crop, value of Cuban sugar exports to the US, value of Cuban exports to the US, value of imports, value of total trade, and bank clearings, in order to measure the differences in the behavior of these indicators during the Auténtico and Batista periods a one-way analysis of variance was performed for each and every one of them. The results of these tests are presented in Table 7. The table basically shows no substantial economic growth when the two periods are compared. Significant differences are only present in the cases of imports and bank clearings and all other indicators show no evidence of change.

Therefore, from a methodological viewpoint, most of these macro-economic factors may be considered invariant which could hardly justify their utilization in order to explain differences in the performance of the Cuban political system. On the other hand, from a theoretical standpoint, the contention is that these economic factors had a relatively constant impact in terms of the constraints that they imposed on national decision-making. Finally, nothing is inferred about economic development from these data in the sense that productivity and marginal propensities have not been analyzed.

The import of the foregoing analysis is, therefore, that between 1944 and 1958, Cuban political decision-makers had approximately the same level of available economic resources. This means that the economic constraints that they were faced with were relatively constant. What matters is the way in which they responded to these constraints and the strategies that they utilized in dealing with them.

Differences in Extractive Economic Policies

The first indication that there was indeed a differential pattern

TABLE 7
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMIC FACTORS
AFFECTING THE CUBAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

Indicators	F-values	Means*		Standard deviations*		Statistical level of significance
		(A)	(B)	(A)	(B)	
(1) National Income	3.80	1,538	1,880	294	386	not significant
(2) Value of Exports	1.25	595	665	143	88	not significant
(3) Value of Imports	7.49	425	624	157	119	P < .050
(4) Value of Total Trade	4.09	1,020	1,289	297	201	not significant
(5) Value of Sugar Crop	0.18	522	556	167	137	not significant
(6) Value of Cuban Exports to U.S.	2.32	382	422	56	43	not significant
(7) Value of Cuban Sugar Exports to U.S.	0.72	277	302	72	35	not significant
(8) Bank Clearings	34.22	2,356	5,403	922	1,097	P < .005

* In millions of pesos

(A) = 1944-1951

(B) = 1952-1958

F-values indicate the results of one-way analyses of variance performed for each variable appearing on the table

Sources: Cuba Económica y Financiera, Anuario Azucarero de Cuba, 1959 (La Habana: Cuba Económica y Financiera, 1959); Banco Nacional de Cuba, Memoria, 1958-1959 (La Habana: Editorial Lex, 1960).

of response, from the part of the Auténtico and Batista administrations, is supplied by an unpretentious analysis of the aggregate revenues and expenditures of these governments.

Three stochastic series pertaining to Total Revenue, Budgetary Revenue, and Budgetary Expense for the years 1944 through 1958 were analyzed with the results depicted in Table 8. In all three cases the results of the analysis indicate that there were differences in the effort made by these regimes to extract economic resources and spend them.

The table shows that Batista, probably faced by a more stringent sugar market had to secure other sources of revenue and adapt new strategies in order to extract economic resources--these strategies included deficit financing. Undoubtedly, Batista spent more than the Auténticos and he also imposed a heavier burden on the economy.

Consequently, this is the first datum that has to be taken into consideration in making a tally of the more obvious differences between the "democratic" and "dictatorial" periods with respect to extractive economic policies.

A second step was to determine the linkage between economy and polity throughout these years in order to gain further insight into the impact that one area had on the other. Obviously, the results presented in Tables 7 and 8 suggest that only two aspects of the economy could be used to explain levels of extraction and, reciprocally, only these two aspects could show the distributive impact that the governmental manipulation of these resources had on the domestic economy.

With respect to the linkage between economy and polity the analysis confirms the interpretation that,

TABLE 8
REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES:
1944-1958

Indicators	F-values	Means		Standard deviations		Statistical level of significance
		(A)	(B)	(A)	(B)	
(1) Total Revenue	12.61	234	334	63	42	P < .005
(2) Budgetary Revenue	15.90	222	322	57	35	P < .005
(3) Budgetary Expense	19.15	221	346	70	30	P < .005

Sources: República de Cuba, Gaceta Oficial; Dirección General de Estadística, Resúmenes Estadísticos Seleccionados, Síntesis cronológica (La Habana: P. Fernández y Cía., 1959).

production and income were at a standstill . . . [that] the sugar crisis of 1952 compelled the new Batista regime to develop an extensive program to encourage the growth of industry and agriculture . . . [that] the emphasis Cuban governments consistently placed on redistributive policies . . . was unfortunately an important³ cause of the long-run tendency of the Cuban economy to stagnate.

A multiple correlation analysis conducted with the data of tables 7 and 8 shows the nature of this linkage between the traditional economy, the level of extraction of resources from the economy by the national government, and the impact of the resources--manipulated by the government--on the domestic economy. Equation (1) shows that the best predictor of the level of resources utilized by the government is neither national income nor exports, but imports. Equation (2) shows that these resources did not produce a more dramatic impact on the domestic economy than a greater level of activity--but no substantial growth on exports or on sugar production. The standard errors of

$$Y_{\text{(budgetary revenue)}} = 70.12016 + 0.38294X_{\text{(imports)}} \quad (1)$$

$$Y_{\text{(bank clearings)}} = -2007.25098 + 20.72755X_{\text{(budgetary expense)}} \quad (2)$$

the estimates are 0.03839 and 2.11407 respectively. Multiple correlation and multiple regression coefficients are .9404 and .9385, and .8844 and .8808 respectively. In the other hand, an analysis of national income for these fourteen years shows that total trade is the best predictor of income:

³ibid., pp. 17-18.

$$Y_{(\text{national income})} = 326.70483 + 1.19648X_{(\text{total trade})} \quad (3)$$

The standard error of the estimate is, in this case, 0.14779 with correlation and regression coefficients of .9135 and .8345.⁴

Therefore, if it can be argued that Batista faced a more stiff sugar market the data show that he was able to find adequate levels of economic resources to continue the programs emanating from the Constitution of 1940, which the Auténticos launched. Consequently, both the Auténticos and Batista seemed equally committed to go after whatever economic resources they could get their hands on and, more important, to pump these resources back into the economy to keep it going on.

However, one may question the significance of this datum for the fact that there was a higher level of expenditures and a heavier tax burden during the Batista regime does not essentially put this regime in any politically relevant category. That is, nothing substantive may be inferred from the datum. Moreover, the contention of O'Connor regarding the commitment of Cuban governments to distributive policies cannot really be substantiated by an analysis of aggregate expenditures. Consequently, it is necessary to get into a more thorough examination of the way in which these resources were spent in order to determine differences in policy priorities and distributive impact of the auténtico and Batista administrations.

⁴An analysis of national income, conducted with identical data pertaining to an stochastic series for the years of 1921 through 1958, shows that total trade was indeed the best predictor of growth. The expression obtained is as follows: Nat. Inc. = 72.80 + 1.36 Tot. Trade (4), with values of 0.06, .96 and .93 for the standard error and the correlation and regression coefficients respectively.

Budgeting in Republican Cuba: Framework
and Implications

In his study of the Mexican Revolution, James Wilkie advanced the proposition that substantive differences may be found in the ideological orientation of different regimes if the way in which they allocate available economic resources into budgetary categories is analyzed.⁵ Although this approach has been criticized,⁶ it can be used for the purpose that Wilkie outlined with a number of modifications dictated by the specific legal framework in which a particular budgetary process is enmeshed and by the political implications created by such a framework that may repercute and distort the process itself.

Before Wilkie's approach can be utilized, it would seem that it is necessary to look into the specific context in which the budgetary process took place in Republican Cuba. Two things require a somewhat detailed examination in particular: the legal framework of the budgetary process, and the political implications of this framework. Obviously, the attempt is to determine what type of manipulation--if any--took place in the sense of a number of formulas being applied to distract budgetary resources from their original purpose. The contention is that if a number of such formulas are uncovered, serious reservations would arise in connection with an unrefined utilization of Wilkie's approach.

⁵The Mexican Revolution: Federal Expenditure and Social Change since 1910 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967).

⁶See Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, "Notes on Quantitative History: Federal Expenditure and Social Change in Mexico since 1910," Latin American Research Review, V, No. 1 (Spring, 1970), 71-85. The fact that this approach is a very powerful aid for purposes of historical periodization remains unchallenged.

As it is generally true of most Latin American systems, the Cuban executive had considerable leverage in determining the way in which he wanted to spend his budget. It is no secret that between 1939 through 1948 the Cuban Presidents governed without a budget being approved by Congress. Authority for this procedure emanated from the Ley de Bases --Law 30 of June 30, 1937--for the 1937-1938 fiscal year. The Executive merely extended the budget approved for that year on a quarterly basis. The Constitution of 1940--articles 255 through 265--established some general provisions for the drafting and liquidation of the budget, but it failed to change the extension procedure.

The concern of the Constituent Assembly, which drafted this Constitution with the quality of Education in Cuba, reflected in articles 52 and 53, among others, proved a little bit far-fetched. Article 52 stipulated that the budget of the Ministry of Education could not be less than the ordinary budget of any other ministry. Moreover, the article required that the monthly salary of elementary school teachers had to be exactly one millionth of the total budget. This implied that elementary school teachers would be the highest paid bureaucrats in Cuba thus creating a very sensitive issue insofar as the rest of the bureaucracy was concerned. On the other hand, Article 53 required that as long as the University of Havana would not be economically self-sufficient, 2-1/4 of the total budget would have to be destined to the University. Evidently, the members of the Constituent Assembly did not anticipate that the national budgets of the late forties and fifties would double and triple the amounts of the budgets of their time. Moreover, the fact that the budget of the Ministry of Education had to be the largest implied that the patronage capability of this Ministry would be

tremendous.

The entry of Cuba into the Second World War--at least the formal declaration of War--gave Cuban politicians a chance to find a formula to get around these two articles. The Emergency Legislation of 1942 was the occasion. This legislation created a number of structures destined to deal with the economic inconveniences created by the war such as price controls, rationing, etc. One aspect of this legislation was that it authorized the Executive to divide the national budget into two categories: ordinary and extraordinary. The former accounted for all expenses of a "permanent" character while those expenditures "resulting from the state of war" were covered in the latter. Needless to say, the ordinary budget was about a third of the total budget and, not surprisingly, the teachers' salaries were computed from it. As for "the state of war" that created the necessity for an extraordinary budget, it still existed when the Economic and Technical Mission of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development went to Cuba. The Mission took note of this awkward division of the budget, of the real meaning of the division, and it reported that this division "served no other purpose."⁷ One of the judges added that when Batista was overthrown Cuba was still formally at war with the Axis.⁸

The net outcome of this budgetary gerrymandering, as reported by the Mission was that "[it was] ironical that the great concern of Cubans for education (together with their tendency to value legal formulae more

⁷ International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Report on Cuba (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1951), p. 654.

⁸ Interview #1.

than practical administration) contributed [to make] the Ministry of Education a principal focus of political patronage and of graft.⁹ All the judges coincided with this appraisal which they held to be specially true during the Grau administration. Prío's education ministers were exempted from this, at least in a large scale, and probably the same holds true for the case of the Batista regime.

But in and of itself, this budgetary aberration is sufficiently powerful so as to invalidate the approach proposed by Wilkie. However, what constitutes a more formidable barrier, at least in terms of the utilization of budget figures pertaining to the Grau regime, can be traced back to an obscure Presidential Decree--Number 300 of February 3, 1945--which allowed the Executive and the Minister of Finance to transfer any revenue surplus into the Sobrantes de Rentas Públicas --Revenue Surplus--Account. This, together with the use of pagarés de tesorería--promissory notes of the Treasury--allowed the government to divert any funds and put them into the Revenue Surplus Account from where they could be extracted--in a physical sense--substituting them with promissory notes. This was the formula used by José Manuel Alemán, Grau's favorite minister, to create the strongest system of patronage the Cuban political system had ever witnessed. Alemán and his associates, with the consent of Grau, created the BAGA--the Alemán-Grau-Alsina Bloc. The BAGA was a clique dominated by Alemán and one of Grau's nephews which eventually came to control the funds of four major ministries plus a number of special funds such as the Lottery Revenue Fund and the Special Public Works Fund. The BAGA tried to monopolize the recruitment

⁹IBRD, op. cit., p. 425.

of candidates and it proved a tough competitor even for prominent members of the Auténtico Party. The impact of the BAGA was the major factor in the increase in campaign costs registered during the 1948 Presidential election.

The operation of the BAGA created a scandal of major proportions and if it proved to be a successful formula for the Grau regime, in terms of availability of patronage, it gave the opposition a good formula to conduct an attack on Auténtico policies. Dr. Pelayo Cuervo, a senator and former member of the Auténtico Party, and at the time a leading figure in the Ortodoxo Party, in conjunction with a lawyer who had been affected in his sugar interests by Grau's social legislation introduced a criminal cause against Grau and a number of his ministers. The plaintiffs claimed that a total of 174 million pesos had been embezzled during the Grau regime. The litigation brought about by this cause was a constant source of embarrassment to the Prío regime, for Prío could hardly afford to prosecute the leading figure of his party.¹⁰

Prío himself took a major step in trying to rationalize the budgetary process in Cuba and his Organic Law of Budgets was a worthy effort.¹¹ However, the law itself proved to be of little help because of the sala nature of Cuban bureaucracy.¹² In order to promote a major overhaul of the budgetary process and effective controls of budgetary practice a major revolution would have been required.¹³

¹⁰Interview #8.

¹¹Law #11 of May 31, 1949.

¹²See Fred Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries, The Theory of Prismatic Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964).

¹³An official of the Accounts Tribunal was quoted saying that in

In the light of the foregoing discussion, it is evident that a great deal of caution has to be exercised in the use of Cuban budgetary data. Obviously, the data pertaining to the Grau regime are unreliable. Moreover, as of the time of this writing nobody really knows how much did Grau spend. Therefore, budgetary data pertaining to the Grau regime is excluded from the analysis. Probably the best index that this is a correct decision is the fact that Prío had to float an internal loan of 100 million pesos in order to patch-up the financial loopholes left by Grau. Incidentally, this was one of the more important decisions taken by Prío.

Criteria for the Comparison of
Budgetary Expense

Budgetary data are available for all of Prío's four budgets and for most of Batista's. In order to compare the two on a more even basis, the first four Batista budgets for which data were available were compared to Prío's four. It is important to note that the analysis is conducted with projected and not with actual expenditures. As the report of the Mission showed,¹⁴ in connection with Cuba, and as Wilkie himself proved this to be the case in Mexico,¹⁵ both sets of figures are never similar. In the other hand, it may be possible to produce more meaningful comparisons using a performance budget or a PPB criterion.¹⁶ However,

order to prosecute all the infractors the Tribunal would require a jail the length of Cuba's Central Highway--600 miles--so as to have space for everyone. See Bohemia, XLVII, No. 22 (May 29, 1955), suppl. 3.

¹⁴IBRD, op. cit., pp. 681-682 and Table 133.

¹⁵Wilkie, op. cit., Chapter 1. The differences in the Mexican case are exorbitant.

¹⁶Allen Schick, "The Road to PPB: The Stages of Budget Reform," in

the inability to directly consult official Cuban archival sources prevented this. Also, it is questionable whether such a sophisticated approach is possible given the aggregate nature of the available data on budgetary expense categories. Consequently, the scope of generalization is limited here to (1) these regimes' stated intentions to spend, and (2) the regimes' priorities and distributive impact as evidenced in these intentions.

With respect to policy categories this study introduced its own scheme of classification of budgetary expenditures. Figure 4 compares this particular scheme with those utilized by Wilkie and the IBRD. The main underlying criteria for the adoption of the present scheme were: (1) the probability that the resources lumped into a particular category would be dedicated to the policy objectives described by the category, and (2) the real impact that a certain level of resources allocated to the policy category would have on the operation of the national political system.

With respect to the relative merits of each of the three approaches, Wilkie's is probably the closest to a "performance" criterion although he showed considerable naivetè in lumping the expenditures dedicated to the armed forces together with other administrative expenditures. Also, he showed that he was aware of the political significance of a regime's orientation to servicing the public debt,¹⁷ yet he failed to separate these "responsible fiscal image" expenditures from the rest. The IBRD

Fremon J. Lyden and Ernest G. Miller (eds.), Planning, Programming, Budgeting: A Systems Approach to Management (Chicago: Markham, 1968), pp. 26-52.

¹⁷Wilkie, op. cit., p. 77.

Wilkie (1968)	IBRD (1950)	This Study
(a) <u>economic expenditures:</u> Capital investments allocated to agencies or budgetary categories which deal directly or indirectly with economic life: agriculture, public works, irrigation, etc.	(a) <u>economic development expenditures:</u> Public Works Agriculture	(a) <u>regulative-productive expenditures:</u> Public Works Agriculture Commerce Labor
(b) <u>social expenditures:</u> Education Health Welfare Public Assistance	(b) <u>socio-cultural development expenditures:</u> Education Health Universities Labor Pensions	(b) <u>human resources:</u> Health Education Universities
(c) <u>administrative expenditures:</u> Defense Public Debt Judiciary Legislature and all other not included in a or b	(c) <u>administrative expenditures:</u> all other not included in a, b, d or e	(c) <u>administrative expenditures:</u> Legislature Judiciary Presidency Prime Ministry State Justice Treasury
	(d) <u>national defense expenditures:</u> Defense	(d) <u>regulative-political expenditures:</u> Defense Interior Communications
	(e) <u>debt service</u>	(e) <u>debt service</u>

Figure 4.--Similarities and Differences of Alternative Criteria for Policy Categories of Expenditures

criterion is more realistic in this point because it separates both the expenditures dedicated to debt service and the armed forces expenditures from the rest.

However, the mere recognition that defense expenditures are "different" from the rest is not enough. The argument that can be used in order to support this interpretation--namely that Latin American armed forces perform an internal order-maintaining function--requires that some other expenditures are also examined in the same light. Obviously, Latin American armies do not perform internal police functions alone. They take over these functions when those that are usually charged with them cannot handle the job. In all of Latin America the police function is controlled by the Minister of the Interior and this writer does not know of any case in which a Latin American President has given this ministry to a coalition partner or to one of his adversaries within his own party. Also, the Ministry of Communication, especially when ballots are being counted, has an all important political function. Therefore, these two Ministries can be grouped together, in terms of their budgetary resources, with the Defense Ministry in order to measure the regime's orientation with respect to its regulation of internal political life. After all, the Ministries of the Interior--or Government, as it was called in Cuba--and Communications are usually charged with the task of regulating free assembly and free speech, respectively, if the need to do this arises.

In the other hand, both Wilkie and the IBRD dedicate a separate category to "economic development" expenditures. In the present case,

following the conclusions presented in the literature about the implications of the characteristics of the Cuban economy, it seems that one of the main functions of the Cuban state, "deriving from the state's monopoly of coercive power"¹⁸ was the regulation of production in Cuba and, more specifically, of the sugar industry. Anybody familiar with the industrial, managerial, financial, and market aspects of sugar in Cuba will necessarily accept the fact that the regulation of the industry was one of the most institutionalized aspects of the Cuban political system. Also, in terms of the amounts of resources required by the state in order to perform this function, together with price controls, etc., this function emerges as the more efficiently performed by the state, at least in terms of a cost-benefit analysis.

The fact that the expenditures for agriculture and public works are also included in the category reflects the state's ability to act as a "participant in the economy"¹⁹ creating sources of employment, agricultural subsidies, etc. Overall, the label utilized to identify this group of expenditures seems reasonable and probably more accurate given the particular aspects that have been analyzed in this section.

Spending in Republican Cuba: Prío and Batista

The first step in the comparative analysis of the expenditure patterns of the Prío and Batista regimes was to determine the differences

¹⁸Anderson, op. cit., pp. 64-65.

¹⁹ibid.

in the proportion of the budget allocated to the six policy categories by the two regimes. The results of this analysis of expense priorities are presented in Table 9.

In an allocational sense, the Batista regime gave more emphasis to the creation of a responsible fiscal image among its creditors. The relative amounts allocated to debt service by this regime are significantly higher than those committed to this category by the Prío regime. However, this is probably the result of the fact that Batista had to borrow heavily in order to make ends meet, thus incurring in a higher level of obligations that he had to satisfy.

The data show that the Prío regime was more preoccupied with a more active state participation in economic life and this may be interpreted as the result of a more activist orientation of this regime in the development of the productive capacity of the Cuban economy. This regime was also identified by the judges as the one which was more concerned with institutionalizing the Cuban state and it is possible that this regime's higher level of administrative allocations corroborates this impression.

No statistically significant differences were obtained for the three remaining categories. This is not surprising, especially in connection with the fifth category, because although budgetary gerrymandering occurred around the provisions of Article 52, both of these regimes finally had to come up with a similar level of resources committed to education--the largest contributor in the category. Both regimes had approximately the same social overhead in the sense of the resources they used in order to meet their pension obligations.

Sources: República de Cuba, Gaceta Oficial; International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Report on Cuba (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1951).

TABLE 9
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF BUDGETARY EXPENSE ALLOCATIONS BETWEEN
PRIO AND BATISTA, BY POLICY CATEGORIES

Categories	F-values	Means*		Standard deviations		Statistical level of significance
		(A)	(B)	(A)	(B)	
(1) Debt Service	5.64	3.44	8.41	.82	4.10	P < .10
(2) Administrative	10.73	16.15	13.50	.22	1.60	P < .025
(3) Regulative-political	1.44	25.74	26.80	1.65	.63	not significant
(4) Regulative-productive	7.81	14.65	9.92	1.59	2.99	P < .10
(5) Human Resources	1.16	30.21	31.46	2.22	.62	not significant
(6) Pensions	.01	9.80	9.95	2.10	1.77	not significant

F-values indicate the result of one-way analyses of variance performed for each variable on the table.

*Percentage of total budgetary expense during
 (A) = 1948, 1949/1950, 1950/1951, 1951/1952
 (B) = 1952/1953, 1954/1955, 1955/1956, 1956/1957

Items included in each category:

- (1) "Debt Payments" and "Obligations from Previous Budgets"
- (2) Legislature, Judiciary, Presidency, Prime Ministry, and the Ministries of State, Justice, Treasury. It also includes the Ministry of Information, the Consultative Council and the Accounts and Auditing Tribunal during the Batista regime.
- (3) Ministries of Government, Defense, and Communications.
- (4) Ministries of Public Works, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor.
- (5) Ministries of Education, and Health.

However, what is startling is the fact that there are no statistically significant differences in the proportion of resources committed to the regulation of domestic political life by the two regimes. Qualitative differences aside, the data show that on this score auténticos and batistianos did not differ in their authoritarian orientation.

But it may be possible, that this and all of the results presented in Table 9 are irrelevant because the proportion of resources allocated to each category may not be as important as the absolute amounts allocated. In this sense, it would seem to be more realistic to talk about distributive impact. After all, Table 8 showed that Batista extracted more resources from the economy and that, consequently, the way he allocated his budget had a greater impact on the performance of the system.

The analysis of this impact was conducted with the absolute amounts allocated to each category and the results of the analysis are presented in Table 10. The results obtained with four of the policy categories are a complete reversal of the findings of the allocational analysis. Amounts allocated to debt service and pension payments do not show a contradictory result when compared with the data presented in Table 9, however, the remaining four categories do not offer the same picture.

First of all, the analysis of absolute amounts dedicated to administrative and regulative-productive expenditures shows no significant differences. Therefore, although differences in priorities were obtained for these categories, their actual impact is not different. Obviously, one could speculate about anticipated and unanticipated consequences of budgetary decisions on this score because unless one

Sources: República de Cuba, Gaceta Oficial; International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Report on Cuba (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1951).

TABLE 10
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ABSOLUTE BUDGETARY EXPENDITURES IN
POLICY CATEGORIES BETWEEN PRIO AND BATISTA

Categorías	F-values	Means*		Standard deviations*		Statistical level of significance
		(A)	(B)	(A)	(B)	
(1) Debt Service	6.18	8.66	26.34	2.31	14.03	P < .10
(2) Administrative	.57	40.67	43.67	5.35	5.44	NS
(3) Regulative-political	83.63	64.40	86.42	3.82	2.93	P < .005
(4) Regulative-productive	.54	37.26	32.14	9.13	10.58	NS
(5) Human Resources	66.24	75.56	101.49	4.45	4.56	P < .005
(6) Pensions	1.58	24.96	32.19	9.24	6.77	NS

F-values indicate the result of one-way analyses of variance performed for each variable appearing on the table.

*Millions of pesos allocated to budgetary expenses during

(A) = 1948, 1949/1950, 1950/1951, 1951/1952

(B) = 1952/1953, 1954/1955, 1955/1956, 1956/1957

as follows

- (1) Includes "Debt Payments" and "Obligations from Previous Budgets"
- (2) Includes Legislature, Judiciary, Presidency, Prime Ministry, and the Ministries of State, Justice, and the Treasury. It also includes the Ministry of Information, the Consultative Council, and the Accounts and Auditing Tribunal during the Batista regime.
- (3) Includes the Ministries of Government, Defense, and Communications.
- (4) Includes the Ministries of Public Works, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor.
- (5) Includes the Ministries of Education, and Health, and the Universities.

assumes that policy makers took both sets of figures--proportional and absolute--into consideration, they seem to have failed to produce the results they anticipated in making their allocation decisions.

A similar picture is obtained with respect to the regulative-political and human resources categories. Both categories were not different when compared in terms of the proportion of the budget that they assimilated. However, if the average absolute amounts spent in these categories are compared, the differences are obvious. The evidence shows that Batista, in spite of the fact that he allocated similar proportions of his budgets in these categories to those allocated by the Auténticos, spent much more than the Auténticos in them. In terms of priorities this did not show, however, in terms of impact the evidence is conclusive and it shows that the Batista regime had a greater regulative capability and a greater impact on the development of human resources.

Finally, it could be argued that whatever policy categories one may come up with, are, to a large extent, artificial and that they really do not underline theoretically satisfying concepts. In order to meet this type of objection, a simple analysis of ministerial allocations could be conducted in order to uncover differences that may be clouded by lumping together a number of dissimilar functions. This type of analysis was conducted with the results depicted in Table 1]. These results basically confirm the findings uncovered in the previous analyses.

In summary, the budgetary contrast between the two regimes shows, (1) that although both regimes put essentially the same emphasis on the regulation of domestic political life and the development of human resources, the Batista regime produced a greater impact in both areas,

TABLE 11
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF BUDGETARY EXPENSE
BETWEEN PRIO AND BATISTA, BY MINISTRY

Categories	F-values	Means**		Standard deviations*		Statistical level of significance
		(A)	(B)	(A)	(B)	
(1) Public Debt	6.18	8.66	26.34	2.31	14.03	P < .10
(2) Legislature	1.50	7.76	5.93	.89	2.85	not significant
(3) Judiciary	23.82	8.71	11.22	.88	.56	P < .005
(4) Presidency	42.28	.62	1.81	.04	.36	P < .005
Ministries of:						
(5) State	3.59	3.10	3.87	.62	.52	not significant
(6) Justice	6.83	.75	.95	.10	.12	P < .10
(7) Government	33.71	14.06	19.37	1.28	1.31	P < .005
(8) Treasury	1.44	19.12	16.47	3.66	2.48	not significant
(9) Public Works	.53	28.01	23.54	8.14	9.19	not significant
(10) Agriculture	.40	5.28	4.89	1.05	.63	not significant
(11) Commerce	2.02	2.15	2.00	.09	.19	not significant
(12) Labor	.10	1.83	1.71	.48	.59	not significant
(13) Education	45.92	52.67	75.87	4.37	5.27	P < .005
(14) Health	11.44	20.44	22.26	.49	.96	P < .025
(15) Communications	2.90	10.08	11.76	1.82	.75	not significant
(16) Defense	379.15	40.26	55.28	1.24	.92	P < .005
(17) Pensions	1.58	24.96	32.19	9.24	6.77	not significant
(18) Universities	5.68	2.45	3.35	.33	.68	P < .10

* Millions of pesos

F-values indicate the result of one-way analyses of variance performed for each variable appearing on the table.

(A) = 1948, 1949/1950, 1950/1951, 1951/1952.

(B) = 1952/1953, 1954/1955, 1955/1956, 1956/1957

Sources: República de Cuba, Gaceta Oficial; International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Report on Cuba (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1951).

and (2) that although the Prío regime put a greater emphasis on strengthening the state's administrative capacity and the state's control over the economy, this regime did not have a greater impact than the Batista regime had in these two areas. Obviously, from the standpoint of the capability to implement a program of economic development, the Batista regime was much better off.

And this is especially true when one is confronted by the evidence that Batista extracted more resources from the economy and consequently enjoyed a higher extractive capability to implement his programs. There can be very little doubt about this when an analysis of the extra-budgetary operations of the Batista regime is conducted. Ironically, it was the Prío regime that devised the strategy that enabled Batista to follow this course of action.

The Prío administration disproved the fallacy of the argument that there was not an internal market for government bonds when it floated an internal debt of 100 million pesos. All Batista did was to maximize the utilization of this source of revenue. When Batista came to power in 1952, the level of the Public Debt stood at 217.7 million pesos; when he left, this figure had increased sixfold.²⁰ In December of 1953 Batista decreed the issuance of public bonds for 145 million pesos;²¹ in July of 1954 he issued bonds for a total of 350 million pesos.²²

²⁰Oscar Pino, "El 10 de marzo o el vandalismo y la irresponsabilidad financiera en el poder," Bohemia, LI, No. 3 (January 18-25, 1959), pp. 148-158. See also Cuban Economic Research Project, A Study on Cuba (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1965), p. 448.

²¹The New York Times (December 30, 1953), 28:2.

²²The New York Times (July 31, 1954), 16:8.

These and similar measures contributed to augment the extractive capacity of the regime. Also, this was the formula that Batista utilized to keep the economy going in spite of a dwindling level of exports. By following a policy of "compensatory public expenditures" Batista was able to maintain a delicate balance during the mid-fifties, but in order to do this he had to create an enormous overhead of Public Debt.

This adds a note of skepticism to the validity of the inferences derived from the exclusive utilization of budgetary figures in other policy areas since the scope and nature of extrabudgetary operations similar to these cannot be ascertained.

However, in terms of available economic resources, the analysis seems to support the conclusion that, in Cuba, "stagnation and underdevelopment were at root political, not economic, problems."²³ These regimes, in one way or another, met the problems created by an export economy and ultimately found the resources they needed to keep the system going on. Contrary to the more widespread opinion, Batista was not limited, in a programmatic or extractive sense, by a more severe economic situation. Therefore, it was the regime's response to the economy what created observable differences in the long run. Consequently, the condition of the Cuban economy cannot and does not supply an adequate explanation of how could Batista overthrow the auténticos without firing a shot and why he was driven to the wall "having to suppress everyone."²⁴ This explanation must be sought elsewhere.

²³ O'Connor, op. cit., p. 19.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 33.

Consequently, the evidence presented in this chapter confirms the following hypotheses: RH-3b, 3c, and 3d, although the results of this analysis can only be interpreted in a tentative fashion given the nature of the data. Hypotheses RH-3a is not confirmed by the evidence and the verification of hypothesis RH-3e will be conducted in Chapter XI.

CHAPTER VI

THE CONTEXT OF CUBAN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP: RECRUITMENT

The concept of a political power structure has been criticized by the pluralist because of the elitist connotation that it carries. However, it is fallacious to do this since the existence of a political power structure--a universal datum of political life--does not necessarily imply the existence of a cohesive, closed, and conspiratorial ruling elite. After all, what the pluralists have offered as an alternative is the much used and abused "black box" in which the process of conversion takes place.

But the empirical task of political leadership research cannot obviate the analysis of political power structures in the search for relevant political dimensions that can be used for comparative purposes.

In Chapter II, political power structure was defined as "the pattern of role behavior of the incumbents of roles that are functionally related to the processes of political decision-making" and the incumbents of such roles were identified as the political elites. In this chapter these two definitions are expanded and their main analytical dimensions elaborated following the community power literature and the evidence of the political system of the Cuban Republic.

A political power structure is really the dividing line between the active and passive members of a political system, the dividing line between political leaders and political elites, and lower participants. These

three different sets of actors may be thought of as three concentric circles with the wider circle identifying all the members of the system, the intermediate circle identifying the political elite, and the last and center circle describing the political leadership group. Figure 5 illustrates the argument.




Figure 5.--The Stratification of a Political System

The elements of set C are usually identified as the lower participants of the system, but Kenneth Prewitt has offered a more attractive nomenclature calling them "the politically attentive public."¹ The elements of set B have been alternatively called social notables, economic notables and political leaders,² specialized elites,³ strategic elites,⁴

¹"From the Many are Chosen the Few," American Behavioral Scientist, XIII, No. 2 (November-December, 1969), 169-187.

²Dahl, op. cit.

³S. F. Nadel, "The Concept of Social Elites," International Social Science Bulletin, VIII (1956), 413-424.

⁴Suzann Keller, Beyond the Ruling Class (New York: Random House, 1963).

institutional leaders,⁵ etc. Probably the least that may be said about the elements of set B is that they possess some attribute which is valued by society. But this mere possession is not a sufficient condition for all of these elements to be included in A, because in order for any political elite--any individual possessing such an attribute--to become a political leader he must make use of the influence that these resources give him in order to augment his political power. Therefore, the elements of B, the political elite, are the people who have political resources and utilize them. The elements of A are the people who have utilized their influence in a way that has made them powerful.

The acquisition of a political elite status has been identified in the literature of comparative elite studies as "recruitment," but since elective and/or professional political actors are also included in this group, the term recruitment is exclusively confined to them in this study. The way in which people acquire a social, economic or institutional elite status is an interesting question, but the emphasis here is on how these and other actors become political leaders.

Recruitment in Republican Cuba

A careful analysis of the main dimensions of the recruitment process in Republican Cuba reveals that this process was organized around the formation of national coalitions, and that these coalitions were utilized by the participants in the process in order to maximize their particular goals.⁶

⁵Mills, op. cit.

⁶William H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1962). The assumption, definitions, and the model developed by Riker, together with some of the propositions advanced by the "rational explanation of voting behavior," will be utilized to describe the process of recruitment in Republican Cuba and to make inferences about the scope and nature of mass participation in this process.

The Rules of the Game

During the period with which this study is concerned two basic pieces of legislation provided the framework for the process of recruitment in Republican Cuba: the Electoral Code of 1943,⁷ and the Law-Decree #1215 of 1953.⁸ The former regulated the Presidential Elections of 1944 and 1948, and the midterm elections of 1946 and 1950; the latter regulated the much-disputed General Election of 1954.

The Electoral Code of 1943 was one of the most authoritative, successful, and relevant pieces of legislation ever produced in Cuba. The Code was authoritative because the most prominent participants in the electoral process had, at the time it was being drafted, the opportunity to intervene in its elaboration. Initially the pet project of Dr. Gustavo Gutiérrez, a representative of the Liberal Party, the project was referred to a committee of the leaders of the national political parties: Alfredo Hornedo, Guillermo Alonso Pujol, Joaquín Martínez Sáenz, Juan Marinello, and Ramón Grau San Martín. The Code favored the opposition to Batista in the Presidential Election of 1944 since it had a number of articles that gave the opposition coalition a comparative advantage in the counting of the Presidential and Senatorial ballots.⁹

There were pitfalls in the Code. For instance, Articles 231 through 233 were unconstitutional, since they gave partisan factions that could secure control over a provincial assembly of their party the opportunity

⁷Law #7 of May 31, 1943, Gaceta Oficial (June 1, 1943).

⁸Gaceta Oficial (December 10, 1953).

⁹"Código Electoral: Hacia una reforma substancial," Bohemia, XLII, No. 28 (July 9, 1950), 78-80.

to veto national coalition agreements concerted by the national assembly of the party. Also the provisions governing the canvassing of the senatorial ballot were criticized because they violated the spirit of Article 98 of the Constitution of 1940.¹⁰ These provisions allowed for the possibility that a relatively weak senatorial candidate would be elected instead of some other candidate who had more votes than he but belonged to a minority coalition.

Yet, these pitfalls fell considerably short of creating a voters' revolt or a revolt on the part of more prominent participants. The reason was that the Code was interpreted as fallible and amenable to revision through litigation. Therefore, since it was accepted by all the more prominent participants, the Code was undoubtedly authoritative. Moreover, the Superior Electoral Tribunal was the final arbiter in the litigation brought about by different interpretations of the Code, and its decisions were binding upon the actors involved in the litigation. The Tribunal was not perceived as being invulnerable to pressures and/or influence, but it served as an open and highly visible arena for the settlement of electoral conflict.

As compared with the previous elections, the elections celebrated under the auspices of the Code of 1943 were relatively peaceful. The number of deaths directly occasioned by electoral violence declined sharply. The number of opinions concerning these conflicts written by the Tribunal speaks of its relevance and salience to the participants in the recruitment process. Really, what the Code did was to institutionalize the process of elections in Cuba.

¹⁰ Raúl Lorenzo, "Es antidemocrático y carece de raíz constitucional el régimen de elección de senadores," Bohemia, XL, No. 34 (August 22, 1943), 55 and 79.

As for the Law-Decree #1215 of 1953, it had a chilling effect on recruitment for what it really did was to fix the "characteristic function," and diminish the "imputation" of the minority players in the 1954 General Election. This piece of legislation fell considerably short of the accomplishments of the Code and it really gave Batista the opportunity to create an overwhelming coalition that ultimately led to violence. Law-Decree #1215 was challenged by the opposition before the Tribunal but in this opportunity the Tribunal adhered to a strict interpretation of the letter of the law and both the Tribunal and the law fell in disrepute.

Participants in the Game

The Code of 1943 tried to strengthen the party system in a number of ways but this was one of the areas in which the Code failed--at least in the sense of institutionalizing the party system in Cuba. Among other things, the fact that the participants in the recruitment process were playing the game in a probabilistic and rational fashion implied that the parties were really electoral conglomerates the value and utility of which depended on their instrumentality as recruitment avenues.

