On 5 November 1956, 82 Cuban revolutionaries based in Mexico boarded a broken-down yacht named La Granma and headed for Cuba. Seven days later the
  yacht ran aground near the Los Colorados beach in Cuba's Oriente Province. The landing was well south of the force's link-up site, where 50 supporters awaited
  their arrival. Government warships patrolled the coast, and government planes flew overhead. The element of surprise was not a factor.

  Three days later, soldiers, tipped off by a local peasant, surrounded the revolutionists and almost annihilated them. From 12 to 20 of the guerrillas survived and
  escaped to the Sierra Maestra Mountains to continue their fight against Cuban dictator and strongman Fulgencio Batista.1 Twenty-four months later the survivors
  formed the nucleus of a rebel army that marched to Havana to form a revolutionary government that continues to shape international relations in the Western
  Hemisphere.

  How did this small group of guerrillas eventually defeat an army of 30,000 soldiers who were well equipped and had unchecked power over the Cuban citizenry?
  How did the United States, one of only two superpowers at the time, allow a nation 90 miles from its southern coast to slip from its grasp during the height of the
  zero sum game of the Cold War?

  The answers to these questions lie in the guerrilla's use of propaganda and political warfare. The propaganda campaign that Fidel Castro and his followers waged
  set the conditions in Cuba and internationally. The campaign helped them gain Cuban society's favor and prevented an international (specifically an American)
  reaction to the insurrection and, ultimately, led to the rebels' victory. The Cuban Revolution's propagan-da and political warfare, when examined in its original
  context, illustrates a well-planned and executed psychological operation (PSYOP) that influenced numerous target audiences and led to behavioral changes that
  helped Castro seize power while commanding a numerically and technologically inferior force.

  Batista Seizes Power

  On 10 March 1952, Batista seized power in Cuba for the third time in 19 years. He voided the results of the recent election and appointed himself chief executive,
  prime minister, and head of the Cuban Armed Forces. Political groups throughout Cuba rejected the coup, but none protested more vehemently than did student
  groups at the University of Havana. Castro, by then a practicing lawyer, legally challenged the coup and called for a 100-year jail sentence for Batista. However,
  Castro's brief was thrown out by the federal courts.2 Castro continued to work to unite the factions that opposed Batista. One student group, the Santamaría,
  published a mimeographed underground paper titled Son Los Mismos.3 Castro frequently published articles in the paper condemning the Batista government, and
  in May 1952 he suggested that the group change the name of the paper to El Acusador.

  Castro's group of students and young leaders later became the nucleus of the 26th of July movement (M-26-7), which favored direct action against Batista's
  dictatorial government. The group began military training in 1953 and set its sights on direct military action against the Cuban government. The location of the
  action would be the Moncada Army Barracks of Santiago de Cuba.

  On 26 July 1953, the group attacked the Barracks. The armed Revolution against Batista had begun. Government forces quickly defeated the attack, and Castro's
  group was forced to retreat. They headed toward the Sierra Maestra Mountains where they sought refuge and strengthened their numbers to continue the fight.

  Government forces tracked the rebels and eventually captured all of them. Several were put to death while sheer "luck and public opinion spared the lives of Fidel,
  Raul [Castro], and some of [their] closest associates."4 Cubans were outraged at the summary execution without trial of many of the rebels. This consternation
  benefited Castro, prevented his death, and allowed him a trial in the courts.

  While imprisoned, Castro decided that to conduct a successful revolution against the Batista regime he would have to launch the Revolution from another country.
  Thus, after his release, he went to Mexico, where he reunited with Raul. Raul had already begun planning the invasion from Mexico and had organized supporters
  and recruited revolutionary-minded men to form a guerrilla army. He introduced Castro to Ernesto "Che" Guevara, an Argentine doctor, who played an important
  role in the Cuban Revolution and the propaganda implemented during the struggle.5 On 25 November 1956, Castro and 82 others boarded La Granma and set sail
  for Cuba.

