In the presidential election of March 15, 1924, Horacio Vásquez Lajara handily defeated Francisco J. Peynado. Vásquez's Alliance Party (Partido Alianza) also won a comfortable majority in both houses of Congress. With his inauguration on July 13, control of the republic returned to Dominican hands. The Vásquez administration shines in Dominican history like a star amid a gathering storm. After the country's eight years of subjugation, Vásquez took care to respect the political and civil rights of the population. An upswing in the price of export commodities, combined with increased government borrowing, buoyed the economy. Public works projects proliferated. Santo Domingo expanded and modernized. This brief period of progress, however, ended in the resurgent maelstrom of Dominican political instability. The man who would come to occupy the eye of this political cyclone was Rafael Trujillo.
Although a principled man by Dominican standards, Vásquez was
also a product of long years of political infighting. In an effort to undercut
his primary rival, Federico
Velásquez, and to preserve power for his own followers, the
president agreed in 1927 to a prolongation of his term from four to six
years. There was some debatable
legal basis for the move, which was approved by the Congress, but its
enactment effectively invalidated the constitution of 1924 that Vásquez
had previously sworn to
uphold. Once the president had demonstrated his willingness to disregard
constitutional procedures in the pursuit of power, some ambitious opponents
decided that those
procedures were no longer binding. Dominican politics returned to their
pre-occupation status; the struggle among competing caudillos resumed.
Trujillo occupied a strong position in this contest. The commander of
the National Army (Ejército Nacional, the new designation of the
armed force created under the
occupation), Trujillo came from a humble background. He had enlisted
in the National Police in 1918, a time when the upper-class Dominicans,
who had formerly filled
the officer corps, largely refused to collaborate with the occupying
forces. Trujillo harbored no such scruples. He rose quickly in the officer
corps, while at the same time
he built a network of allies and supporters. Unlike the more idealistic
North American sponsors of the constabulary, Trujillo saw the armed force
not for what it should
have been--an apolitical domestic security force--but for what it was:
the main source of concentrated power in the republic.
Having established his power base behind the scenes, Trujillo was ready
by 1930 to assume control of the country. Although elections were scheduled
for May,
Vásquez's extension in office cast doubt on their potential
fairness. (Vásquez had also eliminated from the constitution the
prohibition against presidential reelection.)
This uncertainty prompted Rafael Estrella Ureña, a political
leader from Santiago, to proclaim a revolution in February. Having already
struck a deal with Trujillo, Estrella
marched on the capital; army forces remained in their barracks as Trujillo
declared his "neutrality" in the situation. The ailing Vásquez,
a victim of duplicity and betrayal,
fled the capital. Estrella assumed the provisional presidency.
Part of the arrangement between Estrella and Trujillo apparently involved
the army commander's candidacy for president in the May elections. As events
unfolded, it
became clear that Trujillo would be the only candidate that the army
would permit to participate; army personnel harassed and intimidated electoral
officials and
eliminated potential opponents. A dazed nation stood by as the new
dictator announced his election with 95 percent of the vote. After his
inauguration in August, and at
his express request, the Congress issued an official proclamation announcing
the commencement of "the Era of Trujillo."
The dictator proceeded to rule the country like a feudal lord for thirty-one
years. He held the office of president from 1930 to 1938 and from 1942
to 1952. During the
interim periods, he exercised absolute power, while leaving the ceremonial
affairs of state to puppet presidents such as his brother, Héctor
Bienvenido Trujillo Molina,
who occupied the National Palace from 1952 to 1960, and Joaquín
Balaguer Ricardo, an intellectual and scholar who served from 1960 to 1961.
Although cast in the
mold of old-time caudillos such as Santana and Heureaux, Trujillo surpassed
them in efficiency, rapacity, and utter ruthlessness. Like Heureaux, he
maintained a highly
effective secret police force that monitored (and eliminated, in some
instances) opponents both at home and abroad. Like Santana, he relied on
the military as his primary
support. Armed forces personnel received generous pay and perquisites
under his rule, and their ranks and equipment inventories expanded. Trujillo
maintained control
over the officer corps through fear, patronage, and the frequent rotation
of assignments, which inhibited the development of strong personal followings.
The other leading beneficiaries of the dictatorship--aside from Trujillo
himself and his family--were those who associated themselves with the regime
both politically and economically. The establishment of state monopolies
over all major enterprises in the country brought riches to the Trujillos
and their cronies through the manipulation of prices and inventories as
well as the outright embezzlement of funds.
