

them in all directions. As many of them were obliged to make their way back to Masaya through a thick underbrush and closely tangled weeds, they could not make much progress, and the allowed our men to commit great havoc among them. As those who were in front were retreating, several canisters were fired upon them, which, bursting among their ranks, caused them much injury.

The position they chose as an ambuscade was a good one for that purpose, and unfortunately, ten of our men were killed in their gallant efforts to drive the enemy back. There were also about forty-five on our side wounded. Fortunately nearly all the wounds were very slight—three or four only were considered dangerous.

There are very few cases on record where men fought with more bravery than did ours on this occasion. Every man who was killed belonged to the Artillery, fell by the side of his gun; and either a most gallant hero, there was scarcely a man who was not from his most advanced position. There are no men in the world who could do better fighting, or exhibit more cool or determined bravery.

It is difficult to give a correct number of the killed on the side of the enemy. Whenever it is possible, they carry their dead off the field with them, and in this instance, while our soldiers were in pursuit of them, they saw several carried off the ground by their companions. Many were also killed by our riflemen at such a distance, while they were retreating, that their bodies might be carried off without much risk. The dead were allowed to remain on the field all night. When the men who were detailed from our party to bury the dead Americans, arrived on the field in the morning, they counted fifty-one of the enemy lying on the road side, close to the bodies of the Americans, and from the indications of the bushes and grass close to them, they supposed a much greater number had been killed.

If we give the enemy the same number of wounded to the proportion of killed on our own side, which is four and a half wounded to one killed, it will be seen that they will have lost in this engagement two hundred and fifty men. But there must have been more killed than this burying party of our own saw, and their proportion of wounded must have been much greater than ours, as our riflemen would scarcely miss some part of a man when permitted to take deliberate aim at the retreating enemy.

The darkness favored the retreat of those who attacked us, and Gen. Walker advanced to the outskirts of the city, where he waited the approach of day to begin the attack. During the night it rained some heavy showers, and, unfortunately, some of the ammunition for our larger guns became damp. Some of the fuse to the shells were also affected by the weather, causing them to burn somewhat slower than ordinarily. This circumstance rendered the artillery less effective than it would have been under more favorable circumstances during the latter part of the fight.

During the night the enemy kept up a fire in the direction of our men, but as they took care to keep a long distance off, their shots, fired at random, did no damage whatever.

As soon as there was light enough to distinguish objects at a distance, our men were on the move. It was ascertained that the enemy occupied the church in the plaza which had been taken by us in our first attack upon Masaya, and that the avenues to it were well barricaded. Gen. Walker having possession of a rising ground, which commanded both the plaza and the church, began the attack by throwing shells into it. Under the fire of these, the Second Rifle Regiment, led on by Major Cayce, and accompanied by Col. E. J. Sanders, and in a few minutes they had routed the enemy and gained possession of both church and plaza without the loss of a man. He was by this movement put in possession of the whole of the upper part of the city, and was in such a position that he could carry on his operations at leisure in whatever way he chose against the enemy.

Here, along with the provisions he had taken with him, he found an abundance of excellent food, which included fresh beef of good quality, chickens, turkeys, fresh eggs, pork, cheese, &c., as well as a plentiful supply of good water. As our men had been under arms all night, and had taken but little rest since they left Granada, they were here permitted to regale themselves before they began the heavy business laid out for them.

The chief strength of the enemy was, of course, known to be in the large church, which stood in the centre of the large plaza, and to this point all our force began to cut a passage. The first day the church in the upper plaza served as a basis for our operations; but as our force was small, and it would not be safe to give it a great extension, the church was abandoned by all except a guard for quarters still nearer the enemy.

Gen. Walker ascertained before he was long at Masaya, a correct account of the forces of the enemy: they amounted in all to fifteen hundred men. After the first day he could not bring a force exceeding two hundred men against them.

When Gen. Walker started from Granada, the force at Masaya was between five and six hundred men, but the day after he reached that city they were reinforced by about five hundred Guat-malans.

In fact, some of the prisoners which were taken stated that the enemy amounted to nearly three thousand men, and the majority seemed of opinion that there could not be less than two thousand; but these people are so ignorant that they have little or no idea of numbers. None of the prisoners, however, gave a lower estimate than we place before our readers.

Their superior force enabled them to attempt to surround us. Their first attempt was so correctly anticipated, and so promptly met, that they did not again attempt it during the remainder of the three days we remained giving them battle.

