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KGB ACTIVITIES

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KGB is stepping up its North American efforts, experts say

First in a five-part series

By Ted Agres and Roger Fontaine
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The Soviet espionage apparatus, including the KGB, GRU and East European services, is stepping up its activities on the North American continent, White House officials and members of the U.S. intelligence community report.

The prime target of this increased attention, they say, is the United States, which KGB training manuals have long termed their "main enemy."

The officials portray it as a "pincer movement" from Canada and Mexico. Because the United States maintains friendly relations with both neighbors, and because both borders are largely porous, the task of containing and countering Soviet activity becomes that much more difficult, they say.

The increased Soviet threat is in terms of both quantity and quality: There has been a dramatic rise in the number of secret agents operating in all three countries as well as an increase in the sophistication of their personnel.

Soviet bloc agents are said to have become effective at pinpointing their targets of opportunity and concentrating their energies where it is deemed most useful.

U.S. intelligence and law enforcement officials maintain that the United States is also getting better at tracking and countering Soviet bloc clandestine operations. But others question if the improvement is good enough.

"We have substantially enhanced our own capabilities against the threat," states Edward O'Malley, the FBI's director of intelligence. He terms countering

Soviet espionage that agency's "top investigative priority."

But the problem "is very serious, and has been for some time," he adds. Attorney General Edwin Meese calls Soviet espionage "a major problem" and "a matter of great concern."

"We know that the number of Soviet agents in this country is massive, and severely strains our counterintelligence resources," he says.

This strain is evident foremost in the numbers game. The FBI estimates that there are some 4,000 Soviet bloc personnel in the United States alone. Between 30 and 35 percent of these — 1,200 to 1,400 — are full-time professional intelligence officials or agents, the bureau

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reports. It is a number that has doubled in the past decade.

These include not only Soviets but East Europeans as well, including Czechoslovakians, Polish, Hungarians, East Germans and others. Augmenting the Warsaw Pact contingent are the Cubans who, increasingly, are called upon to do Soviet bidding.

To these numbers in America are added the 300 to 400 Soviet-bloc personnel in Canada and Mexico each. One-third of these are said to be involved in intelligence operations.

This total of some 1,600 full-time Soviet bloc espionage agents across the continent includes only those operating under the "cover" of being diplomats, journalists, trade officials or students, and "officially approved" by the host governments.

It does not count an additional unknown number of "illegals" — people who have entered Canada, the United States or Mexico under assumed names and identities ("legends" in spy terminology), and recruits — citizens who, for whatever reason, have become active participants in the Kremlin's work.

In the United States in 1980, Soviet-bloc intelligence personnel outnumbered FBI and other counterintelligence agents by some 10 to 1. While the ratios are said to be better today, FBI officials will not reveal by how much.

Continent-wide the situation is even worse: Canada historically has been far less aggressive than the United States in countering Soviet espionage activities. The Trudeau regime expressed little interest in the matter, and the new Mulroney government is only beginning to get its security appratus in order.

And Mexico for decades has turned a blind eye toward espionage of all stripes — as long as officials there felt it wasn't directed against them.

What is clear, however, are the targets of Soviet activity and the methods they use to go about it.

Interviews with dozens of Canadian, Mexican and U.S. sources, both in and out of official capacity, have revealed a broad picture of Soviet operations on the continent:

- Canada and Mexico are both used as staging grounds for operations against the United States. This is said to involve recruitment and handling of agents in relatively secure environments, far from the probing eyes of U.S. surveillance.

• Mexico, in the words of one former U.S. counterintelligence official, constitutes "a giant safehouse" for the Soviets. Agents and operatives from the states (never Soviet nationals) come and go with little risk of detection.

Information and documents, especially those purloined from high-tech industries in California's "Silicon Valley," can be dropped off. Travel back and forth across the Mexican border is simple, with record keeping perfunctory, at best.

• Both countries, but Canada in particular, are used as diversion points for acquiring U.S. and Western high technology goods and information.

Canada's membership in NATO, its military cooperation with Washington and its historically open trade border with the United States (no export licenses are required for shipments) make that country particularly valuable in this regard.

U.S. intelligence and law enforcement officials maintain that the United States is also getting better at tracking and countering Soviet-bloc clandestine operations. But others question if the improvement is good enough.

Mexico, while far less technologically developed than either of its two northern neighbors, is seen as having a growing role in technology acquisition, especially given its proximity to the West Coast high-tech industry.

• Major U.S. acquisition targets include high technology goods and know-how, especially relating to semiconductor manufacturing and military information. Also of priority is the recruitment of agents having access to secrets. The placement of agents and "illegals" in the federal government, especially in the intelligence agencies, is a constant goal.

• The Soviets use a "vacuum cleaner approach" toward obtaining information in the United States, including a massive effort to acquire tens of thousands of unclassified technical reports and magazines yearly.

Eavesdropping on microwave telephone and telex communications is such a priority that nearly every Soviet-controlled embassy and commercial building in the country is equipped with electronic intercept and recording equipment.

These facilities include their embassies in Washington and New York, their consulate in San Francisco, their "recreation center" on the Eastern shore of Maryland and residential complex in Riverdale, N.Y., and East European commercial establishments across the nation.

Key words and selected telephone numbers are programmed into computers that scan thousands of simultaneous conversations plucked out of overhead microwave traffic channels. When a computer detects one of the target phrases or numbers, the conversation is automatically recorded. The tapes are sent regularly to Moscow where experts translate and analyze their content.

• The manipulation of U.S. foreign policy through "active measures," such as disinformation, forgeries and support for disarmament movements is another priority, which comes under the direct supervision of the KGB.

Former U.S. Attorney General William French Smith termed these "hostile active measures" as among the most insidious of the means used to influence public opinion and the political process through "disinformation" and "agents of influence."

The KGB delineates several types of agents and operatives in its global network. An agent who actively and knowing cooperates is called a principal agent, or *osnovny agent*. Those who politically agree with Soviet direction but who have not been formally recruited by the KGB are called *doveryonnoe litso*, or trusted person. Finally, there are those the KGB calls *tyomhaya verboura*, or unconscious source. They serve the KGB's interests without knowing it; Lenin termed them "useful idiots."

One indication of the growing importance the Soviet ruling apparatus places on the KGB can be seen from last month's elevation of KGB chief Viktor M. Chebrikov to be a full voting member of the Soviet Politburo, Western analysts say. Over the past 20 years, the number of KGB officials on the Central Committee has increased fourfold.

Mr. Chebrikov, a protege of the late Yuri Andropov, runs his worldwide network out of a nine-story building at 2 Dzerzhinsky Square, just a mile from the Kremlin. It was the former Lubyanka Prison, site of countless executions of those found guilty of "counter-revolutionary activities." Political rivals occasionally met similar fates there.

The KGB, or Committee for State Security (*Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopastnosti*), is said to employ some 500,000 officers, technicians, clerical workers informants in the Soviet Union. The major thrust of its activities is on keeping tabs on its own citizens, operating an internal security network that includes overseeing the elite border guards.

The KGB's First Directorate is in overall charge of foreign operations. While it comprises only 15 percent of the KGB's total personnel, they are, in the words of one former counterintelligence official, "the cream of the crop."

Worldwide, the KGB is estimated to control 700,000 agents and an equal number of informers. Massive as this network is, it does not operate with complete impunity — at least not in the United States. In the past five years U.S. counterintelligence capabilities began to reverse declines that resulted from congressional attacks in the late '60s and '70s.

But continent-wide, numerous problems remain. One of them is on-going and institutional. While the Soviet network can work without much difficulty over the borders of the three North American countries, counterintelligence efforts are hampered by significant institutional as well differing national interests.

Meanwhile, Soviet-backed intelligence activities show no sign of letting up. As the FBI's intelligence chief O'Malley puts it, "The KGB is very large, very well trained [and use] very bright people. The Soviets can choose among the elite of Soviet society for the KGB."

Tomorrow: Soviet activities in Mexico.

WASH TIMES 26 MAY 85

Mexico a 'safehouse' for Soviets spying on U.S.

Second in a five-part series

By Roger Fontaine
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

MEXICO CITY — Just off a congested freeway, in a rundown neighborhood south of this city's center, sits an odd, out-of-place mansion, partially hidden by trees and a dark green fence.

Built in the 1920s as a private residence, the gray house at Avenida Tacubaya 204 is identified only by a small brass plate in Cyrillic letters as the embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Those who seek to enter the embassy must wait in their cars between double gates until cleared. The embassy's interior has been described as "pure Charles Addams" — dark and vaguely menacing.

As many as 350 Soviets are at work inside; 100 to 150 of them are embassy officers. Counting the employees of TASS, Aeroflot and the Soviet trade organizations, the number of Soviets in Mexico City rises to 400 or more.

Knowledgeable sources, including present and former intelligence officials here and in the United States, say 30 to 40 percent of these Soviet officials are actively engaged in espionage activities under the auspices of the KGB or its affiliated military intelligence directorate, the GRU.

Their primary target, the sources agree, is the United States.

Simply put, Mexico City hosts one of the largest Soviet intelligence stations in the Free World. Counting Cuban and East European countries whose intelligence services are integrated with the KGB, there are approximately 600 communist-bloc diplomats and officials working in Mexico. In the words of one counter-intelligence expert here, "Mexico is one giant safehouse" for the Soviets, meaning they have virtually free rein to do as they please.

Officials in Washington are expressing increasing concern over efforts against U.S. interests by the KGB and its proxy services from our neighbor to the south.

The Soviets seem interested in two main areas — stealing U.S. secrets, primarily high-technology documents and information, and recruiting and "running" agents into and out from the United States, officials say.

Mexico provides an ideal location for this, having a largely unguarded, nearly 2,000-mile open border with the United States. The Soviets also take advantage of Mexico's laid-back, benign tolerance of espionage — as long as it is not directed against them.

"There isn't any sense in Mexico of a KGB threat," says U.S. Customs Commissioner William von Raab.

The Soviets historically have considered Mexico to be one of the three best places in the world to operate, the others being Vienna and Geneva. This makes Mexico City a prize assignment for the new breed of ambitious KGB officers who are polished, suave and fluent in both Spanish and English.

This sprawling capital of 17 million people is ideal, too, for agent contact since there is little likelihood of surveillance.

It is a relatively simple matter for an agent to drop off whatever sensitive material he has and to do it with little chance of detection.

"The KGB has a huge operation in Mexico City," Mr. von Raab told The Washington Times. "The Mexican border is a serious problem both for drugs and for smuggling technology. The KGB is free to operate in Mexico."

One of the most notorious U.S. espionage cases involving Mexico is that of Christopher Boyce and Andrew Daulton Lee — "the Falcon and the Snowman."

Boyce, a one-time employee of TRW Systems Group in Redondo Beach, Calif., and Lee, a boyhood friend, were convicted in 1977 of selling U.S. secrets to the Soviets. They had handed over top-secret documents and satellite surveillance information to the Soviets in Mexico City, occasionally making contact at the Soviet Embassy itself.

In 1981, Joseph G. Helmich Jr., an Army warrant officer, pleaded guilty on conspiracy charges. For nearly two decades he had been selling the Soviets U.S. military secrets, including sensitive cryptographic information on military codes.

Helmich never delivered those secrets to the KGB in the United States, but took them to Paris and Mexico City. For his efforts, he was given the rank of colonel in the Soviet army, a distinction he enjoys today in an American jail with a life sentence.

One favorite KGB activity, according to intelligence sources, is "spotting" — the practice of singling out Americans in sensitive positions who might be vulnerable to recruitment.

According to one former U.S. intelligence official, the practice extends to Soviet officers eavesdropping on conversations of Americans in this city's bars and hotels for interesting tidbits and clues for approaching them.

The GRU, the military arm of Soviet intelligence, is given the task of handling U.S. armed forces personnel, with their agents and contacts easily shuttled between here and the United States. But the division of labor tends to break down when it comes to obtaining military technology.

"GRU officers have a reputation for being hamhanded. They walk into a bar and immediately try to recruit an American," says one former intelligence officer here.

"The KGB is better on sensitive operations than the GRU," one intelligence source said, including in his assessment the acquisition of military technological secrets.

To do this, the KGB residence here works closely with its counter-

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In the words of one counterintelligence expert, "Mexico is one giant safehouse" for the Soviets, meaning they have virtually free rein.

parts in the San Francisco consulate which, for years, has specialized in the illegal acquisition of high technology, especially from California's "Silicon Valley" and other high-tech firms throughout the Southwest.

To get the documents from the United States back to Mexico City, the KGB uses American citizens or other non-Soviets as couriers. Officials report that in some cases flight attendants have been recruited by the KGB as couriers and take advantage of the nearly 100 flights weekly from California to Mexico City to transport the purloined material.

Travel to Mexico from the United States is easy, and virtually no accurate records are kept. One former counterintelligence official said that anyone can make a plane reservation under an assumed name and fill out the tourist card with the same name. Immigration and customs in Mexico City are perfunctory, he said.

"It is a simple matter to meet your case officer in Chapultepec Park without anyone spotting you," the former official added.

The Soviets also enjoy a rough division of labor with their East [illegible] and Cuban surrogates

KGB: TARGET AMERICA

A five-part series

MONDAY: How the Soviet spy apparatus is stepping up its efforts in North America

TODAY: Mexico: KGB's "safehouse" against the U.S.

WEDNESDAY: How Soviet bloc intelligence operates in Canada

THURSDAY: The KGB's "active measures" in the U.S.

FRIDAY: How the KGB goes fishing for recruits

who conduct clandestine efforts on their behalf. Officials from and agents for Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Poland, East Germany, and the Cubans are assigned specific tasks by the KGB.

The Czechs, for example, are known for their skill at planting bugs and devote considerable time and effort to accomplishing their assignments, especially in Western diplomatic residences and embassies.

James Harper Jr., who had access to technological secrets from the Silicon Valley area of California, passed highly sensitive documents on the Minuteman missile and other military secrets to the Polish intelligence service in Mexico City.

For 2½ years beginning in 1979, Harper fed volumes of classified data to the Poles. While the Poles did the leg work, the Soviets reaped the benefits. They verified the importance of the information Harper supplied and even handed out commendations — one signed by Yuri Andropov himself — to the case officers involved. Last year, Harper was sentenced to life imprisonment on espionage charges.

The acquisition of technology through the Mexico channel, according to intelligence sources, frequently involves the theft of documents and information from the United States, but seldom the equipment itself.

In general, the Soviets seek a wide range of U.S. technology, according to Dr. Stephen Bryen, deputy assistant secretary of defense for international economic trade and security policy.

Documents "are just as valuable" as hardware to the Soviets, Mr. Bryen says. "Software has become the new thing."

A comprehensive report on "Soviet Acquisition of Western Technology," compiled by the CIA in 1982, lists areas of major Soviet interest. These include computers, data bases, memories, image processing design, superconductor materials, semiconductor design and production technology, microwave and millimeter wave communications and control equipment, lasers and microbiology equipment and information.

"They've still not managed to produce the computers they desperately need, so they just steal them," Mr. Bryen told The Washington Times.

Mr. von Raab, the Customs commissioner, maintains that his agency, through its Operation Exodus program, has been making progress in educating U.S. firms to watch out for unscrupulous buyers who may be fronting for the Soviets.

And Theodore Wu, who heads up the Commerce Department's Office of Export Enforcement, says there have not been many major cases of diverting or smuggling high-tech equipment over the border into Mexico.

But the Soviets have begun to set up Mexican cover firms to purchase sensitive technology from U.S. electronics manufacturers, according to sources. In this effort, however, they shy away from the large, well-known companies wary of unknown or new buyers.

Rather, the Soviets target smaller, often financially struggling, firms that are eager to make sales and which may not ask too many questions.

And some officials worry that, as Western allies and neutrals get better at clamping down on illegal transshipments through firms in their countries, the Soviets will increasingly turn to such less developed countries as Mexico through which to ply their trade.

U.S. officials hope to discuss the issue of Soviet technology diversion with their Mexican counterparts in the near future, according to sources. But given the present tenseness resulting from the recent death of a U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency agent in Mexico and continuing immigration and border problems, no one is taking bets on how such talks might develop — if they do at all.

"We have identified the potential problem early, but, because of all the other difficulties, no one wants to create an additional problem now," one official remarked.

"But I guess we have to have a couple of serious diversions before we make it a negotiating priority," he added.

Mexico also has the [illegible] officials can make undercover contact with Soviet officials without embarassing TV lights or reporters' questions.

While the Soviet-bloc intelligence presence in Mexico is large, Moscow has been intent on increasing its capabilities here. For years, the Soviets have pressed the Mexican government for permission to establish 10 consulates along the U.S. border, according to congressional sources.

In fact, they received the go-ahead in 1981 from the Mexican foreign ministry. It was vetoed by then-President Lopez Portillo's office in 1981, and the Soviets had to settle for one consulate in Veracruz in 1981, far from the border.

While there are some indications that Mexican authorities are taking a dimmer view of Soviet espionage in their country, the situation is far from settled.

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Mexico's counterintelligence agency, the Direccion Federal de Seguridad, went into a steep decline starting in 1981 when an experienced professional chief was replaced with a political appointee with no intelligence background, according to a former U.S. intelligence officer with long experience in Mexico.

The DFS has been undergoing a thorough shakeup in the aftermath of the murder of a U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency officer in Guadelajara in February, sources say. A subsequent investigation has revealed serious corruption involving DFS officers and drug traffickers.

So serious were the charges that the head of the DFS, Luis Zorilla, was fired in March. Recent press reports say Mr. Zorilla is running for political office from the state of Hidalgo.

The new head of the service, Pablo Gonzalez, is said to be a professional from within the service. The choice, according to knowledgeable sources, was a surprise since he was not previously a top official. He has, nonetheless, a reputation for competence and for not being anti-American.

It is too early to predict the effect of the shakeup on Mexican counterintelligence capabilities. But one State Department official maintains that surveillance by the DFS improved even before its recent changes.

But others remain unconvinced. They say that decades of laxity and acquiescence cannot be quickly changed. As one former top U.S. intelligence official put it, for Soviet espionage activity in Mexico, "it's like playing tennis without the net."

Washington Times staffer Ted Agres contributed to this report.

WASH TIMES 22 MAY 85

Canada confronts its 'leaky' border

Third of a five-part series

By James Morrison
THE WASHINGTON TIMES FOREIGN SERVICE

OTTAWA — Two years ago, when Brian Mulroney was leader of the opposition party in Parliament, he declared this Canadian capital was "knee-deep" in Soviet spies.

Today Mr. Mulroney is prime minister, and his Progressive Conservative government has the responsibility of cleaning up what he saw as a nest of spies.

The task of monitoring, controlling or reducing the number of Soviet bloc secret agents has been and will continue to be an enormous one, according to intelligence sources.

What makes Canada such an apparent happy hunting ground for the KGB? Sources here and in Washington point to several reasons:

• Canada has a relatively open border with the United States making travel fast and, in most cases, untraceable. This means that intelligence agents operating in the states can meet their KGB controllers in Canada with little risk of surveillance.

Until very recently, Canadian officials had put little effort into monitoring activities of espionage agents in their own country.

• Canada is a NATO ally and a close strategic partner with the United States. Many U.S. military secrets are shared with the Canadians. Canada cooperates with the United States for such critical military operations as command and control and early warning radars (which are scheduled for major upgrading).

A senior U.S. intelligence official in Washington told The Washington Times that Canada is expected to play a key role in eventual operation of the Strategic Defense Initiative or "star wars" defense system.

• High technology equipment, such as computers and semiconductor manufacturing equipment, may be exported from the United States to Canada without the complex licensing and review process reserved for export sales to most other countries. This allows corrupt businessmen in the United States and in Canada to illegally re-export these items to Eastern bloc destinations in exchange for high profits.

Canada has recently gone through a protracted and disputed effort to establish a credible internal counterintelligence capability. The fledgling Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) has just begun to take over from the once-effective but more recently limited efforts that had been made by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

"Our government [the Progressive Conservatives] has recognized the need to purposely increase our commitment to security and intelligence and national defense efforts to protect our sovereignty and to honor our obligations to our allies," said Elmer MacKay, the Canadian solicitor general in charge of the CSIS and the RCMP.

"The Parliament of Canada, in passing the Canadian Security Intelligence Service act, showed its intent to take the threat of international espionage seriously," he told The Times.

"It is our duty to prevent leakage, particularly involving high technology information."

Many laud Mr. MacKay's intentions. But some observers here claim that the effort is too late and too little to counter effectively the long, concentrated push by the Soviet bloc to penetrate Canadian society and institutions.

Arkady Shevchenko, the high-ranking Soviet diplomat who defected to the United States in 1978, claims Soviet spies have "penetrated Canada very heavily."

John Starnes, a former Canadian diplomat and former director of the government's counterspy agency, calls Canada "the target of extensive espionage activity by the Soviet Union that has increased dramatically" since 1983.

Soviet activity in Canada was first documented in 1945 in the celebrated case of Igor Gouzenko, an obscure cipher clerk at the Soviet Embassy here who defected with 109 secret documents under his arm.

The Gouzenko affair sparked an intense effort to break up a Soviet spy ring on two continents and is credited with helping launch the Cold War.

Canada has expelled 19 Soviet spies since 1978 and has uncovered some embarrassing Canadian skeletons in top-secret closets, including the spy Hugh Hambleton, now serving 10 years in a British prison, and a member of the RCMP who is currently fighting a spy charge.

"Scores of Canadians have been blackmailed or coerced into working for the Soviets," said a high-level intelligence source who asked not to be identified.

Some observers of the murky world of espionage doubt Canada's resolve to tackle the problem.

They say the Soviet secret service, the KGB, and its Russian military counterpart, the GRU, operate easily in Canada because of the country's openness and reluctance to see itself as a target of Soviet spies.

"The average Canadian doesn't even think about it," the source said of KGB activity. "They think it's a great big joke."

Also, the KGB has grown over the past two years as it took advantage of government confusion in creating the new CSIS, which took over from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, several intelligence sources have said.

Soviet personnel at the Soviet Embassy here in Ottawa and at a consulate in nearby Montreal number about 125, although only 37 are accredited diplomats. That number is increased by another 100 when accredited diplomats from Bulgaria, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland,

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Romania, Cuba and Nicaragua are added in.

And these figures include only accredited diplomatic personnel, not their spouses and staffs, an External Affairs official said. Intelligence sources estimate that 40 percent of these personnel are actively engaged in espionage.

By contrast, Canada has about 40 diplomats in Moscow, none of which is involved in spying because Canada has no foreign espionage service such as the KGB or CIA, according to Canadian officials.

"Canada is a staging ground" for Soviet espionage operations, said a former counterintelligence officer. Agents can enter Canada easily because of liberal immigration policies and slip into the United States across the long, undefended border.

Aside from engaging in military espionage, the Soviets take advantage of massive Canadian-U.S. trade to gain industrial secrets — sometimes through legitimate sales and sometimes through shady methods.

Soviet spies also masquerade as Russian exiles to infiltrate and disrupt immigrant groups in Canada and use their Eastern bloc allies to expand their spy web, the source said.

"Canadians do not believe themselves threatened by espionage and international terrorism," Mr. Starnes wrote in a recent edition of International Perspectives, a Canadian journal on world affairs.

"We tend to think of ourselves as universally liked and that others perceive us as we see ourselves — peace-loving, honest brokers filled with good will toward everyone," he said.

Canadians also have a habit of "denigrating" the country's importance as a nation with military and industrial secrets worth stealing, he said.

"In fact," he said, "Canada is an important nation. Not only important, but, in relative terms, powerful."

Alliance with the United States and membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization makes Canada privy to top-level military secrets.

"This alone makes us an obvious espionage target," Mr. Starnes said. "In addition, the 3,000-mile frontier with the United States makes Canada an attractive launching point for intelligence and terrorist operations against our powerful neighbor."

The long, undefended border with the United States and billions of dollars in annual U.S.-Canadian trade make Canada an easy country through which to steal trade secrets and smuggle advanced Western technology to the East.

Unlike most other countries, shipments of high-tech equipment between the United States and Canada do not require export license approval. "This puts a tremendous pressure on the Canadians because they have to enforce not only their own exports but ours, too," said Stephen Bryen, deputy assistant secretary of defense in Washington.

U.S. Customs Commissioner William von Raab said that Canadian officials have decided to establish their own version of "Operation Exodus" patterned after Customs' 3-year-old program to halt illegal technology diversion.

Canadian government officials will be seeking the cooperation of Canadian businessmen and exporters in clamping the illegal flow of goods to the Soviet bloc.

"The new Canadian government has a different attitude about this stuff" compared with the Trudeau government, Mr. von Raab said in Washington. The Trudeau administration "sort of yawned and said it wasn't happening," Mr. von Raab stated.

"I am very comfortable about the moves the Canadians are making" now, Mr. von Raab said.

Recent thefts of high technology from California's Silicon Valley have found their way into Soviet hands in Canada.

In one case, officials of a California firm, I.I. Industries, were convicted of selling semiconductor processing equipment to the Soviets without a license.

The firm had sent the equipment in crates marked "washing machines" and "industrial ovens" to Canada, where it was shipped to the Soviet Union through Switzerland.

U.S. Customs agents intercepted some of the crates and substituted the equipment with six tons of sandbags. As a final touch, they thumb tacked one of their business cards inside the lid. The Soviets, presumably, were not amused.

Sometimes through legally licensed sales, occasionally arranged through Canada, and sometimes through theft, the Soviets have nonetheless acquired technology in robotics, computers, radar, inertial guidance systems, lasers, metallurgy and integrated circuits.

These technologies, according to U.S. intelligence and military officials, are quickly applied to Soviet military projects. This process saves the Soviets billions of dollars in research and development costs each year.

Harry Lake, a Toronto private detective, says some of his corporate clients are victims of Soviet industrial spies.

"It's one of the biggest threats we're facing in the high-tech field," he said.

Mr. Lake, president of the Intro spec private investigation agency, said many Soviet spies leave Russia under the cover of Jewish exiles. Those "overnight Jews," as he called them, take jobs in small consulting firms for a few years and then graduate to large research companies.

They then take advantage of their inside information to help target new technology of interest to the Kremlin, he said.

Also contributing to this story were Washington Times staffers Ted Agres and Doug Lamborne.

Tomorrow: How Soviet intelligence targets the United States.

Trudeau blamed for the KGB's foothold

OTTAWA — "For 20 years the KGB has had a happy hunting ground in Canada," says Lubor Zink, a Czechoslovakian writer who has lived in Canada since the 1950s.

Mr. Zink is an expert on Soviet espionage and has been tracking the increasing activities of East bloc agents in Canada over the past three decades.

He lays much of the blame for Canada's penetration by Soviet intelligence to a lax environment fostered by former Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau — a perspective shared by many officials here and in Washington.

As a student, Mr. Trudeau was a supporter of Marxist causes. During a visit to Cuba at the time Moscow's Cuban military proxies were being introduced into Africa, Mr. Trudeau shouted before thousands of Cubans, "Viva Castro, Viva Cuba!"

Mr. Trudeau, who governed Canada for 16 years and resigned last year, refused to deal effectively with the Soviet threat, Mr. Zink and other intelligence sources said.

When Victor Tsekovisky, a trade official at the Soviet consulate in Montreal, and Anatoly Solousov, an official with the Montreal-based International Civil Aviation Organization, were expelled from Canada in 1983 for trying to steal government secrets, the Trudeau administration played down the incident to avoid "retaliation directed at Canadians in the Soviet Union," a Trudeau official said at the time.

Mr. Zink noted that Mr. Trudeau signed a friendship treaty with the Soviets, tried to reduce Canada's role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and tried to justify the Polish government's declaration of martial law by saying that it might have been necessary to prevent violence.

Mr. Trudeau, in a 1980 press conference, said of the friendship treaty, "If I were to visit the U.S., or something, or see a leader of some other country, I'd inform the Russian ambassador of the discussions."

Mr. Trudeau's government also prosecuted a Canadian newspaper for printing a story about a secret document on KGB activities that the government wanted to suppress to avoid hurting relations with the Soviets.

John Starnes, the first civilian director of the RCMP counterintelligence service, said, "There is little evidence . . . that a tough stance on Soviet espionage activities ever seriously damaged our relations with Russia."

