Frank O. Mora, Department of International Studies, Rhodes College, Memphis, TN
Paper presented at the conference on "Cuba: Integration into the International
System: A Multinational Perspective;" The Pell Center for
International Relations and Public Policy, Newport, Rhode Island; 21-24March
2002. Some data presented in this paper is taken from
"Raulismo and the Technocrat-Soldier: The Economic Role of the FAR
and Its Implications for Transition in Cuba." Paper presented at
the conference "The Politics of Military Extrication in Comparative
Perspective: Lessons for
Cuba," Arrabida, Portugal; 21-22 September 2000.
Introduction
Few doubt that the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba (FAR) will play a
central
and decisive role in any potential post-Fidel Castro succession and transition
scenario in Cuba. The FAR have always been an important instrument and
extension of Fidel Castro's power, and, as a result, the institution that
was most
often called upon to assist the leadership in achieving key domestic and
foreign
policy objectives of the Revolution. The armed forces, because it embodies
the
values and desires of the Revolution and its leader, Fidel Castro, holds
a very
special and privileged place in the regime. The FAR's reputation for discipline,
efficiency and loyalty has made it the institution of choice for all social
and political
experiments of the regime, since its inception. Time and again, they have
proven
their loyalty to Cuba and Castro, especially at moments when the regime
needed
their support and expertise the most. In the 1960s, FAR played a pivotal
role in
providing for internal and external defense as well as for socialist development,
working in administration and economic sectors. Until the late 1980s, the
FAR was
at the vanguard of "proletarian internationalism" - serving as a critical
instrument of
the regime's foreign policy objectives in the Third World. Finally, starting
in the late
1980s, the armed forces was once again called upon to take a leading economic
and political role in helping the regime endure the crisis associated with
the end of
the Cold War, the disintegration of the USSR, and the ensuing economic
downturn.
As the edifice of Cuban communism began to crumble, the response to this
decay
and crisis has been for the military to assume a greater role in areas
considered by
the regime to be vital to its survival: economy and state security. Over
the past
decade, the military has been distinguished "not only by its cohesion,
but also by
the way the regime relies on it to lead in the economic and administrative
arenas.
In their dual function of guarding security and improving [economic and]
administrative efficiency… the FAR are virtually assured of playing an
important
role… in shaping the transition to the post-Castro future."1 As a result,
the FAR
has obtained important material benefits for its loyalty and participation
in the
economy, such as compensation for lost budgetary allocations, economic
opportunities for retired military officers and a greater domestic political
and
economic role that could become significant in any transitional scenario.
However,
it has opened possibilities for other problems such as corruption and favoritism,
deprofessionalization, and the creation of pools of autonomy exacerbated
by the
"the uneven nature of economic opportunities that will lead to a differentiation
of
interests and positions" at a critical moment of succession and transition.
There is
also a general consensus among analysts that Raul Castro, Minister of Defense
and heir apparent to Fidel Castro, will play a central role in any succession
scenario. He has spent the last decade working out a succession plan intended
to
secure the regime's survival after Fidel dies.2 The key architect of the
FAR's
enhanced role in economic modernization and reorganization of state security
is
Raul Castro, second secretary of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC), defense
minister, and an historic figure of the Revolution. Raul Castro's profile
and visibility
has enhanced considerably since the early 1990s, as he has become the central
actor, along with the FAR, in helping the regime survive the crisis.3 Raul
Castro
has used his power since the early 1990s to "reorganize, rejuvenate and
strengthen
three pillars that are critical to the regime's survival and stability
after Fidel's death;
the FAR, the central government bureaucracy, and the PCC."4 Moreover, Fidel
Castro has been giving Raul a more public role in running Cuba's government,
and,
during the Fifth Congress of the PCC in 1997, where Raul played a very
active role
in selecting new members of the party's inner circle, Fidel confirmed Raul
as his
successor. In other words, Raul has sought to consolidate his position
as the heir
apparent by enhancing not only his role but that of the institution he
has led since
1959. In other words, Raul and the FAR's have been central to the process
of
economic reform and modernization helping the regime not only weather the
storm
of the "Special Period" but secure a post-Fidel Cuba with Raul the military
at the
helm. However, the consensus among analysts dissolves as to exactly what
impact and role the FAR and Raul will have on any process of change after
Fidel.
Despite official declarations of unity, the FAR, like many other institutions
in Cuba,
are prone to division and conflicts of interests that are being exacerbated,
in part,
by the tensions generated by the military's increased role in the dollar
economy.
As Juan Carlos Espinosa asserts, "the FAR is not a unitary actor and the
Cuban
regime is not monolithic."5 Cuba's political, economic and administrative
model
was never like that of the Marxist-Leninist regimes in Eastern Europe where
legitimacy was vested in Marxist ideology and the supremacy of the Communist
party. In Cuba, this phenomenon existed only in a formal sense. Legitimacy
and
authority wrested in the charismatic-mobilizational capacity of the foundational
revolutionary leader, Fidel Castro. The military-mobilizational type of
totalitarianism,
as described by Juan Carlos Espinosa, or the charismatic post-totalitarian
variant
explained by Mujal-Leon and Busby, note the importance of the regime's
reliance
on Castro's mass mobilization and militarization of public life, coupled
with
improvisation and ideology (with its mix of nationalism, anti-Americanism,
and
anti-capitalism) as the source of the regime's authority and legitimacy.
The end
result has been low levels of institutionalization and, subsequently, factional
conflicts, that although they have seldom challenged the power and authority
of the
maximum leader, can flare up in the absence of Fidel Castro. In other words,
though Raul Castro, since the late 1980s, has strengthened his position
vis a vis
institutions and centers of influence, his power is far from being absolute
and
monolithic which can have important consequences for the process of succession
and transition. In addition to closely examining the enhanced role of Raul
and the
FAR, this paper will address the challenges of successful succession and
transition, particularly in light of the underlying factions and conflicts
that exist
within the state and military that could surface and make succession difficult
and
unruly. After briefly reviewing the evolving nature of the Cuban military,
including the
important events and changes surrounding the end of the Cold War and the
court-martial and execution of General Arnaldo Ochoa, the paper will examine
Raulismo and the economic role of the FAR during the late 1980s-early 1990s.
