U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:30 a.m., in room 2300, New Senate Office Building, Senator James O. Eastland (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Eastland, Olin D. Johnston, and Roman I.. Hruska

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, chief counsel; Benjamin Mandel,of research; and Frank «T. Schroeder, chief investigator.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, sir.

STATEMENT OF GEN. C. P. CABELL, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

General CABELL. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much this opportunity to appear before your committee.

My subject today is, of course, communism in Latin America.

Boris N. Ponomarev, a key member of the central committee of tile Communist Party of the Soviet Union,. wrote the following regarding , Latin America in the October 1958, issue of Kommunist the most important official Communist Party, Soviet Union, theoretical magazine, and I quote:

Latin America is a seething volcano. As in one country, so in another * * *.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you got another copy of this? I do not have that one. I would like to follow you.

General CABELL. I have made a few changes, Senator, but I do not, have another copy. This is the only copy that I have. [Reading -]

Latin America is a seething volcano. As in one country, so in another, outbursts are taking place which are sweeping away reactionary regimes and loosening the nooses which U.S. monopolies have thrown on their economy. The Communist Parties of Latin America ever more closely coordinate their activities in the struggle against the common enemy-U.S. imperialism. The revolutionary movement is of a universal nature. Its main support is the socialist camp.

Collaboration with and infiltration of popular movements, for ex ample that of the Batista in the thirties, and of Castro in the fifties-has been communism's most effective weapon in Latin America.

The Communists base their present strategy on what they call the national liberation struggle.

The CHAIRMAN. When he said its main support is the Socialist camp, he meant the Communist camp?

General CABELL. That is their innocuous term or polite term for the Communist camp, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General CABELL. The so-called national liberation strategy seeks to offset Communist numerical and political weakness through international organizational support and clandestine techniques of infiltration and coordination.

The immediate objective of the strategy is to provoke political or revolutionary action by sympathetic non-Communists, but politically influential elements, for the purpose of establishing an environment within which the Communist Party is free to organize and expand.

The Communists hope for the establishment of governments which are, at least, neutral in the East-West struggle, if not actively pro-Soviet, and which will guarantee them political opportunity equal to that enjoyed by genuine political parties.

It is within such a framework that the Communists then hope to achieve the so-called peaceful transition to socialism, which will find a temporary alliance with the national bourgeoisie within a government of national unity gradually replaced by a Communist-controlled "people's democracy."

The program of communism in Latin America is designed to develop unity of action around popular issues such as antipathy to dictatorships, inflation, a desire for greater industrialization, nationalization of resources, and wider and more stable markets.

It particularly strives to develop international and national labor unity in support of Communist objectives.

The program seeks to promote neutralism through exploiting the fear of wars, nuclear dangers, unpopular treaty obligations, and territorial sovereignty issues.

It encourages opposition to U.S. participation in regional programs affecting Latin America.

The program also involves expansion of the Communist propaganda apparatus to include a network of news correspondents who will develop support for the "national liberation" strategy, while discrediting free world news agencies as agencies of imperialist propaganda.

The techniques of Communist action are both overt and clandestine, legal and illegal, national and international.

The techniques are carried out by the national Communist Parties and their fronts, with support from the "fraternal" Communist Parties abroad, and the international Communist fronts. All of these operate through known Communist Party members and secret party members in nominally non-Communist organizations.

The actions of these national Communist Parties are supported or paralleled by actions taken by the Soviet and satellite diplomatic and commercial missions and their agents.

The Communist Party enjoys legal status or de facto legality, in nine Latin American countries. However, it is able to operate with relatively little opposition in a number of other countries, and it is organized and active on a clandestine basis in virtually all countries.

Where it operates legally or semi-legally, as in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Venezuela, Colombia, Uruguay, Mexico, and Ecuador, it strives to expand its membership and its propaganda organs.

It uses such countries as operational bases for the support of activities in countries where the party is proscribed. Thus, activities in Paraguay are supported from Argentina and Uruguay. Activities in Central America and the Caribbean from Cuba and Venezuela.

The clandestine organization of the Latin American Communist Parties is being improved with the help of training by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and of China.

Where necessary, international and national communication is by encoded letters sent through accommodation addresses or by couriers, who may travel under false names and with false documentation.

Communist literature may be imported under false inventories; financing is accomplished through a great variety of channels which conceal the extent and origin of funds.

Mass recruiting, as attempted several years ago, has in some cases been de-emphasized, while emphasis has been given to selective recruiting of key individuals and secret members.

More effective use is being made of opportunities to engage in legal activities, despite illegal status, such as the development of publications defending all points of view.

Many parties are developing secret directive bodies paralleling the overt organizations.

The actions of the Soviet-bloc governments support the "national liberation" strategy, thereby complementing the activities of the national Communist Parties and fronts in Latin America.

These actions involve propaganda support, the expansion of official representation, the broadening of cultural contacts, and development of commercial relations.

Official bloc propaganda and news services applaud the role of nationalists in revolutions, strikes, and demonstrations to show that the masses are in revolt against "North American monopoly capitalism and its allies."

They denounce cooperative actions to defend Latin America against communism, or to strengthen national economies without Communist participation or Soviet aid.

Bloc propaganda dissemination is being improved through expansion of book stores, cultural and friendship societies, and other outlets.

China, for example, has recently established a press outlet in Latin America, and has given more radio time to Latin American broadcasts.

In addition, Communist propaganda prepared in Western Europe, Africa, and Asia, based upon and supported by Soviet-bloc efforts, also supports the "national liberation" struggle in Latin America.

The Communist-bloc countries are also seeking greater official representation and wider official contacts.

At present, the Soviet Union has diplomatic missions in only three Latin American countries, Argentina, Uruguay, and Mexico.

Missions of satellite countries of a diplomatic, consular, or commercial nature are located in these countries, as well as Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia.

Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam have no representation.

In this effort the Communist governments are using every opportunity and channel to urge an expansion of official diplomatic and non-diplomatic representation, dangling the bait of profitable trade with the bloc before both governments and private interests.

For example, in 1958 the holding of the meeting of the Inter-parliamentary Union in Rio de Janeiro gave bloc delegations a chance to campaign for the exchange of diplomatic missions and to hint at great trade possibilities.

The cooperation of influential legislators or other officials is enlisted through general campaigns and discreet efforts by visiting groups from the bloc or by local friendship societies.

The CHAIRMAN. Could I ask you a question there?

General CABELL. Certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you think of the possibilities of trade between Latin America and the Soviet Union?

General CABELL. Meaning do we think that there is a large market in Latin America?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir; for Soviet goods.

General CABELL. I think there is a market there, Mr. Chairman, because they are producers of many raw materials. The Soviet Union is expanding its industrial base. It would like to get more foreign exchange. It would like to use their trade opportunities as a cover for other and more sinister operations.

So I think that they would seek to force the pace of trade with Latin America, although it might not be completely economically sound otherwise.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you think they would take commodities that are needed in the Soviet Union by the Soviet people and trade with Latin America in order to further political ends of the Soviet Government in Latin America?

General CABELL. Yes. I am sure of that. That is their aim.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator Hruska General, do you leave any knowledge of any offer reportedly made recently by representatives of the Russian Government of a, $200 million credit to be expended in Russia in the acquisition of any type of Russian industrial products?

A second part to that question would be whether or not that related in any way to the sugar business in Cuba.

General CABELL. We are not aware of a $200 million offer. We have heard recently of several offers which, altogether, might total around $200 million. It is not unlikely that such a large offer might be made for propaganda purposes and that the implementation might be in terms of smaller credits arranged through Communist "cover" firms of Soviet-bloc commercial representative-s' in Western countries. These might be arranged directly with some autonomous agency of the Cuban Government, such as the Agrarian Reform Institute. We seek to be alert to such reports and attempt to confirm them and establish the principals involved. We are also aware of the possibility that the Cuban Government may turn to the Soviet bloc for purchases of jet aircraft or other military equipment.

Offers, or rumors, of extremely large Soviet credits could not help but be related to sugar, Cuba's chief source of income. The Communists have long advocated less dependence on the U.S. market and

have propagandized the advantages of trade with the Soviet bloc. The Soviets certainly have an interest in supporting the Cuban Communist Party program. On the other hand, it is true that anti-Communists have an interest in rumors which will increase our alarm over Communist influence in Cuba.

Shall I continue, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator JOHNSTON. Are they having any trouble in disposing of their sugar in Cuba, all that they produce?

General CABELL. Yes; they have to sell. They cannot possibly dispose of the Cuban

The CHAIRMAN. Would you speak a little louder, please, sir?

Senator JOHNSTON. What I have reference to is: have they sold or are they able to sell all of the sugar?

General CABELL. About a month ago the Cuban Sugar Stabilization Institute stated that the holdover this year would be between 1 million and 1.2 million tons. This will be large compared to last year's holdover of some 600,000 tons.

The CHAIRMAN. That sold to us is at a price level that is roughly a hundred percent above the world price.

General CABELL. I am not knowledgeable on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Sir.

Senator JOHNSTON. That is about what it amounts to.

General CABELL. To continue, Mr. Chairman

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General CABELL. Nearly all the bloc governments have been active in the promotion of cultural contacts. They have used these contacts to discredit the charges against Communists and derogatory descriptions of the Communist countries, as a means of cultivating and converting carefully selected non-Communists, and as a means of establishing a precedent for the development of official contacts.

The development of a campaign for increased trade with the Soviet bloc is presented as a means of freeing the Latin American countries from their dependence on the U. S. market.

This campaign is designed primarily to appeal to bourgeois elements in official and business circles, but is also used to appeal to worker groups, to whom it is described as the solution to wage and living standard problems. This trade campaign has, as yet, had little real impact in Latin America.

The major role of the bloc diplomatic establishments is to complement, rather than direct, the activities of the local Communists, through implementation of overt Soviet foreign policy.

The bloc establishments concentrate on usual objectives, that is, cultural interchange, the development of commercial relations, and the presentation of Soviet positions on international issues, as a means of improving the climate for the growth of the local Communist organizations and increasing their prestige.

Through binational centers, such as the Mexican-Russian Cultural Exchange Institute, they distribute Marxist literature and propaganda films, and arrange for the exchange of visits by the various individuals and groups.

Under the cover of the binational centers, the diplomatic establishments are able to maintain close contact with key Communists or Communist sympathizers.

However, the main purpose of these contacts is to develop sympathy for the Soviet Union among non-Communist elements rather than to direct local Communist Party activities.

The direction of the various local Communist Parties and the various national affiliates of the international fronts is achieved primarily through international meetings held in conjunction with a Communist Party congress or plenum, or at an international front meeting, or bilateral meetings of Communist Party representatives in Moscow.