  Psychological Operations

  The term psychological operations was coined in U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 33-5, Psychological Operations, in January 1962.6 The term has since been
  defined in Joint Publication (JP) 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations, as "operations planned to convey selected information and indicators to
  audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of governments, organizations, groups, and individuals."7 The term
  used in the PSYOP community for these is "target audience." Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,
  defines a target audience as "an individual or group selected for influence or attack by means of psychological operations."8

  Field Manual 3-05.30, Psychological Operation's, defines two types of PSYOP programs—an action program and a product program.9 Action programs are
  "sequential, coordinated presentations of a series of actions to achieve a specific PSYOP objective."10 A product program is a "sequential, coordinated
  presen-tation of a series of products to achieve a specific PSYOP objective."11 Finally, JP 1-02 defines a PSYOP action as "an action or activity planned primarily
  for its psychological impact."12

  Broadly defined, psychological operations are designed to influence the attitudes and perceptions and ultimately change the behavior of selected groups so their
  thoughts and actions favor the goals and objectives of the initiator. All PSYOP plans must begin with an ultimate objective or goal; an example of which, for this
  study, is "Defeat the Batista regime." This simple, concise statement is the impetus for the development of the plan that Castro implemented during the Revolution.

  PSYOP objectives, then, are developed to lead to the accomplishment of the ultimate objective. Another example of a PSYOP objective for this operation would
  have been "Deter U.S. involvement in the Revolution." From this objective, target audiences could be determined, and sub-objectives could be formed that would
  help achieve this goal. The target audiences Castro selected were the U.S. press, U.S. policymakers, and the U.S. population in general, all of whom are important
  in helping Castro achieve his objectives.

  Target audiences help the initiator focus on sub-PSYOP objectives that are based on the group's peculiarities. Messages and actions that are effective for one
  group might not be so for another; therefore, each target audience must be understood and targeted separately.13 Study of each target audience helps the planner
  determine the themes that will resonate with the target audience. An example of this is the Revolution's denial of any involvement with communism. This
  sub-objective would read: "Convince U.S. policymakers the Revolution is not communist based." Castro understood the reaction he would incite from U.S.
  policymakers if he did not make this denial. This theme also played across the spectrum of his target audiences because of U.S. sensitivities toward communist
  movements during the early Cold War years.

  Finally, initiators design PSYOP programs to support each of their sub-objectives. This includes determining the type of media to use and when to use it; actions
  that when viewed by the target audience will cause a desired reaction; themes to stress and themes to avoid; and the frequency and timing of dissemination plans.

  Castro's plan called for two PSYOP objectives that his cause needed to accomplish to defeat the Batista regime. First, the group had to convince fellow Cubans of
  the Revolution's legitimacy and that it could succeed. Second, they had to deter U.S. involvement in the Revolution. To achieve these objectives, they had to reach
  numerous audiences in and out of Cuba.

  The Cubans that could influence the achievement of the revolutionaries' first objective were the population of Santiago de Cuba, the Guajiros in Oriente Province,
  Cuban youth movements, and the Cuban military. To achieve the second objective, they had to reach the U.S. press and population and U.S. de-cisionmakers.

  Objective 1:

  Convince the Cubans of the Revolution's legitimacy.

  Target Audience:
  The Santiago de Cuba population, the Guajiros, Cuban youth movements, and the Cuban military.

  The Santiago de Cuba population. Castro said, "No weapon, no force is capable of defeating a people who have decided to fight for their rights."14 Santiago de
  Cuba, located on the eastern end of Cuba near the Sierra Maestra Mountains in the Oriente Province, "is shut off from Havana as surely as if it were another
  country."15 Residents believed people from Havana looked on their city as backward, and they felt exploited by the Havana government.16 Santiagueros were
  proud, defiant, and antigovernment in general. Throughout Cuba's history, Santiago de Cuba served as a starting point for revolution. Castro recognized and
  exploited these qualities in choosing to attack the Moncada Army Barracks in 1953 and later during the Revolution when using the Sierra Maestra Mountains as
  his operational base. Castro's objectives were to increase the discontent among Santiago de Cuba's population; demonstrate the Rev-olution's strength and resolve
  to win; and encourage Santiagueros to support the Revolution.

  Part of Castro's initial plan during the attack on the Moncada Army Barracks was to capture the local radio station so the rebels could use it to "call the people to
  revolt."17 The attempt to seize the radio station failed, but Castro followed up with a rallying cry for the Santiagueros during his trial defense. He repeatedly
  emphasized the atrocities committed against the population by the Batista regime. He described soldiers whose uniforms became butchers' aprons. He painted the
  Batista regime as the worst of all the oppressors of Cuba—a regime that purposely preyed on the Santiagueros, a peaceful, liberty-loving people. He described the
  deaths of innocent children at the hands of soldiers: "After the battle, they threw themselves like wild beasts on the city of Santiago de Cuba and on its defenseless
  population."18

  Castro did not forget Santiago de Cuba as he launched his second attempt at revolution. He planned to coordinate his landing with an uprising in Santiago de Cuba
  through Frank País, the movement's leader in the city. The plan would make Santiago de Cuba "the rebel stronghold" of the Revolution.19 Because of the delay of
  Castro's landing, the synchronization that the plan called for never materialized. However, País did conduct an uprising and controlled the city in the name of the
  26th of July movement for hours on the day of the planned landing.