UPI

Pierre Trudeau

Although Soviet influence in Canada has been documented for decades, Mr. Trudeau's view is still shared by many Canadians, some observers said.

Canada's first exposure to Soviet espionage activites was almost a KeystoneCops affair.

When Igor Gouzenko walked out of the Soviet Embassy laden with Russian secrets, he tried to get someone to believe that the Soviets were running a spy ring out of Ottawa.

The minister of justice refused to see him; the prime minister, Mackenzie King, was embarrassed by the affair, and one Ottawa news organization refused to print his story, thinking he was mentally unbalanced.

But Canadian-born British spymaster William Stephenson, who was in Canada at the time, persuaded officials to listen to Mr. Gouzenko and his revelations of a Soviet espionage ring in Canada's bureaucracy.

With Mr. Stephenson's guidance, British security officers and FBI agents unraveled Mr. Gouzenko's mystery.

The Gouzenko papers are credited with helping launch the Cold War because they revealed a widespread spy ring in North America and Soviet inten-

Washington Times 5-22-85

AP

Hugh Hambleton

tions of worldwide domination, according to many political observers.

The Soviets were "creating in democratic countries, including Canada, a fifth column" to establish a "communist dictatorship throughout the world," Mr. Gouzenko warned in papers declassified by the Canadian government earlier this year.

By the time all of the indictments were handed up, 11 people, including a member of Parliament and a noted British physicist, had gone to jail as a result of Mr. Gouzenko's revelations.

The physicist, Allan Nunn May, who worked with Canada's National Research Council, was convicted of selling a sample of enriched uranium to the Soviets. He received $200 and two bottles of whiskey. The uranium he gave the Soviets helped them develop their first atom bomb.

Mr. Gouzenko died of a heart attack in 1982.

In a second spy episode that rocked Canada, a 59-year-old professor at Quebec's Laval University was sentenced to 10 years in a British prison for selling secrets to the Soviets while he was a NATO economist from 1956 to 1961.

Hugh Hambleton confessed during his 1982 trial that he had operated as a Soviet spy for nearly 20 years in several countries. But he appears to be keeping most of his secrets to himself.

What is known about Mr. Hambleton's exploits include his informing the Soviets that Israel was producing material for nuclear bombs in 1970.

Mr. Hambleton, who served the Canadian government in Haiti, also operated for the Soviets in the Caribbean and South America, according to his boyhood friend, Leo Heaps.

In a new book, the Toronto writer said his old friend "knows enough to blow the Soviets sky high."

Mr. Heaps and others who have investigated the Hambleton affair wonder why the English and not the Canadians prosecuted him.

Canada's Justice Department said they did not have enough evidence against Mr. Hambleton. But RCMP officials worked closely with British authorities to charge him under Britain's Official Secrets Act.

More recently, another spy scandal hit the news.

The infamous "Long Knife," a codename for ex-RCMP official James Morrison, is fighting government attempts to charge him for selling information to the Soviets 27 years ago.

Mr. Morrison admitted his guilt after six days of intense grilling at RCMP headquarters in Ottawa in 1958. Officials later declined to prosecute him because they believed his confession might not have been voluntary and would not stand up in court.

But in 1983, apparently thinking he was safe from prosecution, he told newspaper reporters that he had sold secrets to the Soviets, and Canadian authorities charged him. He is fighting prosecution, claiming authorities waited too long to charge him.

The most recent revelation about Canadian spies was contained in a new book by British writer Chapman Pincher.

Mr. Pincher charges that Herbert Norman, Canadian ambassador to Egypt and Japan, was a Soviet spy.

In the book, "Too Secret Too Long," Mr. Pincher quotes the later Soviet spy Anthony Blunt as saying that "Herb was one of us."

Mr. Norman committed suicide in 1957 after his name came up in a U.S. Senate subcommittee hearing into internal security.

— By James Morrison

5/24/85

The Washington Times

M.I.C.E.

KGB spells spy success

Money, ideology, compromise, ego motivate Americans, Soviets believe

THE WASHINGTON TIMES

There are about 75 Soviet or Soviet bloc recruitment attempts in the Washington area each year, the FBI says. Worldwide, two or three U.S. citizens are approached each day for the same purpose.

And while some 30 "hostile intelligence services" operate in the nation's capital, recruitment efforts seem to follow a definite and recurring pattern.

"There are three definite stages in the recruitment process," says Edward J. O'Malley, the FBI's chief of intelligence.

These stages can take anywhere from several months to several years to complete. But Soviet intelligence, the KGB in particular, is very patient.

Former KGB official Stanislav Levchenko, who worked in the Soviet embassy in Tokyo until defecting to the United States, says "the KGB selects its targets very carefully, accumulating an incredible amount of information."

When sufficient information is collected and there appears a chance for success, the KGB will act.

The get-acquainted stage is the simplest. The person to be recruited is first encountered under seemingly innocent circumstances by a member of any Soviet bloc service.

Typically, the "chance" contact is at a trade conference or a university lecture. Like countless such meetings, introductions are made and business cards exchanged.

If the individual is deemed worthy of further effort, a follow-up contact carried out by the intelligence officer usually occurs. Typically this "takes the form of a lunch or dinner someplace, fairly open, maybe an exchange of trinkets of one kind or another," according to Mr. O'Malley. A bottle of Armenian brandy or vodka also is standard fare.

Next is "a developmental stage where the Soviets have done their assessment in the acquaintanceship stage and think the person might be useful to recruit," Mr. O'Malley says.

In this stage the Soviet agent will "test the person" to find out what kind of access he has to information and whether he is security conscious or is too reckless to be considered.

"What are his strengths and weaknesses, particularly, does this person have a financial problem? The KGB manual says all Americans can be bought," Mr. O'Malley states.

While he says this is not true, among the reasons why Americans agree to work for the KGB, "the primary motivation is money," he says.

Adds Mr. Levchenko, "You can sum it up with the four initals M.I.C.E. — money, ideology, compromise, ego."

"Human beings are complex and each person has to be recruited differently," he says. "You frequently have to use more than one lever. The difficulty resides in approaching and engaging the person and zeroing in on his weak points and exploit his ambitions. Some of them are especially motivated by money and get paid up to $2,000 a month."

When sufficient information is collected and there appears a chance for success, the KGB will act.

In addition to the financial enticement, the KGB also assesses a potential recruit's attitude towards his employer and probes for other possible weaknesses.

In Cuba, for instance, the DGI, which functions as the Spanish language branch of the KGB, maintains computerized files on all prominent U.S. and European media people.

What these journalists and editors report is updated every six months and analyzed for bias, nuances and shifts in viewpoints. Information on financial vulnerabilities and sexual proclivities also is collected. When media stars visit Cuba, the DGI thus knows what "emotional buttons" to push.

At an advanced stage in the KGB recruitment process, according to Mr. O'Malley, the Soviet will ask the American for some information from his company. The Soviet might explain he is doing a paper and the information would be helpful, emphasizing that he is seeking nothing classified.

"The idea is to get the American in the habit of exchanging information," Mr. O'Malley says. After the American provides the public information, the Soviet will thank him abundantly, saying "time is money, I really appreciate this . . . so let me give you something for your time. The American takes it." Mr. O'Malley says.

But then comes the catch.

The Soviet will ask the American to sign a receipt for the money — innocent in itself. But in Mr. O'Malley's words, "they go on and on and suddenly it dawns on the American that he's getting in pretty deep water with this hostile intelligence" service.

If they are successful, the KGB recruitment pattern reaches the final stage.

"The target will receive training in intelligence trade craft, will be given some equipment, be trained in the use of what we call dead drop, where they will secrete information which will be later picked up by the intelligence officer and will pick up his payment from a second dead drop," Mr. O'Malley says.

The recruit also will "be given signaling devices to signal the intelligence officer that there is something in the dead drop. The idea being that they are never together in the same place, particularly in a clandestine operation which compounds the problem from a counter-intelligence standpoint."

This and other kinds of recruitment procedures are a major problem, says Sen. David Durenberger, R-Minn., chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee.

"The targets of opportunity in this country are great," he says. "Go into the

military services and see what the kids in this country are operating now compared to what they used to be operating. Obviously there are opportunities there for drugs, through a variety of other things, to buy information that is going to be substantially helpful to somebody."

One real life example of Soviet recruitment follows the pattern closely.

William Holden Bell, a former project manager for the Hughes Aircraft Co., was found guilty and sentenced to eight years in a federal prison for giving sensitive technology to a Polish agent in 1981.

Four years earlier, Bell and his wife met "by accident" the Polish gentleman and his wife and learned they were neighbors in the same apartment complex.

They soon became good friends in the classic pattern, often playing tennis and meeting on various social occasions. The Polish agent, Marian Zacharski, knew Bell was the project manager of an advanced dual weapons system. He asked him for copies of the Hughes company newsletter and another publication — both innocent public documents. Bell agreed.

A short time later, the apartment building in which they were living was converted to condominiums and Bell expressed financial difficulties over purchasing his apartment. Zacharski made an offer of a loan, which Bell accepted.

Soon the Hughes employee was being pressured into giving his "friend" classified information. He gave in to that pressure and was supplied with paraphernalia for espionage.

Meetings were arranged with Polish intelligence officers in a number of European cities. Code names were adopted and payment took the form of gold coins. Bell received a total of $170,000 for his efforts. It is estimated he compromised nearly $1 billion worth of U.S. technology.

His contacts continued until the FBI arrested him in June 1981 along with his Polish accomplice. Both were convicted and sentenced.

— Roger Fontaine

Agents and double agents in the shadowy spy world — last of a series; and a look at Soviet military intelligence. Page 8A.

Double agents prey upon each other in the spy business

Last in a five-part series

By Roger Fontaine
and Ted Agres
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

It was a blow to the bureau's morale. One of their own, a 20-year veteran of the force, had been arrested on charges of conspiring to provide national defense information to the Soviet KGB.

For the men and women in the FBI, especially those who concentrate on trapping Soviet spies in this country, the arrest last October of Richard W. Miller, an FBI foreign counterintelligence agent, on espionage charges was shocking.

Mr. Miller, whose trial is now being held in Los Angeles, is accused of passing classified FBI documents to Svetlana Ogorodnikova, 34, a striking blonde identified as a major in the KGB. She and her husband, Nikolai Ogorodnikova, 51, from whom she was reportedly separated, were both arrested. He is identified as being her KGB superior.

As part of his defense, Mr. Miller maintains that he was seeking to recruit Mrs. Ogorodnikova and turn her into a double agent.

The Miller case, though still pending, represents a peek into the shadowy world of espionage where agents and double agents prey and are preyed upon by numerous intelligence services. The situation is more troublesome because U.S. intelligence officials and agents are severely outnumbered by the other side.

According to FBI sources, Soviet and Eastern bloc representatives in this country have increased in number from 384 in 1956 to 557 in 1961 and 2,000 in 1980. In the past five years, that number has again doubled and is now about 4,000.

About one-third of these are full-time intelligence officers working for the KGB, the GRU and other bloc intelligence services.

U.S. capability at monitoring this growing presence declined in the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1950s, the ratio of Soviet bloc intelligence operatives to bureau shadows was 1-to-1. By 1975, the bureau was outnumbered by 4-to-1. In 1980, the estimate was 10-to-1 in Moscow's favor. FBI officials say in the United States today the ratio is better, but decline to be specific. On the streets of Washington, however, the ratio remains 10-to-1.

Adding to the problem is the proliferation of classified information and development of technology. Recent congressional hearings have revealed that one million people in the United States currently hold security clearances giving them access to classified information. Some 11,000 U.S. companies also deal in classified information. Security background checks have been criticized as being perfunctory.

Targeting this network is a complex business, and many experts believe Soviet intelligence priorities vary over the years. Nevertheless, the overriding goal — that of penetrating the American intelligence community — remains highest on the list.

But some experts and old counterintelligence hands disagree on the KGB's effectiveness. Stories of moles — deeply planted agents in high intelligence positions — have circulated in Washington for years. "That mole must be 85 years old by now," says one retired FBI counterintelligence expert. "They are always talking about the same mole."

But that doesn't mean the fears are groundless. There were some ideologically motivated recruitments during the Vietnam War era, when draft cards and U.S. flags were burned and Ho Chi Minh was glorified.

David H. Barnett, a CIA staff officer in Indonesia, was recruited by the Soviets in 1976. He subsequently revealed the identities of some 30 CIA officers and foreign agents and provided details of U.S. anti-submarine intelligence in exchange for $92,600. He pleaded guilty in 1981 and was sentenced to 18 years in federal prison.

His primary assignment from the Soviets, however, was to penetrate the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the U.S. State Department. There is no indication of how successful he might have been had he not been caught.

The KGB and the GRU have emphasized stealing advanced technology — a target that will increase in importance when President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative research and development program gets into high gear.

One former CIA counterintelligence expert worries that the Soviet priority given to U.S. SDI research will pose a serious strategic threat on its own. Monitoring our research and development efforts, he said, should give the Soviets the opportunity to discover the most promising lines of research.

A former CIA counterintelligence official says that emigres, especially if they appear to be dissidents, generally elicit "sympathy and cache" in industry, which further reduces suspicions and improves access, even if he works in a relatively low staff position.

Soviet intelligence, however, is not reluctant to use more direct methods in stealing advanced technology. In the late 1960s, a Soviet technical delegation was allowed to visit Boeing, Lockheed, and McDonnell-Douglas plants where wide-bodied

KGB: TARGET AMERICA

A five-part series

MONDAY: How the Soviet spy apparatus is stepping up its efforts in North America

TUESDAY: Mexico: KGB's "safehouse" against the U.S.

WEDNESDAY: How Soviet bloc intelligence operates in Canada

THURSDAY: The KGB's "active measures" in the U.S.

TODAY: How the KGB goes fishing for recruits

planes — 747s, L1011s, DC-10s — were being built.

The Soviets were watched carefully. Despite every precaution, however, U.S. intelligence subsequently learned that the Soviets, too, were making wide-bodied airplanes. The visiting delegation was soon suspected of the espionage, but no one could figure out at the time how the Soviets did it.

In 1980, a defector told the FBI that delegation members had special soles on their shoes which picked up bits of scrap metal. The metal was analyzed and the Soviets learned what type of special alloys were necessary.

Sometimes Soviet intelligence is less successful. Five years ago, a Belgian national was recruited to obtain an American firm's computer software technology. He offered $500,000 dollars for the package — to an undercover FBI agent.

Recruitment, however, is only half the problem. The other half involves placing recruits in good places or at least keeping them where they are already. There are failures. In 1975, the House Subcommittee on International Security was looking for a staff worker. The committee members were particularly impressed with one applicant, James Sattler. But an inquiry with the FBI led to the discovery that Mr. Sattler was a paid and controlled agent of the East German intelligence service.

The East European services also specialize in recruiting and placing members of the emigre communities into sensitive posts and collecting information from them.

"That is a built-in entree that all the satellites can use," says a former FBI official. But when they do, Eastern European intelligence services do not use the soft approach they employ with other Americans.

"They prey upon the emigre community here," says FBI intelligence chief Edward O'Malley. "They all have relatives in the old country," he adds.

Occasionally, such coercion produces unexpected results — for the Soviet Union. In 1977, the Hungarian intelligence service attempted to recruit a U.S. Army serviceman of Hungarian descent after a visit to Hungary.

A Hungarian agent made vague threats about the man's visit, and the possibility of halting future visits. The agent then requested him to obtain NATO military secrets. The Hungarian-American reported the contact to the FBI and consented to act as a double agent. This later led to the arrest of a Hungarian intelligence officer in the United States, caught in the act of buying classified information.

Sometimes there is a windfall — in tradecraft terms, a "walk-in. This is an espionage volunteer who wants to give, or sell sensitive intelligence information to the Soviets.

One of the most famous and possibly damaging walk-in case involved Christoper Boyce and Daulton Lee, who 10 years ago sold the Soviets information about sophisticated U.S. intelligence satellites.

Other walk-ins have also provided valuable information. One former FBI official admitted, "There are quite a few of them, but it would be a smaller percentage than the ones they recruit."

On other occasions there have been ludicrous failures. In 1976 Edwin Moore, a low-ranking CIA official, placed a plastic-wrapped manila envelope containing classified documents and a request for money on the grounds of a Soviet residential building in Washington.

The Soviet security agent, thinking it was a bomb, notified the Executive Protection Service guard who, in turn, notified the local U.S. Army bomb disposal squad. The train of events eventually led to Moore's arrest — a disgruntled employee with financial problems.

Do U.S. counterintelligence officials turn around Soviet bloc agents? The answer is yes, but it is a subject that officials will not talk about since defectors are often still working at their old jobs.

Is the United States doing better in the counterintelligence war?

Mr. O'Malley, chief of FBI intelligence, clearly thinks so. "We had a very, very good base on which to begin, and in the last four to five years we also had substantially more people, substantially more equipment, we have enhanced our analytical capability, we've enhanced the training of our people," he says.

"It's the top investigative priority in the FBI today. All the arrests that you've been seeing" are a result of this, he says.

U.S. losing clandestine war to KGB, two experts assert

By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The United States is losing the clandestine war that the Soviet intelligence agency, the KGB, is waging against it, according to two intelligence authorities.

In a speech before the conservative Monday Club, John Barron, the author of two authoritative books on KGB activities, said the recent spate of espionage cases in the United States is the result of a major Soviet "clandestine attack."

Mr. Barron cited the arrests of an FBI agent in California, a former Navy officer, a CIA clerk and a defense industry employee as recent espionage cases directed by the KGB and its surrogates.

He attributed the increase in espionage activities to the Soviet Union's "insoluble" internal problems, particularly its inability to keep pace with the technologically superior West.

The Soviet Union cannot overtly confront the West, Mr. Barron asserted, and must resort instead to clandestine means to achieve its goals of weakening the U.S. strategic posture.

"The greater threat derives from the clandestine efforts of the Soviet Union to affect the way we think, to cloud our understanding of reality, to determine, if you will, what we as a nation do — how Congress conducts its business, how it is able to assist those in the rest of world who do not want to live under the tyranny of either the left or the right . . . how it will assist the people of Afghanistan.

"This is the area where the KGB will increasingly concentrate its activities," Mr. Barron said.

He said the United States is losing the clandestine war because such methods are "alien" to Americans.

"We are even unwilling to invest in the maintenance of a reasonably healthy foreign counterintelligence agency," Mr. Barron said. "We are unprepared psychologically in terms of what we know, and in terms of a resolve to defend ourselves against a type of warfare that is wholly alien to our society and culture."

He said intelligence warfare is carried out by "hundreds of professional officers in our midst" with diplomatic immunity. The KGB will continue to intensify its covert program, he said.

Francis J. McNamara, an intelligence and national security expert with the public policy organization, the Nathan Hale Institute, told the gathering that U.S. counterintelligence efforts to curb KGB activities are "inadequate in both quantity and quality."

Mr. McNamara, former staff director of the House Committee on Internal Security, said the FBI's counterintelligence division reached its peak between 1972 and 1973. In 1980, the number of special agents for all aspects of law enforcement was cut from 8,630 to 7,804, he said.

That cut came despite requests by then FBI Director Clarence Kelly, from 1973 to 1977, for 250 additional FBI counterintelligence agents, Mr. McNamara said.

At the time Mr. Kelly said the FBI was no longer capable of matching Soviet bloc spies on a one-for-one basis, the minimum required for effective counterintelligence. However, his request for additional agents was rejected, and an almost 10 percent cut followed.

"It wasn't until 1982 — the first time in many years — that Congress finally appropriated some additional funds so the FBI could hire more agents," Mr. McNamara said. Today the bureau has 8,818 law enforcement agents, including an unspecified number of counterintelligence agents.

Counterintelligence by the FBI has been hampered by dramatic increases in Soviet bloc personnel stationed in the United States, Mr. McNamara said. He noted that in 1972 there were 1,154 Soviet bloc nationals in the United States, 40 percent of whom were estimated to be spies. Today, there are twice as many Soviet spies in the United States, he said.

Last month President Reagan said the number of Soviet personnel is around 2,500 and that 30 to 40 percent are considered spies. The president called for reducing the levels to "more manageable levels." Both Mr. McNamara and Mr. Barron called for greater government efforts to educate the American public to the problem of Soviet espionage.

Mr. Barron said the United States should follow Britain's policy of not allowing the Soviet Union to replace diplomatic and consular personnel kicked out for spying.

The Washington Times

MAY 24, 1985

GRU gathers most military secrets

While U.S. bars similar efforts in Soviet Union

By William Parham
SPECIAL TO THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The GRU, or military branch of Soviet intelligence, quietly spends more money and runs more agents in the United States than does its better-known cousin, the KGB.

The GRU has the lead responsibility in obtaining U.S. military secrets and advanced technology. The Soviet military is able to copy these U.S. systems and develop countermeasures that make U.S. weapons ineffective, military experts say.

Such countermeasures are also used against U.S. spy satellites and sophisticated "national technical means." It is part of a comprehensive Soviet campaign to prevent the United States from accurately determining Soviet weapons capability.

Meanwhile, U.S. military intelligence has been forbidden in recent years from sending secret agents into the Soviet Union.

And while the Pentagon complains about inadequate intelligence on Soviet military capabilities from CIA-run agents overseas, the Soviet GRU has coordinated collection of U.S. military and defense secrets so effectively that the Soviets have cut the U.S. lead in much military technology from perhaps 10 years to less than two.

Experts say that Soviet military intelligence collection is so effective and timely, and political wrangling in the United States is so time-consuming, that the Soviet military sometimes fields military equipment incorporating U.S. technology advances before the United States does.

According to one U.S. intelligence expert, there is "nothing strange in the predominance in size of the GRU."

"As a matter of fact, I find something strange on our side, where the defense intelligence services don't have any agents," the source says. "We had some, but they were cut out by the reforms of the mid-1970s. We didn't have many, but they were wiped out."

The Reagan administration has thus far not attempted to change this situation.

Soviet intelligence has been active in the United States for decades. In 1962, after the Cuban missile crisis, Nikolai Khrushchev reportedly praised Soviet military intelligence for giving him crucial information from telephone intercepts in Washington.

These intercepts apparently helped Khrushchev in negotiating with President Kennedy and with arriving at an agreement regarding Soviet military bases on Cuba that he claimed benefitted the Soviet Union.

During the 1960s, GRU military intelligence monitored U.S. Defense Department message circuits used by the Pentagon to give instructions to Saigon and other overseas commands.

Today, GRU specialists are reported to be managing a massive Soviet telephone intercept operation in the United States, including operations at the new Soviet embassy complex on Wisconsin Avenue in Washington.

The new phone intercept facilities — which augment similar GRU operations in New York City, Glen Cove, L.I., San Francisco and Maryland's Eastern Shore — are close to a microwave relay between Arlington, Va., and Gambrills, Md., which serves the primary telephone trunk group for the U.S. Eastern seaboard.

In addition, a Defense Department digitized voice circuit relay link passes almost directly over the site from the Pentagon to Western Union's Tenley Tower on Wisconsin Avenue.

The Soviet "recreation facility" on Maryland's Eastern Shore is located at Pioneer Point. One Soviet official told The Times that embassy employees like to go to the facility to "relax, play volleyball, fish . . . it's a very nice place," the official said.

But U.S. intelligence sources say that Soviets also fish there for sensitive microwave telecommunications. The basic technology is quite simple, one expert explained. Microwave communications carrying telephone, facsimile and telex traffic can be easily intercepted.

Computers, programmed to recognize key phrases or specific telephone numbers, lock onto particular channels and record the communication for future analysis. In this way, the Soviets seek to eavesdrop on sensitive military and commercial communications.

The GRU, in the 1960s, continued its traditional activities in the United States. According to Viktor Suvorov, the pseudonym of a former Soviet GRU officer, defector and now book author, a major GRU operation in the United States succeeded in stealing "all the technological documentation for the American nuclear [ballistic missile] submarine George Washington."

This theft, he wrote, "enabled the Soviet Union to build a perfect copy — nicknamed 'Small George.'"

The USS George Washington, first of the U.S. nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), was delivered to the Navy by the Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics in 1959.

Contrary to earlier CIA forecasts, the Soviet navy was able to build its first modern SSBN fleet in the 1960s — 34 Yankee class subs completed from 1967 through 1974 — modeled on the first U.S. missile sub.

The Soviet submarines incorporated bigger reactors and were faster than their U.S prototypes.

Courtesy of the GRU, in 1967 the Soviets began deploying these Yankee-class submarines of fundamentally U.S. design in the mid-Atlantic and Pacific. Each sub was carrying sixteen 1,600-mile range SS-N-6 ballistic missiles with their 1-megaton nuclear warheads targeted on their designers in the United States.

Now, in the mid-1980s, the GRU continues to gather U.S. military secrets by all means available, including those it has accused the United States of using.

In October 1981, as the first of a new generation of U.S. Trident missile submarines sat moored to a pier at the EBD shipyard in Groton, Conn., a Soviet Aeroflot jetliner took an unscheduled detour into a forbidden zone and flew near the shipyard and the highly-classifed submarine.

Under GRU direction, Aeroflot airliners are modified to carry cameras and

electronic surveillance equipment of many types.

Many of Aeroflot's staff stationed in the United States and in other Western countries are technically trained GRU officers assigned to ferret out intelligence on U.S. aerospace techniques.

And on the sea, many officers of the huge and growing Soviet merchant navy visiting Western ports and plying strategic ocean areas also are GRU officers trained to observe U.S. Navy ships and submarines.

Over Connecticut, the Aeroflot jetliner proceeded safely on its journey without further incident — unlike the flight of Korean Airlines 007 that wandered over sensitive military territory.

The Soviets said the Trident overflight was unintentional. In the United States a controversy arose over whether the Federal Aviation Administration was really at fault.

And the GRU quietly processed its new Trident data.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 23

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PARADE'S SPECIAL

Intelligence Report

Soviet Spies

Every major country employs spies to protect its national security. Politely known as "intelligence agents," these men and women generally are deployed in the diplomatic corps of the nations they serve. To prevent them from being recognized for what they really are, they also are "planted" in overseas missions, international organizations, scholarly exchange programs, news services and trade commissions.

In the intelligence community, it has long been held that the Soviet Union places more espionage agents overseas than any other country. In the U.S., it is assumed that 20% to 30% of the personnel assigned to Soviet installations in New York City, San Francisco and Washington, D.C., are primarily members of the KGB, the Soviet security apparatus.

The FBI is charged with keeping a vigilant eye on these undercover operatives, some of whom they turn into double agents, no doubt with the cooperation of our Central Intelligence Agency. The State Department, which has its own Bureau of Intelligence and Research, keeps a tally of sorts on the number of Soviet spies throughout the world who have been caught, identified as undercover agents and expelled to Moscow.

Herewith a list of 10 countries and the number of Soviet spies they have expelled since 1970:

1) Great Britain.....144
2) France.....51
3) United States (as of 1984).....31
4) Norway.....25
5) Canada.....20
6) Iran.....19
7) Liberia.....19
8) Spain.....14
9) Portugal.....12
10) Switzerland.....11

U.S. Official Expelled From Moscow As Spy

Soviets Say He Was 'Caught in the Act'

By Dusko Doder
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, June 14—The Soviet government announced tonight that it has ordered the expulsion of a U.S. diplomat after he allegedly was caught "in the act of conducting an espionage action" yesterday.

An official statement issued by the Tass news agency said Paul Stombauch, a second secretary in the political section of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, was seized in Moscow yesterday by agents of the Soviet secret police, the KGB, who "cut short a major espionage action by United States special services against the Soviet Union."

The wording of the Tass statement appeared to suggest that several Soviet citizens may have been seized for their links to Stombauch.

Spokesmen for the U.S. Embassy refused all comment beyond confirming that Stombauch worked in the political section, that he has a wife and son with him here, and that they have been in Moscow since last summer.

There was speculation in western circles here that the prompt announcement of Stombauch's expulsion may be linked to the potential embarrassment caused by the FBI probe of the Walker spy ring in the United States. By announcing that a "major espionage action" by the CIA was discovered in Moscow, the Soviets presumably sought to make it clear that both superpowers are engaged in spying on each other.

The announcement two years ago of the expulsion of Richard Osborne was made in similar circumstances. It came after a number of western countries expelled a large number of Soviet diplomats on espionage charges.