This
will be followed by an analysis of the consequences of the FAR's enhanced
economic role, which has created different types of soldiers with divergent
interests
that has implications for change in Cuba. This section will also examine
the
sources of fragmentation and tension between Raulismo and other groups
or
tendencies, even within the FAR that could have important implications
for
post-Fidel succession. The penultimate section will explore potential scenarios,
distinguishing between the most and least likely scenario. Finally, the
paper
concludes with some comments as to the viability and usefulness of enhanced
cooperation between the U.S. and Cuban military and assessment of what
policies
and strategies the U.S. and others can make to prepare the FAR for a future
scenario. Development of FAR's Multiple Roles, 1959-1986 The small guerrilla
force
that Fidel Castro commanded in the Sierras in the late 1950s known as the
Rebel
Army quickly became the most dominant institution of the Revolution after
its
triumph in 1959. The FAR embodied the values associated with the struggle
against the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista. Unlike the Socialist bloc
in Europe,
the FAR predated the PCC. The revolutionary regime and leadership emerged
from
a military struggle that was continued even after its triumph when the
level of
societal militarization was enhanced. The FAR, as the successor to the
Rebel
Army, became the preeminent institution of the early stages of the revolutionary
process by virtue of important responsibilities it assumed.6 For the regime,
as
Domingo Amuchastegui states elsewhere in this volume, the FAR had the highest
degree of legitimacy and reliability in terms of historical background,
prestige,
honesty, loyalty, and efficiency in meeting the complexities and challenges
of the
regime's projects. Therefore, the military has been a central pillar of
the regime,
critical to guaranteeing the survival of the revolution. Over time, the
internalization of
the revolution's assumptions, values and institutional norms, as defined
by the
leadership, became a critical component of control. Also, the historical
myths and
origins of the military and its ties to the leadership of the revolution
were
emphasized in order to secure loyalty and commitment to revolutionary goals.7
Because the leadership trusted the FAR, and technical and organization
skills
were lacking in Cuba at the time, the social role of the military was expanded
to
non-defense tasks. During the 1959-1961 period, rebel officers were frequently
inserted into key posts in education, the judicial system, land reform
institutes and
the police, exalting the institution's prominence in the Revolution. The
FAR became
the backbone of Fidel Castro's revolutionary struggle, providing for internal
and
external defense and economic development.8 The successful anti-guerrilla
campaigns, particularly in the Escambray, and the Bay of Pigs invasion
bolstered
the institution's pride, respect, solidarity and ideological commitment.
In the
economic area, the armed forces played a central role, "assuming responsibility
for
the management, organization, and implementation of national social and
economic programs."9 Army officers expanded their roles in society moving
from
agrarian reform to actual agricultural production and a host of other fields.
The
critical role played by the military in Cuba's bureaucracy and economy
in the early
years that contributing to the fusion between military and non-military
elite
produced what Jorge Dominguez described as "civic-soldier."10
In the early 1970s, the FAR reorganized itself into a more professional
and modern
military institution. Sophisticated equipment was acquired and used extensively
in
training exercises, and a military education system was tightened as several
specialized schools were created within the Center of Military Studies.
Raul Castro
was instrumental in obtaining this training and equipment from the USSR,
playing a
leading role in the professionalization of the FAR. This did much to solidify
his own
position as leader of Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR).
The FAR's professional development was immediately followed by a change
of
mission, from a strictly defensive posture to a more offensive and internationalist
role. With the help of Soviet technical advice and equipment, the Cuban
armed
forces turned into a premier military institution, serving as a critical
instrument of
the regime's foreign policy objectives in Africa and the Middle East.11
Overseas
military activism in defense of "proletarian internationalism" enhanced
Fidel
Castro's global profile, but it also increased the prestige and self-confidence
of the
FAR adding to its influence at home. Perhaps concerned with the FAR's
preeminence and growing independence, the regime proclaimed a new doctrine,
Guerra de todo el Pueblo (war of all people), not only as a device to mobilize
the
population and instill new revolutionary fervor to resist a possible invasion
by the
US, but to strengthen political control over the FAR.12
By the mid-1980s, however, the political and economic costs of support
for
revolutionary causes proved simply too great for Cuba and the FAR. A new
generation of combat-experienced officers, trained and educated in the
Soviet
Union, grew increasingly disgruntled by the conflict in Angola. The growing
discontent within the FAR over Havana's mismanagement of the war in Angola
began to show among some top and middle-ranking officers. Civilian and
military
sectors grew progressively apart-and potentially estranged-as result of
the growing
technical proficiency and professional experience acquired in overseas
campaigns.
Moreover, actions taken by the Polish military in 1981 and the high level
of
cooperation between FAR officers and Soviet gorbachevista officers led
to anxiety
and distrust within the revolutionary leadership. Fidel and Raul Castro
were
particularly concerned with the "dangerous and infectious" effects of Gorbachev's
reforms on Soviet-trained officers. In other words, professionalism and
internationalism weakened, over time, traditional forms of control, putting
into
question the FAR's loyalty to the Revolution13. This led to important adjustments
in civil-military relations that emphasized restoring any lost loyalty
and control.
Special Period: Economic Crisis and Readjustments
The ideological and economic crisis of the late 1980s caused by the end
of the
Cold War and the collapse of the USSR led to a series of dramatic events
and
changes in policies. The goal of economic restructuring and "institutional
rectification and purification" during this period of intense crisis and
uncertainty was
to secure the survival of the regime against any real or potential internal
or external
threat. Reforms in the USSR and the winding down of the Cold War placed
enormous pressure on the Castro regime, particularly as Moscow decided
to phase
out all subsidies and aid to Cuba, which totaled about US$5 billion a year.
In July
1990 Cuba entered what Fidel Castro characterized as a "special period
in time of
peace," which, in the context of tremendous economic pressure, meant austerity,
self-sufficiency and political vigilance. Cuba's principal source of imports,
technology, spare parts, petroleum and markets for the island's exports
disappeared, and, as a result, the economy shrunk by between 35 and 50
percent.
During the Special Period there were some important economic but very little
political reform. In fact, the regime's political grip tightened over all
institutions and
society leading to a "siege mentality" that increased the level of state
vigilance and
repression.
As for the military itself, it implemented the so-called zero-option which
consisted
of an "intensive conservation effort undertaken for a wholly autarkic existence…
conserving existing material and equipment, which, along with self sufficiency
and
defense readiness, is one of the FAR's three main goals."14 The Tripartite
Agreement of 1988 ended the conflict in Angola bringing an end to the FAR's
overseas military mission. Moreover, the military budget was slashed by
nearly half
between 1989 and 1991 and expenditures as a percentage of GNP declined
from
3.9 percent in 1987 to 2.4 percent in 1993 and 1.6 percent in 1995.15 Troop
strength declined dramatically, from a high of 180,500 in 1990 to 105,000
in 1995.
Spare parts for aircraft, ships, vehicles and other equipment became scarce,
increasing equipment downtime and the cannibalization or mothballing of
existing
equipment. The end of the FAR's overseas combat activities coupled with
the
downsizing and curtailment of personnel, equipment and training contributed
to the
deprofessionalization and, some have noted, demoralization of the armed
forces.16
This problem was exacerbated when FAR officers returning from Angola were
put to
work not in the training field but in sugar and other essential crop production.
As a
result, a number of important and highly visible defections occurred during
the
period of intense adjustment and restructuring (1987-1993) of the MINFAR.
The court-martial and execution of General Arnaldo Ochoa, a decorated Hero
of the
Republic, in 1989 on charges of corruption offered an opportunity for the
regime to
assert control and weaken the esprit the corps, prestige and autonomy obtained
by
the institution after years of professionalization and internationalism.17
General
Ochoa, hugely popular with veterans of Angola, represented the type of
officer that
the Castros most feared could lead to a Bonapartist challenge to their
power.