Generally speaking, the quality of life improved for the average Dominican
under Trujillo. Poverty persisted, but the economy expanded, the foreign
debt disappeared, the
currency remained stable, and the middle class expanded. Public works
projects enhanced the road system and improved port facilities; airports
and public buildings
were constructed, the public education system grew, and illiteracy
declined. These advances might well have been achieved in even greater
measure under a responsive
democratic government, but to Dominicans, who had no experience with
such a government, the results under Trujillo were impressive. Although
he never tested his
personal popularity in a free election, some observers feel that Trujillo
could have won a majority of the popular vote up until the final years
of his dictatorship.
Ideologically, Trujillo leaned toward fascism. The trappings of his
personality cult (Santo Domingo was renamed Ciudad Trujillo under his rule),
the size and architectural
mediocrity of his building projects, and the level of repressive control
exercised by the state all invited comparison with the style of his contemporaries,
Hitler in Germany
and Mussolini in Italy. Basically, however, Trujillo was not an ideologue,
but a Dominican caudillo expanded to monstrous proportions by his absolute
control of the
nation's resources. His attitude toward communism tended toward peaceful
coexistence until 1947, when the Cold War winds from Washington persuaded
him to crack
down and to outlaw the Dominican Communist Party (Partido Comunista
Dominicano--PCD). As always, self-interest and the need to maintain his
personal power
guided Trujillo's actions.
Although conspiracies--both real and imagined--against his rule preoccupied
Trujillo throughout his reign, it was his adventurous foreign policy that
drew the ire of other
governments and led directly to his downfall. Paradoxically, his most
heinous action in this arena cost him the least in terms of influence and
support. In October 1937,
Trujillo ordered the massacre of Haitians living in the Dominican Republic
in retaliation for the discovery and execution by the Haitian government
of his most valued
covert agents in that country. The Dominican army slaughtered as many
as 20,000 largely unarmed men, women, and children, mostly in border areas,
but also in the
western Cibao. News of the atrocity filtered out of the country slowly;
when it reached the previously supportive administration of President Franklin
D. Roosevelt in the
United States, Secretary of State Cordell Hull demanded internationally
mediated negotiations for a settlement and indemnity. Trujillo finally
agreed. The negotiations,
however, fixed a ludicrously low indemnity of US$750,000, which was
later reduced to US$525,000 by agreement between the two governments. Although
the affair
damaged Trujillo's international image, it did not result in any direct
efforts by the United States or by other countries to force him from power.
In later years, the Trujillo regime became increasingly isolated from
the governments of other nations. This isolation compounded the dictator's
paranoia, prompting him
to increase his foreign interventionism. To be sure, Trujillo did have
cause to resent the leaders of certain foreign nations, such as Cuba's
Fidel Castro Ruz, who aided a
small, abortive invasion attempt by dissident Dominicans in 1959. Trujillo,
however, expressed greater concern over Venezuela's President Rómulo
Betancourt
(1959-64). An established and outspoken opponent of Trujillo, Betancourt
had been associated with some individual Dominicans who had plotted against
the dictator.
Trujillo developed an obsessive personal hatred of Betancourt and supported
numerous plots of Venezuelan exiles to overthrow him. This pattern of intervention
led the
Venezuelan government to take its case against Trujillo to the Organization
of American States (OAS). This development infuriated Trujillo, who ordered
his foreign
agents to assassinate Betancourt. The attempt, on June 24, 1960, injured,
but did not kill, the Venezuelan president. The incident inflamed world
opinion against Trujillo.
The members of the OAS, expressing this outrage, voted unanimously
to sever diplomatic relations and to impose economic sanctions on the Dominican
Republic.
The firestorm surrounding the Betancourt incident provoked a review
of United States policy toward the Dominican Republic by the administration
of President Dwight
D. Eisenhower. The United States had long tolerated Trujillo as a bulwark
of stability in the Caribbean; some in Washington still saw him as a desirable
counterforce to
the Castro regime. Others, however, saw in Trujillo another Fulgencio
Batista--the dictator Castro deposed in 1959--ripe for overthrow by radical,
potentially communist,
forces. Public opinion in the United States also began to run strongly
against the Dominican dictatorship. In August 1960, the United States embassy
in Santo Domingo
was downgraded to consular level. According to journalist Bernard Diederich,
Eisenhower also asked the National Security Council's Special Group (the
organization
responsible for approving covert operations) to consider the initiation
of operations aimed at Trujillo's ouster. On May 30, 1961, Trujillo was
assassinated. According to
Diederich, the United States Central Intelligence Agency supplied the
weapons used by the assassins.