During the investigation of Stombauch, Tass said, "materials were obtained [by the KGB] fully exposing this staff member of the U.S. Embassy as engaging in espionage activity incompatible with his official status."

"For his unlawful action," Tass said, Stombauch "was declared persona non grata and is being expelled from the Soviet Union."

Osborne, a first secretary of the embassy, allegedly was caught "red-handed" with incriminating espionage gear, including a radio transmitter, in March of 1983.

A year later, two junior members of the embassy staff were detained by Soviet security agents while meeting a Soviet dissident on a playground. They were accused publicly of espionage but were not ordered expelled from the Soviet Union.

In the past, U.S. diplomats accused of spying were ordered quietly out of the country. Moscow usually treated such expulsions discreetly and publicized them a long time after they took place.

Prior to Osborne's expulsion, the last previous expulsion on espionage charges involved Martha Peterson, a member of the embassy consular section, who allegedly was caught "red handed" in the summer of 1977. The Soviets disclosed the news of her expulsion a year later.

ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE 2-A
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Soviet agent flies home after Japan foils KGB operation

By Timothy Elder
THE WASHINGTON TIMES FOREIGN SERVICE

TOKYO — A KGB agent posing as a Tass journalist in Tokyo may have been allowed to leave Japan this week rather than face charges of intimidating a Chinese exchange student, security and diplomatic analysts said here yesterday.

Although the Japanese government apparently sought to avoid a diplomatic incident with Moscow, the case is unique in that it is the first Soviet intelligence operation targeted at China broken up in Japan.

Konstantine Preobrashenski, 32, was stopped and briefly questioned by security officials Sunday near a Tokyo park where he had arranged to meet a Chinese exchange student, police sources said.

Mr. Preobrashenski was asked to come voluntarily the following day to police headquarters to be questioned on possible charges of intimidating the student, the police sources said.

Espionage, whether directed at Japan or other countries, is not a criminal offense in Japan.

The Russian did not appear Monday, and on Tuesday left Japan on an Aeroflot flight to Moscow, leaving his family behind, the sources said.

Security and diplomatic analysts speculated that Japanese authorities may have intended to give Mr. Preobrashenski an opportunity to leave voluntarily, hoping to avoid a diplomatic incident with Moscow. Japan is working to improve relations with the Kremlin after a long cooling period following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Police sources said that security officials had for some time suspected Mr. Preobrashenski of using his journalist status to function in Japan for the past five years as a KGB agent responsible for gathering information on China.

He had attended some news events, but Japanese authorities were not able to identify any Tass articles written by Mr. Preobrashenski, the sources said.

Mr. Preobrashenski's name was found on a membership roster of the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan. Longtime club members, however, could not recall seeing him making regular use of club facilities designed to assist journalists in their work.

When he was stopped by Japanese authorities, Mr. Preobrashenski was carrying a shortwave radio and a list of numbers apparently representing combinations of radio frequencies and times, according to police.

Police officials speculated that Mr. Preobrashenski had intended to give the items to the Chinese student so he could operate as a Soviet mole after his return to China.

The name and whereabouts of the student were not revealed.

Security officials had observed Mr. Preobrashenski and the Chinese student over the past two years as they went through a series of some 20 meetings, the sources said.

According to information supplied by Japanese authorities, the Soviet agent first contacted the student in Tokyo in 1983 on the pretext of wanting to learn Chinese.

During the course of their contacts, the student provided Mr. Preobrashenski a hand-drawn map of the Chinese Embassy compound in Tokyo, the sources said.

The spy later intimidated the student, threatening to use the map to reveal the student's association with him and discredit the student as a Soviet agent, police said.

More than 2,300 Chinese students have come to Japan in the last two years to study in Japanese universities, according to the Foreign Ministry.

Authorities are investigating whether Soviet agents may have been involved in recruiting other Chinese students to act as moles in China, police said.

Soviet citizens have been involved in 10 espionage incidents uncovered by Japanese authorities following World War II.

In 1983, Arkady A. Vinogradov, the first secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo, was expelled after police identified him as a spy. Three years earlier, another Soviet Embassy official, Col. Yuri N. Kozlov, also was expelled for espionage. This incident, however, is the first instance in which an operation targeted at China was broken up by Japan, intelligence analysts said.

According to information provided by official Japanese sources, the KGB's Japan station is headed by a counselor-level official of the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo and is staffed by almost 50 members.

Unlike the United States, Japan does not restrict travel by Soviet citizens.

The KGB staff in Japan is divided into five teams with the largest, numbering some 20 members, charged with gathering information on high technology advancements, the Japanese sources said. High technology is a field in which the Soviet Union is known to lag far behind the United States and Japan.

Most Soviet espionage efforts uncovered by Japan so far have involved the activities of the high technology team and a disinformation group of five to seven members who disseminate false information advantageous to the Kremlin, the sources said.

Mr. Preobrashenski was believed to be involved in a third team specializing in gathering information on China, the sources said. The sources acknowledged that relatively little is known about the China team, as its activities had not surfaced until the most recent incident.

The other two teams are said to be charged with gathering information on the United States and with electronic surveillance.

The teams concentrating on China, the United States and electronic surveillance are believed to be composed of about five members each.

The Soviet Union has been forced to rely on Japan and Hong Kong as primary listening posts on China since the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations in the 1950s left Moscow with no organized intelligence operation in China, intelligence analysts said.

Yugoslavia and the United States were said to function as secondary locations for the Soviet collection of information on China.

Soviets Expel 6 Britons; London Halts Retaliation

By Gary Lee
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, Sept. 18—The Soviet Union expelled five British diplomats and a journalist today, bringing to 31 the number of Britons ordered out in the past five days and deepening the chill in Anglo-Soviet relations that began with the recent defection of KGB official Oleg Gordievski in London.

Britain, which earlier had expelled 31 Soviets, has decided not to retaliate against today's Soviet move, officials in London said. Britain believes further action would irreparably harm relations, they said, and it has come close to the end of the list of alleged Soviet spies there that was turned over by Gordievski.

The British officials said that even before today's Soviet move, no serious thought was given to further expulsions by Britain, barring "a totally absurd Russian reaction" to London's expulsion on Monday of six more Soviet[s], Washington Post correspondent Karen DeYoung reported from London.

While the retaliatory expulsions appeared to be at an end, it was nonetheless clear from statements by both sides today that rancor continued.

British Ambassador Bryan Cartledge, informed of the latest expulsion order by Soviet Foreign Ministry official Vladimir Suslov, called it a "vengeful, spiteful act, directed against wholly blameless people." He told journalists, "The Soviet action today was far from constructive: it represents a further setback."

The official Soviet news service Tass, in a harsh criticism of Britain's expulsion of the 31 Soviets, accused London of conducting a "malicious campaign of fanning up the feelings of mistrust and hostility to the Soviet Union."

After announcing the latest round of Soviet expulsions, Suslov told Cartledge that Moscow expected that "unfriendly actions" Britain had launched against Soviet citizens would be stopped.

The subject of the expulsions is expected to arise during a planned meeting between British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe and Soviet Foreign Minister Edward

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Soviets Order Six More Britons Out

MOSCOW, From A1

Shevardnadze at the current U.N. General Assembly session.

Suslov, in the meeting in the Foreign Ministry today, gave Cartledge a list of the six Britons ordered to leave and accused them of engaging in activities incompatible with their status, a diplomatic euphemism often used to mean spying.

The six Britons, ordered to leave within three weeks, were five embassy officials—Ian Sloane, a first secretary and cultural attache; Ian Wall of the communications staff; Robert Hooper, an assistant air attache; Sgt. Nigel Andrews of the air attache's staff; and Chief Petty Officer Paul Hughes of the naval attache's staff—and Martin Nesirky, a Reuter correspondent.

The diplomatic kickball between Moscow and London began last Thursday, when Britain announced Gordievski's defection and ordered 25 Soviet diplomats, journalists and commercial employes to leave, accusing them of espionage. The Soviets retaliated by expelling 25 British diplomats, journalists and businessmen on Saturday, startling British diplomats here, who said they had anticipated a lesser response.

London then demonstrated its anger Monday by expelling six more Soviets, who, like the previous 25, apparently had been identified by Gordievski as spies.

The expulsions have sharply reduced the size of the already-small British community in the Soviet capital and deflated its morale. In addition to the 31 ordered out, six spouses of expelled embassy employes, who also were working as staffers, will leave.

DeYoung reported from London:

Although the diplomatic row appears to have ended in a draw, with the score even at 31 expulsions each, in percentage terms the British have lost more personnel in Moscow than the Soviets have in London. The total complement of British diplomats, embassy workers, businessmen and journalists has been reduced from 103 to 72. Their Soviet counterparts in London, who numbered 236 before last week, now are down to 205.

But the British government limits the number of Soviets permitted in London. With the recent expulsions, the allowable Soviet ceiling has been lowered and the personnel cannot be replaced. The Soviet Union, however, has not limited the number of Britons, diplomatic or otherwise, allowed in Moscow. Officials in London have said that Britain will send new diplomats to take the places of those expelled.

Aside from the question of replacing personnel, the overall damage done to the relationship between the two countries remains to be seen. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe have devoted substantial efforts during the past year to increasing trade and diplomatic ties with the Soviets. Last year, British exports to the Soviet Union reached their highest level ever at more than $1 billion.

Britain, Howe said today, "did not lightly decide to expel Soviet citizens." He referred to the events of the past week as a "severe setback to U.K.-Soviet relations" that was "not of our choosing."

But officials said that, once confronted with the information Gordievski had provided, Thatcher was characteristically firm in deciding action must be taken, no matter what the bilateral cost.

"The bottom line as far as she is concerned is that national security comes first," one official said. "Everything else is second place to that."

Thatcher said in Luxor, where she is traveling during an official visit to Egypt, that "we have eliminated the core of their subversive and intelligence operation in Britain, so we shall not respond further to their wholly unjustified expulsions."

"I hope this is an end of the matter and that we can get on with a constructive relationship," she added.

Britain has insisted that none of the Britons expelled had an intelligence function. Officials in London say they are taking the strength of the Soviet reaction as a sign that new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev "doesn't want to be seen as a leader who can be pushed around by a second-division country," in the eyes of either his Politburo colleagues or the United States, in advance of his November summit meeting with President Reagan.

"We accept that we are not in his league," an official said.

The press here has asked whether Britain, once it knew the identities of the alleged Soviet agents, could not have reduced the bilateral harm and benefited from an intelligence point of view by simply leaving them in place and watching them. It was noted that over the past 15 years, Britain has expelled 150 alleged Soviet agents, compared to about a third that number by France and only six by the United States.

Officials said that while the FBI might have the resources to watch and glean information from known Soviet agents, MI5, Britain's domestic intelligence unit, does not.

Washington Post
9/19/85

'KGB at doorstep,' Paris paper warns

By Andrew Borowiec
THE WASHINGTON TIMES FOREIGN SERVICE

PARIS — A 35-year-old investigative reporter rattled the French political establishment this weekend by announcing that Soviet KGB agents have penetrated every facet of the nation's life. "The KGB is at your doorstep," bannered the popular Sunday paper "Le Journal du Dimanche."

The revelation by Thierry Wolton, a staff member of the conservative French weekly "Le Point," was regarded as a bombshell by politicians looking toward crucial legislative elections that are expected to unseat the Socialist majority two months from now.

French newspapers and the state television quickly picked up on Mr. Wolton's book "The KGB in France."

Contacted by The Washington Times, Mr. Wolton said that all available copies of his book had been

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KGB

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snapped up Friday and Saturday. "I have nothing more to add, everything I know is there," he said.

The accusations are chilling to French politicians of all stripes.

In short, Mr. Wolton claims that there are few secrets in France to the Kremlin, that KGB agents have reasonably detailed information about what goes on in the presidential palace, the office of the prime minister, in the Ministry of Exterior Affairs and in defense.

He identified the Soviet spy networks in France as using the code names of "Zenith," "Elint" and "Residence" and said most of their key agents occupy three floors in the Soviet Embassy building at 40 Boulevard Lannes, which he described as a "veritable bunker" insulated against electronic monitoring and where even the use of typewriters is banned; all agents write their reports in longhand.

According to Mr. Wolton, the Soviet agents who analyze the collected information work in a large room where desks are separated by transparent plastic partitions. The secretaries are wives of senior KGB officials who watch every move of the agents, most of whom belong to "Section PR," which gathers political intelligence and puts out disinformation, and "Line X," which he identified as scientific and technological espionage.

The walls of this Soviet intelligence hideout, according to the French journalist, are lined with photographs of French security agents as well as of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency officers assigned to France.

The roof of the building is covered by electronic equipment capable of monitoring communications by satellite and having access to a large portion of the Paris telephone network.

Thus, Mr. Wolton claims, the KGB in Paris is capable of relaying to Moscow conversations between the presidential palace and key ministries. The KGB machinery in Paris is also capable of breaking into a number of government and private computer systems, he said.

In his book, Mr. Wolton also claims that Paris is riddled with hundreds of Soviet agents camouflaged under myriad covers. The book has an appendix identifying firms with addresses and telephone numbers that, according to the author, serve either as "mail boxes" or other KGB offices.

For example, among those named are the "Black Sea and Baltic General Insurance" at 4 Rue D'Argenson, or the maritime agency "Sagmar" at 36 Rue Brunel (telephone 45-74-96-24).

Appearing on the Friday night television show "Apostrophes," Mr. Wolton sucked on his pipe and elaborated:

"The Soviet secret services have infiltrated our country. They manipulate officers and high officials. No political party can challenge my book because all have something to hide."

Mr. Wolton started his investigation following the expulsion from Paris of 47 Soviet "diplomats" in April 1983 on charges of spying. It was not immediately clear how he managed to obtain detailed descriptions of the KGB setup in Paris and of its various adjuncts.

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Account of How K.G.B. 'Disinforms'

By STEPHEN ENGELBERG
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 10 — When a Western correspondent arrives in Moscow, he is told, as sometimes happens, that, regrettably, no apartment is available; he must live in a hotel.

A few months later, a friendly Soviet reporter, shocked at this deplorable bureaucratic inefficiency, intercedes. Suddenly a spacious apartment is made available for the grateful Westerner.

Such supposed coincidences were concocted as a part of a broad effort by Soviet intelligence agencies to subvert, deceive and recruit members of the Western press, says Ilya Dzhirkvelov, a former official in the K.G.B. who defected in 1980.

Mr. Dzhirkvelov said in an interview today that he personally had not "coopted" any American journalists, although he said he knew indirectly of such cases in his career of more than four decades with Soviet intelligence and as a journalist. He did not provide any names.

Mr. Dzhirkvelov is in Washington to present the latest issue of Disinformation, a monthly newsletter that seeks to predict what themes the Soviet authorities will play up in their press campaigns and elsewhere. He serves on the advisory board of the newsletter.

Discrediting a Rising Leader

In the two-hour interview, Mr. Dzhirkvelov described how the K.G.B. carried out similar schemes in Africa, Moscow and elsewhere. He said he was present in 1960 when senior Soviet officials asked for suggestions on how the press could be used to discredit West Germany's Franz Joseph Strauss, now the premier of Bavaria and then a rising political star in West Germany who was seen as a contender to replace Chancellor Konrad Adenauer.

As Mr. Dzhirkvelov recounted, "They said, 'We have a very big problem in West Germany. It's very possible that after Adenauer, the Chancellor of Germany would be Strauss. We have to do everything necessary to compromise him. Who can compromise Strauss? Of course: journalists.' "

The result, he said, was an article planted with the help of intermediaries in the German magazine Der Spiegel, which had been a bitter opponent of Mr. Strauss.

Mr. Dzhirkvelov, who now lives in England, has not previously given interviews. He did, however, give a prepared statement in a libel case that arose after the British magazine Now printed a speech in which Sir James Goldsmith contended that Der Spiegal's coverage of Mr. Strauss had been stage-managed by the Soviet authorities. That suit was settled before trial in 1984 when the magazine agreed to drop the case and Mr. Goldsmith agreed to state publicly that Der Spiegel was not "conscious" of any manipulation.

Activities in Africa

Mr. Dzhirkevelov worked directly for the K.G.B. in the 1940's and 1950's in directorates that deal with both espionage abroad and operations involving foreigners in the Moscow region. Later, he joined Tass and became deputy general secretary of the Soviet Journalists Union.

In the interview, he described his career as a Tass correspondent in Africa, when he wrote dispatches for the Soviet news agency by day and then, secretly, worked to bribe African journalists who plant items written by Moscow.

Mr. Dzhirkevelov asserted that Moscow has made elaborate efforts to plant "disinformation," newspaper articles, broadcasts or rumors that have a kernal of truth but are false in their main thrust.

He said that these appear in the press with both the unwitting and witting assistance of journalists.

In Africa, for instance, he said the Russians had decided in the 1960's that the Peace Corps was improving America's image in the region. To counter this, Mr. Dzhirkevelov decided to plant an item in an African newspaper.

He was stationed at the time in Tanzania, but he said he drove to Uganda where he knew a reporter whom he could bribe. The journalist, he said, agreed to put his name on a dispatch written by Moscow alleging that the Peace Corps in East Africa was the tool of the C.I.A.

He said this report gained some credence, in part because the Russians had discovered that one of the Peace Corps volunteers was a retired intelligence officer.

Difficulty of Misinforming

Mr. Dzhirkvelov said that disinformation sufficiently convincing to fool Western journalists and readers was not easy to formulate. He noted that it must always contain elements that can be verified. In the case of Mr. Strauss, for instance, he said one of the articles planted in the press involved his possible purchase of a villa.

The Soviet authorities had learned that Mr. Strauss had hired a real estate agent to look for a modest villa. But he said that the version that later appeared in print had Mr. Strauss using millions from secret bank accounts to finance the purchase of a palatial mansion.

The former K.G.B. officials said items that he believed were "disinformation" have continued to appear in the Western press, and more often in the third world. But he said this was not an everyday occurrance.

"It is not so easy to prepare disinformation," he said. "If you want to be primitive and crude, sure. I heard someone say it is possible to find in American or English newspapers Soviet disinformation all the time. This is a big exaggeration. It is not true."

He said even though his time as a foreign correspondent involved intelligence duties, he was also expected to work as a journalist. Some employees of Tass, he said, are "clean" and have no espionage duties. Others, like himself, also worked for Soviet intelligence. To blur the distinction, he said, Tass insists that all of its writers file articles.

"It's like, the old Reuters saying," he said, referring to the British owned news agency. "No stories — No job."

First of a four-part series

DIS-INFORMATION

Planting false information to influence public opinion

There's a Trojan horse built every minute, parading lies as truth

By Elizabeth Pond
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

DISINFORMATION has been around ever since the serpent sold Eve on that fateful apple.

It has led, say history and legend, to the conquering of a city (Troy, via the Trojan horse); the defaming of Richard III as a murderer (by Sir Thomas More, no less, and then by Shakespeare); the toppling of a government (Britain's Ramsay MacDonald in 1924); and, more positively, the success of the Allied invasion of Normandy in 1944.

It has led as well to miscellaneous pogroms, wars, rejection of diplomats, and apathy in the face of danger.

Most recently it has inspired mutual accusations of "disinformation" by right and left in the United States on every conceivable issue. And it is currently being dramatized in the trial in Norway of Arne Treholt, charged as a Soviet spy and agent of influence.

Disinformation, then, is not just historical. It is present today as a systematized function of the KGB, the Soviet secret police, as well as Soviet-bloc secret services. It is present whenever governments exercise "news management" that suppresses unpleasant facts. It is present when public relations imagemaking goes beyond putting the best face on a political candidate to present a totally artificial picture of that candidate — or to smear a rival.

Just what is disinformation?

Simply put, it is the deliberate planting of false

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Exec AD LES ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
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Intell. ___
Lab. ___
Legal Coun. ___
Off. Cong. & Public Affs. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

The Washington Post ___
The Washington Times ___
Daily News (New York) ___
The New York Times ___
The Wall Street Journal ___
The Chicago Tribune ___
The Los Angeles Times ___
The Christian Science Monitor 16
USA Today ___

Date 2-26-85

or misleading political information to influence either public or elite opinion. It is not just *mis*information, or mistaken information. It is deliberately false.

It is not overt propaganda, in which the true speaker is identified, however outrageous his viewpoint. It is *planted* information, with the source secret or disguised.

It could be especially distorting in our much-vaunted Information Age, dependent as it is on all those facts stored in the computers.

Disinformation is both more and less pervasive than the man in the street wants to acknowledge today. On the one hand, the democrat who trusts in the free market of ideas instinctively shrinks from thinking he can be manipulated by disinformation he doesn't detect. On the other hand, the patriot who is vexed by intractable world problems instinctively would like to blame all his country's troubles on this easy single-cause theory of conspiracy.

The first point to be made about disinformation, then, is that the phenomenon does exist, and that it can be used to devastating effect, especially in character assassination of targeted persons.

The second point is that disinformation is no magic key. It doesn't begin to explain the complexities of Soviet-American conflict, say, or prescribe what foreign policies one should follow.

The third point is that disinformation is ultimately vulnerable to truth, since exposure can only reveal its divergence from reality. This axiom might seem banal, were it not for the frequent reflex of governments to fight disinformation not with truth, but with counterdisinformation of their own.

At this point some examples might help clarify how disinformation works.

The classic case in terms of longevity and damage must be the fake "Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion." This turn-of-the-century Russian account of a purported Jewish conspiracy to enslave the Christian world was used by Russians to blackmail Jews in World War I. In 1921 the Times of London exposed the Protocols as having been plagiarized from a 19th-century anti-Semitic novel. But that didn't prevent Hitler from picking them up to help his persecution and attempted annihilation of Jews.

Today, 60 years after the Protocols were debunked, they are still sometimes cited as authentic in the Arab world.

Usually, disinformation is less brazen than the Protocols. The more common variety is a partial lie tucked into truthful surroundings to enhance credibility. Or it is a fact falsely attributed. Or it is extreme exaggeration designed to mislead by suppressing all contrary evidence. Or it is a red herring to lure the unwary away from what they should be paying attention to.

Highly effective use was made — apparently — of the partial lie in the 1924 election in Britain. To this day historians are not satisfied that they know the full story about the letter purportedly written by Grigory Zinoviev, Soviet president of the Communist International, to the tiny British Communist Party with instructions to set up cells in the British Army. Aino Kuusinen, widow of longtime Soviet Politburo member Otto Kuusinen, wrote many years later that there was such a letter originally but that the public version was a forgery.

What is known is that the letter was printed in the pro-Tory Daily Mail four days before the election — and that it triggered a wave of fear and hysteria among voters that toppled Labour Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald. As a result Labour was out of office for the next five years.

The origins of modern disinformation are disputed. Lenin certainly extolled the virtue of the lie. Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels was no slouch at it in Nazi Germany.

JAN Nowak of the Polish resistance during World War II believes his organization invented many of today's disinformation techniques as it harassed the German occupiers. Considerable testimony about disinformation from the American Central Intelligence Agency came out in the US in the 1970s. Israel was apparently willing to practice disinformation even on its main ally when it strafed and torpedoed the USS Liberty, an electronic monitoring ship, during the 1967 war, then tried to cover it up through all channels as a case of mistaken identity. By now the general assumption seems to be that any secret service worth its salt will engage in manipulation of public and elite opinion in other countries.

Certainly the Soviets put enough stock in disinformation to institutionalize it in 1959 in Department D of the KGB. And a decade later they upgraded the operation by assigning it to Service A of the First Directorate, responsible for all covert and overt "active measures" for influencing foreign opinion.

On a less grand scale the word "disinformation" has been sufficiently popularized in America in the past five years to serve as an all-purpose epithet. Democrats accuse the Reagan administration of disinformation in waiting until just after election day to discover that the federal deficit is roughly $30 billion larger than previously thought. Outgoing US Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick accuses political adversaries of disinformation in presenting her as "some kind of right-wing extremist."

Accuracy in Media, Inc., accuses CBS and NBC of spreading Soviet propaganda. Author Russell Braley, in a book excoriating the New York Times, begins his chapter on Vietnam war reporting with a barbed quote about treason. The Center for National Security Studies sees a potential "serious affront to the democratic process" in a Nicaraguan insurgent's allegation that CIA officials have coached insurgents to misrepresent their policy to the American press and to Congress.

CBS charges that Gen. William C. Westmoreland practiced deception in reporting enemy troop strengths in the Vietnam war. General Westmoreland countercharges that CBS deliberately distorted interviews in the program alleging deception.

So modish has the concept of disinformation become that it is perhaps time to pause for an assessment, at least of its international dimensions.

It may be too late to rehabilitate Richard III — but it's not too late to help ourselves.

TACTIC: Recycle the lie again and again

ON May 13, 1981, Mehmet Ali Agca shot Pope John Paul II in St. Peter's Square in Rome.

In fall 1981 forgeries and other disinformation that bore marks of the KGB handiwork began to appear in West German and Turkish newspapers and were cycled through the Soviet news media and back into the international press. The disinformation had two aims: first, to absolve the Bulgarian secret service from any links with Agca, and second, to implicate the CIA in the shooting.

Some of the recycling relied on the "credulity and predisposition to believe of Western and third-world journalists, writers, and intellectuals," says Paul Henze, a former American National Security Council staffer. Some depended on "the readiness of reporters to accept cash or other favors."

At first, the West dismissed out of hand the idea that Moscow might be behind the attempted assassination. Even the CIA joined in ruling out any probable KGB involvement, despite Soviet dislike of the Polish Pope and his protégé Solidarity trade union. Such action would risk too much world abhorrence should it become known, it was thought. Besides, the job had been unprofessionally bungled, and Agca had a record as a right-wing hit man in his native Turkey.

Two American writers, however, Mr. Henze and Claire Sterling — along with the Italian magistrate investigating the crime — doggedly followed leads that implicated the Bulgarian secret service (and thereby the KGB, given Moscow's close control of its clients' secret services).

In 1982, when Mrs. Sterling published her findings of a Bulgarian connection that had been carefully camouflaged as a far-right connection, the Soviet media attacked her, scoffed at any Bulgarian involvement, and pressed ahead with the CIA charge. Even after the Italians arrested Sergei Antonov and indicted two other Bulgarians (with the prosecutor pointing a finger at the KGB), the Soviet press continued its vehement denials of Bulgarian complicity — and stayed silent about Agca's earlier visits to Bulgaria, his notably good treatment there, and his training with Palestinian guerrillas. Mr. Antonov was ostensibly an official of the Bulgarian airlines but was reputedly also a secret police officer.

Forgeries of State Department cables, lurid rumors of Agca's sexual exploits, and other disinformation that supported the Soviets' thesis continued to circulate in Europe and formed the basis of reports in the Dublin Sunday Press, the Madrid weekly El Tiempo, and Italian and other European newspapers, Henze says. The Dublin articles were expanded into a book and published in New York, he adds.

The indicted Bulgarians have not yet been tried. The case against them rests largely on Agca's confessions — which have been verified in some remarkable details but on other points are inconsistent. The Soviets and Bulgarians argue that the Italian and US intelligence services must have primed Agca in jail — a contention the Italian judge in the case does not credit.

— E. P.

The disinformation had two aims: first, to absolve the Bulgarian secret service from any links with Agca, and second, to implicate the CIA in the shooting.

TACTIC: Use a fraction of reality

"DISINFORMATION is most effective in a very narrow context," says Frank Snepp in an interview.

"It's most effective when it pertains to something the press has no access to, or information which is exclusively in the intelligence community: radio intercepts, spy photos."

Mr. Snepp is a disillusioned former CIA agent who honed his expertise in disinformation while briefing reporters in Vietnam. He became a center of controversy in the United States when he published — without CIA clearance — a book about the fall of Saigon.

"You take a fraction of reality and expand on it. It's very seldom totally at odds with the facts," Snepp says of one approach to disinformation.

"We were trying to suggest to Congress in 1974 that more aid was necessary because the Communist threat was increasing, so we talked about infiltration of Communist forces to the south and led everyone to believe they had been expanded by 60,000. But we neglected to tell them 60,000 had been killed, captured, or dispatched back. It's shaving a piece of reality off."

Snepp continues: "Disinformation in the CIA sense is not false information. That is the grossest kind, and that is the kind you can usually be caught out on. When the CIA does it, it's nothing so gross. It's information which keys off of reality, like docudrama. But that's the CIA definition, which is not to take an untruth, but to take a piece of truth."