There is good evidence, however, that certain diplomatic officials are also Communist Party of the Soviet Union representatives, who have the responsibility for monitoring the activities of national Communist Parties and their leaders, and for reporting on these developments to Moscow.

These representatives also maintain clandestine contact with various Communist Party leaders for the purpose of clarifying the Moscow line, advising on its application,, approving the travel or training of party members in the Soviet Union, and attending to minor financial details. There is also evidence that certain officials are engaged in espionage.

Soviet and satellite subsidization of national Communist Parties through diplomatic missions is known to occur.

In Latin America, however, such direct subsidization appears less significant than financing through any of a number of indirect channels.

The origin of funds is concealed. Promises of financial aid made by the Soviet or Chinese Communist officials to party leaders are intentionally vague, and implementation is apt to be achieved through a variety of devices, such as payment through the translation of books, the awarding of a "peace prize" to a local sympathizer, the negotiating of a lucrative contract with a local sympathizer, gifts attributed to popular collection campaigns and fraternal fronts abroad, or the international solidarity fund of the World Federation of Trade Unions, the awarding of scholarships or tours on an expense-paid basis.

On the other hand; the diplomatic establishments do purchase services which may benefit individual Communists, or may negotiate contracts through which local Communists or sympathizers are enabled to realize some financial gain or which may indirectly benefit the party.

There are cases, however, where Soviet officials have been reported to have made large direct payments to local Communists in an effort to promote strike activity or other types of unrest.

The adoption of the "national liberation struggle" with its concentration on unity of action with the non-Communist nationalist bourgeoisie has been paralleled by an intensive campaign to strengthen the internal organization of the national Communist Parties in Latin America, and to train the party leaders, as well as the membership, in basic Marxist-Leninist theory, and its application.

The training of Latin American Communist Party leaders at the higher party school of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union hats been going on continuously since 1953, with an increase noted since 1956.

The usual curriculum is based on a 2- or 3-year course of training, and the students are active party leaders and functionaries who have

been selected by their parties and approved by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

It is probable that most of the Latin American Communist Parties now have a number of leaders who have received this special training.

Beginning in 1956, the Communist Party of China also undertook to give training to Latin American Communist Party leaders.

They emphasize, among other subjects, the special contributions of the Chinese party in the field of clandestine work, agrarian reform and peasant affairs, guerrilla warfare, and the manipulation of the bourgeoisie and other elements in the "anti-imperialist struggle."

Since 1956, there is evidence that the organization of such training has been improved, and that the Chinese Communist Party is now giving regular courses specifically for Latin American Communist students, thereby paralleling the Soviet effort. In addition to the training offered by the Soviet

Senator JOHNSTON. Is that in all the South American countries or some place

General CABELL. Pretty much so. Their aim is to make it in all of the Latin American countries.

Senator JOHNSTON. I See.

General CABELL. In addition to the training offered by the Soviet and Chinese Communist Parties, the better organized and stronger Communist Parties have, in accordance with recommendations from Moscow, offered training to Communist. Party members from the, smaller and weaker Communist, Parties.

Thus, the Communist Party of Argentina, in 1958, accepted students from a number of other Latin American countries, Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Panama, and Columbia, into its cadre school, which was raided by the Argentine police in October of 1958.

It has been reported that other Communist Parties, such as those of Chile and Cuba, have also undertaken to train Communists from other countries.

This is in further answer to your question, Senator.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, might I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. General, there has been some training of Communists from Latin America in Warsaw, too, has there not?

General CABELL. The training of Latin Americans is centered in the U.S.S.R., China, and (to a lesser extent) in East Germany. There is no evidence of a Polish program in this regard, and there are no international front headquarters in Warsaw which might offer on-the-job training. However, we are aware of cases where the International Union of Students (IUS) has given scholarships to Latin American students for study in Poland.

Mr. SOURWINE. When they go to Europe they go to Moscow

General CABELL. Generally, they want to.

Mr. SOURWINE. When they go to Red China, where do they go, Peiping?

General CABELL. They go to Peiping, via Moscow, usually.

Mr. SOURWINE. Thank you, sir.

General CABELL. There is more prestige connected with going to Moscow or Peiping than going to any of the satellites.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any training of Communist students, Latin American Communist students, in the United States?

General CABELL. We would not be the repository of that information, Mr. Chairman. That would be the FBI.

The CHAIRMAN. I wanted to know whether you had that information.

General CABELL. No, sir; I do not have it at my fingertips.

The above training is carried on by schools conducted by the Communist Parties themselves.

However, the intensified training program is also being undertaken by the Communist fronts. The World Federation of Trade Unions held a training school for Latin American labor leaders in Budapest from 1953 to 1955, and subsidized a Central American training school in Costa Rica in 1958.

The World Federation of Democratic Youth, and the International Union of Students have provided on-the-job training for Latin Americans at their international headquarters, as has the Women's International Democratic Federation.

Marxist training centers, such as the Workers' University in Mexico City, are being expanded in an effort to broaden the appeal of Marxism, and to stimulate nationalism.

Efforts to infiltrate the educational field have been intensified in an effort to gain respectability and recognition for Marxist thought, a drive which has achieved success in several countries. A notable example is the Brazilian Institute for Advanced Studies. In addition, nonpolitical scholarships are offered by the Soviet Union and satellite countries for training in the arts and sciences.

Thus, the international Communist training effort is comprehensive, ranging from the political indoctrination of the militant Communist nucleus to the provision of opportunities to non-Communists which will orient them towards the Communist bloc in their future professional careers.

The coordination of Latin American Communist action is planned through international, regional, and national meetings of Communist Parties or front organizations.

This is done at bilateral meetings between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Latin American Communist Party leaders, through the exchange of publications, through the travel of party leaders, and through continuous training and indoctrination of party members.

The fundamental line is established in discussions with Communist Party of the Soviet Union officials, and an authoritative-or in authoritative journals such as Problems of Peace and Socialism (the World Marxist Review) which is published in 19 languages, and the various party theoretical organs.

Fundamental Marxist texts, both current and classic, are available in Spanish; some are translated and published in Latin America, to provide a standardized basis for internal Party training and for indoctrination of non-Communists.

Spanish translations of Chinese Communist works are increasingly used in the effort to apply Chinese tactical lessons in Latin America.

Latin American delegates to Soviet Communist Party congresses have also attended Chinese Communist Party meetings or have met with Chinese leaders.

The general strategy for Communist activity in Latin America in 1958 was outlined at the Moscow meeting of November 1957.

Activities in 1959, in continuation of the 1958 program, are believed to have been discussed at meetings between Latin America and Soviet Communist Party representatives held in Moscow at the time of the 21st Communist Party of the Soviet Union Congress, and at meetings between the Latin American and Chinese Communists shortly afterward, in Peiping.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was in January of this year?

General CABELL. Late January and early February.

Mr. SOURwINE. All right.

General CABELL. The current program involves the exploitation of the Cuban Revolution as an example of a successful "liberation struggle," which should be emulated by "anti-imperialist" elements in other Latin American countries.

A significant element of the Communist program for 1959 appears to be the support of a "People's Congress," ostensibly sponsored by non-Communist patriots and liberals, but oriented by Communist or pro-Communist delegates so as to pass anti-U.S. resolutions.

The Cuban Communist newspaper Hoy recently quoted Raul Castro, Chief of the Cuban Armed Forces, as giving his support to such a congress.

The CHAIRMAN. These congresses, while they are composed of liberals who are not members of the Communist Party, yet, the congress and its membership are manipulated by the Communists; is that correct?

General CABELL. That is the purpose of them and the fact of them.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General CABELL. Mr. Chairman, this type of approach, the exploitation of non-Communists and the infiltration of crypto-Communists, or secret Communist Party members into progressive movements, is an old technique, but one which has been particularly emphasized by the Chinese.

It is believed that all Latin American Parties are now under orders to recruit new members on a "secret" basis, so that they may remain in or be infiltrated into non-Communist groups.

In 1958 and 1959 there has been increasing emphasis on the need for communism to adapt its tactics to the regional and national situation in which it works.

In Latin America where the "national liberation," strategy is aimed at influencing non-Communist liberals, nationalists and intellectuals, Communist-front activity and subversion of non-Communist organizations has been increasingly emphasized.

The international Communist-front organizations, such as the World Federation of Trade Unions, the International Union of Students, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the Women's International Democratic Federation, and so forth, have tried in their programs aimed at Latin America, to pay more attention to national questions and peculiarities and thus to de-emphasize Soviet direction while developing the basis for unity of action.

Mr. SOURWINE. General

Mr. Chairman, may I inquire

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you tell us which Communists, what meetings they attended?

General CABELL. Abe Magil was CPUSA representative at the Twelfth CP-Mexico Congress, in September 1954.

But as a matter of fact, the attendance has not been notable at these congresses mainly because they wished to avoid attention.

Senator HRUSKA. By "notable" do you mean heavy in numbers?

General CABELL. Wither that or frequent. It has been neither heavy in numbers nor frequent.

Senator HRUSKA. General, you have given the names of several international associations and so on, down in Latin America, like the teachers, the public workers, and the metalworkers. Where do these men come from ?

General CABELL. These men come from various countries and they are officials in various of the unions, and particularly the World Federation of Trade Unions and its subsidiary organizations.

Senator HRUSKA. Where are the headquarters for the international-the World Federation of Trade Unions that you just mentioned?

General CABELL. Prague. Prague is a big center for these various unions.

Senator HRUSIKA. So that many of these leaders come from Europe?

General CABELL. Yes, Sir.

Senator HRUSKA. From either Poland, Czechoslovakia, or Russia?

General CABELL. Yes. Many are from Western Europe.

Senator HRUSKA. You have not named, so far, any Chinese. Are you coming to them?

General CABELL. I do not believe I named any Chinese. They are not as well known to us as the European ones.

Senator HRUSKA. They are relatively recent arrivals on the scene then?

General CABELL. Yes. I would like to say, as I have said, they simply have not traveled in the same or similar capacities as the others. They are not heavily represented, you see, in the same organizations, like the WFTU and IUS.

The people who travel for the WFTU and other front organizations are, in the main, Westerners, by culture and background, and people who have some linguistic connection with the West.

The Chinese started their intensified drive in Latin America only since 1956, and then only by stages. Just a handful of correspondents came out.

They are dependent wholly upon the local Communist Party and the network of correspondents which I have mentioned.

Senator HRUSKA. The tempo of their activity has steadily increased?

General CABELL. That is correct.

Senator HRUSKA. When I say they, I mean those people from China. Isn't that true?