  País was instrumental in gaining support for the Revolution in Santiago de Cuba and was the key executor of propaganda in the city from the 1956 landing until his
  death in 1957. During a pro-Batista rally organized by Roland Masferrer on 18 May 1957, "País used a clandestine radio to cut into Masferrer's speech."20 País
  called for revolution and exalted Castro and his followers throughout the city, and the 26th of July movement gained support from the Santiagueros. The movement
  shipped arms through Santiago de Cuba and received medical treatment, shelter, and provisions in the city.

  The Guajiros. The refuge for the rebels in the mountains consisted of "2,500 square miles and 50,000 Guajiros."21 The Guajiros can be described as "poor,
  illiterate black, white, and mulatto peasants" who lived in the villages and farms throughout the Sierra Maestra area.22 Most of them were squatters who cleared
  land for subsistence farming and built huts in which to live between sugar harvests. During harvests, they left their mountain homes and worked as sugarcane
  cutters. Castro understood that to survive in the mountains he needed the Guajiros' support. He had to convince them to support the 26th of July movement; to
  recruit them to join the Revolution; and to persuade them to inform the rebels of government action in the area.

  Guevara served to motivate the Guajiros. In late 1957, with Castro's permission, Guevara began to build a small-scale infrastructure in his sector of the Sierra
  Maestra—El Hombrito. Guevara's action demonstrated to the local population the rebels' commitment to improving their lives. Guevara oversaw the construction
  of a small hospital, a bread oven, pig and poultry farms, a cigar factory, and a small armory.23 The guerrillas paid farmers to grow certain types of vegetables so
  the rebels could purchase them for subsistence. The benefit of seeing words transformed into actions served to steel the resolve of the Guajiros to support the
  rebels.

  Guevara also established a newspaper and radio network to serve the area. The small newspaper, El Cubano Libre was copied on a mimeograph and distributed
  throughout the area.24 Articles written by Castro, Guevara, and others served to illustrate the ideology of the 26th of July movement and their plans for Cuba's
  future. The radio station started small, broadcasting only in the local area but widening its area as the war progressed: "When we began to broadcast from our own
  transmitter, the existence of our troops and their fighting determination became known throughout the Republic; our links began to become more extensive and
  complicated, even reaching Havana and Camagüey in the west, where we had important supply centers, and Santiago in the east."25 The results of the intensive
  campaign waged among the Guajiros served the rebels well. The network of supporters kept the rebels informed of "the presence of not only the Army but of any
  stranger" who entered the rebel zone.26 The combination of civil and military development provided a working model of the society the Revolution hoped to create.

  The Batistas also targeted the Guajiros, but the strength of Castro's campaign prevented government inroads into the rebel zone. Castro was able to give the
  Guajiros hope, and the Guajiros gave Castro the time and support he needed for success.

  Cuban youth movements. Another key group Castro targeted was Cuba's youth movements. Castro's objectives were to establish the legitimacy of the 26th of
  July movement to unite all revolutionary efforts and to convince youth movements that the main effort was in the Sierra Maestra Mountains.

  Castro understood the importance of uniting all of the revolutionary movements throughout the island, and he began his campaign to do so even before the
  Moncada Barracks attack. On 23 July 1953, he released a manifesto declaring the philosophy of the Revolution to the Cuban people. The manifesto defined the
  vanguard of the Revolution as "a youth that wants a new Cuba, a youth that has freed itself from all the faults, the mean ambitions, and the sins of the past."27

  Castro continued efforts to unite Cuban youth movements during his time in Mexico. In September 1956, he and José Antonio Echevarría, the leader of the
  University Federation of Students (FEU), signed the Mexico pact that united the revolutionary efforts of these two powerful organizations.28 Point 16 of the pact
  reads: "The FEU and the 26th of July movement adopt as their watchword the unity of all the revolutionary, moral, and civic forces of the nation—students,
  workers, youth organizations, and all men of dignity—so that they will support us in this struggle which will end in our victory or our death."29 Thus, on the eve of
  Castro's invasion, unity with a powerful youth organization took shape and legitimized the 26th of July movement in the eyes of other youth movements throughout
  Cuba.

