pages 133-138

I accepted a position in the Cuban government in 1959 because I believed the revolution offered an opportunity for changing the political, economic, and social structure of Cuba. This structure had encouraged administrative corruption and facilitated the abuse of power and the loss or adulteration of human rights. Because of it, our economic development was retarded and the problem of chronic unemployment became insoluble. The old way of government sheltered an inequitable distribution of wealth and income; it left valuable resources untapped; it led to the demoralization of the people and a growing disrespect for the law; it perverted consciences and turned the administration of justice into a farce.

Cuba's ills were not caused by a sanguinary dictator's occasional seizure of power, by a demagogic and corrupt politician's tenure of office, or by the presence of dishonest persons in the personnel of the public administration. These phenomena were merely symptoms of a structural malady that had to be torn up by the very roots. It was the whole structure that demanded change. And, when these changes would be made, Cuba would be rid of judges who made a mockery of the law, labor leaders who looked after only their own personal interests, and businessmen who prospered from unfair economic privileges.

Agrarian ownership had to be altered to permit the development of unused resources. We had to give every fanner the chance to purchase his own land. A reform of the tax system was needed to stimulate economic development, decrease tax evasions, and put an end to undue privilege. A more equitable distribution of income was needed to broaden opportunities, provide aid for the dispossessed, and extend the benefits of the state to all citizens throughout the island. Electoral procedures had to be changed if we were to have both honest voters and honest public officials. It was necessary to base the selection of government employees exclusively on merit. The democratization of political parties and labor associations was imperative. A system of checks and balances among the three branches of government had to be created. Among several other revisions, it was of primary importance to institutionalize the relations between the government and the churches, the press, business, labor, the police, and the military forces so that the protection of the state would not be subject to personal favor and the enforcement of the law would not become an instrument of terror.

On March 9, 1952, these reforms were slowly under way. Out of the elections set for June 1, 1-952, a better state might have emerged in the hands of Carlos Hevia or Roberto Agramonte. But the "garrison revolt" that brought Batista to power on March 10, 1952, cut short the process of reform. The revolution, which forced Batista to flee Cuba on January 1, 1959, again opened up the door to these much-needed reforms. The revolutionary government bad a moral obligation to carry out the institutional changes that the interests of our country required and to bar the way against the return of either another cruel dictator or more corrupt politicians.

The revolution of 1959 set out to attain these goals; the public gave wholehearted support. The people wished to see the revolution strengthen the right of private property, implement democratic processes, and maintain good relations with the U.S. and the West. Castro did not. Castro, betraying the people, established socialism, dictatorship, and an alliance with the Soviet bloc. Because of Castro's betrayal, true revolutionaries have fought him. Because of Castro's betrayal, Cuba will one day free itself of Castro.

But counterrevolution is another matter, if we define counterrevolutionaries as those who combat Castro only because he confiscated their ill-acquired properties, or made them leave Cuba for fear of being tried for their crimes, or took away their privileges, or did not appoint them to public office. These counterrevolutionaries attack Dr. Felipe Pazos because he arranged to have the bank vaults opened to confiscate stolen booty; attack Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo because he informed of the conspiracy they hatched with Trujillo; attack the people who fight Castro while upholding the aims of the revolution. Such counterrevolutionaries accuse President Kennedy or Munoz Marin of Communism and paint the U.S. State Department "pink." These persons who make no sacrifice to liberate Cuba; they feel that Castro should he overthrown by the U.S. Marines. These counterrevolutionaries do not believe in democracy; to them, the Cuba of yesterday was perfect. They want it to be restored intact.

The only enemies the revolutionary government had until March 10, 1959, were followers of Batista and assassins in the pay of Batista. At that date, they were joined by other persons affected by the law lowering rents on housing, and later by petty politicians when Castro announced the postponement of political activities. When the Agrarian Reform Law was enacted in May 1959, the number of persons touched adversely by the revolutionary process increased. So did the ranks of the "counterrevolution." At this time, with the acquiescence or complicity of Castro, the Communists began their attack on the genuine revolutionaries of the government. (Roberto Agramonte and I soon became their preferred targets.)

Rafael Trujillo had extended his protection from the beginning to the first counterrevolutionaries from Cuba. A personal secretary of Batista's tells in his book, Los dos culpables, how Trujillo promised immediately 5,000 Dominican troops to the Cuban ex-dictator to overthrow Castro and return Batista to power. Trujillo was not alone: After agrarian reform began in Cuba, certain public and private forces in the U.S. joined overtly or covertly in these counterrevolutionary efforts.

The counterrevolutionaries I have described made the mistake of believing that any person personally dissatisfied with Castro or the Cuban government would join their forces. When they sought to associate themselves with the Cuban revolutionary groups Castro had excluded from positions of importance in the government, they were caught in a trap.

