DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE POUCH CONFIDEN TIAL (Security Classification) FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH Chis Centr 112 FROM AMEMBASSY, HABANA DESP, NO Document 9, 1955 ugust. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON. TO REF Must DEPT ACTION 0 5 011-10 N AC For Dept. F OTHER REC'D Be Use Only 8 Returned Jeint Weeka Ne. 32 for State, Army, SUBJECT: Nam 6022300 Departments from SANA. 2 On Augustor

(UNCLASSIFIED) ARMS SEIZURES. On August 4, and again on August 5, the authorities seized and stantial caches of clandestine arms in Havana. Between the two caches the arms included the following: 44 M-1 carbines; 33 assorted rifles; 31 Johnson automatic rifles; 22 submachine guns; 34 machine guns, including three of 50 caliber; 11 antitank rifles; three trench mortars; some pistols; hand grenades; blasting powder and caps; and ammunition for the weapons. Between 20 and 25 persons were arrested in connection with the seizures. Search for possible additional caches continues.

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The authorities charged that the arms were intended for immediate use by supporters of ex-President Carles PRIO Socarrás, headed by Aureliano SANCHEZ Arango, Eufemio FERNANDEZ Ortega, and Jesús GONZALEZ Cartas ("El Extraño"). According to the official version, attempts were to be made against President BATISTA and other government figures, as well as against opposition elements, including even Prio himself with whose scheduled return from exile some of his insurrectionary followers were not in agreement.

(OFFICIAL USE ONLY) <u>Comment</u>. These two arms seizures coincided most opportunely with the date (August 6) on which Prie was to have arrived in Havana. Hence, they might be regarded as a frameup to create tension facilitating repressive measures in connection with his arrival. However, it is the Embassy's impression that the finds were legitimate. Their existence is no cause for surprise in view of the practical certainty of the introduction of clandestine arms into the country.

The efficial charge regarding the plans of Sanchez Arange et al. may of course be true but the Embassy has no independent information to confirm it.

(UNCLASSIFIED) <u>Ex-President Prie Pestpenes Return</u> Meet Cubans received with surprise the news that ex-Fresident Gank Prie Secarrás, enly a <u>few hours before his scheduled arrival</u> <u>ECFornes Lr/mgw</u> <u>CONFIDENTIAL</u>

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in Habana en August 6, had postponed his return from exile. The announcement of his decision to remain in Miami for the present, as released by "Teny" VARONA, the head of the Prio Autentices, blamed "the tension existing in the country as a consequence of the finding of arms and the continuous persecutions and searches" which created an atmosphere "unpropitious" for the ex-President's return. Prie was also reported as saying that he wished to avoid the "violence and bloodshed" which might develop upon his arrival in Cuba. He insisted that his return was only postponed and not abandoned.

After his first incredulity, President Batista expressed regret at Prie's decision, saying that in Cuba under his government Prie would have "greater security and guarantees" than anywhere else in the world. Batista also suggested that, had Prio actually come back, he might have reason to fear not the government so much as his own associates who were dissatisfied with his announced decision to return and abandon insurrection for peaceful political activities.

(LIMITED OFFICIAL USE) Comment. Right up to his eleventhhour change of mind, Prio had repeatedly insisted on his determination to return, spurning "government guarantees", proclaiming his reliance solely on the "guarantees of public backing", reportedly declaring himself willing to return even "under gunfire", and building up his imminent presence in Cuba as an important factor in reestablishing democracy. There is ne doubt that the fanfare attending his proposal placed him more preminently before the public than at any time since his overthrew in 1952.

New, however, he is open to the accusation of cowardice, of having perpetrated a vast hear on the Cuban people, or at least of indecision and vacillation. His brave words came to nothing and his eventual return, if he does come back in the near future, will be in the nature of an anticlimax.

