MORE REVEALED ON CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
The Associated Press
Havana
AP
The Miami Herald
La Nueva Cuba
Protagonists in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis discovered that events at
the height
of that Cold War drama may have brought them closer to nuclear war than
they
originally believed.
Newly declassified U.S., Cuban and Soviet documents discussed during a
three-day conference that began Friday underscore the danger of a nuclear
attack
— either accidental or deliberate — that existed during those tense October
days.
``A real war will begin, in which millions of Americans and Russians will
die,''
Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador to the United States, quoted then-U.S.
Attorney General Robert Kennedy as telling him in a top secret memo, now
declassified, on Oct. 27, 1962.
``The situation may get out of control, with irreversible consequences,''
Robert
Kennedy warned after an American spy plane was shot down over Cuba and
President Kennedy was pressured to order pilots to return fire if fired
upon.
Also on Oct. 27, 1962, the most dangerous day of the crisis, notes from
the U.S.
Joint Chiefs of Staff detail a series of alarming events in addition to
the shooting
down of the U-2 spy plane.
There was a Joint Chiefs' recommendation for an air strike and invasion
of Cuba,
and reports that Cuban anti-aircraft units were given authority to open
fire against
``enemy aircraft'' starting on Nov. 18.
Some of the notes were taken from transcripts of Joint Chiefs meetings
in
October-November 1962 dealing with the Cuban missile crisis. The documents
were declassified under the Freedom of Information Act.
Many documents studied during the conference were collected by the National
Security Archive, a nonprofit research group at George Washington University
in
Washington. Archive researchers were also participating in the conference.
Cuban President Fidel Castro was participating in the conference's closed
door
sessions, as were former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and other
key
advisers in the Kennedy administration.
As events began spinning out of control in late October 1962, Castro began
expecting a U.S. airstrike on Soviet facilities on the island and was prepared
to
shoot down American combat aircraft if they invaded Cuba, according to
a top
secret military directive to Gen. Issa A. Pliyev, head of Soviet forces
in Havana.
The Soviets were prepared as well.
``In case of a strike on our facilities by American aircraft it has been
decided to use
all available air defense forces,'' the directive said.
A portion of the documents, made available to The Associated Press in
Washington, demonstrate that the crisis did not end on Oct. 29, 1962, with
the
Soviet Union's agreement to remove the offensive weapons, as is widely
believed.
Weeks after the Soviet Union agreed to pull the missiles from Cuba, Khrushchev
worried that an ``irrational'' Castro would renew tensions with the United
States —
perhaps even provoke war.
Cuba ``wants practically to drag us behind it with a leash, and wants to
pull us into
a war with America by its actions,'' Khrushchev said in a Nov. 16, 1962,
letter to
diplomatic aides in Cuba.
During conference sessions on Friday, participants also looked at American
covert
actions following the disastrous CIA-backed invasion of Cuba's Bay of Pigs
in April
1961 and how they intensified Cuban fears of a U.S. military attack.
The conference took on special relevance as President Bush now ponders
a
pre-emptive strike against Iraq.
The missile crisis began in mid-October 1962 when President Kennedy learned
that Cuba had Soviet nuclear missiles capable of reaching the United States.
The
crisis was defused two weeks later when the Soviet Union agreed to remove
the
missiles.
Former Kennedy aides Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Richard Goodwin and Ted Sorensen
are attending the conference, as well as former CIA analyst Dino Brugioni,
who
interpreted American spy photos of Soviet missiles in Cuba.
Conference participants on Sunday will travel to sites related to the crisis,
including
a missile silo in the western province of Pinar del Rio.