Moreover, Case 2/89 offered an opportunity to purge the FAR and the Ministry
of
Interior (MININT) of officers suspected of being influenced by glasnost
and
perestroika.18 In the end, as Mujal-Leon and Busby note, the execution
of Ochoa
and subsequent purges "underscores the existence of tensions associated
with the
return of combat-weary and Soviet-trained veterans" from Angola.19
Raul Castro, along with key Raulistas such as General Abelardo Colome Ibarra
and
General Carlos Fernandez Gondin, were the key protagonist in the court-martial
of
Ochoa. During the court-martial, Ochoa was accused of betrayal, violation
of
revolutionary values, and failure to uphold the revolutionary code. Fidel
and Raul's
main task was to discredit Ochoa's character and military capabilities
while
inducing the forty-seven generals and admirals of the Military Honor Tribunal
to
make critical statements about the general as an expression and reaffirmation
of
their revolutionary commitment and loyalty to Fidel and Raul.20 The Ochoa
case
was a "convenient shorthand for a wider and much more complex official
attempt to
resolve several crises confronting the regime simultaneously." The purge
and Raul
Castro's prominent role was not only about the regime's attempt to reaffirm
its
hierarchical and political control of the military, but it "enabled the
faction of military
officers around Raul Castro to consolidate and extend its control over
both the
armed forces and security services."21 In the end, the execution of Ochoa
and
three other officers from the FAR and the MININT stood as a warning to
military
men and state security agencies of the fate that would await them if they
ever
crossed Fidel and Raul.22
With respect to MININT, in July 1989 Minister Jose Abrantes and three of
his
associate were arrested. Soon the MININT was "cleansed" of "wayward
revolutionaries," including five generals and nearly sixty mid-level officers.
The
demise of Abrantes and decimation of MININT was, in part, provoked by the
resentment and envy of Raul Castro, but, more importantly, it was Raul's
attempt
to consolidate and extend his control over one of the most important and
powerful
sectors and institutions of Cuban society. Raul conclusively guaranteed
command
of the state's repressive arm by removing high MININT officials and replacing
them
with loyal FAR officers, such as General Colome, deputy vice-minister of
MINFAR,
and General Fernandez Gondin, head of FAR counterintelligence, as minister
and
vice-minister, respectively, of MININT. In the end, MININT becomes a branch
of
MINFAR and, accordingly, of Raulismo. In other words, as a result of MINFAR's
control of state security, it became what it had never been since the early
1960s -
part of the regime's internal security apparatus. In the aftermath of the
Ochoa case
with the purge of the FAR and MININT, absorption of MININT into MINFAR,
and the
military's growing role in the economy, by 1991 the armed forces, and,
consequently, Raul, had extended its control to areas deemed critical to
the
survival of the regime. In short, this important incident allowed Castro
to reassert
his authority, and also enabled the faction of the military officers around
Raul
Castro to consolidate and extend his control over both the armed forces
and the
security services.
Raulismo and the Economic Role of the FAR
As a result of the material and political challenges to society and Revolution,
the
leadership turned, once again, as it did in the early 1960s to the armed
forces in a
mobilization campaign to protect the revolution by contributing its expertise
and
manpower to mending and restructuring the economy. Once the FAR had been
reorganized and control by the revolutionary leadership reasserted, the
military
once again became the trusted institution and was given a decisive role
in helping
the regime weather a difficult period of crisis. In other words, the technical
capabilities of a "cleansed" and disciplined institution, under the authority
of Raul
Castro, contributed to the regime's decision to rely on the FAR in implementing
Raul's proposal for economic modernization. The leadership had to rely
on the FAR
because all other institutions, the PCC above all, were failing to perform.
The
absence of a civil society and independent entrepreneurs placed the burden
of the
economy on the military. There simply was no societal alternative. As Michael
Radu asserts, "since the latter 1980s, economic crisis, institutional sclerosis
and
shifts in policy have forced the regime to rely on a trusted pillar of
the regime: the
FAR. The militarization of the regime, expressed by the overwhelming role
of the
FAR in all aspects of policy and economy seems to be the answer to the
situation."23 Also, as one Latin American diplomat based in Havana aptly
described in 1995, "reality of Cuba in 1995 is that the military is one
of the few, if
not the only, institution that really and truly work.
Revolutionary fervor has vanished, and with it the credibility of the party,
leaving
only the armed forces to fill the vacuum."24 Even before the collapse of
the USSR,
the military had been called upon by Raul, and after Fidel's consent, to
manage
some key areas of the economy. Starting with the Third Party Congress in
1986,
Raul insisted on the need to apply military efficiency and discipline to
the civilian
economy. When in 1991 Fidel Castro stated that "one of the tasks of the
armed
forces is to help the economy of the country during the Special Period,"
and in
1993 when Raul asserted, in reference to the military's mission, "beans
are more
important than cannons," it was clear that the FAR's mission had been redefined.
However it is important to remember, that it was Raul Castro that took
over the
process of reorganizing the FAR in a dual effort to enhance the role and
contribution of the military to the national economy while ensuring his
control and
support of the military. In other words, Raul played a pivotal role restructuring
the
economy and military in effort to secure the survival of the regime and
his position
as Fidel's heir apparent.25
The centrality of Raul Castro's role in reorganizing the military while
placing it at the
center of his economic reforms and modernization program enhanced the profile
of
the FAR, the institution he heads and hopes will help him further consolidate
his
position as a post-Fidel era approaches. Raulismo is the process by which
Raul
Castro enhanced his role and that of the institution he commands in sectors
deemed critical for the regime during the Special Period, helping him to
strengthen
and consolidate his position and that of the FAR in society and, consequently,
in a
post-Fidel transition. Raul Castro is more flexible ideologically than
his brother and
is aware of the situation on the ground in a way that Fidel is not and
realizes that
change is necessary. Raul's more pragmatic approach led him to propose
opening
the economy, if only slightly, to a new system of farmer's market and to
the
military's direct role in key economic sectors such as agricultural production
and
construction (hotels, public utility projects, and industrial centers).
Vice-President
Carlos Lage, a top economic official said the farmers' market and other
economic
reforms had been "strongly pushed by Raul but with the support of Fidel."
Raul was
mentioned repeatedly in the press or by high government, party or military
officials
as the "architect," "father," or "brains" behind Cuba's effort to save
the revolution
from economic crisis.26 General Senen Casas, the late Minister of Transportation,
proclaimed that the "goal was to follow faithfully Raul's guidance and
Fidel's
thinking."27 It is important to note that Raul is not usurping power, but
is playing a
more active role in government, economic, and party affairs in preparation
for a
transition to a post-Fidel era. This is an essential tenet of Raulismo.