General CABELL. Chinese activity, both in drawing Latin Americans into China for training and consultation, and now coming out for the first time, apart from a few cultural acrobatic and ballet troupes and things like that; but they are now sending out Red Chinese newspaper correspondents to actually set up headquarters, for example, at Havana; that is true.

Senator HRUSKA. To what extent is that done to avoid the appearance of direct Russian interference in the Western Hemisphere'?

General CABELL. Well, actually the Chinese are operating very strongly on their own. They have their concept of their rights within the movement, and they send out their representatives as a sovereign power within the movement.

Senator HRUSKA Do you think a part of their increased activity is due to a desire to not counteract, but to-but in recognition of our policy in Formosa, for example, and Quemoy? Do you think that is involved?

General CABELL. I would suggest that is a small part of it. I think the basic reason for it is that they are feeling their oats.

Senator HRUSKA. They want to go into business on their own?

General CABELL. They want to go into business on their own, and they want to establish themselves and be recognized as Communist ideologists on their own hook.

Senator JOHNSTON. In other words, it is a religion with them?

General CABELL. That is right.

Senator JOHNSTON. It is almost like the churches sending out the missionaries?

General CABELL. Yes.

In organizing Latin American Youth, the International Communist movement works through the World Federation of Democratic Youth, and the International Union of Students.

At their fifth congress in Pieping in September of 1958, they gave greatly increased importance to Latin America, adopting seven resolutions of solidarity with students in nine Latin American countries or colonies. These are British Honduras, which they described as Guatemalan territory, Brazil, Cuba, Guadalupe, Guiana, Martinique, Nicaragua, Peru, and Venezuela. They also adopted a separate twopage resolution on Latin America as a whole.

Young Latin American leaders are working at the World Federation of Democratic Youth, and International Union of Students headquarters in Budapest and Prague.

For example, the Brazilian Communist youth leader, Orlando Funcia Gomez, headed the important Latin American commission at World Federation of Democratic Youth headquarters, and then he returned to Brazil.

He was replaced by Ruben Guedes, also from Brazil.

Another Latin American World Federation of Democratic Youth official, Otto Cesar Vargas Girete, helped organize Latin American participation after the ,Seventh World Youth Festival held in Vienna on the 26th of July to the 4th of August of this year.

Latin American Communists known to have worked at International Union of Students headquarters include individuals from Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, and Venezuela.

The important International Union of Students secretariat includes an Ecuadoran , Jorge G-alarza, who replaced a fellow Ecuadoran, Efrain Alvarez Paredes.

Cesar Alonso Alvarado, a Colombian, has been working at International Students headquarters in Prague as the Spanish editor of the union's monthly organ, World Student News, since January of 1959, when he replaced Antonio Massip, a Cuban. Massip quickly returned to Cuba after the fall of the Batista regime.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know what he is doing there now?

General CABELL. Our most recent information indicates that Antonio Massip is engaged in propaganda work for the army at La Cabana Fortress in Havana.

Some of the Latin American Communists who have worked with the World Federation of Democratic Youth or the International Union of Students headquarters - worked at those headquarters have also received training in party schools in the Soviet Union, and on returning to Latin America have been made responsible for clandestine propaganda distribution, and for the organization of strikes and demonstrations.

In the appeal to non-Communist youth, probably the most important of all World Federation of Democratic Youth and International Union of Students tactics, are the world youth festivals held every other year.

Since the national liberation strategy was initiated about 1954, over 3,300 young people from Latin America and the European Caribbean dependencies have attended these festivals.

Relatively, Latin American attendance increased sharply at the 1959 festival in Vienna.

The festivals are primarily propaganda efforts, but serve to strengthen the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Union of Students organizationally through the experience received by those working on the various preparatory committees.

We believe that close to $1 million was expended for Latin American delegates' travel to the Sixth Youth Festival in 1957, of which less than $100,000 was contributed from Latin America. That is $1 million cost, but the Latin Americans contributed $100,000 of it.

In 1958, the bloc expended about $:100,000 in order to subsidize the travel of Latin American Communists and sympathizers to the bloc.

This was not at youth festivals, but just travel to the bloc.

The Young Communist, youth and student leaders associated with and trained by the World Federation of Democratic Youth, and the International Union of Students, are instrumental in the coordination of the liberation struggle.

In 1958 the two organizations sought to emphasize the participation of the students in the anti-Batista struggle in Cuba, and in their publications called for international support and solidarity with the Cuban students.

In the antipathy to existing dictatorships in Latin America, the Communists have found a popular issue which allows them to infiltrate, or work closely with non-Communist youth and student groups.

Wherever possible, they have sought to provide the initiative and, with the aid of Communists abroad, to develop international support and coordination.

For example, a number of meetings of youth and student leaders were held in Cuba earlier this year, some under Communist sponsorship or with Communist participation.

At these meetings, international coordination of anti-dictatorial action was discussed, including plans for an anti-dictator congress to be held in Havana.

Similar meetings have been held in other countries, such as that held in April by the Uruguayan Communist Youth.

Some government officials

The CHAIRMAN. General, right about there, what about the Cuban Government, has it encouraged those Communist meetings?

General CABELL. I think the Cuban Government gives them every facility for those meetings, and any number of Cuban officials give them encouragement. But I think it would be improper to say that the Cuban Government, as such, gives them the encouragement. It is not necessary for the Cuban Government, as such, to give them

The CHAIRMAN. No; but the officials in a private capacity do?

General CABELL. Or the officials in the Government capacity, but it might not be the Government official's responsibility for a certain thing that gives these Communists such encouragement, because the Government is so disorganized that there is continual crossing of lines by one official of the Government into other departments. So I would not want to give the impression that it is governmentally organized encouragement that is taking place. It is rather the encouragement of officials and elements within the Government.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not see the difference.

General CABELL. Well, there is just a legal difference; that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Senator JOHNSTON. In other words, the Government is doing nothing to prevent it?

General CABELL. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. No; they are encouraging it.

General CABELL. I would say even more than that.

The CHAIRMAN. They take affirmative action, the officials of the Government take affirmative action in promoting it.

General CABELL. I just did not want to give you the impression that the Government has officially organized that kind of action.

Senator JOHNSTON. They encourage it as long as it helps them to stay popular.

General CABELL. Oh, yes.

Senator HRUSKA. Well, of course, in Cuba, since Castro took over, the Popular Socialist Party, for example, which had previously been banned, was allowed to come out in the open. Of course, that is not official, that does not make them officially Communists, but it certainly is along the same line; is it not?

General CABELL. And there is no inhibition or prohibition of such movement whatsoever.

Some Government officials may be providing the Communists with readymade opportunities for expanding their propaganda.

Senator JOHNSTON. When anybody tries to oppose it they meet it by saying, "Oh, we agree; we give everybody freedom."

General CABELL. That is right. They oppose it on "freedom" grounds.

For example, Raul Castro, who supported the People's Congress in a recent speech, as previously mentioned, also supported the idea of holding a Latin American Youth and Student Congress in Havana, in the name of defending the Cuban Revolution.

He did not publicly use the earlier anti-dictatorship theme, presumably to minimize the international aspects of the meeting.

It remains to be seen whether this congress, when held, will reveal Communist handiwork through violent attacks on the United States in an effort to apply the theme of "national liberation" to other countries.

The CHAIRMAN What it is a Communist meeting; is it not?

General CABELL. It is a Communist-influenced meeting, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Cuba has a great many Chinese and other Orientals. Do you have any information that Red China has attempted to mobilize them or to

General CABELL. Mr. Chairman, I have got a little piece on that, if you don't mind, which I will come to a little later.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. Proceed, General.

General CABELL. The Communist journalists in Latin America have, particularly since 1956, been encouraged and assisted in broadening their influence by the Communist front International Organization of Journalists.

Since that time, Communists and their supporters have sought to bring national press associations closer to the International Organization of Journalists, and to sponsor a Latin American Congress of Journalists at which they could exploit Latin American nationalism and regionalism to the detriment of the United States.

Important national press associations in Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela have given some official recognition to the International Organization of Journalists.

In October of 1958, the Venezuelan National Press Congress invited Jaroslav Knobloch, of Czechoslovakia, the International Organization of Journalists' president, and Renato Leduc, of Mexico, a vice president, to speak. Leduc used this forum to attack the Latin American coverage of the so-called commercial news agencies, and called for a truly Latin American organization.

As if in answer to this, the Prensa Latina Agency was organized, with headquarters in Cuba, in early 1959.

This agency denies Communist sponsorship, while claiming the backing of Mexican industrialists and promoting the ultranationalist line.

Prensa Latina now has correspondents, and sells its service throughout Latin America and in the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. You think that is a Communist-controlled news service?

General CABELL. This came out very quickly after the encouragement in the speech by the Communists that. such an institution was needed.

We also call attention to the fact that its line plays this very ultra, nationalist line, which is the Communist line.

Other than that, at this present moment, I do not think we could testify to you that it is a Communist organization.

General CABELL. It is under intensive investigation along the lines we have indicated, and it is just ripe for exploitation because of its intensely nationalistic character.

The CHAIRMAN. But, in your judgment, it is Communist-influenced?

General CABELL. We do not have the evidence to make such a firm

conclusion, Mr. Chairman. But we certainly strongly suspect that is the case, and we are watching it like a hawk.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator HRUSKA. It has many badges which would indicate that?

General CABELL. That is right. The Communists undoubtedly encouraged or even inspired the organization of Prensa Latina, have infiltrated the organization, and have aided it both by providing news and utilizing its services. Its correspondents include some known Communist Party members, a number of crypt.o-Communists, and a good many ultranationalists. To date, one of the chief customers of Prensa Latina appears to be the Cuban Communist newspaper Hoy. However, because of its access to Communist and nationalist circles, it has also been able to supply material of interest to other newspapers and news services, including non-Communist ones.

The Communist-bloc countries have increased their press activities in the area.

Tass correspondents are located in Mexico, Uruguay, and Argentina. The Czechoslovakian News Agency has established an office in Argentina.

A group of Soviet journalists visited Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Peru, and Panama in April and May of 1958, establishing contact with pro-Communist writers and newsmen.

In early 1959, the New China News Agency began building a network of correspondents in Latin America, and established a headquarters in Havana, adjacent to that of the Prensa Latina. In connection with this effort, a group of Communist Chinese journalists traveled to various key Latin American countries.

Not only have their gains in the field of journalism been significant, but Communists have also increased their propaganda in other fields.

Wherever possible, as in Cuba, Communists have quickly exploited opportunities to utilize local radio and television.

At the special conference held in Moscow in November 1957, emphasis was placed on the. revival and diversification of the peace movement.

It was concluded that its main objective in Latin America should be to weaken the "war economy" of the United States. Thus, economic nationalism was established as a major "peace" objective.