Asked for an example from 1973, he describes feeding a story to the Economist magazine "to create the impression that the Communists were trying to build a third Vietnam on the western border of South Vietnam, where they could set up airfields, antiaircraft, a fortified separate Communist entity." The object was to convince Congress that the cease-fire would not hold, he says.

"What we did was to take very scattered, questionable intelligence, intelligence that seemed to fit our theory, pieced it together, and made a mosaic, not indicating a lot of countervailing evidence. Though there were plans for a road, for example, there was no evidence that they were really building it; they were just contemplating this. . . . That was disinformation. It wasn't a lie." — E. P.

"Disinformation in the CIA sense is not false information. That's the grossest kind— the kind you can usually be caught on."

TACTIC: Hide a forgery

"I think the West should be very careful when receiving documents that are not originals. That is the first suspicious signal," says Ladislav Bittman in an interview. He is a specialist who honed his expertise in forgery as deputy chief of the Czechoslovak Disinformation Department before his defection to the West in 1968.

The Soviets and Czechs, he says, "have hundreds of genuine Western documents. Most forgeries today are actually rewritten original American documents. [The forgers take] a document speaking about something totally different, and they use some parts of the document and insert only three or four new paragraphs that are really incriminating.

"It's much easier because the whole format is preserved and looks genuine. The language is very important. American governmental language is very special to bureaucrats."

Besides forgeries "there is a great variety of tactics" in "active measures," Bittman continues. The Soviet phrase "active measures" encompasses the gamut of attempts to influence opinion in foreign countries. It includes both overt and covert propaganda.

"The Soviets have a great advantage over the West (which of course uses the same tactics), a highly centralized system makes it possible to coordinate and orchestrate these measures, to use both the official propaganda channels, agents, organizations; semiofficial channels, agents, organizations; and the secret channels, agents, organizations. In the West the [United States Information Agency], CIA, American press, and hundreds of business organizations involved in international relations," all speaking with different voices, make the US much less effective in influencing other countries.

— E. P.

Second of a four-part series

DIS-INFORMATION . . . thrives in the third world

Lack of feisty opposition parties and free press offers fertile ground for lies

By Elizabeth Pond
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

DISINFORMATION is at its most rampant in the third world.

Disinformation anywhere depends on credulity. And credulity tends to be high in developing countries. Politics is often volatile; civic traditions frequently include authoritarian rule, colonialism, hierarchical relationships, and fierce familial or tribal rivalries in once-static societies that have now been wrenched out of their old certainties. In such an atmosphere truth is not at a premium.

Moreover, the institutions that industrial democracies depend on to protect themselves against disinformation — including strong opposition parties, a vigorous pluralist press, and an educated, literate population — are generally weak in the third world. When this situation is aggravated by nationalist hostilities with neighbors and by intervention in regional politics by more distant powers, there is an open invitation to rumor and disinformation.

Allegations of disinformation abound.

A Communist-owned Indian newspaper implicitly links the CIA to the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

"American officials" concede to the New York Times that the US is behind the clandestine anti-Khomeini Free Voice of Iran broadcasts out of Egypt.

A forged document purportedly issued by the US State Department surfaces in Peru, saying that Washington has authorized the sale of nuclear missiles to Chile.

Latin American journalists, at a conference organized by the Nicaraguan Journalists' Union, discuss creating a "front against imperialist disinformation in Central America."

The Bahamian prime minister, caught in a mounting political storm, charges that a US diplomat triggered "a disinformation campaign" to smear his government with allegations that drug traffickers bribed Bahamian officials.

American opponents of US military intervention in Nicaragua and El Salvador accuse the Reagan administration of disinformation in alleging that MIGs were being brought into Nicaragua. American fans of Maj. Roberto d'Aubuisson say he is the victim of disinformation in being linked to the Salvadorean death squads.

Angola alleges that the United States is involved in Israeli and South African nuclear bomb projects.

US Attorney-General William French Smith accuses the KGB, the Soviet secret police, of fabricating "classic examples of Soviet forgery" in sending threatening, racist letters purporting to have been written by

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The Wall Street Journal ___
The Chicago Tribune ___
The Los Angeles Times ___
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the Ku Klux Klan to athletes in 20 Asian and African countries on the eve of the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles.

Egypt stages a sham murder of the target of a Libyan hit squad, then when Libya boasts of the assassination, produces the "victim" alive to make a laughingstock of Cairo's adversary.

"I think disinformation is on the upswing, on many levels," says Paul Henze, a former National Security Council staffer who is now a consultant with the Rand Corporation. "True, some of the more obvious cases have been very unimpressive, but it's cumulative. . . . In Turkey there have been some spectacular examples. I think there has been a considerable effect on the educational process in many countries. You find [Soviet forgeries about US scheming and plotting] turning up in books for universities and schools."

In Latin America there are persistent accusations in the Brazilian press that the US is "somehow poisoning Brazilian Indians," says a United States Information Agency official dealing with Soviet-bloc "active measures" and disinformation. He believes that "a lot of activity in Latin America is handled by the [Soviet Union's] Cuban surrogate."

Lucian Heichler, State Department chairman of Washington's interagency working group on "active measures," adds, "It seems to us that the volume of active measures has been on the increase in recent years."

He characterizes the repetition of Soviet claims of a CIA connection to the assassination of Indira Gandhi and of an alleged spy mission of the Korean airliner the Soviets shot down in 1983 as "psychology based on the old adage that where there's smoke, there's fire.

Third-world newspapers are less likely now than a couple of years ago to rush a sensational anti-American story into print without checking with the US first, Heichler explains.

"People tend to think that the more the Soviets are able to recycle and replay [these accusations in the third-world press], the more a sticky residue of credibility attaches in people's minds to the point where they begin to wonder if it's really so."

In particular, disinformation can be devastating in blackballing targeted individuals.

"A friend of mine was hurt by this," states one American diplomat. "George Griffin was assigned as political counselor to New Delhi [but rejected by the Indian government]. He wanted to go. He is a real India hand. He was in Bangladesh and Afghanistan.

"Patriot and Blitz, the pro-Soviet papers [in India], kept saying he had been doing secret work during the Bangladesh war. Actually they were mad because, on trips to Delhi, he was doing briefing on Afghanistan. This active-measures activity changed the opinion of the government to which we wanted to send him, to the detriment of his career and I think US-Indian relations."

Heichler sums up, "The effectiveness [of disinformation] is, I think, on the way down in some cases. At least I think we have had some telling effect in our last two years, in causing specific active measures to backfire. . . . Even [in the third world] the credibility is beginning to go down."

Third-world newspapers are less likely now than a couple of years ago to rush a sensational anti-American story into print without checking with the US first, he explains.

"One active measure . . . which backfired totally was the Ku Klux Klan [forged letter threatening third-world athletes who were coming to the Los Angeles Olympics]. These were received by any number of Olympic committees in Africa and Asia. Just about every one of them brought them around to our embassies for discussion. No one took them really seriously; no one proceeded to boycott the Olympics."

Dimitri Simes, a Soviet émigré and foreign-policy analyst, is skeptical about how much impact Soviet disinformation actually has in the third world.

"It's usually successful in areas where there is very strong emotional anti-Americanism," he points out, "so I would be interested to know to what extent so-called Soviet successes are Soviet successes and to what extent it's just normal anti-American stuff that appears anywhere."

CASE STUDY: BEIRUT

Planting propaganda in the Mideast news media

BEIRUT in the old days was a "wide open city," according to one knowledgeable Western official who served there. "There were some 30 papers, almost all influenced or financed by one or another international party. It was very easy to find a propaganda outlet and not terribly dangerous. Disinformation was heavy on both sides" — i.e., the Soviets and the West.

"All sides put a lot of throwaway propaganda into the papers that took their line, even though they were identified with [them].

"One could often spot an item which served Soviet interests in a small pro-communist paper which later turned up in a larger sheet in Europe, India, or Latin America. And they clearly intended that over a period of time there would be a crescendo of replays," especially in the more credible European news media. The hope, says the official, was that eventually reporters and readers would think " 'OK, this is the fact, the truth.' Then it's no longer traceable to this little paper it originally appeared in."

The West undoubtedly did the same.

A more specific procedure might mean challenging favorable material that one's own side had already inserted into the media to "keep it alive" by controversy. Another might be supplying subtle forgeries, even to opposition papers, just to get a detail into print. The Soviets played such games with Islamic and pro-Western papers.

And how well did these tricks work?

"The down-to-earth answer is that they are not so successful in most cases. But there are times when something gets accepted as fact on the analytical side. . . .

"The more specific, the more fruitful. An effective ambassador or intelligence operative, for instance, might be hurt by a disinformation effort.

"The broader the objective, the more difficult it is to have a lasting success. . . .

"There are three situations when disinformation can be useful: 1. A very specifically targeted situation, when the mindset is such that it merely reinforces attitudes. 2. Constant and long-term repetition has an impact. 3. When decisions have to be made about ongoing situations, the balance can be tipped if there is not much information. These are the only times when it really works."

As an illustration, the Soviets "can mobilize peace groups and convince a given audience of the warlike intentions of the Pershing II, etc." (though that is not disinformation per se). Or, if they want to convince someone of "a specific intention of the US to overthrow a government, they can do it if there is a small enough, unsophisticated enough audience."

The late Indira Gandhi was a "very interesting" example. She was "a lady brought up in an anticolonialist background, very well educated. As she grew more nonaligned, she became more paranoid about Western intelligence agencies. She had observed their activities at first hand for many years. The Soviets played that very well. They know the ingrown, psychological basis. They feed that preconception, even when they know it's not true."

Is there any difference between the West and Moscow in practicing disinformation in the Mideast?

"The means are not all that different. Maybe the Soviets put a little more effort into it. But maybe that's essentially because the basic Western message is so effective in the overt sense." — E. P.

CASE STUDY: JAKARTA

A Communist campaign that backfired

ONE of the great coups of the Czech Disinformation Department — or so it seemed at first to Ladislav Bittman — was Special Operation Palmer.

The year was 1964. The Czechs had established a channel for disinformation in an Indonesian ambassador whom they were supplying with girls. He funneled to Jakarta the anti-American documents the Czechs gave him — including material alleging that one William Palmer, director of the Association of American Film Importers in Indonesia, was the CIA's most important agent in the country.

The Czechs "had no direct and persuasive evidence that Palmer was a CIA employee and could only suspect him to be one," wrote Bittman, deputy director of Czech disinformation operations until his defection to the West in 1968, in his book, "The Deception Game." Nonetheless, the Czechs patched together an incriminating dossier on Palmer.

Indonesia, "torn by economic chaos, inflation, internal tension, and hatred for Malaysia, was a ready victim for Communist intelligence activities," mused Bittman in the 1972 book. "It was possible to claim that all past, present, and future difficulties, real or imagined, were the result of American imperialism."

In December, student demonstrators ransacked the US Information Agency libraries in Jakarta and Surabaja. In February 1965 students attacked the residence of the US ambassador. Shortly thereafter the Indonesian women's movement, bowing to its communist branch, demanded the expulsion of Palmer.

In the meantime the Soviets, impressed by the Czech campaign, joined in. General Agayants, head of the Soviet disinformation service, visited Indonesia to supervise the next stage of the operation himself.

In March a mob attacked the American Motion Picture Association in Indonesia. In April rioters broke into Palmer's (unoccupied) villa. In mid-April the Indonesian government ordered the American Peace Corps out of the country.

At this point, according to Bittman, the Czechs and Soviets forged a report from the British ambassador in Jakarta to London about a purported British-American plan to invade Indonesia from neighboring Malaysia. American and British denials were brushed off by the Indonesian government.

"For almost a year, with only the most primitive means and a few agents, the Czechoslovak and Soviet intelligence services influenced Indonesian public opinion and leadership," wrote Bittman. "The reasons were inherent in the extremely favorable objective curcumstances. Operation Palmer was initiated at the proper time. It succeeded in riding the crest of a wave of anti-Americanism. It corroborated the existing views."

Western diplomats may think the Soviets and Czechs were in fact just "riding the crest," rather than strengthening it, in the pro-Chinese, virulently anti-American Communist Party. But Bittman and his fellow operatives considered their campaign "quite successful," he recalled in an interview. "It stirred up a kind of anti-American hysteria in Indonesia."

But then suddenly a violent reversal snatched all the gains away from Moscow, Prague, Peking, and the Indonesian Communist Party. Emboldened by the swell of anti-Americanism, the Indonesian Communists launched an attack on their political opponents with the tacit consent of President Sukarno and killed six generals. The armed forces fought back and won, and some 300,000 suspected Communists and fellow travelers were slaughtered. The Indonesian Communist Party, once the largest per population in any non-Communist country, was driven underground. Sukarno was replaced by the anticommunist General Suharto. Malaysia and Indonesia became friends.

"In August and the beginning September 1965, Operation Palmer was still being hailed as a tour de force by the Czechoslovak and Russian intelligence services," Bittman wrote in summing up the campaign. "By October, no one willingly mentioned it." — E. P.



The West wakes up to the dangers of disinformation

By Elizabeth Pond
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

FIVE years ago the best seller "The Spike" created a sensation. Its thesis — "so explosive it can only be told as fiction," as the blurb had it — was that major American news media were manipulated by Moscow.

"Disinformation" was not yet a buzzword. The authors of "The Spike," Arnaud de Borchgrave and Robert Moss, along with a few other crusaders, were out to make it one.

They succeeded.

Congress opened hearings on disinformation. The State Department set up a section to deal with Soviet disinformation abroad.

Publicity and the State Department's meticulous documentation of forgeries even steeled the Netherlands, Portugal, and Denmark to expel some of the most blatant Soviet operatives. A storybook example of the phenomenon is on stage now in a Norwegian court as Arne Treholt — ex-Foreign Ministry spokesman, left-wing Social Democrat, and onetime political star — is being tried as a Soviet spy.

All this fact and fiction about Soviet disinformation in the West has been much more alarming to Westerners than shadowy intrigue in volatile third-world politics.

In the 1980s, then, disinformation in the politically stable industrialized world has become an issue in its own right — but one hard to pin down.

"I'm afraid you won't have much to write about," sympathized a Western intelligence official when asked about it.

He noted there have been only two ranking Soviet-bloc

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disinformation in their former secret-service jobs: Stanislav Levchenko of the KGB's Tokyo "residency" before he fled to the United States in 1979, and Ladislav Bittman, deputy chief of the Czechoslovak Disinformation Department before his defection in the fall of 1968. Bittman's information is old; Levchenko was involved in disinformation only "on the periphery," the official observed.

Nonetheless, enough is known by now to venture at least an initial assessment of disinformation in the industrialized world.

First off, there is probably minimal Western disinformation inside the Soviet Union. Western intelligence services see little point in targeting Soviet public opinion (apart from overt radio propaganda), since public opinion has so little impact on Soviet policy. Nor would they normally have any hope of influencing the Soviet political elite. A high-ranking asset like Col. Oleg Penkovsky in the early 1960s is much more valuable as a spy than as a persuader.

Presumably there is more room for Western disinformation in a relatively open Eastern European country like Poland, with its vigorous underground press and large emigration. Even there, however — given the anti-Russian disposition of Poles and the stubborn independence of indigenous social-political movements like the now-outlawed Solidarity trade union — the West is better served by reinforcing the Poles' penchant for truth than in circulating lies that could easily be exposed and backfire.

West-West disinformation is practiced, especially in buying placement of articles in the press. Among Western allies any differences over such matters are generally settled amicably, however, and do not raise the same kind of alarms as Soviet-bloc disinformation does.

The major question in probing disinformation in stable industrialized societies, then, is how effective covert Soviet-bloc efforts are in influencing opinion in open Western societies.

According to rough Central Intelligence Agency estimates presented in US congressional hearings in 1980 and 1982, Moscow spends some $4 billion a year on overt and covert propaganda, with some $3 billion of this going to Pravda, Tass, and other overt activities and the residual $1 billion presumably going into covert disinformation. Georgetown University Prof. Roy Godson, coauthor with Richard H. Shultz of the book "Dezinformatsia" says the Soviets employ 15,000 in "active measures."

"Active measures" — the term came into use in the Soviet Union in the 1950s — include international front organizations, agent-of-influence operations, and forgeries. Front organizations straddle overt and covert measures, Godson and Shultz explain. The International Department of the Soviet Communist Party "coordinates the activities of these organizations," but "the fronts actively attempt to maintain an image of independence."

The flagship of these fronts is the World Peace Council. The longtime president of the [illegible] nonruling communist parties most loyal to Moscow. Other WPC executives, the authors write, come primarily from other communist parties, Soviet-backed guerrilla movements, and other Soviet-controlled international fronts.

"Moscow provides the bulk of the funds for WPC activities, although how these arrangements operate is not completely clear," according to "Dezinformatsia."

The World Peace Council has campaigned against NATO; against American "germ warfare" in the Korean war; American, British, and French bases abroad; American involvement in the Vietnam war; the American neutron warhead; and the NATO Euromissiles that began deployment a year ago.

The WPC and other front organizations eagerly join in popular Western peace campaigns. Various Western officials have asserted that such front organizations also generously fund these campaigns (though public proof has been skimpy). Front organizations try to steer these movements toward focusing criticism on the West while sparing the Soviet Union. And they seek to gain legitimacy for communists by their association with these movements.

HOW successful they are is debatable. Bittman detects a "tendency to glorify successes" in disinformation services. Some signs suggest the Soviets think their overt and covert opposition to the neutron warhead in the late 1970s played a key role in killing NATO plans for it. Probably a more accurate generalization, though, would be that Soviet "active measures" find little resonance when they stray too far from public opinion (as in charges of germ warfare in Korea) — but that, when they join already popular protests, especially in Europe, the communists' strong organizational skills amplify the appeal of these movements.

Agent-of-influence operations are best represented by the one Westerner who has been convicted on this count, Pierre-Charles Pathé. From 1961 to 1979 Pathé served as a paid Soviet agent in France, disseminating generally anti-American and pro-Soviet views in public articles and in a private newsletter.

A more ambitious and convoluted operation with agents of influence has been attributed to the KGB by Soviet defector Anatoliy Golitsyn and ex-CIA head of counterintelligence, James Angleton. In this scenario, the whole Soviet-Chinese split of the past quarter century is a sham — and the Soviets have succeeded in fooling all Western foreign ministries and most academic scholars with their pretense.

In this thesis — presented in detail in Mr. Golitsyn's 1984 book "New Lies for Old" — the Kremlin has fed a number of bogus defectors into the CIA to persuade the US that the split was real. So convinced of Golitsyn's theory were parts of the CIA in the 1970s that one Soviet defector whom Golitsyn deemed an agent of disinformation was kept in solitary confinement for 3½ years in a cell in a building constructed solely to jail him until he confessed.

In the late 1970s, when CIA directors William Colby and Stansfield Turner discovered this treatment of a human being — as well as the paralysis wrought in the CIA by the con-

stant suspicion and search for a presumed Soviet "mole" — they dropped Angleton and severed Golitsyn's links with the agency. As the conduct of the Golitsyn camp then became public knowledge, it added to America's post-Vietnam revulsion toward the CIA. Today the mainstream of academics (and CIA analysts) dismisses Golitsyn's thesis as wild fantasizing.

As for forgeries, these have been used by the Soviets since soon after the 1917 revolution. The most elaborate in recent years was "US Army Field Manual 30-31B," an entire manual that urged American officers to spy on their host countries and in some cases subvert their governments. The fake manual first appeared in Turkey in 1975. It was later circulated in some 20 countries to try to implicate the CIA in the Red Brigades' murder of Christian Democrat leader Aldo Moro in Italy in 1978.

This much is clear then: The Soviets take their disinformation seriously.

One man's disinformation may be another's free press

London and Hamburg

FRANZ Josef Strauss and the magazine Der Spiegel — quite a few West Germans think — deserve each other. Both are convinced of their own importance, and of their own rightness. Neither suffers critics gladly.

Mr. Strauss has long been a hero of the right and a bogeyman of the left. Der Spiegel's publisher, Rudolf Augstein, has been a hero of the iconoclasts and a bogeyman of the establishment.

The "Spiegel Affair" that pitted these two giants against each other came in 1962. In the past year it has been widely presented in Britain and the US as a classic exhibit of Soviet disinformation.

But is it?

Certainly West German conservatives do not refer to it as such. And an exploration of the convolutions of the affair suggests considerable difficulties with the thesis of disinformation.

Back in 1962 the magazine had been carrying on a vendetta against Strauss for some time. But the article that precipitated the storm was less a personal attack than a report on the inadequacies of the fledgling German armed forces as displayed in the fall exercises just past.

Conventional forces could not hold in case of a Warsaw Pact attack, Defense Ministry evaluators wrote in internal studies. This judgment reinforced the conclusion of an earlier supersecret ministry report, commissioned by Strauss, speculating that a preemptive nuclear attack by the West might be needed to reduce West German losses in a war — and that Bonn should be able to trigger that nuclear preemption if the US lacked nerve.

The leak about the fall exercises was given to Der Spiegel by a north German Army colonel who mistrusted Strauss's Bavarians (and the Air Force) and thought — mistakenly — that the ministry's musings about a preemptive nuclear strike had never been shown to the West German chancellor.

After a lag of two weeks Der Spiegel was charged with revealing 17 official secrets. There was a night raid on the weekly; Augstein and editors were arrested. The main author of the article, Conrad Ahlers, was in Spain on vacation, and Strauss telephoned the West German military attaché in Madrid after midnight on a weekend to arrange for his arrest. Strauss said he was calling on the authority of the chancellor and the foreign minister (neither of whom knew about the call) and that the proper Interpol warrant was on its way (even though the international police organization had not been contacted). Ahlers was picked up at his hotel at 3 a.m. and sent back to West Germany.

West Germany was a different country then than now. It had been a democracy for only 13 years. In that time it had had only one chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, and his conservatives regarded themselves as the country's rightful governing party. The German propensity to obey authority may have been bitterly challenged by intellectuals, but not by the other institutions, including, by and large, the press. Der Spiegel was an exception. It saw — and sees — itself as the crusading political adversary of the government in power.

Der Spiegel had checked its story with Defense Ministry, intelligence, and other government sources and deleted some material on request — a precaution it would probably be embarrassed to take today. One of those deletions appeared shortly in Die Welt — and brought no prosecution for Die Welt.

The Federal High Court eventually acquitted Der Spiegel and all the defendants — and the US Judge Advocate's Office in Heidelberg categorically denied the Spiegel article had endangered US troops. Augstein's arrest politicized a generation of students, however. During his six weeks in jail there were demonstrations for his release, and thereafter he was lionized at universities.

Strauss made out less well. After denying in Parliament for two weeks that he had been involved in getting Ahlers arrested, he finally conceded his role. The conservatives' junior coalition partner, the Free Democrats, threatened to pull down the government if Strauss didn't resign. The 85-year-old Adenauer, who in any case resented Strauss's ambition to replace him, then forced Strauss out. The Christian Democrats, who had been trying to get Adenauer to yield to a younger chancellor, thereupon insisted that Ludwig Erhard take over to manage the economic miracle.

By 1966 Strauss was back in a new "grand coalition" as finance minister — and press spokesman for the government was one Conrad Ahlers, the Spiegel writer who had been yanked back from his Spanish vacation. Since then, Strauss and Spiegel have continued what Spiegel foreign editor Michael Naumann describes as their love-hate relationship, with Strauss interviews regularly appearing in the magazine, to the profit of both.

Chapter 2 of the Spiegel Affair opened in 1981, when British magazine publisher Sir James Goldsmith said in a parliamentary chamber — then repeated in print — that Der Spiegel's infamous article was orchestrated by the KGB (presumably through the whistleblowing West German Army colonel.) According to Goldsmith, the Soviet aim was to force Strauss out because he was too anti-Soviet.

GOLDSMITH cited comments by Gen. Jan Sejna, the hard-line political chief of the Czechoslovak Army who resisted the Prague reform leadership in 1968 and fled to the West just as he was to be arrested on charges of embezzlement. (Ladislav Bittman — the deputy head of the Czech disinformation service who defected to the West only after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia — says the Czechs were privy to no such plot.)

Der Spiegel sued Goldsmith for libel in Britain; the magazine reasoned that Goldsmith could hardly prove that the KGB had the foresight to know that Strauss would arrange for the arrest of a German in Spain, stonewall it in Parliament, and then be fired because of it.

Only after the pretrial investigation had begun, according to Mr. Naumann, did Der Spiegel realize that British law, unlike German law, puts the burden of proof in such cases on the plaintiff rather than the defendant. By the time Goldsmith's lawyers called for evidence from Der Spiegel's files, including several full years of back issues of Pravda and other Soviet-bloc papers — again according to Naumann — Spiegel had second thoughts and went for an out-of-court settlement. Goldsmith supporters,

like one interviewed in London who asked that his name not be used, say that Spiegel initiated the arbitration and that this amounts to an admission by Der Spiegel and a victory for Goldsmith.

Goldsmith immediately took out full-page ads in major British and American newspapers in October giving the text of the settlement. He didn't mean to imply that Der Spiegel had wittingly disseminated Soviet disinformation, his statement read — leaving the clear implication that the magazine had still been an unwitting dupe of Soviet disinformation.

In summing up the settlement columnist Gerd Bucerius suggested Goldsmith was himself engaging in disinformation.

"Of course, the KGB tries to spread its true and false assertions everywhere," Bucerius said in the weekly Die Zeit. "The Spiegel campaign against Franz Josef Strauss was at that time so fierce that it often drove me to the side of Strauss, a man I admired. But I never had the impression that Spiegel trafficked in untrue assertions steered by the East.

"Now, however, Sir James Goldsmith shouldn't seek to manipulate us."

Conclusion: One man's disinformation may be another man's free press.

— E. P.

Fourth of a four-part series

DIS-INFORMATION

Truth is the best defense

Free press and active political parties uncover lies

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By Elizabeth Pond
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

JUST how serious a danger to the West is Soviet-bloc disinformation? And how do democratic societies defend themselves against it?

The answer to the first question is controversial. It pits crusaders against pragmatists.

The answer to the second question is both obvious and awkward. It can be summed up in one word: truth.

The crusaders who have made disinformation a household word over the past five years see the danger as stark. It is bound up with what they view as the whole scandalous downgrading of counterintelligence within the CIA under directors William Colby and Stansfield Turner — and with what they deem liberal naivété in seeing Moscow as anything more nuanced than an "evil empire."

In this school of thought the CIA went soft and lost its nerve in the post-Vietnam, post-Watergate 1970s. British intelligence had been neutralized by Soviet moles. The French and Israeli intelligence services were the only ones left with enough backbone not to be incapacitated by exaggerated civil-rights restraints.

Part of the syndrome, in this view, was American refusal to acknowledge the inroads made in US news media and the East Coast governing elite by Soviet overt and covert propaganda and perhaps even subversion. Proof of Soviet influence was found in the spread of the 1980s nuclear freeze movement and in the American media's opposition to the Vietnam war in the 1960s, harassment of the CIA in the 1970s, and suspicion of American intervention in Central America in the 1980s.

Summing up the situation, John Reese, one of the original popularizers of the concept of Soviet disinformation, sees the root of the problem in America's revulsion against "Senator McCarthy's charges [that various public figures were Communists] which could not be substantiated. It [Joseph McCarthy's lack of substantiation] does not mean the charges were not true. It means they were badly documented and badly put together," he says. He decries Soviet manipulation of US media today.

Asked if he has proof that any major American reporters have been Soviet agents in the past 30 years, Reese responds, "I don't think there is any evidence of that. I do think there were or there are journalists who are supportive of the Soviet Union and would report it in a more favorable light than it deserves. . . . If a person is a member of the Communist Party of the USA and employed by [he names an East Coast newspaper], it does not make him a paid conscious agent. . . .

"The journalist on [he names another East Coast newspaper] who improves his position and gets a bonus because he gets handed a scoop by the KGB, does that make him a paid agent for future stories? I think it does."

Taking a contrary view, Soviet émigré Dimitri Simes, a foreign-policy analyst, contends that the impact of Soviet disinformation should not be overblown. "Since Soviet efforts exist, journalists should be particularly careful. But to present disinformation as a serious threat to the West is ridiculous."