One important component of Raulismo is the increasing number of Raulistas
appointed by Raul to key government, economic and party posts. Raulistas
are
either veterans of the 26 of July Movement, who fought alongside Raul in
the
Second Eastern Front, or high-ranking MINFAR officers who have demonstrated
repeatedly their commitment and loyalty to Raul Castro but have been appointed
by Raul to key posts in the economy, bureaucracy and MINFAR.28 In the
mid-1990s, Raul personally replaced half of the PCC's first secretaries
with younger
pro-Army men, and in the 1997 Party congress he was central in selecting
new
members to the Central Committee and Politburo, many of which are Raulista
officers of the MINFAR. Furthermore, high-ranking Raulistas in the military
were
named to head the MININT (General Abelardo Colome Ibarra), and key strategic
economic sectors such as the Ministry of Sugar (General Ulises Rosales
del Toro,
former Chief of General Staff), Ministry of Fisheries and Merchant Marine
(Navy
Capt. Orlando Rodriguez Romay), Ministry of Transport and Ports (Colonel
Alvaro
Perez Morales), Gaviota Enterprises (General Luis Perez Rospide), Cuban
Civil
Aviation Corporation (Rogelio Acevedo) and other important state institutions
and
economic entities. The prominence of Raul is paralleled by the visibility
and
growing power of those institutions he and his loyal Raulistas now control.
In short,
Raul Castro and his loyalists have assumed a wider range of official duties,
playing
a more prominent role in the running of the military, economy, government
and (to a
lesser extent) PCC - central pillars of the regime that will help Raul
consolidate his
position in a post-Fidel Cuba.
In the late 1980s, Raul initiated a program that saw a number of high-ranking
FAR
officers travel to Western Europe to study new business methods and practices
that could be applied in military and civilian industries in Cuba. They
also closely
studied and admired the model of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA).
Raul
Castro argued that the FAR had the managerial skill, expertise and knowledge
of
Western business techniques needed to improve the efficiency of state-run
industries and meet the material and defense needs of the country. Thus,
as
Edward Gonzalez notes, "Raul, the Army, and a younger generation of civilian
leaders and technocrats, many personally linked to him, are spearheading
the
economic changes that the regime has so far implemented… pressing forward
with
limited, incremental reforms to stabilize the economy and prevent a political
crisis."29 According to Phyllis Greene Walker, an expert on the Cuban military,
there is evidence "that goes back to the party congress held in the late
80s, out of
which the decision emerged that the military should try to improve its
efficiency and
productivity, through what is known as the sistema de perfeccionamiento
empresarial - business improvement system."30 According to Cuban officials,
"perfeccionamiento empresarial's main objective is to increase maximum
competition and efficiency of the base power, and establish the policies,
principles
and procedures that propel the development of innovation, creativity and
the
responsibility of all managers and workers."31 As one of the architects
of the
reform process asserted in explaining perfeccionamiento empresarial, the
goal of
the MINFAR was to provide "new technical and entrepreneurial solutions
to old
problems."32
It is important to note that the FAR's new economic role is not solely
an issue of
the leadership turning to a reliable entity for help in a time of crisis.
The new role is
also due to simple necessity. The dramatic decline in budget, troops, and
equipment in the early 1990s was a direct result of the disappearance of
Soviet
military aid and the crisis of the Cuban economy.33 In the 1990s, the new
mission
offered the armed forces a means to compensate for the loss of Soviet largesse
while contributing to the national economy. Specifically, the FAR adopted
a plan of
self-sufficiency, particularly in the area of agriculture and production
of some
consumer goods. By 1993, the FAR covered 50 percent of its expenditures
with
funds generated from its own units. In other words, the armed forces have
sought to
generate foreign exchange so as to be able to sustain them as a military
force
without being a load on the state or a burden on the rest of the economy.
Nonetheless, the focus of the regime's plan was to have the military contribute
substantively to turning the economy around. As Raul Castro stated in 1993,
"the
principal economic, political, ideological, and military responsibility
of the FAR is to
continue enhancing the efficiency in production, particularly foodstuffs
and
sugar."34 Therefore, since the late 1980s, military goals have emphasized
institutional self-sufficiency and help in producing and distributing much
needed
agricultural goods and services.
The most important military is the Union de Empresas Militares (UEM). The
UEM
is the largest military-run industrial complex consisting of about 230
factories and
companies. The UEM formerly headed by General Luis Perez Rospide an
important technocrat and Raulista, is now led by Colonel Luis Bernal Leon.
Colonel
Bernal is also another important technocrat that received much of his training
and
education in management programs in Europe. The UEM, specifically the Ernesto
Che Guevara Military Industrial Enterprise, was the first complex chosen
to
undergo restructuring under the new business improvement system. The UEM
is
involved in biotechnology, sugar mills, pharmaceuticals, and the production
and
repair of light armaments and consumer goods. Since 1996 UEM increased
its
participation in the civilian economy, manufacturing clothing, mechanical
and
consumer items for the civilian market in addition to providing services
for repairs of
industrial equipment and consumer goods. It is believed that 32 percent
of the
FAR's production is destined for the island's civilian economic sectors.
Also, more
than 75 percent of all repairs and spare parts for civilian industries
come from
military enterprises.35
Most UEM's companies have become efficient and profitable. The Che Guevara
Industrial Enterprise has done so well in recent years that new housing
for more
than 3,000 of its military and civilian employees was built on the premises
of the
complex. This level of penetration and exposure has significantly enhanced
the
prestige and influence of the armed forces in the process of economic
modernization and regime stability. The military's stake in the status
quo and in an
orderly transition has grown as a result of its contribution to alleviating
Cuba's
economic problems and because of the benefits accrued from its new and
dominant economic role. The military's central role in helping the regime
overcome
economic crisis has provided it with a greater political profile and influence
that will
not lead to extrication but direct involvement in any transition.
In 1992-1993 the military began to expand its control to industries and
economic
sectors involved in hard currency transactions. The best-known military
enterprise
is a large tourist agency known as the Gaviota Tourism Group. It is the
most
important and profitable of the military's enterprises. General Rospide
now leads
Gaviota. Gaviota is involved in virtually every aspect of tourism in Cuba,
including
luxury hotels, discotheques, restaurants, hunting preserves, marinas, spas,
bus
tours, fishing excursions, shopping malls and a large taxicab fleet and
airplane
flights which transport tourists with the help of air force pilots.36 There
are about
ten enterprises in Gaviota that manage nearly 25% of Cuba's total tourism
trade.
Since 1993, Gaviota has established a number of subsidiaries; Texnotec,
dedicated to information technology and electronic equipment; Turcimex,
cargo and
mail delivery; TRD (tiendas para la recaudacion de divisas), a department
store
chair that sells expensive imported goods, mostly to tourists; and Aerocaribe,
which provides transportation and shipping for tourism; Marinas Gaviota,
Arcoiris
and Via Auto Rentals.37
Finally, although not bureaucratically taken over by the MINFAR, the most
important industry in Cuba, sugar, came under the control of a respected
and
fiercely loyal Raulista military officer, General Ulises Rosales del Toro,
Hero of the
Republic and former chief of the general staff.