Article 43 of the Code regulated the process of electoral reorganization of the parties. Every two years the parties had to update their registration figures before the Superior Electoral Tribunal. These and other articles were a specific attempt to counter-balance the effect of the traditional "political machines."¹¹ These machines were controlled,

¹¹The description of Robert K. Merton about the latent functions of political machines applies here in full. See his Social Theory and Social Structure (rev. ed.; New York: Free Press, 1957).

at the local level, by a political cadre: the sargentos. The sargento was the version of a fairly generalized political phenomenon that exists in the context of a patronage-clientele relationship and has been identified in the U.S. as the "ward heeler." The sargento was, therefore, a combination of electoral agent for higher level politicians and a point of access to the political system for disenfranchised groups.

There were two views of the sargento: a moralistic and critical view that called for the complete abolition of the machine and the sargento, and a second more realistic view that accepted the pitfalls of the system but interpreted them in a functional sense. The reformist view was supported by substantial sectors of the national press and the middle class. Supporters of this position were constantly calling for the decent citizens to "get the rascals out." The assumption and postulates of their argument were strikingly similar to those utilized by leaders of the movement that led to the creation of the city manager system and the non-partisan ballot in the U.S.¹² There is no evidence, at the time of this writing, that the Cuban press and other supporters of this position were getting their inspiration from American politics, and although this is a possibility, there were enough precedents of this position in Cuba.¹³

The position had a pessimistic tone, for it really never came around to offer a viable alternative to the machines. At the same time, it did

¹²See Edward C. Banfield (ed.), Urban Government (rev. ed.; New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 267-321.

¹³See Fernando Ortiz, La decadencia cubana (Habana: Imprenta y Papelería La Universal, 1924).

not go beyond the mere expression of dissatisfaction. The following is a typical critique of the system, out of an editorial of one of the national weekly magazines:

The political parties . . . appoint a committee in each neighborhood integrated by the professionals of politics, that is, salaried pranksters, collectively called sargentería that open an office in each neighborhood, install the affiliation tables in them, and then proceed to go hunting for the voters. The clientele is provided . . . by poor people, who frequently need to send someone in the family to a hospital that denies [them] the admission, or have a [pending] case before Correctional Court and need a recommendation for a judge . . . The sargento gets the sick admitted, gets the X-Ray, gets the prescription . . . and, on occasions, gives [them] a couple of quarters to help the menu of the day . . . This can be attributed to every party and, since the procedure is so generalized, then the process of democratic election is jeopardized and mimicked.¹⁴

The realistic view perceived things pretty much in the same manner but it interpreted them in a different way. It understood the quid pro quo of the sargentería system but it gave emphasis to the service aspect of the relationship between the sargento and his clientele. One of the most authoritative critics of traditional Cuban politics¹⁵ put it this way:

the factors of the private economy are not still sufficient enough so as to provide the means of subsistence to six million people . . . The national budget must supplement . . . [this] deficit inasmuch as possible . . . This is the social welfare aspect [of the budget] that almost all politicians have censored . . . but that none has dared to eradicate . . . The free vote (uncompromised by clientelism) is a luxury that only those who do not need the services of the sargento can afford . . . While the majority of the population is directly or indirectly linked to the budget there will not be a . . . [majority of votes that are] free.¹⁶

¹⁴"La farsa reorganizativa," Carteles, XXX, No. 42 (October 16, 1949), 25. See also "Política vs. decencia," Carteles, XXXIII, No. 6 (February 10, 1952).

¹⁵ABC, El ABC al pueblo de Cuba, Manifiesto-programa (Habana, 1932).

¹⁶Francisco Ichaso, "Democracia limitada," Bohemia, XLVI, No. 21 (May 23, 1954), 46 and 99.

The argument is apologetic and its appropriateness need not be weighed at this time except to say that this was the rationalization utilized by professional politicians in order to justify their use of the system and claim that evolutionary change would take care of it in the long run.

The sargento was typically a municipal councilman in a large city, or the mayor of a small town controlled by some higher level politician. The permanence of the sargento depended, among other things, on his ability to deliver services to his clientele in order to secure their loyalty at the time of the election. Therefore, the case of a group of neighbors who got together and elected their own representatives to the neighborhood committee and the municipal assembly of their party--as it had been the desideratum of the Code--never took place because the sargento had other ideas. By the time electoral reorganization came around the sargento would have monopolized most of the cédulas--the electoral i.d. cards of his neighbors--and would be negotiating with them, thus denying the group of neighbors the opportunity to organize themselves.

Depending on his autonomy, the sargento would utilize the cédulas for his compromisos--or deals--with candidates for higher office. If he was a subordinate of someone else, he would try to get the most out of his boss in exchange for the delivery of the vote, but he would have less room to maneuver. If he was a free agent, the sargento would then call for competitive bidding on his bloc of votes. Subordinate sargentos, therefore, negotiated the vote trying to maximize "contingent payments out of profits" while free sargentos would demand, more often

than not, "payment out of working capital."¹⁷ In both cases, the sargento would guarantee a minimum of votes on election day in return for the payoff.

The main sources of criticism leveled against the machine were that (1) it prevented the "best" people from being elected; (2) that it gave the advantage to the more "popular" candidates, or to anybody who could afford to purchase the vote, and (3) that it tended to recruit people who were only concerned with their own interests.¹⁸ The obvious corollary was that there was no room for decent people and meritorious candidates in the system. The main underlying assumption was, of course, that professional politicians were obnoxious.

True as this may have been, the fact remains that (1) the machines were based on competition; (2) that the machines were not completely closed, and (3) that quite a few candidates were elected outside the influence of the machines. Moreover, it could be argued that the machines are not stable forms of political organization.¹⁹

After all, the Ortodoxo party, a splinter group of the PRC, made it one of the more important points in its platform the eradication of the

¹⁷"Contingent payments out of profits" are the payments that an actor can make--or extract--out of the prospective gains of the decision at hand. "Payments out of working capital" are those payments that the actor--in this case the candidate himself--can make by the expenditure of present skills and possessions." The definitions are essentially Riker's, op. cit., p. 115.

¹⁸"El triunfo de la emoción," Carteles, XXIX, No. 23 (June 6, 1948), p. 25.

¹⁹James C. Scott, "Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change," American Political Science Review, LXIII, No. 4 (December, 1969), pp. 1142-58.

sargentería and the patronage system. Although this party was not exactly invulnerable to criticism on this source, it was successful in making administrative honesty and the end of corrupt political practices the issues of the 1952 Presidential campaign that was suddenly cut off by the coup of March, 1952. Therefore, if a group of professional politicians were trying to form a winning coalition in terms of these two issues, if they had been able to mount a serious challenge against the "in" party, if they had been able to elect a few of their top vote-getters to office, can it be said that the machines were unbeatable?

On the other hand, the fact that the machines were so widespread in Cuba may be interpreted as evidence that their use was a successful strategy that everyone had to utilize in order to stay in the game. By the same token, if the ortodoxos were so successfully utilizing "blue chip" candidates wouldn't this imply, in the long run, that the rest of the parties would have to follow suit? After all, Carlos Hevia, the Presidential candidate of the PRC for the election of 1952 was not the most popular, but the most honest auténtico and President Prío, who was the determining factor in Hevia's nomination, defended his choice in terms of the issues of the campaign and the unquestionable integrity of the candidate that the ortodoxos had come up with.

It is true that money was utilized as a "payment out of working capital" by many candidates. But the purchasing of the vote also required skill. Some people spent huge sums of money to get a senate seat and they failed. Moreover, except for the government itself, nobody could really afford to purchase all the sufficient votes for an elective office. Most of the experienced "buyers" waited until the

process of electoral reorganization had been completed and the integration of the municipal and provincial assemblies was underway before they made any move. Then, they would approach the sargentos in charge of the districts in which they knew they were weak and they would buy thus making an optimal use of their money.²⁰ Finally, the professional politicians perceived the opponents of the machine in a very critical way:

Sure . . . these were the people who wanted to get everything done through a book . . . Who were always around trying to make themselves visible at the time a Cabinet was being formed . . . the people who disliked having to embrace the Negro housewife or shooting the breeze with a grocer in order to find out what the folks really wanted.²¹

How widespread were these views of the Cuban electoral system nobody really knows. Certainly many of the more powerful functional groups--outside the Armed Forces and the Confederation of Labor--seemed to have shared the "moralistic" interpretation. Professional and voluntary associations seemed to have been the leaders in the campaign against corruption.²² Also the national weekly magazines played a preponderant role in the critique of the machines and their consequences.

On the other hand, most professional politicians did not question the necessity of the machine and the expediency of the politics of service and patronage engendered by the machine. In 1950, at a time when he badly needed Congress to act on his legislative program--which by the way was a program of undisputable national interest--President Prío told a gathering of lawyers in Holguín that he could not really

²⁰ Interview #2.

²¹ Interview #11.

²² See Club de Leones de la Habana, El peculado en Cuba (La Habana: Ojeda, 1949).

force the legislators to give him their undivided attention when the Electoral Code "imposed political obligations upon them."²³ President Prío finally got his program through Congress--making use of the patronage capability of the government--and the legislators continued to pay more attention to their clientele than to the pending business of Congress. This example shows that the machines, and more concretely, the patronage system, were value-free in the sense that they could be utilized for selfish or for national interests.

What kind of interpretation was more deeply rooted among the masses of voters is an entirely separate question. For instance, it can be said that a majority of the voters had some opinion about the performance of the national government. A poll taken in late 1951 showed that only 7 per cent of those interviewed did not know how to evaluate the performance of the Prío government.²⁴ Another poll, taken in early 1952, showed that the three most salient characteristics of the Presidential candidates were their promises of policy regarding programs of popular benefit, their reputation concerning their personal integrity, and their reputation concerning the respect they had for democratic practices.²⁵ These three items were the most frequently mentioned by those interviewed when they offered a rationale for their choice. Therefore, it can be shown that substantial segments among the masses of voters were aware of the impact

²³Carteles, XXXI, No. 36 (September 3, 1950), 96.

²⁴Raúl Gutiérrez, "El pueblo opina sobre el gobierno actual, los posibles candidatos presidenciales y los pactos de la ortodoxia," Bohemia, XLIII, No. 49 (December 16, 1951), 124-127, 146-148.

²⁵Carteles, XXXIII, No. 6 (February 10, 1952), 28-34.

that the national government and the action of political leaders had on them. The next and more important question would be the kind of attitude that they had with respect to the government.

The question is important because many professional politicians consider that the ortodoxos were partially responsible for the Batista coup because they undermined public confidence in the government with their tirades against it.²⁶ The argument has it that, as the government of President Prío came closer to the 1952 elections, the ortodoxos became less and less restrained in their accusations of corrupt and immoral practices against the government. They went as far as insulting the President himself and the members of his immediate family, accusing them of grand larceny, pushing drugs, etc. Although Prío sent the director of this strategy, Senator Eddy Chibás, to jail, a poll taken shortly thereafter showed the majority of the public in favor of releasing Chibás.²⁷ Ninety-three per cent of those interviewed knew Chibás was in jail and a majority of them--76 per cent--said Chibás should be absolved.²⁸ Prío, who took pride in reversing his decisions when they were unpopular,²⁹ released Chibás. Some may have interpreted this as proof that the government knew it did not have a case against Chibás and that Chibás really was telling the truth in his tirades against the government. This is very

²⁶Interview #8.

²⁷Raúl Gutiérrez, "El pueblo opina sobre la condena de Chibás," Bohemia, XLI, No. 19 (May 8, 1949), 52-53, 74.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Interview #14.

difficult to ascertain at this point, yet the fact remains that all Chibás was trying to do was maximize his chances of gaining the Presidency.

But there is evidence to show that public opinion was becoming more and more suspicious of the government. For instance, in late 1949, most of the people interviewed in a national poll said that they considered the loan the Prío government was trying to negotiate as detrimental to the country.³⁰ Also, when Prío launched his Nuevos Rumbos policy--essentially an effort to convince the public that the government was serious about its efforts to clean the administration--a poll taken immediately thereafter showed that 53.07 per cent of the interviewees were not aware of this policy. The pollster concluded in his analysis that the government was suffering from a lack of popular credibility although he specifically mentioned that a drop in the popularity of the government could not only be explained in terms of an increasingly high regard for the Ortodoxo party.³¹

In summary, there is very little doubt that the machine greatly compromised the scope of governmental action in Cuba and that it introduced an informal component that diminished the capabilities of the administration in turn. The critique against the machines became a constant argument that functional groups utilized in order to mobilize public opinion. This state of opinion was utilized by an opposition party in order to maximize the probability of its becoming the majority

³⁰Raúl Gutiérrez, "2^o Survey sobre el empréstito," Bohemia, XLI, No. 47 (November 20, 1949), 84-86.

³¹Raúl Gutiérrez, "En un survey nacional el pueblo opina, sobre el gobierno, el nuevo rumbo, Grau, Batista y Chibás," Bohemia, XLII, No. 14 (April 2, 1950), 86-88, 98.

party. The leaders of this party successfully identified the government itself as the main culprit behind the corrupt practices of the machine and most of the real--or imaginary--"evils" of Cuban politics. Finally, it seems that the main effect of the propaganda barrage against the machine was to undermine public confidence in the system.

A reform of the machine system was possible if the rules of the recruitment game were changed and/or if one of the participants in the game showed that there was one strategy that rendered the machines obsolete. The ortodoxos were the first to break the rules since they sided with functional groups in denouncing the rest of the more prominent participants in the game before public opinion. They tried to establish a direct link between their top leadership and the mass of voters, but they unwisely undermined public confidence in the idea of a party system. The fact that their strategy was successful--short of their winning the Presidency--proved that the other participants in the game had to follow suit or revise their utilization of the machines and try to coopt functional eminents or other actors in order to counterbalance the ortodoxo drive. This was the state of affairs when Batista stepped in and reorganized the recruitment process in his own benefit.

The Rationality of the Game

Whether immoral or practical, the machine was one of the available strategies that participants in the recruitment process in Cuba could utilize in order to maximize the payoffs they got out of the process. The fact that these players were willing to stay in the game utilizing

the machine--regardless of whether or not they had a viable alternative--speaks of the existence of an internal logic in the recruitment process. It will be shown that the utilization of this logic by the players constituted rational behavior.³²

The first set of actors that can be identified in the recruitment process, the voters, had a rational behavior. Those who had compromised their vote with the machine were trying to maximize the "utility function"³³ that induced them to participate in the game. These voters really had very little choice. They lacked any organizational resources outside the machines. These were the voters who were not trade union members, or members of some other voluntary organization that could support their demands upon the system. These were the voters who really needed the sargento and the services that he offered to them and they were behaving in a rational manner when they accepted the compromise created by their utilization of those services. After all, many of the proposals for the elimination of the machines were concomitant with the establishment of literacy and/or other requirements for the suffrage. Obviously, these and similar proposals were not exactly a bland alternative for the clients of the machine.

The dilemma involved in the explanation of the behavior of the free voters--those who could afford the luxury of ignoring the sargentería--³⁴

³²There is considerable debate about the rationality of political man and there are numerous models of rational choice in the Social Sciences today. The present usage of rationality conforms to Riker, op. cit., p. 23.

³³A utility function is basically the net payoff that an actor may derive from his choice behavior in a given situation. The function may be described as the difference between expected gains minus expected losses.

³⁴"El mercado de votos y otros asquitos," Carteles, XXXI, No. 15 (April 9, 1950), 52.

is essentially the same sort of dilemma that V. O. Key and Angus Campbell and his associates tried to solve in their explanation of the behavior of the American voter.³⁵ Key offered what amounted to a rational theory of choice based on the premise that the electorate analyzes the performance of the national parties and makes a decision on the basis of its estimates of the future performance of the parties. Campbell and his colleagues emphasized the social and psychological aspects of this choice offering a dispositional explanation of the voting act. There have been some attempts to conciliate both types of explanations³⁶ but, in the present case, the interpretation that these voters were trying to maximize some utility function will be adopted.

The second set of actors, the political cadre or sargentería, also tried to maximize their profits. They secured the most favorable compromises they could and tried to get the most out of them because their own political permanence depended on their doing so. They were predominantly oriented to their clientele and to the candidates for whom they were delivering the vote. They carefully analyzed the payoffs they could obtain from their association with these candidates, and they calculated the costs of getting them in office. Finally, they tried to optimize their utilization of coercion and inducements with the clientele in order to maximize the probability that they would be able to deliver the vote.

³⁵V. O. Key, The Responsible Electorate (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), and Angus Campbell et al, The American Voter: An Abridgement (New York: Wiley, 1965).

³⁶Michael J. Shapiro, "Rational Political Man: A Synthesis of Economic and Social Psychological Perspectives," American Political Science Review, LXIII, No. 4 (December, 1969), 1106-1118.

The third set of actors included the candidates for office, and they also behaved rationally. The assumption here is that these actors tried to maximize their chances of coming to office and staying in office at all times. Some say these were their only motives.³⁷ But regardless of whether or not these were the only or the principal motives they were a goal being maximized by all candidates.

The first type of candidates were the professional politicians, the manengues,³⁸ who always managed to return to office or to get around a setback and reappear the next time around. The manengues were probably all the things they were reputed to be but they also behaved rationally in the process. They were really sargentos of a higher category who had their own cadre to take care of the local clientele while they themselves took care of the more select clients. The difference between the manengue and the sargento was that the former was usually a congressman, while the latter was a lower level politician. Probably more important was the fact that the manengue was the link between the bombines,³⁹ who ventured into elective politics, and the machine.

The bombines were the second type of candidates. They largely operated outside the machines since their goal offices⁴⁰ were predominantly ministerial and/or appointive. They based their claim to office on their functional or technical expertise, although some of them were really generalists who had made a career out of holding any ministerial job.

³⁷ Interview #12.

³⁸ See Figure 3, Chapter IV.

³⁹ See note 27 and Figure 3, Chapter IV.

⁴⁰ Schlesinger, op. cit.

They were called bombines because

they were the figureheads who on the basis of friendship or their reputation of honorable people were brought into the Cabinet in order to increase its respectability . . . They disdained the servitude imposed by running for elective office . . . They were the eternal aspirants for the Cabinet who patiently waited their turn.⁴¹

There was an explicit antagonism between bombines and manengues. It is possible to speculate that they were two stereotypes that represented two different political styles: the technocrat and the professional politician. Also, it is possible to say that those who called for the extermination of the machine exaggerated the civic virtues of the bombín and minimized his political ambitions. The fact that many of them ventured into the realm of elective politics does not corroborate this impression.⁴²

Some of the bombines indeed ventured into elective politics. According to one of the leading supporters of the "politics of decency" they were being utilized by the manengues as live bait in a ticket in order to make the ticket more respectable.⁴³ However, it is also possible that the bombines were not so disdainful of the machine when they were willing to utilize it in order to get in office.

The bombín had his own clientele but in his case this was always a functional clientele with which he identified in terms of his personal background. He was brought into the Cabinet because he was a representative

⁴¹ Interviews #2, 8, 10.

⁴² Interview #8.

⁴³ "Política vs. decencia," op. cit.

of one of such groups and this was a way in which the administration helped enhance its image with the group. This is the origin of the distinction that was made in Cuban politics between a "political" and a "technical" cabinet and, needless to say, opinion was polarized about the advantages and disadvantages of the two in the same way opinion was polarized about the significance of the manengue and the bombín. Most professional politicians were adamant about the necessity of the political cabinet but obviously every President had to conciliate both criteria attending to the prevalent climate of opinion about his administration. However, President Grau was notorious for his Cabinet selections because he really followed his own preference above any imaginable criterion of expediency.

The bombín was usually a non-partisan candidate although every party had its own set of available bombines. They were essentially amateurs and at times they were really the delegates of some high level politician who for a number of reasons could not appear in the Cabinet.⁴⁴

A third type of candidate was, in terms of the way he was recruited, a curious mixture of the bombín and the manengue. These were candidates who relied on the machine and the sargento in order to maximize the probability of their being elected, but who also had a functional clientele. These candidates utilized a party label and usually held some formal party office. They were likely prospects for a Cabinet portfolio and the fact that they had some electoral support made them more powerful than the bombines.

⁴⁴ Interview #3.

Finally there were the electoral leaders who made the fourth type of candidates. The leaders not only participated in the bargaining for the creation of national coalitions, but also were within range of a Presidential candidacy. Their electoral resources surpassed those of the rest of the participants in the recruitment process and they had powerful machines that included delegates in several provinces. However, they also had a following among the free voters on the basis of their national visibility and their leadership status in the national parties. The most popular of these leaders were called porta-aviones--literally aircraft carriers--for they could deliver a large number of votes in behalf of their electoral entourage. For the period with which this investigation is concerned, there were only two porta-aviones in Cuba: Ramón Grau San Martín and Eduardo Chibás. However, there were a number of leaders who could get a heavy vote for a national office on their own.

The leaders also behaved rationally although some incurred in serious miscalculation that had systemic repercussion in trying to promote their Presidential aspirations. However, most of them knew all the intricacies of the Electoral Code or had a competent staff that did nothing but research the Code in order to create electoral formulas that could benefit their cause. The leaders were the participants in the recruitment process who operated at a truly national level and the focal points of the controversy between realists and reformists. They were forced to justify their electoral deals in a programmatic fashion, but it is doubtful that they were successful in doing this.

The leaders were the participants in the recruitment process who made more extensive use of all the different features of the Code. They

monitored the reorganization of all the parties and derived their own estimates of the organizational and electoral capabilities of the parties before they initiated any coalition moves. Moreover, they used the affiliation figures as indicators of the "weight"⁴⁵ that the parties had in order to negotiate the "imputation"⁴⁶ of the parties in different possible coalitions.⁴⁷

Winning was, therefore, the goal being maximized by all the participants in the recruitment process in Cuba and, in order to win, they

⁴⁵Riker, op. cit., p. 78.

⁴⁶ibid., p. 37. Riker defines imputation as "the statement of the payment to each player (in this case the parties) in a given structure of coalitions."

⁴⁷Article 43 of the Code imposed a mandatory biennial reorganization for all parties. In order to qualify for the status of national party, every party had to come up with a number of affiliations larger than a predetermined arbitrary percentage of the total number of affiliated voters. Otherwise, the party could not participate in national elections with its own candidates. This was a life or death matter for all parties and they used whatever means they could in order to exaggerate their affiliations. Obviously, the affiliation process was manipulated by the sargentos, manengues, and the leaders themselves. Usually the sargentos of the parties had collected the electoral identification cards of their clients, and by the time of the electoral affiliation process they had brought their resources. At this time many deceased voters, and many imaginary voters were inscribed in the party rolls in order to inflate the figures. Because of all this, the number of affiliations that a particular party claimed was never taken as definite but only as an approximate figure of its real number of affiliates. Consequently the registration figures were merely estimates of the organizational capability of the party's sargentería and not of the "free" electoral following of the party. But this was used to estimate the weight of the party and make proposals to it. The fact that the leaders were monitoring the "moves" of other leaders and that they had gathered intelligence on all the main actors in the recruitment process for a particular election, implied that, at least during election time, the leaders could make their decisions on the basis of "systematically complete information," and "partially perfect information." Riker, op. cit., p. 78.

behaved rationally even at times when their course of action was not the best in terms of their own interests. Voters, cadre, and candidates tried to maximize the payoffs of the system, although the magnitude and nature of these payoffs varied for each set of actors and for each individual actor in each set.

But winning was not the main motive of the fourth and last type of participants in the game. These participants had been included in the game because the authors of the Code assumed the conflictive nature of the game itself and the need to provide institutional channels for the resolution of conflict created by the game. Notice that the Code did not assume that conflict could arise but rather that the nature of the game itself was conflictive. Moreover, they interpreted this conflict as political in nature and tried to elaborate political remedies to it.

These participants were the Magistrates of the Superior Electoral Tribunal, and the members of other branches of the Judiciary that acted as delegates of the Tribunal at the local and provincial levels. The role these actors were supposed to play in the game was fairly complex. Conceivably, their predominant function was the arbitration of electoral disputes stemming from an interpretation of the Code or created by some formula conceived by the leaders. The idea was to minimize conflict but not in the sense of preventing it--since this was impossible--but in the sense of keeping the process in operation in spite of conflict.

Each party was represented before the Tribunal and any one group of ten citizens could petition the Tribunal for an opinion. Obviously any predisposition of the Tribunal to a particular type of outcome or to a

specific outcome cannot be accounted for unless the distribution of role orientations among the members of the Tribunal is specified. This is impossible at the present time, but it is possible that two broad types of judicial role orientations applied: restraint and activism.⁴⁸ A restrained orientation would have characterized those judges who had a constructionist and purely legalistic approach to each case, although it can be inferred that this approach responded to the values of the judges in question. On the other hand, the activist orientation could be attributed to those judges who were trying to "apply the law and help the underdog . . . [following the assumption that] a judicial functionary can apply the law and serve a friend at the same time."⁴⁹

There were numerous reports of pressures brought upon the Magistrates in one occasion or the other. However, the contention that the Tribunal served its function while the Electoral Code of 1943 was in force seems very reasonable. At the time when the Tribunal failed to help the underdog--during the debates of Law-Decree #1215, which were carried live on national television--the Code was no longer operative and the political climate that helped its application was gone. Even in this occasion the Tribunal was an arena to which the opposition against Batista brought its case and proved the real intentions of the regime at the time of the 1954 elections.

⁴⁸See Harold J. Spaeth, "Judicial Power as a Variable Motivating Supreme Court Behavior," Midwest Journal of Political Science, VI (May, 1962), 54-82.

⁴⁹"Política: La Madre del Cordero," Bohemia, XL, No. 10 (March 7, 1948), 49-54.

Figure 6 summarizes the main points of the discussion. The figure describes the nature of the relationships between the incumbents of the more salient focal positions of the recruitment process. Given the complexity of the role structure of recruitment, the figure is really an n-diatic model for this structure. The notion of a system of stratification is implicit in the figure in the sense of a lack of direct interactions between some pairs of positions. For instance, leaders were cutoff from the "compromised voters" by the sargentería and the manengues. These acted as the delegates of the leaders before the base--the voters--and they represented a structural barrier between leaders and lower participants.

The figure also delineates the strategies utilized by different participants in terms of their associations with other actors and the payoffs that both extracted from the relationship. A concrete case refers to the strategy of the bombín: completely cutoff from the lower levels of the machine and trying to "win" by his interaction with other candidates and "free voters." Moreover, the bombín and the hybrid types of candidates relied on the support of "outside groups"--read functional groups--in order to maximize their winning chances.

Obviously, the candidates with the greatest number of alternatives open to them were the bombines and the hybrids, and it is certainly no coincidence that they add up to a majority of the Ministers included in the sample of this investigation.

The capitalized subheadings of the figure describe the main relationships between the broad types in which the participants in the process of recruitment have been classified, and the main counter-

Focal positions	Relevant Counter-positions	Goals maximized by incumbents of focal positions in their interactions with incumbents of relevant counter-positions
(1) VOTERS	CANDIDATES	PAYMENTS
Compromised	sargentos	payments out of profits
Free	manengues	payments out of work capital
	candidates	payments out of profits
(2) CANDIDATES	(1), (2), (3), (4)	WINNING
Manengues	sargentos	payments out of work capital
	other candidates	payments out of work capital
	leaders	payments out of profits and payments out of work capital
Bombines	free voters	payments out of work capital
	interest groups	payments out of work capital
	manengues	payments out of work capital
	leaders	winning
Hybrids	sargentos	payments out of work capital
	manengues	payments out of work capital
	free voters	payments out of work capital
	interest groups	payments out of work capital
	leaders	winning
Electoral Leaders	free voters	winning
	other leaders	payments out of profits and payments out of work capital
	arbiters	winning
(3) CADRES	(1) and (2)	PAYMENTS
Sargentos	hybrids	Payments out of work capital
Subordinates	manengues	Payments out of profits

(4) ARBITERS	CANDIDATES	CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
Magistrates	litigants*	compliance

*Refers to two or more candidates or group of candidates who had sought the arbitration of the Tribunal.

Some relationships that are theoretically possible have been excluded because they were not frequent enough in Cuba, e.g., the relationship between voters and arbiters. Others have been excluded because they are really accounted for by others: the relationship between candidates and compromised voters in which the sargento was the intermediary.

Figure 6.--The Role Structure of the Recruitment Process in Cuba.

positions of these focal positions are specified in the capitalized headings of the second column.

Finally, since this is a study that focuses on leadership behavior, there is always the danger of overlooking the impact of the mass on leadership behavior. And this is necessary, in the present case, because the main assumption validating the applicability of the Code of 1943--the scrupulous tally of the vote--was strictly enforced until 1952. Therefore, all the deals and compromises concerted by the leaders were really tentative pending the ultimate verdict of the polls.

It can be shown that there was always a discrepancy between the number of affiliations that a party claimed at the time of reorganization and the number of votes it got at the time of the election.⁵⁰ Therefore, the strategies utilized by the leaders in order to prevent a serious setback must be examined especially in terms of their relationships with the mass. Consequently, the "weight" of the mass in the game of recruitment must also be specified.

⁵⁰See Table 12 in the next chapter.

CHAPTER VII

THE CONTEXT OF CUBAN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP: POPULAR PARTICIPATION

The enforcement of the Code of 1943, together with Batista's scrupulous respect for the results of the 1944 Presidential Election, increased the level of mass participation in the Cuban process of recruitment. The fact that Batista had graciously accepted the defeat of his Presidential candidate--Carlos Saladrigas--and the coming to power of Ramón Grau San Martín--the most popular Cuban President after the 1933 Revolution--were hopeful signs of the beginning of a new era in Cuban politics. Ironically, it was Batista himself who forestalled these hopes with his coup of March, 1952. But the greatest irony of it all was that one of the reasons that precipitated the coup was the fact that Batista was ostracized and denied any possibility of winning--deriving some sort of payoff from his participation in the formation of national coalitions--or even avoiding a complete defeat in the election. Because Batista's gains and losses had been fixed by the coalitions from which he was excluded, he decided to make a risky move, and he stopped the process altogether.

Dimensions of Popular Participation

The description of the main characteristics of the recruitment process in Cuba dictates a careful utilization of the traditional indicators of voting behavior and mass participation that are available.

The focus here is on the interaction between two basic units of value-- votes and cédulas--and the parametric constraints on the elasticity of these values: the universe of eligible voters, and the feasible number of participating voters.

The universe of eligible voters refers to all the elements included in set S --Figure 7--and these elements may be defined as the citizens who meet the minimal requirements of the suffrage. The elements of A , a subset of S , are the affiliated voters and they are defined as the participants in the electoral process who invest at least one of their two basic units of value--the cédula--in the process. The elements of B , also a subset of S , are the voters or those participants who spend at least one of their two basic units of value in the process: their vote. Finally, \overline{AB} , the complement of the union of A and B , contains all the non participant elements or those eligible voters who spend neither of their two basic units of value in the electoral process.

Other subsets of S that have an immediate relevance for the purpose of this study are also represented in Figure 7. The first of these is A_1 , the area of A that is not common with B , and the elements included in this area are the affiliated and non-voting participants. The second of these subsets is B_1 , or the area of B that is not common with A and contains all the non-affiliated and voting elements of S . B_1 has been customarily identified in the literature as the "independent vote," and the elements of this subset were identified in the previous chapter as the "free voters," while the elements of A were referred to as the "compromised voters."




Figure 7.--Dimensions of Popular Participation in the Electoral System in Cuba

- Set definitions:
- $A \in S, \quad 0 < P(A) < 1 \quad (1)$
 - $\bar{B} \in S, \quad 0 < P(\bar{B}) < 1 \quad (2)$
 - $AB \in S, \quad 0 < P(AB) < 1 \quad (3)$
 - $A_1 \in A, \quad 0 < P(A_1) < 1 \quad (4)$
 - $B_1 \in B, \quad 0 < P(B_1) < 1 \quad (5)$
 - $\bar{A} \in S, \quad 0 < P(\bar{A}) < 1 \quad (6)$
 - $\bar{B} \in S, \quad 0 < P(\bar{B}) < 1 \quad (7)$
 - $AB = A \cap B \in S, \quad 0 < P(AB) < 1 \quad (8)$

- Element definitions:
- S_k : eligible voters
 - A_i : affiliated voters
 - B_j : voters
 - $\bar{A}_i \bar{B}_j$: marginals, non-affiliated, non-voting
 - $B_{1.}$: non-affiliated, voting
 - \bar{A}_1 : non-affiliated
 - \bar{B}_j : non-voting
 - $A_i B_j$: affiliated and voting

Obviously the magnitude of these sets--including S itself--vary over time but the important point is that the analysis of their relative magnitudes and the way in which they are interrelated can be used to derive inferences about the main dimensions of popular participation in the electoral system, or what Jack Dennis has called the levels of "support for the institution of elections."¹

The probabilities associated with the event that any one element of S--the universe of eligible voters--will be included in one of these sets can be used as indicators of different aspects of popular participation in the electoral process. Five of these aspects will be described and examined.

The first of these aspects refers to the organizational capability of the system and is measured by $P(A)$, the probability that a given number of electors will be affiliated to the parties. This probability is simply a linear function of $P(A_1)$ and $P(AB)$. But since both A_1 and AB are usually unknown or very hard to determine, the computational procedure for $P(A)$ is simply to divide the number of affiliated voters by the number of eligible voters. Obviously, the degree of distortion introduced by the machines is lost in the procedure and the inferences derived from the behavior of $P(A)$ have to be restricted to the capability of the infrastructure of the system to obtain a minimal degree of participation--the investment of the cédula in the process--from elements of the universe of eligible voters.

¹"Support for the Institution of Elections by the Mass Public," American Political Science Review, LXIV, No. 3 (September, 1970), 819-831.

Table 12 clearly indicates that the extractive capability of the political infrastructure decreased by twenty-two per cent between 1944 and 1954 in Cuba. Comparing the three Presidential elections for which data are available, it is possible to show that both the number of non-participants and the number of non-affiliated electors increased between 1948 and 1954, while the number of participants practically remained constant, and the number of non-affiliated electors increased between 1944 and 1948. The inference is that the party system was diminishing in importance as an avenue of popular participation in the electoral process in Cuba.

The second aspect of popular participation, the minimal marginality--the minimal level of no participation--that exists in the system at a given point in time, is measured by $P(\bar{A})$, the complement of $P(A)$. It seems redundant to utilize this measure, but the nature of the definitional formula for $P(\bar{A})$ indicates that there is no methodological overkill involved in considering both $P(A)$ and $P(\bar{A})$. The reason is that, being the complement of $P(A)$, one can expand $P(\bar{A}) = 1 - P(A) = 1 - [P(A_1) + P(AB)]$, the solution set of which is given by $P(\bar{A}) = P(\bar{AB}) + P(B_1)$. Consequently, if one assumes that in every electoral system there is always a fairly stable set of hard-core non-participants--given by $P(\bar{AB})$ --the variance of $P(\bar{A})$ can be predominantly attributed to $P(B_1)$, the size of the independent electorate.²

²This is the optimistic version of the reformist argument. See "El mercado de votos," op. cit. Also, "Elecciones: La lección del primero de junio," Bohemia, XLII, No. 24 (June 11, 1950), 75-81, 84, 95. A dissenting opinion may be found in Francisco Ichaso, "Ante el proceso afiliatorio," Bohemia, XLVI, No. 7 (February 14, 1954), 44, 90. The argument here is that $P(B_1)$ was increasing all the time, while $P(AB)$

Obviously, $P(\bar{A})$ increased in Cuba, between 1944 and 1954, by an amount equal in magnitude to the decrease of $P(A)$ for the same period. But in this case the variation was not primarily due to fluctuations in the number of full participants--voting affiliates--but to the fluctuation in the number of independents. Therefore, interpreting the behavior of $P(A)$ and $P(\bar{A})$ together, it can be said that the decrease in the organizational capability of the electoral system in Cuba was primarily due to popular dissatisfaction with the parties but not with the system of elections.

The analysis of the behavior of the third indicator confirms this interpretation. This indicator--which is customarily called "voting turnout"--is represented by $P(B)$, the probability that a given number of electors will vote in a particular election. The dimensions that this indicator purports to measure, the support aspect of the extractive capability of the system, is the most reliable measure of popular participation. However, the reliability of the indicator itself depends on the fact that the probability of manipulation of the voting results is indeed negligible.

remained relatively constant. Therefore, if the rate of change of $P(\bar{A})$ increased, it was mainly the result of the former. A similar argument could not be made with respect to the relationship between $P(A)$ and $P(A_1)$ because, for the period under consideration, $\Delta P(AB) > \Delta P(A_1)$. Consequently, both had to be taken into consideration in explaining the variation of $P(A)$. On the other hand, $P(\bar{A}\bar{B})$ has been defined as $P(R)$, and $P(RB_1) = \emptyset$ and $P(RA_1) = \emptyset$, so there are three separate aspects: no participation, participation in terms of affiliation without voting, and participation in terms of voting without affiliation. There is no possibility of overlapping among the three, although for the sake of simplicity it is assumed that the first-- $P(\bar{A}\bar{B})$ --remains relatively constant.

As interpreted in the present context, this measure of popular participation incorporates two aspects of support for the electoral system: the approval of the electoral process itself, and the perceived efficacy of a particular election.³

The data presented in Table 12 show that this supportive capability of the mass for the electoral process declined dramatically between the election of 1948 and the election of 1954. Therefore, both the popular approval for the way in which the electoral process was being conducted, and the perceived efficacy of the election of 1954 were very low. The concomitant result was the withdrawal of hard currency--votes--from the system by a substantial segment of the electorate.

The fourth indicator is simply $P(\bar{B})$, the complement of $P(B)$, and it measures the maximum marginality that exists in the system at a given point in time, or simply the maximum level of no participation. Again, there is no redundance in the utilization of both $P(B)$ and $P(\bar{B})$. The reason is that $P(B) = P(B_1) + P(AB)$ and $P(\bar{B}) = P(\bar{A}\bar{B}) + P(A_1)$. So, although both will be related in an inverse ratio they refer to different aspects of popular participation if, again, one assumes that $\Delta P(\bar{A}\bar{B}) \neq 0$. In this case the greatest influence in the fluctuations of $P(\bar{B})$ would be attributable to $P(A_1)$, the proportion of disgruntled, non-voting affiliates. However, it is also possible that $P(A_1)$ is really a function of the degree of distorsion introduced by the machines during the affiliation process--the affiliation of deceased and/or imaginary electors, etc.