Their first flanking movement was made by a body of the enemy, which probably exceeded five hundred. They made a very vigorous attack, but were promptly met by a portion of the First R.R.s, under Lieut. Col. O'Neil, and a part of the artillery under Major Schwartz. The enemy, after persistent efforts, were driven back, with a loss of some eighty killed and wounded. Our loss in this case was some two men killed and eight wounded. Major Schwartz, assisted by Capt. Farrand, of the artillery, behaved so gallantly that Gen. Walker promoted the former a colonel on the field, and the latter a major.

The necessity of keeping his small force concentrated as he continued to advance, and the number of men necessary to hold the church in his rear if it should be attacked, as well as the danger of having such a stronghold in his rear if it should by any accident fall into the hands of the enemy, determined him in setting it on fire, and thus destroying it.

This mode of defence had been already adopted by the enemy; they burned two houses before the church had been fired by the Americans.

It appeared that the enemy will not, under any circumstances, attack our men unless sheltered by thick adobe walls. As our force was comparatively small, much of it could not be spared to remain idle in defending the rear, and as an open space was of itself sufficient protection, Gen. Walker ordered the houses in his rear to be burned. By this, if the enemy advanced he could meet them on a fair field, where American bravery was certain of a triumph. The result justified the action. When there were no more walls to crouch behind there were no more attempts at an outflankment.

The enemy, on the third day, made a charge in a large body to capture a mortar battery which Gen. Hennessy had erected, and which was evidently giving them much annoyance. The number appeared to be about three hundred. They were resisted only by two companies of the rifles and fifteen volunteers from the Hacienda department. Our men stood firm until they came up quite close, and then poured into them a well directed volley. They broke in confusion, and did not attempt another regular charge while our men remained at Masaya. In this charge we had only one man killed.

The enemy had been ever since the former battle at Masaya, fortifying and strengthening every spot available for a stand; hence nearly every house was of itself a citadel in miniature, from which it was necessary to drive them before the Americans could take possession; and the very places which our men had formerly gained at the point of the bayonet had now to be taken in the same manner.

But the impetuosity of our soldiers was irresistible. During three entire days they continued to advance from house to house and from square to square, without being once obliged to yield an inch of what they had conquered, until they succeeded in getting into the main plaza, and forced the enemy to take shelter in the large church and in the buildings at the extreme end of the city.

Several times during the third day the officers begged Gen. Walker to permit them to lead their men in a charge at the large edifice; but this he would not by any means permit. He was anxious to save his men, and felt assured that the same result could be accomplished by sheltering them out of it; and it is most remarkable that so well were his measures taken and so effectively, but safely did he work that there were only three Americans killed during the three days' fighting in the city; while on the other hand, the bodies of the enemy were strewn about in all directions, and this, too, when they put forth their utmost efforts to carry off their dead.

So great at length became the stench of the decomposing bodies that some of our men began to sicken. Even the burning of the houses did not purify the air sufficiently to render it endurable. All our dead were buried. It would have occupied the entire time of a large portion of our men to inter the remains of those who had fallen beneath their well directed fire; and as their energies were put forth in rather anguishing, thus lessening the evil, the stench continued to get so much worse that it became insupportable. If in the morning the large church was taken by us, many lives might have been lost in gaining it, and if the army remained there another day so as to take time to shell the enemy out, an equal number might be carried off by disease. Under these circumstances it was adjudged best to draw off the forces, and as it happened in almost a like manner at Rivas, at low Providence to complete the battle the Americans had so vigorously begun and so bravely maintained.

By remaining to take possession of the place, General Walker would also have lost valuable time, which was probably necessary to secure the integrity of the Transit road. The distance between Virgin Bay and Masaya is so great that intelligence of what was going on in the former place could not reach him, until the force under Colonel Sanchez might have been in need of assistance, if the enemy, who had been beaten a few days previously, had rallied around the strong point of Rivas, which they knew next about that time have reached the vicinity of Rivas.

The enemy made three distinct attacks upon us—the ambuscade on the first night, the attack on our rear, the second day, and the charge upon a mortar battery. Each of those attacks were made by different sets of men, under different officers; and it is worthy of remark that the same body never attacked us twice. They were no doubt always so badly beaten that they could not be again brought against us. On the second, Lieut. Col. O'Neil shot the leader and captured his horse. His spurs and stirrups were of solid silver, and worth nearly \$300. He was dressed in good style, and was evidently possessed of much bravery. The man he led were, however, almost entirely naked.