After several disastrous sugarcane harvests between 1991 and 1995, mostly
due to
the scarcity of fuel, financing, and spare parts, the military stepped
in to rescue
this floundering but critically important industry of the Cuban economy
applying
many of the military's new organizational and technical methods. However,
the
Sugar Ministry was not placed under a strict sistema de perfeccionamiento
empresarial plan. As Juan Carlos Espinosa and Robert Harding note, the
MINFAR's involvement in the ministry is more consistent with the traditional
activities of the military in the 1960s providing labor, leadership and
mobilization
than with the business improvement system of recent years.38 The results
of the
MINFAR's involvement in the sugar industry have been mixed. Despite signs
of
recuperation, since 1996 harvests have not surpassed 4.3 million tons and
in 2000
it is expected to be less than four million.
As with many issues related to the Cuban military and its involvement in
the
economy, scholars disagree on the long-term consequences of such a role,
particularly as it relates to institutional cohesion and its relationship
with the
leadership and party. With respect to party-military relations, if the
FAR is
perceived to have succeeded in meeting its economic tasks by the civilian
population, while other civilian institutions remain discredited and impotent,
military
leadership may try to assert a new position of independence.39 As Michael
Radu
notes, the FAR's dominant economic role has led its leadership to expand
its "area
of influence and control… at the expense of all other political and social
institutions."40 Richard Millet points out that an important downside to
the
increasing participation of officers in a variety of economic-related tasks,
"frequently
involving assignment to entities with no discernible relations to national
defense,
tends to erode military skills and produce a new set of interests and loyalties
that
may conflict with military necessities."41 Moreover, as with the People's
Liberation
Army (PLA) in China, corruption begins to seep through the cracks creating
new
priorities and loyalties for officers more interested in making money than
in fulfilling
military tasks. The exposure to economic activities and the rise of corruption
erode
the central values of any military, such as centralized command, hierarchy,
discipline, intercommunication and the esprit de corps.42 The truth is
that at this
time we do not know the full effect of the FAR's involvement. As Espinosa
and
Harding have suggested, it could go either way, "the question remains whether
these economic activities increase loyalty and cohesion of the FAR and
the
regime, or whether it promotes individualism, capitalist ambitions, and
regime
disloyalty."43 Military data is hard to come by. Moreover, the duration,
depth and
breadth of economic reforms and military involvement, though clearly growing,
is
such that the consequences of the FAR's commercial activities have yet
to fully
develop. Proof of rampant corruption is difficult to confirm; however,
anecdotal
evidence demonstrates that with relatively easy access to dollars, fuel,
food and
vehicles, corruption is increasing. For one thing, economic crisis and
reform in
Cuba has contributed to pervasive corruption at all levels of Cuban society.
Despite
institutional checks, "the FAR are a part of society and are prone to the
same
needs and pressures, whether it's a young draftee stealing gasoline from
a truck to
resell in the black market" or an active or retired high-ranking officer
skimming
profits or selling goods stolen from the industry he manages.44
Other scholars argue quite the opposite. They maintain that by providing
the
military with another important task tied to the survival of the regime,
the leadership
has strengthened its ties and control of the armed forces. Despite some
initial
signs of problems, "one does not find the kind of institutional cleavages
that would
threaten the cohesion of the armed forces, nor is there reason to believe
that the
armed forces deviate from the civilian leadership on fundamental issues
of domestic
and foreign policy. For elites and troops alike, a system of incentives
and rewards
limits problems of disaffection."45 Rather than this new economic mission
contributing to discontent and equivocal loyalties within the FAR, it has
offered
many active and retired officers the means of protecting themselves from
the
effects of the economic crisis, thus intensifying their ties and stake
in the stability
of the regime. Many officers, particularly from the air force, have found
that working
in these enterprises provides them with better salaries and access to certain
goods
and services not available to the general population. In the early period
of economic
restructuring and FAR downsizing, morale was low; however, increasingly,
officers
have been given employment opportunities and even managerial positions
in
military-run enterprises, particularly Gaviota. As a result, many retired
and active
duty officers attained a higher standard of living than most Cubans have.
Therefore,
not only does the new economic role help reassure the institutional survival
of the
FAR during the Special Period, but it allows many of its high-and middle-ranking
officers to take advantage of emerging and lucrative opportunities in these
areas.
This has partially alleviated the problem of morale in the military. By
running its
own enterprises, the FAR contributes to the national economy, ensures its
own
budget, and maintains a decent standard of living for its officers -- always
a key to
military loyalty. The top brass is solidly behind the new economic role
and
lower-ranking officers are gradually gaining from FAR's new direction.
One scholar
of this interpretation, Juan del Aguila suggests, "a new class of military
entrepreneurs has emerged. Their increasing dependence and focus on these
ventures… [is] raising its [military's] stake in the regime's survival."46
In other
words, these economic opportunities have strengthened the military's ties
to the
architect of economic reform and patron of the military's involvement in
the
economy - Minister of MINFAR General Raul Castro. In other words, by offering
the
military economic opportunities and a higher political profile, Raul Castro
purchased and guaranteed the FAR's support and loyalty for Raulismo.47
It is clear that enhanced economic influence and profile has translated
into some
political power. The FAR's political visibility has increased since the
early 1990s.
After the Fourth PCC Congress in 1991 that saw military representation
in the
Central Committee and Politburo drop to its lowest point ever, largely
a function of
military reorganization and the Ochoa case, the military's political influence
began
to rise as it assumed a larger role in economic survival. In the Fifth
PCC Congress
in 1997 the military was singled out for praise and, subsequently, rewarded
for its
service during a period of political and economic crisis. Representation
of key
officers in the Central Committee rose from 12.5 percent in 1991 to 17.4
percent in
1997. Moreover, presence of military Raulistas in the Politburo, the highest
body of
the PCC, also rose after the 1997 congress. By the end of the 1997 congress,
the
total number of military officers in the Politburo was five out of twenty-four,
the
highest percentage since 1975. The military's representation in the PCC
should not
be overemphasized, however. As Amuchastegui states, what is critical in
understanding the source and indefatigability of the military's power is
"its
overwhelming centrality… in every single area of policymaking." As the
political
leadership expands the responsibility of the military to various levels
of the
government and party, increasingly one finds, at the apex of the political
system,
the fusion between high military rank, political responsibility and ministerial
duties.
Apart from the military's dominant role in the economy, bureaucracy, and
state
security, its representatives, specifically Raulistas, are now at the pinnacle
of
political power, in control of strategic economic sectors, security services,
and at
the highest levels of the PCC.
Categorization and Fragmentation: The FAR and Tensions with Raulismo The
personalist-mobilizational nature of the Castro regime coupled with the
effects of
the reorganization and readjustments of the Cuban military, economy and
society
has produced certain divisions or factions that could represent a challenge
to
Raul's project of consolidating power. Juan Carlos Espinosa and Juan Benemelis
note in separate studies that the country's political culture and tradition
is one of
factionalism between competing groups struggling for power and dominance.
Rather than destroying all vestiges of factionalism, Fidel Castro actually
encourages the existence of competing groups as long as they remain loyal
to his
power and project. As mentioned above, the FAR is not a unitary actor and
the
regime is not monolithic. In fact, Castro's decision-making style is one
in which "he
hovers above the fray of debate with feigned detachment before casting
his
(decisive) vote with courtiers vying for his favor up till the last moment.