In accordance with instructions, the Argentine Communists held a "Congress for International Cooperation, General Disarmament, and National Sovereignty" in May 1958, attended by leaders from throughout the hemisphere.

This served to prepare for Latin American participation in the subsequent world meeting in Stockholm and also to coordinate regional planning.

In accordance with a Soviet goal of several years standing, it resolved to promote a "Congress of the Peoples of Latin America" which would "meet the imperative necessity of integrating the national economies, strengthening the homogeneous elements of Latin American cultures, and organizing joint action to preserve world peace."

Originally planned for December 1958, this "People's Congress"which I mentioned earlier-was postponed, and it now appears that the Communists are capitalizing on the appeal made by Cuba's youthful Minister of Education, Dr. Armando Hart, for just such a "People's Congress."

This has given them the non-Communist sponsorship which they desire, and has also allowed them to develop the "defense" of the Cuban revolution as an additional basis for attracting the support of Latin American nationalists, and anti-U.S. elements.

Senator HRUSKA. Let me ask, do you know any new date for the meeting of that congress?

General CABELL. Luis Carlos Prestes, the secretary general of the Communist Party of Brazil, said in August that he expected it to come off in the very near future in Cuba, and that is the last date we have.

The national peace movements have also been active in more conventional "peace" activities such as opposition to military pacts, nuclear testing, and activities of U.S. military missions.

The current trend, however, suggests that the main purpose of the national peace committees has become that of coordinating activities in behalf of the "liberation struggle" within a wide variety of organizations, particularly those of an economic and cultural nature.

Under the heading of other front activities, the labor, youth and student, journalistic, and peace-front activities are the most important in Latin America.

There are many others, however, in which increased organizational activity is also apparent.

The Women's International Democratic Federation, for example, is seeking to develop a First Latin American Congress of Women, scheduled to be held in Santiago, Chile, between November 19 and 20 of 1959.

Coordination of the activities of the various Soviet friendship societies or binational cultural exchange institutes may have been the purpose behind the organization of a Soviet Federation for Friendship and Cultural Cooperation with Latin America in January 1959.

In addition to the -world fronts, the Communists have organized or infiltrated numerous national or regional organizations to aid in the "national liberation" struggle.

For example, the Union of Latin American Friendship, Union de Amistad Latino Americana, recently established with headquarters in Mexico, serves to coordinate and disseminate information from various countries, such as the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Honduras.

For each of these countries, and for others as well, there is at least one Communistcontrolled front, among the various political opposition groups, which advocates unified action based on a minimal program for "national liberation."

Such a front is the Haitian National Liberation Movement, founded by the Communist leader Rene Depestre, but claimed to be "composed of young persons from all patriotic groups and of all political tendencies." The program of this group was recently published in the Cuban Communist newspaper Hoy.

To conclude, it is evident that the Communists have an extremely useful formula in the strategy of the "national liberation struggle."

They have difficulties and are still having problems in allaying the distrust of nonCommunist elements, which either recognize the true nature of communism and the opportunistic nature of the Communist alliance which is being offered, or which recognize the beneficial as

pects of their national ties with the United States and prefer to negotiate political and economic differences rather than to destroy these ties.

To counteract this opposition, the local Communists, with the help of the international Conmiunist apparatus and the Soviet Union, are attempting to show, first, that the Communists are sincerely dedicated to democracy and "national liberation" and are willing to fight to achieve these goals; and, second, that the United States needs no longer to be feared, as its influence has been matched by the Soviet Union.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. General, the committee has received from a. very knowledgeable person, who has been a lifelong student of China, an appraisal from which I would like to read two paragraphs, and ask whether you concur or if there is any comment you can give us on this

Talk of an allegedly "inevitable" Sino-Soviet schism may serve as intellectual aspirin to repress our policy headaches with both Moscow and Peiping. Like aspirin, however, the repressant only postpones coping with the problem; it does not eliminate it.

All the component parts of the Soviet Empire, including Red China, may be compared to the members of a baseball team. Each has a part to play in trying to win the game, although each occupies a different position and is called upon to do a different sort of thing. Moscow is on the team, too, but its position is that of a player-manager, and it flashes the signs. In a given situation, the player-manager may call for all kinds of play-squeeze, sacrifice, and so on. The player asked to play a certain way cannot give any consideration to his own personal record. Mickey Mantle cannot go up to Casey Stengel and say to him that, since he (Mantle) is well on the way to beating Babe Ruth's home-run record, he had better be given the chance to try the long ball rather than bunting for a sacrifice. If the particular situation appears to the manager to call for a bunt, Mickey Mantle must bunt, home-run record or no home-run record. The idea is to try to win the game, not to achieve a personal glory. Khrushchev is a better team player than Stalin. Hence his denunciation of the "personality cult." Liu Shao-chi is a better team player than Mao Tze-tung. Hence Mao's displacement. Chou En-lai, with his many faces which so baffle Western observers, is an excellent team player. Western estimate of world communism suffers considerably by paying too much attention to personalities and too little to the team concept. To win the game is the all-important thing, and the Communists, whether Russian, Chinese, Polish, or Albanian, mean to win it.

We must also be careful to draw the proper line of distinction between "total" and "limited" wars. The Russians, and to a lesser extent the Chinese, understand that a "total" war with nuclear weapons may spell the doom of everybody, especially the Communists. I say "especially the Communists" because of the ring of strategic bases around Russia and mainland China. Their propaganda has been to induce the United States to give up the bases. Before they succeed in doing that, 'the Communists are not likely to risk total war. But limited wars are an etirely different thing. They are not hesitant in provoking them here and there as long as they are sure they will not explode into a total war. Russia at present has very little room to stage limited wars. The moment she touches Western Europe, total war is on. On the other hand Red China has plenty of room to risk limited wars. Surely no total war will break out on account of Sikkim or Bhutan for the Indian border. So, on the surface, Russia may appear to be pursuing one line and Red China another. To return to the baseball analogy, one player may be bunting and the other swinging for the fences. The thing to remember is that all are on the same team, putting on obviously different plays under different circumstances, but the ultimate objective is to win the game.

General CABELL. Mr. Sourwine, I cannot comment on the whole piece. But I will make some comment on it.

In the first place, I think the aspirin analogy is not a bad one.

As I pointed out earlier, I think this is a very comforting thought, this schism betwen the two, but I think it is more potential than actual at the present time.

With respect to the baseball team analogy, I would not be as extreme as that, because I do not believe that the response to discipline or orders is quite as immediate and complete and unquestioning as the ballplayer to the manager.

It is true, however, that the team aspect of international communism is often insufficiently considered. One of the chief objectives of communism in the last few years has been to improve international coordination. Both the Soviets and the Chinese have been doing this, with some success. This is particularly true in the undeveloped areas where the strengthening of the regional and local Communist movements is the immediate goal.

I think, as time goes on, the sensibilities of the Chinese will have to be taken more into consideration, and the willingness or ability of their team manager to give firm orders and sacrifice, hit instructions, and things like that, are going to be somewhat eroded.

With respect to the limited war elements of your question, I think it would take up a long time to deal with that aspect, and I would just suggest that we check on that.

Mr. SOURWINE. General, what is the numerical strength of the Communist movement in Latin America ?

General CABELL. I would say that, in general, the Communist Parties have increased their membership. The number of Latin American Communists is estimated now at about 220,000 to 240,000, which is about a 10-percent increase over our 1958 estimates. The number of sympathizers is estimated at about 650,000 to 700,000.

It should be emphasized that the Communist threat continues to be based on the organizational ability and international connections of the Communist Parties and their fronts, and individual leaders, rather than numerical strength.

The CHAIRMAN. That is true all over the world?

General CABELL. Yes; but I would say it is particularly true in Latin America.

The CHAIRDIAN. Is the Communist drive in Latin America similar to their drive in Africa and the Middle East; is it more intense?

General CABELL. Yes, sir; but I think it started sooner in Latin America.

The CHAIRMAN You think it is more intense in Latin America?

General CABELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It started sooner there?

General CABELL. Yes, Sir.

Senator HRUSKA. How much sooner?

General CABELL. I would say in the nature of several years, sir; and I think they, too, realize that the United States is more susceptible to hurt in this area than elsewhere.

The CHAIRMAN. They can weaken us more easily in Latin America.

General CABELL. And there is no doubt about who the principal enemy of the Soviet Union is and of the Communist Party. There is no doubt about that whatseoever, and that is the United States.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, the drive in Latin America is pointed at us?

General CABELL. More than anything else; yes.

Senator HRUSKA. General, you say it is several years; it is a fact, is it not, that there has been organized Communist activity and movement in Latin America for 25 years?

General CABELL. Oh, yes; I was talking in terms of a drive.

Senator HRUSKA. And the intensification that we now witness?

General CABELL. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. General, would it be possible for your agency to furnish the committee a table showing the estimated strength of the Communist Parties in various countries in Latin America?

General CABELL. Yes; I can do that.

The following table contains approximate figures on Communist Party strengths. These figures are constantly under review, and are subject to changes in response to new and more reliable information.

COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERSHIP

Argentina -------------------- 80,000

Bolivia________________ 5,000

Brazil________________ 40,000

Chile_________________30,000

Colombia ---------------------- 6,000

Costa Rica -----------------------300

Cuba_________________17,000

Dominican Republic--------------50

Ecuador________________3,000

El Salvador -----------------------500

Guatemala _____________1,100

Haiti -------------------------------15

Honduras_______________ 700

Mexico-------------------------2, 500

Nicaragua ________________50

Panama_________________110

Paraguay______________3, 000

Peru__________________6, 000

Uruguay_______________3, 400

Venezuela_____________40, 000

Total________________ 238,725

General CABELL. But again let me point out that this table does not include the Communist-front parties, such as Lombardo Toledano's Popular Party in Mexico. These in the table are the Communist Parties themselves, and not the front parties.

Senator JOHNSTON. The front parties are kind of a training party?

General CABELL. It is an influence party.

Senator JOHNSTON. It kind of breaks them off.

The CHAIRMAN. General, are you familiar with a document purporting to be a Castro directive laying the groundwork for the extinction of the Catholic Church in the Dominican Republic?

General CABELL. No; I am not.

Mr. SOURWINE. General, what are your estimates on the scope of the subsidies which the Communist movement in Latin America is receiving from the bloc?

General CABELL. The truth about Communist finances is generally known only to a very small number of Communist leaders within each local Communist Party.

Even within the apparatus of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and China there are only a few functionaries who handle the problem of subsidizing foreign Communist Parties.

In addition, the transmission of funds from the Soviet Union, as was pointed out earlier, proceeds through a multitude of channels and under a multitude of disguises.

