Castro's Moles Dig Deep, Not Just Into Exiles
By Tim Weiner
WASHINGTON, Feb. 29 - No one should have been shocked
when a trusted pilot for Brothers to the Rescue, the anti-Castro organization
whose planes were shot down last week, showed up on Cuban television denouncing
the group as a tool of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Cuba's spy service has infiltrated the exile groups
of Miami for more than 30 years, compromising and sometimes controlling
their work. The chief of operations of one of the most militant groups
secretly reported to Fidel Castro for a decade. Dozens of Cubans
recruited by the CIA during the cold war were double agents in the pay
of Havana and Moscow. Some may still be.
Cuba might be a poor, politically isolated island
whose people scrape by on rice, beans and slogans. But its spy service
is "one of the most sophisticated, agile and effective" in the world, in
the words of Juan Armando Montes, a retired United States Army special-forces
colonel. It is a particularly sharp thorn in the side of the CIA,
which has been bedeviled and bamboozled by Mr. Castro, his agents and double
agents ever since the Bay of the Pigs fiasco in 1961 - an operation fatally
compromised by infiltrators.
Hundreds of spies from Cuba's Direccion General
de Inteligencia, the D.G.I, live and work in the United States, according
to former members of the Cuban service who have defected. They operate
as diplomats and cab drivers, dealers of guns and drugs and information.
They thrive in embassies - a sizable contingent of the Cuban delegation
to the United Nations do cloak-and-dagger work, United States officials
say - and in the bars and restaurants of the Little Havana section of Miami.
Among their ranks, United States officials believe,
was Juan Pablo Roque, the dashing pilot who defected - or rather, re-defected
- to Cuba from the ranks of Brothers to the Rescue.
"One has to assume that he is a Cuban agent," Under
Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff said of Mr. Roque. He was also an
informer for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which paid him $6,720
for inside information on Cuban exiles. In this classic double agent
scheme, Cuban intelligence used Mr. Roque to manipulate the F.B.I, to try
to gain insight into the bureau's operations and to undermine the exile
groups. Incidentally, the CIA flatly denies any present-day ties
to the members of Brothers to the Rescue.
Mr. Roque is far from the first member of a Cuban
exile group to suddenly reveal his links to Havana. The Cuban intelligence
service, which reports to Defense Minister Raul Castro, Fidel's brother,
has infiltrated the exile groups and United States Government agencies
with notable success.
Take the case of Jose Rafael Fernandez Brenes, who
jumped ship from a Cuba merchant vessel in 1988 and quickly landed a Federal
job. From 1988 to 1991, he helped set up and run TV Marti, the United
States Government-financed station that beams anti-Castro information and
propaganda at Cuba. The Cuba Government jammed TV Marti's signal
the moment it went to the air in March 1990 - thanks in no small part to
the frequencies and technical data supplied by Mr. Fernandez Brenes.
Then there was Francisco Avila Azcuy, who ran operations
for Alpha 66, one of the most violent anti-Castro exile groups, all the
while reporting secretly to the FBI and Cuban intelligence. Mr. Avila
planned a 1981 raid on Cuba, telling both the FBI and the D.G.I. all about
it. His information helped convict seven members of Alpha 66 for
violating the Neutrality Act by planning an attack on a foreign nation
from United States soil. He also informed on the personal lives and
tastes of 40 top anti-Castro leaders.
The most disturbing news about Cuban spies came
from Maj. Florentino Aspillaga, a D.G.I. officer who defected to the United
States in 1987. He contended that most, if not all, of the Cuban
agents recruited by the CIA from the mid-1960's onward were doubles - pretending
to be loyal to the United States while working in secret for Havana.
Four years later, CIA analysts and counterintelligence officers glumly
concluded the major was telling the truth.
This meant not only that much of what the agency
knew about Cuba was wrong, but also that a great deal of what Cuba knew
about the CIA was right.
The agency long ago cut its ties to most of the
Cuban exiles in Miami. But the legacy of the Bay of Pigs, when the
agency sent thousands of Cubans off in a doomed plot to overthrow Mr. Castro,
lives on in the exile groups still trying to finish that mission.