  The Cuban military. Castro's embrace of a soldier as Castro left his prison cell on the Isle of Pines was a symbol of his attempt to stop the military from
  participating in the violence directed by the Batista regime. Castro knew that if he could influence the Cuban military to support the Revolution by either joining him
  or, at least, not fighting him, he could rapidly achieve Batista's overthrow. The objectives he established to influence the military were to erode military support for
  Batista, stress the legitimacy of the 26th of July movement, and emphasize the inevitability of the military's defeat.

  In June 1957, Batista began an all-out offensive against Castro that led to Castro being surrounded on a mountain crest near La Plata. With no more than 40 men,
  he and his men held their position, wearing down the attackers. Castro used this opportunity to apply tactical "psychological warfare for the first time in the Sierra
  war by installing loudspeakers that blared the national anthem, patriotic songs, and revolutionary exhortations at the exhausted Batista soldiers."30 Castro's force
  denied the military a victory at that decisive point.

  Castro opened a dialogue with military commanders, and several exchanges illustrate his PSYOP objective of eroding support to the regime. To General Eulogio
  Cantillo he wrote, "I appreciate your noble feeling toward us, who are, after all, your compatriots, not your enemies because we are not at war with the armed
  forces, but against the dictatorship."31 During the battle of Mompie, Castro fought against a former law student colleague, Major José Quevedo. Castro reportedly
  held a dialogue with Quevedo guaranteeing the good treatment of the soldiers if they surrendered. After several days of this, Quevedo surrendered. The rebels fed
  Quevedo's soldiers before turning them over to the International Red Cross.32

  Castro's humane treatment of his prisoners of war served to legitimize his fighting force in the eyes of his armed adversary. As Castro's army marched across the
  island in 1958, Cuban military commanders could not rally their troops to fight the rebels. One commander cautioned his soldiers not to be impressed "by what
  `Fidel Castro's radio station and his propaganda organs—or the ill-born Cubans who propagate rumors—may say.'"33 Castro's campaign against Cuban Armed
  Forces was effective and greatly hastened his march to victory.

  Objective 2:

  Deter U.S. involvement in the Revolution.

  Target Audience:
  The U.S. press and population and U.S. decisionmakers.

  U.S. press and population. Castro possessed a radio in the Sierra Maestra Mountains, which allowed him to monitor Cuban broadcasts and U.S. broadcasts
  from Florida. He knew that to further the Revolution, he had to get the right message out so the international press and, more important, the U.S. press would not
  disregard the rebellion in Cuba. His contacts led him to Herbert L. Matthews, a Latin America expert for The New York Times, who conducted an interview of
  Castro in Cuba. Matthews' interview became a three-part series of articles about the Cuban revolt and, more important, Castro, its leader. Allowing Americans to
  see his ideas in print would lend legitimacy to Castro's cause, as would his denial of it being a communist-based revolution. "Above all," he said, "we are fighting for
  a democratic Cuba and an end to the dictatorship."34

  Matthew's articles had a de-legitimizing effect on the Batista regime. After Cuban officials challenged the validity of the story, The New York Times responded by
  publishing a photograph of Matthews and Castro together in the Sierra Maestra Mountains.35 The effect of Matthews' article was invaluable to Castro.

  Castro presented to Matthews a force that appeared to be well organized. Nothing could have been further from the truth. Castro said his army "works in groups
  of 10 to 40," and, he further stated that he had "no less than 50" rifles with telescopes that Cuban soldiers feared.36 The reality of the situation was that at the time
  Castro's army numbered "less than 20 armed men."37

  Matthews's articles were filled with admiration for Castro and his cause. As a result, U.S. attention turned toward the Cuban situation. Mat-thews' scoop opened
  the floodgates, and U.S. journalists hastily tried to reach the Cuban rebels. Money, recruits, and support flowed to the Sierra Maestra.

  Such interviews allowed Castro to publicly separate himself from Cuba's communist movement. He understood that U.S. citizens, decision-makers, and the U.S.
  press needed to hear his denial of communist affiliation for themselves. Anticommunist sentiment in the U.S. was strong during the late 1950s, and Americans
  would oppose any rebellion with communist connections. If Castro convinced the U.S. press that his movement was not communist, he also would be able to reach
  other important target audiences.