It is interesting to observe that Castro has made a somewhat similar mistake. He thought that when genuine Cuban revolutionaries turned against him they would have to join the counterrevolution. That has not occurred. And he has not been able to attack them effectively as counterrevolutionaries. As a consequence, the so-called counterrevolution against Castro every day becomes weaker. The true revolutionary fight-against Castro Communism I believe is every day stronger.

The first military attempt of the false counterrevolution came to its farcical end in August 1959. Planes flying from Santo Domingo came to earth in Cuba in an airport surrounded by forces loyal to the revolutionary government and under the leadership of Major William Morgan, the American later executed by Castro, and of Gutierrez Menoyo. The last of the conspirators were taken at a fake clandestine meeting staged by Gutierrez Menoyo. There was a trial, and one of the prisoners accurately summed up the famous "Trujillo invasion" when be declared to the military court: "I should not be judged as a conspirator but as an imbecile for participating in this counterrevolution."

The plotting against the revolutionary government began as early as March 1959, less than three months after Batista fled to the Dominican Republic and the "warm embrace" of his fellow dictator, the late Rafael Trujillo. Cubans then in Miami and elsewhere in the U.S. no doubt raised some of the money (much of it stolen from the people of Cuba during the Batista dictatorship), and discussed Castro's overthrow, at the time the revolutionary government and Castro's popularity in Cuba and in the free world were tremendous.

They were not alone in their imbecilities. Trujillo was ready at once to place back into Cuba the hopelessly rejected Batista, who had lost the backing of virtually every Cuban on the island. And, as I hinted above, there were North Americans who shared the hopes of the counterrevolutionary exiled rich Cubans of Miami and the hopes of Trujillo.

In March 1959 there was incorporated in the state of Florida the Double Checker Corporation, a cover for the CIA in the employment of American pilots for the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion a year later. At this time, Cuban counterrevolutionaries in the U.S. were allowed to plot in safety. It is conceivable that the Double Checker was also involved in the ridiculous "Trujillo invasion."

Gutierrez Menoyo and Major William Morgan were contacted by Batista's people. The approach made to these two men was of this nature: "You have been neglected by Fidel, after all you did for him in the struggle against Batista! He ignores you. But we will give you money and the aid of Trujillo and the U.S. to remove Castro!"

Behind this argument was the assumption that money interested Morgan and Gutierrez Menoyo more than the revolution. But Morgan and Gutierrez Menoyo were completely loyal to Fidel in March 1959, and they reported everything to him. Castro told them to go ahead in the plot until the time came to smash it. Morgan went to Miami in May 1959 and was given $70,000 in cash, which he gave to the revolutionary government.

Trujillo's role in the plot was to furnish men and planes. A certain Father Posada, a Spaniard close to Trujillo, came to Havana from the Dominican Republic and established himself in a hotel. Castro had his suite wired, and his talks with Gutierrez Menoyo and Morgan were recorded. Fidel followed the plot with interest and glee. Finally Castro, Morgan, and Gutierrez Menoyo decided to use the Cuban city of Trinidad and its airport as the trap; they established a radio contact with Trujillo and invited him to send a planeload of Dominican army officers to "the rebel base" from which Castro was to be destroyed. Trujillo, the master plotter, fell for all this. His officers came, saw the base and city in the hands Of 2,000 "rebels," and reported favorably to their master.

Gutierrez Menoyo later told of a conversation he had with Trujillo by short-wave radio: "We hold Trinidad and the airport," Trujillo was informed. "We are ready to begin and we will win." Trujillo was delighted. "What do you need?" he asked. "More planes, machine guns, etc.," was the reply.

"And what else?"

Finally Gutierrez Menoyo confessed to a request he was afraid to make. Trujillo urged him to make it: "Go ahead, tell me. You deserve the best." And the Cuban spoke into the radio: "Well, with your permission, Generalissimo, I always have admired your uniform, with the medals and the tri-cornered hat. I would like to enter Havana in a uniform like that. But I feel too ashamed to ask for it, though it is something I would like very much to have." Trujillo then asked for the Cuban's measurements and took note of them, promising to have a uniform made and sent to Cuba. But before it could arrive, the plotters were caught by Castro. They were sentenced to prison.

Trujillo had absurdly demanded that he be given the country villa of Miguel Angel Quevedo, editor of Bohemia magazine, as the price for his help. At the end of August 1959, Quevedo gave a fiesta in honor of Gutierrez Menoyo, Morgan, and II Frente Nacional del Escambray. Castro did not attend. Dorticos, Raul, and his friends remained apart conspicuously aloft during the festivities. Everyone wore Trujillo hats made of paper.

The "counterrevolution" was defeated, not by Castro, but 'by the people of Cuba, first on January 1, 1959, and again at this time. The tactical blunders of certain American intelligence agents gave it another temporary lease on life at the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961. But every day it becomes more evident that only a revolutionary battle can liberate Cuba and prepare it for the future. This, I believe, will take place, and sooner than most observers believe. I give my detailed views on this subject in the Appendix to this book.