Ex-CIA director Turner argues along the same lines. Asked how serious the threat of Soviet disinformation really is in the US, Turner replies, "I don't think

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anybody knows. And those who [say they] do know are right-wing fanatics."

THERE is very little hard data on disinformation, he observes. "Supporting those causes which are supported by the Soviet Union" is no proof of Soviet influence on an individual — and it is doubtful that it is Soviet backing that makes an antinuclear movement flourish. Turner cautions against becoming "paranoid," or going in for guilt by association and innuendo.

Georgetown University Prof. Roy Godson, by contrast, sees a more disturbing threat in Soviet disinformation. "We won't know the really successful cases," he notes, because their very success will mean they remain secret. "What passes into the public domain is only what is traceable." Besides, the Soviets view "active measures" of overt and covert influence as a long-term investment that cannot be measured in the short term.

Several sources interviewed for this series observed that there is rather more printing of political disinformation for pay in Europe than in the US. From his experience as a US official in Ankara, Paul Henze — author of a study of the 1981 shooting of the Pope — singles out Turkey as a particularly egregious case.

And in Greece part-time New York Times correspondent Paul Anastasiades has presented a detailed case arguing that the best-selling newspaper, Ethnos, follows Soviet direction, not only in editorial content promoting the Soviet position on the Mideast, Afghanistan, and Poland but also in selection of the present owner of the profitable newspaper. (Ethnos sued for criminal libel and initially won the suit with a two-year jail term for Mr. Anastasiades; but in 1984 the Greek Supreme Court overruled the guilty verdict.)

Then how can the West effectively counter the Soviet disinformation effort? Answers vary among the 10 American, British, and West German current and former intelligence officials and 15 governmental, academic, and press sources consulted for this series.

"By answering with the truth," bluntly asserts a US Information Agency official who deals with Soviet active measures.

For him and others, "truth" in this case breaks down into awareness, specific refutation of lies, and a vigorous pluralist press to search for truth.

THE first task, says the USIA official, is "sensitizing journalists and government officials to Soviet active measures. In that I think we are fairly successful in Europe. We now have journalists coming to us when there is a document they have suspicions about. In a great many cases we have been able to show that it's a forgery or utterly false."

To ensure that the act of forgery and not the content of the false document remains the news story, the USIA monitors identified Soviet active measures.

On the basis of this monitoring, an interagency working group from the USIA, State Department, FBI, CIA, and the Defense Intelligence Agency discusses how to expose and react to these Soviet efforts. Such reaction might involve demonstrating to a reputable American journalist that he or she has been fooled by a forgery, or warning European governments that forgeries are in circulation.

Professor Godson agrees that coordination by the interagency working group is a good first step in combatting disinformation. As a second step he would like to see enforcement of American laws requiring registration of lobbyists for foreign governments. As a third step he recommends that journalists learn about the intensive Soviet program of active measures — and that the media then police themselves.

In the end vigorously pluralist media must be the defense against, as well as a prime target of, disinformation. Henze believes that the "effective, natural working of a free society tends to cough it up out of the system. There is a level everywhere where people like to believe in plot theories. . . . At that level, a steady flow of disinformation, once started, tends to bounce around." But for the most part it eventually gets rejected, he argues.

Stansfield Turner puts a great deal of confidence in the "inherently probing and skeptical American press." Since the American citizen has so many varied sources of news, he argues, the US has "built-in defenses" and a "reasonable chance" that disinformation will ultimately be revealed for what it is.

Dimitri Simes makes the same point: "You cannot maintain your reputation [as an American journalist] if you become a Soviet agent. You just can't do it. . . . We essentially all have to be centrists. I do not see a major [Soviet] effort to cultivate American journalists. [Here the targets are] more CIA or FBI officials than journalists. . . . Being pro-Soviet is much less socially acceptable now than in the 1930s, when not just journalists, but everybody was taken for a ride. . . ."

"I disagreed with the more optimistic assessments of détente [in the mid-'70s], but none could be defined as a Soviet apologist except [in the] old generation. . . . I would blame some American reporters for not being sufficiently careful, but I would not put it into a disinformation category. I would think more [it's a question of] being unduly influenced by sources when the sources are incredibly narrow. It's more a fault of judgment than of professional integrity."

For governments fighting Soviet disinformation, "truth" and an unfettered press can be uncomfortable antidotes, however. A vigorous press and parliament can turn their skepticism on their own government's disinformation as well as on the opponent's. And the whole concept of disinformation can easily be debased to little more than a whip with which to lash political opponents.

Furthermore, a democratic press and society are likely to demand much higher standards of honesty from their own government than they do from foreign authoritarian ones. And their willingness to test many points of view can at times make them especially vulnerable to outside disinformation in the short run.

In the long run, however, a feisty, critical press and society are far more resistant to disinformation than are docile ones. If rigorous, the competition of ideas should eventually force disinformation to prove itself and be discredited by its divergence from reality.

The best-documented case studies we have — described on this page — are in the end far more encouraging to Western democracies than to Soviet disinformers.

Richard III, take heart.

CASE STUDY: JAPAN

Prominent reporters did KGB bidding

WHEN KGB agent Stanislav Levchenko defected to the US in 1979, he brought some juicy tidbits with him.

His identification of 10 out of 12 foreign correspondents of the Soviet weekly New Times (as well as many other Soviet journalists) as KGB officers was no surprise. But his description of his successes as acting chief of the "active measures" section of the KGB office in Tokyo titillated his CIA debriefers.

The KGB had suborned four prominent Japanese journalists, he said, who "conducted various influence operations against" various friends in government and also provided the Soviets with secret information. The KGB also launched newspaper stories, Levchenko said, through an agent who was "a close confidant of the owner of a major Japanese newspaper with a daily circulation of 3 million copies."

Levchenko said he was 1 of 5 KGB case officers in Tokyo directing 25 "agents of influence" out of some 200 "recruited agents" in Japan. These included a former member of the conservative government's Cabinet of Ministers, several leading Socialists, several members of parliament, and a prominent China scholar. In addition to floating KGB stories, "recruited agents" engaged in "political intelligence, external counterintelligence, and . . . scientific and technological intelligence," Levchenko told his interviewer in the 1984 book "Dezinformatsia" by Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson.

Despite the KGB's impressive recruiting success in Japan, however, one thing was working against the Soviets: Soviet foreign policy. Ever since the end of World War II the Soviets have kept four southern Kurile Islands, which had not previously belonged to them but which they acquired in their one-month war with Japan. Recently the Soviet Union has been adding insult to injury by piling weapons into the four disputed islands.

Furthermore, with a bias born of old-fashioned awe of military power, the Soviet Union has consistently sought to browbeat rather than entice Japan, an economic giant but military dwarf. All in all, it's a policy that some Soviet diplomats privately call a disaster.

As a result the Japanese abandoned their policy of "equidistance" between Moscow and Peking of a decade ago and are helping to develop China rather than Siberia. In addition, despite the Japanese aversion to armed forces after World War II, Tokyo is on the verge of increasing its defense budget over the taboo figure of 1 percent of gross national product — all in response to the Soviet military buildup in the southern Kuriles.

Conclusion: In this case Moscow's own foreign policy overwhelmed Soviet disinformation. — E. P.

CASE STUDY: FRANCE

The conviction of a longtime agent of influence

FRENCH publicist Pierre-Charles Pathé, son of the French film tycoon, acted as a paid agent of influence for the Soviet Union from 1961 until his arrest in 1979.

He targeted both the French public and elite, not only writing newspaper and magazine articles and moving in Parisian salon society, but also circulating his newsletter "Synthesis" to 70 percent of the members of France's Chamber of Deputies, 47 percent of Senate members, and several dozen journalists and ambassadors.

"Synthesis" consistently berated the United States as a "police democracy" and enforcer of "the American empire for 30 years . . . [through] force and corruption." It castigated France for getting too close to the US and portrayed West Germany as being riddled with crypto-Nazis and too pro-American, while it praised East Germany as economically progressive.

Had Mr. Pathé been operating under US guarantees of free speech, he probably could not have been convicted for anything more serious than failing to register as a lobbyist for a foreign nation. But the French state security court sentenced him in 1980 to five years in prison for being an agent of influence for the Soviets — and his case offers the only court-documented example so far of Soviet news media disinformation in the West.

His impact on French opinion therefore merits closer examination — and is very hard to pin down.

Pathé may well have exerted influence throughout the 1960s and early '70s. But he may just have reflected the general disdain for the US and leniency toward the Soviet Union that was fashionable among intellectuals and Gaullists as well as France's powerful Communists. Certainly there was a popular predisposition to dismiss (in the 1930s) or excuse (in the 1960s) Stalin's murderous purges.

Then three things happened.

First, Alexander Solzhenitsyn wrote searing exposés of the world of the Soviet prison camp — and, uniquely, his works continued to have a large readership in the West even after he himself was expelled from the Soviet Union.

Second, the US got out of the Vietnam war, stopped ostracizing China, entered détente with the Soviet Union — and was no longer perceived by Frenchmen as a cold-war ogre.

Third, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and underwrote martial law in Poland — the latter a country that has enjoyed France's special affection ever since Napoleon's officers brought back brides from Warsaw.

The upshot was French revulsion toward the Soviet Union, new admiration for the exuberant Americans, wholesale intellectual desertion of Marxism for neo-conservatism, a plunge of the French Communist Party to an all-time low of 11 percent of votes last year — and election of a Socialist President who has been much tougher toward Moscow than his conservative predecessors were.

Public opinion shows just how dramatic the disillusionment with Moscow has been. The number of those who believe the Soviet Union sincerely desires peace sank from 58 percent in 1975 to 24 percent after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Conclusion: In this case Solzhenitsyn and Soviet foreign policy eventually overwhelmed Pathé and Soviet disinformation. — E. P.

0 5/23/85

KGB emphasizes 'active measures'

Disinformation and rumors are part of attempts to discredit the U.S.

THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Its name bore awful irony — The Trust.

To its supporters in the 1920s — White Russians, anti-Bolshevik emigres, and concerned Western governments — The Trust was an underground organization in Moscow dedicated to the overthrow of the new Soviet regime. To them, it was worth great expenditure of money, faith and even human lives.

The Trust was, in fact, an elaborate scam, a front group set up and run by Felix Dzerzhinsky, founder of the Cheka, father of the KGB.

The Trust was part of the start of a tradition, of what KGB literature today calls *aktivnye meropriyatiya* — "active measures" — a broad term used to embrace forgery, disinformation, manipulation of foreign media, false rumor, use of agents of influence, clandestine radio stations, blackmail, bribery, and front groups.

Active measures, covert and overt, are distinct from espionage and counterintelligence. They are directed by Section A of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB where they enjoy ample financing and high priority, having been upgraded significantly during the 1970s. Many of Section A's more ambitious projects are known to command the attention of members of the Politburo.

They also command the attention of the CIA, State Department and other U.S. agencies charged with monitoring them and undoing their damage.

Active measures is "another area where we see the Soviets increasing their emphasis," says Edward O'Malley, in charge of the FBI's intelligence division.

A comprehensive 1982 CIA study on Soviet Active Measures determined that the "primary target" of such Soviet operations is the United States. It said that active measures are "systematically employed to discredit, isolate and weaken the United States," which the KGB manual refers to as the "main enemy."

The Soviets are willing to spend handsomely. Some estimates place the cost as high as $3 billion a year for disinformation, propaganda, forgeries, political influence operations and other overt and covert activities.

Once the Politburo decides to promote a certain foreign policy or other issue, active measures campaigns and operations are designed to support these policies. This is the responsibilty of the KGB's Service A. It works with close cooperation with the International and International Information Departments (ID and IID) of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

The ID works with communist and leftist and socialist political parties in other nations to coordinate policy, the CIA report states. It also supports operations of hundreds of international front groups, including the World Peace Council, the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the International Organization of Journalists, the Women's International Democratic Federation and the Afro-Asian People's Solidaity Organization, among many others.

The KGB's Service A runs more than 1,000 operations a year in Western and Third World media outlets.

The actual implementing of active measures abroad is done by the IID. Some of the means at its disposal include: the Soviet news agencies TASS and Novosti, Radio Moscow and propaganda publications in foreign languages, including New Times.

Former U.S. Attorney General William French Smith said these "active hostile measures" are among the most insidious of the means used to influence public opinion through "disinformation" and "agents of influence."

Stanislav Levchenko, a former high-ranking KGB official in Japan who defected to the United States, says that the KGB uses a number of techniques under the umbrella of "active measures." These include propaganda, organizing demonstrations, controlling international organizations, establishing front organizations and forging documents.

Running through these actions, he says, is one major objective: "By weakening or destroying the consensus within a free country, active measures do much more harm than classical espionage," he said. "In the West, few people understand this concept."

"All Soviet field agencies and representatives abroad are potentially available to support or participate in Soviet active measures," the CIA report states. These include embassies and KGB residences, Soviet trade missions abroad, Soviet front groups, Aeroflot and other commercial organizations, and visiting delegations.

Examples of some of the more significant cases of active measures are:

● **Disinformation.** The most recent, and prominent, example occurred last year when the Justice Department revealed that a letter allegedly written by the Ku Klux Klan and circulated in Africa and Asia was, in fact, a KGB forgery.

Entitled "The Olympics — For The Whites Only," the letter apparently was meant to suggest that racism and terrorism awaited Third World athletes in the Los Angeles Olympics.

One of the more durable disinformation projects was the matter of a forged Army field manual, FM 30-31B. It surfaced in more than 20 countries in 1975 and purported to guide American military personnel in how to interfere in the internal affairs of friendly nations. It was cited in Italy in 1978 as evidence of U.S. involvement in the murder of Christian Democrat Aldo Moro.

(The term *dezinformatsia* was formerly used by the KGB to describe most the activities now called "active measures.")

● **Agents of influence, media manipulation.** French journalist Pierre-Charles Pathe was exposed in 1979 as having been a willing mouthpiece for the KGB for 19 years. His articles and newsletters carried great weight among government leaders and heads of industry.

He was caught in the act of receiving documents to be used as articles under his byline and he made a full confession. Pathe was tried, convicted and sentenced to five years in prison. But was pardoned in 1981 by Francois Mitterand upon becoming the new Socialist president of France.

Six KGB officers had handled Pathe in more than two decades of operation.

More recently, there is the case of Arne Treholt, former head of the foreign press section of Norway's Foreign Ministry, a position that gave him considerable influence with key government personnel and journalists. He was watched by the FBI while stationed at the U.N. and was arrested last year with classified documents. He faces trial this year.

Valdimir Posner, who appears regularly on ABC's "Nightline" as a Soviet correspondent in Moscow, is said by several authorities to be a member of the KGB.

● **Front Groups.** The Soviet-controlled World Peace Council, acknowledged by the State Department and intelligence experts as a KGB front, engineered widespread demonstrations in Europe against the development of the enhanced radiation warhead (neutron weapon system, which the KGB dubbed "the capitalist bomb").

There was even a demonstration at a Baptist church in Washington during a service attended by President Carter, who eventually shelved development plans for the system. The CIA estimated that it cost the Soviets $100 million to conduct the neutron bomb propaganda campaign.

The WPC also figured prominently in demonstrations against deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe. According to several authorities, the KGB sent diplomats and agents to the United States in 1982 to assist with nuclear freeze campaigns.

● **Forgeries.** In 1981, a letter with President Reagan's signature was sent to the King of Spain urging him to join NATO and crack down on leftist groups. It was eventually exposed as a Soviet forgery in the Spanish press.

The Holocaust Papers, which purported to show U.S. military plans to use Western Europe as a nuclear battleground in the event of World War III, surfaced in Norway in 1967 and have appeared on 20 other occasions, as recently as 1982.

There have been several faked telegrams allegedly from the American embassy in Rome meant to claim that Washington contrived the "Bulgarian connection" in the plot to kill Pope John Paul II. The forgeries were cleverly done and resembled genuine State Department cables, but several technical errors helped lead to their exposure.

According to William E. Knepper, deputy assistant secretary of state for the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Soviets have experienced their greatest successes in active measures in Third World countries.

"In Africa and South Asia, in particular, they have probably significantly added to the U.S. image problem," Mr. Knepper stated.

The Soviets, he added, "regard active measures like pawns in a chess game, able to damage the opponent at the margin."

— Ted Agres and Doug Lamborne


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Source: FBI, 1982
Chart by Paul Woodward/The Washington Times

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Crim. Inv. ___
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Legal Coun ___
Off. Cong & Public Affs ___
Rec. Mgmt. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

Drawing Board

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AMERICANS GIVEN MOSCOW BRIEFING

500 Residents Are Summoned by Staff of U.S. Embassy, but Questions Remain

By SERGE SCHMEMANN
Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Aug. 21 — American residents here were informed of assertions about the use of a potentially harmful chemical by the K.G.B. in an extraordinary series of briefings today.

In three separate one-hour sessions, about 500 diplomats, technicians, journalists, businessmen, teachers and other residents gathered in the ballroom of Spaso House, the Ambassador's residence, for information that few found assuring and none found sufficient.

The thrust of the information was that the K.G.B., the Soviet internal security agency, had intensified its use of the chemical as an aid in conducting surveillance of foreigners.

In the absence of Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman, the briefings were held by the chargé d'affaires, Richard E. Combs Jr., who said available information gave no cause for alarm.

But the information presented by Mr. Combs and by Dr. Charles E. Brodine, a State Department medical officer who flew here for the briefings, was too scanty to allay concern.

Questions Being Asked

A young mother asked whether her child could be tested for exposure to the substance. A journalist asked what specific places or things should be avoided. A woman recently arrived wondered whether the chemical could be included in preparations used by Soviet exterminators against cockroaches.

Others asked why the alarm was being raised now, if the use of the tracking agents had been known for years, and tests were conducted in 1984. Mr. Combs and Dr. Brodine said that a yellowish powder called nitrophenylpentadienal was being used increasingly by the Russians to keep track of foreigners' movements.

Laboratory analyses in Washington, they said, determined that the chemical was a substance known to cause genetic change. They said the substance was being used in minute quantities and its use was therefore probably not a cause for alarm.

Dr. Brodine said little was known about the properties of the compound and extensive tests were required to determine its actual effects. A team of scientists are on their way to the Soviet Union to begin testing, he said.

Wash With Soap and Water

He advised the American residents to wash with soap and water and then with an alcohol-based compound.

Mr. Combs said no diplomats were known to have suffered from the chemical.

"Our hope is now to get some sense of how concerned we should be," he said.

Both he and Dr. Brodine said they had learned of the hazard over the weekend, but they declined to say what specifically had prompted their concern. In the past, Mr. Combs said, Soviet use of tracking agents had been "sufficiently erratic and infrequent" not to be considered a danger.

There is now evidence, he added, that usage was "more widespread than we thought" and had increased "significantly" over the past spring and summer.

Mr. Combs seemed to be speaking under tight security constraints. He declined to say how the Russians used the chemical, how the embassy had determined an increase in use, where it was most frequently employed, or how many people had been targets.

Though the medical danger was the first concern for the Americans here, the revelation of the existence of tracking agents appeared to offer yet another glimpse into the Soviet practices of surveillance in a system of institutionalized distrust in which foreigners are often considered potential spies.

"I was a bit scared to learn about that powder, but I was not surprised," a journalist's wife said. Most foreign residents here assume that their activities and conversations are being constantly monitored.

Microwave Incident Is Recalled

The evidence over the years has been substantial. In 1976, the United States Embassy disclosed that the Russians were beaming microwaves at the embassy building, touching off concern of medical consequences. United States Government tests eventually found no adverse effects, but in November 1983, the United States again protested the use of microwave radiation.

In other publicized instances, embassy employees in 1952 discovered a microphone in the beak of a wooden American eagle presented by the Russians as a gift in 1945. Other microphones were found in embassy walls during repairs in 1964, and last March it was disclosed that electric typewriters in the embassy had been bugged from 1962 to 1984.

Most foreigners believe that the few reported incidents are only a small portion of the enormous effort the Soviet Union puts into keeping track of foreign residents.

The revelation today that the Russians used tracking powders implied that internal security agents could determine not only where a foreigner was going, but where he had been, with whom he had met and what items he had handed over or touched.

But for those at the briefings in Spaso House, there could be little titillation at the discovery of another James Bond technique or concern over possible breaches of security.

"I have an infant child," a young mother said. "What should I do?"

'Tracking Powder' Testing Begun in Moscow

Team Leader Says U.S. Inquiry Has 'High Priority'

By Celestine Bohlen
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, Aug. 29—A team of U.S. scientists today began testing the use and possible harmful consequences of a chemical tracking agent allegedly found on U.S. Embassy property.

Dr. Ernest McConnell, the toxicologist from the National Institutes of Health who heads the four-member team, said he had "a blank check" to investigate the possibly cancer-causing powder that the United States has accused the Soviet Union of using to keep track of the movements of U.S. diplomats.

"They are giving this high priority, not just lip service," McConnell said, referring to the U.S. government, in a briefing this morning for Americans in Moscow who do not work at the embassy. "They take this very seriously."

He said the team would stay in Moscow 10 days to two weeks and perhaps find some answers to the medical questions posed by NPPD, or nitro phenyl pentadiene aldehyde, within 30 to 60 days.

U.S. officials said at briefings last week that NPPD, a synthetic chemical largely unknown in the United States, had been discovered last year to be a mutagen, meaning it may cause cancer. Protests about use of the chemical were lodged against the Soviet government last week.

The team, which arrived here last night and briefed U.S. Embassy personnel today, came equipped with 500 vials to collect samples from doorknobs, steering wheels and other surfaces that might have been sprinkled with the chemical dust. The samples will be tested in the United States.

One of the team's first tasks is to find out how widely NPPD has been used and whether other members of the American community have been exposed to it. It is estimated that 500 Americans live here.

At today's briefing, Richard E. Combs Jr., charge d'affaires at the U.S. Embassy, said it was still not known what the KGB, the Soviet security agency, used to detect the powder. "We have shined every damned kind of light on it and detected nothing," he said.

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At Moscow Embassy, Continuous Shadow War

Charges Are Latest in 30-Year Spy Saga

By John M. Goshko
Washington Post Staff Writer

Charges that the Soviet Union used a chemical dust to keep track of U.S. diplomats mark the latest chapter in a saga of espionage activities directed against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow for more than 30 years.

It generally is assumed in diplomatic circles that U.S. intelligence agencies routinely use various tricks of their trade to keep a similar eye on what goes on inside the Soviet Embassy here.

While electronic bugging and surveillance are an accepted part of the superpower rivalry, it is the Soviets, with their willingness to use more brazen techniques, who periodically are caught doing things that make headlines.

Perhaps the best-remembered incident occurred in 1960, when the United States was trying to deflect attention from the fact that its U2 spy plane had been downed in the Soviet Union.

Henry Cabot Lodge, then U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, dramatically displayed to a session of the United Nations a large, carved wooden replica of the Great Seal of the United States that the Soviets had presented as a gift in 1952 and had hung in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow for six years.

Lodge said the plaque was a listening device, with a hollow inside chamber that produced resonance and permitted the Soviets to overhear conversations in the room by bouncing radio waves off the plaque.

Lodge charged that more than 100 similar devices had been uncovered in U.S. missions and residences in the Soviet Union and East European communist nations.

In the ensuing years, as advances were made in eavesdropping techniques, reports of Soviet espionage efforts became increasingly exotic.

In 1969, a security officer at the U.S. Embassy in Bucharest detected the voice of a senior diplomat talking business. It turned out that the diplomat had sent his shoes to be repaired a few days earlier and they had come back with a tiny but powerful transmitter in a new heel.

During the early 1960s, U.S. officials discovered that the Soviets were bombarding the Moscow embassy with microwaves to tap telephones and interfere with telephone and cable traffic. The bombardment continued through much of the 1970s and finally forced a strong public U.S. protest in 1978 about a possible health hazard to embassy personnel.

Disclosure of the microwave assault caused such a stir that the State Department asked the Johns Hopkins University School of Public Health to make a two-year study of more than 2,000 Americans who had worked at the embassy. It concluded that they suffered no apparent ill effects.

Despite the protests, there have been U.S. allegations that the Soviets periodically resort to using microwaves and more advanced laser techniques to hear what goes on behind the embassy's walls.

At one point, Washington formally accused the Soviets of installing a "secret listening post" in the chimney of the chancery building and linking it to a neighboring Soviet apartment building by a tunnel through embassy property.

As recently as last March, U.S. officials said that Soviet agents had installed tiny sensing devices in several of the embassy's typewriters. The devices reportedly could pick up the contents of documents typed on machines and transmit them to antennas in the embassy walls.

In 1978, Soviet officials claimed to have caught an employe of the embassy consular section, Martha Peterson, in an apparent attempt to poison an unnamed Soviet official. Because she had diplomatic immunity, the United States was able to rush her out of the country and she dropped out of sight, with U.S. officials refusing to discuss the circumstances of the incident.

The espionage allegations have extended to this country, where U.S. officials frequently have charged the Soviet Embassy here and its consulate general in San Francisco with spy activities. Sometimes the FBI surveillance produces such dramatic results as the recent disclosure of the Walker family spy ring, charged with selling Navy secrets to the Soviets.

Sometimes the results are bizarre. When an aide to the Soviet naval attache delivered a package to the commander of the Washington Navy Yard last Christmas, suspicious explosives experts detonated it—destroying two bottles of vodka intended as a present for the admiral.

Staff writer John Mintz contributed to this report.

Substance Unfamiliar to Chemists

'Tracking Agent' Seen as Unlikely to Harm Embassy Employes

By Boyce Rensberger
Washington Post Staff Writer

The "tracking agent" that the State Department said yesterday was being used to monitor the activities of U.S. diplomats in Moscow appears to be unknown among forensic chemists and other specialists in the use of science for surveillance.

The Soviet powder, chemically called nitro phenyl pentadiene aldehyde, is not listed in any standard chemical reference book.

Although special powders are used by police in this country to mark valuables, preliminary indications were that the Soviet powder was of a different sort—one that may persist longer on the skin or in clothing and one that may elude detection by the usual means.

U.S. "marking powders," which glow under ultraviolet light, the so-called "black light," are used by police to mark money and other valuables so that thieves may pick up smudges that are visible only under ultraviolet light.

Several chemists said the molecular structure of the Soviet tracking agent suggested it might be similarly fluorescent, but a State Department official maintained that it was not and that the powder could be detected only by subjecting it to laboratory analysis.

Some forensic scientists suggested that although fluorescent powders would be easier to use in tracking people, they would also be easy for the marked person to detect and wash off.

The State Department also said the substance caused mutations in bacteria in the Ames test, a standard method of screening chemicals for cancer-causing potential.

But all indications are that Moscow embassy personnel picked up quantities too small to be hazardous. Dr. Charles Brodine, a State Department specialist in environmental health, told embassy employes that it could be measured in quantities of only a few billionths of a gram.

"Substances that are positive on the test," said Bruce Ames, the inventor of the test, "are often carcinogenic but there's no way you can tell without further tests." Ames, a professor at the University of California in Berkeley, said the amounts reportedly used probably pose less of a health threat than a variety of other substances naturally present in foods and which do cause cancer in large doses.

A cup of coffee, Ames said, contains natural carcinogens in amounts far larger than those of the substance picked up by embassy personnel.

The State Department said specialists from the National Institutes of Health and the Environmental Protection Agency would go to Moscow to evaluate the degree of exposure and that their findings would not be available for some time.

When Brodine briefed several hundred embassy employes and family members last night he said "any danger is far from proved" and added that tests so far "all argue that the level of risk is fairly low." Many said it was the first they had heard of the powder and several expressed concern about possible health effects, especially about the danger to pregnant women.

"I have been here two years now and I want to know what it is I should do," one young mother told Washington Post correspondent Celestine Bohlen.

Another embassy employe after the briefing said people were "concerned but quite understanding that the information at this point had to be incomplete."

Several forensic experts in this country said they knew of no comparable use of marking powders to track people. "Marking powders are used by security firms to mark valuables but to my knowledge there's no chemical substance that's put on a person to tell who he's in contact with," said John Hicks of the FBI laboratory in Washington. "But it does sound perfectly conceivable that this could be done."

Another forensic scientist, Walter F. Rowe of George Washington University, expressed skepticism about the State Department's announcement.

He recalled a previous incident in which the State Department claimed the Soviet Union was spraying a toxic "yellow rain" in Southeast Asia. The substance turned out to be bee feces, he said.