Between the hours of 8 and 9 on the evening of Tuesday, the 13th inst., the order was passed along the American lines to prepare for a retiring to Granada. The night was dark, although the stars shone clearly, and many of the men were sleeping, after the fatigue of the day. When awakened and commanded to "fall in" to their companies, they did so with the utmost cheerfulness, in the expectation that they were to be led in a night attack against the church in the large plaza—the strength of the enemy.

As the Americans passed by where the first fight happened the dead of the enemy remained yet unburied. The stench was almost beyond endurance, and was distinctly perceptible for a distance of nearly five miles. Some companies did not appear to be aware that they were marching back to Granada until they had advanced some miles upon the road; and when made aware of the direction in which they were moving, they expressed much disappointment that a certain victory was thus

snatched from them at the very moment they were about to clutch it.

As an evidence of the entire prostration of the enemy, it may be stated that they neither endeavored to impede our march nor attack our rear. Our men marched the entire distance with as little fear of being disturbed as if there was not an enemy within one hundred miles. Everything was also brought back in good order. We brought back our cannons, mortars, howitzers, ammunition, horses, mules, and all our sick and wounded men. The army which had left Granada on the 15th re entered it on the 19th, with a large brass band playing lively airs at their head, their colors flying gaily at their fronts, and, save the indications of having travelled on a muddy road, appeared in as good spirits as when they took their departure.

GRANADA DURING THE FIGHTS.

The spiritlessness of the Americans in this country was well illustrated the past fortnight by the manner in which they volunteered to do garrison duty, in the absence of the major part of the troops at Virgin Bay and at Masaya. There were some four hundred and fifty soldiers left here as a garrison, while the other part of the force was engaged with the enemy in various parts. Some of the soldiers left here were unfit for active service, but the interests of the city were not on this account neglected. The citizens enrolled themselves into a volunteer corps, and stood guard as regulars. Brig Gen. Fry was in command, and probably his suavity of manner did much toward getting men to thus come forward to perform what they considered their duty.

OUR LATE BATTLES.

[From El Nicaraguense, Nov. 22.]

The courage and daring displayed by Americans in their attack upon Masaya, on the 12th of last October, when, with a force of only about one half of the enemy, they succeeded in driving them from point to point and from house to house, until they were so completely hemmed in that one more hour's fighting would have driven them completely out of their stronghold; the desperate defence of undisciplined Americans in Granada, where 150 men resisted successfully the combined attack of an allied force of 1,200 men, and the cunning of secret enemies, for twenty one hours; the routing of the enemy on the Transit route by Brigadier General Hornsby, with a force not equal in numbers to a fifth part of the enemy, on the 10th inst.; and the complete triumph of our soldiers upon the same ground, under General Walker, on the 19th—two days afterwards—where, with about four hundred men, he put to a complete rout 1,200 of the opposing force, will make an epoch in the history of American bravery and valor.

There are but few instances in history where a force of men, however well trained in war, marched against an enemy three or four times their own number, strongly fortified, and succeeded in not only driving them from their outposts, but putting them to a complete rout.

All past experience serves to prove that a small party behind entrenchments are equal to many times their number, if they possess ordinary courage, and that in some instances a mere handful of men have kept in check for months and years whole armies of brave men.

Where a small number have overcome large bodies it has been usually in the open field. Here bravery has a fair opportunity to distinguish itself, and superior generalship may be displayed. It was in an open field fight that General Taylor beat treble his numbers of Mexicans; it was in field fights that Napoleon Bonaparte established his fame, and vindicated the honor and valour of France. But Napoleon failed before the comparatively insignificant town of Jean d'Acce, because here, instead of men, he was obliged to contend against stone walls and other fortifications. Whenever it came to a fight in the open field the British and French soldiers beat the Russians; but the Russians behind walls were, apparently, invincible. It has not unfrequently happened that a besieging force of ten times the number of those besieged have failed in their attempts, and this, too, oftentimes when aided by a powerful fleet. Nearly all the records of the past show that one man behind a wall is, under circumstances, nearly equal to three who would attack him there, and that in the majority of instances an attacking party should be larger than the party attacked.

Now the reverse of all this has been the case with Americans in Nicaragua. Here small forces have attacked large bodies of men in strongly entrenched positions more frequently, and with greater success, than was ever before achieved. Here the smaller force has always acted on the offensive, and the larger on the defensive. Here, contrary to all precedent, the smaller forces having invariably succeeded in driving the larger from their entrenchments.

In the United States the battle of Buena Vista was looked upon as one of the most severe tests of American courage. Even England caught up the strain, and felt complimented that they could claim relationship with people as brave as the Americans; while Europe applauded and acknowledged the military spirit and daring of our people. But Buena Vista was an open field, and men were met by men only.