Inspection of the data presented in Table 12 indicates that the magnitude of $P(\bar{B})$ precludes the latter interpretation, at least for the 1944 and 1948 Presidential elections. With respect to the 1954 election

³ Dennis, op. cit., pp. 828-830.

--that elicited the least amount of participation on all counts--it may be said that in spite of the inordinate manipulation of the cédulas by the coalition of parties that supported Batista⁴ the number of people who were affiliated and did not vote must have been very high. The net analytical outcome seems to be that, in effect, party dissatisfaction was rampant in the sense of a solid proportion of affiliates who refused to spend their vote in this election thus censoring the performance of their parties.

Finally, the analysis turns to a summary measure of all the dimensions discussed above because it is necessary to ascertain the meaning of the observable discrepancies between the organizational and the supportive capabilities of the electoral process in Cuba. It may be hypothesized that both of these capabilities would converge and become identical if both $P(A_1)$ and $P(B_1)$ tended to disappear, thus allowing for an optimal level of performance of the party system. Then, these capabilities would converge and become identical if both $P(A_1)$ and $P(B_1)$ tended to disappear thus allowing for an optimal level of performance of the party system. Then, these capabilities would be given by $P(AB)$ since

$$\lim_{P(A_1) \rightarrow 0} P(A) = P(AB)$$

and also

$$\lim_{P(B_1) \rightarrow 0} P(B) = P(AB)$$

However, neither $P(A_1)$ nor $P(B_1)$ tended to disappear in Cuba during the period with which this investigation is concerned--nor are they likely

⁴Bohemia, XLVI, No. 24 (June 13, 1954), 76-78. Also Herminio Portell Vilá, "De elector a elector," Bohemia, LXVI, No. 43 (October 24, 1954), 23, 111.

to disappear in any competitive party system. On the other hand, the fluctuations of $P(\overline{AB})$ were considered minimal following the premise that no electoral system can function at full participation and that there is always a residual segment of hard-core non-participants. It was also hypothesized, as a consequence of this, that the fluctuations of two different aspects of incomplete participation, $P(\overline{A})$ and $P(\overline{B})$, could be explained in terms of the fluctuations of two measures of dissatisfaction with the party system: $P(A_1)$ and $P(B_1)$. The important question would then be: What is the interaction between these two measures of system inefficiency?

In the first place, the nature of this interaction is essentially linear because, by definition $P(A_1 B_1) = \emptyset$. On the other hand, the union of A_1 and B_1 is logically possible, but it cannot be estimated since AB is not known. However, the seemingly trivial $P(B_1) - P(A_1)$, not only can be estimated but it happens to be identical with $P(B) - P(A)$,⁵ and this is what the discrepancy is all about. That is, the difference between the percentage of non-affiliated voters and the percentage of affiliated non-voters is the best measure of the performance of the party system, and the size and magnitude of this measure will be amenable to inferences about whether the party system was mobilizing or alienating people in Cuba. Finally, since all possible sets in S may be defined in terms of A or B , or both, the discrepancy between the two incorporates every possible source of variance in S .⁶

⁵Proof: $P(B) - P(A) = [P(B_1) + P(AB)] - [P(A_1) + P(AB)] = P(B_1) - P(A_1)$.

⁶ $P(B) - P(A)$ is also a measure of the discrepancy between minimal and maximum marginality: $P(B) - P(A) = [1 - P(\overline{B})] - [1 - P(\overline{A})] = P(\overline{A}) - P(\overline{B})$.

The results of Table 12 offer the two possible cases that may be obtained for the discrepancy: mobilization-- $P(B_1) > P(A_1)$ --or simply a high rate of participation outside the party infrastructure, and alienation-- $P(B_1) < P(A_1)$ --a low rate of participation. The magnitude of this mobilization-alienation dimension--as the table shows--are not impressive but the reasons for this are simple. In order for mobilization to occur, in an electoral system based on clientelism, both minimal and maximum marginality have to be low, but the former must be greater than the latter. This is only possible if B_1 increases at the expense of AB and obviously the increase of B_1 can be cancelled off by party switches.

On the other hand, alienation from the electoral system implies that both $P(A)$ and $P(B)$ will be relatively low so chances are that the magnitude of their discrepancy will be low unless a considerable manipulation of the voting results--a possibility in the case of the 1954 election--takes place. Moreover, alienation implies that \overline{AB} will increase at the expense of AB , B_1 , and A_1 . However, an electoral system based on clientelism does not allow for greater fluctuations in AB because alienated affiliates who choose to vote have to vote for a given party and, again, these fluctuations will remain within AB .

In Cuba, the Presidential elections of 1948 and 1954, offer two good examples of mobilization and alienation respectively. For the 1948 data the discrepancy between participation and organization rates is small but positive. The 1954 data confirms the impression of a high and undisguisable incidence of alienation. However, the election of 1944--in spite of the conventional wisdom about the "glorious journey" of Dr. Grau into the Presidency--seems to have taken place in a context of alienation.

TABLE 12

DIMENSIONS OF POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN
THE ELECTORAL PROCESS IN CUBA

Dimensions	Indicators	Definitional formulas	Computational formulas
Organizational capability	$P(A)$	$P(A_1)+P(AB)$	affiliated/elegible
Minimal marginality	$P(\bar{A})$	$1-P(A)$	$1-(\text{affiliated/elegible})$
Supportive capability	$P(B)$	$P(B_1)+P(AB)$	voting/elegible
Maximum marginality	$P(\bar{B})$	$1-P(B)$	$1-(\text{voting/elegible})$
Mobilization- alienation	$P(B)-P(A)$	$P(B_1)-P(A_1)$	$(\text{voting-affil.})/\text{elegible}$

Dimensions	Presidential Elections Years		
	1944	1948	1954
Organizational capability	90.49	78.12	68.40
Minimal marginality	9.51	21.88	31.60
Supportive capability	80.73	79.46	52.56
Maximum marginality	19.17	20.54	47.44
Mobilization-alienation	- 9.66	+ 1.34	-15.84

Source: Computed from Mario Riera, Cuba Política, 1899-1955 (La Habana: Impresora Modelo, S.A., 1955), pp. 521, 529, 561, 601, 606.

This was, in effect, the case and the explanation lies in the size of $P(\bar{A})$, the level of minimal marginality. What this very low level means is that $P(\bar{AB})$ --allowing for the incidence of inflated registration figures--was, at best, 9.51 per cent. Consequently, the rate of mobilization--participation outside the party infrastructure was low, and also $P(B_1)$ was low, the discrepancy was primarily a function of $P(A_1)$. But a theoretically high proportion of affiliated and non-voting electors cannot be explained by the use of coercion by the government against the opposition since this was definitely not the case. Therefore, there was a residue of affiliates who did not perceive the efficacy of the election, or a number of "compromised voters" who switched their allegiance in the privacy of the voting booth. If one inspects the registration figures that the parties claimed at the time the electoral reorganization of 1943 took place, and one compares these affiliation figures with the vote that every party got in 1944, it becomes obvious that the opposition coalition--which actually won the election--mobilized voters, that is, it got more votes than it had affiliates, and the government coalition alienated them.⁷

Mobilization and Alienation: 1944-1958

A subtle distinction was introduced in the last paragraph of the preceding section in the sense of coalitions having their own participatory

⁷See "Resumen de la votación de cada partido político en las elecciones," Diario de la Marina (July 18, 1944), 2:3. The Diario reported official figures distributed by the Superior Electoral Tribunal.

and organizational capabilities. Up to this point the usage of these terms had been confined to the system of elections in general, but now that a summary measure of participation has been elaborated, this usage may be made extensive to coalitions and parties. After all, most of the equations utilized in the discussion could be rewritten adding more subscripts and using double summation signs to differentiate government and opposition, winners and losers, etc. Therefore, for every party or coalition "i," the same properties of $P(B) - P(A)$ and $P(B_1) - P(A_1)$ that are given for the system in general are obtained. Consequently, for every party i:

$$P(B) - P(A) = P(B_1) - P(A_1) = \sum_1^n [P(B_i) - P(A_i)] = \sum_1^n [P(B_{1i}) - P(A_{1i})], \text{ where } n$$

is the number of participating parties at a given time.

A concrete example of this is given by the results of the election of 1944. Two coalitions and six parties participated in this election. The government coalition is shown to have alienated a number of its claimed affiliates because $P(B_g) - P(A_g) = -24.26$. If the discrepancy of every participant in this coalition is computed and all the discrepancies of the parties composing the coalition are added up, the result is -22.79 . The reason behind $-24.26 \neq -22.79$ is that the results for a very minor participant in this coalition--the Partido Nacional Cubano--were not included. The match is perfect in the case of the opposition coalition: $P(B_o) - P(A_o) = [P(B_{prc}) - P(A_{prc})] + [P(B_{pr}) - P(A_{pr})] = 14.50$. Moreover, alienation was shown to be present in this election--see Table 12--in the magnitude of -9.66 . This alienation can now be fully attributed to the government since the opposition is shown to have mobilized at least

TABLE 13

MOBILIZATION AND ALIENATION: 1944-1958

Parties	1944		1948		1954	
	Gov't	Opposit.*	Gov't*	Opposit.	Gov't*	Opposit.
PRC	-	13.06	-3.00	-	-	-0.30
PR	-	-1.44	-3.71	-	-	-
PD	-10.18	-	-	NA	-2.16	-
PL	-10.77	-	-	NA	-0.54	-
PSP	- 0.20	-	-	-0.57**	-	-
ABC	- 1.64	-	-	-	-	-
PPC	-	-	-	6.44**	-	-
PAP	-	-	-	-	-	-
PUR	-	-	-	-	-8.35	-
Aggregate discrepancy	-24.26	14.50	-6.71	8.03	-14.77	-0.30
Supportive capability	36.02	44.71	36.46	42.56	45.71	6.79
Electoral support	44.61	55.39	45.89	54.11	86.97	13.03

* Winning coalition

NA = not available

**Independents (not affiliated to a coalition)

Supportive capability = votes for party/elegible voters = B_i/S

Electoral support = votes for party/total vote = B_i/B

Source: Computed from Riera, "Cuba Política," *op. cit.*, pp. 521, 529, 561, 601, 606.

TABLE 13 (cont.)

Note: All the discrepancy scores for each party were computed as $P(B_i) - P(A_i) = P(B_{1i}) - P(A_{1i}) = (B_i - A_i) / S$. B_i was taken from the vote for the Presidential candidate of the party or coalition except for the cases of the PD and the PL--in 1948--in which the datum was not available and the "party vote" awarded by the Superior Electoral Tribunal to these parties, on the basis of their congressional vote was utilized.

14.50 per cent of the electorate. Therefore, in 1944 the electoral system received a high level of popular support, the perceived efficacy of the election was high, and alienated affiliates had an alternative

This brief summary of the basic aspects of popular participation in the 1944 Presidential election indicates that a full assessment of the scope and nature of the impact of mass participation in the process of elections in Cuba can now be made. It will be shown that for as long as the Electoral Code of 1943 was in effect, the leaders of the recruitment game tried to maximize B_{1i} and minimize A_{1i} in their interaction with the mass. However, they could not really determine where the fluctuations in both would come from since they did not know the true value of their expected A_1B_i as a consequence of the manipulation that took place with the cédulas. Consequently, these leaders were misled, at times, by incomplete information.

This is the first conclusion of the analysis, namely, that every available measure indicates that A for the system in general, and A_i for the parties and/or coalitions in particular were never reliable. Tables 12 and 13 indicate that this was always the case. Moreover, Table 13 shows that, without exception, the government was always the participant most heavily affected by this. In a different sense, this can be interpreted as a result of the presence of alienation with respect to the government and this is still the interpretation, but one cannot obviate the observation that included in this discrepancy there was always a floating proportion of cédulas that had high negotiability with every government. This means that with respect to the flow of the cédulas in the system a "centripetal gradient" was present.. This

gradient refers to the fact that every government was always able to extract a considerable amount of *cédulas* from the political infrastructure, thus setting an unrealistically low level of minimal marginality for the party system. If $P(B) - P(A)$ is computed for every government as a function of $(B_{\text{gov } t} - A_{\text{gov } t}) / A_{\text{gov } t}$, it can be shown that the centripetal gradient was operative between 1944 and 1958 in Cuba. In other words, every government played the game of contracting the services of the greatest possible number of machines.

For instance, the values assumed by $(B_{\text{gov } t} - A_{\text{gov } t}) / A_{\text{gov } t}$ for the Presidential elections of 1944, 1948, and 1954 were -40.21, -46.80, and -33.18 respectively. However, the magnitude of this measure is not indicative of winners and losers since the PRC was the party that utilized this strategy to its conceivable limits and it did not lose the election of 1948. The fact that the size of the indicator was the smallest for the 1954 election may be explained in terms of the fact that \bar{B} --the number of people who did not vote--was 1,316,423.

Consequently, the predictive value of the affiliation figures --utilized by the leaders of the national parties as estimates of their electoral strength--was, at best, limited. Moreover, in spite of the magnitude and nature of the payoffs that the governments could afford in securing the services of the machines, the amount of support that they could derive from this was limited. The best indication of this was the experience of the BAGA. The BAGA was a faction of the PRC controlled by Senator José Manuel Alemán, who, with the consent of Grau, utilized the resources of three ministries and several special funds to generate "payments out of work capital." The BAGA tried to insure the

control of the party and ultimately the control of the government through the increase of the real value of the machine services. One participant in the coup of March, 1952, put it this way:

sure . . . the auténticos stole a lot of money . . . but they also knew how to distribute it . . . they put the senatorial election of 1948 out of the reach of most people because they distribute an inordinate amount of money among the sargentería . . . and, consequently, you and I could be sitting here, almost thirty years after they came to power trying to figure out how to beat them if we hadn't delivered the coup.⁸

The fact that most of the interviewees perceived the "electoral inflation" created by the BAGA speaks of their awareness of the potentiality of this strategy; however, the fact that they exaggerated these potentialities can probably explain why would the leaders continue to rely on the affiliation figures to estimate the strength of the parties when they knew that the figures were not reliable. The reason was that while the system operated at high levels of mass participation--from 1944 to 1952--there was no other way to do it, since nobody could really pinpoint the magnitude of the distorsion introduced by every major participant.

Second, the obvious corollary is that, while the system operated at high levels of mass participation the inability to predict the size of B_1 and A_1 forced the leaders of the government coalition to increase the level and availability of the resources that they could utilize in contracting the services of the machine. The other way in which they could minimize $A_{1gov,t}$ and maximize $B_{1gov,t}$ was to attract the support of the independent vote criticizing the corruption engendered by the machine. Obviously, this strategy could only be utilized by the

⁸ Interview #10. Also interviews #2, 3, 8 and 11.

opposition although the Nuevos Rumbos policy of President Prfo tried to conciliate both. This explains why the government had to remain silent about the machine and why would the leaders criticize it when they were in the opposition and why did they utilize it when they were in power.⁹ This also explains why they had to concentrate on securing the loyalty of their own $A_{gov't}$.

It is evident that B_1 increased between 1944 and 1952 in Cuba, as the data presented in Tables 12 and 13 show. Since B_1 increased at the expense of AB --the organizational capability of the system--the main dimension of the competitiveness of the system took place outside the machine infrastructure in terms of the parties trying to maximize their extractive capability from B_1 . Obviously, the only party that was really successful in doing this was the Ortodoxo party.

What made B_1 so important was that the weight of A decreased as a function of B_1 and this was precisely the parameter that determined the difference between a winning and losing coalition. Consequently the deciding nature of this vote--that followed a different "utility function" than the function which kept the machine clients participating in the system--forced the more prominent actors to include it in their probabilistic calculus in the best possible way they could.

Third, it is unquestionable that before the coup of 1952 the main characteristics of mass participation in the electoral process in Cuba were: (1) alienation from the government coalition; (2) support for the

⁹ Ichaso, "Democracia limitada," op. cit.

electoral system, and (3) high perceived efficacy of the elections. The fact that both in 1944 and in 1948 there were parties that benefited from popular dissatisfaction with the government--thus providing a viable electoral alternative--indicates that the system was not only competitive but also capable of extracting a considerable amount of popular support.

The election of 1948 can be perceived in this light. First, there was fierce competition within the PRC for the Presidential nomination. Second, one of the losing factions within the PRC made some moves in the direction of the Ortodoxo party and the Democratic Party, but these efforts were cut down by the veto of a provincial assembly of the PD.¹⁰ Third, the PRC literally took the BAGA to the streets trying to secure every possible vote. Fourth, the ortodoxos were able to mobilize a considerable amount of people. And, fifth, there was no question that all three levels of participation were high considering that the level of alienation from the government coalition was only -6.71.

But the election of 1948 incorporated one more feature that came about to increase the quality of the information that the candidates and leaders could utilize--although this was not always the case--in order to increase the accuracy of their estimates: the survey. Some haphazard and unsophisticated utilization of this technique had been made before 1948, but by the time the election was held, Cuban pollsters

¹⁰ Bohemia, XL, No. 13 (March 28, 1948), pp. 42-43, 46-49.

were meeting the minimum requirements of validity and reliability in their use of the sample survey.

Therefore, the size of $A_i B_i$ and B_{1i} could be incorporated into the calculus of negotiation and also into the campaign strategy of every party and candidate. It cannot be determined whether they used this available information or not but the fact remains that this information was available.

All of these factors indicate that by the time the coup of 1952 took place, the electoral process was undergoing a revamp in Cuba and that in spite of the considerable turmoil generated by the behavior of the leaders in the creation of national coalitions, popular support for the electoral process continued to be high.

Yet, if all of these inferences are correct--fourth--how can one explain the apathetic reaction of the mass with respect to the coup? How can one explain the fact that a high level of support for elections was not concomitant with a high level of support for the democratic process?

A reflection about the nature of popular participation in elections through the machines may help explain this incongruence. The reflection concerns the election of 1954, which was fraudulent according to the opposition. Since this election is typical of many similar elections held under the auspices of authoritarian regimes in Latin America, its analysis is worth the effort.

The election was not necessarily fraudulent--if by fraudulent one means a high degree of distorsion of the actual result. The election was restricted in two different aspects: first, the fixed imputation of

the top position, and second, the identify of the actors who would be allowed to participate. With respect to the former, there is very little need to elaborate except for the fact that "Batista could not lose and would not lose this election."¹¹ In terms of the restrictions on popular participation, Presidential decrees #1215 and 1725, together with physical limitations imposed on the opposition, account for the low level of participation.

Therefore, the election of 1954, which was really a primary among the members of the government coalition, was held in a situation in which $A_{\text{gov't}}$ and B_{oppos} were minimized. Probably, the fact that $P(B) - P(A)$ was still fairly high may be explained by the style of the more prominent participants in this election, many of which were traditional politicians who had been badly beaten during the auténtico period at the polls and who could only function--electorally-wise--through the machine. Consequently, what the election of 1954 showed was that there was a maximum of 45.71 per cent of the electorate that only perceived their participation in the process through the machines. Moreover, some deals were concerted between leaders who did not run for office themselves--primarily because they were members of the opposition parties--but contracted the services of their machines with leaders of the government coalition. This seems to have been the case in Pinar del Río and Las Villas provinces, and in the city of Havana.¹²

¹¹Interview #10.

¹²See fn. 4 in this chapter.

The fact that these deals were possible and that many of the machines survived the coup unveils two aspects of the operation of machine: the integrative capability of the machine, and its normative correlates.¹³ The hypothesis that the machines help the process of integration is probably correct, but the fact remains--and the Cuban experience is a good indication of this--that this integration is not necessarily conducive to the generation of loyalty and/or support for democratic institutions. Consequently, the true impact of the machine on the operation of the electoral process in Cuba may be interpreted in terms of providing a minimal level of stability that was largely independent of the competitive and popular participatory aspects of the process. On the other hand, there was too little time between 1944 and 1952 to expect that the process instilled a definite commitment to democracy among the "independent voters" who also failed to rally against the coup.

¹³René Lemarchand and Keith R. Legg, "Political Clientelism and Development: A Preliminary Analysis," forthcoming, Comparative Politics (January, 1972).

CHAPTER VIII

THE INDIVIDUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CORRELATES OF POLITICAL POWER IN CUBA

In Chapter II, the following assumptions were made: (1) that power is relational; (2) that the role structure of conversion constitutes the main organizing dimension of the power structure of a political system; (3) that there are a number of political roles that may be found in every process of conversion, and (4) that the individual and institutional correlates of these roles may be used to determine the identity and composition of the political elite.

In this chapter these characteristics are described in terms of their distribution with respect to the sample of 320 individuals, and the interrelationships among these characteristics are specified in order to measure their cumulativeness. The focus is on what types of combinations prevailed that could be indicative of the resources that individual actors utilized in order to become incumbents of political decision-making roles in Cuba.

Individual Correlates

Demographic Characteristics

Table 14 presents a summary description of the more salient demographic traits of our sample of 320 individuals. Obviously, what is being measured is not the discrepancy between the aggregate characteristics of the sample and the Cuban population at large--although the

TABLE 14
 SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

Characteristics	Categories	Sample distribution		Population distribution*	
		(n)	%	(n)	%
1. Province of Birth (NA=49)	Pinar del Río	38	14.02	448**	7.7
	La Habana	62	22.88	1,539**	26.4
	Matanzas	34	12.55	396**	6.8
	Las Villas	39	14.39	1,030**	17.7
	Camaguey	32	11.81	618**	10.6
	Oriente	57	21.03	1,798**	30.8
	Other	9	3.32	--	--
2. Date of birth (NA=75)	before 1900	85	34.69		
	1900-1919	154	62.86		
	1920+	6	2.45		
3. Race (NA=21)	Caucasian	260	86.96	4,244**	72.8
	Black	16	5.35	725**	12.4
	Mestizo	23	7.69	843**	14.0
4. Sex	Male	311	97.19		
	Female	9	2.81		

NA = not ascertained

** = Thousands

Sources: The population figures were taken from República de Cuba, Tribunal Superior Electoral, Oficina de los Censos Demográfico y Electoral, Censo de Población, Vivienda y Electoral, Informe General, 1953 (La Habana: P. Fernández y Cía., 1955).

Note: The Figures for the population pertaining to variable #1 refer to the "residence" of the population and not to the place of birth so the two sets are not entirely comparable.

table provides some of these comparisons--but simply the more salient features of Cuban politicians in an aggregate sense.

Table 14 shows that the following inferences may be derived from the actual distribution of these characteristics among the individuals for whom data are available: (1) a predominance of actors from the two most populated provinces although Oriente province is clearly underrepresented; (2) a predominance of middle-aged individuals which is indicative of the dominance that the generation that overthrew Gerardo Machado in 1933 was exerting in the system during the period with which this investigation is concerned,¹ and (3) an aggregate of individuals in which blacks and women were underrepresented.²

Obviously, these findings were conducive to eliminate these characteristics from the rest of the analysis because: (1) the skewness of the sample distributions for race and sex does not allow for meaningful comparisons, and (2) because the magnitude of the discrepancy between the parametric and sample distribution of geographic origin, together with the high incidence of "not ascertained" cases, does not allow for any meaningful utilization of this indicator.

¹See Francisco Ichaso, "Ideas y aspiraciones de la primera generación republicana," in Ramiro Guerra *et al.*, Historia de la Nación Cubana, VIII (La Habana: Editorial Historia de la Nación Cubana, 1952), 327-366.

²Of the 21 persons whose race could not be determined, it can be hypothesized that the majority of them were non-whites. The fact of whether or not the individuals included in the white category were, in effect, white is open to question and obviously outside the scope of this investigation. However, the fact remains that a sizeable portion of Cuban whites are really light-skinned mestizos.

The distribution of the age factor allowed for the subsequent use of this factor in the rest of the analysis and this variable was made dichotomous lumping the second and third categories together. This variable is referred to as 'political generation'--to which the actor belonged--in the rest of the analysis.

Background Characteristics

If the elitist hypothesis is applicable to the case of the Cuban Republic, it may be assumed (1) that the economic and social structures dictated the kinds of political decision-making roles that prevailed in the conversion process in Cuba. In an individual sense, this means (2) that a high degree of overlapping was present between those actors who enjoyed a privileged position in the social and economic structures and the incumbents of the more powerful conversion roles. Finally, one can also expect (3) that the possession of an attribute valued by the Cuban society led to or facilitated the acquisition of other attributes that were also valued by this society.

The data presented in Table 15 clearly indicate that most of the individuals included in our sample may be characterized as: (1) university graduates who had a (2) social eminent or social elite status, and who (3) possessed considerable or some means of fortune. Consequently, there seems to be little doubt that education, social status, and economic wealth were closely related in Cuba. However, inspection of the data presented in Table 16 reveals that the direction in which this cumulative process operated is not entirely clear.

Sources: Computed from Oficina de los Censos Demográfico y Electoral, op. cit., p. 125. Only the population 10 years of age and more (n=4,376,529) was taken into consideration for the educational data. The professional data for the population (n=85,909) were derived in a similar manner, ibid., p. 204.

TABLE 15

SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION OF BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS

Characteristics	Categories	Sample distribution		Population distribution	
		(n)	(%)	(n)	(%)
5. Educational level attained (NA=66)	no formal education	4	1.57	1,110**	23.36
	elementary	25	9.84	3,038**	69.42
	vocational, technical or secondary	23	9.06	175**	4.00
	university	202	79.53	53**	1.22
6. Professional area (NA=66)	does not apply	52	-	1,887**	-
	lawyers & kindred	126	65.28	8**	9.09
	physicians and kindred	37	19.17	11**	12.31
	engineers, architects & kindred	16	8.29	6**	6.69
	all other	14	7.25	62**	71.85
7. Professional status (NA=42)	eminent	32	11.51		
	average	162	58.27		
	note	84	30.22		
8. Social status	eminent	47	15.61		
	elite	191	63.46		
	non-elite	63	20.93		
9. Economic status (NA=21)	wealthy	102	34.11		
	prosperous	167	55.85		
	average/modest	30	10.03		

NA = not ascertained

** = Thousands

For instance, it may be argued that a university degree could have increased the probability of social mobility for many of the individuals included in the sample. Table 16 shows that 180 out of the 202 university graduates were also social eminents--35--or social elites--145. In a similar manner, these graduates were also wealthy--62--or prosperous--127. Therefore, there is no doubt that these three characteristics were related. Moreover, since only 83 of these 202 actually graduates engaged in any sort of professional practice between 1944 and 1958, there is reason to believe that a university degree could have been utilized as a convenient showpiece by these individuals in order to enhance their prestige and/or status. However, it is also possible that many of these actors were social eminents or social elites, independent of their degrees, and that they acquired a university education because it was "the proper thing to do." In this regard, Table 16 shows that no particular profession was a more expedient avenue of social mobility or a more convenient springboard for the accumulation of economic resources. However, the fact that lawyers are enormously overrepresented among the professionals in the sample suggests there may be more aspects to be explored in this cumulative relationship.

For instance, it could be argued that in a frivolous and essentially materialistic society as the Cuban society was, the possession of money may have been the singlemost important element in the relationship. Economic wealth is related to every other variable in this panel except professional area. However, there are reasons to believe that it was the time for which the person had been wealthy that determined the possibility

TABLE 16

FIRST TEST OF THE CUMULATIVE ASSUMPTION OF THE ELITIST
HYPOTHESIS: RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SAMPLE DISTRIBUTIONS
OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS

16(a)				16(b)				
Education	Social Status			Row Totals	Economic Status			Education
	1	2	3		1	2	3	
1	5	21	26	52	19	22	11	1
2	35	145	22	202	62	127	13	2
	40	166	48	Column Totals	81	149	24	
$\chi^2 = 41.27$ $P < .005$				$\chi^2 = 12.91$ $P < .005$				
16(c,d) Professional area x social and economic status: NOT SIGNIFICANT								

TABLE 16 (cont.)

16(e)				16(f)				
Professional status	Social Status			Row Totals	Economic Status			Professional status
	1	2	3		1	2	3	
1	11	21	0	32	9	22	1	1
2	23	123	16	162	52	101	9	2
3	9	34	40	83/82	31	34	17	3
	43	178	56	Column Totals	92	157	27	
	$\chi^2 = 66.30$				$\chi^2 = 57.56$			
	P < .005				P < .005			

16(g)				
Economic status	Social status			Row Totals
	1	2	3	
1	36	11	0	47
2	61	128	2	191
3	5	28	28	61
Column totals	102	167	30	299
	$\chi^2 = 149.65$			
	P < .005			

Categories: Education: 1=less than university; 2=university
 Professional status: 1=eminent; 2=average; 3=none
 Social status: 1=eminent; 2=elite; 3=non-elite
 Economic status: 1=wealthy; 2=prosperous; 3=average/modest

of this person becoming a social eminent, or only a social elite. The cases of Fulgencio Batista, José Manuel Casanova, and Alfredo Hornedo--to mention a few--all of whom started "from below" indicate that the nouveau riche was not considered a social eminent in Cuba. On the other hand, it was a matter of public domain that many Cuban politicians were "broke" when they came to office and "independently wealthy" when they left, and the Cuban press took care of constantly reminding the public about this.³

Consequently, the inference is that although these three basic parameters around which the power structure of the Cuban political system was organized were related in a cumulative fashion, their relationship was not monotonic. Therefore, a partial verification of the cumulative assumption of the elitist hypothesis has been made as this assumption applies to the case of the Cuban Republic. However, it has not been shown that, in this particular case, the combinations of these three values--education, social status, and economic status were closely related to the conversion roles that the individuals played or to the reputational power that other prominent political actors attributed to them.

The test of the relationship between socio-economic status and conversion roles will be postponed until these roles--in all their complexity--have been defined, but the test of the relationship between

³See the following editorials in Carteles: "La meca de los ladrones cubanos," XXX, No. 20 (May 15, 1949), 21; "Malhechores impunes," XXX, No. 36 (September 4, 1949), 25; "Restitución de lo robado," XXX, No. 37 (September 11, 1949), 25; "El desfaldo del tesoro y el mensaje al Congreso," XXXI, No. 15 (April 9, 1950), 31; "El empréstito y los millones robados," XXXI, No. 35 (August 27, 1950), 15; and "Sanción y no amnistía para el crimen," XXXII, No. 33 (August 19, 1951), 27. Although all of these editorials were written during the auténtico period, they can be made extensive to the Batista regime. See Pino Santos, op. cit. See also "Malversadores," Bohemia, LI, No. 6 (February 8, 1959), 103-104.

background characteristics and reputational power will be taken up right here. A preliminary step in the direction of this test would be to construct a typology of socio-economic status differentials. The combination of variables 7 and 8--as they appear in Table 15--yields such a typology, and Table 17 describes its basic features.

The nine possible types have been reduced to five and although they could have been reduced to three, the former number was adopted in order to emphasize the congruence between the two status dimensions. As di Tella has shown, status incongruence is related to the phenomenon of populism but di Tella's comments about the link between an incongruent elite and a mobilized mass are very relevant in the context of the present effort.⁵ After all, the cohesiveness of the ruling group is affected by the degree to which members of this group are subject to status incongruence, and at least 98 of the individuals included in our sample may have been subject to this form of discrimination by their own class.

This typology of socio-economic status differentials--which has been developed for an aggregate of individuals who were to be considerably above the rest of the population--may be cross-tabulated with indicators of political status in order to determine the possibility of a cumulative relationship between both. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 18--together with similar cross-tabulations between professional area and professional status, and political status.

⁴Torcuato S. di Tella, "Populism and Reform in Latin America," in Véliz, op. cit., pp. 46-74.

⁵Ibid., p. 50.

TABLE 17
 DISTRIBUTION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC
 STATUS DIFFERENTIALS IN THE SAMPLE

Type	Social status	Economic status	Frequency in sample
1. Eminent	eminent	wealthy or prosperous	47
2. Aspirants*	elite	wealthy	61
3. Elites	elite	prosperous	128
4. Deviants*	elite non-elite	modest wealthy or prosperous	37
5. Marginals	non-elite	modest	28

*Incongruent types

The table shows that some cumulativeness was present, but not between the same attributes that were related in this fashion in the socio-economic structure of the national community. For instance, the data in Table 16 indicated that the distinguished practice of any profession--measured by professional status which obviously subsumes educational status--was conducive to a higher socio-economic status--see tables 16(e) and 16(f). In that case, no particular profession could be singled out as being a more expedient avenue for the accumulation of other resources. However, in the present case, the data of Table 18(a) show that a law profession--irrespective of whether or not the individual actually practiced it--was more conducive to a higher political status than any other profession in Cuba--see also 18(b). This may be interpreted as a basic discontinuity between the socio-economic and the political power structures in Cuba in the sense that the presence of an overlapping between both is beyond question, however, the kinds of values that could be accumulated in each one were not exactly the same. It is hypothesized that, in Cuba, this discontinuity between the political and the socio-economic systems of stratification was occasioned by individual differences, such as skill, motivation, and other individual traits that enabled one type of individual(s) to utilize his capabilities more efficiently than others who had the same or very similar capabilities.

On the other hand, the evidence presented in Table 18(c) does not allow for a clear-cut inference about the relationship between socio-economic differentials and political status. Most of the actors in every category of socio-economic status are grouped in the lower categories of political status, although it seems that the particular contribution

TABLE 18

SECOND TEST OF THE CUMULATIVE ASSUMPTION OF THE ELITIST
HYPOTHESIS: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SAMPLE DISTRIBUTIONS
OF BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS AND REPUTATIONAL RANKINGS

18 (a)						
Professional Area						
Total Reputational Score	Lawyers and kindred	Physicians and kindred	Other professionals	Row Totals		
0 - 13	32	20	15	67		
14 - 26	48	7	10	65		
27 - 65	<u>46</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>61</u>		
Column Totals	126	37	30	193		
$\chi^2 = 15.60$ $P < .005$						
18 (b) Professional status x Total Reputational Score: NOT SIGNIFICANT						
18 (c)						
Total Reputational Score	Socio-economic Status					Row Totals
	Eminents	Aspirants	Elites	Deviants	Marginals	
0 - 13	14	21	57	14	12	118
14 - 26	21	18	48	15	9	103
27 - 65	<u>20</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>80</u>
Column Totals	47	61	128	37	28	301
$\chi^2 = 14.83$ $P < .10$						

from each one of these categories to the higher categories of political status is somewhat different. For example, the incongruent groups --aspirants and deviants--contributed with a third of their combined frequencies to the top category of political status, while the combined frequencies of all other groups contributing to this category is only a fourth--50 out of 203.

However, if the original cross-tabulation of these two variables is reproduced--see Table 19--there is very little doubt that (1) all socio-economic status categories are represented in the top political status category, (2) that most of the individuals in the sample are accounted for by the two lowest categories of political status, and (3) that no significant differences are obtained between the five socio-economic status differential categories in terms of political status. Simply stated, socio-economic status and political status were not related in a way that could account for the differences in the political status of top reputationals and other political actors in Cuba. The relationship is present and it reaches a level of statistical significance when the three top categories of political status are combined--as they were in Table (c)--but this combination of the categories blurs the distinctions in political status among the top group of actors included in the sample.

In summary, the analysis of the interactions between the background characteristics of these actors suggests that the cumulative assumption of the reputational hypothesis explains the way in which these basic

TABLE 19

THIRD TEST OF THE CUMULATIVE ASSUMPTION OF THE ELITIST
HYPOTHESIS: SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS AND POLITICAL STATUS

TOTAL REPUTATIONAL SCORE	SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS					Row Totals
	Eminents	Aspirants	Elites	Deviants	Marginals	
0-13	14	21	57	14	12	118
14-26	13	18	48	15	9	103
27-39	10	14	19	5	5	53
40-52	8	6	4	2	2	22
53-65	2	2	0	1	0	5
Column Totals	47	61	128	35	28	301

$$\chi^2 = 12.22$$

$$d.f. = 16$$

inference: not significant

"power capabilities"⁶ were interrelated in the social and economic structures of the Cuban society. However, only one of these characteristics--professional area of specialization--seems to have been successfully utilized by some actors in order to increase their political status. Consequently, the accumulation of socio-economic resources that could be used as power capabilities by individual actors was not a sufficient condition that could have enabled these actors to play a political leadership role, although it may have been a necessary condition for any one actor to be able to become an incumbent of a political elite role. This goes back to the basic distinction between political leaders and political elites that was suggested at the beginning of Chapter VI: both have accumulated power capabilities but they have combined them in a different way and they have not been equally successful in their utilization.

Criticism and Refinement

Yet impressive as these findings may be, one can anticipate the criticism that reputational rankings are not an "objective" measure of the "real" power that any one group or individual may have at a particular point in time, and that the partial verification of the cumulative assumption of the elitist hypothesis is a consequence of the "research artifact" implied by the utilization of reputational rankings.

In order to meet this type of criticism,⁷ and at the same time

⁶A power capability is "a political resource (in this case a combination of attributes that are valued by society) of a group or individual." Anderson, op. cit., p. 91.

⁷The results of Table 26, in this chapter, show that this criticism is completely irrelevant in this case.

refine the outcome of the analysis, the three indicators of social background characteristics were cross-tabulated with nine different indicators of individual capabilities and four of the Guttman scales developed from the reputational comments made by the judges. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 20.

The results of this test indicate that even when a pluralist conception of power is followed--power as an individual attribute--a degree of cumulativeness is obtained between political status and relevant measures of social and economic elitism. However, it is necessary to probe a little bit further into the nature of the relationships described in Table 20 in order to determine their substantive implications.

Table 21 expands the results of the analysis insofar as the relationships between professional area, and individual capabilities and reputational characteristics are concerned. The data presented in this table indicate that lawyers outranked all other professional groups in the utilization and control of political machines--see 21(a) and 21(b). However, this use did not make this group more powerful because no significant differences were obtained when their participation in and control over issues of national scope were compared to the issue participation and issue control of other groups--see Table 20.