It is, therefore, very difficult to make an accurate estimate on b, -w much money the Soviets or the Chinese spend on Communist subversion in Latin America.

In general, it appears that the bulk of Soviet subsidies is poured into the promotion of Communist front activities, rather than into the Communist Parties themselves.

This is, of course, only a technicality since Communist fronts and Communist Parties work hand in hand.

Nevertheless, it is another indication of how seriously the Soviets intended to create a favorable climate for communism in Latin America.

On the basis of similar observations in other areas, it would be fair to state that the Soviets heavily subsidize the Communist Party press in Latin America.

The cost of training Latin American Communists is also borne by the Soviets who, obviously, desire that the Communist Parties in Latin America be strengthened for the long haul.

The cost of the Soviets' overall training program for Communists in the free world has been estimated at, conservatively, $500,000 per year. This is in addition to the approximately $500,000 mentioned already as having been spent for travel expenses alone in 1958.

Indications are that the Chinese Communists may complement Soviet subsidies. The Chinese Communist Party bears all expenses for the training of Latin American Communists in China, and has given the impression of having ample funds for the "fraternal" support of foreign Communist Parties.

Mr. SOURWINE. General, is the U.S.S.R. or any of its satellites providing military aid to the Communist or pro-Communist forces in Latin America?

General CABELL. Not to our current knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. It is said that roughly 750 North Korean and Communist Chinese fought with the Castro forces. These people were not seen in the cities of Cuba, but were kept in the interior of Cuba.

Do you have any knowledge of that?

General CABELL. No, sir; we do not, and we would seriously doubt the authenticity of any such figure. We have no evidence of any participation in the revolution. Nor do we have any knowledge of Chinese Communist No. 1 participation.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

What do you have information about? About what Communists fou ht in Castro's forces?

General CABELL. In Cuba?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

General CABELL. That question is related to the question. Is Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro a Communist?

Let me develop that thought for you, sir. Our information shows that the Cuban Communists do not consider him a Communist Party member, or even a pro-Communist.

On the other hand, they are delighted with the nature of his government, which has allowed the Communists opportunity, free opportunity, to organize, to propagandize, and to infiltrate.

We know that the Communists consider Castro as a representative of the bourgeoisie, and were unable to gain public recognition or commitments from him during the course of the revolution.

We know that the Communists were concerned when, at the tune of his trip to the United States, he showed evidence of a friendly attitude toward the United States.

We know also that it has been the assigned task of the Cuban Communist Party to prevent Castro's revolution from going to the right, that is, from establishing friendly relations with the United States, or ending its tolerance of Communist, activities.

Our conclusion, therefore, is that Fidel Castro is not a Communist; however, he certainly is not anti-Communist. His extreme policies, including confiscation of private property, lead him to take positions and make statements such as his violent anti-U.S. outbursts which are extremely useful to international communism and are being exploited by the Communists to the maximum extent.

He has delegated authority in key areas to persons known to be pro-Communists or who are susceptible to exploitation by Communists.

In turn, he appears to be increasingly susceptible to Communist propaganda, which is designed to exploit "evidence" that the United States is an enemy, to discredit, charges of Communist influence in Cuba and witch hunting-or as they call it, maccartismoand to glorify the Cuban revolution, and particularly the agrarian reform, as a pattern for the "liberation" of the masses in other Latin American countries.

It is questionable whether the Communists desire to recruit Castro into the Communist Party, that they could do so if they wished, or that he would be susceptible to Communist discipline if he joined. As I say, that is subject to question.

The Communist viewpoint is that he represents leadership of a nationalistic, bourgeoisie-democratic revolution which precedes a Communist rise to power.

The Communist interest is to help further the nationalistic aspects of his regime and to preserve a climate of tolerance which will allow the Communists to organize and build the foundation for their future control.

At present, therefore, their primary interest is to influence Castro in favor of an aggressive, "anti-Imperialist" nationalism supported by non-Communists, but which will defend the rights of Communists to express their views openly and engage in legal activity.

In their attempt to influence Castro, the Communists are known to be utilizing five principal channels.

First, they are seeking to influence him through his close associates who are generally known to be pro-Communist.

Fidel's brother, Raul, and his close adviser, Ernesto (Che) Guevara, are both strong friends of the Communist Party.

Second, the Communists have sought to guide the program and the policies of the Government and of the 26th of July movement.

They have been able to exert considerable influence through pro-Communists or sympathizers who have been appointed to key posts and who have virtual autonomy in their fields.

Such persons have been appointed by Fidel on the basis of friendships, trust, and loyalty established during the revolution, and he is committed to defend their policies.

Third, the Communists and their sympathizers are seeking to implant elementary Marxist concepts within the political indoctrination

courses established by the 26th of July movement, thereby establishing the foundation for a pro-Communist-Marxist political philosophy to eventually replace the highly personalistic philosophy represented by Fidel.

Fourth, through their overt propaganda organs, radio and television commentary, and selective or false news reporting, the Communists hoe to shield Fidel, and the Cuban public, from news favorable to U.S. policies, and to exploit news unfavorable to the United States.

Fifth, through organizational activity among the peasants, within the army, and within labor, they hope to gain control of the public demonstrations, mass meetings, and strikes which Fidel is wont to call in evidence of the solidarity of the Cuban people with him and his policies.

Although it is evident that the Communists have been able to exploit Castro in his movement for their own benefit through these channels, as yet they do not appear to control him or his government. In terms of mass following, they still represent a minority, though a very well organized one.

In certain areas, as in organized labor, there are experienced non-Communist leaders who form an obstacle to rapid Communist progress.

There are student and professional groups which are also non-Communist although firmly supporting Fidel, and within the 26th of July movement there is considerable evidence of opposition to communism.

As evidenced in the recent demonstrations, however, these groups are prepared to rally to the defense of the regime.

Senator JOHNSTON. Is it not true that he is more dangerous than if he would come out and let them know that he was a Communist?

General CABELL. I personally would agree that Castro would probably lose much, or even most, of his popular support should this occur. However, we believe that Castro is not a member of the Communist Party, and does not consider himself to be a Communist.

Senator JOHNSTON. He knows himself that, if he would come out openly for the Communists he would lose his usefulness.

General CABELL. That is right. Insofar as he loses public support., he loses the capability to achieve his goals-though he could still be portrayed as victim of counterrevolutionary machinations.

The CHAIRMAN. To say the least, the Communist movement ha made very great -progress in Cuba since Castro took over the Cuban Government; has it not?

General CABELL. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. General, what type of aid is the U.S.S.R. providing to revolutionary elements, such as those in the Caribbean?

General CABELL. Primarily advice-primarily they are furnishing advice and moral support, propaganda materials and services.

Soviet support to revolutionary elements is channeled through the Communist Parties, through the Communist fronts, and through key Communists within other organizations.

The sending of military shipments to Latin American revolutionary elements or sending Soviet military advisers is not yet evident.

Mr. SOURWINE. To what extent are the Communists responsible for the revolutionary expeditions which have appeared in the Caribbean area in the past few years?

General CABELL. The Communists have participated actively in such expeditions, but we do not believe that they have organized them nor dominated them.

Communist participation in such expeditions is demanded by their "national liberation" strategy and tactics. Such participation is also fully in keeping with specific items and encouragement given them by both the Soviet and Chinese Communists in early 1959.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us, General, what is the extent of Chinese Communist penetration in Latin America?

General CABELL. I think this is essentially the question that you were driving at, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

General CABELL. Since 1952, the Chinese Communist penetration in Latin America has been increasing.

In that year the Chinese Communists invited delegates from the Pacific coast countries t0 attend a Peace Congress of Asian and Pacific peoples in Peiping.

In 1956 the Chinese Communist penetration effort was intensified through the establishment of direct relations with Latin American Communist Party representatives and the founding of a training school in Peiping for Latin American Communists.

Chinese Communist revolutionary instruction is well received by Latin American Communist students who find it practical and well suited to the conditions in which they operate in Latin America. They especially appreciate the fact that the Chinese Communists pay even their travel expenses.

In February and March of 1959, Latin American Communist representatives received specific advice and guidance from Mao Tze-tung and other leading Chinese Communists concerning international Communist policy and effective methods of carrying on clandestine activities.

Notably increased "cultural" exchanges and the formation of additional "friendship" societies have contributed to further Chinese Communist penetration of Latin America..

With the aid of local Communist Parties, the Chinese Communists have taken effective steps to establish throughout Latin America a network of correspondents for their official New China News Agency.

Chinese Communist broadcasts to Latin America have been stepped up to 14 program hours per week. Trade with Latin America is also expanding.

Senator HRUSKA. General: what would you know or what would you care to tell us about any interaction between the so-called China Friendship Societies in Latin America and those here in America, in the United States? Is there any interaction?

General CABELL. I do not think that we have been able to detect any.

We have no evidence. The way they do that-they have that interaction, and certainly it occurs-is that the people from here will go to a meeting in Moscow or Peiping, and the people from there will go to the meeting in Moscow or Peiping, and then subsequently get together and get their orders and philosophy and all at that point, so that the exchange or the indoctrination does not actually take place on U.S. soil. But we know that they attend these joint meetings of those various front organizations.

Mr. SOURWINE. General, are the Chinese groups resident in Latin America significant with respect to Communist penetration?

General CABELL. There are numerous Chinese colonies in Latin America, mostly located in the principal cities. Many of these Chinese are second generation or more.

In Peru, where the largest Chinese population exists, the total, including second generation, is about 50,000. Of these, some 14,000 are Chinese nationals, that is, immigrants retaining Nationalist Chinese documentation, and 11,000 are located in Lima, the capital.

In Cuba, the total Chinese population is about 40,000, of which some 20,000 are in Havana.

In Guayaquil, Ecuador, there are over 5,000; in Sao Paulo, Brazil, there are over 1,000.

Mr. SOURWINE. General, may I interrupt at that point, you say of the 50,000 Chinese in Peru approximately 14,000 are Chinese Nationals and 11,000 are located in Lima. You do not mean 11,000 out of the 14,000, but 11,000 out of the 50,000 ?

General CABELL. 11,000 out of the 50,000 is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Please go ahead, sir.

General CABELL. In general, these Chinese are non-Communist and relatively unimportant in terms of national politics. Many actively favor the Nationalists.

There are, of course, some pro-Communist elements, although very few are known to be members of the Communist Party, and the various parties have made no significant effort to expand their membership within the local Chinese communities up to now.

However, in seeking to expand its commercial and propaganda relations, the Chinese Communist Government is seeking to use these people.

One of the purposes of the recent trip by Chinese journalists to various Latin American countries was to establish contact with friendly members of the local Chinese communities.

It is also known that Chinese have used false documentation, obtained through members of the resident Chinese communities, as a means of illegally obtaining documentation as nationals of a Latin American country.