"After the yellow rain business," Rowe said, "I don't have a bit of faith in the State Department. I don't say it's impossible the Soviets are doing it. I just say I would like to see a lot more evidence."

Attempts by The Washington Post to learn more about the Soviet powder from various federal agencies with expertise in such areas were unavailing.

The Washington Post A-28
The Washington Times ___
Daily News (New York) ___
The New York Times ___
The Wall Street Journal ___
The Chicago Tribune ___
The Los Angeles Times ___
The Christian Science Monitor ___
USA Today ___

Date 8-22-85

Tracking-powder story absurd, Soviets say

MOSCOW [AP]—The Soviet Union Thursday rejected as "absurd" the U.S. charge that the KBG had been using an invisible powder to track employees of the American Embassy in Moscow.

The U.S. Embassy said Thursday it had briefed about 25 diplomats from other nations on Washington's claim that a potentially cancer-causing chemical dust known as NPPD, or nitrophenylpentadienal, had been used by the Soviet secret police. U.S. nationals in Moscow were told Wednesday.

In the first Soviet media acknowledgment of the accusations made by the U.S. government on Wednesday, the official news agency Tass said the Soviet Embassy in Washington had denied the charges.

"The Soviet side resolutely rejects the absurd inventions that some chemical substances are being used against personnel of U.S. establishments in the Soviet Union," Tass said

Tass said the U.S. claims were intended "to prepare the ground for the regular slanderous campaign against the Soviet Union, to poison the atmosphere in relations between our two countries and to fan hostility toward Soviet people."

U.S. Embassy spokesman Jaroslav Verner said diplomats invited for Thursday's briefing by charge d'affaires Richard Combs were "from NATO allies as well as others." He declined to say which countries were represented.

Combs claimed Wednesday night that Soviet secret agents had been exposing some U.S. diplomats to the substance. The chemical leaves traces on documents, possessions and people that the people carrying it come in contact with, he said.

The chemical causes cell mutations and can cause cancer, Combs said. He said only extensive tests could tell whether there was a hazard to those exposed.

After three separate briefings at the U.S. ambassador's residence Wednesday, American residents of Moscow were left with more questions than answers.

Rumors that the substance had been found on steering wheels and in drinking water at the Moscow embassy snack bar swept the American community of 500.

"Can you give me some advice—should I keep my kid away from the car?" asked Jane Thatcher, a journalist's wife. "How protective should I be?"

Officials said minute particles of the chemical had been found, and sought to reassure the Americans there was probably no immediate health risk.

They declined to say who had been exposed or where the chemical had been detected.

"All I can tell you is there is no doubt that the KGB is using this substance. I can't go beyond that," Combs told one gathering of U.S. businessmen and journalists.

Spokesmen at several Western embassies said their diplomats had attended Thursday's briefing, but said they did not know or declined to give details of what was said.

"The West German Embassy is not prepared to comment at all on this briefing," said spokeswoman Emily Haba.

Canadian, French and British Embassy spokesmen acknowledged their diplomats attended, but said those who participated were unavailable for comment.

In New York, the deputy Soviet representative to the United Nations said on the ABC News program "Nightline" that the U.S. charges were false.

"This invention with the powder deserves to have its place in the very cheap . . . detective story. It can't happen in our country, where we protect the foreign diplomats," said Vladimir Shustov.

"I was greatly astonished [by the charge] because I couldn't figure out how far will go the imagination of those who want to poison the Soviet-American relations. I should say that it's an invention, a falsehood from the beginning to the very end," he said.

Angry U.S. senators said the Reagan administration should shut down the embassy in Moscow or expel Soviets from the United States in retaliation.

A former U.S. ambassador to Moscow, Malcolm Toon, said Thursday he was "frankly surprised to hear that apparently we have known about this for a number of years going all the way back to the time when I was ambassador."

The Washington Post ___
The Washington Times ___
Daily News (New York) ___
The New York Times ___
The Wall Street Journal ___
The Chicago Tribune Sept. 1, p. 1
The Los Angeles Times ___
The Christian Science Monitor ___
USA Today ___

Date 8-25-85

Dustup in Moscow

The U.S. takes a hard line with the Soviets

The phone calls from the U.S. embassy in Moscow last Wednesday struck a note of ominous mystery. Business people, journalists and students in the Soviet capital were "urged to attend" a 9.30 p.m. briefing at Spaso House, the residence of the American Ambassador. They would be asked to sign a list of those attending; no cameras or recording devices would be allowed. Subject: secret until the briefing.

But by the time the Americans assembled, the message read to them by Chargé d'Affaires Richard Combs had already been trumpeted to the world by the State Department. The U.S. proclaimed that it had caught the Soviet KGB using a kind of spy dust: an invisible chemical agent "applied indirectly to embassy personnel" and possibly to other Americans in the U.S.S.R., presumably by spreading it on objects such as doorknobs and auto steering wheels that the Americans would be sure to touch. The Americans would then leave traces of it on anything or anyone they touched. Thus the KGB might, for example, determine that a Soviet dissident had been meeting with Americans by finding the chemical tracer in the dissident's apartment.

The chemical, NPPD (for nitro-phenyl-pentadien) is "potentially harmful" as well, the U.S. contended. Tests show that it is a mutagen, meaning it is capable of altering a cell's genetic makeup; mutagens can be, but are not always, cancer-causing agents. The U.S. conceded it has "no evidence to date" of any serious ill effects. All the same, said State Department Spokesman Charles Redman in Washington, "we have protested the practice in the strongest terms and demanded that it be terminated immediately."

That was one of a series of public challenges delivered to the Kremlin by the Reagan Administration last week. National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane fired the first salvo on Monday by warning, in a speech to the Channel City Women's Forum in Santa Barbara, Calif., that the Soviets must change their basic thinking on security issues and human rights if they are to have much hope of reaching even "incremental" agreements with the U.S. The next day Washington announced over strenuous Soviet objections that it would go ahead, possibly by the end of next week, with an often postponed test of an advanced antisatellite weapon

At week's end the President joined the offensive. In a Los Angeles speech interrupting his California vacation, Reagan once more defended his Star Wars program to develop a defense against enemy missiles. In the process, he took a poke at the Soviet bear. Noting that domestic critics had called Star Wars "unfeasible," Reagan asked, "Well, if that's true, why are the Soviets so upset about it? As a matter of fact, why are they investing so many rubles of their own in the same technologies?"

Taken together, the words and actions suggest that the U.S. is preparing for the Nov. 19-20 summit meeting in Geneva between Reagan and Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev in a spirit of confrontation. The Soviets are posing as conciliators, but at the same time have launched a wide-ranging propaganda offensive, aimed principally at Western Europe. Its chief elements: a temporary suspension of underground nuclear tests that is attractive to the Europeans but deceptive in the Americans' view, combined with loud charges that the U.S. is accelerating preparations to conduct chemical warfare.

In that climate, Washington seized an unexpected chance to embarrass the Soviets by publicizing the spy-dust episode. As a propaganda opportunity, it ranked with the 1976 disclosure that the Soviets were bombarding the embassy with potentially harmful microwaves, apparently in an effort to eavesdrop on communications. U.S. officials gave this account: as early as 1976, microscopic pinches of NPPD were found at the embassy. The chemical is a synthetic one concocted in Soviet laboratories and almost unmentioned in scientific literature. It has no known use except for espionage. It is odorless and, in the tiny quantities normally used, invisible, but it produces a glow under ultraviolet light and a yellow residue when treated with another special chemical.

The U.S. synthesized its own NPPD and began tests that by last year showed it to be a mutagen. This finding seemed academic, since Soviet use of the chemical appeared to have stopped in 1982. But last spring a routine sweep of the embassy found NPPD again. Also, some embassy employees developed skin rashes, the possible result of contact with heavier-than-usual concentrations of the chemical.

Intensified searches pointed to more widespread Soviet use of NPPD, and in larger quantities than ever before. At one point, in fact, careless KGB operatives seem to have sprinkled it so heavily in the embassy that the chemical for once turned visible, leaving a telltale yellow splotch. Two weeks ago the Administration made a detailed report to President Reagan, who approved a formal protest to Moscow and a public statement.

U.S. officials admit that two or more years of tests on animals will be needed to determine whether NPPD poses a serious threat to health. That displeased many Americans at the Spaso House briefing, who felt they were being given a warning so vague as to be meaningless. "You've told us the stuff is there, but you haven't told us where you found it or where we might come in contact with it," the husband of an American journalist protested to Chargé d'Affaires Combs. Asked what precautions to take, Charles Brodine, a State Department doctor, could only suggest lamely, "Wash your hands frequently with soap and water."

William O'Hara, an American steel executive in Moscow, noted that any risks to health would be shared by "some very high-level Russians" who come in contact with embassy personnel. Officials in Washington speculated that the KGB might simply not have given any thought to health hazards.

To some officials in Washington, the episode indicated blundering by an overzealous KGB. Wide use of the spy dust would seem to be self-defeating, since the number of people spreading it would increase exponentially, from 500-odd Americans (180 of whom work at the embassy) to countless Soviet citizens with whom they have routine dealings. The Soviet government officially dismissed the U.S. charges as "absurd" and "outrageous." At a White House briefing in Los Angeles, Spokesman Larry Speakes suggested that the Kremlin's leaders, including Gorbachev, may not have known about the spy dust. There was more than a hint of a taunt in his remarks, however, as

Time
p. 12
September 2, 1985

he noted that the Soviet military and KGB sometimes act as if they were under no one's control.

The other challenges from Washington to Moscow were more direct. For more than two years, the Soviets have been proposing a ban on development and testing of antisatellite (ASAT) weapons. But Reagan last week gave Congress the required 15-day notification that the U.S. would proceed with its first attempt to shoot down an actual satellite, one that has outlived its usefulness and is orbiting aimlessly.

Speakes explained the motivation crisply: a moratorium on tests would only "perpetuate" a Soviet "monopoly" since Moscow has an operational ASAT system and Washington does not. "They have one and they don't want us to have one," said Speakes. But the U.S. must try to catch up to ward off a "clear threat" to its satellites, he said, and to that end "we have to test, and we have to test now."

The opposing argument was stated by retired Admiral Noel Gaylor, a frequent critic of U.S. arms policy, in testimony last year to the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Said the admiral: "The Soviet antisatellite weapon is a busted flush—slow, unreliable, clumsy and easy to countermeasure, capable of only low-altitude attack." His conclusion: "If we both stop testing now, neither side will ever have a serious antisatellite capability." Some other experts add that the U.S. would have more to lose from an ASAT race than the Soviets would, since it is more dependent on satellites to provide intelligence and coordinate military movements. In any case, says John Pike of the Federation of American Scientists, the U.S. test "is throwing down the gauntlet to the Soviets before the summit."

That in fact might be part of Reagan's purpose. Star Wars hovers in the background of every discussion of ASAT testing, since the same weaponry that could shoot down satellites could also attack nuclear warheads in mid-course. Thus the ASAT test could serve as a warning to the Kremlin not to expect any dwindling of the Administration's determination to develop a Star Wars defense. More generally, the ASAT test might convey this message to the Kremlin: do not expect us to conclude agreements for their own sake. We will negotiate only from a position of strength.

Administration officials have been talking privately of the summit as an opportunity less to search for agreements than to set a philosophical agenda for future dealings with Gorbachev, who at 54 might be in power in Moscow for a generation. McFarlane put this idea on the record last week. Seeking specific agreements, said the National Security Adviser, "should not become an excuse for not thinking about what is at the heart of our disagreements." As an example of the Soviets' "one-sided negotiating positions," he cited demands that the U.S. abandon Star Wars "even as they pursue the greatest research program on earth. And then, in a masterpiece of chutzpah, they insist repeatedly that ours is a program designed to acquire a first-strike capability." His key sentence: "Without some change in the Soviet approach to security issues, in fact in the thinking that underlies it, I fear that even incremental improvements will be extremely hard to reach."

Bristling at such talk, Moscow accused the U.S. of mounting an anti-Soviet propaganda campaign. Noted TASS: "One gets the impression that instead of encouraging dialogue between our countries and creating a favorable atmosphere [for the summit], attempts are being made to raise obstacles." There is some merit to the Administration's desire to focus on fundamental issues rather than cosmetic agreements, but there are high risks as well. Too many harsh signals from Washington before November could convince the Soviets once and for all that they can never do business with Ronald Reagan. If that happens, the "agenda for the future," which Reagan wants to write in Geneva, could turn out to be disappointing indeed. *—By George J. Church. Reported by James O. Jackson/Moscow and Johanna McGeary/Washington*

NEW YORK Times FEB 15, 1986

U.S. Says 'Spy Dust' Used by the Russians Is No Health Hazard

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 14 — The United States said today that the powdery chemical apparently employed by Soviet authorities to track Americans in Moscow had been used against only a handful of diplomats and "does not pose a health hazard."

The statement, issued by the State Department and by the United States Embassy in Moscow, seemed to end an episode in which the Reagan Administration announced with great fanfare that the Soviet Union was suspected of using a carcinogenic agent against Americans in Moscow.

Glowing 'Spy Dust'

The chemical agent, nitrophenylpentadienal, or NPPD, quickly became known as "spy dust." Many Americans in Moscow became alarmed because at the time of the public disclosure about the chemical last August, the State Department suggested that the agent might cause cancer.

Because of the negative findings, reporters asked if the Administration had exaggerated the problem last August when it announced that Soviet authorities in Moscow had been trying to track Americans by applying an almost invisible powder to their clothing, cars, doorknobs and other objects. The "spy dust" reportedly glowed under ultraviolet light. At the time, the United States said it was making a protest "in the strongest terms."

In response to questions about exaggeration, a senior State Department official said: "Absolutely not. We felt it was better to be safe than sorry, and had an obligation to our people in Moscow to make public what we knew and to make sure that the Soviets stopped it. We had to alert everyone, and it made no sense to try to keep quiet about it while trying to conduct scientific tests. We were aboveboard about this from the start."

Charles E. Redman, a State Department spokesman, reporting today on the six-month study, said: "We have conducted extensive tests on this tracking agent. Test results indicate that it has not been used indiscriminately against American personnel but has been employed by Soviet authorities against a specifically targeted, relatively small percentage of official American employees.

"Fortunately, the results of those tests show that exposure to the quantities of NPPD found does not pose a health hazard," he said.

As a result of tests, Mr. Redman said, the National Institute for Environmental Health Sciences "concluded that exposure to NPPD, particularly at the very low levels found in Moscow, does not carry with it any known health risk."

The research showed, he said, that the chemical "will not cause cancer in exposed persons" and does not cause birth defects when applied to the skin of laboratory animals.

When the State Department disclosed Aug. 21 that a mysterious powdery substance had been used by the Soviet Union to track the movements of Americans in Moscow, American officials said there was concern that the "spy dust" was a mutagen, a substance that could cause genetic change, and therefore might have the potential to cause cancer.

Mr. Redman, who was the spokesman last August, said then that "we have protested the practice in strongest terms and demanded that it be terminated immediately." The Soviet Union denied what it called "the absurd allegations" made in connection with the chemical.

Today, Mr. Redman said, a report on the American findings was submitted to the Soviet Embassy in Washington. The United States, he said, continues "to object to the use of chemicals against U.S. personnel."

In August, the United States said it had known of the use of NPPD since the mid-1970's, but had become particularly concerned because of evidence in recent months that the chemical was being used more than in the past.

Tests taken last month in Moscow detected samples of the chemical on five cars of American Embassy personnel, Mr. Redman said. He said it was not possible to tell if the chemical found last month had been the result of "dusting" last year or was a sign of continued activity.

'Unacceptable,' U.S. Envoy Says

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Feb. 14 — The United States Ambassador in Moscow, Arthur A. Hartman, said today that he had ordered a second series of tests for the chemical last month after an investigation last summer found none.

Mr. Hartman said that "I insisted that we go back for a more pointed sample."

The second series of tests, concentrated on vehicles used by American diplomats, detected traces of two chemical substances, neither of which was found to be a health hazard.

The second chemical found, the report said, was luminol, which is used in an alkaline solution for analytical testing in chemistry. The embassy statement said that luminol did not appear be dangerous to humans, and that American authorities were asking scientists whether further tests on this chemical were necessary.

"It is unacceptable," Mr. Hartman said, "to subject Americans in Moscow to any substance that is not present in the general environment."

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Chemical espionage in Moscow: Is the KGB carrying surveillance of Americans to a dangerous new extreme?

AREA STUDIES

Albania Says Premier Was Slain

By DAVID BINDER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 4 — A longtime Prime Minister of Albania was "liquidated" as a "secret agent" in 1981, according to Albania's principal Communist Party newspaper.

The report contradicts the earlier Albanian explanation that the official, Mehmet Shehu, committed suicide during a Central Committee meeting in December 1981. He was 68 years old.

The new version appeared almost casually on Thursday in Zeri i Popullit, the party daily, in a long article critical of Yugoslavia.

Almost immediately after the Albanian radio announced Dec. 18, 1981, that Mr. Shehu, the Prime Minister since 1954, had taken his life, there were unconfirmed reports from several capitals that he had been killed.

The suicide version was reiterated in November 1982 in a speech by Enver Hoxha, the Albanian leader, and the following month again in a book by Mr. Hoxha. On both occasions Mr. Hoxha said Mr. Shehu had been a spy successively for the United States, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

Zeri i Popullit repeated these espionage accusations but said Mr. Shehu "was liquidated because he met with the unbreakable unity of the party with the people."

An American official specializing in Balkan affairs said this description was Albania's first public admission that Mr. Shehu had been killed.

In the original account of the death of Mr. Shehu, who was the commander of the Albanian Communist guerrillas during World War II and Mr. Hoxha's close political associate for four decades, Albania said:

"During the night dawning on Dec. 18, 1981, in a moment of nervous crisis, Comrade Mehmet Shehu, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee and chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Albania, killed himelf."

Then came reports from Belgrade, Athens and Rome saying that Mr. Shehu had been engaged in a dispute with Mr. Hoxha over the direction of Albanian foreign policy, with Mr. Shehu purportedly advocating an opening to Western Europe, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and Mr. Hoxha defending a policy of relative isolation. These reports held that the dispute culminated in a fight in a Central Committee session in which Mr. Shehu was shot to death with a pistol.

In the course of 1982, there were several Cabinet shake-ups in which Shehu associates was reported replaced.

GOING BACK:
Bulgaria, 20 Years Later

The author, twice barred from the country, finds improved living conditions. But the nation is wrenched by foreign intrigue and domestic oppression.



DAVID BURNETT/CONTACT

A statue of the Russian Czar Alexander II stands outside the Alexander Nevsky church.

By David Binder

I RETURNED WITH A certain uneasiness to Bulgaria, where I had served 20 years earlier as a correspondent. In part, my discomfort grew from memories of wretched hotel food, which invariably made me break out in boils, and the rather hostile attitude of Bulgarian officials functioning under a mandated policy of anti-Americanism. Primarily it was based on the fact that the People's Republic had issued a ukase barring me from the country for life. Twice.

The reason given for the action was a joke I had used in an article to illustrate the attitudes of Rumania toward neighboring states. The joke took a cut at Todor Zhivkov, then Bulgaria's Prime Minister. It appeared first in 1965 in the daily paper, prompting the initial ukase. When it appeared a second time, in this magazine, the Bulgarians reiterated the lifetime ban. I had not tested the ban until now, and although I had no trouble getting a visa, I was a bit hesitant.

Not surprisingly, I found many changes in Bulgaria, from the easy availability of food, clothing and housing to the smooth handling of foreign correspondents — for a fee — by a special state agency. The furnishings of the Sofia hotel where I stayed hinted that life was more comfortable now: the bathroom taps were metal instead of the leaky plastic of yore; the restaurant food did not induce boils; the Gamza burgundy was excellent.

Pleasantly situated in a broad valley, Sofia is described by Bulgarians as "the greenest city in Europe" and streets are lined with black locusts, maples, birches, elms and horse chestnuts. Looming to the south is Mt. Vitosha, the queen of the Rila range; to the north are the long spines of the Balkan Mountains.

The city was established as Serdica in the second century by the Roman Emperor Trajan on the site of an ancient Thracian settlement; elements of Roman fortifications have been carefully preserved to this day. The architecture of the capital is a congenial mixture of Viennese, Byzantine and Turkish styles, although a Parisian critic recently described the mustard-tinted former royal palace as "a French town hall."

With its screeching yellow streetcars, its cobblestoned avenues and tin-roofed shacks housing thousands of Gypsies, Sofia seems an appropriate setting for old-fashioned international intrigue, but scarcely the ideal spot for masterminding a far-flung plot to murder a Pope.

Nonetheless, that is what an Italian magistrate has charged. In 1982, Mehmet Ali Agca — the lone Turkish gunman seized after attempting to kill Pope John Paul II the previous year — swore that Sergei I. Antonov, chief of the Bulgarian airline office in Rome, and two other Bulgarians had directed the plot. Worse still was the suggestion by the Italian magistrate, Ilario Martella, that the assassins were acting as agents of the Bulgarian Government.

David Binder, who served as The New York Times's East Europe correspondent from 1965 to 1967, is assistant news editor of The Times's Washington bureau.

BULGARIA

Continued

The Bulgarians promptly rejected the charges as preposterous. But even if the "Bulgarian connection" is proved false (the outcome of Agca's interminable trial is as unpredictable as Agca's testimony, which has included — among other assertions — his claim that he is Jesus Christ), the incident further tarnished the image of a country that has already been implicated in a number of cloak-and-dagger activities.

There was, for instance, the case in 1978 of the notorious umbrella killer who fired from his bumbershoot a minuscule platinum pellet containing a powerful poison into the leg of Georgi Markov, a dissident Bulgarian writer living in London. Mr. Markov, who had assailed President Todor Zhivkov in broadcasts transmitted by Radio Free Europe to his homeland, died four days later at age 49. His assassin was never found.

Then there are the charges that Bulgaria's large export company, Kintex, is an international arms trafficker. Deputy Foreign Minister Lyuben Gotsev acknowledged to me in an interview that "there have been cases in which Kintex arms have been found in the hands of people who are, as you say, hostile to the United States" — people, according to American intelligence agents, such as Arab terrorists in Lebanon and Libya.

In addition, the United States Drug Enforcement Administration says that Bulgarian authorities harbor international dealers responsible for shipments of heroin and other narcotics from the Middle East to northern Europe.

Domestically, the Government is waging a remorseless campaign to force homogeneity on what has been a typically multi-ethnic Balkan salad of Turks, Moslem Pomaks, Gypsies, Armenians, a handful of Albanians, Greeks and Rumanians, not to mention several hundred thousand Macedonians.

In the recent drive to "Bulgarize" the Turkish minority, at least 200 civilians and soldiers were killed. (Amnesty International has reported the figure at 500.) The aim, as described by the Communist Politburo member Stanko Todorov, is to make Bulgaria a "single-nationality state" — something southeastern Europe has not known in its 3,000 years of recorded history.

BULGARIAN AUthorities call criticism on any of these points part of an "anti-Bulgarian campaign." With a studied air of resignation, Deputy Foreign Minister Gotsev said that a clipping service had collected 4,033 articles from United States periodicals on Sergei Antonov — the Bulgarian now being held and tried in Italy — adding, "Antonov has not even been sentenced and yet we are called assassins, terrorists."

The Bulgarian official who has become the international spokesman on the Antonov case is Boyan Traikov, director of the Bulgarian Telegraph Agency. A tall, long-faced man, suave in a pink shirt, Mr. Traikov receives me in his vast office on Sofia's Lenin Boulevard and recites his lines smoothly, calling the Turk Agca a fantasist: "It is of purely formal significance that Agca, traveling from Turkey to Western Europe, has passed through Bulgaria. He has been here, seen the people, streets, hotels," seen enough, in essence, to be able to fabricate the "Bulgarian connection" scenario.

The campaign, he says, smiling under heavy eyebrows, "is not directed exactly toward Bulgaria, but toward the Soviet Union." He continues: "It fits the thinking in the West about Bulgaria as the most faithful, the most orthodox — they call us a satellite.

"We are not so important as to be the object of such great attention around the world. The campaign is aimed at the Soviet Union and the Socialist system. Like billiards, you hit one ball to hit another." His allusion to the "Bulgarian connection" thus embodies the supposition of its believers: that the Soviet K.G.B. ultimately pulled the wires in the plot to kill the Pope, while the Bulgarians served as mere marionettes.

At least on the surface it would seem this country, the size of Pennsylvania and with a population of nine million, is indeed Russia's most faithful ally. The capital boasts not only a statue of Czar Alexander II and the Alexander Nevsky Cathedral, erected in gratitude for the 1878 liberation of Bulgaria, but also a huge monument to the Soviet Army, a large statue of Lenin and numerous avenues named for Russian figures. No Soviet troops or rockets are based here, but the Russian Embassy has more than 500 personnel, according to Western diplomats, who believe still more Russians function as military and police advisers.

Sovietization of Bulgaria began immediately after Marshal Fyodor I. Tolbukhin's troops took over the country in 1944. Thrust into power under Soviet guns, the Bulgarian Communist Party, numbering fewer than 11,000 members, began the bloodiest of all Communist takeovers in Eastern Europe. In less than a year, it passed 2,138 death sentences. Late in 1945, Bulgaria's most famous Communist, Georgi Dimitrov, became the Party Secretary and Prime Minister. After a brief flirtation with Yugoslavia's Tito in 1947 and 1948, however, he was reduced to simply a political puppet of Stalin. He died in 1949 and was succeeded by his brother-in-law, Vulko Chervenkov, a Moscow-trained Stalinist.

In 1954, a year after Stalin's death, Bulgaria acquired what is known as a "home Communist," a party member whose political experience was Bulgarian, not Russian. This was Todor Zhivkov, a printer who, in the last years of World War II, had become political commissar of the partisan Chavdar Brigade that fought Bulgarian fascist government forces.

Mr. Zhivkov is now the senior governing Communist in Europe, having ruled as party secretary for 31 years, and having survived the years of Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko and nine months of Gorbachev — as well as a military coup attempt in 1965.

To be sure, Mr. Zhivkov has paid public dues with such remarks as, "The Soviet Union and Bulgaria breathe with the same lungs and the same blood flows in our veins," and such actions as sending a token force to aid in the Soviet-bloc invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 (neighboring Rumania did not).

But to suggest that Mr. Zhivkov's Bulgaria is an unwavering Soviet satellite may be to exaggerate. A year ago, Mr. Zhivkov's long-planned trip to Bonn was called off at the last minute by Mikhail S. Gorbachev. This annoyed the Bulgarian leader, who responded to the humiliation with a series of visits to and from the heads of state of Rumania, Japan, Finland and France, thus asserting a degree of independence from Moscow.

In October, Mr. Gorbachev visited Bulgaria, this time as Soviet party chief. In private talks, he let Mr. Zhivkov know that the Soviet Union was no longer going to accept the second-rate goods Bulgaria was dumping in the Soviet market, while selling higher-quality products to the West. Putting the squeeze on further, he said Moscow was cutting back on its shipments of subsidized oil to Bulgaria.

Western diplomats maintain that the Soviet Union has never treated Bulgaria as a valuable partner. "The Soviets don't consult, they don't even inform their own allies," one ambassador observed.

Certainly, the Russians contemplate Bulgaria with a mixture of suspicion and envy. This Slavic nation, which sided with Germany in two wars, has accepted the Soviet system and improved upon it, so that agriculture and some industries are more productive than in the motherland.

Meanwhile, the Russians have remonstrated in private with the Bulgarians about the antiminority campaign, pointing out that the tensions it has raised could have serious repercussions among Russia's own fast-growing Turkish population. The Soviet press has maintained a disapproving silence about the Bulgarian drive.

CERTAINLY THE push to "Bulgarize" the minorities is the most dramatic event within the country since Mr. Zhivkov's rise to power. The campaign, which, according to some Bulgarians, was conceived in a secret party directive in 1971, has been massive: Although 250,000 Bulgarian Macedonians were recorded in the 1946 census, by 1975 none were listed — nor were there any headings indicating other national minorities.

Not content simply to drop minority listings, over the last four years, the Government has forced some 5,000 ethnic Albanians, along with thousands of Gypsies and Armenians, to take Bulgarian names. The People's Socialist Republic of Albania has lodged a formal protest.