Lawyers are also shown to have been able to stay in office longer than any other professional group in Cuba; however, some of these groups seem to have had a greater control of patronage than lawyers--see 21(c) and 21(d). Finally, lawyers were found to be more active in the

TABLE 20

FOURTH TEST OF THE CUMULATIVE ASSUMPTION OF THE ELITIST
 HYPOTHESIS: MEASURES OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC ELITISM AND
 INDIVIDUAL CAPABILITIES AND CUMULATIVE REPUTATIONAL
 CHARACTERISTICS

	Professional Area	Professional Status	Socio-economic Status
Capabilities:			
Electoral potence	NS	P < .10	P < .10
Party authority	NS	NS	P < .005
Scope of Machine	P < .10	P < .005	NS
Control of electoral machine	P < .10	P < .005	P < .050
Issue-decisional control	NS	NS	P < .005
Issue participation	NS	NS	NS
Control of patronage	P < .10	P < .10	P < .10
Political permanence	P < .10	NS	P < .005
Formula participation	P < .01	NS	P < .025
Cumulative (Guttman) Reputational Characteristics:			
Dependency	NS	NS	P < .005
National Visibility	NS	P < .025	P < .10
Decision-making power	P < .10	P < .025	P < .005
Formula participation	NS	P < .005	P < .005

Note: Table values indicate the probability that the value of chi-square derived in each cross-tabulation may be due to chance.
 NS = not significant (P ≥ .10)

elaboration of political formulas than any other professional group and although the panel of judges did not perceive them as such, they ranked lawyers higher than other professionals in their decision-making capabilities--see 21(e) and 21(f).

These results may be compared to the results presented in Table 18(a) and the inference about the existence of a nexus between a law profession, a higher political status, and a greater level of individual capabilities is now undisputable. Moreover, the types of capabilities on which lawyers scored consistently higher than other professional groups may be indicative of the functional importance of the lawyer in some specific aspects of the process of conversion of the Cuban political system. The fact that lawyers had the upper hand--when compared to other professionals--in the electoral process, the elaboration of political formulas, and the deliberative stages of national decision-making speaks of the elasticity and versatility of a law degree--when compared to other types of professional training--in the pursuit of a successful political career. The role of lawyer was, therefore, the most interchangeable role in the Cuban political system.

The analysis of the results of the comparisons between professional status, and individual capabilities and cumulative reputational characteristics is based on the data presented in Table 22. These data show that "average professionals" and non-professionals controlled the electoral machines and had a lion's share of the patronage--see 22(c) and 22(d)--while the "eminentes" utilized their professional status best in gaining access to the national political organizations that could be

TABLE 21

PROFESSIONAL AREA, INDIVIDUAL CAPABILITIES,
AND CUMULATIVE REPUTATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

21 (a)					21 (b)				
Scope of Machine					Control of Electoral Machine				
	None	Local	Prov.	Nat.	Row Totals	None	Low	Moderate	High
(1)	2	29	34	61	126	29	33	55	9
(2)	1	7	7	22	37	13	9	12	3
(3)	2	6	1	21	30	15	7	8	0
	5	42	42	104	Column Totals	57	49	75	12
$\chi^2 = 11.44$					$\chi^2 = 11.10$				
21 (c)					21 (d)				
Control of Patronage					Political Permanence				
	None/low	Moderate	High	Row Totals	None/low	Moderate	High		
(1)	51	38	37	126	36	63	27		
(2)	13	10	14	37	13	21	3		
(3)	8	5	17	30	15	12	3		
	72	53	68	Column Totals	64	96	33		
$\chi^2 = 8.12$					$\chi^2 = 8.36$				
21 (e)					21 (f)				
Formula Participation					Decision-Making Power				
	None	Low	Moderate/high	Row Totals	High/moderate	Low	Very low		
(1)	39	56	31	126	29	66	31		
(2)	20	11	6	37	7	17	13		
(3)	16	12	2	30	3	12	15		
	75	79	39	Column Totals	39	95	59		
$\chi^2 = 11.58$					$\chi^2 = 8.35$				

Categories of Professional Area: 1 : lawyers; 2 : physicians; 3 : other

TABLE 22

PROFESSIONAL STATUS, INDIVIDUAL CAPABILITIES
AND REPUTATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

	22 (a)				22 (b)		
	Electoral Potence			Row Totals	Scope of Machine		
	Low	Moderate	High		None/local	Provincial	National
Eminents	19	7	6	32	4	3	25
Average	67	63	32	162	46	38	78
Non-Professional	26	35	23	84	26	27	31
	112	105	61	Column Totals	76	68	134
	$\chi^2 = 8.92$				$\chi^2 = 16.28$		
	22 (c)				22 (d)		
	Control of Electoral Machine			Row Totals	Control of Patronage		
	None	Low	Moderate/high		None/low	Moderate	High
Eminents	17	8	7	32	13	3	16
Average	40	41	81	162	59	51	52
Non-Professional	14	27	43	84	32	28	24
	71	76	131	Column Totals	104	82	92
	$\chi^2 = 18.10$				$\chi^2 = 8.50$		

TABLE 22 (cont.)

	22 (e)				22 (f)		
	National Visibility Score			Row Totals	Score of Decision-Making Power		
	High/moderate	Low	Very low		High/moderate	Low	Very low
Eminents	11	0	21	32	8	8	16
Average	39	40	83	162	31	87	44
Non-Professional	27	19	38	84	9	44	31
	77	59	142	Column Totals	48	139	91
	$\chi^2 = 11.56$				$\chi^2 = 12.96$		

22 (g)					
Formula Participation Score					
	High/moderate	Low	Very low	Row Totals	
Eminents	8	20	4	32	
Average	45	38	79	162	
Non-Professional	24	9	51	84	
	77	67	134	Column Totals	
	$\chi^2 = 37.16$				

created through the bureaucracy--see 22(b). On the other hand, the eminents are also shown to have been at a disadvantage with respect to the other two groups in almost every aspect of individual political capabilities associated with the professions.

Therefore, there is ample evidence to show that a relationship existed but that this relationship was not monotonic. And this result is not conflictive with the negative results reported in Table 18(b) because it has been shown that professional eminence did not account for a greater level of individual political capabilities or higher scores of cumulative reputational characteristics. Consequently, political power was not monopolized in Cuba by a select group of eminent professionals who were able to control the most sensitive aspects of the process of conversion. Eminents are shown to have shared very modestly in the exercise of dominance over these aspects of conversion.

But it is evident that the most sensitive aspect of the verification of the elitist assumption about the cumulativeness of power capabilities is given by the interaction between the measures of socio-economic elitism and individual political capabilities. Keeping in mind the basic distinction between "congruent" and "incongruent" types--see Table 17 and notes 4 and 5 in this chapter--one may begin the analysis expanding the results presented in the third column of Table 20 and reproduce the cross-tabulations on which these results are based.

A careful scrutiny of all the cross-tabulations presented in (a) through (k), Table 23, allows for two basic inferences: (1) socio-economic eminents and socio-economic elites did not, under any imaginable

TABLE 23
 SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS, INDIVIDUAL CAPABILITIES
 AND REPUTATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

	23 (a)				23 (b)					
	Electoral Potence			Row Totals	Level of Party Authority					
	Low	Moderate	High		None	Local	Prov.	National	bur.	National
(1)	17	15	15	47	16	4	10	6		11
(2)	16	27	18	61	10	14	21	7		9
(3)	63	47	18	128	42	28	38	13		7
(4)	15	13	9	37	8	7	11	7		4
(5)	<u>13</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>7</u>		<u>2</u>
	124	113	64	Column Totals	81	64	83	40		33

$\chi^2 = 15.41$ $\chi^2 = 35.44$

	23 (c)					23 (d)			
	Control of Electoral Machine				Row Totals	Issue-Decisional Control			
	None	Low	Moderate	High		None	Low	Moderate	High
(1)	11	12	21	3	47	16	22	8	1
(2)	8	16	28	9	61	18	27	12	4
(3)	42	33	50	3	128	60	61	7	0
(4)	8	14	10	5	37	15	14	5	3
(5)	<u>8</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
	77	83	119	22	Column Totals	126	133	33	9

$\chi^2 = 21.88$ $\chi^2 = 28.50$

	23 (e)				23 (f)		
	Control of Patronage			Row Totals	Political Permanence		
	None/low	Moderate	High		Low	Moderate	High
(1)	15	15	17	47	15	25	7
(2)	23	16	22	61	12	24	25
(3)	55	36	37	128	46	73	9
(4)	9	15	13	37	12	15	10
(5)	<u>18</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>3</u>
	120	86	95	Column Totals	94	153	54

$\chi^2 = 13.78$ $\chi^2 = 36.45$

TABLE 23 (cont.)

23 (g)					23 (h)			
Formula Participation					Dependency Score			
	None	Low	Moderate/high	Row Totals	High	Moderate	Low	Very low
(1)	16	20	11	47	13	7	7	20
(2)	17	29	15	61	16	6	6	33
(3)	65	49	14	128	40	21	29	38
(4)	17	12	8	37	12	3	10	12
(5)	<u>16</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>2</u>
	131	121	49	Column Totals	88	41	67	105
$\chi^2 = 18.48$					$\chi^2 = 35.54$			

23 (i)					23 (j)		
National Visibility Score					Decision-Making Power		
	High/moderate	Low	Very low	Row Totals	High/moderate	Low	Very low
(1)	18	13	16	47	13	22	12
(2)	12	19	30	61	17	30	14
(3)	30	30	68	128	9	67	52
(4)	11	7	19	37	6	19	12
(5)	<u>7</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>12</u>
	78	71	152	Column Totals	48	151	102
$\chi^2 = 13.97$					$\chi^2 = 22.19$		

23 (k)				
Formula Participation Score				
	High/moderate	Low	Very low	Row Totals
(1)	16	14	17	47
(2)	28	3	30	61
(3)	20	41	67	128
(4)	12	2	23	37
(5)	<u>4</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>28</u>
Column Totals	80	68	153	301
$\chi^2 = 40.47$				

Note: Categories of Socio-economic status: 1: eminent; 2: aspirants; 3: elites; 4: deviants; 5: marginals

criterion, control the more fundamental aspects of the conversion process in Cuba, and (2) socio-economic incongruents had a greater access to and a greater control over the conversion process than any other group in Cuba.⁸

In each and every comparison presented in Table 23, the socio-economic eminent are shown to be underrepresented in the top categories of individual political capabilities. The cross-tabulations show that the socio-economic eminent did not control national decision-making in Cuba--23(d), 23(g), 23(j) and 23(k)--that they did not control the electoral process or the patronage system--23(a), 23(c) and 23(e)--that they made a substantial contribution to the leadership of the national political parties--23(b)--although this did not tend to increase their political permanence--23(f) and 23(i)--and, finally, that they were relatively dependent on other political actors--see 23(h).

On the other hand, the socio-economic incongruents--aspirants and deviants--are shown to have been capable to accumulate political capabilities to a larger extent than any other group. Consequently, if any dominance was exerted by socio-economic eminent and socio-economic elites in Cuba, this dominance must have been exerted through delegates or intermediaries.

Institutional Correlates

Role Interchangeability

But this partial verification of the cumulative assumption of the

⁸The term "group" is utilized here in a statistical and not in a sociological sense.

elitist hypothesis may not be valid--at least for the more enthusiastic supporters of this position--because it is really the roles and not the individual what really determine the whether or not a particular power structure is elitist. Mills argued that the positions of power are not carried out by great men but are attached to certain roles in the society; therefore, the cohesiveness "of the elite will be in large part determined by the closeness of the links between institutional hierarchies . . . [and this cohesiveness may be measured by] the ease with which this interchange of [institutional] roles is made."⁹

Moreover, it could be argued that most of the tests reported in the preceding section have a pluralist bias because they all focus on individual attributes. The fact that some background characteristics of the individuals included in the sample were shown to be relatively inelastic may have exaggerated the importance of individual differences when these differences could have been accounted for in terms of the presence of institutional linkages. In other words, what has been considered status by these tests was really the role that the individual was playing within the confines of an institutional framework. Consequently, if only the role of lawyers was shown to have been highly interchangeable in the Cuban political system this was largely the result of the assumption subsumed in all the tests: that one cannot infer role behavior from structural characteristics.

Therefore, a staunch elitist would argue, the verification of the

⁹Parry, op. cit., pp. 52-53.

elitist assumption about the cumulateness of power capabilities must be conducted following the argument advanced by Mills and not being overly cautious about the relational implications of the sociological conception of power.

Table 24 reports the preliminary findings of the kind of analysis dictated by the proposition of Mills: the relationship between measures of socio-economic elitism and functional area. This preliminary analysis is necessary because if Mills' argument is carried out to its ultimate implications, the occupational structure of a society must necessarily reflect, in one way or another, the systems of stratification imbued in the society. Therefore, one may expect that some functional areas will be more elitist than others and that the roles included in these areas will lend themselves more readily to be interchanged with others that are concomitant with a higher political status.

The data presented in the table show that the more elitist among the more important functional areas represented in the sample were: the sugar industry, other agricultural pursuits, and the areas pertaining to industrial, managerial, financial and business concerns. The pursuit of professional practice was not, on the whole, closely related to an eminent socio-economic status, but it was undoubtedly concomitant with at least a socio-economic elite status. The same was probably true of a dedication to academic or intellectual activities. Finally, three functional areas are shown to have been much less elitist: activism within the trade union movement, a career in the bureaucracy, and a journalism career.

TABLE 24
FUNCTIONAL AREAS AND MEASURES OF
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ELITISM

24 (a)			
Measures of Elitism	Nature of the Association		
	χ^2	P<	ϕ
Educational level attained	81.87	.005	.4996*
Professional area	22.62	NS	-
Professional status	126.97	.005	.5640*
Social status	96.62	.005	.2968*
Economic status	183.08	.005	.4278*
Socio-economic status	205.29	.005	.5020*

24 (b)						
Functional Area	Row Totals	Socio-Economic Status				
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Sugar	30	9	12	7	2	0
Agriculture	20	2	12	2	4	0
Industrial/managerial	17	4	5	7	1	0
Financial/business	40	10	16	9	5	0
Labor	14	0	0	0	2	12
Bureaucratic	15	1	0	9	1	4
Professional practice	83	13	9	55	5	1
Journalism	19	1	3	7	5	3
Intellectual/academic	31	5	2	18	2	4
	Column Totals	45	59	114	27	24

Note: Categories of Socio-economic Status:

(1) : eminent; (2) : aspirants; (3) : elites; (4) :
deviants; (5) : marginals.

If attention is now diverted to the political power that these functional roles carried into the Cuban political system, the results are, to say the least, striking. Table 25 presents cross-tabulations obtained in the comparison between the sample distributions of functional roles and reputational rankings. The data presented in the table show that these functional roles did, in effect, differ in terms of their interchangeability with other roles that carried a high political status. Two results are--if not shocking--particularly interesting. First, the total contribution of three of the more elitist functional areas to the top reputational category is strikingly low: only three out of sixty-seven. Second, businessmen and labor activists seem to have been over-represented in this category.

What is striking about the low proportion of individuals who could have represented sugar and other agricultural interests in the power structure of the Cuban political system is that, under any imaginable criterion of economic relevance, these two sectors were undoubtedly the more important contributors to national production in Cuba. Moreover, conventional wisdom had it that, in Cuba, the sugar planters and owners wielded an inordinate amount of socio-economic power, and that consequently, they had a tremendous political influence.

Basically, the results of Table 25 do not challenge this kind of interpretation; however, it seems clear that if socio-economic dominants exercised a decisive control over the domestic political process in Cuba, they operated outside the structure of formal political roles. After all, this is still a possibility because the sample was drawn from

TABLE 25
 FUNCTIONAL GROUP IDENTIFICATION
 AND REPUTATIONAL RANKING

FUNCTIONAL AREA	RANKINGS				Row Totals
	0-13	14-26	27-39	40-65	
Sugar industry	14	7	7	2	30
Agriculture	10	7	3	0	20
Industrial, managerial	7	7	2	1	17
Financial, business	9	9	14	9	41
Labor	5	4	2	3	14
Bureaucratic, clerical	7	8	0	0	15
Professional practice	30	32	12	9	83
Journalism, communications	7	9	3	0	19
Intellectual, academic	12	10	7	2	31
Column Totals	101	93	50	26	270

$$\chi^2 = 40.06$$

$$P < .025$$

$$\phi = .3889$$

the structure of formal political roles and socio-economic dominants may exert their control outside of this structure; however, as it will be shown in the next chapter, this was not the case at all.

So, again, the operation of a cumulative effect is shown to be present with respect to some groups but the nature of the relationship remains obscure because of the effect of individual differences. Clearly, practicing professionals, and actors with outside financial and business interests add up to a majority of the top reputational group. However, the indicators utilized in the specification of functional area outside politics did not allow for the specification of when did the individuals acquire these interests. Once more the argument about the utilization of public office to enhance economic self-interest could be advanced (see note 3, this chapter). And it is very likely that this argument could prove to be a more plausible interpretation of these results. Because, after all, if the top reputational group was not at all confined to the socio-economic eminents, and a large number of incongruents were included in it--see Tables 19 and 23--couldn't this be an indication that the origins of the status incongruence of many of the top reputationals was due to the way in which they acquired their wealth?

But it has not been shown here--nor in the rest of this chapter--that reputational rankings, and individual capabilities and reputational characteristics are closely related. And the fact is that they are very closely related. As Table 26 shows, only one of the indicators utilized to measure individual capabilities, value orientations, political roles, and reputational characteristics fails to be related to the rankings.

TABLE 26

REPUTATIONAL RANKINGS, INDIVIDUAL CAPABILITIES, VALUE
ORIENTATIONS, REPUTATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS, AND
CUMULATIVE REPUTATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

CHARACTERISTICS	Nature of the Association		
	χ^2	P <	ϕ
<u>Capabilities:</u>			
(12) ELPOT	114.80	.005	.5990
(13) PARTYA	200.33	.005	.7912
(14) SCOMAC	76.59	.005	.4892
(15) CONMAC	78.73	.005	.4960
(16) ISSCON	228.19	.005	.8444
(17) ISSPAR	248.31	.005	.8809
(18) CONPAT	23.19	.005	.2692
(19) POLPER	51.88	.005	.4026
(20) FORPAR	204.62	.005	.7996
<u>Value Orientations:</u>			
(21) PRESID	221.90	.005	.8327
(22) PURPOS	73.18	.005	.4820
(23) ADVORI	5.74	NS	.1367
(24) REPSTY	95.41	.005	.5512
(25) DISSTY	13.86	.100	.2104
(26) CLIORI	42.17	.005	.3642
(27) PARORI	36.80	.005	.3407
(28) CONORI	35.52	.005	.3342
(29) IDEORI	28.50	.005	.3098
<u>Reputational:</u>			
(35) OFFIMA	268.99	.005	.9168
(36) MPBF44	21.90	.005	.2620
(37) MANIPU	36.98	.005	.3421
(38) SFMADE	22.92	.005	.2697
(39) PROFPO	52.98	.005	.4082
(40) TRADPO	36.84	.005	.3404
(41) CONCIL	26.13	.005	.2867

TABLE 26 (cont.)

CHARACTERISTICS	Nature of the Association			
	χ^2	P <	ϕ	
<u>Cumulative</u>				
<u>Reputational:</u>				
(42)	BOMBIN	46.67	.005	.3843
(43)	DEPEND	84.57	.005	.5173
(44)	VISIBI	194.27	.005	.7841
(45)	MANENG	48.90	.005	.3934
(46)	DECMKG	318.44	.005	1.0000
(47)	VIOLEN	74.84	.005	.4867
(48)	FORPAR	129.87	.005	.6411
(49)	SLOCON	133.58	.005	.6502
(50)	PERLIA	84.64	.005	.5175

NS = not significant ($P \geq .10$)

Note: All phi coefficients were computed from the original cross-tabulations.

Numerals in parenthesis appearing on the left margin represent the ordinal sequence of the variable in the study.

The variables are identified by the labels utilized in the computer runs.

The greater the functional importance of a political role, the greater the rankings, the more scarce an individual capability the greater the rank of the individual utilizing it, and so on. This is why the results of the analyses conducted on the basis of rankings were so similar to those conducted on the basis of capabilities and this holds true for all cases reported in this chapter.

In passing, it may be pointed out once more that this is another indication that the reputational rankings constitute reliable measurement but the most important outcome of the results presented in Table 26 is that the data presented in Table 25 may be utilized in order to derive inferences about the political status attached to the more relevant socio-economic roles in the Cuban society. And on the basis of these data one may conclude that the functional relevance and/or the degree of elitism of certain institutional roles of the Cuban society did not necessarily make those roles highly interchangeable with the most powerful political roles. Moreover, although some of these socio-economic roles were highly interchangeable with powerful political roles, these were not the more elitist in a socio-economic sense. Consequently, the proposition advanced by Mills has been verified insofar as the existence of close institutional linkages has been shown but it has been disproved in its basic assumption that individual differences are negligible and that the greatest degree of interchangeability is confined to the more elitist functional roles.

Summary

The following conclusions may be drawn from the results of the analyses that have been reported in this chapter:

1. That there seems to be a range in which the possibility of a cumulative interaction between individual elitist characteristics could be maximized in Cuba. This range was essentially multi-dimensional, and it included: the élite sector of the socio-economic dimension, the average professional sector of the professional status dimension, and the university training sector of the education dimension; all of which are included in the socio-economic structure.
2. The cumulative tendency of this interaction was reduced, in the socio-economic structure, by status incongruence, and in the political power structure by individual differences that may have been related to skill, motivation, and other individual factors.
3. Very little interchangeability took place between the role of socio-economic dominant and political roles associated with a high degree of political power in Cuba.
4. Role interchangeability between the political and the socio-economic structures was easiest between conversion roles and the roles of lawyer, practicing professional, businessman and labor activist.

Therefore, although a cumulative gradient was present in the interaction between individual capabilities and elitist characteristics in Cuba, this interaction was greater between the less elitist functional roles and the more powerful roles of conversion. Consequently, the

cumulative assumption of the elitist hypothesis has been verified in the sense that this assumption may apply to any institutional sector, and to every and all levels of socio-economic status differentials, and not necessarily the more elitist. Therefore, it is obvious that the power exercised by an individual actor is not solely attributable to his personal characteristics but it is also obvious that individual differences do not whither away in an analysis of institutional linkages. The case of the Cuban Republic shows that although the overwhelming majority of the incumbents of relevant political roles may have elitist characteristics, the differentiation of their roles, and the political status that they enjoy cannot be explained solely by the cumulative interaction of their elitist characteristics.

PART III: ANALYSIS

CHAPTER IX

THE POWER STRUCTURE OF THE CUBAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

Introduction

The analysis of the previous chapters allows for the possibility of a summary description of the basic features of the power structure of the Cuban political system.

In Chapter V the constraints that the economic environment imposed on national decision-making were described. The analysis of the policy responses with which Cuban decision-makers met these constraints led to the conclusion that the maximization of existing resources and the creation of new ones allowed these decision-makers to maintain the existing institutional framework. Finally, the assumption that these economic constraints were--during the period of 1944 to 1958--relatively stable was verified. Consequently this was a power structure that did not undergo changes of systemic magnitude produced by the national economy.

Chapter VI identified the participatory roles that could be played in the process of recruitment in Cuba. The strategies that the incumbents of these roles utilized were described following the framework of the theory of political coalitions. It was shown that the utility function of these participants was not the same and that this function was the link between the types of payoffs that these actors were trying to maximize and the strategies that they utilized in maximizing them. Consequently,

this was a power structure in which rational behavior was given by the use of a criterion of self-interest.

Chapter VII was utilized to elaborate a model of mass participation in the process of elections in Cuba. The model was organized around a basic alienation-mobilization dimension that purportedly summarized the interaction between the scope and nature of mass participation, and the strategies utilized by the leaders of the recruitment process. Therefore, this was a power structure in which the nature of the process of recruitment ultimately dictated the types of outcomes that the structure would have to produce in order to preserve its legitimacy among precisely those who were excluded from it.

Finally, in Chapter VIII the elitist assumption about the cumulative tendency of power capabilities was tested and it was found to be partially correct as it applied to the Cuban case. The analysis showed that some cumulateness obtained between socio-economic and political capabilities but that this cumulateness did not follow a totally deterministic pattern. On the other hand, it was shown that the cumulateness of political capabilities--which was far greater than any other type of cumulateness of capabilities--was confined to the middle ranges of these capabilities and that individual differences accounted for the extreme cases of maximum accumulation of capabilities in the political power structure.

But all of these comments are fairly vague and it would seem more appropriate to utilize these and other--unreported--findings to produce a summary statement that may account for the basic features of the power structure of the Cuban political system. And it will be shown that Beck

and Malloy's assertion about the possibility of finding "some uniquely political criteria which allows one to establish and measure political eliteness"¹ can be operationalized.

It will also be shown that, in the Cuban Republic, the scope and nature of an actor's participation in national decision-making was pre-determined by the political status of the actor, the substantive nature of the political roles that he was able to play, and the capabilities associated with these roles. A practical consequence of this will be the operational possibility to differentiate between political leaders and political elites on the basis of the relationship between political status, political roles, and capabilities.

Much of the analysis, of course, relies very heavily on Beck and Malloy's subsequent elaboration of their proposition:

we will suggest that the concept power augmented by the concept control constitutes the effective measure of political eliteness . . . The political elite can then be identified by their involvement in the set of relationships formed around the authoritative allocating process . . . any individual or group's power is therefore a function of the number of alternative lines of action [or entry] or qualitative character of lines of action [or entry] that the individual or group has to the authoritative value allocating process . . . [Therefore if] power is a measure of a potential relative to the authoritative allocation process the measure of the actualization of that potential is control.²

Following this relational conception of power the analysis of this chapter concentrates on the type of control that different groups or

¹Op. cit., p. 4.

²Ibid., pp. 5-8.

individuals had over different aspects of conversion and the relationship between this control and the differentiation of political roles and political statuses.

Four Levels of Political Stratification

The data presented in Table 26, Chapter VIII, constitute the best proof that the power structure of the Cuban political system was based on a well-defined system of political status differentials. The data indicated that the sample distribution of reputational rankings was associated--at a very high level of statistical significance--with the sample distributions of thirty-four political characteristics. It had been previously shown--Tables 18 and 25, Chapter VIII--that this distribution of reputational rankings was also related to sample distributions of two measures of socio-economic elitism and one measure of institutional role differentiation.

On the basis of this evidence, and using the sample distribution of reputational rankings--see Figure 8--as an indicator of the actual distribution of political status differentials, it is possible to identify five different strata in the power structure of the Cuban political system. These five strata will be reduced to four in order to facilitate statistical manipulation.




Figure 8.--Sample Distribution of Reputational Rankings

The First Level

This level may be operationally defined by a range of reputational scores RS such that: $X_{RS} > 39.5$ This set includes 27 actors that may be divided into top political leaders--frequency of 5, and $52.5 < X_{RS} < 65.5$ --and key political leaders--frequency of 22, and $39.5 < X_{RS} < 52.5$ The basic difference between top and key political leaders was that the former were predominantly incumbents of Presidential roles and therefore had ultimate decisional control. The latter had almost the same number of lines of action but the quality of these lines of action was inferior --in a decisional sense--to the lines of action that top political leaders utilized. (See Table 27.)

The identity of the two groups was as follows: Top political leaders were Guillermo Alonso Pujol, Fulgencio Batista, Eduardo R. Chibás, Ramón Grau San Martín, and Carlos Prío Socarrás. Batista, Grau and Prío were all Presidents, while Alonso Pujol and Chibás were the leaders with the greatest amount of influence who did not occupy this office. Key political leaders were Anselmo Alliegro, Aurelio Alvarez de la Vega, José Raimundo Andreu, José Manuel Casanova, Pelayo Cuervo Navarro, Gustavo Cuervo Rubio, Jorge García Montes, Rafael Guas Inclán, Carlos Hevia, Alfredo Hornedo, Félix Lancís, Carlos Márquez Sterling, Eusebio Mujal Barniol, Lázaro Peña González, Justo Luis Pozo, Santiago Rey Pernas, Blas Roca Calderío, Carlos Saladrigas Zayas, Miguel Suárez Fernández, Eduardo Suárez Rivas, Manuel Antonio de Varona, and Ramón Zaydín.

TABLE 27
 CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH
 A TOP REPUTATIONAL RANK

Characteristics	Size of cohort group	Cohort members in range	Probability of correct selection	Definitional Rank
(17) Intensive participation in many issue areas	20	17	.74	1
(21) Candidate or aspirant to the presidency	43	23	.53	3
(46) Very high or high score of decision-making power	30	21	.70	2

Range: $X_{ps} > 39.5$

Size: $n = 27$

Note: Size of cohort group refers to the total number of individuals in the sample who have the characteristic.

-Probability of correct selection refers to the probability that one of the individuals included in the reputational range may be drawn at random from the total sample if the drawing is made on the basis of this characteristic.

-The definitional rank refers to the rank-order of the characteristic among all the characteristics with a probability greater than .50.

-Numerals appear in parenthesis on the left margin of the table refer to the sequential order of the variable in the study.

The three characteristics that had a higher definitional rank indicate that, in Cuba, top and key political leaders were:

- (1) capable³ of intensive participation in many issue-areas,
- (2) perceived⁴ as incumbents of the more powerful decision-making roles (determinant factors, men with impact),
- (3) displaying the role behavior of candidates or aspirants to the Presidential role

The Second Level

This level is operationally defined by: $26.5 < X_{r5} < 39.5$ and a total of 53 of the individuals included in the sample are shown to belong to this reputational category. These actors are identified as concealed political leaders and the reason behind the usage of the term "concealed" may be found in Table 28.⁵ This table shows that these leaders cannot be correctly identified by any of the characteristics. Yet, the interesting thing is that, in spite of this, they received a fairly high reputational score from the judges.

Concealed political leaders were: José Manuel Alemán, Alberto Inocente Alvarez, Santiago Alvarez Rodríguez, Antonio Bravo Acosta, Edgardo Buttari, Luis Cañas Milanés, Manuel Capestany, Raúl de Cárdenas, Luis Casero, Nicolás Castellanos, Carlos Miguel de Céspedes, Ramón Corona, Radio Cremata, Agustín Cruz, Lomberto Díaz, Andrés Domingo Morales del

³The term "capable" is consistently utilized in this chapter to identify a power capability attributed to the individual from content analysis of documentary sources. See Appendix B, Operational Indicators.

⁴This term is utilized to identify a reputational characteristic attributed to the individual by the panel of judges. See Appendix C, Codebooks, and also Figure 3, in Chapter IV.

⁵The present usage of the term "concealed" deviates from its original

Castillo, Aníbal Escalante, Federico Fernández Casas, Manuel Fernández Supervielle, Simeón Ferro, Oscar Gans, Salvador García Agüero, Raúl García Menocal, Marcelino Garriga, Gastón Godoy, María Gómez Carbonell, and José Manuel Gutiérrez Planes.

Also included in this group were Arturo Hernández Tellaecbe, Alfredo Jacomino, Rubén de León, Aquilino Lombard, Amadeo López Castro, Juan Marinello, Antonio Martínez Fraga, Joaquín Martínez Sáenz, Rolando Masferrer, Menelao Mora, Emilio Núñez Portuondo, Emilio Ochoa, Joaquín Ordoqui, Porfirio Pendás, Genovevo Pérez Dámera, Luis Pérez Espinós, Prisciliano Piedra, Andrés Rivero Agüero, Octavio Rivero Partagás, Lincoln Rodón, Aureliano Sánchez Arango, Emeterio Santovenia, Diego Vicente Tejera, Ramón Vasconcelos, Santiago Verdeja, and César Vilar.

The two more salient characteristics of this group are presented in Table 28. These results show that, in Cuba, some concealed political leaders were:

- (1) incumbents of provincial or national bureaucratic party roles,
- (2) perceived as being capable of high participation in the elaboration of political formulas.⁶

There is an obvious incongruence between the moderate reputational rank of this group and their inability to monopolize a significant capability that may justify the rank that they received.

utilization. See Charles Bonjean, "Community Leadership: A Case Study and Conceptual Refinement," American Journal of Sociology, XLVII (May, 1963), 672-681.

⁶The low probabilities associated with the correct identification of this group speak of its heterogeneous nature and underline the fact that their rank is not really associated with a very specific set of characteristics.

TABLE 28
 CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH A
 MODERATE REPUTATIONAL RANK

Characteristics	Size of cohort group	Cohort members in range	Probability of correct selection	Definitional Rank
(13) Provincial or national bureaucratic party authority	127	37	.29	1
(33) High or low formula participation score	120	34	.28	2

Range: $26.5 < X_{FS} < 39.5$

Size: $n = 53$

The Third Level

This stratum of the political power structure may be operationally defined by a reputational range: $13.5 < X_{rs} < 26.5$. This was the stratum of the top political elite, and a basic discontinuity obtains between this and the top levels already specified: the characteristically low degree of control that these actors had over the process of national decision-making.

The way in which this level has been labeled follows from the argument developed in Chapter II, and the basic distinction between political leaders and political elites introduced in that chapter may now be operationalized in full. Therefore, political leaders have both high access to and high or at least moderate control over national decision-making while political elites may have high access to but very low control over this process.

On the other hand, although most of the actors below a reputational score of 26 could have been lumped together into a single group, the decision to separate them stemmed from the results presented in Tables 29 and 30. In summary, although a number of characteristics are similar for the two groups, the group ranking below 13 scores lower in every meaningful category that may be associated with a higher political status.

As for the categories that may be utilized in characterizing the top political elite, they indicate that, in Cuba, top political elites were:

- (1) perceived as being capable of only a limited participation in national decision-making.
- (2) capable of only limited participation in the elaboration of

TABLE 29
 CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH A LOW
 REPUTATIONAL RANK

Characteristics	Size of cohort group	Cohort members in range	Probability of correct selection	Definitional Rank
(18) Low or moderate control of patronage	223	101	.45	3
(20) Low formula participation	122	56	.46	2
(46) Low score of decision-making power	159	75	.47	1

Range: $13.5 < X_{rs} < 26.5$

Size: $n = 105$

political formulas,

- (3) capable of exercising moderate or low control over patronage.

The magnitude of the probabilities is moderate and, consequently, these characteristics only produce an approximate description of the group.

The Fourth Level

Finally, the lowest level of the power structure of the Cuban political system is operationally defined by a range of reputational rankings below 13.5. This was the stratum of the lower political elite or, simply, the base of the political power structure. Curiously enough, the probabilities associated with the correct identification of the members of this group are greater than the probabilities associated with the correct identification of the members of any other group. In other words, this is the most easily identifiable group.

Five of the numerous definitional characteristics of the lower political elite appear in Table 30, and these characteristics indicate that, in Cuba, the lower political elites were:

- (1) perceived as highly dependent on other actors,
- (2) perceived as not being capable to participate in national decision-making.
- (3) not incumbents of a party office or, at best, incumbents of a local party office,
- (4) incapable to participate in the elaboration of national political formulas.
- (5) incapable of being elected to a national political office in a competitive situation.

TABLE 30
 CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH A
 VERY LOW REPUTATIONAL RANK

Characteristics	Size of cohort group	Cohort members in range	Probability of correct selection	Definitional Rank
(12) Low electoral potence	134	91	.68	5
(13) None or local party authority	160	112	.70	3
(20) No formula participation	149	101	.68	4
(43) Highest dependency score	85	64	.75	1
(46) Lowest score of decision making power	109	80	.73	2

Range: $X_{rs} < 13.5$

Size: $n = 135$

The fact that four different strata may be differentiated in the power structure of the Cuban political system not only validates Beck and Malloy's proposition, but also allows for the construction of a typology of leadership that may emphasize the decision-making roles that political actors play and the capabilities and reputational characteristics associated with them. The rudiments of such a typology are depicted in Figure 9. Obviously, there is a predominantly political criterion--control of national decision-making--on the basis of which political leaders and political elites may be identified and differentiated. And, although the characteristics associated with concealed leadership roles and top political elite roles are not clear, all the strata may be identified in terms of decisional and participatory capabilities.

Political leaders may now be defined as "the incumbents of dominant roles in national decision-making," while political elites may now be identified as "the incumbents of roles that allow for participation in national decision-making but are not associated with a high decisional control."

Although these definitions would seem to exclude the possibility of non-incumbents of formal political offices from being leaders or elites the case is quite the opposite since nothing is advanced in these definitions about the substantive nature of these roles. Moreover, the fact that the present analysis focuses on the incumbents of formal political positions was defended as the more convenient point of departure and not as an exclusive focus. Therefore, when one talks about four levels of the political power structure of the Cuban political system the

Types	Decisional Capabilities				Reputational Characteristics		
	Intensity and scope of participation	Issue-decisional control	Formula Participation	Decisional Roles	Office Image	National visibility	Decision-making power and formula participation
Political Leaders (top & key)	Intensive in many	high or moderate	intensive, very frequent	determinants, men with impact	Presidential Senatorial	high or moderate	very high or high, very high or high
Concealed Leaders	Intensive or regular in a few	low	infrequent	decidores	Congressional or ministerial	moderate or very low	low, high or low
Top Political Elites	Intensive or regular in a few, or intensive in one	low or none	limited	factors	Subnational or Congressional	none or very low	low, very low
Lower Political Elites	Regular or intensive in a few, or intensive in one	none	none	marginals	none or subnational	none	very low, very low

Figure 9.--A Typology of Political Leadership in the Cuban Political System

implication is that actors who were not incumbents of formal political positions, and could behave as power contenders on the basis of an institutional or socio-economic capability, necessarily had to exercise their influence through one or more of these levels.

For instance, what was the role of a wealthy sugarman who was active in politics? He could be an incumbent of a formal political office--such as senator José Manuel Casanova who was also a national leader of the Liberal party--or he could be an influential like Julio Lobo, who utilized the strategy of attempting a direct conversion of his economic power into political influence without becoming a career politician. The difference is that when both participated in a sugar decision, Casanova was playing a role of economic dominant--as president of the sugar owners association--and other political roles, while Lobo was only playing the role of an economic dominant. Lobo had to be "brought" into every sugar decision while Casanova participated in these and in other non-sugar decisions of national scope because of the importance of the political roles he was playing besides the role of economic dominant.