In the
dictator's absence, the high level of FAR factionalism and regime fragmentation
may surprise some observers who have confused unanimity with unity."48
In other
words, mobilizational regimes so dependent on the charisma and unity provided
by
the leader are inherently vulnerable and prone to collapse in the absence
the ruler.
According to Juan Benemelis, Fidel Castro has not provided a clear set
of legal
mechanisms that will infuse his successor with legitimacy.49 Benemelis,
a skeptic
of the inevitability of Raul's succession, asserts that "the disappearance
of Fidel
Castro, no mater when it occurs, will create a vacuum of power that will
lead to a
long and cruel struggle among factions within the armed forces, state bureaucracy,
technocrats and the historical elite with possibilities of violence." Therefore,
it's very
plausible that in the absence of Fidel Castro, Cuba may fall back to its
tradition of
political infighting as competing groups struggle for control and influence
in a
post-Fidel Cuba. This represents an important challenge to Raulismo.
Some analysts have attempted to identify many of these informal groups
or
factions within different areas of the Cuban state and society. This section,
however, will only attempt to explore cleavages within the armed forces
that could
potentially create difficulties for Raulismo. There are three fissures
that have
surfaced in the last ten to twelve years caused by the military's role
in the
economy and consequences associated with Raul Castro's restructuring and
reorganization (particularly after the Ochoa case) of Cuban society, state
and
armed forces. First, the FAR's massive contribution to the economy led
to the
development of three types of soldiers as described by Jorge Dominguez,
Frank O.
Mora, and Juan Carlos Espinosa.50 The desegregation of the FAR according
to
specific economic roles and access to the dollar economy has not only weakened
unity but it has created disparate and conflicting set of interests and,
potentially,
loyalties.
In the early stages of the revolution, because of a shortage of labor,
army officers
were assigned to all sorts of economic, military and administrative tasks,
ranging
from agricultural production to labor construction and natural disaster
relief. The
military and civilian responsibilities were fused to produce what Jorge
Dominguez
called "civic-soldier." In the 1970s the Youth Labor Movement (Ejercito
Juvenil de
Trabajo, EJT) assumed many of the agricultural and construction responsibilities
as
the FAR professionalized, but in the late 1980s, the FAR, along with the
EJT,
expanded its role organizing agricultural and construction units. With
the goal of
self-sufficiency, the FAR began to manage farms and lead construction units,
thus
returning to the "traditional military industries of the old economy" of
the
civic-soldier. Many high-ranking civic-soldiers are closely tied to the
socialist
economy, thus have limited access to foreign exchange.
The second type of soldier to emerge in the 1990s, particularly as a result
of the
implementation of the sistema de perfeccionamiento empresarial, was what
Frank
O. Mora describes as the "technocrat-soldier." This soldier is defined
as a
"manager and administrator, in addition to being a soldier." He implements
modern
organizational and technical business practices and methods to enhance
the
efficiency and productivity of military and civilian industries during
a period of crisis
and change for the regime. The technocrat-soldier applies his management
training
to the FAR's military-industrial complex, i.e. UEM. The technocrat-soldier
is also
present in a number of state enterprises and ministries such as transportation,
fisheries, sugar, communication, state reserves and aviation. The principal
technocrat-soldiers, like General Julio Casas Regueiro (Deputy Minister
of MINFAR
and head of the ministry's Department of Economic Affairs), General Luis
Perez
Rospide, Colonel Armando Perez Betancourt, and Colonel Eladio Fernandez
Civico, are all logistics experts and/or engineers trained in management
techniques. More importantly, they are all well-known Raulistas. General
Casas
heads the large Grupo de Administracion Empresarial, SA (GAESA) that oversees
all these operations. The executive director of GAESA is Major Luis Alberto
Rodriguez, son in law of Raul Castro.
The third variant of soldier is entrepreneur-soldier. According to Juan
Carlos
Espinosa, this officer is a "technocat-soldier with greater autonomy and
with
greater access to the international dollar economy." He is involved in
commercial
enterprises, mixed enterprises, and sociedades anonimas (privately run,
state-owned corporations), particularly those associated with new economic
ventures, such as tourism, trade, telecommunications and banking, many
of which
are financed by foreign investors. Many of these soldiers, active and retired,
represent many profitable enterprises. In addition to Gaviota, S.A., some
of these
enterprises include Habanos (tobacco monopoly), Omnivideo (film and video
distribution), CIMEX (import-export monopoly), COPEXTEL (electronics
conglomerate), and ETECSA (telecommunications). Some entrepreneur-soldiers
are Raulistas. However, since many of these enterprises do not necessarily
respond to any state organism and are led by retired MINFAR and MININT
officers
(possessing a significant amount of influence as a result of their autonomy
and
access to dollars) many operate very much outside of Raul's sphere of influence
and control. As Espinosa notes, "while all three kinds of soldiers can
parlay their
positions into privilege, status, and some sort of personal financial benefit,
it is the
entrepreneur-soldier who has the best environment in which to maximize
their
potential" for profit and political influence. Of course, the negative
consequence of
this kind of role and soldier is "corruption, insubordination, and the
creation of pools
of autonomy incompatible with the interest of the state" and that of Raul.
There are several important cases since 1989 of corruption that directly
or indirectly
involve FAR officers. For example, in 1995 the Minister and Vice-minister
of
Domestic Trade, Colonels Manuel Vila Sosa and Manuel Sanz Farras,
respectively, were removed after allegations of financial fraud. Also,
General Tomas
Benitez, former director of Gaviota, was fired for receiving commissions
from foreign
clients. The most obvious case of blatant corruption within the military
is that of
General Julio Casas Regueiro, major guiding hand of the military's commercial
involvement and a man close to Raul Castro tainted by charges of corruption
in his
dealings on the economic front.51 He is occasionally accused of establishing
a
system of privilege around himself and his staff. However, because of his
close ties
to Raul and important role in the reform process, he remains, for the time
being,
untouchable.
A second important fissure that could represent problems for Raul's succession
is
the command structure of the FAR. It is important to remember that much
of Fidel
Castro's legitimacy among elite emanates from his power and influence over
institutions and his political and moral authority, particularly within
the FAR. Raul
Castro, by virtue of being defense minister, possesses institutional authority
but
lacks the political and moral component needed to mobilize support and
consolidate power after Fidel has past from the scene.52 The organization
and
military structure is decentralized into the three independent army corps
subordinated, in a formal sense, to the Minister of MINFAR and the Commander
in
Chief. The structure of MINFAR is clearly under the direction of Raulistas,
but
those commanding troops in the three regional armies are led by generals
promoted by and loyal to Fidel Castro, many of them having fought with
General
Ochoa in Africa.53 Since their promotions and longevity of command is due
to
Fidel their loyalty is, in a substantive and direct sense, to the maximum
leader.
According to much anecdotal evidence, there is much rancor, suspicion,
and
jealousy between MINFAR bureaucrats (Raulistas) and commanders in the field.
