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February 19, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

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Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 86-135
Document # 10

SUBJECT: Cuba Meeting - February 19 at 5:00 P.M.

1. You might want to read State's four page covering memo especially carefully. It is a good paper and clearly identifies the issues we should focus on at the meeting today.

2. Here are some preliminary views on miscellaneous agenda items:

(a) Surveillance - Our problem on this most important issue boils down to two choices. First, we can push for a resolution which results in the stopping and searching of Cuban vessels on the high seas; this implies a willingness to use force and to accept the risk of unwanted escalation.

1,3(a)(5) [REDACTED] Second, we can push for a resolution which results in the stopping and searching of Cuban vessels in territorial waters. This measure does not involve the use of force.

I, for one, am not in favor of the "force" option. Attached at Tab 3 of your folder are my views on the subject as expressed in December, 1963; generally speaking, they are the same now.

(a)(5) || (b) OAS and the Closing of Ports - State believes that we may want to include in the OAS resolution language which would call on OAS's to close their ports to ships of non-OAS countries going to and from Cuba in continuous voyage. I frankly haven't focussed on this one before now. [REDACTED]

|| Before we go ahead with it, however, we will want to know more about its effectiveness. We will also want to look in the closet to see if this action involves any skeletons.

(c) C/OAS or MFM? - We must decide on the forum we want to use for our Rio Treaty action against Cuba -- a high-key MFM or a low-key C/OAS. I'm still flexible on this. At first blush, I am for a low-key C/OAS treatment -- especially in view of the fact that State's paper indicates that a resolution out of the C/OAS is likely to be just as strong, substantively, as one from the MFM. It should be noted, however, that the latest word from the Venezuelans is that they will probably push hard for an MFM.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 86-135

By LS, NARA, Date 4-13-87~~SECRET~~

DP

~~★~~ (d) OAS Action in General - In essence, I think we should focus on trying to get a "non-force" surveillance system; a diplomatic and communications break between Latin America and Cuba (especially meaningful for the political dimension of our isolation policy and for our anti-subversion policy); and some wording which could act as a cover for the possible unilateral issuance of a proclaimed list.

(e) Proclaimed List - Digging is still going on in the Government on this subject and the 5:00 P.M. meeting is not likely to produce any conclusive results. However, since the agencies have been working on the problem the meeting should produce some informed discussion and an indication of the type of digging that still needs to be done. Whatever digging needs to be done should probably be done urgently. (Some recent staff memos on the problem are attached as Tab 4.)

GC
Gordon Chase

Cuba Meeting - February 19, 1964

Discussion Guide

A. OAS Action

1. Composition of the resolution
 - (a) Surveillance and possible use of force
 - (b) Closing of OAR ports to ships going to or from Cuba in continuous voyage
 - (c) Other sanctions - i. e. diplomatic, communications, and economic break (including cover for possible unilateral issuance of a proclaimed list)
2. Forum for OAS action - MFM or OAS?
3. What OAS vote would be politically acceptable to us?

B. Economic Program

1. Policy problems - abandon efforts, continue as is, or adopt new measures ?
2. Possible new measures
 - (a) Proclaimed list
 - (b) Partial measures
3. Factors bearing on our economic program
 - (a) Waiver for Spain under 620(a)(3)
 - (b) US/USSR Air Agreement

C. Counter-Subversion

1. Measures we have taken
2. Further Possible Measures, including retaliation

3. Factors bearing on our efforts

(a) US travel controls

(b) US/USSR Air Agreement