Finally, the use of the relational conception of power implied in the definitions of leaders and elites allows for the possibility to predict the scope of influence of the actor from the specific roles that he occupies and from the capabilities associated with these roles.

The Presidency and Regime Style

Rosendo Gómez once wrote that the most widely-professed fact in the field of Latin American politics is unquestionably the dominant role of the president . . . The task

facing the Latin Americanist is not the defense of this theme, but the elaboration of it.⁷

Jacques Lambert went much further in his own elaboration of this theme:

Presidential dominance has become such a permanent characteristic of Latin American regimes that whenever it is absent, the regime can no longer operate. The inherent flaw of the regime of presidential dominance is not, as is often alleged, its tendency to give rise to dictatorship. The flaw is rather that this type of regime is apt to conceal dictatorship under the veneer of constitutional norms.⁸

These two views require very little elaboration except to say that they reflect the general consensus that has prevailed with respect to the power that a Latin American president commands.⁹ But it is in the performance of his office, in his role behavior concerning the more salient aspects of conversion, that a Latin American president may actually become a constitutional dictator. And it is in this sense that the role behavior of a Latin American president constitutes the organizational focus of the political power structure. Needless to say, the Cuban Republic fits this pattern.

In Cuba, as in most Latin American systems, rule-making was primarily an executive function predominantly exercised by the President and his

⁷"Latin American Executives: Essence and Variation," Journal of Inter-American Studies, III, No. 1 (January, 1961), 81-96.

⁸Op. cit., p. 323.

⁹Recent phenomena like the emergence of Castroism in Cuba and the new pattern of military interventionism in Peru may challenge this interpretation; however, presidential dominance applies in full for the period of analysis with which this investigation is concerned.

Cabinet. Consequently, the pattern of interactions and behaviors that defined the style of a political regime in the Cuban Republic was the pattern of interactions and behavior between the President, his ministers, and his most trusted advisors, and all other actors who were able to participate in national decision-making.

This pattern probably varied with the nature of the formula under consideration, the identity of the participants, and the level of available resources; however, all of these factors were heavily influenced by the President's interest in the process. Moreover, one of the strongest objections that could be raised against the analysis of top and key political leaders in a single category is the discrepancy between presidential power and the power of any other office in the system. Most of the judges perceived this to be a problem in their rankings because they thought that the Presidents included in the list were way over the arbitrary limit of five points and they couldn't really be compared to anybody else in these terms.

The judges also perceived that psychological and socialization background factors pertaining to the incumbent of the office explained some of the characteristics of the regime over which he presided. For instance, there were extensive considerations about the impact that Batista's childhood of deprivation and abject poverty had upon him later in life.¹⁰ There were explanations of Batista's inability to penetrate the level of the top social eminents because of his race and humble origins that were offered

¹⁰Interview #15.

to account for the fact that he never became a conservative.¹¹ There were also speculations about the personality and personal qualities-- such as courage--of Grau, Prío, and Batista and the effect that some of these personality traits had in critical decisional situations.¹² In summary, there was a shared impression among the judges that the personal power of the office tended to maximize the impact of individual differences on the style of the regime.

The dominance of professional politicians

Two specific results may be utilized to show that professional politicians exercised a dominant role in the power structure of the Cuban political system. The first is the fact that a majority of the actors included in the top three levels of the power structure were perceived as professional politicians--25 out of 27 top and key leaders, 39 of 53 concealed leaders, and 63 of 105 top political elites. Second, this was not the case with respect to the base--91 out of 135 actors included in this range were not perceived as professional politicians.

Obviously, this is not a conclusive finding because nothing has been said about the orientations and roles of these actors. However, a lot has been said already. Going back a little bit one can point out that the majority of the actors included in the top three levels were (1) incumbents of party roles and formal political offices of national scope, (2) perceived as being incumbents of such offices, (3) capable

¹¹Interviews #1, 2, 10, 11, 14, 15.

¹²Interviews #2, 8, 14.

to reach these offices in a competitive situation, (4) oriented to an independent style of representation and were not perceived as being dependent on other actors, and (5) they had moderate or high control of electoral machines. Therefore, if all of these aspects are simultaneously taken into consideration, one has to conclude that the performance of these roles demanded most of the time of these individuals. And although one may cast a doubt about the extent of this "professionalization" there can be no doubt that these actors were full-time politicians.

Moreover, it is evident that most of the top and key leaders, concealed leaders, and top political elites were career politicians because they met the functional requirements of a political career. And of all these requirements the most important was

not to come to office . . . because, after all, anybody could . . . but rather to stay and be able to maintain yourself in office . . . There were people who went to the Cámara (the Chamber of Representatives) and answered the first roll call of the session and never stood up to say anything. There were people who would come and say "Leader I'll come tomorrow if you tell to me to but I'd rather not." There were also the wealthy people who were there to protect their interests and nothing else because they never really understood what the heck was going on.¹³

In talking to the judges one gets the impression that some of them have something in common that tends to make them a homogeneous group. Some judges would attribute this to the fact that "all of us started at the same time in this business in 1930 and whether we like it or not we belong to the same generation."¹⁴ Others would speculate on the fact that they had been around long enough to know each other very well and that they could separate the sheep from the goat.¹⁵

¹³ Interview #11..

¹⁴ Interview #10.

¹⁵ Interview #2.

Therefore, if there is any evidence of a homogeneous trait that could be used to argue the case that these actors constituted a ruling class it is the fact that they were, in their great majority, primarily concerned with politics and willing to invest most of their time and effort in public life. In other words, they were a class of professional politicians.

Finally, the fact that only at the level of the base were professional politicians in the minority speaks of the existence of a group that accumulated most of the political resources as a consequence of their permanence in the power structure of the Cuban political system.

Divisiveness

The argument about the cohesiveness of a ruling group has been operationalized as the indicator that may be used to determine the existence of such a group. Some of the standard measures of this cohesiveness are the ideology of the leadership,¹⁶ the prevalence of conflict in the community,¹⁷ and the pattern of purposive orientations prevailing among the leaders.¹⁸ Other measures are also possible but the present analysis will be confined to these three.

There is very little need to speculate about the existence of conflict in the Cuban political system during the years of 1944 to 1958. Besides the usual cleavage of government and opposition--which by the way is the only cleavage that makes any analytical sense in Cuba--one can add the internecine strife among revolutionary groups during the

¹⁶ Agger et al., op. cit., pp. 73-74.

¹⁷ Dahl, "Who Governs," op. cit.

¹⁸ This is sometimes called "elite perspectives." See Beck and Malloy, op. cit., p. 19.

presidency of Grau, the conflict between professional politicians and functional elites that culminated in the Ortodoxo drive of the early fifties, the perennial conspiracies to overthrow the government in turn, and the armed conflict of the late fifties. The intensity of this conflict is debatable, but the fact remains that there were frequent instances of violent competition among rival political groups. So, obviously, this is not a case in which a ruling group was successful in preventing the ventilation of conflictive issues--such as the legitimacy of the Batista regime--although there were numerous instances of non-decisions.¹⁹

It was really at the level of the base where the most conflictive patterns obtained in the sense of the prevalence of two polar types of purposive orientations: electorally-oriented institutional resisters, and non-electorally oriented institutional advocates. Also the pattern of ideological orientations is conflictive because this is the only level at which conservative ideological orientations are detectable.

Yet if the existence of intense ideological cleavages cannot be inferred from these data, the prevalence of a vigorous competition for a limited number of positions cannot be denied if one considers the fact that, in varying degrees, auténticos and batistianos excluded each other from the top levels of the power structure when they were in power; and a number of minor participants always trying to incorporate themselves to the government coalition. The analysis of this governmental tendency to overcome the opposition will be dealt with in the next chapter.

¹⁹ Bachrach and Baratz, op. cit.

The Institutional Linkages

The conclusion about the relative independence of the political power structure from the institutional structure of society follows from the argument presented in Chapter VIII. It was shown that the accumulation of political capabilities was more readily accomplished within the political power structure than in trying to maximize the potentialities of a functional and/or socio-economic status. The fact that none of the top three levels of the political power structure may be characterized in socio-economic or institutional terms is offered as further evidence that the stratification of political status followed the pattern of differentiation of political roles and not the distribution of status differentials among the incumbents of the more powerful institutional roles in the society. This is not to say that a member of a disenfranchised group normally had more power than a social elite. On the contrary, it has been shown--see Tables 15 and 16, Chapter VIII--that only a minority of the individuals included in our sample came from marginal groups and that there was a cumulative pattern of socio-economic and institutional measures of elitism. What is being said here is that there was not a one-to-one correspondence between political and socio-economic or institutional status.

Permeability

Finally, nothing has been said about the permeability of the power structure of the Cuban political system and the fact is that nothing can be said about it because of the basic assumption that "between 1944 and 1958, the power structure of the Cuban political system remained relatively

constant."²⁰ This implies that although the structure was individually permeable, and allowed for the transit of the actor between different levels no new groups were incorporated into the political power structure. Consequently, the structure was relatively impermeable.

Furthermore, the only realistic measures of permeability that could have been derived were the rate of turnover of the different levels and the circulation of different actors through these levels. However, there were three insurmountable difficulties involved in this operationalization. First, each individual received only one score from every judge and the sum of these scores has been used to characterize his political power for the entire period. And, although the judges--and this researcher--agreed that this was unrealistic, there was no question about the fact that the judges would not be able to give one ranking for every year that each particular individual remained active in national politics in Cuba.

Second, there was also the empirically verifiable datum that most of the incumbents of the roles included in the top three levels remained the same for most of the period with which this investigation is concerned, and that the complete revamp that took place in March of 1952 greatly jeopardized any attempt to measure inter-positional mobility and inter-level permeability.

Finally, the net operational outcome of this operationalization would have been the conclusion that the system was 100 per cent permeable and this was obviously not the case. Consequently, permeability is one of the aspects of the Cuban political power structure that cannot be defined in a satisfactory way.

²⁰See above, Chapter III.

Summary Statement

Beck and Malloy's assumption about the possibility to elaborate a predominantly political criterion for the identification and differentiation of political leaders and political elites can be operationalized. The result of this operationalization is a typology of political leadership and political elitism based on the decision-making roles that different actors play and the concomitant capabilities and reputational characteristics associated with them. Moreover, this typology allows for the characterization of some of the more basic features of the power structure of a political system and using the distribution of its main types the following statement may be made about the power structure of the Cuban political system, a structure that was:

- (1) pyramidal with four basic levels of political status,
- (2) centered in the incumbent of a formal political office,
- (3) dominated at the top three levels by professional politicians,
- (4) segmented and divided at the lower three levels, and
- (5) closely related to but not pre-determined by the institutional power structure of the society.

As for the ambiguity of the characteristics associated with the roles of the middle levels of this structure, this may be the result of the fact that the analysis was conducted without differentiating the Auténtico and Batista periods. And it is extremely likely that if these regimes were different, some of the characteristics associated with concealed leader and top political elite roles cannot be determined without making the distinction.

CHAPTER X

AUTENTICOS AND BATISTIANOS (I)

The basic question of this study remains unanswered. The question is concerned with the possibility of making relevant distinctions between democratic and dictatorial regimes in Latin America using the perspective of political leadership. The study has assumed that two concrete cases of democratic and dictatorial government may be found in the analysis of the last fourteen years of the Cuban Republic. It has been hypothesized that the perspective of political leadership may provide an optimal point of departure for the analysis of the discrepancies that may be found between these two polar types of political organization. But it remains to be proved that this perspective may indeed facilitate the making of the distinction, and that the two cases to be analyzed were really examples of democracy and dictatorship.

This chapter will examine every relevant aspect of the political power structure and compare it during the two periods in order to arrive at a satisfactory criterion that may corroborate the adequacy of the selection of the empirical referent of the study, and determine whether or not the auténtico period was democratic and the Batista period dictatorial.

The analysis is conducted following the hypotheses enunciated in Chapter II, although not in the same sequence in which these hypotheses were presented. The basic question behind the analysis of each of these

hypotheses is "Does this particular piece of evidence indicate that it is possible to distinguish between democratic and dictatorial regimes in Latin America?" The question is by no means trivial or irrelevant because if the answer is negative, then the only alternative is revolution, because the implication would be that democracy and dictatorship are basically the same type of phenomenon in Latin America. And it so happens that a revolution occurred in Cuba when the Batista regime was overthrown.

The Controversy

Apologies and Critiques

Writing about the historiography of the Republican period in Cuba Robert F. Smith commented that this historiography is

characterized by a shortage of scholarly research and publication. Many of the books on recent history are colored by the profound political cleavages of the period and are probably most useful as guides to various points-of-view. This is specially true for books dealing with events from 1920 to the present.

The historiography of the period with which this study is concerned is no exception. Many of the more prominent public figures have taken an active part in the making of this historiography and there are very few authors who have made an effort to incorporate the different points of view in their work. As a consequence of this the hypotheses of this study were vicariously derived from the available documentary sources, and from the more plausible points of view expressed in the literature or articulated by the interviewees.

¹"Twentieth-Century Cuban Historiography," Hispanic American Historical Review, XLIV, No. 1 (February, 1964), 44-73.

The auténtico point of view includes the following elements: (1) the original program of the PRC was aimed at eliminating the effect of American economic imperialism in Cuba, the displacement of the group of "traditional" politicians who were subservient to foreign economic interests, and the neutralization of the armed forces in domestic politics;² (2) these goals were largely accomplished during the provisional presidency of Dr. Ramón Grau San Martín in 1933-1934 and during his second term in 1944-1948;³ (3) President Prío made a serious effort to eliminate the corruption of the auténtico governments and he and Grau had an absolute respect for elections and the democratic process;⁴ and (4) that the Cuban political system was a genuine democracy when Batista staged the coup of 1952.⁵ Obviously, the position of the PRC with respect to Batista could not be other than the attempt to overthrow his regime together with the unwillingness to negotiate with the batistianos in order to achieve a compromise.⁶

²Ramón Grau San Martín, La revolución cubana ante América, Conferencias (México: Ediciones PRC(A), 1936).

³Rubén de León, El origen del mal (Coral Gables: Service Offset Printers, 1964).

⁴Interview #8.

⁵Ibid. Also, Interviews #4, 9, and 12.

⁶See Carlos Hevia, "Todo ha sido detenido por el golpe," Carteles, XXXIII, No. 14 (April 6, 1952), 58-59. Also Interview #8.

The critics of the auténtico party can be divided into two large and diffuse groups: the Ortodoxos and the batistianos. The ortodoxos were largely former auténticos who had become disgruntled with their party because of its corrupt practices in the administration, or because of electoral conflict over the candidate nomination procedure, or both. The core of the ortodoxo critique of the auténticos was that (1) the auténticos were taking advantage of the machine to perpetuate themselves in power thus depriving the citizenry of the effective exercise of the suffrage,⁷ and (2) that the auténticos were only concerned with the pilfering of the national treasure and that they did not care about anything else.⁸

The batistiano argument was more subtle. It departed from the premise that Batista had been the most constructive President Cuba ever had during his term of office that ended in 1944,⁹ that his enemies had utilized his willingness to abide by the results of the 1944 election to ostracize him and force him into exile,¹⁰ and that he had been excluded from all the coalitions formed for the 1952 election and that, in order to maintain himself as a public figure, he decided to stage the coup.¹¹

⁷ Arturo Alfonso Roselló, "Explica Chibás la causa y el origen de su divorcio del Dr. Grau," Carteles, XXIX, No. 21 (May 23, 1948), 28-32. See also Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Ortodoxo), Doctrina del Partido Ortodoxo (Habana: P. Fernández y Cía., 1951).

⁸ See Gabino Delgado, "El Dr. Pelayo Cuervo ante La Prensa," Carteles, XXXII, No. 48 (December 2, 1951), 42-44. See also Arturo Alfonso Roselló, "El Profesor Agramonte contesta a Carteles," Carteles, XXXII, No. 51 (December 23, 1951), 38-40, 82.

⁹ Interview #10.

¹⁰ Interviews #10 and 15.

¹¹ Interviews #3 and 10.

The batistianos explain their ability to deliver the coup in terms of the public's awareness of the corrupt practices of the auténticos and the ortodoxo critique of the auténtico administrations:

I advance the proposition that without BAGA . . . there is no tenth of March [coup]. There could not have been a coup by Batista or by Jesus . . . The [coup] of March 10th. is a product of the BAGA . . . Why? . . . Because the Cuban people did not elect Grau to create the BAGA. In other words, if anybody could not create a BAGA it was Grau San Martín . . . Batista could be good or bad after the coup . . . the people expected him to be bad . . . so if he [Batista] was about regular it was phenomenal. But not with Grau . . . On the contrary, the people knew they were electing a man of great capacity, very honest, very brilliant . . . Grau won because . . . he had the record of the legislation he implemented while he was provisional President (in 1933-1934) in his favor . . . [Therefore] Grau came to power, above all things, because the people believed him to be an absolutely honest man.¹²

On the other hand, they offered the justification that the country was in a state of anarchy,¹³ that Batista would guarantee the reinstatement of public order and new sources of employment,¹⁴ and that Batista was really not a dictator because he always wanted to be popular, he maintained an independent Judiciary during his regime, and he let the press perform its duties while these did not endanger the national security of the country and/or the very own existence of his regime.¹⁵

In summary, the auténticos defend the democratic nature of their regimes on the bases of their scrupulous respect for popular sovereignty and their progressive record in government, while the batistianos argue that they were the more constructive group and that they were the only

¹² Interview #10.

¹³ Gabino Delgado, "El ingeniero Amadeo López Castro ante la Prensa," Carteles, XXX, No. 14 (April 6, 1952), 34-35, 76.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Interview #3. See also Batista's own argument in Cuba Betrayed (New York: Vantage Press, 1962), and The Growth and Decline of the Cuban

group capable of maintaining order and respect for the principle of authority in Cuba.

Continuity and Change in the
Political Power Structure

The Bases of Political Power

But democracy and dictatorship do not simply refer to what a government is able to do for the public or to how stable is this government but rather to whether or not the governed have any means of influencing the outcomes of decisions that are going to affect them and whether or not they have the opportunity to produce a turnover in the governing group in order to secure more favorable outcomes. Moreover, they also refer to whether or not there is, at some stage of national decision-making, the ability--from the part of a group of incumbents of power structure roles--to constrain the decisions of the national executive to a certain extent.

A preliminary test toward the determination of the more general discrepancies between democratic and dictatorial regimes would be to compare the concomitants of political power in terms of the roles, capabilities, orientations, and reputational characteristics associated with a higher political status. After all, there has long been the impression that Latin American military coups do not alter the fabric of society nor the bases of the political power structure,¹⁶ and that the intervention of the military--according to José Nun--is really a response

Republic (New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1964).

¹⁶Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York: Praeger, 1960), Chapter 5.

to middle class pressures to prevent a new group from being incorporated into the power structure.¹⁷ Consequently, the fact that the Batista regime originated from a coup is no sufficient criterion for calling this regime dictatorial--at least in a Latin American sense.

The data in Table 31 verify the assumption--see Chapter II--that "no fundamental changes occurred in the power structure of the Cuban political system for the period of 1944 to 1958." When the results of this table are compared to the results presented in Table 26--see Chapter VIII--there can be very little doubt that the correlates of political status were essentially the same during the auténtico and the Batista periods. Political status continues to be related to the same capabilities, value orientations and reputational characteristics when the period during which an actor was an incumbent of formal political office--office tenure--is controlled by statistical manipulation. So if the Batista period was dictatorial, the political bases of this dictatorship--the political correlates of political status--were essentially the same bases on which the political power structure was organized during the democratic period.

But as Agger and his colleagues have pointed out,¹⁸ it is more appropriate to apply the terms democratic and dictatorial to political regimes. After all, the fact that the correlates of political status continued to be the same during the two periods does not imply that the distribution of political power was the same or that the distribution

¹⁷ Op. cit.

¹⁸ Op. cit., p. 82.

TABLE 31

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN REPUTATIONAL RANKINGS, INDIVIDUAL CAPABILITIES, VALUE ORIENTATIONS, REPUTATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND CUMULATIVE REPUTATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS FOR THE AUTENTICO AND BATISTA PERIODS

CHARACTERISTICS	1944-1952			1952-1958		
	χ^2	P<	ϕ	χ^2	P<	ϕ
(I) Capabilities:						
(12) ELEPOT	65.59	.005	.52	54.61	.005	.60
(13) PARTYA	117.31	.005	.70	78.90	.005	.72
(14) SCOMAC	53.71	.005	.47	28.58	.005	.43
(15) CONMAC	44.33	.005	.43	26.70	.005	.42
(16) ISSCON	154.72	.005	.80	20.93	.005	.37
(17) ISSPAR	73.28	.005	.55	40.33	.005	.51
(18) CONPAT	27.81	.005	.34	16.65	.025	.33
(19) POLPER	30.48	.005	.36	24.76	.005	.40
(20) FORPAR	138.18	.005	.76	81.43	.005	.73
(II) Value orientations:						
(21) PRESID	117.55	.005	.70	96.93	.005	.76
(22) PURPOS	33.60	.005	.37	16.18	.005	.33
(24) REPSTY	58.40	.005	.50	43.86	.005	.54
(25) DISSTY	10.08	NS	-	6.14	NS	-
(26) CLIORI	26.31	.005	.33	35.12	.005	.48
(27) PARORI	20.67	.025	.29	19.41	.005	.36
(28) CONORI	31.04	.005	.38	21.92	.005	.38
(29) IDEORI	13.55	NS	-	12.24	NS	-
(III) Reputational:						
(35) OFFIMA	78.82	.005	.57	24.95	.005	.40
(36) MPBF44	15.54	.005	.26	13.20	.005	.29
(37) MANIPU	25.49	.005	.33	15.79	.005	.32
(38) SFMADE	30.84	.005	.36	3.19	NS	-
(39) PROFPO	26.69	.005	.33	22.13	.005	.38
(40) TRADPO	28.31	.005	.34	13.33	.005	.30

TABLE 31 (cont.)

CHARACTERISTICS	1944-1952			1952-1958		
	χ^2	P<	ϕ	χ^2	P<	ϕ
(IV) <u>Cumulative reputational:</u>						
(42) BOMBIN	34.85	.005	.38	17.99	.010	.35
(43) DEPEND	59.73	.005	.50	30.11	.005	.45
(44) VISIBI	27.22	.005	.34	27.42	.005	.43
(45) MANENG	24.59	.025	.32	23.43	.025	.40
(46) DECMKG	162.62	.005	.83	119.54	.005	.89
(47) VIOLEN	36.64	.005	.39	18.61	.005	.35
(48) FORPAR	89.14	.005	.61	53.27	.005	.60
(49) SLOCON	71.86	.005	.55	58.59	.005	.63
(50) PERLIA	61.50	.005	.51	30.32	.005	.45

NS = not significant ($P \geq .10$)

Note: Numerals in parenthesis appearing on the left margin represent the ordinal sequence of the variable in the study.

The variables are identified by the labels utilized in the computer runs.

of decisional and other power structure roles was the same. In this respect, some of the changes that took place in the distribution of power attributes between the auténtico and the Batista periods may be inferred from the data presented in Table 32. These data indicate that when compared to the auténtico period the political power structure underwent the following changes during the Batista period:

- (1) a reduction in the number of top and key political leaders, and a concentration of decisional power in the hands of fewer individuals,
- (2) a lower level of electoral capabilities from the part of these leaders,
- (3) a decline in the importance of national party offices,
- (4) a reduction in the number of autonomous political organizations and more specifically political machines, with a concentration of the control over these machines and the control of patronage in general in the hands of fewer individuals,
- (5) a reduction in the number of concealed leaders,
- (6) a decline in the capability of concealed leaders to participate in the elaboration of political formulas,
- (7) a shifting pattern of purposive orientations away from a predominantly electoral toward a predominantly non-electoral distribution of these orientations,
- (8) a dramatic decrease in the number of actors with an independent style of representation, and an equally dramatic revamp of the pattern of partisan orientations brought about by the increase of non-partisan actors occupying power structure roles, and

TABLE 32

SAMPLE DISTRIBUTIONS OF CAPABILITIES, VALUE ORIENTATIONS,
 REPUTATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND CUMULATIVE REPUTATIONAL
 CHARACTERISTICS FOR THE AUTENTICO AND BATISTA PERIODS

CHARACTERISTICS	Categories	1944/1952		1952/1958		overlap*	
		f _i	%	f _i	%	f _i	%
(1) <u>Capabilities:</u>							
(12) ELEPOT	high	70	29	21	14	20	27
	moderate	106	44	45	29	30	41
	low	64	27	87	57	23	32
(13) PARTYA	none	44	18	58	38	15	21
	local	61	25	31	20	19	26
	provincial	76	32	34	22	23	32
	national bureauc.	31	13	13	8	4	5
	national	28	12	17	11	12	16
(14) SCOMAC	none	2	0	10	7	2	3
	local	71	30	44	29	25	34
	provincial	71	30	28	18	19	26
	national	96	40	71	46	27	37
(15) CONMAC	none	41	17	54	35	13	18
	low	67	28	39	20	16	22
	moderate	113	47	46	30	34	47
	high	19	8	14	9	10	13

TABLE 32 (cont.)

CHARACTERISTICS	Categories	1944-1952		1952-1958		overlap*	
(16) ISSCON	none	108	45	67	44	32	44
	low	102	43	63	41	30	41
	moderate	22	9	21	14	10	13
	high	8	3	2	1	1	1
(17) ISSPAR	one	76	32	53	35	24	33
	a few-occasional	12	5	6	4	3	4
	a few-reg./int.	121	50	75	49	39	53
	several	12	5	9	6	1	1
	many	19	8	10	6	6	8
(18) CONPAT	none	106	44	57	37	30	41
	low	68	28	43	28	21	29
	moderate/high	66	28	53	35	22	30
(19) POLPER	none	70	29	44	29	11	15
	low	120	50	64	42	24	33
	moderate/high	50	21	45	29	38	52
(20) FORPAR	none	108	45	76	50	35	48
	low	95	40	49	32	22	30
	moderate/high	37	15	28	18	16	22
(11)	<u>Value orientations:</u>						
(21) PRESID	yes	37	15	17	11	11	15
	no	203	85	136	89	62	85

TABLE 32 (cont.)

CHARACTERISTICS	Categories	1944-1952		1952-1958		overlap*	
(22) PURPOS	electoral	108	45	53	35	37	51
	ambivalent	60	25	36	24	21	29
	non-electoral	71	30	60	39	15	20
(24) REPSTY	dependent	38	16	36	24	13	18
	fairly independent	77	32	65	42	25	34
	independent	123	51	48	31	35	48
(25) DISSTY	open	40	17	21	14	10	13
	permeable	62	26	30	20	18	25
	closed	137	57	96	63	45	62
(26) CLIORI	specific	187	78	124	81	57	78
	diffuse	52	22	28	18	16	22
(27) PARORI	indifferent	21	8	43	28	10	13
	weak	27	11	28	18	13	18
	moderate	61	25	34	22	17	23
	strong	129	54	47	31	33	45
(28) CONORI	national	73	30	49	32	20	27
	sub-national	166	69	103	67	53	73
(29) IDEORI	conservative	47	20	64	42	28	38
	moderate	38	16	24	16	11	15
	pragmatic	85	35	42	27	26	36
	liberal/progress.	51	21	18	12	7	10

TABLE 32 (cont.)

CHARACTERISTICS	Categories	1944/1952		1952/1958		overlap*		
<u>(III) Reputational:</u>								
(35)	OFFIMA	Pres./VP/Senator	50	21	21	14	17	23
		minister	28	12	16	10	6	8
		local executive	23	10	11	7	7	10
		representative	53	22	21	14	17	23
		other	51	21	55	36	15	20
		none	35	15	29	19	11	15
(36)	MPBF44	yes	21	8	14	9	6	8
		no	218	91	139	91	67	92
(37)	MANIPU	yes	83	35	72	47	29	40
		no	156	65	78	51	44	60
(38)	SFMADE	yes	146	61	87	57	38	52
		no	93	39	62	41	35	48
(39)	PROFPO	yes	150	63	64	42	45	62
		no	90	37	87	57	28	38
(40)	TRADPO	yes	52	22	31	20	18	25
		no	188	78	120	78	55	75
<u>(IV) Cumulative reputational:</u>								
(42)	BOMBIN	high	23	10	25	16	5	7
		moderate	93	39	57	37	26	36
		low	123	51	68	44	42	58

TABLE 32 (cont.)

CHARACTERISTICS	Categories	1944/1952		1952/1958		overlap*	
(43) DEPEND	high	55	23	58	38	19	26
	moderate	36	15	20	13	14	19
	low	58	24	23	15	11	15
	very low	90	38	49	32	29	40
(44) VISIBI	high/moderate	73	30	27	18	18	25
	low	68	28	33	22	23	32
	very low	98	41	90	59	32	44
(45) MANENG	very high	68	28	26	17	23	32
	high	27	11	15	10	9	12
	moderate	33	14	14	9	10	13
	low	33	14	16	10	8	11
	very low	78	33	79	52	23	32
(46) DECMKG	very high/high/mod.	39	16	21	14	12	16
	low	136	57	67	44	44	60
	very low	64	27	62	40	17	23
(47) VIOLEN	high/moderate	39	16	18	12	8	11
	low	37	15	24	16	14	19
	very low	163	68	108	71	51	70
(48) FORPAR	high/moderate	65	27	37	24	22	30
	low	47	20	31	20	9	12
	very low	127	53	82	54	42	58

TABLE 32 (cont.)

CHARACTERISTICS	Categories	1944/1952		1952/1958		overlap*	
(49) SLOCON	high	57	24	26	17	21	29
	moderate/low	42	18	13	8	6	8
	very low	140	58	111	73	46	63

*Overlap: Refers to the number of incumbents that served during both periods.

Note: Incumbents during 1944-52 : 240
 Incumbents during 1952-58 : 153
 Incumbents during both periods : 73

All percentages were computed from these totals and not from the sums of the known columnar frequencies appearing on the table.

Numerals in parenthesis appearing on the left margin refer to the sequential order of the variable in the study.

Variables are identified by the labels utilized in the computer runs.

(9) a more conservative pattern of ideological orientations.

No greater changes are evidenced by the comparison of the distributions of reputational characteristics during the two periods except for (10) a decrease in the number of professional politicians occupying power structure roles, and (11) an increase in the characteristics attributed to lower political elites: higher probability of being manipulated by or dependent on other actors, lower visibility scores, and higher bombinism scores.

These changes are significant because if the determinants of political power remained the same, the distribution of these determinants was narrower during the Batista period. Moreover, if control over the decisional process is a characteristic of leadership, and varying degrees of access to--but not control over--this process can be used to identify other actors then one has to assume that either the political leadership group took over some of the capabilities that are characteristic of the political elite or the political elite took over the functions of a displaced group of leaders. The analysis of Chapter IX indicated that the differentiation of power structure roles implied a functional specialization that allowed for a dispersion of some of the non-decisional capabilities throughout and within the lower levels of the political power structure. And because of the fact that political leaders monopolize the control of the decisional process, the only means available to the incumbents of other power structure roles that may allow them to prevent the leaders from becoming tyrannical is for these incumbents to be able to accumulate some of these non-decisional capabilities, and utilize them to influence decisional outcomes.

It is evident that, during the Batista period, the political power structure was characterized by a much narrower distribution of all capabilities. Whether accumulated by leaders or by elites usurping the role of leaders, it seems that there was a group that was able to monopolize capabilities to a larger extent than the top group was able to monopolize them, during the auténtico period.

The political power structure was therefore more 'elitistic' during the Batista period than during the Auténtico period, but as it was shown in Chapter VIII--see Table 26--marginal groups were discriminated by the power structure at all times.

It is also evident that, during the Batista period, a sizeable number of professional politicians were literally thrown out of the power structure and replaced by other actors whose characteristics have not been ascertained yet. According to one source, these actors were representatives of all the major economic classes 'who were located in key decision-making positions.'¹⁹ Some went to the Consultative Council; others to the new semi-autonomous corporations--CENPLUC, CENCAM, Financiera Nacional, etc.--created by Batista, and other organs of a similar nature created before Batista came to power--like the National Bank, the Accounts Tribunal, etc. Included among these representatives were

labor leaders . . . representatives of the rural associations of tenants and landlords, who answered largely to the most prosperous of the island's farmers, and deputies of the mill owners, ranchers, manufacturing, commercial, and financial interests, and professional classes. Batista even retained a number of Communists in high technical posts in the old government.²⁰

¹⁹ O'Connor, op. cit., p. 31.

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 31-32.

A test of this hypothesis could be possible if the relationship between socio-economic and institutional characteristics and political status during both periods could be compared. The test would also require a comparison of the distribution of these characteristics in order to determine the changes in the socio-economic and institutional composition of the political power structure during the two periods.

The results of this test are presented in Tables 33 and 34. Table 33 shows that the socio-economic and institutional bases of political status remained practically unchanged during the two periods. If the results of this table are compared to the data presented in Tables 18, 19, and 25--see Chapter VIII--the inevitable conclusion is that the power structure of the Cuban political system does not show any evidence of a radical transformation when its basic features are compared for the auténtico and the Batista periods.

On the other hand, the results of Table 34 indicate that no significant differences are likely to result from the comparison of the distribution of these attributes for the two periods in question. Consequently, if O'Connor's interpretation is correct, these new elements--and one has to consider them new because only a total of 73 out of the 320 individuals included in our sample were incumbents during both periods--did not come from groups that were not represented before. O'Connor himself gives the reason for this

[In Cuba] both elected governments . . . and governments formed on the basis of armed revolt and coup . . . drew their support from all major economic elements . . . governments rose to power on whatever support they could obtain, anywhere it was available. The balance of class forces . . . created a political nexus in which no class

TABLE 33
 POLITICAL STATUS AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND
 INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS DURING
 THE AUTENTICO AND BATISTA PERIODS

CHARACTERISTICS	Nature of the Relationship					
	1944-1952			1952-1958		
	χ^2	P<	ϕ	χ^2	P<	ϕ
(3) Professional area	13.28	.050	.30	12.17	.100	.37
(4) Professional status	2.65	NS	-	3.06	NS	-
(5) Socio-economic status	17.33	NS	-	17.31	NS	-
(6) Functional area	32.27	NS	-	41.31	.025	.57

NS = not significant ($P < .100$)

Numerals in parenthesis appearing on the left margin represent the ordinal sequence of the variable in the study.

TABLE 34

SAMPLE DISTRIBUTIONS OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL
CHARACTERISTICS FOR THE AUTENTICO AND BATISTA PERIODS

CHARACTERISTICS	Categories	1944-1952		1952-1959		overlap*	
		f _i	%	f _i	%	f _i	%
Professional area	lawyers	101	.42	59	.39	35	.48
	physicians	29	.12	12	.08	4	.05
	other	19	.08	16	.10	5	.07
Socio-economic status	eminentes	37	.15	21	.14	11	.15
	aspirants	50	.21	30	.20	19	.26
	elites	94	.39	58	.38	24	.33
	deviants	25	.10	25	.16	13	.18
	marginals	21	.09	10	.07	3	.04
Functional area	sugar industry	19	.08	20	.13	9	.12
	agriculture	16	.07	8	.05	4	.05
	industrial, managerial	9	.04	12	.08	4	.05
	financial, business	35	.15	14	.09	8	.11
	labor	9	.04	5	.03	-	-
	bureaucratic, clerical	14	.06	6	.04	5	.07
	professional practice	69	.29	35	.23	21	.29
	journalism	12	.05	12	.08	5	.07
intellectual, academic	21	.09	14	.09	4	.05	

*Overlap: Refers to the number of incumbents who served during both periods.

Note: Percentages were computed from the total number of incumbents in each period and those who served during both--240,153 and 73, respectively--and not from the columnar totals of the known frequencies.

had the political initiative . . . Cuba was therefore governed by men who had no class interests in governing efficiently or honestly. In the 1950's the collection of opportunists willing to support the dictator were by and large neither for nor against capital or labor or the farmers or United States economic interests either on principle or from the standpoint of their own class interests. Instead, they were very much out for themselves.²¹

Insofar as the changes that occurred in the power structure of the Cuban political system between 1944 and 1958, this interpretation is absolutely correct. These findings confirm the hypothesis that between 1944 and 1958, "the same functional groups were represented in the political power structure."²²

The Political Regimes

But the conclusions about the changes in power structure must be refined because "power structures . . . specify the relations of people as political decisions are made and units of political power, rather than political status, are produced and distributed."²³

These units of political power are the power structure roles and the use that the incumbents of these roles make of the capabilities associated with them, in their interaction with the incumbents of other roles, is what constitutes the total pattern of behavior that we call power structure. However, there is a decisional core in this pattern of interactions and role behaviors that has been defined as regime style, and it is this pattern that will determine whether or not the use of the terms democratic and dictatorial is justified.

²¹ Ibid.

²² See RH 2k, Chapter II.

²³ Agger et al., op. cit., p. 77.

The concept of political regime is not a popular one in the literature of American politics. Dunner does not include it in his Dictionary of Political Science,²⁴ and Safire dedicated it a very brief comment in his work.²⁵ The term has been frequently utilized in the literature of Latin American politics and it has some currency in everyday language but it carries an authoritarian connotation that has not been justified by empirical research.

As utilized here, the term regime refers to two basic aspects of power structure: (1) the power span of the focal office of this structure-- in this case the Presidency--and (2) the mode of government under a particular incumbent as reflected by the interactions between the President, other political leaders, political elites, and lower participants; interactions that are exclusively concerned with rule making. This interpretation incorporates the definition of regime style introduced in Chapter II, and the discussion about Presidential power presented in Chapter IX.²⁶

Following this definition, the analysis now turns to the comparison of the bases of political power for the government and the opposition during the auténtico and the Batista periods, and the distribution of roles and capabilities that may be utilized to define the characteristics of the auténtico and Batista regimes.