It
is important to note that since 1998, perhaps in order to counter this
potential
challenge, Raul Castro has visited each of the three commands at least
two to
three times a year in an effort to establish a more direct and personal
relationship
with the commanders and troops.
The final cleavage within the FAR that can potentially become a source
of problems
for Raul at the time of succession is generational. Alvaro Alba has recently
emphasized that since the early 1990s the regime has dramatically slowed
the
process of promoting many mid-ranking officers, preferring to promote some
colonels while keeping most general officers in service beyond retirement.54
Most
promotions within the FAR were due to the need to fill positions left vacant
after
several FAR generals were reassigned to MININT. In other words, there has
been
much lateral movement within the highest levels of the FAR and between
the armed
forces and MININT, but limited vertical ascending from within the FAR.
One notable
exception is Army General Alvaro Lopez Miera, Chief of the General Staff
and
Vice-Minister, who between 1980 and 1989 served as a colonel in several
posts in
the Eastern Army, was rapidly promoted surpassing many brigade and division
generals ultimately awarded the title of Hero of the Republic.
Another related development that is the cause of much discontent among
younger
generation of officers was the decision of the regime to reinstate to important
positions in the armed forces several veterans who had retired from the
FAR.
Today, there is no possibility of promotion based on professional experience
or
accomplishments, but rather the criteria has changed to an emphasis on
political
loyalty and commitment to the regime and corp. This has resulted in the
recycling
of old military elite with established political credentials back into
key positions in
the military and bureaucracy, freezing the promotion of those below the
rank of
colonel with extensive professional experience, even battlefield experience,
but no
record of political and ideological commitment. Two examples of retired
officers that
were reinstated, not because of their competence but their proven loyalty
to Raul
are General Sixto Batista Santana, named Chief of the Political-Ideological
Directorate of the MINFAR in 2001, and General Antonio Enrique Lusson Battle,
assigned to command Special Troops. There is some anecdotal evidence to
suggests that officers below the rank of colonel are demoralized and have
no
interest in contributing to the continuity of the regime under Raul, who
they blame
for the deprofessionalization of the FAR.55 Also, many of these officers
resent the
increasing levels of corruption and the division within the military between
those
with access to the dollar economy (many high ranking active and retired
officers)
and those mid-ranking cadres that are prohibited from participating. At
the moment
of succession, the issue is perhaps not so much whether the commander will
support Raul but whether the rest of the officer corps will stand behind
the
commanders and Raul.
Once again, this analysis is not meant to put in doubt the high probability
that
Raul, after more than a decade of paving the path for his own succession,
will play
a central role in the succession. This discussion of cleavages within the
armed
forces is only to point out that that the military is not monolithic and,
subsequently,
Raul's power and succession is not absolute or inevitable.
Scenarios
Not only is change inevitable, but also the preeminence of Raulismo indicates
that
that transition to a post-Castro Cuba has begun. The only thing in doubt
is the
direction or path of the transition. This section will examine three potential
post-Fidel scenarios, specifically in terms of the role played by the two
key
variables or actors examined in this paper: the FAR and Raulismo. Though
the
scenarios remain preliminary and speculative, they are based on the evidence
and
analysis discussed in this paper. They are ranked from weakest to strongest
in
likelihood. The first path is one in which the military, because of deepening
cleavages (along ideological and economic interest lines) and increasing
societal
pressure for real reform disintegrates unable to support Raul's project
or control a
social protest. This collapse scenario could lead to a popular revolt that
would
spread to sectors of the military. This possibility is least likely largely
because
society remains powerless unable to mount or organize any challenge during
the
transition. Moreover, the military maintains the coercive capacity, along
with
MININT, to suppress societal upheaval. Also, all evidence suggests that
elite within
the regime will dominate the immediate post-Castro era. Despite the rifts
within the
FAR, they are not pronounced enough to lead to the disintegration of the
armed
forces. In the last ten to twelve years, Raul Castro has made every effort
to keep
the military a unified and cohesive institution supportive of his project.
The second possible scenario, argued by Cuba military analyst Juan Benemelis,
is
based on the notion that Raul's power and leadership is superficial and
largely a
function and extension of Fidel's overwhelming legitimacy, particularly
within the
armed forces. Raul does not possess the authority or mass-based support
that
Fidel enjoys. Therefore, Raul will not be a dominant actor as his prerogatives
diminish substantially when Fidel is gone. Benemelis argues that Raul has
not
been able to impose absolute and vertical control over the FAR. The Raulistas
within MINFAR (having no command of troops) would be pushed aside by more
professional FAR officers in the regional commands. As a result, Raul would
be
obligated to accommodate and provide concessions to certain groups and
officers,
redistributing power and authority among competing groups within the FAR.
Another direction within this scenario is the military discarding Raul
and his
entourage in favor of a civilian-military government that pushes for greater
integration into the international system and acceleration of political
and economic
reform. Despite the cleavages and fragmentation, it is unlikely that the
military
would turn against Raul. It is true that Raul will not be able to govern
like Fidel
(using ideological and mobilizational tactics); therefore, he will have
to change the
present structure via a distribution of functions and political influence.
However,
Benemelis underestimates Raulismo (i.e., carefully nurturing and promoting
military
and civilian leaders loyal to him and his economic reforms), and assumes
that the
military after years of obtaining economic benefits will not have a stake
in ensuring
a peaceful and orderly transition under Raul's leadership. In other words,
the FAR
is motivated not by any loyalty to a figure possessing moral or revolutionary
authority, but by a self-interested calculation that Raul is the leader
that will ensure
their economic privileges and political influence are not threatened. Finally,
as
noted by a former FAR officer in exile since 1995, "the military command
does not
recognize nor trust the authority or legitimacy of civilians, such as Ricardo
Alarcon
and Carlos Lage, to assume maximum direction of the government."56
The most likely path is one that has been discussed by the author in a
previous
work and Juan Carlos Espinosa, an expert on Cuban society and military.57
This
option argues that a Raulista succession will lead to "the creation of
a
military-civilian government that maintains the current model, but of a
soft variant
that allows greater economic freedoms, while restricting political freedoms,
i.e. the
Chinese model."58 Raul Castro has on several occasions, along with other
powerful leaders such as Abelardo Colome, and Ramiro Valdes, expressed
interest
in "Cubanizing" the Chinese model. In fact, this author has previously
argued that
Raulismo is, in many ways, an attempt to adopt the Chinese model with Cuban
characteristics.59 Raul Castro would be joined by a group of civilian technocrats
and reformers (promoted by Raul to important positions in the party, government,
and bureaucracy during the last ten years), many of them under the age
of
forty-five, who will provide technical and political support to Raul's
project. In this
scenario, "the FAR maintains their high levels of prerogatives, medium-high
levels
of autonomy, low levels of control and contestation from civilians." Raul
Castro will
have to negotiate and share some power with hard-liners and other influential
elements in the government and bureaucracy, but it will not be, as some
have
suggested "a collective exercise in shared responsibility and authority"
as was the
case in the immediate post-Stalin period in the USSR.60 Finally, Raul Castro
would take a more pragmatic approach toward the United States hoping to
normalize relations with Washington as he attempts to consolidate his position
and
program. This process will open multiple opportunities for economic and
political
reforms as the regime focuses more on its survival than ideological purity
of the
revolution and anti-Americanism.