Prio's announced reasons for changing his mind are not entirely impressive. The finding of arms caches just prior to his scheduled arrival and increased activity by the authorities arising therefrom do not substantially change the status que The presence of clandestine arms in the country surprises ante. ne one. Furthermore, with or without arms finds and arrests, it should have been as obvious to Prio as to anyone else that it was quite possible for trouble to develop out of his return. from either over-enthusiastic or het-headed followers. It is hard not to suspect that the arms seizures brought home forcibly to Prio the unabated insurrectionary determination of some of

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his associates or other elements and made him realize that he might run a greater risk than he thought in returning to Cuba

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(UNCLASSIFIED) PRIO FOLLOWER COMES OUT OF HIDING. On August 1, Diege Vicente TEJERA Rescalvo, accused with others of complicity in a Prio-inspired terroristic plot (see Weeka No. 26), came out of hiding and presented himself to the Shief of the Military Intelligence Service (SIM). According to reports the interview between the two was more cordial than otherwise. Thereafter Tejera visited the Urgency Court where he was informed that there was no arrest order out against him and where he placed himself at the disposition of the Court to appear when called to testify in any case in which he is involved.

Tejera teld reporters that he had returned clandestinely to Cuba in February 1955, disguised as a sailer. He also said that he had abandened revolutionary activity as a failure and that he had come out in the open as an act of party discipline in view of Prio's announced intention of abandoning exile and returning to Cuba.

(OFFICIAL USE ONLY) <u>GOVERNMENT NOT TO ACT ON CTC BAN</u> <u>AGAINST SUGAR SHIPMENTS IN SYMPATHY WITH STRUCK LOUISIANA</u> <u>REFINERIES.</u> Officials of the Cuban-American Sugar Mills Company were informed by the Minister of Labor that he was closing his eyes to the ban declared by the Confederation of Cuban Workers (CTC) against shipment of raw sugar to the Company's United States refineries (see Weeka No. 30). The CTC action was taken in support of strikers at the Godchauz and Colonial refineries of the Company in Louisiana. The Minister said the ban had been imposed at the request of the CIO and that the government was following this policy out of gratitude for CIO and AFL cooperation with Cuba in the matter of sugar legislation in the United States Congress.

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(CONFIDENTIAL) FURTHER DATA ON MAGAZINE EXPLOSION. A reliable source stated that the magazine explosion in Habana harber on August 1 completely destroyed or rendered useless the entire contents (see Weeka No. 31). A previous report stating that the magazine had contained explosives and grenades confiscated from subversives apparently was in error. In addition to powder, there were 55 barrels of potassium perchlorate stored in the magazine which reportedly had been confiscated from the foreign registry vessel in Havana some time during World War II. Sourse stated that the age of the potassium

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perchlorate, coupled with improper storage, probably caused the explosion. The U. S. Army Mission to Cuba also lost a small quantity of demolition materials which were stored in the same magazine.~

## Navy

(UNCLASSIFIED) <u>MIDSHIPMAN CRUISE "CHARLIE"</u>. Thirteen vessels participating in midshipman cruise "Charlie" for 1955 arrived in Havana on August 5 for a visit to last until August 9. The flotilla was headed by the light cruiser, <u>USS Reanoke</u>, carrying the flag of Rear Admiral E. R. McLean, Jr. The heavy cruiser, <u>USS Newport News</u>, ten destroyers, destroyer escorts and transports, and a fleet eiler made up the balance of the vessels on the cruise. There were about 6,000 officers, enlisted men and midshipmen embarked.

The visit was well received and no significant incidents were reported. Two receptions and an official luncheon were held on board ship. Various official and unofficial entertainment was offered the visitors by the Cubans and American residents.

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Carles C. Hall ( Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

Participants:

CCHall, CABeenstra, CFPick, Jr., FCFernes, Jr., JdeZengetita, ACertesime, WBCaldwell, FJDenahue, CAnderson, Treadway (Army), Krisel(Navy) and Slaten(Air).

cc: Amembassies Ciudad Trujille and Pert-au-Prince MA(4), NA(4), and AA(2).

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