²⁴(New York: Philosophical Library, 1964).

²⁵The New Language of Politics (New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 5-6.

²⁶By definition, there were three different regimes in Cuba: the Grau regime, the Prío regime, and the Batista regime. Consequently, what was formulated as a hypothesis--see RH 2a, Chapter II--now becomes an assumption incorporated in the analysis. However, due to the relatively small size of the sample and the large number of categories of some of the indicators, the two Auténtico regimes are treated as one in the rest of the analysis.

The bases of political power of the auténtico and the Batista regimes were very similar. Table 35 indicates that when office tenure and participation in the government--collaboration with the PRC, collaboration with Batista--are controlled by statistical manipulation (1) the association between political status and most of the other characteristics disappears for the two opposition groups, and (2) the pattern of association is not the same for the two government coalition groups. Moreover, a long and thorough scrutiny of the figures--together with a careful inspection of the data presented in Table 36--indicates the following characterization is possible:²⁷

(I) Characteristics of the Auténtico Regimes:

1. Recruitment:

- (a) Leadership-leadership relations: a lower probability of regime turnover on a competitive election.²⁸
- (b) Leadership-elite relations: a wider distribution of high and moderate control over electoral machines.²⁹
- (c) Leadership-mass relations: a higher capability to extract electoral support.³⁰

²⁷Because of the fact that political leaders dominated the regimes under consideration, all the statements specify the relations between these leaders, opposition leaders, members of the government coalition, functional groups, and the mass. It must be mentioned that the categories of Table 36 closely follow the definitions of leaders and elites outlined in Chapter IX.

²⁸Item (12), Tables 35 and 36.

²⁹Item (15), Table 36.

³⁰Item (12), Table 36.

TABLE 35

CAPABILITIES, VALUE ORIENTATIONS, REPUTATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS,
 CUMULATIVE REPUTATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS, AND POLITICAL STATUS
 DURING THE AUTENTICO AND BATISTA PERIODS
 BY GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION

CHARACTERISTICS	Nature of the Relationship							
	(1944-1952)				(1952-1958)			
	χ^2	GOV'T. P <	χ^2	OPPOS. P <	χ^2	GOV'T. P <	χ^2	OPPOS. P <
(I) <u>Capabilities:</u>								
(12) ELEPOT	45.7	.005	10.6	NS	43.5	.005	15.1	.025
(13) PARTYA	93.3	.005	39.3	.005	74.0	.005	30.3	.005
(14) SCOMAC	14.1	.050	33.0	.005	23.1	.010	6.8	NS
(15) CONMAC	41.6	.005	7.7	NS	38.8	.005	11.5	NS
(16) ISSCON	78.2	.005	49.7	.005	77.9	.005	11.2	.100
(17) ISSPAR	104.3	.005	56.3	.005	137.3	.005	32.7	NS
(18) CONPAT	11.5	.100	19.0	.025	17.4	.010	7.7	NS
(19) POLPER	22.6	.005	5.7	NS	29.2	.005	5.2	NS
(20) FORPAR	73.6	.005	33.9	.005	71.0	.005	16.9	.010
(II) <u>Value Orientations:</u>								
(21) PRESID	81.9	.005	20.2	.005	81.3	.005	14.8	.005
(22) PURPOS	23.5	NS	15.0	NS	43.7	.005	10.7	NS
(24) REPSTY	43.9	.005	4.9	NS	42.8	.005	4.5	NS
(25) DISSTY	13.3	.050	8.2	NS	6.6	NS	2.5	NS
(26) CLIORI	8.2	.050	13.3	.005	26.6	.005	13.0	.005
(27) PARORI	18.7	.050	11.2	NS	16.2	.005	19.4	.025
(28) CONORI	8.1	.050	10.9	.025	15.1	.005	8.6	.050
(29) IDEORI	11.5	NS	7.5	NS	9.6	NS	13.1	NS

TABLE 35 (cont.)

CHARACTERISTICS	Nature of the Relationship							
	(1944-1952)				(1952-1958)			
	X ²	GOV'T. P<	X ²	OPPOS. P<	X ²	GOV'T. P<	X ²	OPPOS. P<
<u>(III) Reputational:</u>								
(35) OFFIMA	61.0	.005	16.4	NS	53.5	.005	9.8	NS
(37) MANIPU	22.3	.005	2.4	NS	11.7	.010	5.0	NS
(38) SFMADE	22.2	.005	4.3	NS	1.1	NS	7.4	.100
(39) PROFPO	21.6	.005	2.3	NS	17.8	.005	3.8	NS
(40) TRADPO	26.4	.005	6.0	NS	11.9	.010	9.5	.025
<u>(IV) Cumulative reputational:</u>								
(42) BOMBIN	28.8	.005	7.5	NS	15.6	.025	3.3	NS
(43) DEPEND	42.6	.005	8.6	NS	29.4	.005	4.6	NS
(44) VISIBI	23.9	.005	4.0	NS	19.3	.005	11.6	NS
(45) MANENG	23.7	.025	6.5	NS	14.1	NS	17.7	NS
(46) DECMKG	90.8	.005	32.3	.005	104.1	.005	16.9	.010
(47) VIOLN	22.0	.005	12.1	.100	22.1	.005	6.5	NS
(48) FORPAR	52.7	.005	19.2	.005	42.9	.005	9.7	.025
(49) SLOCON	57.9	.005	11.2	.100	43.8	.005	20.6	.005

Note: Numerals in parenthesis appearing on the left margin refer to the sequential order of the variable in the study. The variables are identified by the labels utilized in the computer runs.

NS not significant ($P \geq .100$)

TABLE 36

SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION OF CAPABILITIES, VALUE ORIENTATIONS,
 REPUTATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS, AND CUMULATIVE REPUTATIONAL
 CHARACTERISTICS DURING THE AUTENTICO AND BATISTA
 PERIODS BY GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION

CHARACTERISTICS	Categories	1944-1952		1952-1958	
		Government	Opposition	Government	Opposition
(1) <u>Capabilities:</u>					
(12) ELEPOT	low	58	12	79	8
	moderate	80	26	37	8
	high	54	10	17	4
(13) PARTYA	none	34	10	55	3
	local	49	12	26	5
	provincial	60	16	29	5
	national bureauc.	29	2	9	4
	national	20	8	14	3
(14) SCOMAC	none	-	2	10	-
	local	57	14	38	6
	provincial	50	21	21	7
	national	20	8	14	3
(15) CONMAC	none	35	6	51	3
	low	54	13	35	4
	moderate	89	24	36	10
	high	14	5	11	3

TABLE 36 (cont.)

CHARACTERISTICS	Categories	1944-1952		1952-1958	
		Government	Opposition	Government	Opposition
(16) ISSCON	none	81	27	56	11
	low	86	16	56	7
	moderate	18	4	19	2
	high	7	1	2	-
(17) ISSPAR	one-occasional	7	4	9	-
	one-reg./int.	51	14	38	6
	a few-occasional	8	4	5	1
	a few-reg./int.	99	22	65	10
	several	11	1	8	1
	many	16	3	8	2
(18) CONPAT	low	81	25	47	10
	moderate	55	13	40	3
	high	56	10	46	7
(19) POLPER	none/low	59	11	41	3
	moderate	99	21	56	8
	high	34	16	36	9
(20) FORPAR	none	83	25	66	10
	low	80	15	43	6
	moderate/high	29	8	24	4

TABLE 36 (cont.)

CHARACTERISTICS	Categories	1944-1952		1952-1958	
		Government	Opposition	Government	Opposition
(11)	<u>Value orientations:</u>				
(21)	PRESID				
	yes	31	6	14	3
	no	161	42	119	17
(22)	PURPOS				
	elect.-ambivalent	11	3	3	2
	elect.-resistor	66	26	40	8
	ambivalent	49	11	32	4
	non elect.-instit.	45	1	8	2
	non elect.-ambiv.	13	7	25	2
(24)	REPSTY				
	dependent	31	7	32	4
	fairly independent	60	17	59	6
	independent	99	24	38	10
(25)	DISSTY				
	open	37	3	20	1
	permeable	50	12	27	3
	closed	104	33	81	15
(26)	CLIORI				
	specific	146	41	107	17
	diffuse	45	7	25	3
(27)	PARORI				
	indifferent	15	6	41	2
	weak	23	4	22	6
	moderate	49	12	30	4
	strong	103	26	39	8

TABLE 36 (cont.)

CHARACTERISTICS	Categories	1944-1952		1952-1958	
		Government	Opposition	Government	Opposition
(28) CONORI	national	64	9	43	6
	sub-national	127	39	89	14
(29) IDEORI	conservative	21	26	52	5
	moderate	18	10	23	1
	pragmatic	77	8	32	10
	liberal/progress.	47	4	14	4
(111) <u>Reputational:</u>					
(35) OFFIMA	Pres./VP/senator	39	11	16	5
	minister	24	4	14	2
	local executive	19	4	10	1
	representative	43	10	17	4
	other	42	9	50	5
	none	25	8	26	3
(37) MANIPO	yes	68	15	63	9
	no	123	33	68	10
(38) SFMADE	yes	114	32	8	7
	no	77	16	50	12
(39) PROFPO	yes	119	31	53	11
	no	73	17	78	9
(40) TRADPO	yes	34	18	30	1
	no	158	30	101	19

TABLE 36 (cont.)

CHARACTERISTICS	Categories	1944-1952		1952-1958	
		Government	Opposition	Government	Opposition
(IV)	<u>Cumulative reputational:</u>				
(42)	BOMBIN				
	high/moderate	22	1	23	2
	low	84	19	51	6
	very low	95	28	57	11
(43)	DEPEND				
	very high/high	42	13	49	9
	moderate	29	7	18	2
	low	50	8	21	2
	very low	70	20	43	6
(44)	VISIBI				
	high/moderate	65	8	22	5
	low	50	18	25	8
	very low	76	22	84	6
(45)	MANENG				
	very high/high	80	15	25	6
	moderate	21	12	8	6
	low	26	7	14	2
	very low	64	14	74	5
(46)	DECMKG				
	high/moderate	35	4	18	3
	low	100	36	58	9
	very low	56	8	55	7

TABLE 36 (cont.)

CHARACTERISTICS	Categories	1944-1952		1952-1958	
		Government	Opposition	Government	Opposition
(47) VIOLEN	high/moderate	35	4	15	3
	low	28	9	21	3
	very low	128	35	95	13
(48) FORPAR	high/moderate	48	17	30	7
	low	41	6	31	-
	very low	102	25	70	12
(49) SLOCON	high	49	8	20	6
	moderate/low	36	6	12	1
	undefined	106	34	99	12

Note: Government: includes all incumbents during this period who participated in the government coalition.

Opposition: non-participant incumbents during the period.

Numerals in parenthesis appearing on the left margin refer to the sequential order of the variable in the study.

Variables are identified by the labels utilized in the computer runs.

2. National decision-making:

- (a) Leadership-leadership relations: concentration of control in the government coalition.³¹
- (b) Leadership-elite relations: formula elaboration confined to leaders of the government coalition, possibility of regular or intensive participation in a few, several, or many issue areas by the opposition.³²

3. Distribution and representation:

- (a) Leadership-leadership relations: a wider distribution of control over patronage and machine structure,³³ but a concentration of these capabilities on the government coalition.³⁴
- (b) Leadership-elite relations: a higher degree of functional autonomy at the lower levels of the government coalition indicated by a greater frequency of party leaders,³⁵ a greater frequency of actors oriented to an independent style of representation,³⁶ and a lower proportion of actors manipulated by or dependent on other actors.³⁷
- (c) Leadership-functional group relations: a high incidence of orientations toward specific clienteles and subnational constituencies.³⁸

³¹Item (16), Table 36.

³²Items (16) and (20), Tables 35 and 36.

³³Items (14) and (18), Table 36.

³⁴Items (14) and (18), Tables 35 and 36.

³⁵Item (13), Tables 35 and 36.

³⁶Item (24), Tables 35 and 36.

³⁷Items (37) and (43), Table 36.

³⁸Items (26) and (28), Table 36.

- (d) Elite-mass relations: a higher proportion of open or permeable machines, and a more cohesive relationship between the lower levels of the regime and the mass public.³⁹
4. Overall orientations of the regime:⁴⁰
- (a) Programmatic: weak or progressive.⁴¹
- (b) Coalitional: professional politicians competing for control of recruitment in order to gain access to national decision-making; structure of opportunities defined by the distribution of control over party, patronage, and machine structures; high incidence of manenguisim;⁴² recruitment process influencing attempts of the regime to institutionalize the system.⁴³
- (II) Characteristics of the Batista Regime:⁴⁴
1. Recruitment:
- (a) Leadership-leadership relations: a higher capability of regime turnover in a competitive election.
- (b) Leadership-elite relations: a narrower distribution of control over electoral machines.
- (c) Leadership-mass relations: a lower capability to extract electoral support and induce mass participation.
2. National decision-making:
- (a) Leadership-leadership relations: concentration of control in the leaders of the government coalition, low possibility of issue participation by the opposition.
- (b) Leadership-elite relations: formula participation confined to leaders of the government coalition.

³⁹Items (25) and (49), Table 36.

⁴⁰Refers to the predominant pattern of orientations among the members of the government coalition.

⁴¹Item (29), Table 36.

⁴²Categories (II) and (IV), and Item (39), Tables 35 and 36.

⁴³Category (I), Table 35, and Items (22) and (45), Table 36.

⁴⁴The indicators utilized in order to derive these inferences are the same indicators utilized in the description of the Auténtico regimes.

3. Distribution and representation:

- (a) Leadership-leadership relations: a narrower distribution of control over patronage, machine and party structures, concentration of this control in the top and key leaders of the government coalition.
- (b) Leadership-elite relations: a lower degree of functional autonomy at the lower levels of the government coalition indicated by a lower frequency of party leaders, a greater frequency of actors oriented to a dependent style of representation, and a higher proportion of actors manipulated by or dependent on other actors.
- (c) Leadership-functional group relations: a high incidence of orientations toward specific clienteles and sub-national constituencies.
- (d) Elite-mass relations: a lower proportion of open or permeable machines, a more disorganized relationship between the lower levels of the regime and the mass public.

4. Overall orientation of the regime:

- (a) Programmatic; conservative or weak
- (b) Coalitional: professional politicians competing for control of recruitment within the government coalition; structure of opportunities defined by leaders of the government coalition; control over party, patronage and machine structures not influenced by recruitment, high incidence of bombinism.

Some Conclusions

On the basis of the evidence presented in this chapter, it is possible to conclude that, although the political bases of the three regimes that prevailed in Cuba between 1944 and 1958 were essentially the same, a number of changes contributed to differentiate the style of these regimes.

First, participation in rule making differed in terms of the number of political leaders who controlled the process of national

decision-making and the political elites who had some access to this process through their participation in the elaboration of political formulas.⁴⁵

Second, as a result of changes in the distribution of power among the incumbents of formal political positions,⁴⁶ the areas over which the incumbents of these positions exercised control were different; in terms of their control over electoral, party, and machine structures.⁴⁷

Third, the strategies utilized by these incumbents in order to remain in office were different because of the fact that the control of the recruitment process was restricted to fewer individuals.⁴⁸

And, fourth, as a consequence of these changes, the distribution of power capabilities among the incumbents of power structure roles became much narrower, with a larger gap between the power of the incumbents of leadership roles and the power of incumbents of elite roles.

On the other hand, two dimensions of the political power structure contributed to minimize and overshadow these basic difference in regime style: (1) the fact that incumbents of formal political positions controlled the process of national decision-making at all times,⁴⁹ and (2) a constant pattern of representation of the functional groups coupled with similar patterns of orientations toward clienteles and constituencies.⁵⁰

⁴⁵Hypothesis RH 2c, Chapter II: verified.

⁴⁶Hypothesis RH 2h, Chapter II: verified.

⁴⁷Hypothesis RH 2e, Chapter II: verified.

⁴⁸Hypothesis RH 2g: verified.

⁴⁹Hypothesis RH 2f: verified.

⁵⁰Hypothesis RH 2d, Chapter II: not verified.

These findings may suggest the difficulties involved in the identification of the structural differences between dictatorial and democratic regimes in Latin America but, more important, they speak of the flexibility of the political power structures in which these regimes are embedded. Obviously, the contention is that these differences do not, in and of themselves, constitute the ultimate criterion for the application of the democratic or dictatorial label to a particular regime. However, since they get at the distribution of power among the more prominent actors--among the leaders of the system--further discriminations could be possible if the roles that the incumbents of formal political positions play under each set of circumstances are identified and related to one another. This would constitute the last step in the analysis the outcome of which would be the specification of the prevalent patterns of role relationships in democratic and dictatorial regimes.

CHAPTER XI

AUTENTICOS AND BATISTIANOS (II)

In Chapter IX it was shown that two basic types of roles prevailed in the power structure of the Cuban political system: political leadership roles, and political elite roles. The further differentiation of these roles was shown to have taken place in terms of five specific types: top and key leaders, concealed leaders, and top and lower political elites. However, concealed leaders and top political elites could not really be associated with specific political characteristics.

In the present chapter the task will be to determine the characteristics that were associated with these roles during the Auténtico and Batista regimes. The strategy will be (1) to replicate the analysis conducted in Chapter IX and determine the nature of role differentiation under the two regimes, and (2) to develop a model of role differentiation along the lines of the interrelationships between these roles. The analysis will be confined to the members of each government coalition, and therefore, the generalizations and inferences derived from this analysis will be restricted to the regimes.

Replication

Top and Key Leaders

The first obvious difference between the two regimes comes from the number of actors playing top and key leadership roles. A total of

twenty-two different actors were incumbents of these roles in the Auténtico regimes while these roles were played by only seven actors during the Batista regime. Only two actors were able to play the role of key political leader in the two regimes: Eusebio Mujal and Miguel Suárez Fernández.

Second, because not only the differences between the two groups of leaders are important but also the probabilities associated with their accurate identification--in terms of the characteristics that may be utilized to describe the roles they played in Cuba--an arbitrary limit of .50 will be set in order to select the more salient characteristics from the results presented in Table 37.

Following this criterion it can be shown that key batistiano leaders were only able to play two roles: (1) the role of intensive participants in many issue areas, and (2) the role of candidate or aspirant to the presidency.¹ The fact that they were only able to play these two roles --in the sense of roles that they did not share with a substantial number of participants in the regime--indicates that substantive differences must obtain between the roles played by key batistiano leaders and the roles played by their auténtico counterparts.

Initial confirmation of this interpretation may be found in the second column of Table 37 in which the probabilities of making a correct selection of key auténtico leaders--on the basis of each particular characteristic--appear. These data show that top and key auténtico

¹The generalizations about the batistiano group are confined to the key leaders since there was only one top leader: Batista. The inferences about the two roles are derived from items (17) and (21), Table 37.

TABLE 37

CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH TOP AND KEY POLITICAL
LEADERSHIP ROLES: 1944-1952 AND 1952-1958

1944-1952				1952-1958				
(1)	(2)	(3)	category	CHARACTERISTIC*	category	(1)	(2)	(3)
17/54	31.5		high	(12) ELEPOT	moderate	4/37	10.8	
12/20	60.0	4	national	(13) PARTYA	national	4/14	28.6	
15/85	17.6		national	(14) SCOMAC	national	5/64	7.8	
17/103	16.5		moderate/high	(15) CONMAC	high	4/36	11.1	
17/25	68.0	2	moderate/high	(16) ISSCON	moderate	5/19	26.3	
14/18	77.8	1	regular/intensive in many	(17) ISSPAR	intensive in many	5/6	83.3	1
12/56	21.4		high	(18) CONPAT	high	5/46	10.9	
(ambiguous)			--	(19) POLPER	high	6/36	16.7	
16/29	55.2	7	high	(20) FORPAR	high	7/24	29.2	
21/31	67.7	3	yes	(21) PRESID	yes	7/14	50.0	2
(ambiguous)			--	(22) PURPOS	ambivalent	5/32	15.6	
20/99	20.2		independent	(24) REPSTY	independent	6/38	15.8	
13/22	59.1	5	closed	(25) DISSTY	closed	4/81	15.6	
12/45	26.7		diffuse	(26) CLIORI	diffuse	6/25	24.0	
16/152	10.5		strong/moderate	(27) PARORI	strong/moderate	5/69	7.2	
16/63	25.4		national	(28) CONORI	national	6/43	14.0	
15/39	38.5		president/vice-president/ senator	(35) OFFIMA	president/vice-president senator	4/16	25.0	
22/123	17.9		no	(37) MANIPU	no	7/68	10.3	
20/81	24.7		yes	(38) SFMADE	yes	5/80	6.3	
21/119	17.6		yes	(39) PROFPO	yes	6/53	11.3	
(ambiguous)			--	(40) TRADPO	yes	4/30	13.3	

TABLE 37 (cont.)

1944-1952			1952-1958		
(1)	(2)	(3) category	CHARACTERISTIC*	category	(1) (2) (3)
16/74	21.6	low	(42) BOMBIN	low	5/51 9.8
18/70	25.7	very low	(43) DEPEND	very low	4/43 9.3
15/65	23.1	high	(44) VISIBI	high/moderate/low	4/47 8.5
13/88	14.8	very high/high	(45) MANENG		(ambiguous)
20/35 (ambiguous)	57.1	6 high	(46) DECMAK	high	7/18 38.9
17/48	35.4	high/moderate	(47) VIOLEN	low	4/21 19.0
13/49	26.5	high	(48) FORPAR	high/moderate	6/30 20.0
			(49) SLOCON	high	4/20 20.0

* Characteristics are identified by the labels utilized in the computer analysis. The numerical symbols in parentheses are described below.

- Note: (1) Frequency of individuals with a leadership status included in the category of the characteristics over number of individuals in the government coalition with the same characteristics and category.
- (2) Probability of making a correct selection. Quotient of the expression described in (1), and probability that a leader of the government coalition may be identified using the category of the characteristic.
- (3) Definitional rank. Only the values for $p = .50$ are listed.

leaders² were able to play five other roles besides the two roles played by key batistiano leaders: (3) dominants of the decisional process,³ (4) national leaders of the national political parties,⁴ (5) closed distributors of patronage,⁵ (6) determinant factors and men with impact in national decision-making,⁶ and (7) intensive participants in the elaboration of political formulas.⁷ Each of these roles were played, during the auténtico regime, by top and key leaders at least 50 per cent of the time; in most cases well over 50 per cent of the time.

This particular finding about top batistiano leaders who could only play two of the roles that were shown to be closely related to political status--see Table 26, Chapter VIII--can be traced back to the discussion about the nature of the group that took over the functions of the top auténtico leaders deposed by the coup of March, 1952,⁸ and the discussion about the nature of the concealed leaders group--the second stratum of the political power structure.⁹

²Although there were only four top leaders during the auténtico regime, the small size of the group of key leaders--seventeen--does not warrant the confinement of the inferences to this group.

³Item (16), Table 37.

⁴Item (13), Table 37.

⁵Item (25), Table 37.

⁶Item (46), Table 37. See also Figure 3, Chapter IV.

⁷Item (20), Table 37.

⁸See Chapter X.

⁹See Chapter IX.

In the first place, top batistiano leaders are shown to have been capable to exercise only a moderate degree of issue-control.¹⁰ Second, it is evident that they shared this reduced control with at least twelve other actors. Third, there is only one case of high issue-control during the Batista regime, namely, Batista himself. So, the group that was able to monopolize some of the power structure roles that top batistiano leaders were not able to monopolize, must have come from below; but not from the "outside" since we are dealing with political roles adscribed to formal political positions--party leaders, etc. Consequently, the inference is that, during the Batista regime, the functions of the top leadership group were mostly appropriated by Batista or dispersed among incumbents of different power structure roles.

Concealed Leaders

Very little can be said about the roles associated with the role of concealed leader during the two regimes,¹¹ except that they more or less conform to the general case developed in Chapter IX. Only one characteristic role may be associated with the role of concealed auténtico leader and this was the role of intensive participant in the elaboration of political formulas.¹² Although concealed auténtico leaders

¹⁰Item (16), Table 37.

¹¹Because of the fact that the number of occasional participants in the auténtico coalition--members of the Democratic and Liberal parties who joined the coalition in 1950 or shortly thereafter--increases as one goes down to the lower levels of the power structure during the auténtico regime, it is necessary to separate the two groups. This allows for more precise inferences about the nature of the roles played by the senior and junior partners of the coalition which is, after all, a measure of the permeability of the regime.

¹²Item (48), Table 38.

TABLE 38

CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH CONCEALED
LEADERSHIP ROLES: 1944-1952 AND 1952-1958

Character- istics	1944-1952				1952-1958				
	Permanent*		Occasional**		Permanent*		Occasional**		
	category	(1)	(2)	category	(1)	(2)	category	(1)	(2)
(12) ELEPOT	moderate	23.5		moderate	24.1		moderate	27.0	
(13) PARTYA	national/bur./prov.	33.9		(ambiguous)			national/provincial	30.2	
(14) SCOMAC	national	20.0		provincial	30.4		national	17.2	
(15) CONMAC	moderate	28.3		moderate	27.8		low	25.7	
(16) ISSCON	low	24.6		low	28.6		low	16.1	
(17) ISSPAR	internal/few	31.0		internal/few	46.2	2	internal/few	23.7	
(18) CONPAT	high/moderate	25.7		low	22.2		high	58.8	1
(19) POLPER	moderate	29.7		moderate	28.6		moderate	17.9	
(20) FORPAR	low	32.1		low	33.3		high/moderate/low	22.4	
(21) PRESID	no	15.5		no	15.5		no	9.2	
(22) PURPOS	ambiguous/nonelect.- adv.	24.1		nonelect.- adv.	58.3	1	(ambiguous)		
(24) REPSTY	independent	31.0		independent	24.4		independent	23.7	
(25) DISSTY	closed	20.3		closed	17.5		closed	12.3	
(26) CLIORI	specific	17.0		specific	17.3		specific	11.2	
(27) PARORI	strong/moderate	21.0		strong/moderate	28.6		strong	23.1	
(28) CONORI	subnational	17.3		(ambiguous)			national	20.9	

TABLE 38 (cont.)

Character- istics	1944-1952				1952-1958				
	Permanent*		Occasional**		Permanent*		Occasional**		
	category	(1)	(2)	category	(1)	(2)	category	(1)	(2)
(35) OFFIMA	senator/minister	35.6		senator/represent.	23.5		(ambiguous)		
(37) MANIPU	no	25.3		no	22.7		no	16.2	
(38) SFMADE	yes	25.0		yes	26.3		yes	15.0	
(39) PROFPO	yes	26.1		yes	22.0		yes	18.9	
(40) TRADPO	no	15.0		no	17.6		no	9.9	
(42) BOMBIN	low	27.1		low	17.8		low	17.6	
(43) DEPEND	lowest/low	26.3		low	31.6		lowest	20.9	
(44) VISIBI	(ambiguous)			high/moderate	35.0		lowest	10.7	
(45) MANENG	(ambiguous)			low/lowest	30.4		lowest/low	12.5	
(46) DECMKG	low	26.8		low	15.9		high/moderate	50.0	
(47) VIOLEN	(ambiguous)			lowest	11.8		lowest	9.5	
(48) FORPAR	high/moderate	42.9	1	high/moderate/low	30.0		high/moderate	30.0	
(49) SLOCON	high/undefined	18.8		undefined/high	16.7		lowest/high	11.8	

* Permanent: members of the government coalition during a considerable amount of time (1 year or more).

** Occasional: members of the government coalition during a short period of time (less than 1 year).

(1) : probability of making a correct selection

(2) : definitional rank

Note: Numerical symbols in parentheses are the same; labels utilized for the identification of the characteristics are the same utilized in the computer analysis.

did not play this role at least 50 per cent of the time, they dominated it because, as a group, they played this role more often than any other group of incumbents of power structure roles during the auténtico regime. They basically conform to the general type of concealed leaders proposed by Bonjean because they were perceived by the judges as playing this role and could not be classified as such using content analysis. Moreover, the majority of the incumbents of this role did not receive a high or moderate visibility score.¹³

One specific purposive role is the more salient feature associated with the role of concealed leader as played by the junior members of the auténtico coalition. This purposive role is defined by a non-electoral orientation coupled with support--advocacy--for policies of institutionalization of the state apparatus along the lines of a legal-rational conception.¹⁴ In terms of issue participation, these actors played the role of intensive participants in a few issues,¹⁵ and because of the fact that their visibility was high or moderate, the adequacy of their inclusion in the concealed leadership category is doubtful.¹⁶

¹³See the discussion about the nature of concealed leadership and its theoretical justification in Chapter IX. Basically, the argument is that concealed leaders are characterized by low visibility, a reputation for intensive participation in the elaboration of political formulas, and a conspicuous lack of other capabilities that may justify their ability to participate in national decision-making on the basis of their ability to accumulate these capabilities.

¹⁴See the operational definitions of "predominant policy orientation" and "institutional orientation"--combined into "purposive orientation" at this stage of the analysis--in Appendix B, Indicators.

¹⁵Item 17, Table 38.

¹⁶It can be shown that this was really a result of their position in the coalition.

Finally, concealed batistiano leaders are shown to have been very low on visibility,¹⁷ and very active in national decision-making,¹⁸ although this participation was not merely confined to formula elaboration. But their more salient characteristic was their high control of patronage and although the majority of the top batistiano leaders also had high control over patronage, this capability was dominated by concealed leaders during the Batista regime.¹⁹ Therefore, concealed batistiano leaders were able to dominate two functions that should have corresponded to their top leadership as the auténtico case shows. However, it is possible to speculate that the distinction between these two leadership types was blurred as a consequence of the fact that Batista himself appropriated most of these functions and distributed them according to his own interests.²⁰

Top Political Elites

The overlapping between the roles that were associated with the role of top political elite during the two regimes is practically minimal although all the different patterns may be included in the general definition of this type proposed in Chapter IX. The unifying characteristic for all the actors included in this type--regardless of regime--is their notorious lack of decisional power manifested by: low issue-decisional control, low scores of decision-making power, and low scores of formula participation.

¹⁷Item (44), Table 38.

¹⁸Item (46), Table 38.

¹⁹Item (18), Table 38. Compare with Item (46), Table 37.

²⁰Interview #2.

The role complex associated with the role of top auténtico elite includes: (1) a predominant orientation toward a specific clientele, (2) the formal roles of representative, administrator--technician--or other minor formal political role, and (3) a fairly independent style of representation.²¹

The case of the junior partners of the auténtico coalition who played top political elite roles is probably the most interesting of the three cases presented in Table 39. This group seems to have been the most independent of the three in terms of the availability of roles that they could play. Besides, their fairly independent style of representation and their minor participation in decision-making and the elaboration of political formulas, the incumbents of this role provide the most clear-cut case of manengism uncovered by this study. These actors are shown to have played manengue roles, to have been oriented to electoral politics, to have been opponents of institutionalization policies, to have had low visibility, moderate permanence and almost absolute control over a local political base.²²

Finally, the batistiano group is best characterized by its lack of decisional power and its low participation in formula elaboration,²³ but there is very little else that may be said about them besides this. The overall impression obtained from the results is that this group played a very minor role in the Batista regime.

²¹Items (25), (35), and (24), Table 39.

²²Items (24), (45), (20), (46), (22), (44), (19), and (49), Table 39. Local political base refers to a municipal term or geographical region of one province that these actors were able to control through their deals with local executives who responded to their interests. Interview #2.

²³Items (20) and (46), Table 39.

TABLE 39

CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH TOP POLITICAL
ELITE ROLES: 1944-1952 AND 1952-1958

Character- istics	1944-1952				1952-1958				
	Permanent**		Occasional***		Permanent**		Occasional***		
	category	(1)	(2)	category	(1)	(2)	category	(1)	(2)
(12) ELEPOT	low/med.	36.8		moderate	37.9		low		24.1
(13) PARTYA	provincial/local	39.3		provincial	44.4		provincial/none		31.0
(14) SCOMAC	national	33.8		provincial/local	40.9		national/provincial		28.2
(15) CONMAC	moderate/low	39.5		moderate	44.4		med/low		31.0
(16) ISSCON	low	40.0		none	37.1		low/none		28.6
(17) ISSPAR	regular/internal/few	34.8		(ambiguous)			internal/regular/few		35.4
(18) CONPAT	none/low/high	36.1		moderate	45.8		moderate/low		31.8
(19) POLPER	low/moderate	37.6		moderate	50.0		moderate/high		31.5
(20) FORPAR	low	39.3		low	54.2		low		48.8
(21) PRESID	no	40.8		no	41.4		no		31.9
(22) PURPOS	electoral-resisters or ambivalent	37.3		electoral- resisters	50.0	5	electoral-resisters or ambivalent		39.0
(24) REPSTY	fairly independent	50.0	3	independent	62.5	1	fairly independent		40.7
(25) DISSTY	closed	34.4		closed	30.0		closed		27.2
(26) CLIORI	specific	77.3	1	specific	38.5		specific		28.0
(27) PARORI	strong/med.	35.2		strong/weak	40.0		(ambiguous)		
(28) CONORI	subnational	35.8		subnational	45.7		subnational		33.7

TABLE 39 (cont.)

Character- istics	1944-1952				1952-1958				
	Permanent*		Occasional**		Permanent*		Occasional**		
	category	(1)	(2)	category	(1)	(2)	category	(1)	(2)
(35) OFFIMA	represent./technical or other	50.9	2	senator or representative	44.1		minister/technical or other	28.1	
(37) MANIPU	no	32.9		no	34.1		no	32.4	
(38) SFMADE	yes	32.9		yes	39.5		yes	28.8	
(39) PROFPO	(ambiguous)			yes	42.0		yes	37.7	
(40) TRADPO	no	38.1		no	17.8		no	27.7	
(42) BOMBIN	lowest	39.1		lowest	45.2		lowest	40.4	
(43) DEPEND	low/lowest	35.5		lowest/low	38.6		low/lowest	37.5	
(44) VISIBI	lowest/high moderate	33.3		low	50.0	6	lowest	23.5	
(45) MANENG	lowest or highest	40.0		highest	57.1	2	highest or lowest	29.2	
(46) DECMKG	low	42.9		low	52.3	4	low	50.0	1
(47) VIOLIN	lowest	36.4		lowest	45.1		lowest	27.4	
(48) FORPAR	lowest	39.7		lowest	38.2		lowest/high/moderate	28.0	
(49) SLOCON	lowest	32.4		high	50.0	8	undefined	26.3	

* and **: Same as in Table 38.

(1) : probability of making a correct selection

(2) : definitional rank

Note: Numerical symbols in parentheses are the same; labels utilized for the identification of the characteristics are the same utilized in the computer analysis.

The Lower Political Elite

Of all the four general types described in Chapter IX, this is the case that conforms best to the general description. Regardless of regime there is an abundance of characteristics that allow for a very accurate identification of the group, and the probabilities associated with the top definitional characteristics are so high that they hardly deserve any comment. This is clearly the lowest level of the political power structure and the utilization of the resources provided by parties, machines, patronage, formal position, and an independent political base were clearly beyond the reach of the actors playing the role of lower political elite --see Table 40.

The Model

One operational consequence of this replication of the general typology proposed in Chapter IX is the reduction to a maximum of fourteen of the number of variables needed to describe the style of a political regime. These fourteen variables can be grouped into three specific dimensions of the regime: recruitment, decision-making, and policy orientation. Figure 10 describes the composition of each of these three dimensions in terms of the variables included in each.

The reason behind the detailed specification of the operational definitions of each of these variables is very simple. First, the analysis purports to explain and describe structural characteristics --or aggregate patterns of political behavior--from indicators of individual political behavior. In other words, the interrelationships among these indicators will be utilized to make inferences about:

TABLE 40

CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH A LOWER POLITICAL
ELITE ROLE: 1944-1952 AND 1952-1958

Character- istics	1944-1952				1952-1958				
	Permanent*		Occasional**		Permanent*		Occasional**		
	category	(1)	(2)	category	(1)	(2)	category	(1)	(2)
(12) ELEPOT	low	61.4	2	(ambiguous)			low	73.4	5
(13) PARTYA	none/local	63.3	1	local/provincial	37.2		none	74.6	4
(14) SCOMAC	low/national/bur.	40.0		local	61.9	1	(ambiguous)		
(15) CONMAC	low/none	47.8		low/moderate	28.8		none	72.6	7
(16) ISSOCN	none	56.5	7	none	45.7		none	71.4	9
(17) ISSPAR	int. or regular in few	37.7		regular in one or few	48.3		int. or regular in one/int. in few	56.3	
(18) CONPAT	none/low	46.3		low	44.4		low or high	58.1	
(19) POLPER	low/moderate	33.9		low/moderate	38.8		none/low/moderate	61.9	
(20) FORPAR	none	60.8	4	none	59.4	2	none	78.8	3
(21) PRESID	no	43.7		no	36.2		no	58.8	
(22) PURPOS	elect.-resist./ nonelect.-adv.	40.3		electoral- resisters	43.8		elect.-resist./ nonelect.-resist.	65.6	
(24) REPSTY	dep. or fairly indep.	50.0		dep. or indep.	31.3		dep. or fairly indep.	62.6	
(25) DISSTY	closed/open	38.7		closed	37.5		closed	55.5	
(26) CLIORI	specific	39.4		specific	38.5		specific	59.8	
(27) PARORI	strong/moderate	33.3		strong	31.4		indifferent	73.2	5
(28) CONORI	subnational	40.7		subnational	45.7		subnational	56.2	

TABLE 40 (cont.)