Americans have surpassed themselves in this country. They have not only vanquished relatively greater numbers, but they have done it when the enemy were shielded against their open attacks. The soldiers of Central America have never but twice attacked the Americans in Nicaragua—once at Virgin Bay and once at Granada. At Virgin Bay 750 attacked 120, the fight lasted only about an hour; the attacking party were driven back with great loss. The other was the late attack upon this city, of which the world knows the result.

Now, when we consider that in each of the instances mentioned above the attacking force was vastly superior to the force attacked, and was repulsed with great loss, and that wherever the Americans have attacked the enemy they have been successful with forces much inferior numerically, the difference of the material of the two armies will be at once apparent. The Americans here fight as if engaged in an arena, under the immediate view of the whole world, and the bravery they display is worthy at once the object for which they are contending and the admiration of all mankind.

The day is not far distant when the late engagements of Americans in this country will be pointed to as surpassing Buena Vista, or Alma, or Inkermann, and paralleled only by the defence of Leonidas with his 300 Spartans, against the hosts of Xerxes, or others of the most remarkable feats of arms in ancient or modern times.

The Nicaraguan army is already spoken of wherever bravery is admired. Its feats are already upon the tongues of the young, chivalrous and daring of North America and the nations of Europe, and before many weeks elapse many of the bold and adventurous soldiers of fortune who have been already engaged in European wars will come to this country, where fame and honor are open to all, and where courage, being appreciated, never goes unrewarded.

The humblest soldier in the ranks of the Nicaraguan army has a brighter future before him than is opened to the officers of the majority of armies. Scarcely a fight takes place that several are not taken from the ranks and invested with a commission, nor does any person distinguish himself without being rewarded. We have now several field officers who were less than one year ago serving in the ranks, and nearly one-half of the intermediate grades have but a few months since served as private soldiers. It was an army constructed on this principle that made Napoleon invincible, and that will ultimately place Gen. Walker at the head of the bravest men in the world.

THE ALLIED MODE OF WARFARE IN NICARAGUA.

[From El Nicaraguense, Nov. 22.]

The world was, not long since, startled with the proclamation that the governments of Guatemala and San Salvador were, in the goodness of their hearts, about to send a large force against the Americans in Nicaragua to drive them back to their homes in the North. Proclaiming themselves, with loud voices, the champions of right and the defenders of the weak and unprotected, they denounced us as freebooters and pirates, whose extermination would be equal to an especial act of grace for all the world, and marched against us, bringing a force which is, numerically, at least four times stronger than the entire number of Americans in Central America.

They met with no material opposition, they marched boldly on until they came to Leon, in this State, where they were, no doubt, hospitably received. There, as we were informed by Mr. Manning's letter, some three months ago they fortified themselves and prepared for a siege. This brilliant manoeuvre no doubt served to amuse the credulous Leonese, but it became apparent that the great object these chivalrous gentlemen had in coming to Nicaragua was to get something to eat and wear.

When the alternative was presented to them to advance or retire, they chose the former, and in the very first place which afforded them food and water they again pitched their tents, and would still, in all probability, have remained there, were it not that about the time their supplies ran short, Gen. Walker, in order to induce them to draw nearer, ordered his outposts to fall back on Granada. This induced them to come as close as Masaya—some fifteen miles.

We cannot state positively what their ideas were in fencing themselves in there, were it not they were laboring under the delusion that they were thus besieging Granada. This immense display of stratagem ability, must assuredly be appreciated by the people who are interested in the struggle in this country for freedom. They must also admire the valor of the thousands who, with the resources of two States at their back, and the duty to perform of fulfilling great promises, sat down and entrenched themselves, as if in dread of a few hundred Americans.

They started with the avowed purpose of driving the Americans out of this country, and when they came within a day's march of where they were, quietly settled down and waited to be driven out themselves. This sitting down and waiting to be attacked is the only thing they have done since the war began. It is true they advanced upon Granada, but they were under the impression at the time that there was no person in it, except a few sick, whom they calculated upon slaughtering. When they went to Rivas, instead of attacking the few Americans who were in that vicinity, they began to fortify and await an attack, and when upon the Transit road they dare not advance to either end—a distance of only six miles—but pitched their tents and awaited there until the Americans went and drove them from their position.

If this is to be their settled policy—if they will not, under any circumstances, advance upon positions where they have reason to suppose Americans are stationed, it may, we think, be set down as settled that by this mode of warfare considerable time will elapse before they succeed in driving the Americans out of Nicaragua.