In August 1984, the push gathered force, in anticipation of a national census scheduled for this month — when the Government is expected to declare the country ethnically pure, with no hints of any cultural diversity.

Last December, the Government focused its efforts on Bulgaria's one million ethnic Turks, starting in the southern district of Kurdzhali. There was bloody resistance in Momchilgrad and the state militia, the military and the Zapasi, or special reserves, were called in. Dozens of people were killed. In early January, the drive was expanded to the north. Whole districts were sealed off to foreigners.

Armed forces typically would surround a village and then force the inhabitants, at gunpoint, to line up and sign name-change petitions. Stopped by a roadblock on the outskirts of Yablanovo, on the northern rim of the Balkan range, a foreigner questioned a soldier. Yes, said the young rifleman, Turks had been killed in the rural town, and so had some soldiers. In all, about 30 died, he said, brandishing his AK-47 and sputtering, "Rrra-tat-tat-tat."

The Government has closed all Turkish schools (there had been 1,129 Turkish schools in 1951) and the one Turkish newspaper, Yeni Isik; Turkish-language radio broadcasts have been taken off the air and fines imposed for speaking Turkish in public. Increasing numbers of Turks have fled to Rumania and Greece.

A good deal of historical revisionism has accompanied the campaign. In 1964, Todor Zhivkov proclaimed that "all possible opportunities had been created for the Turkish population to develop their culture and language." As late as last year, Bulgaria told a United Nations committee that it had national minorities. But in early March, Stanko Todorov of the Politburo declared in the Turkish village of Novachevo: "At the end of 1984 and the beginning of 1985, a process was carried out with a new force spontaneously and comprehensively restoring the Bulgarian names of our compatriots who had Turkish-Arabic names. This process was concluded in the whole country in two to three months. The workers considered their past, recognized their Bulgarian roots and their Bulgarian national belonging." Ethnic Turks, he boasted, were really descendants of Bulgarians who had been "forcibly Turkicized" under Ottoman rule.

Clearly, some are not willing to accept this new version of their past. An explosion rocked the railway station in Plovdiv in August 1984, but it was not until May 16 of this year that Kostadin Lyutov, the state prosecutor, acknowledged that a woman had been killed in the blast; he added that seven others were killed by an explosion on a train on March 9. Some observers suggest that the death toll might be as high as 30 from bombs in a supermarket, a tramway, a disco and a hotel.

Off the record, Bulgarian officials charge that ethnic Turks are responsible; publicly, the bombs have touched off an explosion of hatred. "Our Turks don't believe in God, they believe in whisky," a middle-ranking government official remarked with a sneer. Later, in an outdoor cafe facing Sofia's Eagle Bridge, a 20-year-old graduate student told me vehemently that all Turks "deserve to be punished." Others trotted out rationalizations typical of such ethnocentricity: the minority populations were reproducing at a fast clip, while the Slavic population was stagnating. The fact that the original Bulgarians — the Bulgars — were a Turkic people did not stop their xenophobic responses.

Still, the Zhivkov Government is palpably nervous about the ethnic Turk issue.

What was it Boyan Traikov had said to me? "They think we are a totalitarian police state, that no bird can pass over without being seen, that telephone conversations are both tapped, foreigners followed. But there is no such system of control."

BULGARIA

Continued

Nonetheless, as a passenger in the cars of Western diplomats, it was clear to me that many were followed by unmarked automobiles of the Darjavna Sigurnost, the state security force.

Telephone taps? One day I called the Turkish Embassy from the hotel and was told to come to the chancery on Boulevard Tolbukhin. Guarding the embassy, in addition to a policeman, was a muscular youth in a camouflage uniform with a broad leather holster, from which the grip of a ten-shot Skorpion machine pistol protruded. He was a member of the Zapasi, the special reserve unit deployed in suppressing the Turks. Neither the policeman nor the Zapasi trooper bothered me, but next morning at 7:05, my phone rang and, when I answered, a male voice, plainly Slavic, snarled: "Tolbukhin!"

"Tolbukhin?" I inquired.

"Yes," came the reply, and then the line went dead.

My uneasiness returned. This was a warning. Yet, several days later when I set out into the mountains to find some ethnic Turks no one seemed to be following.

The Turks were not hard to find, but they were frightened. A group of construction workers told me everyone in their village had been compelled to accept Bulgarian names last December. There had been resistance and one man had been killed, others had been taken away to a camp for political prisoners on Belene, an island in the Danube.

Whenever anyone passed on the road, the men fell silent. With a look of disgust, one proffered his new internal identity pass, with his new Bulgarian name. The workers' Bulgarian foreman had warned them not to talk to strangers, one explained, adding that if they were caught they could be put off the job.

Nonetheless, they ticked off their complaints and fears: mosques had been closed; perhaps ethnic Turks would be denied higher schooling; they were not getting the full wages due them. Why the campaign of repression? "Because they fear we Turks will demand a federated state," said one. Would he emigrate if he could? "I was born here and I'll die here."

TODOR ZHIVKOV BOASTS OF making Bulgaria "the Japan of the Balkans." It is an overreaching claim, but a returning traveler cannot fail to be impressed by the transformation of what had been, 20 years ago, essentially a peasant society.

Today, Bulgaria generates 25 percent of its electrical power in nuclear plants and is planning on 50 percent in the year 2000. There are traffic jams in city streets and shop windows are filled with consumer goods. Evidently, decades of diligence — Bulgarians are known as disciplined workers — are paying off in terms of improved living standards for many citizens. The average wage is about 230 leva a month ($240 at the official exchange rate), but there are usually two or more wage earners in a family.

Thus the extremely harsh winter of 1984-85, with its power outages and food shortages, came "as a bit of a shock," in the words of a middle-aged office worker. Bulgarian Socialism, with its mania for fulfilling plans, had not taken account of such vagaries as bad weather or other natural calamities. Prospects for this winter are grim, as well: already, every day there are power outages for two hours.

One young West German technician who travels around the country servicing advanced machine tools told me: "They are 15 to 20 years behind us and they will stay there because they have no way of developing their own products." He was scornful of the lack of incentive — Bulgarian electronics engineers earn little more than ordinary factory workers — but spoke admiringly of some enterprises that were "as clean as those in Stuttgart and working beautifully."

Bulgarian farming is relatively prosperous, with large and growing agro-industrial complexes specializing in the cultivation of grapes, fruits and vegetables and raising cattle. Gradually, Bulgarian agricultural products are penetrating Western markets, although it appears that the better wines are not exported.

Nearly 28 percent of the agricultural output comes from the 13 percent of the land the Government lends to farmers as private plots. One Sunday, I saw Bulgarians tilling these small plots in the fertile Struma River Valley, their backs bent in classic peasant posture as they hoed. But they had driven to the fields in their own cars, mostly Soviet Fiat-licensed Ladas, a new kind of mobility for farmers in the Balkans. Encouragement of private farming is also partly the work of Mr. Zhivkov.

Todor Zhivkov became party chief in 1954 by denouncing the "personality cult" of his predecessor, Vulko Chernenkov. But now there would seem to be a Zhivkov personality cult. Through his largesse, his hometown of Pravets, formerly a small farming village, is today a model town, with a new high school, hotel, computer factory and a state-of-the-art dairy farm. A bust of the most famous native son dominates the square in front of the town's Culture Palace, which also contains a museum tracing Mr. Zhivkov's life in photographs. His collected works, with titles like "Some New Views and Approaches Concerning the Framing and Implementation of the Techno-Scientific Policy," have reached Volume 29, and cover only the years of his rule to 1979.

The road to Pravets is Bulgaria's newest four-lane highway, and on a mountaintop overlooking the town is Bulgaria's new state guest house where, according to one visiting diplomat, Mr. Zhivkov entertained Finland's President Mauno Koivisto with a daring girlie show.

The leader, it would seem, bears little similarity to the man I saw briefly 20 years ago at a state funeral in Bucharest. Russia's Anastas Mikoyan and China's Zhou Enlai and all the other Communist leaders chatted among themselves, laughing and making small talk — all, that is, but Todor Zhivkov, who sat alone on a chair against the wall. No one spoke to him and, having just been barred from his country, I decided not to myself.

For a brief period, some observers wondered whether a Zhivkov dynasty was in the offing. After his daughter, Lyudmila, graduated from university in 1936, he drew her into the party, and by 1975 she had become chairman of the state committee for culture; four years later, at age 36, she was elected to the Politburo. She died in 1981 in an automobile accident. Typical of the Balkan rumor mill that works overtime in the absence of a free press, talk spread that Lyudmila had been "poisoned by Soviet doctors" for advocating nationalism.

She is commemorated by the Lyudmila Zhivkova National Palace of Culture, Sofia's largest and perhaps ugliest building. It serves as a backdrop to a memorial dedicated four years ago to 13 centuries of nationhood.

Such nationalism is also apparent in the schools. One Western diplomat tells the story of his son, who was enrolled in a Bulgarian high school. One day, in a military course, an officer-teacher pointed to a map of Europe. "You are not here because of the NATO military threat," he said. "You're here for this!" He rolled down a map showing medieval Bulgaria encompassing large areas of present-day Greece, Yugoslavia and Albania. It is just such extreme nationalism, and the dream of restoring the medieval empire of "Greater Bulgaria," that brought woe and shrinkage upon the nation in the first place.

Yet, it would seem that most of the young Bulgarians I met do not share such nationalistic dreams. Like their contemporaries all over the world, they are interested in jeans and rock music; one spoke of his dream to become a country-western singer, in Bulgarian. The young people say "ciao" and "merci" instead of "dovizhdane" and "blagodarya." Some, like the sweet-faced young woman I saw at noon on a weekday in Sofia's Sveta Nedelya church, light votive candles in the chapels.

STILL, THERE IS THE puzzle: Why does the Zhivkov Government indulge in such an atavistic nationalist paroxysm, going so far as to force its citizens to change their names? Why does a country that aspires to enter the high-tech age risk international opprobrium by engaging in trafficking in drugs, arms and cloak-and-dagger intrigues?

At least part of the answer lies in Bulgarian history. In the Middle Ages, the Bulgars created an empire stretching from the Black Sea to the Aegean and, for a time in the 9th and 13th centuries, to the Adriatic. Modern Yugoslavia's capital of Belgrade was, for a time, a Bulgarian citadel. So was Greece's Salonika. But for five of the last six centuries, there was no Bulgaria, only the Ottoman Empire, and what the nation's greatest writer, Ivan Vazov, called the Turkish yoke. Freedom movements were growing when Bulgaria was liberated in 1878 by the troops of the Russian Czar. "The Bulgarians never liberated themselves," remarked a Macedonian from Yugoslavia, who is a keen observer of this country, "and after the Russians liberated them, they only won one war, a short one in 1885."

"Bulgarian history is discontinuity," he said, adding that, "they chose the wrong side in three wars," suffering defeat in the Second Balkan War, and again in World Wars I and II, when Bulgaria sided with Germany.

Having made wrong choices at three critical junctures in the space of less than three decades, "there is no fixed reference point," observed the Macedonian. "For Bulgarians, who is to say the choices they make now are not wrong?" ■

Chinese in U.S.: Question of Loyalties

By FOX BUTTERFIELD
Special to The New York Times

Several years ago a Chinese-American working for Union Carbide in Peking was approached by a senior Chinese official with a proposal.

He reminded her of a common loyalty to China, then suggested that if she would get him some confidential information on her company's costs for a proposed chemical project, he would introduce her to other well-placed bureaucrats who could help her work and advance her career.

The woman rejected the offer. But the incident reflects the complex web of pressures that affect some Chinese-Americans in their dealings with China.

Last month Larry Wu-Tai Chin, a former analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency, was arrested on charges of spying for China in a case that has Federal investigators and some of Mr. Chin's friends wondering what might have motivated him if he was indeed a double agent, a charge he denies.

Deeply Sensitive Question

Money and Communist indoctrination figure in the speculation, but some diplomats, business executives and scholars suggest that deep-seated loyalty to his Chinese homeland could be an important factor in the case.

The issue of whether Chinese-Americans face a problem of divided loyalty is a deeply sensitive one.

Woo Chia-wei, the head of the National Association of Chinese-Americans, says it is "totally unfair" to suggest that Chinese-Americans are not patriotic to the United States.

"It's like the attitude toward Japanese-Americans in World War II," said Mr. Woo, who is president of San Francisco State University. "I've been to China many times, and I've never sensed any kind of pressure other than that they wanted me to be an American friendly to them. I've always sensed there is a clear line drawn, that China wants overseas Chinese to remain, as Zhou Enlai put it, like married daughters."

But some Americans who have worked in China contend that Chinese-Americans face a special problem.

Threats About Families

"Chinese-Americans are often under tremendous pressure by the Government in China, and Taiwan too," said Lucian Pye, a political scientist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who has written extensively about the cultural aspects of Chinese politics. "They can play on Chinese-Americans' pride in China and make threats about their family members still in China. It's a dimension other Americans don't appreciate."

Scholars have long observed that nationalism is an especially potent force among Chinese. China has been not just a country but an amalgam of people, territory, language, history and civilization more like a religion than a nation-state.

Nevertheless, according to several current and former State Department officials, the 63-year-old Mr. Chin is the first Chinese-American they can recall who has been being arrested as an agent for China.

In part, said one, that is because comparatively few Chinese-Americans have joined the Foreign Service or the military. "It isn't where they get mobility," he suggested. "They go into business or science instead."

Scientists Returned to China

In addition, said Charles Cross, a retired Foreign Service officer who served as American Consul General in Hong Kong, the few ethnic Chinese in the State Department were usually not permitted to work on Chinese affairs until the 1970's because of lingering anti-Communist sentiment dating to the era of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy.

At the height of Senator McCarthy's accusations about Communists in Washington in the early 1950's, a number of Chinese-American scientists were investigated and eventually returned to China.

The most famous case was that of Qian Xuesen, a professor at the California Institute of Technology, a pioneer in American rocket research in World War II. In 1950, on the suspicion that he had briefly been a member of the Communist Party in 1938, the Government seized Mr. Qian's scientific papers, put his house under surveillance and subjected him to a series of hearings. Disillusioned by his treatment, Mr. Qian eventually returned to China where he helped develop Peking's own nuclear missile program, along with a number of scientists and engineers trained in the United States.

The American Consulate General in Hong Kong, for many years the center of American China-watching, has employed Chinese as translators and analysts, Mr. Cross said. "But they were not allowed into anything that could matter," he said. "They were assumed to be under pressure just because they had relatives in China."

It is not clear how Mr. Chin escaped such suspicion.

Chin's Long U.S. Career

The Federal Bureau of Investigation says that after Mr. Chin attended Yenching University in Peking he was employed by the United States Army in Puzhou as an interpreter in World War II, later moving to the American consulate in Shanghai and then in 1949 to the Consulate in Hong Kong.

Federal agents say that later, after joining the C.I.A. through its Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Mr. Chin handled a number of top-secret reports and made several trips to Toronto and Hong Kong to turn over material to the Chinese.

The F.B.I account of Mr. Chin's activities has puzzled some Chinese-Americans. "It strikes me as very strange," said Wang Lingchi, a professor of Asian-American studies at the University of California at Berkeley.

"You have to remember that for most of the past 35 years the C.I.A. had very close contact with KMT agents from Taiwan," Mr. Wang contended, referring to the Kuomintang or Nationalist Party. "I'm certain that Chin was some sort of liaison with the KMT, and Taiwan has fingered him now to embarrass relations between the United States and China."

Mr. Wang said he personally was never pressured by China, although he was born there and grew up in Hong Kong. "But I have friends with the opposite experience," he added.

Two of his Chinese-American acquaintances who travel to China have been detained by the F.B.I., one held in a hotel room in Oakland for a week, in an effort to recruit them to spy for the United States, Mr. Wang asserted.

Mr. Woo, the president of San Francisco State University, said that "even the sentimental connection" to China has weakened in recent years among younger Chinese-Americans, few of whom now speak Chinese and most of whom are largely interested in their careers. "No more than 1 or 2 percent of Chinese-Americans are involved with China now," he said, "and mostly for doing business."

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The Washington Times ____
Daily News (New York) ____
The New York Times A23
The Wall Street Journal ____
The Chicago Tribune ____
The Los Angeles Times ____
The Christian Science Monitor ____
USA Today ____

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U.S., China Sign Accords

Amid Closer Ties, Senators Air Gripes

By Daniel Southerland
Washington Post Foreign Service

PEKING, Aug. 27—While a delegation of U.S. senators aired contentious issues with Chinese officials today, the United States signaled continuing progress in relations with the announcement of several accords, including one that will bring the Army Corps of Engineers here to assist in harbor projects.

Among the issues the senators raised was the American commitment to Taiwan. At a press conference here today, the senators also described the overall relationship with China as friendly.

"We believe that slow progress, not dramatic progress, will continue to be made," said Sen. James A. McClure (R-Idaho).

Sen. William S. Cohen (R-Maine) raised the Taiwan issue on behalf of the group, arguing that the United States had a commitment to defend Taiwan, its security, way of life and "freedom of choice." Cohen said that China's talk of using force against Taiwan would be "counterproductive" and lead to more American support for Taiwan.

But after two days of talks, which included more than an hour today with Deng Xiaoping, the paramount Chinese leader, the senators found they shared "similar views" with the Chinese on most issues, Senate Majority Leader Robert J. Dole (R-Kan.), the delegation's leader said.

Earlier in the day, U.S. Transportation Secretary Elizabeth Hanford Dole announced that the two nations had signed agreements on the following:

- To renew negotiations on a maritime agreement;
- To develop air cargo operations between the countries;
- An amendment to existing accords that will allow the Army Corps of Engineers to undertake projects to help expand China's heavily congested ports.

Secretary Dole, who traveled here with her husband, the senator, said the two sides also exchanged the initial draft of an agreement on cooperation in developing China's railroad system.

In their meetings here, the senators broached U.S. disagreement with Peking over China's failure to fulfill a 1980 grain purchase agreement, their concern over rapidly rising costs for American business executives operating here, and their view that clearer business investment rules were needed.

The senators expressed the hope that the Chinese would sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty but received no encouragement that China would sign the treaty.

McClure, chairman of the Senate Energy Committee, said that "there are those in the Congress who still see some problems" in fulfilling the peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement recently signed in Washington between the United States and China. McClure said he thought the agreement would take effect but said it would help if the Chinese provided more definite assurances that nuclear technology would not be spread from China.

The Chinese categorically denied that they had anything other than normal scientific exchanges with Pakistan, which some observers suspect has received nuclear assistance from China.

Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.) said the senators had objected to China's voting pattern in the United Nations. He said that China had voted with the United States only 14 percent of the time and with the Soviet Union 86 percent.

The other senators here were Sen. Pete V. Domenici (R-N.M.), Sen. Pete Wilson (R-Calif.) and Sen. Daniel J. Evans (R-Wash.).

UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL/REUTER

U.S. Transportation Secretary Elizabeth Dole shakes hands with Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping as her husband, Sen. Robert J. Dole (R-Kan.), looks on.

Washington Post, 8/28/85

'Free the Priests' protests technology sales to China

THE WASHINGTON TIMES

A letter-writing campaign to Air Force Secretary Verne Orr has been launched by Free the Priests, a human-rights organization objecting to the proposed sale of advanced fighter plane technology to the People's Republic of China.

The organization was set up in 1983 to fight for the release of several Catholic priests serving prison terms in China for religious reasons.

"We are very disappointed that the Air Force would even consider selling these weapons of death to China while so many elderly Catholic priests are being imprisoned by the Chinese government," the organization's president, John Davies, said in Winston-Salem, N.C.

"These priests have done nothing wrong. They are being brutally persecuted just for trying to practice their Christian faith. China is not the 'enlightened' nation that their propaganda would have us believe. Instead, the reality is that they are trying to cruelly stamp out all religion."

Mr. Davis said no civilized country would keep the Rev. Stanislas Chen, 83, in prison for 30 years. "No progressive nation would keep the bishop of Shanghai, Ignatius Kung, in solitary confinement since 1953."

"Yet," he said, "the Chinese are doing all of these things, and more. Last year, Bishop Peter Fan, 77, was sentenced to 10 years in prison. Other priests are kept in handcuffs 24 hours a day. And we have received numerous reports of mostly Baptist and Pentecostal 'house church' ministers being arrested and jailed."

He called on congressmen to "block this immoral sale."

"There is no excuse for giving military aid to a repressive regime like China's," he said.

The proposed sale would allow China to upgrade and modernize 50 of their F-8 fighter aircraft. The radar to be sold is Emerson Electric's APG-69.

Free the Priests was organized to work for the release of Father Chen, the oldest of the incarcerated priests; the Revs. Stephen and Joseph Chen, Vincent Chu and George Wong; and Bishops Kung and Fan.

— William F. Willoughby

Washington Times, 5/22/85

China Holds Major Arms Exhibition

U.S. Manufacturers Heavily Represented in Peking Show

By Daniel Southerland
Washington Post Foreign Service

PEKING, Jan. 27—Arms merchants representing some of the world's leading defense companies have descended on Peking for the first large-scale international defense exhibition to be held here.

U.S. companies have the heaviest representation of foreign firms displaying weapons at the exhibition, which opens Tuesday and runs until Feb. 2.

But they face sharp competition in some areas from French and West German firms.

More than 160 companies from 17 countries and regions are participating.

Products on display include aviation equipment, missiles and defense electronics.

The debate over how far the Chinese will go in purchasing western defense equipment goes back more than a decade. The Chinese are noted for doing much window shopping but little buying. But because of a few sales and the knowledge that the Chinese armed forces need new equipment, the merchants keep coming.

The most recent significant development in this controversial and sometimes lucrative field is a Reagan administration decision to seek congressional approval for the sale of radar and navigational equipment to help modernize the Chinese Air Force's F8 jet fighter plane. The sale could come to as much as $500 million, according to reports from Washington.

This would be the second government-to-government arms sale between the two countries since they established diplomatic relations in 1979. The first agreement was made last year for $98 million worth of technology and equipment to help modernize China's production of artillery shells.

The largest contingent of U.S. exhibitors consists of 18 aerospace and defense companies participating in a joint exhibit organized by American Aerospace Industries, Inc., a marketing firm based in Harrison, N.Y.

Hans G. Hollander, president of American Aerospace Industries, said that the U.S. government has pursued an ambiguous and sometimes erratic policy on arms sales to China, that has resulted in significant advantages to French and British firms.

"The policy ought to be more definitive and not this Mickey-Mousing around, one day saying yes and one day no," Hollander said.

According to Hollander, it will "take quite some time" for the Chinese to develop their own military technologies to the point at which they can do without imported foreign technologies.

An American businessman with long experience here who represents a U.S. defense company said that a major factor is the amount of foreign exchange the Chinese can earn by selling their defense products overseas.

In 1984, this businessman said, China was reported to have made a major push into the international arms market, selling overseas more than a $1 billion worth of weapons, including small arms, rocket-launchers and antitank guns.

If the Chinese can continue to increase such sales, the businessman said, they will be in a much better position to buy sophisticated equipment from abroad of the type that they cannot yet produce themselves.

THE WASHINGTON POST SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 1985

FROM TOP: DENG XIAOPING, HU YAOBANG AND HU QILI—BY STEVE SHEROUSON—THE WASHINGTON POST

Deng Revamps Party

Leader Prepares for Smooth Succession

By Daniel Southerland
Washington Post Foreign Service

PEKING—Rarely has any politician had a chance to orchestrate so carefully promotions among those who will follow him. China's pragmatic leader, Deng Xiaoping, 81, is creating the framework for what he hopes will be the smoothest transfer of power in his country's often tumultuous postrevolutionary history.

In the process, Deng may be fundamentally transforming the ruling 40-million-member Chinese Communist Party.

Deng's efforts to promote technocrats rather than ideologues and to decentralize the Chinese economy seem to point toward a less intrusive, more relaxed Communist Party rule and toward diminishing the party's power over the long run. Although the efforts have not weakened the party's ability to crush its opponents, the moves could create contradictions and new turmoil down the road.

The new generation of Communist Party leaders, unlike most members of Deng's generation, will be primarily university-trained professionals. And while no one in the party will say so openly, they probably will be more focused on economic modernization than on ideology. Unlike the leaders who were molded in the tradition of the late chairman Mao Tse-tung to be "more red than expert," these new leaders will be "more expert than red."

This does not mean that Deng and his colleagues are abandoning Marxist ideology. But they do seem to have become less dogmatic. What counts for Deng in the end, it seems, is what might produce a better quality of life for his people. Economics, rather than politics, is what matters in Peking at the moment, and economic progress requires well-trained economists, engineers and factory managers.

If Deng has his way, political scientists say, the emergence of another figure like Mao and the radicalism he brought to China will be blocked by an ever stronger system of consultation among top leaders.

No one leader will hold a monopoly on power the way Mao did or even the way Deng sometimes appears to do, they say.

If all goes according to plan, China's new leaders will be not so much charismatic as they will be well-educated, well-organized and hard-working. They will, in short, be team players.

Last of His Kind

Deng is preparing to be the last of his kind of leader.

And if western scholarly experts are correct, China may follow the pattern of the smoother, more routine leadership changes that have characterized some other maturing communist systems.

[illegible] revolution of this country from a young and volatile communist system to a more stable and institutionalized regime," wrote Harry Harding of The Brookings Institution in a paper to be published early next year.

In the end, some other experts suggest, Deng may also be planting the seeds of much greater change.

By giving greater scope to technocrats, factory managers, peasants and entrepreneurs, or those who create wealth for the society, rather than to the party ideologues, he may be transforming the Communist Party into something quite different from the Stalinist model.

Deng has stated that the change occurring in China through the economic reforms amounts to a "second revolution."

Legitimacy Not Questioned

But for any Chinese to begin to talk openly about any fundamental change within the party or its relationship to the rest of society is risky; it could lead to a questioning of the legitimacy of the party's rule and its monopoly on political power.

Any Chinese analyst who advances too far with this theme might see a quick end to his career.

Deng has insisted in recent years that the essence of the ruling principles is to uphold the leadership of the Communist Party.

Not surprisingly, Chinese officials and theoreticians stick close to that line.

The inner workings of the Communist Party are largely kept secret.

Requests by this reporter to see two leading officials in the organization department of the party in connection with this series of articles were declined.

No matter how leaders at the top, including Deng, might want to bring change, the resistance to any change within the Communist Party and the sprawling Chinese bureaucracy is enormous, particularly as one moves out from Peking to the provinces, counties and countryside.

The national Communist Party headquarters, which is located near a lake in the Zhongnanhai part of Peking's old imperial Forbidden City, is not listed in the Peking public telephone book.

Some Chinese, perhaps mistrusting a questioning foreigner, profess not to know the location.

Given China's long history and tradition of following a single, strong leader, it is not certain that Deng's plan for collective leadership will hold in the long run.

Like everything else in China, much depends on the success or failure of Deng's economic reforms, which are now going through a difficult period that has been marked by excessively rapid industrial growth, a major corruption scandal and a sharp drop in the country's foreign exchange reserves.

At the same time, the successful implementation and continuation of the reforms requires a more competent and technologically oriented group of young leaders.

cessors gain stronger positions in the country's ruling organization, the Communist Party.

By his own definition, Deng and other top leaders in their seventies or eighties are first-echelon officials. Officials in their sixties, such as Premier Zhao Ziyang and Communist Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang, are considered the second echelon. When the Communist Party holds its congress in two years, Hu and Zhao are expected to be relieved of power by officials in their forties and fifties, known as the third echelon.

But Deng apparently cannot wait until 1987 to lay the groundwork for these promotions.

For the past year, Deng and his colleagues have been preparing for a special party conference to be convened here later this month. This meeting of approximately 1,000 delegates will appoint new members to the 210-member Central Committee. It is to be followed by a Central Committee meeting that is expected to appoint officials of the third echelon to the ruling Politburo and Secretariat.

Western diplomats say they expect to see up to nine new faces in the 24-member Politburo. Perhaps most prominent among them, diplomats say, will be Hu Qili, 56, a bespectacled, soft-spoken, scholarly looking advocate of China's open-door policy toward foreign trade and investment.