  Castro convinced Matthews that his group had no links to the communists. The second article in the series focused on the rebels' anti-dictatorial stance and, more
  important, for the rebels, the separation of the movement from the communists: "Communism has little to do with opposition to the regime. There is a well-trained,
  hard core of communists that is doing as much mischief as it can and that naturally bolsters all the opposition elements, but there is no communism to speak of in
  Fidel Castro's 26th of July movement or the disaffected elements in the Army."38

  Castro continued to distance his movement from the communist movement before the U.S. press. In a February 1958 Look magazine interview, Andrew St.
  George questioned Castro on charges that the Revolution was communist-inspired.39 Castro credited Matthews with discrediting this claim and stated that "the
  Cuban communists, as your journalist John Gunther once reported, have never opposed Batista, for whom they have seemed to feel a close kinship."40 Castro not
  only denied the charges, he attempted to link Batista with the communist movement.

  In a letter to the U.S. policy journal The Nation, Castro summarizes the programs of the 26th of July movement that the rebels would implement when they won.
  The program is outlined in six paragraphs, with paragraph 5 addressing the international affairs of the proposed government: "In international affairs, the
  establishment of close solidarity with the democratic nations of the American continents."41 Again, through the U.S. press, Castro attempted to demonstrate his
  distance from the communist movement.

  Before Matthews' interview, the Cuban press covered mostly articles about the resort atmosphere of Havana, and the Cuban government did a fairly good job of
  controlling the stories that left the island. Entries in the Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature focused on how Americans could vacation cheaply in Havana, of
  the visits of high-profile celebrities to the island, and so on.42 After Matthew's interview, Reader's Guide articles focused on rebel demands and interviews with
  Castro, which kept the Revolution on the front pages of the U.S. press.

  U.S. decisionmakers. Castro had to convince U.S. decisionmakers that the movement was not communist. He had to persuade them to stop shipping small arms
  and planes to Cuba, and he wanted to dissuade them from intervening in the Revolution.

  Castro's programs with regard to the U.S. press, concerning the movement's political goals, also served to affect U.S. decisionmakers. Castro's public rejection of
  communism was reflected in correspondence, dated 7 December 1957, between the U.S. Department of State and U.S. American Embassy policy officer Wayne
  Smith. Smith wrote: "The Cuban Government accuses Castro of being a communist, but has not produced evidence to substantiate the charge."43 Castro's
  campaign of distancing himself from communism was reaching his intended audience.

  Castro, no stranger to Cuban history, was well aware that the United States believed it had a legitimate reason to intervene in Cuban politics. He had to maintain a
  delicate balance of fighting against a demonstrably illegitimate dictator, while simultaneously not offending the United States enough to cause intervention in Cuban
  affairs. Part of the program to reduce the chances of U.S. intervention was the anticommunist rhetoric he spouted. Matthews wrote that Castro "has strong ideas
  of liberty, democracy, social justice, the need to restore the constitution, to hold elections."44 In the interview, Castro said, "We are fighting for a democratic Cuba
  and an end to the dictatorship."45 In the Look interview, Castro said, "Under our constitution, I am far too young to be a candidate."46 The ideals that Castro
  presented through the press to the U.S. public made it difficult for U.S. decisionmakers to justify an intervention on Batista's behalf.

  Lessons Learned

  Examining Castro's propaganda effort is valuable for the PSYOP specialist because it illustrates the effectiveness of a well-planned, flexible plan. The most
  important aspect of the effort was never losing sight of the mission, in this case the overthrow of the Batista regime. Propaganda can take on a life of its own, but
  Castro was able to direct his program to support his objectives at all times. Incidentally, the program Castro successfully executed parallels current U.S. PSYOP
  doctrine, illustrating the soundness of these principles.

  Castro's successful propaganda campaign also was due to his understanding of target audiences and his sense of timing in applying the art of PSYOP. Castro
  quickly responded to U.S. concerns when his brother kidnapped U.S. citizens. He could have chosen that moment to demonstrate the movement's increased
  strength, but he stuck with his goal of avoiding U.S. intervention, understanding that the kidnappings would only serve to anger his northern neighbor.

  PSYOP officers must also examine the propaganda Castro conducted in the sense of a potential adversarial PSYOP effort. The program Castro followed could
  easily be replicated in today's information-age environment. The advances in media technology actually would assist a guerrilla effort in gaining, or preventing,
  international support. One only has to look at propaganda efforts by Philippine and Colombian insurgents exploiting the Internet to sense the possibilities available to
  potential adversaries.