This procedure could very well be used, if required, by Chinese Communists to infiltrate Asians into Latin America.

Recently, there has been an increase in activity favoring Communist China within the Chinese colonies. This has been most noticeable in Peru and Cuba, but also is evident in countries with smaller Chinese populations.

In Lima, where the anti-Communist newspaper Man-Skiing-Po has a daily circulation of 10,000, the pro-Communist newspaper, the Voice of the Chinese Colony has a daily circulation of about 3,000.

In Cuba, the New China Democratic Alliance, a Communist front, has announced the establishment of a Chinese language newspaper in Havana, which will be printed at the plant of Hoy, the Cuban Communist Party organ.

Communist news sources stress the warm reception given to the visiting Chinese newspapermen in Cuba by the local Chinese, as well as by Ran] Castro and by the staff of Prensa Latina, another bit of evidence of Prensa Latina's inclinations.

The New China News Agency office in Havana, working in close contact with the Prensa Latina, will serve to further Chinese Communist propaganda penetration in Latin America.

There has been noticeable growth in the establishment of the Communist ChineseLatin American "friendship societies." A total of 18 now exist, of which 12 have been established quite recently.

With some exceptions, principally in Chile, the societies have not drawn their members from the local Chinese communities. This is probably not through design, but is the result of the relative lack of importance of the Chinese, particularly those of proCommunist tendencies, in local intellectual, academic, and cultural life.

Mr. SOURWINE. General, are there any significant pro-Communist sympathies among the various Eastern European minority groups living in Latin America, such as the Yugoslavs, Poles, the Czechs, and the Hungarians?

General CABELL. In all of these groups there are pro-Communist elements which are seeking to bring these ethnic groups under greater control.

Through their special attributes of race, language, culture, family ties, business interests, these emigres form a special bridge for Communist-backed programs calling for the establishment of closer diplomatic, commercial, and cultural ties with the bloc.

Undoubtedly they facilitate the work of Soviet bloc representatives in Latin America. These groups have been targets of repatriation programs which have declined from their peak of activity.

However, their Communist activities and influence are, in general, peripheral and subservient to the national Communist Party of the country concerned, and the national affiliates of the international Communist fronts.

There are some 1,500 Slav Communists resident in Uruguay, many of whom belong to the front organization Slav Union, Union Eslava, which includes Eastern European emigres such as Poles, Czechs, Bulgarians, Hungarians, and Rumanians, and such independent groups as Armenians and Lithuanians.

It has the mission of grouping together the different Slav communities under its political control.

It works in the preparation of conferences cultural, and other activities, in coordination with the Uruguayan-§owiet Cultural Institute. It receives abundant propaganda material from the Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.

In Argentina and Brazil there are also significant Slavic minority groups. As in Uruguay, the chief vehicles for Communist influence are the various cultural institutes or "friendship" societies.

In Argentina, for example, there are some 13 Soviet cultural centers. Such centers are used as distribution outlets for propaganda, as agencies for sponsoring travel to and from Communist countries, by "cultural" delegations, and for funding local proCommunist activities.

The satellite countries and Yugoslavia also seek to influence the local emigre groups. In Chile, the Yugoslav group has been cultivated by the Yugoslav Embassy. The Titoist brand of communism has met a, sympathetic response from the Chilean Socialists who form part of the political alliance which includes the Communist Party.

The Chilean-Czechoslovakian Cultural Institute recently renewed its activities, which have included the issuance of propaganda favorable to the establishment of diplomatic relations and expansion of commercial relations with Czechoslovakia, and also the coordination of propaganda work of the pro-Communist Cultural Institutes and Centers in Chile.

Mr. SOURWINE. General, do these Eastern European groups represent a significant anti-Communist influence?

General CABELL. Excuse me just a moment. Senator, you had a question ?

Senator HRUSKA. General, a little while ago I asked about the interaction among the Chinese groups in Latin America and here in America. Would your answer be about the same if I had asked the same question as to the Slovac groups and the other groups that you have just discussed, in regard to their interaction with American groups here?

General CABELL. I think so, but, Senator, please understand that I am not-we, in our agency, are not very expert as to what happens in the United States by these groups. Any information that we would have pointing towards that in the United States we would furnish to the FBI, and they would develop that. I am not familiar with the extent of their development of that activity.

If I may comment very briefly, the Canadian Slavs have been much more active in coordinating with the South American Slavs than the Americans have, to the best of our knowledge.

Senator HRUSKA. But whatever the answer is in that regard, the fact would still remain that there is the avenue of contact and collaboration furnished by visits from the societies and centers in Latin America to Moscow or to Prague

General CABELL. That is correct.

Senator HRUSKA. Or Warsaw?

General CABELL. That is correct.

Senator HRUSKA. Which would be similarly visited by representatives and leaders of the American groups?

General CABELL. That is where they would hold their skull sessions.

Senator HRUSKA. I wanted to establish that connection.

General CABELL. So as to avoid being detected in this country.

Mr. SOURWINE. General, do these Eastern European groups in Latin America represent a significant anti-Communist influence in terms of the national life or policies of those countries?

General CABELL. We would say no, in terms of the national life or policy of any country; they do not represent a significant anti-Communist group.

Mr. SOURWINE. To what extent are the various national Communist Parties aided by the receipt of propaganda literature from abroad?

General CABELL. The quantity and variety of Communist propaganda in circulation is literally enormous, and in Latin America there are some 250 or more Communist publications, including Communist Party theoretical journals, newspapers and youth organs, and including also the publications of labor, youth, student, women, and various professional or cultural fronts.

Increasing emphasis has been placed on developing publications appealing to the intellectuals and the business community in which the Communist inspiration is concealed, or is of a more subtle and more disarming nature, and which tend to offer nationalistic solutions to national problems.

These publications are exchanged within the Latin American area.

In addition, propaganda is received from the Communist movement in other free world countries and the bloc, and from the International Communist headquarters.

Soviet bloc and Chinese Communist radio propaganda beamed at Latin America now amounts to about 85 hours weekly in Spanish and Portuguese, and 21 hours in Polish and other languages.

In recent years, the number of its outlets handling Communist propaganda has increased, and the Soviet Union has moved into the publishing field in Latin America.

For example, Editorial Grijalbo, a Communist publishing house in Mexico City, published two basic Marxist tests in recent years, along with other lesser works.

These are "Historical Materialism" by Konstantinov, and the "Manual of Political Economy," both translated into Spanish in Mexico.

The influence of these books can already be seen.

It may be noted also that "Problems of Peace and Socialism," that is the World Marxist Review, the most important international Communist theoretical journal, has been published in Spanish locally at two points in Latin America, Bogota and Buenos Aires, and in Portuguese in Brazil, in an effort to effect, to insure its dissemination.

Senator HRUSKA. General, you have mentioned the publishing house in Mexico City. I do not know that you would care to comment on it, but repeatedly we hear from various sources that there is a big plant, a big printing plant, printing establishment right outside of Mexico City where the Russians have approximately 800 persons employed and they are turning out Communist propaganda for shipment into Latin American countries.

Would you care to comment on that?

General CABELL. I am unable to identify this plant from your description. Most of the Soviet propaganda, including much that is published in Spanish, is imported to Mexico where it is redistributed through a number of outlets. The translation and publication and distribution effort in Mexico involves a number of firms. We do not have information on the present number of employees of the various publishers and bookstores, but we believe that none employs anywhere near 800 persons. In addition to Editorial Grijalbo, there is also the Talleres Graficos de Libreria Madero S. A. which prints the fortnightly Information Bulletin of the Soviet Embassy and the Embassy's newssheet, which appears 5 days a week. These publications are prepared in the press office of the Soviet Embassy. Another publisher is the Fondo de Cultura Popular, A. C. (Editorial Popular), which is the publishing house and bookstore of the Communist Party of Mexico. The Libreria Nacional is a bookstore reportedly owned by the Mexican Workers' and Peasants Party, a Communist splinter group which is in contact with the CP of the Soviet Union. The Institute of Mexican-Russian Cultural Exchange also runs a bookstore. The regular publication of the Institute, entitled Intercambio Cultural, is printed by the Imprenta Cosmos. The Popular Party of Lomardo Toledano and Workers' University, also run bookstores. The Libreria Navarro, the Editorial Atlante and a number of other bookstores sell Soviet publications or Communist, pro-Communist or leftist publications originating in Latin America. There are also publishers who specialize in material of a strongly Marxist or nationalist nature which is of value to the Communist "national liberation" strategy.

The Latin American Confederation of Labor (CTAL) publishes and distributes its own organ as well as the Spanish language editions of the World Trade Union News and the bulletins of various trade union internationals. It also publishes posters, resolutions, essays, and other propaganda, or training materials. The regular Spanish language edition of the World Federation of Trade Unions' publication, edited by the CTAL, is printed by a firm named Impresiones Modernas.

Mr. SOURWINE. To what extent, sir, have the Communist gains in Latin America given concern to the governments of the Latin American nations, and what can you tell us about the countermeasures these governments have taken?

General CABELL. Although apathy concerning the threat of communism continues to prevail in some Latin American countries, there is evidence that other Latin American governments are becoming more concerned about the Communist threat, and are also more aware of the nature of the clandestine tactics employed by the Communists.

Some governments are increasing the efficiency of their anti-Communist investigative work.

This is required if the illegal aspects of Communist Party operations, which are essential to Communist manipulation of non-Communist leftists and nationalists, are to be rendered ineffective.

The arbitrary suppression of political opposition groups as being Communist or Communist-front groups has been somewhat discredited, and this is essential if the international Communist movement with its Soviet direction is to be accurately identified.

Despite Communist claims, such arbitrary actions have never served our best interests.

Concrete examples of recent governmental action, prompted by increased awareness of the Communist threat, are seen in Argentina and Mexico.

In Argentina, President Frondizi, through executive decrees, has banned certain Communist activities as part of a subversive plan involving collaboration with agents of a foreign power, and jeopardizing national sovereignty.

It will be recalled that in early 1959 Argentina and Mexico both declared several bloc diplomats persona non grata for interfering in internal affairs in connection with labor agitation.

In Venezuela, President Betancourt, an anti-Communist who is aware of the opportunism, as well as the ultimate objectives of the Communist program, has seen to it that the Communist Party is not represented in the coalition government.

Mr. Chairman, that ends my prepared material, and I will be happy to answer what questions your committee would like to put to me.

The CHAIRMAN. Do the Communist Parties in Latin America make it a practice to give financial aid to political stooges so that nonCommunist candidates receive Communist support?