Character- istics	1944-1952				1952-1958				
	Permanent**		Occasional**		Permanent**		Occasional**		
	category	(1)	(2)	category	(1)	(2)	category	(1)	(2)
(35) OFFIMA	other formal or none	52.1		represent./tech./ other/none	43.2		technical or other than political	70.0	
(37) MANIPU	yes	54.8	8	no	27.3		yes	65.0	
(38) SFMADE	no	52.9	9	no	50.0	5	yes	50.0	
(39) PROFPO	no	50.8		yes	22.0		no	66.7	
(40) TRADPO	no	38.9		no	42.2		no	59.4	
(42) BOMBIN	lowest	39.1		lowest	38.7		lowest	43.9	
(43) DEPEND	high/moderate	58.8	5	highest/lowest	44.4		highest/high	81.6	2
(44) VISIBI	lowest	48.3		low	39.3		lowest	61.9	
(45) MANENG	lowest	42.3		highest/lowest	32.5		lowest	63.5	
(46) DECMKG	lowest	60.9	3	low	29.5		lowest	83.6	1
(47) VIOLIN	lowest	46.8		lowest	37.3		lowest	62.1	
(48) FORPAR	lowest	51.5		lowest	52.9	4	lowest	71.4	8
(49) SLOCON	undefined	56.8	6	undefined	53.1	3	undefined	65.7	

* and ** : Same as in Tables 38 and 39.
 (1) : probability of making a correct selection
 (2) : definitional rank

Note: Numerical symbols in parentheses are the same; labels utilized for the identification of the characteristics are the same utilized in the computer analysis.

DIMENSIONS OF THE REGIME	INDICATORS UTILIZED	SUBSTANTIVE NATURE OF THE INDICATORS
I. Recruitment	(12) elepot	Electoral potence: subject's ability to elect himself to national office in a competitive situation
	(13) partya	Level of party authority: formal position occupied by subject in the party(ies) of which he was a member
	(21) presid	Presidential orientation: subject's declared intention to become a presidential candidate
	(35) offima	Office image: formal position with which the majority of judges associated the subject
II. Decision-making	(16) isscon	Issue decisional control: subject's ability to bring about desired outcomes and prevent the implementation of undesirable ones
	(17) isspar	Issue participation: scope and intensity of subject's participation in decision-making
	(20) forpar	Formula participation: frequency of subject's intervention in the elaboration of the more important formulas <u>implemented</u> during the period of analysis
	(46) decmkg	Decision-making score: subject's score on the Guttman scale of decision-making derived from the judges' comments about the more relevant types of decision-makers
	(48) reppar*	Formula participation score: (formerly identified as forpar but now changed to eliminate confusion) subject's score on the Guttman scale of formula participation derived from the judges' comments about the different roles that a subject could play in the elaboration of a formula

DIMENSIONS OF THE REGIME	INDICATORS UTILIZED	SUBSTANTIVE NATURE OF THE INDICATORS
III. Policy Orientation	(22) purpos	Purposive orientation: combination of the subject's predominant policy orientation (distributive=electoral; mixed; substantive=non-electoral) and his institutional orientation (advocate=for policies of institutionalization of the state apparatus; ambivalent; resistor=against these policies)
	(24) repsty**	Representation style: probability of subject's role behavior being controlled by relevant others: delegate=high probability and a dependent style of representation, trustee=moderate probability and a fairly independent style of representation, politico=low probability and an independent style of representation
	(25) dissty	Distribution style: subject's willingness to open his patronage network to a larger clientele than his usual clientele: open=high willingness, permeable=moderate, and closed=low.
	(26) cliori	Clientele orientation: nature of the clientele toward which the subject was primarily oriented
	(45) maneng	Manenguism score: subject's score of the Guttman scale of manenguism developed from the judges' use of terms related to a manengue style of political behavior in their comments about the subject.

* Formerly (48) forpar and now (48) reppar in order to distinguish "reputational" from "actual" participation in formula elaboration.

**The use of the terms delegate, trustee and politico does not conform to Wahlke et al (1962) but the terms have been incorporated in the analysis because, with the modification introduced in their operational definitions, these terms convey an accurate connotation of the styles of representation that prevailed in Cuba.

Figure 10.--Regime Style Characteristics

(1) the structure of opportunities embedded in the recruitment patterns of the two regimes, (2) the decisional structure of the regime--from the direction of the interactions among decisional roles--and (3) the regime's predisposition toward certain outcomes from the prevalent patterns of individual policy orientations.

Second, the discussion to follow assumes that the formalization of these interrelationships will constitute a summary statement of the styles of the two regimes, and that the nature of the systems of causality to be derived will provide the final test of the hypothesis that the two regimes were different. Obviously, one cannot do this if the substantive nature of the variables is unclear and this is not an unlikely prospect, given the extension of the analysis and the different aspects from which this analysis has been approached.

Finally, the formalization of the model does not imply the description of a relationship between attributes. What is being measured and described now is aggregate behavior, and the scope of generalization will be greatly reduced if it is not emphasized that the unit of analysis is no longer the individual, but the role.

The general pattern of interactions among these variables during the two regimes is presented in Table 41. These correlation matrices were utilized to generate multiple and partial correlations that could explain--in a causal sense--the predominant patterns of recruitment, decision-making and policy orientations of the two regimes.²⁴

²⁴The analysis to be conducted is based on the method proposed by Hubert M. Blalock, Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964).

TABLE 41
 INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG CHARACTERISTICS
 OF REGIME STYLE

40 (a): 1944 - 1952

Variables	13	16	17	20	21	22	24	25	26	35	45	46	48
12	.62	.42	.42	.39	.34	.39	.64	.33	.29	.70	.59	.55	.39
13		.67	.73	.58	.61	.68	.57	.35	.36	.59	.64	.74	.64
16			.89	.78	.69	.54	.33	.11	.38	.58	.44	.73	.53
17				.74	.69	.77	.37	.36	.51	.70	.53	.67	.53
20					.54	.35	.29	.15	.40	.55	.23	.73	.45
21						.28	.29	.17	.29	.37	.23	.64	.37
22							.40	.46	.38	.58	.78	.47	.64
24								.18	.17	.55	.41	.43	.38
25									.26	.32	.30	.24	.35
26										.28	.15	.29	.21
35											.63	.60	.53
45												.50	.46
46													.53

40 (b): 1952 - 1958

Variables	13	16	17	20	21	22	24	25	26	35	45	46	48
12	.66	.26	.36	.23	.37	.55	.70	.18	.29	.66	.67	.58	.35
13		.59	.76	.57	.49	.80	.64	.37	.28	.74	.78	.72	.58
16			.87	.89	.63	.61	.28	.25	.36	.67	.37	.70	.38
17				.86	.72	.64	.39	.36	.44	.85	.59	.72	.64
20					.55	.46	.31	.24	.22	.52	.22	.62	.39
21						.37	.29	.09	.34	.38	.08	.72	.35
22							.56	.36	.40	.76	.75	.58	.61
24								.22	.26	.62	.63	.59	.30
25									.28	.37	.13	.16	.20
26										.30	.13	.33	.15
35											.82	.64	.56
45												.58	.29
46													.47

Note: Table values are phi coefficients derived from the original cross tabulations of the variables included in the table. The numbers utilized to identify the variables refer to the sequential order of each variable and is the same that has been utilized throughout the analysis.

Recruitment Patterns


An initial model of the structure of opportunities that prevailed in each regime is provided in Figure 11. All possible correlations between the predominant recruitment roles have been included in the figure.

The evaluation of the alternative causal models that may be derived from this overall pattern of relationships led to the formulation of the two models presented in Figure 12. The direction of causality in these models indicates that:


- (1) the structure of opportunities of the auténtico regime was defined by the interaction between electoral, formal, and partisan roles with the electoral role acting as an antecedent of the other two.
- (2) the structure of opportunities of the Batista regime was also defined by electoral roles but the possibility to play the more prominent electoral roles was confined to the party leadership.

On the basis of this evidence it is possible to conclude that the process of leadership recruitment was competitive during the auténtico regime and non-competitive during the Batista regime. Electoral roles ceased to be a major influence in the structure of opportunities and it seems that the possibility to play a formal political role was confined to the party leadership who were able to fix the formal roles that other participants could play.²⁵

²⁵Hypotheses RH-1a, 1b and 1A are confirmed by these results.



11 (a) : 1944 - 1952




11 (b) : 1952 - 1958

Figure 11.--Initial Models of the Structure of Opportunities of the Auténtico and Batista Regimes.

Predictions:

$$r_{21\ 12} = 0$$

$$r_{21\ 35} = 0$$



Results:

$$r_{21\ 12} = r_{21\ 13} r_{12\ 13} : .34 \text{ vs. } (.61)(.62) = .38$$

$$r_{21\ 35} = r_{21\ 13} r_{13\ 35} : .37 \text{ vs. } (.61)(.59) = .36$$


12 (a) : 1944 - 1952

Predictions:

$$r_{21\ 12} = 0$$

$$r_{21\ 35} = 0$$

$$r_{12\ 35} = 0$$



Results:

$$r_{21\ 12} = r_{21\ 13} r_{12\ 13} : .37 \text{ vs. } (.49)(.66) = .32$$

$$r_{21\ 35} = r_{21\ 13} r_{13\ 35} : .38 \text{ vs. } (.49)(.74) = .36$$

$$r_{12\ 35} = r_{13\ 35} r_{12\ 13} : .49 \text{ vs. } (.74)(.66) = .49$$

12 (b) : 1952 - 1958


Figure 12.--Proposed Models of the Structure of Opportunities of the Auténtico and Batista Regimes.

In summary, leadership recruitment was ascriptive during the Batista regime and controlled by a minority of party leaders who monopolized the more relevant electoral roles. The functional relevance of electoral roles in this process was diminished to the point that the distribution of formal political roles was no longer dependent on the distribution of electoral roles.


Consequently, the Batista regime had a relatively impermeable structure of opportunities and the functional autonomy of the recruitment process was greatly reduced.

Decision-Making

If the permeability and the openness of a decisional process constitute an accurate measure of the democratic or dictatorial nature of this process, there can be no doubt that the auténtico regime was democratic and that the Batista regime was dictatorial. The evaluation of the alternative causal models that may be extrapolated from the general models proposed for the two regimes--see Figures 13 and 14--confirms this interpretation. In the case of the auténtico regime, the ability to participate in issues of national importance was not predetermined by the degree of issue control that the leaders of the regime exerted on the process. Two modes of participation were prevalent: ad hoc participation--outlined by the sequence 17-16-20-46--or institutional participation--outlined by the sequence 17-16-46. Both avenues of participation could conduce to the accumulation of decision making power.



13 (a) : 1944 - 1952



13 (b) : 1952 - 1958

Figure 13.--Initial Models of the Decision-Making Structure of the Auténtico and Batista Regimes.

Predictions:


$r_{17\ 46} = 0$

$r_{17\ 20} = 0$

$r_{48\ 16} = 0$

$r_{48\ 17} = 0$

$r_{48\ 20} = 0$

Results:


$r_{17\ 46} = r_{17\ 16} r_{46\ 16} : .67 \text{ vs. } (.89)(.73) = .65$

$r_{17\ 20} = r_{17\ 16} r_{16\ 20} : .74 \text{ vs. } (.89)(.78) = .69$

$r_{48\ 16} = r_{48\ 17} r_{17\ 16} : .53 \text{ vs. } (.89)(.53) = .47$

$r_{48\ 17} = r_{48\ 16} r_{16\ 17} : .53 \text{ vs. } (.53)(.89) = .47$

$r_{48\ 20} = r_{20\ 16} r_{48\ 16} : .45 \text{ vs. } (.53)(.78) = .41$

Results:

$$r_{16\ 46} = r_{16\ 17} r_{17\ 46} : .70 \text{ vs. } (.87)(.72) = .63$$

$$r_{17\ 20} = r_{16\ 17} r_{16\ 20} : .86 \text{ vs. } (.87)(.89) = .77$$

$$r_{20\ 46} = r_{17\ 46} r_{16\ 17} r_{16\ 20} : .62 \text{ vs. } (.72)(.87)(.86) = .56$$

$$r_{48\ 46} = r_{48\ 17} r_{17\ 46} : .46 \text{ vs. } (.64)(.72) = .46$$

$$r_{48\ 20} = r_{48\ 17} r_{16\ 17} r_{16\ 20} : .39 \text{ vs. } (.64)(.72)(.89) = .49$$

$$r_{48\ 16} = r_{48\ 17} r_{17\ 46} r_{16\ 46} : .38 \text{ vs. } (.64)(.72)(.70) = .32$$

$$r_{48\ 17} = r_{17\ 46} r_{16\ 46} r_{16\ 20} : .64 \text{ vs. } (.89)(.87)(.72) = .55$$

14 (b) : 1952 - 1958

Figure 14. --Proposed Models of the Structure of Decision-Making of the Auténtico and Batista Regimes.

The case of the Batista regime indicates that ad hoc participation was predominantly consultative and ritualistic since this participation did not imply the acquisition of a decisional capability from the part of the participants in formula elaboration. It is also worth mentioning that the reputation to participate in formula elaboration was not an indication of actual participation and, therefore, actual participation was far more secretive.


Finally, there can be very little doubt that the process of participation in national decision-making was controlled from above during the Batista regime and that the ability to participate was not a function of the participatory capabilities that any one actor could derive independently; this ability to participate was really a function of the leadership's willingness to open the process.²⁶

Regime Orientation


The normative orientations of the ruling group were also different. If a single purposive orientation could be attached to a particular regime as a measure of the regime's predisposition toward certain outcomes one would expect that this purposive orientation of the regime could account for the prevalent patterns of orientations and political styles of the regime.

Figure 16 indicates that in the case of the auténtico regime, the purposive orientation of the regime was representative of every significant orientation or style that was characteristic of the leadership of the regime. In the case of the Batista regime, the normative

²⁶These findings confirm the hypothesis RH 2b, Chapter I!




15 (a) : 1944 - 1952



15 (b) : 1952 - 1958

Figure 15.--Initial Models of Regime Orientation.

Predictions:

$$r_{24\ 25} = 0$$

$$r_{24\ 26} = 0$$

$$r_{25\ 45} = 0$$

$$r_{26\ 45} = 0$$

$$r_{24\ 45} = 0$$

$$r_{25\ 26} = 0$$

Results:

$$r_{24\ 25} = r_{22\ 24} r_{22\ 25} : .18 \text{ vs. } (.40)(.46) = .18$$

$$r_{24\ 26} = r_{22\ 24} r_{22\ 26} : .17 \text{ vs. } (.40)(.38) = .15$$

$$r_{25\ 45} = r_{22\ 25} r_{22\ 45} : .30 \text{ vs. } (.46)(.78) = .37$$

$$r_{26\ 45} = r_{22\ 25} r_{22\ 45} r_{25\ 26} : .15 \text{ vs. } (.46)(.78)(.26) = .09$$

$$r_{24\ 45} = r_{22\ 24} r_{22\ 45} : .41 \text{ vs. } (.40)(.78) = .31$$

$$r_{25\ 26} = r_{22\ 25} r_{22\ 26} : .26 \text{ vs. } (.46)(.38) = .17$$

Predictions:


$r_{24\ 25} = 0$

$r_{24\ 26} = 0$

$r_{22\ 24} = 0$

$r_{25\ 45} = 0$

$r_{26\ 45} = 0$

Results:

$r_{24\ 25} = r_{22\ 24} r_{22\ 25} : .22 \text{ vs. } (.56)(.36) = .20$

$r_{24\ 26} = r_{22\ 24} r_{22\ 26} : .26 \text{ vs. } (.56)(.40) = .22$

$r_{22\ 24} = r_{22\ 45} r_{24\ 45} : .56 \text{ vs. } (.75)(.63) = .47$

$r_{25\ 45} = r_{24\ 25} r_{24\ 45} : .13 \text{ vs. } (.22)(.63) = .14$

$r_{26\ 45} = r_{22\ 26} r_{22\ 24} r_{24\ 45} : .13 \text{ vs. } (.40)(.56)(.63) = .14$

16 (b) : 1952 - 1958

Figure 16.--Proposed Models of Regime Orientation.

patterns of the regime were much more disorganized. The style of representation was not a characteristic that could identify the orientation of the regime and the clientele and manengue orientations interacted with the distributive and representational orientations thus complicating the picture.

The only valid inference that seems to obtain from these results is that representation was no longer taken into consideration by the Batista regime in its orientations toward specific outcomes. The contention is that it hardly needed to since this regime was able to control recruitment and participation. The historical evidence seems to indicate that this strategy proved to be a serious miscalculation.

Recruitment-Decision-Making and Regime Orientation

The style of these regimes may now be characterized in terms of the input-output linkages that have been discussed separately under each different model. These linkages refer to the relationship between the style of recruitment, the style of decision-making, and the predominant orientations of these regimes. The models selected in the evaluation of the alternative causal models that could be extracted from the operation of these linkages appear in Figures 17 and 18. Each model constitutes an empirical statement of regime style.²⁷

²⁷ Each of the last causal links uncovered by the models of recruitment, decision-making, and orientations was incorporated. Multiple regression equations were developed in order to test the adequacy of the links. The rest of the relationships were taken from Table 41.

Predictions:


$$r_{20\ 22} = 0$$

$$r_{21\ 22} = 0$$

$$r_{13\ 20} = 0$$

$$r_{22\ 46} = 0$$

$$r_{20\ 21} = 0$$

Results:

$$r_{20\ 22} = r_{20\ 46} r_{22\ 46} : .35 \text{ vs. } (.73)(.47) = .34$$

$$r_{21\ 22} = r_{21\ 46} r_{22\ 46} : .28 \text{ vs. } (.55)(.47) = .26$$

$$r_{13\ 20} = r_{13\ 46} r_{20\ 46} : .58 \text{ vs. } (.74)(.73) = .54$$

$$r_{22\ 46} = r_{13\ 46} r_{13\ 22} : .47 \text{ vs. } (.74)(.68) = .50$$

$$r_{20\ 21} = r_{21\ 46} r_{20\ 46} : .54 \text{ vs. } (.64)(.73) = .47$$

Figure 17.--Style of the Auténtico Regime.


Predictions:

$$r_{21\ 22} = 0$$

$$r_{13\ 21} = 0$$

$$r_{17\ 22} = 0$$

$$r_{22\ 46} = 0$$



Results:

$$r_{21\ 22} = r_{13\ 21} r_{13\ 22} : .37 \text{ vs. } (.49)(.80) = .39$$

$$r_{13\ 21} = r_{13\ 46} r_{21\ 46} : .49 \text{ vs. } (.72)(.72) = .52$$

$$r_{17\ 22} = r_{13\ 17} r_{13\ 22} : .64 \text{ vs. } (.76)(.80) = .61$$

$$r_{22\ 46} = r_{13\ 22} r_{13\ 46} : .58 \text{ vs. } (.80)(.72) = .58$$

Figure 18.--Style of the Batista Regime.

From the direction of causality that seems to be present in the models, it is possible to describe the style of the auténtico regimes as follows:

- (1) competitive recruitment among aspirants to and incumbents of top and key political leadership roles;
- (2) decision-making roles accessible to participants in formula elaboration, and party leaders, with top and key political leaders exerting dominance over the process of decision-making; and
- (3) purposive orientations of the regime articulated through party leadership roles but not by top and key decision-makers.

The style of the Batista regime indicates a reversal in these relationships:

- (1) decisional dominants exerting control over the recruitment and decision-making processes;
- (2) decisional dominants delegating or exerting their control through recruitment roles in order to maintain their control of the decision-making process; and
- (3) purposive orientations of the regime articulated through party leadership roles but not evident from the role behavior of top and key leaders.

Consequently, the auténtico regimes were democratic and the Batista regime was dictatorial. But they were not so because of the ideological orientations of top and key leaders or because of the policies

that the regime implemented. They were democratic and dictatorial regimes because the patterns of role relationships inside the regime indicate so, because the degree of overlapping between different regime roles indicate so.

If the auténtico regime was not dictatorial, this can be best explained in terms of the role relationships within the regime and not because the incumbents of top and key leadership roles were committed to democracy regardless the consequences.²⁸ Likewise, the Batista regime was a dictatorship because these role relationships allowed it to produce the outcomes it produced.²⁹ But even if it had produced the most beneficial outcomes ever, the Batista regime would have always been a dictatorship.

²⁸ Grau was perceived as a man who was tolerant with the opposition but who exercised dictatorial power within the PRC. Interviews #1, 2, 12, 13.

²⁹ It is a mistake to assume that Batista was an implacable monster who derived satisfaction from the repressive measures of his regime. Most interviewees perceived him as a man who would have liked to be a popular democratic leader. Interviews #1, 2, 3, 14, 15.

PART IV: CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTER XII

SOME FINAL REMARKS

Between the years of 1944 and 1958 the Cuban Republic was not governed by a power elite of socio-economic dominants who could very easily interchange institutional and political roles. Nor was Cuba governed by delegates or subordinates of these dominants who preferred to stay behind the scenes. During these fourteen years, Cuba was governed by a small group of visible leaders who were, for the most part, professional politicians playing top and key leadership roles.

The Auténtico Regimes

Under the Partido Revolucionario Cubano (Auténtico) and especially during the administration of Carlos Prío Socarrás, the Cuban political system was democratic. During the auténtico regimes, popular participation in elections was high, the probability of reversing an unpopular governmental decision was high,¹ the ruling group could have been removed by elections, and there was a relative diffusion of power that practically forced the ruling group to negotiate with lower participants in order to

¹This was probably much lower under Grau because he flatly refused to ask for the resignation of José Manuel Alemán following the scandal created by the BAGA, and he responded to the parliamentary interpellation of the minister who had negotiated some highly profitable and scandalous sugar deals with South American countries by making this minister his delegate before the United Nations.

obtain their support for crucial national decisions.²

But corruption was rampant during the auténtico regimes, popular credibility in the government gradually diminished to a very low point, and there was evidence that the continuity of the administrative effort of the government was minimal.

The Grau regime engaged in a number of programs of popular benefit and made it a constant theme its respect for popular sovereignty and the right of political opposition. However, during the Grau regime the level of political violence increased dramatically as a consequence of the repeated confrontations between rival "revolutionary" groups that were competing for spoils. The Prío regime engaged in a legislative program aimed at strengthening the institutional fabric of the Cuban state and this regime made an attempt to diminish the level of administrative corruption. There was also scrupulous respect for the opposition and the government was extremely sensitive to the swings of public opinion as reported by the national polls.

But the important point is that the style of the auténtico regimes was democratic because no one group or individual was able to control the recruitment process, and although Grau was a very strong and determined executive, neither he nor Prío exercised an absolute control over the decision-making process. In spite of the fact that a minority was able to accumulate the most relevant political resources, this accumulation was the result of competition and not the outcome of an ascriptive process controlled by top and key leaders. As a result of this, there was a diffusion of capabilities among the more important roles that tended to increase

²This was much less so during the Grau regime because he largely ignored Congress and ruled by decree.

the functional autonomy of these roles, enabling the incumbents of power structure roles to challenge the incumbents of top and key leadership roles in a number of issues.

In other words, the differentiation of regime roles and power structure roles was heavily influenced by a fairly autonomous process of leadership and elite recruitment. This process tended to decrease the dependency of lower participants on the leadership group because incumbency was determined by "winning" and not by an arbitrary assignment of specific roles.

In summary, the pattern of role relationships that characterized the auténtico regimes allowed for the adoption of a democratic style, and if a dictatorial style would have been adopted by these regimes, a drastic change in these relationships would have been inevitable. The contrast with the Batista regime confirmed this interpretation

The Batista Regime

The style of the Batista regime was dictatorial. The regime was the product of a coup, it adopted a wide variety of restrictive and repressive policies, it engaged in the harassment of opposition leaders, and it produced the death of many of its opponents. But it would be erroneous to utilize these facts to call it a dictatorship. The regime was dictatorial primarily because it was based on a pattern of role relationships that enabled it to produce all these outcomes. And the point is that even if it had not produced all these outcomes--at least the most violent and repressive--it would have been a dictatorship anyway.

First, popular participation was restricted, the process of recruitment was controlled by a few leaders, and this process had no impact whatsoever on the policies of the regime. Second, competition was a given during the auténtico regime but the control of the process of decision-making by a few leaders was the constant feature of the Batista regime. These leaders restricted participation in the process of recruitment to those actors who would not constitute an obstacle to the regime if they were elected to office. Consequently, the nature of the linkage between recruitment and decision-making was reversed during the Batista regime and it was the ability to control decision-making that determined the recruitment roles that different actors could play.

If during the auténtico regime the recruitment process tended to diffuse capabilities, during the Batista regime no specific capabilities were associated with roles other than those of top and key leaders. All regime and power structure roles were deflated as a consequence of the de facto nature of the regime. Since practically none of the incumbents of these roles had come to occupy them in an independent fashion, their individual capabilities and the capabilities associated with their offices were greatly reduced. Moreover, since the incumbents of regime roles had appropriated most of the capabilities associated with power structure roles--control of electoral machines, party leadership roles, etc.--were really in the hands of top and key leaders.

In summary, the role of political elite was a very subordinate role during the Batista regime because the power bases of the elite roles were cutoff by the regime and many of the functions of the elite

were taken over by the leadership. The dictatorial style of the Batista regime did not merely refer to a situation that characterized the relationships between the regime and the rest of the population but also the relationships between the leadership and the elite of the regime.

One or Many Dictators?

Batista could have had a dictatorial "vocation" or not,³ he could have preferred being a democrat or not⁴ but the important point is that he organized a regime that was predisposed toward certain outcomes. And these outcomes were predominantly produced in an unidirectional decisional flow in which the lower participants of the regime had very little influence. Consequently, it was the pattern of role relationships that determined the types of outcomes that the regime was able to produce. In this sense a dictatorship is never the work of only one person but rather a system of relationships in which one actor shares his absolute control with others that accumulate most of the resources that this one actor is willing to distribute.

Batista could have had first-rate figures around him⁵ or he could have been surrounded by incompetents,⁶ but very few differences would have resulted from this because the roles that both kinds of actors would

³Interview #15.

⁴Interviews #1, 2, 10, 14, and 15.

⁵Interview #15.

⁶Interview #10.

have been able to play would have been very similar.⁷ This is what makes participation in a dictatorial regime so costly. And it is the fact that incumbency in a leadership or elite role in a dictatorial regime implies the acceptance of a situation in which the role set from which any one actor may select a particular type of role behavior is severely limited. Moreover, the fact that there is an implicit connotation of servilism in these relationships indicates that most of the participants in a dictatorship greatly compromise their political careers because once they consented to participate in the regime the continuation of their political careers depends on the existence of the regime. And it seems that some of the top and key leaders of the regimes that sponsored more intransigent views were professional politicians.

At times the Batista regime seemed to oscillate between legalismo and tanquismo, between the attempt to articulate political formulas and the inclination to suppress the opposition.⁸ This cleavage that divided the regime was not a cleavage between professional politicians and other actors who were playing top and key decisional roles. This was a cleavage between professional politicians who were evenly divided in their positions on this point. Obviously, the more intransigent group was supported by a small group of perennial conspirators who had played decisive roles in the coup.⁹ And, again, contrary to what

⁷ Batista could receive good or bad advice from very competent or very mediocre collaborators but these collaborators could only counsel him for they really had no means of challenging the power of Batista.

⁸ Interview #3.

⁹ This group of perennial conspirators was rewarded with a few portfolios in the first cabinet of the regime. However, once the regime started to play with the idea of an electoral solution, they were gradually replaced by professional politicians.

one might expect, there were more long-time batistianos among the legalistas than among the tanquistas. However, the legalistas were more dependent on Batista and consequently had less power than the tanquista group. Therefore, the more intransigent and powerful faction among top and key leaders of the Batista regime was a group of professional politicians who had not participated in the coup.

It was this group of professional politicians who had a great interest in maintaining the regime and they seem to have been the group that would not have been able to make it back into office if a democratic regime would have been established.¹⁰ Therefore, the confrontation between this group, the top and key leaders of the regime, and the opposition leaders was not a confrontation between a military oligarchy and a civilist opposition rather it was a conflict between rival political groups of professional politicians who had been competing against each other since the Revolution of 1933. This is why it is erroneous to think that the Batista regime was a military dictatorship. True, the Armed Forces had more ascendancy during this period but they were completely controlled by Batista. But Batista was really the undisputable leader of the enlisted man and not a representative of the armed institutes.

Nor was the Batista regime a heaven for conservative oligarchies or social eminents who wanted to ensure the respect for authority and the maintenance of law and order. If the regime manipulated these issues it did so in order to justify its crack down of the opposition

¹⁰ Interview #2.

but not because it interpreted law and order in a strictly ideological sense. Moreover, opposition leaders were extremely irked by the repressive measures of the regime not only because of the impact that these measures had upon them but also because they were convinced that they responded to a criterion of expediency and not to a staunchly conservative orientation.¹¹

This is why the style of the Batista regime was totally devoid of an ideological component, a component that was never taken into consideration in the making of the policies of the regime. And after all, Batista himself tried to organize a leftist party of sorts, a party that he finally had to cut down because the leading figures of this party took their role very seriously and created conflicts within the government coalition.¹² There was the case of a parliamentary scuffle between members of this party and other leaders of the government coalition who accused them of marxist tendencies.¹³ Although the incident was really a soap opera, it is indicative of the kaleidoscopic nature of the political orientations that were represented in the government coalition created by Batista. Consequently, an ideological interpretation of the dictatorial style of the Batista regime is inadequate.

So this is a case of a Latin American dictatorship based on a political coalition, with military support but without military dominance,¹⁴

¹¹ Interview #11.

¹² Interview #13. See also "Responso al PUR," Bohemia (May 1, 1955), pp. 69-70.

¹³ See "Congreso," Bohemia, XLVIII, No. 7 (February 13, 1955), 67.

¹⁴ The military increased their influence with the mountain insurrectional activities and although they were not dominant at the national level, they were extremely powerful at the provincial level to the point

and without the least indication of any dominant ideological orientation. Was it really a dictatorship? The answer is yes. Was it a "typical" Latin American dictatorship? Insofar as the corruption that continued to prevail in the administration and in terms of the outcomes of the regime the answer is "probably yes, but . . ." And the fact is that there has not been a typology of Latin American regimes that has taken the pattern of role relationships within the regime as the initial point of departure. Therefore the answer to the second question cannot be adequately formulated at this time.

Old Myths and Old Realities

The case of the Cuban Republic shows the inadequacy of some of the models that have been offered in the comparative literature. These models have usually emphasized the socio-economic environments and the outcomes of the systems that they report to classify but they ignore a fundamental aspect of the performance of political systems.

The value of the case of the Cuban Republic is that a predominantly political explanation may be given to account for the differences between two unmistakable cases of democratic and dictatorial regimes. Two regimes that were immersed in a very similar socio-economic context. Two regimes that were embedded in essentially the same structure of political power.

In trying to approach the explanation of this case, it was shown that the adequacy of macrosystemic explanations is doubtful and that all

that regimental commanders had more power than the civilian governors.

that can be said about the nature of mass participation under the two regimes is that alienation increased as a response to the recruitment strategies utilized by the more powerful participants in this process. So if one does not adopt the perspective of leadership as the initial analytical perspective, one has to come to grips with it after the evaluation of other strategies of research indicates that these strategies are not adequate--at least in the present case.

On the other hand, the "traditional" explanations of the Latin American political processes have assumed that there is a characteristic pattern in which democratic and dictatorial tendencies confront one another and most of the political cleavages may be accounted for in these terms. However, another component of these explanations postulates the competition among different groups as an essential component of the pattern. Yet the case of the Cuban Republic shows that the nature of the institutional linkages does not account for the differentiation of regime and political power structure roles. How can one then argue that the group is a relevant component of this pattern? Doesn't it seem that the leaders of these groups utilize them to their own advantage in order to increase their individual capabilities? And, after all, didn't Batista receive the support of the most powerful groups when he came to power? Wasn't he able to form a coalition that represented every major interest in the country?

Personalismo has been another of the constant features that are attributed to this pattern. But isn't personalismo an attribute or a style that is present in the behavior of all the more prominent actors of the system? Because if the Latin American societies are individualistic

why should one think that the leaders are the only ones that behave in this way? And is it possible to talk about democratic and dictatorial personalismo?

The fact that one may adopt the perspective of leadership in the analysis of the Latin American political systems does not necessarily imply an unqualified endorsement of elitism or of democratic elitism. Leadership is basically elitistic in Latin America but conflict rather than consensus seems to be the norm. Therefore, if there is a ruling minority and a governed majority, there are factions in this minority that compete against each other. The mere existence of competition is not enough to say that these systems are democratic because it is the results of this competition that must be examined in order to make a justifiable selection of the terms democratic and dictatorial.

The use of these two terms, insofar as the traditional interpretations of Latin American politics are concerned, has been largely impressionistic and very much influenced by the prevalent political myths of the times. It seems that the time has come to make an adequate usage of these terms, independent of what may be expedient for a specific political purpose. Whether the attempt is the assignment of responsibilities to specific actors concerning certain events or simply the study of **how** power was utilized in connection with these events, it seems that the obvious point of departure has to be the analysis of political leadership.

Finally, if there is a constant in the conflictive style of the Latin American political processes, this constant is the struggle for

power. In the words of one of the five top political leaders included in this study, "you have to take power away from whoever has it." And this seems to be the most crucial aspect of the "classical" pattern of Latin American politics.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

THE LIST

Last names have been capped. Numerals at the left of each name represent the sequence number of the subject in the study.