  Epilogue

  On 3 January 1959, Cuban revolutionary commander Fidel Castro began his "long march on the central highway from Santiago to Havana."47 The march was a
  move to gain the popular support of the people as the column crossed the island. Mounted on a captured tank, Castro addressed Cubans at various stops along the
  way. People clamored for this "liberator." Castro used these opportunities to spell out what Cuba's future should look like, and he promised to "punish those who
  have been responsible for so many years of suffering."48

  Castro arrived in Havana on 8 January 1959. He gave his respects to the president he had appointed, Manuel Urrutia Lleó, and gave a speech to the thousands of
  people gathered there. Castro, elevated to legendary status, received the monikers "Savior of the Fatherland" and "The Maximum Leader." He had achieved his
  goal—the overthrow of Batista. His use of propaganda enabled him to achieve that goal in the face of seemingly insurmountable odds: "We cannot become
  dictators; we shall never need to use force because we have the people, and because the people shall judge, and because the day the people want, I shall leave."49
  MR
 
 

  1.Accounts vary on the number of survivors from La Granma, although there is no number less than 12 or greater than 20. In several press interviews, Castro
  gives the number as 12. Maps that show Castro's movements from 1956 through 1959 can be accessed online at
  <www.rose-hulman.edu/~delacova/cuban-revolution.htm>.

  2.Fidel Castro, Revolutionary Struggle, eds., E. Rolando Bonachea and Nelson P. Valdes (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1972), 40.

  3.Ibid., 37.

  4.Ibid., 53. Raul Castro was part of the group that attacked the barracks.

  5.Enrique Menses, Fidel Castro (New York: Taplinger Publishing Company, 1966).

  6.U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 33-5, Psychological Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), superceded).

  7.U.S. Joint Publication (JP) 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, 10 July 1996).

  8.JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: GPO, 12 April 2001).

  9.FM 3-05.30, Psychological Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, 19 January 2000).

  10.Ibid., glossary.

  11.Ibid., glossary.

  12.JP 1-02.

  13.This statement does not mean that some messages and actions do not cross target audiences. In fact, many messages might, and often do, cross target
  audiences. Only by studying each target audience individually can one determine if this will happen and how to plan for it.

  14.Castro, 182.

  15.Herbert L. Matthews, "Cuban Rebel is Visited in Hideout," The New York Times, 24 February 1957, 1.

  16.Menses, 22.

  17.Castro, 50.

  18.Ibid., 197.

  19.Ramon L. Bonachea and Marta San Martin, The Cuban Insurrection, 1952-1959 (Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1974), 79.

  20.Ibid., 140.

  21.Menses, 46.

  22.Jon Lee Anderson, Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life (New York: Grove Press, 1997), 220.

  23.Ibid., 287.

  24.Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1968), 205.

  25.Ibid., 207.

  26.Ibid.

  27.Castro, 157.

  28.The FEU founded the Directorio Revolucionario (DR) in September 1955 as an answer to Castro's revolutionary movement. The DR formed the nucleus of the
  urban guerrillas in Havana.

  29.Castro, 339.

  30.Tad Szulc, Fidel (New York: William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1986), 447.

  31.Ibid.

  32.Ibid., 447-48.

  33.Bonachea, 272.

  34.Matthews, Cuban Rebel is Visited, 1.

  35.Ibid, photo.

  36.Ibid., 34.

  37.Anderson, 236.

  38.Matthews, "Rebel Strength Gaining in Cuba, But Batista has the Upper Hand," The New York Times (25 February 1957), 11.

  39.Andrew St. George, "Interview with Fidel Castro," Look (4 February 1958), 30.

  40.Ibid.

  41.Castro, "What Cuba's Rebels Want," The Nation (30 November 1957), 400.

  42.Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature.

  43.John P. Glennon, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States: 1955-1957, vol. VI, American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico; Caribbean (Washington,
  DC: GPO, 1963), 866.

  44.Matthews, "Cuban Rebel is Visited," 34.

  45.Ibid.

  46.St. George.

  47.Bonachea, 326.

  48.Ibid.

  49.Ibid., 330. See also online John T. Skelly, "The Men Who Left the 26th of July Movement," <www.sigloxxi.org/menleft. htm>.

  Major Russell J. Hampsey, U.S. Army, is a Psychological Operations Officer at USSOCOM. He received a B.A. from East Stroudsburg University, an
  M.S. from Troy State University, and he is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.