Conclusions: U.S. Policies and Strategies
The expansion of the FAR's participation in the economy and the concomitant
rise
of the technocrat and entrepreneur-soldier was the result of the intersection
between the need for increased efficiency, heightened loyalty, and incorruptibility
ascribed to the military, and the need to maintain regime loyalty amidst
the
precipitous economic decline of the Special Period. Military involvement
in the
economy was motivated by a need to exploit its manpower and managerial
expertise to help the ravaged Cuban economy, and a strategy of offering
economic
opportunities to the compensate for a loss of resources and personnel while
giving
officers a stake in the survival of the regime. The military's participation
in the
economy and opportunities in lucrative industries mitigated any morale
problem
that may have emerged during the early period of restructuring and mission
change. It also helped strengthen and consolidate ties between the armed
forces
and Raul Castro, the author of economic modernization and proponent of
the FAR's
authoritative role in the economy and society. Specifically, Raul Castro
is
responsible for instituting a system of incentives and rewards, symbolic
or real,
which not only mitigated disaffection but also, more importantly, secured
a largely
committed military loyal to the regime and his leadership. Raul Castro's
dominant
role in restructuring and reorienting Cuban institutions and economy during
a period
of crisis demonstrates his growing indispensability for the stability and
future of the
Revolution. The objective of Raulismo is not limited to surviving the crisis
of the
Special Period, but to securing his plan of succeeding Fidel with the full
support of
the FAR.
The restructuring and readjustments of the last decade in the Cuban military,
particularly in its role in the economy and heightening of its political
profile, has
assured it a decisive role in a post-Fidel transition. Under any conceivable
scenario
the military will continue to be a key, decisive player. This author wholeheartedly
concurs with the notion stated by others that the military will not extricate
itself
from any process of political change. On the contrary, the FAR have played
a
crucial role in helping the regime extricate itself from its internal and
external crisis.
They have "laid the foundations for a stable restructuring and continuity
of the
regime," guaranteeing its place as the dominant actor in Cuban politics
and
society.
A powerful and proud institution, the armed forces would see any attempt
to
undermine the regime and Raulismo as a direct threat to its interests and
the
stability of the regime and Revolution. Their control under the Castro
regime of key
economic sectors will make it more difficult in the future to dislodge
them from
these activities and to limit their role to a strictly military one when
the transition
begins. The military will attempt to guide and shape a transition that
safeguards its
newfound economic and political interests and privileges. Raulismo has
insured
that the military play exactly that role in the expectation that the military
equates
its interests with those of Raul Castro.
At the moment, there is very limited contact between the U.S. and Cuban
militaries. This is a function of a high level of mutual distrust and conflict
in bilateral
relations that both sides seem to encourage. After all, it has been the
modus
vivendi for the last 40 years. However, on two occasions in 2001, Raul
Castro
indicated repeatedly that he favors better relations with the United States
before
Fidel is gone from the scene. More importantly, in the last few years the
FAR has
spearheaded Raul's (with Fidel's cautious blessing) efforts to reach out
to the U.S.
armed forces. In 2001, Raul Castro appointed General Jesus Bermudez Cutino,
former head of the FAR's counterintelligence unit, director of the Center
for Defense
Information Studies (CDIS). According to Stratfor, the CDIS is a think
tank linked to
the FAR charged "with building a favorable impression of the FAR in the
Pentagon
and U.S. defense establishment." Since 1998, the Center for Defense Information
(CDI), a Washington-based think tank, has sponsored several delegations,
led by
retired four-star U.S. generals (Atkeson, Sheehan, Wilhelm, and McCaffrey),
to the
island to hold meetings with CDIS officials and active FAR officers.
The results and recommendations that have come from these meetings offer
interesting and useful starting points for enhanced cooperation between
the U.S.
and Cuban militaries. There are several security issues of common interests,
such
as terrorism, international crime, arms and drug trafficking, and illegal
migration,
that can become the bases upon which confidence building measures and,
thus,
military to military cooperation can be enhanced. Steps to increase confidence
and
understanding (such as the greater exchange of information and joint operations)
between the two sides about each other's intentions can lead to a more
stable
relationship and enhanced levels of trust that will be useful in the immediate
post-Fidel period. During the CDIS-CDI meetings in February 2001, both
delegations discussed another important mechanism to enhance communication
and cooperation: possibilities for exchanging curriculum materials from
military-related institutions and programs for the exchange of lectures
between the
war colleges. Greater levels of interaction and cooperation will ease concerns
within the FAR that the U.S. will not intervene or seek to take advantage
during the
transition. The U.S., through its military, can help encourage the forces
of political
liberalization and economic reform.
Previous efforts to reach out to the FAR circumventing the leadership in
Havana in
an effort to undermine the regime have been counterproductive. It has had
the
opposite effect of building trust and enhancing military to military contacts;
it is
viewed as a dishonest attempt to subvert the regime rather than building
bridges.
For example, in January 1997, the U.S. issued a report titled "Support
for a
Democratic Transition" that called on the military to lead the transition
to
democracy in return for assistance and recognition. This measure only contributed
to a siege mentality reaction on the part of the regime and military because
it was
viewed as an attempt to undermine the regime discipline and loyalty of
the FAR.
The Cuban government immediately initiated a national campaign to collect
the
signatures of soldiers who "supported the revolution and rejected the interventionist
policy of the United States." In a highly ceremonial event in March, FAR
and
MININT officers presented the Castros with books containing more than 200,000
loyalty signatures.61 More nuance and less interventionist measures, such
as
those described above, will do more to advance dialogue and understanding
between the militaries than an offer of support or assistance if the military
overthrew
the regime.
*Frank O. Mora, Ph.D. is an Assistant Professor of International Studies
and J.S. Seidman Research
Fellow at Rhodes College since 1994. He received his B.A. from The George
Washington University
(1987) and M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Miami (1993). He is the
author of several works on
Latin American democratization and civil society, U.S.-Latin American relations,
drug trafficking in the
Americas, Paraguayan politics and foreign policy, and Cuban civil-military
relations. His work has
been published in such academic journals as the Journal of Interamerican
Studies and World Affairs,
Bulletin of Latin American Research, Third World Quarterly, Foro Internacional
(Mexico), and Airpower
Journal. In 1999 Professor Mora published an article titled, “From Fidelismo
to Raulismo: Civilian
Control of the Military in Cuba,” that was published in Problems of Post-Communism.
Presently, Dr.
Mora is editing a special issue of Problems of Post-Communism on Cuban
politics and society since
the end of the Cold War that will be published in early-2001. Professor
Mora has worked as a
consultant for the U.S. Air Force, National Democratic Institute, and the
Division of Inter-American
Affairs of the U.S Department of Defense. Professor Mora has appeared on
several national and
international media outlets, including Radio Marti and CBS Telenoticias.