- 001.- ACOSTA CASARES, Salvador
- 002.- AGUILAR RECIO, Antonio
- 003.- AGUILAR ROBAINA, Angel
- 004.- AGUILERA SANCHEZ, Guillermo
- 005.- AGUIRRE VIDAURRETA, Francisco
- 006.- ALBERNI YANCE, José
- 007.- ALEMAN CASHARO, José Manuel
- 008.- ALLIEGRO MILA, Anselmo
- 009.- ALONSO ALVAREZ, Rubén
- 010.- ALONSO AVILA, Antonio
- 011.- ALONSO LORENZO, Ignacio
- 012.- ALONSO PUJOL, Guillermo
- 013.- ALVAREZ BACALLAO, Manuel Rogelio
- 014.- ALVAREZ BIGAS, José D.
- 015.- ALVAREZ CABRERA, Alberto Inocente
- 016.- ALVAREZ DE LA VEGA, Aurelio
- 017.- ALVAREZ DEL REAL, Evelio
- 018.- ALVAREZ DIAZ, José
- 019.- ALVAREZ DIAZ, Manuel
- 020.- ALVAREZ FUENTES, Germán
- 021.- ALVAREZ RODRIGUEZ, Santiago
- 022.- AMPUDIA GONZALEZ, Manuel
- 023.- ANAYA MURILLO, Leonardo
- 024.- ANDREU MARTINEZ, José Raimundo
- 025.- ARAGONEZ MACHADO, Alberto
- 026.- ARAZOZA FORCADE, Carlos F. de
- 027.- ARMENGOL VERA, Alejandro
- 028.- ARREDONDO MORANDO, Francisco
- 029.- ARROYO MARQUEZ, Nicolás
- 030.- ARTILES LOPEZ, Juan
- 031.- AYALA, René Gregorio
- 032.- AZCARATE ROSSELL, Carlos
- 033.- BARRETO MARTINEZ, Fidel
- 034.- BARROSO PINAR, Jorge
- 035.- BATISTA ZALDIVAR, Francisco
- 036.- BATISTA ZALDIVAR, Fulgencio
- 037.- BECERRA CAMPA, Humberto
- 038.- BENITEZ, Francisco

- 039.- BENITEZ VALDES, Manuel
- 040.- BISBE ALBERNI, Manuel
- 041.- BLANCO TORRES, Pedro
- 042.- BORRELL NAVARRO, Eduardo
- 043.- BOSCH LAMARQUE, José
- 044.- BRAVO ACOSTA, Antonio
- 045.- BRINGUIER LAREDO, José
- 046.- BUGALLO BLANCO, Cirilo
- 047.- BUTTARI PUIG, Edgardo
- 048.- CABALLERO ROJO, Jorge
- 049.- CAINAS MILANES, Luis Felipe
- 050.- CAIROL GARRIDO, Francisco
- 051.- CAMACHO COVANI, César E.
- 052.- CÁMEJO ACOSTA, José R.
- 053.- CAMPA CARAVEDA, Miguel Angel de la
- 054.- CAMPANERIA VALDES, Ricardo
- 055.- CAMPOS MARQUETTI, Generoso
- 056.- CAPABLANCA GRAUPERA, Ramiro
- 057.- CAPESTANY ABREUS, Manuel
- 058.- CARBONELL ANDRICAIN, Néstor
- 059.- CARAMES, Bernardo
- 060.- CARDENAS ECHARTE, Raúl de
- 061.- CARRERA JUSTIZ, Pablo
- 062.- CARVAJAL, Antonio
- 063.- CASABUENA MIRANDA, José Ambrosio
- 064.- CASADO GUERREÑO, José Manuel
- 065.- CASANOVA DIVINO, José Manuel
- 066.- CASAS RODRIGUEZ, César M.
- 067.- CASERO GUILLEN, Luis
- 068.- CASTELLANOS RIVERO, Nicolás
- 069.- CASUSO DIAZ ALBERTINI, Jorge
- 070.- CAUCE CARRAZANA, Vicente
- 071.- CESPEDES, Miguel Angel
- 072.- CESPEDES ORTIZ, Carlos Miguel de
- 073.- CHIBAS RIBAS, Eduardo Renato
- 074.- CLARK, Sergio I.
- 075.- COBAS REYES, Mario
- 076.- CODINA SUBIRATS, Armando M.
- 077.- COLLADO, Luis A. del
- 078.- COLLOT PEREZ, Enrique
- 079.- CONSUEGRA, Julia Elisa
- 080.- CORO, Armando
- 081.- CORONA GARCÍA, Ramón
- 082.- COSCULLUELA, José Antonio
- 083.- COSSIO DEL PINO, Alejo
- 084.- CREMATA VALDES, Radio
- 085.- CRUZ CASO, Alberto C.
- 086.- CRUZ FERNANDEZ, Agustín
- 087.- CRUZ, Carlos Eduardo de la
- 088.- CUERVO NAVARRO, Pelayo

- 089.- CUERVO RUBIO, Gustavo
- 090.- CURTI MESSINA, Segundo
- 091.- CUSIDO TORRES, Eugenio
- 092.- DIAZ BALART, Rafael J.
- 093.- DIAZ PARDO, Rogelio
- 094.- DIAZ ROBAINA, Regino
- 095.- DIAZ RODRIGUEZ, Lomberto
- 096.- DIHIGO LOPEZ TRIGO, Ernesto
- 097.- DOMINADOR PEREZ, Rafael
- 098.- DOMINGO MORALES DEL CASTILLO, Andrés
- 099.- DORTA DUQUE, Manuel
- 100.- EGUILIOR VINENT, Ricardo
- 101.- ESCALANTE DELLUNDE, Aníbal
- 102.- ESCOBAR QUESADA, Francisco
- 103.- ESTEVA LORA, Salvador
- 104.- FE, Ernesto de la
- 105.- FEBLES, Manuel
- 106.- FERNANDEZ CASAS, Federico
- 107.- FERNANDEZ CONCHESO, Aurelio
- 108.- FERNANDEZ SUPERVIELLE, Manuel
- 109.- FERRETI VIDAL, Carlos M.
- 110.- FERRO MARTINEZ, Angel M.
- 111.- FERRO MARTINEZ, Simeón
- 112.- FIGUERAS GONZALEZ, Wifredo
- 113.- FIGUEROA FRANQUI, Leopoldo
- 114.- FUENTES RODRIGUEZ, Antonio
- 115.- GALEOTE CARRASCO, Mario
- 116.- GANS MARTINEZ, Oscar
- 117.- GARCIA AGUERO, Salvador
- 118.- GARCIA BENITEZ, Julián
- 119.- GARCIA HERRERA, Manuel
- 120.- GARCIA IBAÑEZ, Roberto
- 121.- GARCIA MENOCA, Raúl
- 122.- GARCIA MONTES, Jorge
- 123.- GARCIA RAINERY, Justo
- 124.- GARCIA RANDULFE, Cesáreo
- 125.- GARCIA VALDES, Alberto
- 126.- GARRIGA GARAY, Marcelino
- 127.- GODOY LORET DE MOLA, Gastón
- 128.- GOMEZ CARBONELL, María
- 129.- GONZALEZ, Arsenio
- 130.- GONZALEZ PUENTES, José
- 131.- GRAU ALSINA, Francisco
- 132.- GRAU SAN MARTIN, Ramón
- 133.- GUAS INCLAN, Rafael
- 134.- GUELL, Gonzalo
- 135.- GUERRERO JIMENEZ, Santiago
- 136.- GUTIERREZ LOPEZ, José R.
- 137.- GUTIERREZ CASANOVA, Fausto
- 138.- GUTIERREZ PLANES, José Manuel

- 139.- GUTIERREZ SANCHEZ, Gustavo
- 140.- HERMIDA ANTORCHA, Ramón
- 141.- HERNANDEZ TELLAECHÉ, Arturo
- 142.- HERNANDEZ DE LA BARCA, Alicia
- 143.- HERRERA ARANGO, Alejandro
- 144.- HEVIA DE LOS REYES GAVILAN, Carlos
- 145.- HORNEDO SUAREZ, Alfredo
- 146.- ICHASO, Francisco
- 147.- IGLESIAS ABREUS, Martín Antonio
- 148.- ILLAS CUZA, Arturo
- 149.- IZAGUIRRE HORNEDO, Alfredo
- 150.- JACOMINO, Alfredo
- 151.- JIMENEZ MASEDA, Ramón
- 152.- LA GUARDIA, Miguel Manuel de la
- 153.- LANCIS, Félix
- 154.- LEON FUENTES, Miguel A. de
- 155.- LEON GARCIA, Rubén de
- 156.- LEYVA, Mario
- 157.- LEYVA HERNANDEZ, Gilberto
- 158.- LIMA DELGADO, Luis
- 159.- LOMBARD THONDIQUE, Aquilino
- 160.- LOPEZ BLANCO, Marino
- 161.- LOPEZ CASTRO, Amadeo
- 162.- LOPEZ DEL CASTILLO, Raúl
- 163.- LOPEZ DEUSTUA, Eduardo
- 164.- LOPEZ IBÁÑEZ, Raúl
- 165.- LOPEZ ISA, José
- 166.- LORENZO RUIZ, Raúl
- 167.- LORET DE MOLA, Luis
- 168.- MACEO GONZALEZ, José
- 169.- MADRIGAL RAMIREZ, Heriberto
- 170.- MARINELLO VIDAURRETA, Juan
- 171.- MARISTANY SANCHEZ, Carlos
- 172.- MARQUEZ STERLING, Carlos
- 173.- MARTIN GONZALEZ DE MENDOZA, Félix
- 174.- MARTINEZ, Florentino
- 175.- MARTINEZ ALVAREZ, José Luis
- 176.- MARTINEZ FRAGA, Antonio
- 177.- MARTINEZ ODIO, Vicente
- 178.- MARTINEZ SAENZ, Joaquín
- 179.- MASFERRER, Rolando
- 180.- MASVIDAL MARIN, Raúl E.
- 181.- MEGIAS, Sergio
- 182.- MENDIGUTIA SILVEIRA, José A.
- 183.- MENENDEZ RODRIGUEZ, Pedro
- 184.- MENENDEZ VILLOCH, Salvador
- 185.- MILANES TAMAYO, José Narciso
- 186.- MONTORO SALADRIGAS, Octavio
- 187.- MORA MORALES, Cándido
- 188.- MORA MORALES, Menelao
- 189.- MORELL ROMERO, José
- 190.- MORENO, Gustavo

- 191.- MUJAL BARNIOL, Eusebio
- 192.- MULET PROENZA, Zoila
- 193.- MUÑOZ, Cristóbal
- 194.- NIBOT NAVARRO, Florencio
- 195.- NODAL JIMENEZ, Román
- 196.- NOGUEIRA HERRERA, Alfredo
- 197.- NORDELO, Gustavo
- 198.- NUÑEZ CARBALLO, José Antonio
- 199.- NUÑEZ MESA, Delio
- 200.- NUNEZ PORTUONDO, Emilio
- 201.- OCHOA OCHOA, Emilio
- 202.- OLIVA ROBAINA, Adelaida
- 203.- OLIVELLA LASTRA, José Elías
- 204.- ONATE, Ramiro
- 205.- ORDOQUI MESA, Joaquín
- 206.- ORIZONDO CARABALLE, Manuel
- 207.- ORTEGA SIERRA, Luis
- 208.- OTEIZA SETIEN, Alberto
- 209.- PAGES CANTON, Héctor
- 210.- PANDO ARMAND, Francisco de
- 211.- PARDO JIMENEZ, Angel
- 212.- PARDO JIMENEZ, José
- 213.- PARDO MACHADO, Octavio
- 214.- PEDRAZA CABRERA, Joaquín
- 215.- PELAEZ COSSIO, Carlos M.
- 216.- PENÑAS GARRA, Porfirio
- 217.- PENA GONZALEZ, Lázaro
- 218.- PEQUENO, Alfredo
- 219.- PEREZ ALMAGUER, Waldo
- 220.- PEREZ CABRERA, José M.
- 221.- PEREZ CARRILLO CAÑAVERAL, Ernesto
- 222.- PEREZ DAMERA, Genovevo
- 223.- PEREZ ESPINOS, Luis
- 224.- PEREZ GALAN, Manuel
- 225.- PEREZ GONZALEZ, José
- 226.- PEREZ GONZALEZ MUNOZ, Rafael
- 227.- PEREZ HERNANDEZ, Nicolás
- 228.- PEREZ LOPEZ, Virgilio
- 230.- PEREZ MAGARIÑOS, José Ramón
- 231.- PERTIERRA LINERO, Indalecio
- 231.- PIEDRA, Prisciliano
- 232.- PINO MARTÍNEZ, Mario
- 233.- PINO PEREZ, Noel del
- 234.- PINO SANDRINO, Armando
- 235.- PINO SANTOS, Fidel
- 236.- PORTOCARRERO, Jesús
- 237.- PORTUONDO DOMÉNECH, Juan M.
- 238.- POZO PUERTO, Justo Luis
- 239.- PRESNO BASTIONY, José A.
- 240.- PRIO SOCARRAS, Antonio

- 241.- PRIO SOCARRAS, Carlos
- 242.- PRIO SOCARRAS, Francisco
- 243.- PUENTE, Orlando
- 244.- PUPO SANCHEZ, Andrés
- 245.- RABELO BERACIERTO, Francisco
- 246.- RAMIREZ CORRIA, Carlos
- 247.- RAMOS RAVELLA, Luis
- 248.- RECIO FORNS, Alberto
- 249.- REGALADO RODRIGUEZ, Rogelio
- 250.- REY PERNAS, Santiago
- 251.- REMEDIOS, Benito
- 252.- RIO, Pastor del
- 253.- RIVA, Ramiro de la
- 254.- RIVERO, Antero
- 255.- RIVERO AGUERO, Andrés
- 256.- RIVERO PARTAGAS, César
- 257.- RIVERO PARTAGAS, Octavio
- 258.- ROCA CALDERIO, Blas
- 259.- RODON ALVAREZ, Lincoln
- 260.- RODRIGUEZ DEL HAYA, Tebelio
- 261.- RODRIGUEZ DIAZ, Ramón
- 262.- RODRIGUEZ FERNANDEZ, Santos Manuel
- 263.- RODRIGUEZ JIMENEZ, Orencio
- 264.- RODRIGUEZ RODRIGUEZ, Primitivo
- 265.- RODRIGUEZ SANCHEZ, Conrado
- 266.- ROJAS GARCES, Angélica
- 267.- ROJAS MACHADO, Miguel
- 268.- ROSSELL LEYTE-VIDAL, Ernesto
- 269.- ROUX SANCHEZ, Victor de
- 270.- RUBIO PADILLA, Juan Antonio
- 271.- RUIZ CERDA, Jorge
- 272.- SABAS ALOMA, Mariblanca
- 273.- SALADRIGAS ZAYAS, Carlos
- 274.- SALADRIGAS ZAYAS, Enrique
- 275.- SALAS ARZUAGA, Justo
- 276.- SALAS HUMARA, Carlos
- 277.- SANCHEZ ARANGO, Aureliano
- 278.- SANCHEZ GONZALEZ, Francisco
- 279.- SANCHEZ MASTRAPA, Esperanza
- 280.- SANCHEZ PEREZ, Alberto
- 281.- SAN MARTIN, José Ramón
- 282.- SANTOVENIA ECHAIDE, Emeterio
- 283.- SARGENT, Aurelio Nazario
- 284.- SERA SERRANO, José Manuel
- 285.- SERRANO MUNOZ, Guillermo
- 286.- SOLORZANO TABERNILLA, Julián
- 287.- SUAREZ DE LA PORTILLA, Dionisio
- 288.- SUAREZ FERNANDEZ, Miguel
- 289.- SUAREZ RIVAS, Eduardo
- 290.- SUAREZ RIVAS, José
- 291.- TARAFÁ CARDENAS, Julio

- 292.- TARAFÁ GOVIN, José Manuel
- 293.- TEJERA RESCALVO, Diego Vicente
- 294.- TORRE REINE, Oscar de la
- 295.- TORRES SANCHEZ, Maximino
- 296.- TORRES SANCHEZ, Pastor
- 297.- TORRADO, Nicolás
- 298.- TRASANCOS HERRERA, José J.
- 299.- URÍA LUIS, Pedro H.
- 300.- URQUIAGA BARBERENA, Pablo
- 301.- URQUIAGA PADILLA, Carmelo
- 302.- VALDES ASTOLFI, Adelardo
- 303.- VALDES DE LA PAZ, Osvaldo
- 304.- VALDES LOPEZ, Alfredo
- 305.- VALDES MORENO, Isauro
- 306.- VALDIVIA PEREZ, Raúl
- 307.- VALLE RAEZ, Luis del
- 308.- VARONA LOREDO, Manuel Antonio de
- 309.- VASCONCELOS MARAGLIANO, Ramón
- 310.- VAZQUEZ ALVARADO, Gerardo
- 311.- VEGA GOMEZ, Pablo A.
- 312.- VERDEJA NEYRA, Santiago
- 313.- VILAR AGUILERA, César
- 314.- VILLA SUAREZ, Jesús
- 315.- VILLALOBOS OLIVERA, Pedro
- 316.- VILLAR RIOS, Fernando del
- 317.- VINENT GRINAN, Juan A.
- 318.- YERAS, Evangelina de las
- 319.- ZAYAS-BAZAN RECIO, Eduardo
- 320.- ZAYDIN MARQUEZ STERLING, Ramón

APPENDIX B

OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS

Demographic Characteristics: Card #1, Variables 1-4.

- | | |
|------------------|----------------------------------|
| 1. Birthplace | as indicated in biographical |
| 2. Date of birth | dictionaries, secondary sources, |
| 3. Race | and oral history portions of the |
| 4. Sex | interviews |

Background Characteristics: Card #1, Variables 5-10.

- | | |
|---------------------------------------|--|
| 5. Educational level | same as above |
| 6. Profession | same as above |
| 7. Professional status: | (1) eminent: President or chairman of a professional association, dean at the University of Havana, author of numerous papers related to his field, or any combination of these. |
| | (2) average: None of the above. |
| 8. Social status: | (1) eminent: Member of an illustrious family, official or member of a prestige social club, resident of an exclusive section of Havana or Santiago de Cuba. |
| | (2) elite: Member of a prestige social club, member of the Rotary, Lyons, etc., resident of an upper class neighborhood in some large city. |
| 9. Economic status: | (1) wealthy: Owner of a sugar mill, industry, large farm, bank, commercial firm, etc. |
| | (2) prosperous: Professional with large clientele, small businessman, retailer, etc. |
| 10. Functional area outside politics: | Same as 1-6. |

Political antecedents: Card #1, Variables 11-17.

- | | |
|---|--------------|
| 14. Political status in family: | Same as 1-6. |
| 15. Public office before 1944: | Same as 1-6. |
| 16. Politically active before 1944: | Same as 1-6. |
| 17. Most important office was held before 1944: | Same as 1-6. |
| 18. Collaboration with Batista, 1935-1944: | Same as 1-6. |

19. Role behavior in the 1933 Revolution:

- (1) does not apply: subject born after 1919
- (2) Machadista: same as 1-6.
- (3) Anti-Machadista: same as 1-6
- (4) Revolutionary: member of DEU, ABC, participant in the Gibara expedition, or a member of some other revolutionary group.

20. Communist affiliation:

- (2) possible: interviews
- (3) youth: member of a communist, troskyte, or anarchist group
- (4) permanent: member of URC, PSP, and/or the organizations of the PSP,

Career Pattern: Card #1, Variables 18-31.

All of these were coded utilizing the data of the biographical dictionaries, and/or the secondary sources, but for none of these variables were the interview data utilized.

Capability Variables: Card #1, Variables 32-41

Electoral potency:

subject's ability to elect himself and other in a competitive situation.
 Categories: univariate : high/moderate/
 low
 Types: (1) figura (high)
 (2) componedor (moderate)
 (3) relleño (low)

Level of party authority:

focal position that subject held in the office structure of his party(ies).
 Categories: univariate
 Types: (1) none
 (2) local
 (3) provincial
 (4) national-bureaucratic
 (5) national

Scope of machine: geographical distribution of the structures of recruitment and patronage controlled or manipulated by subject.

Categories: univariate
 Types: (1) none
 (2) local
 (3) provincial
 (4) multiprovincial
 (5) national

Control of electoral machine:	<p>subject's ability to commit assembly and/or popular votes for himself and/or other actors in pursuit of national office.</p> <p>Categories: univariate</p> <p>Types: (1) none (2) low (3) moderate (4) high</p>
Issue-decisional control:	<p>subject's ability to veto undesirable outcomes and bring about desired ones in national decision-making.</p> <p>Categories: bivariate</p> <p>Types: (1) none (2) low (3) moderate (4) high</p>
Scope of participation:	<p>number of issue areas, policy spaces, etc., in which subject ordinarily intervened in national politics</p> <p>Categories: univariate</p> <p>Types: (1) only one (2) a few (3) several (4) many</p>
Intensity of participation:	<p>frequency of direct participation in national decision-making</p> <p>Categories: univariate</p> <p>Types: (1) occasional (low) (2) regularly (moderate) (3) extensively (high)</p>
Control of patronage:	<p>subject's ability to extract resources from the nation state such as positions, monetary compensations, prebends, etc., and distribute them among "power contenders"</p> <p>Categories: univariate</p> <p>Types: (1) none (2) low (3) moderate (4) high</p>

- Political permanence: subject's ability to stay in the national level of the political power structure as an incumbent or contender by his use of one or more of the following techniques: party switches, participation in electoral deals, etc., given the continuation of the "classical" pattern of Cuban politics.
 Categories: univariate
 Types: (1) none (fugaz)
 (2) low (inestable)
 (3) moderate (estable)
 (4) high (insurgible)
- Formula participation: subject's access to non-routine, or highly conflictive routine decisions involving the need to elaborate and implement a political formula on the part of national decision-makers.
 Categories: univariate
 Type: (1) none
 (2) low
 (3) moderate
 (4) high
- Political Orientations: Card #1, Variables 42-51.
- Presidential goal orientation: endorsement of subject as a Presidential candidate by a party assembly and/or an unmistakable attitude/statement/declaration, etc., from subject of his intention to be President.
 Categories: bivariate:
 (1) announcement: Yes/no
 (2) nomination: Yes/no
 Types:
 (1) Candidate: Yes/yes
 (2) Aspirant: Yes/no
 (3) Improbable: No/no
- Predominant policy orientation: policy space where subject was predominantly located in formula participation
 Categories: bivariate, collapsed
 Types: (1) distributive
 (2) mixed
 (3) substantive

- Institutional orientation:** subject's role behavior with respect to issues, proposed legislation, and/or measures aiming to pattern the Cuban state after a legal-rational model.
 Categories: univariate
 Types: (1) advocate (pro)
 (2) ambivalent (mixed)
 (3) resistor (con)
- Adversary orientation:** subject's orientation to other actors in conflict with him as evidenced by his willingness to negotiate and communicate with them.
 Categories: bivariate
 Types: (1) hard liner
 (low on both)
 (2) ambivalent
 (moderate on both)
 (3) conciliator
 (high on both)
- Representation style:** probability of subject's role behavior being controlled by incumbents of relevant counter-positional roles.
 Categories: univariate
 Types: (1) delegate (high)
 (2) trustee (moderate)
 (3) politico (low)
- Distribution style:** subject's willingness to make his patronage network available to the largest possible number of clients as evidenced by the availability of services rendered by his machine to actors outside his usual clientele.
 Categories: univariate
 Types: (1) open (high)
 (2) permeable (moderate)
 (3) closed (low)

Clientele orientation:

nature and relative homogeneity of groups, factions, or other social, economic, ethnic, or political aggregates toward which subject acted as a "facilitator"

Categories: multivariate

Types: (1) specific
(2) diffuse

Partisan orientation:

subject's willingness to conform his role behavior to party discipline in decisions pertaining to distributive policies

Categories: univariate

Types: (1) indifferent
(2) low
(3) moderate
(4) strong

Constituency orientation:

audience to which subject's statements, declarations, etc. were aimed with the purpose of creating support for himself and his views

Categories: univariate

Types: (1) national
(2) subnational

Ideological orientation:

subject's predominant beliefs about the nature and function of the state, and its relation with groups and the individual citizen.

Categories: multivariate

Types: (1) conservative
(2) moderate
(3) ad hoc
(4) progressive, liberal
(5) radical, socialist

APPENDIX C

CODEBOOKS

Card # 1: Objective Characteristics

<u>Cols.</u>	<u>Variable number</u>	
1/3	-	Sequence number
4/7	1/4	DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS
4	1	Birthplace: 1 - 6 : Cuban provinces 7 : Spain 8 : Other
5	2	Date of birth: 1 : before 1900 2 : 1900 - 1919 3 : 1920 or later
6	3	Race 1 : CAU 2 : Black 3 : Mestizo 4 : Other
7	4	Sex 1 : Male 2 : Female
8/13	5/10	BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS
8	5	Educational level attained 1 : no formal education 2 : elementary 3 : vocational, technical, secondary 4 : University
9	6	If professional specify 1 : lawyer, notary, etc. 2 : MD., dentist, pharmacist 3 : engineer, architect 4 : economist, accountant 5 : all other
10	7	Professional status 1 : eminent 2 : average 3 : none
11	8	Social status: 1 : eminent 2 : elite 3 : non elite
12	9	Economic status: 1 : wealthy 2 : prosperous 3 : modest

Cols.	Variable number	
13	10	Functional area outside politics 1 : sugar industry (all aspects) 2 : agriculture 3 : industrial, managerial 4 : financial, business 5 : labor 6 : bureaucratic, clerical 7 : professional practice 8 : journalism (all aspects) 9 : intellectual, academic
14/20	11/17	POLITICAL ANTECEDENTS : 1933 - 1944
14	10	Political status in family 1 : father or relative more important before 1944 2 : idem, after 1944 3 : subject was most prominent after 1944 4 : both 1 and 3 5 : both 1 and 2 6 : no other member of the family active in politics
15	12	Public office before 1944 : 1 Yes; 2 No
16	13	Politically active before 1944 : 1 Yes; 2 No
17	14	(If public office before 1944) Was this the most important office ever? 1 Yes; 2 No
18	15	Collaboration with Batista, 1935 - 1944: 1 Yes; 2 No
19	16	Role behavior in the 1933 Revolution: 1 : does not apply 2 : Machadista 3 : anti-machadista 4 : revolutionary 5 : no known participation
20	17	Communist affiliation: 1 : no, never 2 : possible, not confirmed 3 : youth, or before 1944 4 : permanent

21/34	18/31	CAREER PATTERN : 1944 - 1958
21	18	Career style: 1 appointive 2 elective - legislative 3 mixed : 1 and 2 4 elective - executive 5 elective - exec./legislative 6 mixed : 1 and 4 7 mixed : 1 and 5
22	19	Office combination: 1 executive only 2 legislative only 3 executive - legislative
23	20	Ministerial tenure: 1 Yes 2 No
24	21	Senatorial tenure: 1 Yes 2 No
25	22	Office tenure: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
26	23	Period of highest influence: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
27	24	Collaboration with Batista: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 explanation 0: (27 only) never 1: 1944-48 2: 1948-52 3: 1944-52 4: 1952-55, 1950-55 5: 1955-58 6: 1952-58, 1950-58 7: 1944-55, 1948-55 8: 1944-58, 1948-58 9: non-consecutive
28	25	Political mobility: Did subject reach a national office: 1: no, never 2: occasionally 3: yes, but after exit did not remain a power contender 4: yes, and after exit remained a power contender
29	26	Participation in election: 1 Yes 2 No
30	27	Ever defeated in election: 1 Yes 2 No 3 Does not apply
31	28	Ever sacrificed in ticket: 1 Yes 2 No 3 Does not apply
32	29	Number of parties subject belonged to: 0 1 2 3 4 (or more)
33	30	(If affiliated) Party of predominant membership 1 PRC (A) 6 PR 2 PRC (O) 7 PD 3 PAU, PAP 8 PSP, ABC 4 PUR 5 PL
34	31	Did subject die during the period? 1 Yes 2 No

35/44	32/41	INDIVIDUAL CAPABILITIES
35	32	Electoral potence: 1 : low 2 : moderate 3 : high
36	33	Level of party authority 1 : none 2 : local 3 : provincial 4 : national bureaucratic 5 : national
37	34	Scope of machine: 1 : none 2 : local 3 : provincial 4 : multiprovincial 5 : national
38	35	Control of electoral machine 1 : none 2 : low 3 : moderate 4 : high
39	36	Issue-decisional control 1 : none 2 : low 3 : moderate 4 : high
40	37	Scope of issue participation 1 : one 2 : a few 3 : moderate 4 : high
41	38	Intensity of participation 1 : occassional (low) 2 : regularly (moderate) 3 : extensively (high)
42	39	Control of patronage 1 : none 2 : low 3 : moderate 4 : high
43	40	Political permanence 1 : none 2 : low 3 : moderate 4 : high
44	41	Formula participation 1 : none 2 : low 3 : moderate 4 : high

45/54	42/51	VALUE ORIENTATIONS
45	42	Presidential goal orientation 1 : candidate 2 : aspirant 3 : improbable
46	43	Predominant policy orientation 1 : electoral 2 : ambivalent 3 : non electoral
47	44	Institutional orientation 1 : advocate (pro) 2 : ambivalent (mixed) 3 : resistor (con)
48	45	Adversary orientation 1 : hard liner 2 : ambivalent 3 : conciliator
49	46	Representation style 1 : dependent (delegate) 2 : fairly independent (trustee) 3 : independent (politico)
50	47	Distribution style 1 : open 2 : permeable 3 : closed
51	48	Clientele orientation 1 : specific 2 : diffuse
52	49	Partisan orientation 1 : indifferent 2 : weak 3 : moderate 4 : strong
53	50	Constituency orientation 1 : national 2 : subnational
54	51	Ideological orientation 1 : conservative 2 : moderate 3 : ad hoc 4 : progressive/liberal 5 : radical/socialist
55/79	-	Blank
80	-	Deck identification: digit 1 punched in every card

Card #2: Reputational Rankings

<u>Cols.</u>	<u>Variable number</u>	
1/3	-	Sequence number
4	1	Ranking by first judge
5	2	Ranking by second judge
6	3	Ranking by third judge
7	4	Ranking by fourth judge
8	5	Ranking by fifth judge
9	6	Ranking by sixth judge
10	7	Ranking by seventh judge
11	8	Ranking by eighth judge
12	9	Ranking by ninth judge
13	10	Ranking by tenth judge
14	11	Ranking by eleventh judge
15	12	Ranking by twelfth judge
16	13	Ranking by thirteenth judge
<hr/>		
17/79	-	BLANK
<hr/>		
80	-	Deck identification: digit 2 punched in every card.

Card #3: Composite Deck

<u>Cols.</u>	<u>Variable number</u>	
1/3	-	Sequence number
4/17	1/4	REPUTATIONAL SCORES
4/5	1	Total reputational score
6/9	2	Ideological-general score
10/13	3	Pragmatic-partisan score
14/17	4	Pragmatic-general score
18/22	5/9	CAREER PATTERN: 1944-1958
18	5	Period of highest influence: 1. Grau 2. Prio 3. Batista
19	6	Collaboration with Batista: 1. Yes 2. Occasional 3. No
20	7	Collaboration with the PRC: 1. Yes 2. Occasional 3. No
21	8	Office tenure: 1 : 1944-1952 2 : 1952-1958 3 : overlapping
22	9	Subject usually identified as: 1 : President, Vice-President 2 : Senator 3 : Minister 4 : Mayor 5 : Representative 6 : Technician 7 : Other 8 : None
23/25	-	BLANK

 REPUTATIONAL COMMENTS BY JUDGES:

<u>Cols.</u>		Yes	No
26	A man who had more power before 1944	1	2
27	A <u>bombin</u>	1	2
28	A know-nothing about politics	1	2
29	A nobody	1	2
30	A product of relatives or friends	1	2
31	An accident, a product of an unusual situation	1	2
32	A man manipulated by others	1	2
33	A <u>sargento</u>	1	2
34	A subordinate of someone else	1	2
35	A man of fortune	1	2
36	A man with an illustrious name	1	2
37	A representative of a group or class	1	2
38	A self-made man	1	2
39	A professional politician	1	2
40	A traditional politician	1	2
41	A machine politician	1	2
42	A clientele politician	1	2
43	A <u>cacique</u>	1	2
44	A magnate	1	2
45	A potence	1	2
46	An <u>asamblea</u> politician	1	2
47	A <u>manengue</u>	1	2
48	A factor	1	2
49	A local factor	1	2
50	A determinant factor	1	2
51	A <u>decidor</u>	1	2
52	A popular figure	1	2
53	A dispenser of favor, serviceable	1	2
54	An ambitious man	1	2
55	A son-of-a-bitch	1	2
56	A violent man	1	2
57	A professional conspirator	1	2
58	A man of action	1	2
59	A valiant and fearless man	1	2
60	A man capable of anything	1	2
61	A formula man, an idea man	1	2
62	A brilliant man	1	2
63	An astute and shrewd man, intrigant	1	2
64	A <u>componedor</u>	1	2
65	A man with impact	1	2
66	A decent and honorable person	1	2
67	A great Cuban	1	2
68	A man of stature, great figure	1	2
69	A conciliator	1	2
70	A heavy or dense guy, jerk	1	2

 CUMULATIVE REPUTATIONAL (GUTTMAN) SCALES:

Cols.

71	Bombinism score:	1	2	3	4	5	
72	Dependency score:	1	2	3	4	5	
73	National visibility score:	1	2	3	4	5	
74	Manenguism score:	1	2	3	4	5	6
75	Decision-making score:	1	2	3	4	5	
76	Personal Use of violence score:	1	2	3	4	5	6
77	Formula participation score:	1	2	3	4	5	
78	Style of local control score:	1	2	3	4	5	
79	Personal liabilities score:	1	2	3	4	5	

80 Deck identification number: digit 3 punched in every card

APPENDIX D

ROTATED FACTOR MATRICES

VARIMAX ROTATION OF RANKINGS
FOR THE ENTIRE LIST

Variables	Factors		
	I	II	III
12	.79	.37	.17
7	.77	.20	.30
8	.75	.31	.07
13	.75	.33	.14
6	.74	.27	.11
1	.63	.37	.33
11	.62	.27	.49
2	.29	.83	-.04
5	.23	.69	.40
9	.37	.68	.30
4	.41	.58	.24
3	.48	.58	.29
10	.18	.19	.90
Eigenvalues	7.34	.90	.81
Cumulative proportion of total variance	.56	.63	.70

ROTATION OF THREE FACTORS WITH COMMUNALITIES
IN THE PRINCIPAL DIAGONAL OF THE RANKINGS
FOR THE ENTIRE LIST

Variables	Factors		
	I	II	III
12	.77	.17	.36
7	.74	.25	.23
13	.71	.15	.33
8	.69	.11	.31
6	.67	.14	.30
1	.62	.29	.37
11	.62	.40	.31
10	.21	.88	.18
2	.29	.03	.78
9	.42	.28	.61
5	.31	.36	.60
3	.50	.27	.53
4	.46	.24	.47
Eigenvalues	7.03	.69	.56
Cumulative propotion of total variance	.54	.59	.64
common variance	.77	.84	.90

Note: Communalities estimates derived from the principal component (varimax) solution.

ROTATION OF THREE FACTORS WITH RELIABILITIES
IN THE PRINCIPAL DIAGONAL OF THE RANKINGS FOR
THE ENTIRE LIST

Variables	Factors		
	I	II	III
12	.74	.39	.25
13	.66	.35	.25
7	.66	.24	.38
8	.65	.33	.20
6	.63	.31	.23
1	.55	.37	.41
2	.33	.62	.15
9	.36	.60	.36
5	.26	.59	.38
3	.43	.52	.39
4	.41	.50	.28
10	.20	.26	.55
11	.51	.28	.57
Eigenvalues	6.91	.44	.27
Cumulative proportion of total variance	.53	.57	.59
Cumulative proportion of reliable variance	.87	.93	.96

Note: Estimates for the reliabilities were the squared multiple correlation coefficients.

CENTROID ROTATION OF THREE FACTORS OF
RANKINGS FOR THE ENTIRE LIST

Variables	Factors		
	I	II	III
12	.72	.39	.25
8	.69	.33	.15
7	.69	.23	.35
13	.69	.35	.22
6	.67	.30	.19
1	.53	.37	.39
11	.55	.28	.52
2	.32	.68	.10
5	.25	.60	.41
9	.37	.60	.35
3	.45	.53	.35
4	.40	.52	.28
10	.20	.21	.66
Eigenvalues	6.98	.53	.38
Cumulative proportion of total variance	.54	.58	.61

OBLIQUE ROTATION OF THREE PRIMARY FACTORS USING
COMMUNALITIES' ESTIMATES ON
THE PRINCIPAL DIAGONAL

Variables	I	II	III
12	.89	.11	.01
11	.83	.23	-.08
2	.71	-.12	.04
5	.54	.29	-.18
10	.51	-.06	.25
13	.06	.95	-.08
3	.03	.86	.03
9	-.03	.59	.21
4	.22	.38	.27
1	-.34	-.35	-.25
6	.14	.33	.32
7	.06	.17	.69
8	.40	.19	.41

Intercorrelations for these simple loading primary factors

	1	2
2	.654	
3	.487	.436

OBLIQUE ROTATION OF THREE REFERENCE FACTORS
 USING COMMUNALITIES' ESTIMATES ON THE
 PRINCIPAL DIAGONAL

Variables	Factors		
	I	II	III
12	.64	.08	.01
11	.60	.17	-.07
2	.51	-.09	.04
5	.39	.22	-.15
10	.37	-.05	.22
13	.05	.71	-.07
3	.02	.64	.03
9	-.02	.44	.18
4	.16	.28	.23
1	-.25	-.26	-.21
7	.05	.13	.59
8	.29	.15	.35
6	.10	.25	.28

Intercorrelations for these simple loading reference factors

	1	2
2	-.562	
3	-.296	-.18

APPENDIX E

THE DECISIONS

Included here are the most important formulas and decisions implemented by or during the Grau, Prío, and Batista regimes. Participation in these formulas and decisions of national scope was the operational criterion utilized to code variables (16) ISSCON, (17) ISSPAR, and (20) FORPAR. In general, all of these formulas and decisions conform to the criteria of: (1) communityness, (2) importance, (3) salience, (4) participation, (5) consequences and (6) representativeness discussed by Forward (1969).

1944-1948 (During or by the Grau Regime)

1. Creation of the Alianza Auténtico-Republicana.
2. Revamp of the Armed Forces' higher echelons.
3. Trade agreements and barter deals with South American countries.
4. Sugar Differential Act.
5. Creation and control of the BAGA.
6. Creation of the Ortodoxo Party.
7. Sugar covenant (Cuba-US) for 1946-48.
8. Confrontation and liquidation of the Communist leadership that was controlling the Cuban Federation of Workers.
9. Selection of the Presidential candidates for the 1948 Presidential elections and creation or renewal of national coalitions.

1948-1952 (During or by the Prío Regime)

1. Split of the Alianza Auténtico-Republicana.
2. Incorporation of the Democratic Party in the government coalition.
3. Incorporation of the Liberal Party in the government coalition.
4. Selection of the Presidential candidates for the 1952 Presidential elections and negotiations for the six-party governmental coalition.
5. Legislative Program of 1950.
6. Nuevos Rumbos policy.
7. Internal Loan of \$100 million.
8. Legislative Acts creating the National Bank, the Constitutional and Social Rights Tribunal, and the Organic Law of Budgets.
9. Reconciliation of the two auténtico factions (prístas and grausistas).

1952-1958 (During or by the Batista regime)

1. Coup of March 10, 1952.
2. Provisional Statute of April, 1952.
3. Creation of the Government Coalition and incorporation of the democratic and liberal parties to the coalition, creation of the PUR, and bargaining for the distribution of positions for the Presidential elections of 1954.
4. Orden Público decree regulating opposition rights.
5. Modification of the Electoral Code of 1943.
6. Amnesty for all political prisoners (1955).
7. Civic Dialogue.
8. Creation and control of the BANDES, CENPLUC, CONACA, Financiera Nacional, and other semi-autonomous corporations through which the regime implemented its economic programs.
9. Decisions concerning censorship and suspension of civil rights.
10. Negotiations between government and opposition other than the Civic Dialogue.
11. Sugar policies of unilateral restrictions
12. Quota negotiations of 1955.
13. Pact of Montreal between PRC and PPC leaders.
14. Selection of the Presidential candidate and negotiations within the government coalition for the Presidential Elections of 1958.
15. Litigation between government and opposition through the Judiciary concerning the constitutionality of the Provisional Statute of 1952 and the Elections of 1954.

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Interview #4: Miami, 9/3/70.

Interview #5: Miami, 9/3/70.

Interview #6: Miami, 12/21/70.

Interview #7: Miami, 12/22/70.

Interview #8: Miami, 12/22/70, 2/12/71.

Interview #9: Miami, 12/22/70.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Enrique A. Baloyra was born in Havana, Cuba, on August 1, 1942. In 1960, he graduated as Bachelor in Sciences from the Colegio Champagnat in Havana.

In 1960, he joined the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil and served in several capacities with this organization. After the Bay of Pigs Invasion Mr. Baloyra became editor of Trinchera and National Coordinator of Propaganda and Intelligence of the Directorio. He held these positions until he came to the United States in September of 1961.


From 1961 until 1965, except for a brief period of service in the United States Army, Mr. Baloyra continued to work with the Directorio having served as Secretary of Information and Chief of the delegation of this organization in Venezuela. During these years he was able to complete some courses at Miami-Dade Junior College and the first year of Psychology at the Universidad Católica Andrés Bello in Caracas.

In September, 1965, Mr. Baloyra enrolled as an undergraduate in the University of Florida. In April, 1967, he received the degree of Bachelor of Arts with a major in Psychology. In September, 1967, he enrolled in the Graduate School of the University of Florida. He worked as a graduate assistant in the Latin American Data Bank. In August, 1968, he received the degree of Master of Arts with a major in Political Science. From September, 1968, until the present time he has pursued his work toward the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

In September, 1968, Mr. Baloyra received a National Defense Educational Act fellowship. He retained this fellowship until February, 1971, when he accepted a Woodrow Wilson fellowship to complete his doctoral research.


Enrique A. Baloyra is married to the former María Clara Alvarez, another Directorio member, and they have five children. He is a member of Phi Kappa Phi, Pi Sigma Alpha, the American Political Science Association, and the Latin American Studies Association.

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.




Andrés Suárez, Chairman
Professor of Latin American Studies

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
O. Ruth McQuown, Co-Chairman
Associate Professor of Political Science

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
Alfred B. Clubok
Associate Professor of Political Science

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Thomas A. Henderson
Assistant Professor of Political Science


I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.



Lyle N. McAlister
Professor of History

This dissertation was submitted to the Department of Political Science in the College of Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate Council, and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

August, 1971


Dean, Graduate School
Arts