Raid Leaders Explain the Use of Automatic Weapons
By DAVID JOHNSTON
WASHINGTON, April
27 -- Commanders of the raid that
reunited Elián
González with his father went into the home of his
Miami relatives
with automatic weapons early last Saturday because
intelligence
reports indicated that the house was being guarded by a
shadowy network
of men who had permits to carry concealed weapons,
a history of
violent crime or a record of anti-Castro violence, one of the
officers said
today.
A senior immigration
official in charge of intelligence gathering for the operation said
it was the information
suggesting the possibility of violence that led the authorities
to plan a large
military-style raid with about 140 agents, a few armed with automatic
weapons.
"There was a
structure and the potential of violent threats to prevent us
from recovering
Elián from the house and perhaps do serious harm to our
personnel and
maybe innocent people in the area," the official said.
"That's really
why we structured the enforcement plan to be, by any
objective standard,
an overwhelming show of force to prevent the use of
force."
The official
said there were several reports of an unidentified person at
the house who
was observed with a firearm but no reports of weapons in
the house. Attorney
General Janet Reno has said there were reports of
weapons inside
the house.
There was no
immediate comment on firearms tonight from a spokesman
for the family,
though the family has always insisted it had none in the
house and none
were confiscated in the raid.
The intelligence
operation uncovered what the official said was a plan to
thwart any effort
to remove Elián from the González home forcibly by
rushing him
to the house directly behind the González's if the authorities
tried to break
in. That house was headquarters for the Cuban-American
security operation
in the Little Havana neighborhood, the official said.
The intelligence
operation relied largely on covert surveillance, overflights
of helicopters
and fixed wing aircraft, the official said, speaking on
condition of
not being named. The information was cross-checked with
law enforcement
and commercial databases to provide a profile of the
loose network
of security personnel around the child in the days before
the raid.
The official
said agents detected several layers in what he described as a
security cordon
around the house of Lázaro González, where Elián was
staying after
he was rescued from the Atlantic on Nov. 25. The security
operation extended
to the streets surrounding the house, where, the
official said,
supporters in lawn chairs took positions at strategic
intersections
and used walkie-talkies and cell phones to report law
enforcement
activity.
The official
said the reports were transmitted to supporters of the Miami
relatives at
a house on the same block as the González home. The
reports, he
said, were relayed to local Spanish-speaking radio stations,
which sometimes
broadcast appeals to Cuban-Americans to crowd the
streets around
the house.
The official
said agents identified five people who seemed to operate as
what he called
"close quarters bodyguards" who were at the González
house at varying
times. Four of the five people, the official said, were
identified,
and all four had active permits to carry concealed weapons.
Although the
González family seemed to know and allow some members
of the security
force into their home, the official said, it was unclear
whether the
Miami relatives played a significant role in organizing or
managing the
network of Cuban-American supporters.
The official
said the leaders of the security force occupied the house
behind the González
home. This was what he described as a base of
operations for
a larger group of 15 to 20 people who set up roving
patrols on foot,
bicycles and cars.
Among this group
were nine people whom the official said had criminal
records for
violent crimes.
"These people
had essentially taken it on their own to prevent the
removal of Elián
from the González home," the official said.
In addition,
the official said, five members of the militant anti-Castro
group Alpha
66 were seen on several occasions in the crowd of
demonstrators.
He said three of the five had taken credit for firing from a
boat into a
seaside hotel in Cuba in 1995.
Immigration officials
said they coordinated their intelligence gathering with
other federal
agencies and with Miami police. But the officials said they
did not coordinate
the raid with the local authorities who, except for a
few senior commanders,
did not know how or when the operation was
to take place.
Although several
Cuban citizens in the security operation were detained
in the days
before the assault, the official said, the intelligence collection
effort did not
result in arrests or searches for weapons. That was because
the operation
to take custody of the child was focused solely on that
goal, the official
said, and was not viewed as broader law enforcement
action.
The operation
took place shortly after 5 a.m. on Saturday after
negotiations
that Ms. Reno had said stalled over the relatives'
unwillingness
to surrender the child unconditionally to the authorities after
months of refusing
to hand over the boy.
Lawyers for the
relatives have complained that they were pleading for
more time to
negotiate a peaceful transfer at nearly the exact time that
Ms. Reno sent
the agents to the house and have bitterly criticized her for
undertaking
the assault without giving the talks more time.
Republicans in
Congress are planning hearings to review the operation.
Some lawmakers
have sharply criticized Ms. Reno for sending in agents
outfitted in
military-style jump suits who carried automatic weapons in an
operation that
they said was likely to provoke violence and terrorize the
boy.
Justice Department
lawyers have not allowed the agents who planned
and carried
out the assault to be interviewed until today, in part because
they were assembling
an after-action report and reviewing each agent's
account in anticipation
of civil lawsuits and Congressional inquiries.