General CABELL. Yes; in the following sense. In a number of countries we have seen that the Communist Party is prepared actively to campaign in favor of strongly nationalistic or opportunistic politicians, with or without open acknowledgment of this support, on the understanding, or assumption, that Communists may win minor posts or be given appointive posts. In some cases, where the Communist Parties are legal, they have been able to form alliances with other parties to support a joint slate, in which some Communist or proCommunist candidates are represented.

It is possible, in some cases, that the Communist Party might reward a politician directly (rather than giving him campaign support only) in return for certain guarantees. In general, however, we believe that such payoffs would not be handled through the Communist Party, but rather through clandestine non-Communist channels of which only a few high Communist Party leaders are aware. It would be poor policy to permit party members to know that funds are available and are being diverted to non-Communist politicians. Thus a variety of covers might be used to explain the financing. For example, a politician might be given an opportunity to participate in an import business, in partnership with a local agent who does business with the Communist bloc. Or a politician, if he has written nationalist books or articles, might be paid for the translation of these articles for republication in some other country-not necessarily in the Soviet bloc, but where it will serve to further the "antiimperialist" campaign. Again, a politician might be influenced by an expensespaid trip to the bloc and payments for subsequent lectures or articles praising conditions there. In all these cases, it is probable that the politician would have to commit himself to some action sympathetic or helpful to the bloc which is used to justify the political support of the local Communist Party.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have information about a reported Communist program to oust U.S. interests from the copper mines in Chile?

General CABELL. It is the great hope of the Communist Party of Chile that such action will be taken. It is an integral part of every Communist program in Latin America to oust U.S. interests from every mine and every petroleum company in Latin America.

The CHAIRMAN. That is true of the tin mines in Bolivia?

General CABELL It goes for anything the United States possesses.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Can you give the names of any known Russian agents operating in Cuba?

General CABELL. We do not have the names currently of any Russian agents, Soviet agents, operating in Cuba, to my knowledge. Do you have in mind Vadim Kotchergin of last May? We have evidence of the visits of Soviet agents in Cuba, but the fact that they are now in residence we do not have that.

The CHAIRMAN. But they do visit the country?

General CABELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that also true of Red Chinese?

General CABELL. We have the record of Red Chinese visiting. Now, whether you would label them as intelligence agents or not is another question.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have evidence of agents of either country operating in other parts of Latin America?

General CABELL. I would give the same answer with respect to the visits.

Now, with respect to whether or not any of them remain in those countries

Senator JOHNSTON. It is not a question of whether they came over here to spread their propaganda or not; we have them coming into the United States, too, even Khrushchev came.

General CABELL. Without specifying cases, we have known of Soviet intelligence activities in Mexico, in Buenos Aires, and Uruguay.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any evidence of the activities of agents from Russia?

General CABELL. Well, I was referring to Soviet espionage carried out through the installations, because the general pattern is, if you have a Soviet Embassy, somebody in there is charged with espionage and clandestinely he gets into operation. Without specifying cases, we have known concretely of Soviet espionage in the countries I have mentioned.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any knowledge of a report that the central committee of the. Spanish Communist Party has been transferred from Mexico City to Havana?

General CABELL. No. The members of the central committee of the Spanish Communist Party are scattered. with the majority-or at least the most important members-resident within the Soviet bloc. The last meeting of the central committee was held within the Soviet bloc. Certain central committee members have lived in Mexico, but we know of none resident in Cuba.

The CHAIRMAN. To what extent can the recent riots in the Canal Zone be attributed to Communist influence?

General CABELL. Mr. Chairman, there is do doubt but what the Communists in Panama have been agitating over the years to get the Americans out of the Canal Zone or in any other way to interfere with our continued operation of the Canal and enjoyment of all of our rights down there.

Certainly, therefore, that agitation played a role in the riots of the last few days in Panama.

We do not know as of this stage, that these particular riots at these particular times and places were directed by or organized by or controlled by any known Communists.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have knowledge

Senator HRUSKA. Would the Chairman yield, and may I follow up on that particular topic?

The CHAIRMAN Yes.

Senator HRUSKA. A little bit ago you suggested that one of the aims of the Communist Party was to affect-that is, to deprive America of anything that she owns or controls in any of the Latin American countries, mines, petroleum fields, and so on.

General CABELL. And the Panama Canal.

Senator HRUSKA. Would that extend to installations like the Panama Canal?

General CABELL. It most certainly does.

Senator HRUSKA. Or Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, and that sort of thing?

General CABELL. It most certainly does.

Senator HRUSKA. So it is not only in the nature of investment fields but military holdings, as well?

General CABELL. Yes.

Senator HRUSKA. Well now, what will be the effect there in Latin America if there is-and this is highly suppositions, if the United States abandons its traditional strong attitude toward the naval base in Cuba, for example, or makes additional concessions in the Panama Canal, what effect will that have on the attitude of Latin American countries toward America?

General CABELL. I am not very much an expert on this subject, but I would say that the question of abandonment per se is not as important as the case that the United States would put up in its insistence upon retention of the base.

If the United States said, "We no longer have a requirement for the base at Guantanamo and, therefore, we are abandoning that base," that is one set of circumstances.

But if the United States said that "We have no alternative but to pick up here and leave because you are forcing us out," I think that latter circumstance would have a disadvantageous bearing upon the United States position in Latin America generally.

Senator HRUSIKA. Let us get to a little narrower field. There has been what amounts to virtual expropriation of American property in Cuba. If that is suffered to remain in that state, is that apt to have the impact on the other Latin American countries to embolden them to similar confiscation of American properties within their borders?

General CABELL. From the standpoint of commonsense and human nature I would answer that in the affirmative, but not on the basis of any evidence that I have in the other country.

Senator JOHNSTON. General, are you familiar with the operation of the Panama Canal?

General CABELL. Yes, Sir.

Senator JOHNSTON. We have a very delicate situation there in regard to Panamanian laborers that we employ there. It is hell if we do and hell if we don't with regard to their pay.

If we go up on the pay and pay them more, then w e will interfere with the economy of tile Panamanians, and if we do not go up they criticize us for not paying them, so since I have to handle that situation, that is the reason I am familiar with it, and we have had a great deal of trouble in that particular field, and it makes no difference what you do, you are cussed; isn't that right?

General CABELL. That is right.

I was stationed in Panama for 3 years a number of years ago, and I know well that situation and I personally do not know the answer to it.

Senator JOHNSTON. No, I do not know either, but it is causing a great deal of trouble there, and it leaves an open field for a great deal of criticism by the Panamanians. It makes no difference what w e do.

General CABELL. Yes, Sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know about the book "Lessons in Reading and Writing" published by the Castro government which is being used in the schools in Cuba?

General CABELL. We have a copy of this book, which is designed primarily for teaching adults. It is being used, for example, in the education classes which the army holds for illiterates.

The book is extremely simple, but nevertheless is strongly nationalistic. In itself, it is neither pro-Communist nor anti-American. It glorifies the revolution and its principal leaders-Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, and "Che" Guevara.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have knowledge of a secret military organization known as Amere, composed of ex-combatants of the Spanish civil war, which is now functioning in Cuba?

General CABELL. No; or not by this title. We are aware of the UCE (Union de Combatientes Espanoles-Union of Spanish Combatants), which is the military group associated with Gen. Alberto Bayo, who trained the nucleus of the Castro guerrilla force. There are other leftist groups also, such as the APLE Agrupacion por la Libertad de España-Group for the Liberty of Spain). Another is the FUDE (Frente Unido Democratico Español-United Spanish Democratic Front), which is closely related to the MLE (Movimiento por la Libertad de España-Movement for the Liberty of Spain). All of these are active in Cuba. There is also a group known as the ARDE (Accion Republicana Democratica Española), with headquarters in Paris, which may have a branch or members in Cuba.

Mr. SOURWINE. Air. Chairman, so that the record may be clear about the Panamanian riots of which the chairman spoke, perhaps it might be desirable to put in the record in connection with that question the New York Times' story about what happened.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be admitted.

(The article referred to reads as follows:)

PANAMA, November 3.-Repeated mob attempts to invade the Canal Zone were broken up this morning by Canal Zone police using clubs, tear gas, and high pressure hoses.

Demonstrators hurled rocks and at least six policemen were treated for contusions. Two youths were arrested. Later, mobs in the city of Panama burned cars, tore down the Stars and Stripes in front of the U.S. Embassy and stoned U.S. agencies.

After 4 hours of rioting, U.S. troops with bayonets and machine guns took over the guarding of the border.

The Panamanian authorities said 30 Panamanians were in a hospital here as a result of today's violence, 9 of them with birdshot wounds inflicted by the U.S. forces and 1 with a bayonet wound.

Violence also was reported in the Panamanian city of Colon, at the Atlantic end of the canal, where the U.S. consulate was attacked.

The demonstrations were in commemoration of the 56th anniversary of PanaIna's independence from Colombia. The clashes occurred in the course of attempts by Panamanians, who described themselves as National University students, to plant the Panamanian flag in the Canal Zone.

The flag invasion was organized by former Foreign Minister Aquilino Boyd to symbolize Panamanian sovereignty over the zone. Dr. Boyd, a candidate for the presidency next year, has also called for Panama to get 50 percent of the Canal tolls.

The first wave of students, bearing a large Panamanian flag, was turned back at 10:21 this morning after marching about 50 feet into the zone.

At the order of the Canal Zone's police chief, Maj. B. A. Darden U.S. policemen in crash helmets and with mob sticks began pushing the crowds back into Panamanian territory.

The crowd mostly youths, sang the Panamanian anthem and then paraded along Tivoli Avenue, which is the border between the zone and the capital city. Five Panamanian National guardsmen accompanied the marchers, keeping them on the Panamanian side.

More than two companies of U.S. troops with bayonets were stationed behind the canal police but did not engage in the action.

Violence broke out shortly after 11 o'clock when a youth apparently of high school age edged too far over. Canal Zone policemen tried to push him back and a scuffle ensued.

When policemen put the youth into a Canal Zone patrol car Panamanians pelted the car and the police with rocks from a rubble heap. Shortly afterward, the canal police began using tear gas and water hoses.

A Panamanian patrol car paused at the riot scene briefly but moved off.

At one point the demonstrators crossed the avenue in the face of tear gas and pressure hoses and tied a flag to a traffic signal post. It was torn down by zone policemen. Another wave of Panamanians advanced to put it up again, but they were driven back.

From the telegraph office near by, which remained open only to correspondents, fires could be seen in two directions. In one direction, automobiles belonging to U.S. citizens were being burned in a parking lot. In another, a passenger car of the U.S.-owned Panama Railroad was being burned in front of its station.

A block away, the plate glass windows of Pan American Airways were being demolished. Farther off, windows of the U.S. Information Service were being stoned.

Acts of vandalism, incendiarism and violence were reported throughout the city, adding up to the worst anti-U.S. outbreak here in memory.

Canal Zone authorities estimated the number of demonstrators and onlookers at the border at 2,000.

The U.S. Embassy said it had presented a note of "strongest protest" to Panama against the desecration of the flag and damage to U.S. property.

It warned that the attacks might have "serious consequences" and demanded protection by the National Guard.

Maj. Gen. William E. Potter, Governor of the Canal Zone, said he had called for U.S. troops after damage had been done to zone property and at least one canal patrol car had been burned. He said he had asked the Embassy to protest against the failure of the Panamanian National Guard to act when the rioting began.

The Governor charged that the Panamanian authorities "did not at any time attempt to control" the attackers. He said the authorities had shown a "strange lack of will." "Much earlier, the authorities could have prevented the attacks," he said. General Potter ordered that the zone radio broadcast a warning for all zone residents to remain in their neighborhoods and not approach the borders, where "agitators" were seeking to provoke incidents.

The U.S. Ambassador, Julian F. Harrington, said angrily that at the time of the attack on the Embassy, he and his staff were in the National Palace "felicitating Panama on its independence."

He added that the flag that had been torn down "was being flown in honor of Panama's independence and, ironically enough, the window display in the ruined showcase of the Information Service was dedicated to Panamanian independence."

Mr. Harrington said he had received word that the U.S. consulate in Colon, Panama, had been attacked. He said he had asked Panama "for adequate protection."

The day's incidents began quietly before 8 a.m. when Dr. Boyd led a party into the zone. He was accompanied in what he termed "a peaceful invasion" by Dr. Ernesto Castillero, Jr., a professor of history at the National University and a leading nationalist.

The group posed with Panamanian flags before the monument to George Washington Goethals, builder of the canal. Then they left.

Pablo Othon, president of the National assembly, who visited the scene of the fighting, said: "I look at this as a very bad thing and not helping anyone."

Under a treaty signed with Panama after she was split off from Colombia in 1903, the United States has a perpetual lease on the 10-mile-wide Canal Zone. The terms give the United States rights "as if" it held sovereignty, which has long been a subject of dispute here.

Senator HRUSKA. General, we had testifying before us in open session some months ago Pedro Diaz Lanz, and he gave testimony respecting indications that Communist military supplies were furnished to the Castro forces.

Can you tell us anything about the extent to which such aid was provided through those sources?

General CABELL. I could not offhand. I have not seen any information indicating such aid was given.

I think our answer there would be that we doubt that any large amounts of arms were provided on any extensive scale or else we would have more evidence of it than we now have. If we had it, it would be in my testimony.

Senator HRUSKA. There was also testimony with reference to submarines, Russian submarines, having been observed in Cuban waters, Caribbean waters and Cuban waters. Can you tell us anything about those?

General CABELL. We have been unable to verify any such reports.

Senator HRUSKA. And part of the testimony was to the effect that certain supplies and equipment -were landed from the submarines. Have you had anything along that line?

General CABELL. We have not.

Senator HRUSKA. This Pedro Diaz Lanz has testified before us here, and I notice he has been arrested down in Florida. Castro has been demanding his extradition.

General CABELL. Yes.

Senator HRUSKA. Have you any comment as to the effect of such extradition, if it. is even considered, let alone granted, upon this whole situation, the Latin American operation of the Communist Party?

General CABELL. Any comment I would make, Senator, would be very highly speculative. I think it would all depend upon the circumstances of his extradition, the extent of the evidence against him here.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any information that this man Diaz dropped a bomb or machinegunned anyone or did anything but drop leaflets?

General CABELL. Of course, the Cuban Government is trying at least to show that he machinegunned or dropped bombs. But there would be a judge or a commission that will hear that evidence.

Mr. SOURWINE. Isn't the tradition of political asylum pretty deeply ingrained in the policies of all the Latin American countries?

General CABELL. Yes, political asylum; but criminal asylum is another matter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, do not the Latin American countries traditionally grant political asylum even in the face of the inevitable charges of criminality which are always brought against such persons?

The CHAIRMAN AN. Even as against Batista.

General CABELL It is pretty complicated in view of the question of when political asylum includes asylum for a man who has assassinated people in the course of his political activity.

Senator HRUSKA. And we are going to run into that. In fact we have encountered that already, because there have been charges by various members of the Castro government, that certain people who are here in the United States were members of the Batista government and with great abandon did mow down people with horse pistols and with machineguns, and so on. And then the question arises at that point, does it not, whether political asylum can be granted or is the record outright criminal? Is it in that regard, Mr. Sourwine, that you ask about the well-ingrained political asylum principle.?

Mr. SOURWINE. I ask about it, because it seems a little bit anomalous that, with this deeply ingrained tradition of political asylum in the Latin American countries, there should be so much concern about political asylum awarded to one Latin American in this country.

Senator HRUSKA. General, Dr. Emilio Nunez Portuondo, formerly President of the Security Council of the United Nations, made a tour of Latin American countries not too long ago, and he came back predicting that a substantial part, if not all, of Latin America will fall to the Communists within 6 or 7 months. Is the situation that immediate? What comment, would you have on that remark of his?

General CABELL. I think that is entirely too alarmist.

On the other hand, the whole thrust of my presentation here to you today has been to the effect that it is a serious situation. But I would not attach any such timetable as he has.

Senator HRUSKA. It impressed most of us as being very, very extreme, and I wondered what your testimony was. Certainly the tenor of your testimony this morning was that it was a much more longrange proposition than that.

Senator JOHNSTON. What is the population of Argentina?

General CABELL. Senator, I would be guessing. I would not like to put a guess in your record.

Mr. SOURWINE. General, does your agency have any knowledge about the present situation of Rafael Del Pino who is an American citizen shot in Cuba or taken into custody?

General CABELL. Del Pino was in prison in Havana as of September 1959. His trial has been delayed due to the injuries he suffered. Our most recent information is that it had been set. for November 20, 1959.

Senator HRUSKA. There was an organization in Cuba referred to as BRAG, Bureau Of Resistance To Communist Activities is a liberal translation of its official name. Is it still functioning?

General CABELL. It is not functioning, Senator. As a matter of fact, one of the first targets of the Castro forces, Castro and his entourage, was the complete destruction of BRAG.

Senator HRUSKA. At least a, removal of its records. We do not know if they were destroyed; do we?

General CABELL. No, sir; there was a very large element of destruction involved in the records.

Senator HRUSKA. And when you said records you refer to

General CABELL. Whatever information BRAG might have assembled on the activities of the Communist Party.

Senator HRUSKA. And those records go back a long way, as long as 30 years?

General CABELL. I doubt if the BRAG had records going back that far. BRAG was established only a few years ago-in 1954 or 1955 although the Communist Party in Cuba was founded over 30 years ago and it is probable that they had some information on it going back that far.

Senator HRUSKA. BRAG had a predecessor of some kind; didn't it ?

General CABELL. Well, there was no office or agency for the investigation of Communist Party and international Communist conspiratorial activities. There were investigative agencies, such as the Department of Investigation, but these were not primarily interested in communism.

The CHAIRMAN. What caused Batista to fall'? Just what happened?

General CABELL. Well, Mr. Chairman, he did not have a sound base for his regime.

The CHAIRMAN. Was his army whipped in the field? Was he deposed by his generals?

General CABELL. The army disintegrated. Its morale just completely disintegrated in the face of the growing numbers in the Castro movement. It became helpless.

Senator JOHNSTON. Did they continue to pay the soldiers?

General CABELL. Essentially; yes. I do not think that it disbanded through lack of pay. That was not it.

Their heart was not in it. They recognized the Batista regime as being corrupt, and they were generally impressed by the slogans that the revolutionaries were putting out, and so they did not have the will to fight or the leaders did not have the courage to attempt to fight, so there really was no fight.

The CHAIRMAN. We received testimony from the President-elect of Cuba, who never took office, that representatives of the American Government in November or December, which was it

Mr. SOURWINE. Sir, I think it was November.

The CHAIRMAN. Called on the generals and stated that our Government would not recognize the election of the new government in Cuba and that, therefore, the Army lost confidence, and that the Army caused Batista to leave the country and attempted to make a deal with Castro.

General CABELL. Are you asking me the question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. If you have any information about it.

General CABELL. Mr. Chairman, there was no such approach made by members of CIA. I do not know whether or not any such approach was made by any Government agencies, but my best belief is that it is incorrect. It did not happen.

And, as a matter of fact, the lack of an army forced him to run, but not the army.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Sir.

But what I got was just the sense of what he said, as I remember it. I think he said the army then caused Batista to leave. They attempted to make a deal with Castro, and each one of those generals was killed.

General CABELL. As a matter of fact, Mr. Chairman, Batista put in arrest several of his principal army leaders before his flight.

Senator HRUSKA. General, Puerto Rico and the Virgin lands are pretty much down in that neighborhood where there is a lot of activity. Has anything come to your attention as to any efforts along subversive lines there along the same approach you have described in other countries?

General CABELL. Senator, we are not knowledgeable or expert in that.

Senator HRUSKA. If there were not any such activities they would have to start someplace and end there. I just wondered if there was anything that came to your attention in connection with the effort that you make.

General CABELL. I do not know of any concerted or organized movement against the Virgin Islands or against Puerto Rico or against U.S. interests in those places, based outside the area.

Senator JOHNSTON. What was Batista's attitude toward the Communists ?

General CABELL. Batista was opposed to the Communists, but without a great depth of feeling.

As a matter of fact, it was in Batista's regime that BRAG was established for the purpose of combating the Communists.

Senator HRUSKA. Might it be said that his opposition to them was that he conceived of them as a political enemy of his own?

General CABELL. That is right. He was not really interested inhe did not hoist aboard the idea of an international Communist movement.

Senator JOHNSTON. Isn't that also true now of Castro? A lot of those were leaders with him against Batista, and he is appointing them in the Government.

General CABELL. But I would say in the case of Batista there was just an unawareness of it. But in the case of many of the leaders around Castro they do not seem to care.

The CHAIRMAN. They cooperate with them.

General CABELL. Yes.

Senator HRUSKA. In connection with Puerto Rico, particularly, we have heard evidence that there were mailings of Communist literature, emanating from presumably Mexico, made into Puerto Rico on a basis not as large as in some other countries, because it is a smaller area, but we do have evidence on that score.

Senator JOHNSTON. We do have evidence that it is coming into the United States, too.

General CABELL. Yes.

Senator JOHNSTON. In New York, if you go up there, you see a room three times as big as this, covered with such mailings.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Gentlemen, we thank you.

General CABELL. It is a pleasure, Mr. Chairman.

(Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the committee adjourned.)