Hu Qili is clearly being cultivated to replace Hu Yaobang in the Communist Party's top job. He is currently the youngest full member of the party's eight-member Secretariat, the working arm of the Politburo, and serves as its permanent secretary or chief of staff. He acts, in effect, as deputy general secretary of the party and is Hu Yaobang's right-hand man.

Role of Secretariat

The secretariat, headed by Hu Yaobang, directs the day-to-day work of the party, and together with the State Council, which operates like a Cabinet, makes most policy decisions. Deng Xiaoping and other other senior leaders have the last word, of course, and sometimes the first word on major decisions.

Hu Qili, who is not related to Hu Yaobang, differs in personality and style from many of the older leaders who now control China. He would be the first English-speaking Communist Party chief in the party's 64-year history. He would be the first not to have participated fully in the party's struggle to take power and the first not to have military experience.

His rise to power, should he make it to the top, would mark the passing of the Long March generation of Chinese leaders, those who made the historic 1934-35 march across China during the war against the Chinese Nationalists, or Kuomintang.

If Hu Qili becomes a member of the Politburo, as expected, he would be in a much stronger position to replace Hu Yaobang as the party's chief in 1987, when the latter has said he plans to step down.

But if past history is any indica-

(See A-2)

Deng Restructures Communist Party

CHINA, From A1

tion, transitions in communist systems, no matter how well-planned, often can go awry. That was certainly the case with the late chairman Mao's chosen successor, Hua Guofeng, who lasted only a short time as the Communist Party's leader before his power began to be sharply eroded.

As head of the party, Hu Qili still would have to cope, even once Deng and Hu Yaobang were gone, with a number of experienced party leaders who seem to have doubts about how far and how fast China should be transformed economically and the degree to which Peking has now decentralized economic decision-making.



BY MARTY BAUMANN—THE WASHINGTON POST

Qili could run into difficulties with influential Army leaders.

Deng Xiaoping still holds the chairmanship of the party's powerful Central Military Commission, apparently because he has been unable to turn that position over with any confidence to Hu Yaobang or to any other party leader without significant military credentials. The military is believed to harbor reservations about accepting such leadership despite the Marxist principle that the party "commands the gun."

In an interview with the Hong Kong magazine Pai Hsing in May, Hu Yaobang emphasized Deng's continuing importance with the military when he said that to get anything done with the Army, Hu and Premier Zhao have to say five sentences, while Deng achieves the same result with only one.

But the Communist Party of today engages in a much more orderly process of decision-making than it once did. As A. Doak Barnett, professor of Chinese Studies at the School for Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, described in a recently published book, "The policy-making process is more systematic, regularized and rationalized than it has been for years."

Barnett quotes authoritative Chinese sources as saying the Politburo and its powerful six-member standing committee are no longer in charge of most day-to-day policy making, as western observers generally had assumed. Today the party's Secretariat, in which Hu Qili is so active, and the State Council's "inner cabinet," made up of Zhao, four vice premiers and 10 state councillors, are the key centers for policy-making.

Perhaps someday the changes that are occurring here will stand out as more sweeping than anyone realizes they are at the moment.

"I think the Deng revolution is far more fundamental perhaps than even Deng himself realizes," said Roderick MacFarquhar, a professor of modern Chinese politics at Harvard University, speaking in an interview during a recent visit to Peking.

"He is altering the bases of political power . . . . He has jettisoned the idea of the supreme leader. He has tried to build a power balance both institutionally and among personalities."

The party is also changing in other ways.

It is a party that is more open in discussing its policy-making process, especially when it comes to informing foreign experts. But some Chinese complain that party leaders tell foreigners more than they do their own people and that the most important aspects of their leaders' lives and activities remain secret.

It is a party that, at the moment, is actively courting intellectuals and university graduates. But even at the end of 1984, according to the official party newspaper, People's Daily, only 4 percent of the party's 40 million members had a university education.

It is a party that speaks often these days about corruption among its cadres or leading officials, but that has punished few among the top ranks for such transgressions.

[illegible] for many of its best educated youths. One Chinese woman student from a leading university describes these youths as a wait-and-see generation. Others in China call them a doubting, or skeptical generation.

But the party also maintains some fundamental characteristics. It is very much a party of personal connections and factionalism; the Chinese system still relies more on relationships between people than on the rule of law.

It is also a party that faces the age-old problem of bringing into line millions of members in the provinces who have shown a great ability over the years to resist change.

It is a party that pretends ties between the top leaders and the "broad masses" are close but in reality secludes its leaders from the masses and provides those leaders and their sons and daughters with luxuries and special privileges that the average Chinese can only dream of.

'Rigid Thinking'

One small incident may show that it is not easy to bring a change in style, much less in substance, to the Chinese Communist Party. In the summer of 1982, when he was director of the general office of the party's Central Committee, Hu Qili liked to make informal visits to other party and government offices on his bicycle. This gave Hu a more natural and open style than his predecessor in the Maoist era, who moved about only in a heavily escorted automobile.

But, according to a knowledgeable Chinese, once Hu Qili became a full member of the Central Committee, as well as of the Secretariat, the party's security system prevailed. Henceforth, Hu Qili moved about only under the protection of bodyguards and security police.

Deng has railed repeatedly over the years against the "rigid way of thinking" of Chinese bureaucrats. If a strong leader such as Deng has had difficulty energizing party bureaucrats, one can imagine the trouble his successors might have.

Deng insists that the succession is proceeding smoothly and that party General Secretary Hu and Premier Zhao already are running the day-to-day affairs of the party and government.

"Right now, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang are doing the work instead of me," Deng told Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone in April 1984. "Even if heaven should fall, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang can support it."

But the big question that some people may begin asking at the upcoming special party conference is whether Hu Qili and other relatively young Chinese leaders have the strength to hold up the heavens once Deng passes from the scene.

NEXT: Grappling with bureaucracy

China On the Move

WILL THE CHANGES LAST?

By John F. Burns

FOR THOSE WHO KNEW the China of Mao Zedong, a shrill, implacable place where anything remotely Western was automatically suspect, the country is barely recognizable these days. Not even in the 19th century heyday of the Taipans and the missionaries and the foreign concessions was it as accessible to the outside world as it has become in the era of Deng Xiaoping.

After seven years of the Chinese leader's "open door" policy, urban dwellers are falling over each other in the scramble to adopt Western ways. More than 50 million people are learning English, and many more are wearing Western clothes. Among the young, the rage is disco dancing, Japanese motorcycles, fast food. Nearly 40,000 of the country's brightest college graduates have already gone abroad for further study, more than 15,000 of them to the United States.

Still more important are internal changes that have nothing to do with the West. After 30 years of repression under Mao, Deng's "second revolution" has swept away countless taboos. Working to relax the Communist Party's tyrannical control over the smallest details of social and economic life, Deng has instituted a more benign dictatorship that has encouraged individuals to rely increasingly on themselves. Talent that had lain dormant for decades has been harnessed to Deng's vision of a 21st-century China second to none in economic and political power.

For Deng, twice purged by Mao, vilified in the Cultural Revolution as a "demon" and a "freak," condemned to years of waiting on tables in a party canteen and working a lathe in a provincial tractor plant, the reversal has been sweet. From a time 15 years ago when townsfolk would cross over to avoid him along the path to the tractor plant, he has gained a popularity greater than any Chinese leader in modern times, save possibly that of Mao in the period after the revolution in 1949.

And yet, at the pinnacle of his power, the 81-year-old Deng is an embattled man, struggling to entrench his policies against some of the same forces that overwhelmed him in the past. For all the opportunities he has fostered with the open door, for all the improvements he has brought to the lives of millions of his countrymen, he stands now much as Mao did 10 years ago, incapable of guaranteeing that anything he has done will survive him in the power struggle that seems likely to develop when he dies.

He has done everything a leader can to insure that his policies outlive him, including grooming a new echelon of Communist Party leaders who share his commitment to practicality and moderation. But their claim to the succession will be vulnerable to powerful constituencies within the party that cling to a vision quite unlike Deng's. In a showdown, much that the world has begun to take for granted about China, including the open door, could change.

In his drive for modernization, Deng has challenged interests and beliefs that range well beyond the party's still-powerful Maoist faction. He has sharply undercut the political power and prestige of the Chinese Army, and retired more than 200,000 of its veteran officers. In addition, he has risked the further alienation of his own generation of revolutionaries by forcing the retirement of more than a million party and Government officials.

Perhaps most dangerous of all, he has raised fears about the one issue on which virtually all Chinese agree: the need for a government strong enough to bind this fractious nation together. By adopting economic policies that involve a far-reaching decentralization of power, he has reversed a tradition that reaches back to the earliest emperors. While the stringencies of Mao's rule were extreme by historical standards, there are many Chinese who believe that a nation of a billion people will fall into chaos if the rulers in Peking relax their grip too far.

It is an issue that brings together the two most powerful factions in the party: a doctrinaire group that owes its allegiance to Mao, and the conservatives who see the party's primary role as the enhancement of China's integrity and power. Deng, a conservative himself, has been implacable on the question of the party's political authority, cracking down severely on anybody challenging its right to rule. But he has answered warnings about economic liberalization by saying that it is the only way to make the country truly strong.

The resistance he has encountered on this score has been compounded by tortuous debates on ideology. Deng's lack of interest in ideology has been one of the hallmarks of his career, but his encouragement of foreign investment and private enterprise at home has repeatedly forced him into defending his policies against the charge leveled against him by Mao, that he has been taking the "capitalist road."

John F. Burns is chief of The Times's Peking bureau.

Deng Xiaoping (below) speaks at the national conference of the Chinese Communist Party in September, where his commitment to tolerating divergent voices resulted in a bitter attack on his reforms.

WANG JINQDE/NEW CHINA PICTURE CO./EASTFOTO

As Deng searches out his successors, the question is whether his 'open door' policy can survive him.

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Despite his insistence that his policies find ample justification in the works of Marx and Mao, he has faced a consistent rumble of discontent from the party's Maoist wing.

To this has been added a crescendo of warnings about the corruption that has accompanied the open door. Once more, ideologues and conservatives have found common ground in protesting the accretion of foreign influence, identified in the surging popularity of Western music, in black-marketeering and other "evil winds," including pornography and prostitution. Although many of these have origins that are entirely Chinese, there are increasing numbers of people who look back with nostalgia to the simpler days of Mao.

Deng's reaction to the criticism has been to point to the miseries of the Cultural Revolution, when hundreds of thousands died in a convulsion of leftist extremism, and ask whether anybody could seriously contemplate a rerun of that experience. While conceding the intrusion of "negative things," he has told party forums that there is no alternative course if the country is to drag itself out of "poverty, backwardness and ignorance" and to have any hope of competing with the capitalist nations on equal terms.

Meanwhile, he has been husbanding his health. This year, he cut back sharply on his working hours, attending only the most crucial meetings and leaving an increasing share of the work to his two closest associates, Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang and Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang. In the summer, he retreated for his longest vacation in years, to a walled compound above the sea at Beidaihe, 150 miles east of Peking. There, between twice-daily swims in the sea and walks with his grandchildren, he built up a handsome walnut tan.

As criticism of his policies has grown, any talk of retiring has receded. As though recognizing that his policies would be vulnerable without him, he has spoken more than once lately of his expectation that he will "make it up to 85." At other times, he has said that he expects the proof of his policies to be plain within three to five years. Evidently, he hopes to develop such momentum that his critics will have been silenced by the time he dies.

VIRTUALLY EVERY VISITor who has been ushered into the Great Hall of the People to see Deng has asked him about the durability of his policies. Between puffs on his Great Wall cigarettes and frequent use of the spittoon, he has pointed to popular enthusiasm and said that the Chinese people will "in no wise permit" any reversion to the policies of Mao.

The answer has a disingenuous ring. Few in the party know better than he how little voice ordinary people have had in the party's affairs. In April 1976, when Deng was a Deputy Prime Minister embattled by the radical faction around Mao that would later be called the Gang of Four, there was a massive outpouring of public support for him in Tiananmen Square under the guise of memorial ceremonies for Prime Minister Zhou Enlai. Shortly afterwards, Deng was arrested, stripped of all offices and banished for the second time.

His return to Peking the following year was engineered by powerful figures in the Politburo and army high command, not by public demand. The fact that millions of people wanted the change may have helped, but in the end it was a handful of Politburo votes that counted.

Ironically, threats to his policies now are rooted in the same political monopoly. Although the bureaucracy's day-to-day power has been vastly reduced, Deng's policies have done little to make the party more democratic in a wider sense. Most of its 42 million members remain politically passive, awaiting directions from Peking. Among ordinary people, the idea of challenging the party is as remote as it has always been.

Although virtually no one can envisage a full-scale return to the extremism of Mao, the voices for a return to much stricter, more inward-looking policies will always be strong. In part, this is an outgrowth of traditions that go back to the beginnings of the party in 1921. The workers and intellectuals and peasants who joined clandestine cells were united in their desire to rid the country of its weak and corrupt rulers, but there were wide divergences as to what should be instituted in their place. In the late 1920's, there were already two main bodies of opinion, and it is these that have been in contention ever since.

One group, represented by Mao, had a millennial vision that was a fusion of ancient Chinese beliefs about social harmony and the writings of 19th-century socialists, principally Marx. The other group founded its attitudes in more practical concerns. Strongly nationalist, it saw in the party a vehicle for restoring China to a place of respect in the world, of making it once more sovereign and strong.

Schisms deepened once the party was in power. From the early 1950's, Mao was engaged in a constant struggle within the leadership. The opposition to Mao's egalitarian obsession was strong, and from early on found two vocal champions in Liu Shaoqi, who became head of state, and from a meddlesome Sichuanese, a 4-foot-11-inch plug of a man called Deng Xiaoping.

The conflict between the two approaches became critical after the debacle of the Great Leap Forward, Mao's fanatical attempt after 1958 to put the "genius of the masses" to work by attempting to turn the country into an industrial superpower overnight. By 1961, millions of Chinese were dead of starvation and disease, and Mao's prestige was at a low. Liu and Deng seized the opportunity to begin implementing more practical policies.

Outvoted in the Politburo, Mao resorted in 1966 to the expedient of a mass uprising. This was the Cultural Revolution, and its earliest victims included Liu and Deng. By 1969, when the worst violence had subsided, the paroxysms of the Red Guards and their army backers had wrecked the economy once more. Liu was among the many killed and millions of others had been dispatched to menial labor in remote towns and villages. Among these was Deng.

At the tractor plant in Jiangxi Province, Deng saw the disaster at first hand. An account written by one of his daughters on his 70th birthday told of her father marching head down around the vegetable patch he tended in an abandoned army barracks, wearing a groove in the red earth. The daughter, writing under the pseudonym Maomao, said that her father, "never doubting" that he would be returned to power, spent the Jiangxi years planning the course that he would pursue.

Just as the upheavals in 1936 had made it possible for Mao to implement his policies in their purest form, the catastrophic outcome of the Cultural Revolution served a purpose for Deng. Rehabilitated in 1973, purged again in 1976, and restored to the Politburo for good the following year, he faced little serious opposition in dumping the egalitarian nostrums of Mao in favor of pragmatic policies of his own.

Deng must have been tempted to seek revenge against his erstwhile persecutors and drive them and their views from the party. Apart from his own humiliation, his oldest son, Deng Pufang, had been rendered a paraplegic after a "worker propaganda team" sent by Mao to Peking University had pushed or frightened him into jumping from a fourth-floor window. A good portion of the years in Jiangxi had been spent nursing the young man, turning him over in his bed, and cooking his food.

But in this, too, Deng had brought a lesson back from Jiangxi. Instead of perpetuating the cycle of political warfare, he set out to end it. He told the party that under his leadership there was to be no more "settling of scores," no more purging of political opponents and victimizing of their families. Instead, he said, party organs at every level should encourage contending views.

Apart from the show trial in 1980 of Mao's widow, Jiang Qing, and her associates in the Gang of Four, he stood by his word. All but a few thousand party members were allowed to keep their memberships, and only a few hundred went to jail. Within the leadership, Deng showed equal forbearance. Although party congresses in 1977 and 1982 removed his most powerful enemies, he retained other men who could hardly be seen as his acolytes. When a special party conference was held this fall to bring younger officials into the Politburo and the Secretariat, the body that oversees implementation of policy, several of Deng's most insistent critics kept their seats while some more supportive of him were retired.

Deng has cited the tolerance as an indication of the party's "maturity," but some of his supporters say he carried the magnanimity too far. In 1983, a group centered on the party propaganda chief, Deng Liqun, launched a campaign against "spiritual pollution" that bore the earmarks of a determined bid to undermine the open door. As in 1966, the initial battlefield was culture, but it was not hard to see that the instigators had wider aims.

Aiming first at selected plays and films, then rapidly broadening their field of fire, the campaigners set out to uproot what they called "decadent bourgeois ideology." Soon, vigilantes were on the streets burning books and breaking the high heels off women's shoes. After initially supporting the campaign, Deng Xiaoping moved to suppress it, saying that it had become a menace to the reforms. Deng Liqun, the campaign's instigator, lowered his profile for a year, but he was not purged.

The criticism resumed in earnest with the approach of the September party conference, turning what had been envisaged as an occasion for celebrating Deng's successes into a forum for assailing him. On command, the conference approved the personnel changes put forward by Deng, including the retirement of 10 veterans from the 31-member Politburo and their replacement with six younger men loyal to Deng. Two of these, Hu Qili and Li Peng, both in their mid-50's, have been earmarked as future leaders of the party and Government.

CHINA

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But the spotlight as the conference closed was not on Deng or his protégés. Instead, the delegates were stunned by the harshest public attack to date on the reforms, voiced this time by Chen Yun, an 80-year-old Politburo veteran whose voice carries almost as much weight in the party's councils as Deng's. Like Deng, Chen has a party pedigree dating to the 1920's. In the 1950's he was a close ally of Mao's, responsible for working with Soviet advisers in the creation of a tightly centralized economy.

What Chen had to say has reverberated for months. With Deng sitting a few paces away, he mocked reformers' claims that large numbers of peasants have been "getting rich," saying that their numbers were few. Quoting Mao, he warned of "social disorder" if they remained free to choose between growing grain and going into other pursuits, including private business. On the extension of market principles in general, he was equally severe, saying that "blindly allowing supply and demand to determine production" was a formula for chaos. "We are a Communist country," he said.

UNDERSTANDING THE power of Maoist ideology in China has never been easy, all the less so now that the country seems to have gained so much by shunting it aside. To watch the Chinese thronging private markets, whiling away leisure hours with chess and birds or heading abroad for education is to see a people who seem happier now than at any time since 1949.

But that is only part of the story. To grasp a measure of the full story demands an understanding of a culture that goes back 4,000 years. Few Western historians would claim to have mastered the subject, but many observers believe that Maoism, in its extreme egalitarianism, its insistence on purity of spirit and its suspicion of the outside world, is an outgrowth of a tradition as old as China itself.

It is a proposition that Deng would almost certainly contest. In saying that the reforms can never be rolled back, he has taken the position that Mao's successes were a historical aberration. Much the same argument has been made about the Bolsheviks by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who has been at odds with Western scholars convinced that what happened after 1917 was an outgrowth of something buried in the Russian tradition.

That Maoism answered to something profound in the Chinese character seemed evident to anybody who witnessed the Cultural Revolution and saw in it something more than the fanaticism of an angry old man. For a decade, millions of people turned their backs on personal loyalties, family life, comfort, education and recreation. Toward Mao personally, there was an intensity of feeling that was mystical and, to an outsider, often frightening.

Liang Heng, a rangy young man from the southern city of Changsha, is an intellectual who has spent much of his adult life trying to understand the Maoist phenomenon. Partly, this has been an exploration into his own past, for Liang was a 12-year-old Red Guard and wrote about the experience in his book "Son of the Revolution." The book tells how Mao's ideological excesses wrecked Liang's parents' marriage and careers. Liang himself married an American scholar, Judith Shapiro, and now lives in New York.

During a two-month visit to China earlier this year, his first since 1980, Liang was astonished at the changes that Deng has introduced but wary of predicting that they would last. In travels that took him to several major cities and deep into the provincial hinterland, he found a surging affection for Deng. But he also found traces of tensions from the past, signs that what Mao stood for still lurks in the consciousness of ordinary people as it does among the leaders in Peking.

Liang's explanation was that Mao and those who followed him welded Marxism to the peasant traditions of clannishness, chauvinism and suspicion that they had inherited. From this viewpoint, the attack on things foreign can be seen as the counterpart of a villager's hostility to anything that threatens the harmony of his milieu. The instinct to strike out at anybody differentiating himself from the "masses" — by clothing, thought or deed — can be similarly understood.

Also from this viewpoint, Deng's attempt to turn the country outward marks him as the standard-bearer of a minority tradition. Like the Mandarins who made an ill-fated attempt at Westernization towards the end of the 19th century, many of the modern reformers have an experience of the outside world that separates them from most of their fellow party members, as it does from the overwhelming majority of Chinese.

Deng, the son of a minor official in Sichuan, was a student and factory worker in France in the early 1920's. Although a young Chinese at Renault in Paris after World War I cannot have viewed capitalist life from an advantaged position, Deng has spoken happily about his digs in a working-class quarter and his taste for coffee and brioches. Mao, a peasant's son, never went abroad until he was middle-aged, and then only to Moscow.

For Deng, the result is a paradox. The opportunities he has created with the open door have been greeted with enthusiasm by a population that had few choices under Mao. But there has been another, more complex reaction. Confronted by a widening of choice and experience, some Chinese have fallen back on old instincts. In a sense, they have opted to close the door.

Nobody living in China in the past year could fail to notice the signs. One came in reports of an epidemic of an old peasant malady called "red-eye disease" — otherwise known as jealousy. As the People's Daily and other publications told it, resentment among rural dwellers toward neighbors faring better than themselves had become a matter of serious concern. One peasant living outside Peking was said to have requested a police guard after attacks by others jealous of his success.

An equally telling indication came in outbursts of nationalistic feeling. In May, a riot that followed China's 2-1 loss in a soccer match with Hong Kong was characterized by attacks on foreign cars. The Government was quick to punish the offenders and to assure the diplomatic community that they in no way represented prevailing opinion, but foreigners traveling elsewhere in the country continued to report incidents of hostility.

The most ominous development, however, was the series of university demonstrations that continued into the winter.

The ostensible target of the protests was Japan, accused by the students of renascent militarism and attempts to mount a "second occupation" of China by aggressive commercial policies. Although Japan responded by apologizing yet again for World War II and vowing to reduce its trade surplus with China, the students were unappeased.

As has often been the case in China, however, the protesters' real target lay elsewhere. In marching to Tiananmen Square, they appeared to be putting Deng on notice that they had reached the limits of their tolerance with the open door. Although some wore Western clothes to the demonstrations and carried Japanese stereos, they seemed to be crying out for a return to an era when China kept its distance from the world. The last person to adopt that expedient was Mao.

THE FACT THAT Deng has carried the reforms as far as he has owes at least something to a shift in his political style. His imperious manner before the Cultural Revolution earned him the nickname "little Napoleon" from the Red Guards. The word from Mao in 1966 was that Deng had ignored instructions, to the point of arranging the seating at Politburo meetings so as to place his deaf ear as a barrier between himself and anything Mao or other leaders said.

Deng's deafness has been eased by a miniaturized hearing aid, but long before technology intervened there were signs that the old man was listening more than he had in years. This, too, could have been a lesson from the years in Jiangxi, when there was plenty of time to reflect on the folly of being too bullheaded.

In Mao's day, public dissent by other leaders was virtually unknown. Deng has encouraged it, saying that his policies can withstand whatever critics say. When the complaints have been ideological, he has moved quickly to co-opt them. This was the method at the outset of the "spiritual pollution" campaign, when an outsider would have trouble telling which of the two Dengs — Deng Xiaoping or the unrelated propaganda chief, Deng Liqun — was the more doctrinaire.

Lately, the tactical skill has been in heavy demand. When Chen Yun shook the September conference with his vehemence, Deng bounced back with a speech that included one of the purplest passages since the days of Mao. Agiong social systems, he said, Communism was superior not only because it provided for more rapid economic growth but because it alone could eliminate "the greediness, corruption and injustice which are inherent in capitalism."



YANN LAYMA/IMAGINE

High rises in Peking point to China's new affluence under Deng's reforms.

In Peking, an elder takes time to talk of birds with an attentive youngster.

YANN LAYMA/IMAGINE

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This was not the breezy Deng who told party elders last year that there was nothing to fear if a little capitalism crept in, nor was it the man who has told visiting business executives of his admiration for the accomplishments of the West. Instead, it was a political horse-trader ready to make concessions on peripheral questions of culture and ideology to insure that the country's economic transformation remained on track.

For Deng's critics, the logic works in something like reverse. When they have sensed the economic momentum faltering, as they did with the scandals of last winter, Chen Yun and Deng Liqun have stepped up their warnings about the corrupting influences flowing through the open door. To each new wave of criticism, Deng has ceded something marginal. Instructions have gone out to step up ideological instruction within the party, or to close down an avant-garde play. But the basic commitment to reform has remained unchanged.

With the heady pace of agricultural and industrial growth, Deng has managed to keep the harshest criticism away from the economic policies themselves. But some Western experts believe that the expansion achieved so far could begin to falter as the last of the slackness built into the system by Mao is shaken out. After that, they say, there will be a truer test of the path the reformers have chosen.

A point of faith with Deng that has begun to attract attention is his conviction that high technology holds the key to achieving his ambitious growth targets — a $1 trillion economy by the end of the century, four times the figure for 1980, and equality with the West by the year 2050. A common complaint among Western businessmen is that the Chinese are buying computers and other state-of-the-art equipment that stands idle for want of qualified technicians.

By overbuying, some Western officials believe, the reformers could be setting themselves up for a backlash later, when opponents of the open door could say that the country's meager resources were plundered by the West. Similarly, there is concern about the emphasis Deng has attached to Western investment. Hopes that capital would rush in have been disappointed, with barely a trickle from Japan and only modest commitments — barely $1 billion in all — from the United States.

Virtually every flight brings new squads of potential investors, but the majority of them have kept their wallets closed. Like many ordinary Chinese, Western executives take little time to fasten on the uncertainties — principal among them Deng's advanced age. "If I've heard it once, I've heard it a thousand times," one Western ambassador said. "They all want to know what will happen when Deng dies."

Deng has spoken jocularly of the problem, saying that he is not as pivotal a figure as people think. "The heavens will not fall," he has said, resorting to one of the old folk sayings that characterize his talks. "We have people who can prop up the sky."

In fact, the succession has taken up an increasing share of his energies. More than once this year, he has described the problem of "continuity" as the most pressing one of all, an oblique way of acknowledging that the survival of the reforms may not be so assured after all. Privately, he has reminisced about the political turmoil that ensued in the Soviet Union after Stalin died, saying that it was avoidable if the dictator had taken action in time.

His own solution lay in the September party conference, called to promote the men he has groomed as his successors. The conference, prepared over a two-year period, reflected the broader effort under Deng to move from the arbitrary political methods used by Mao. For the first time, the conference introduced the concept of "voluntary retirement" for senior officials, 64 of whom stepped down from the Central Committee to make way for younger blood.

The men promoted to the Politburo were models of the university-educated professionals who have borne the principal burden of implementing the reforms. Hu Qili, favored as the eventual party chief, is an engineering graduate who rose through the Communist Youth League to be mayor of Tianjin, the country's third-largest city. Li Peng, groomed for the prime minister's post, is also an engineer, educated in Moscow after a boyhood spent in the Communist guerilla stronghold of Yunnan.

Deng's immediate plans for the two men are obscure, but one theory is that he intends to place them in the top jobs at a party congress in 1987. In this scenario, the incumbent party and Government leaders, General Secretary Hu and Prime Minister Zhao, would move up to the Central Advisory Commission, the body of elders currently headed by Deng. Deng himself, it is said, might then withdraw, no doubt to keep an eye on matters from his villa in the leaders' compound at Zhongnanhai.

With Deng to back them, even if he were no longer a member of the Politburo, the younger men might prosper. But on their own, serious problems could arise from handicaps that Deng can do nothing to alter. Unlike all of the men who have held high political rank until now, neither of them played any active role in the revolution and neither has any military connection, potentially crucial in the struggle to protect the reforms.

Deng himself owes much to his military ties, including the protection given to him at a Canton army barracks after he was purged the second time. But he has repaid that support by freezing the military budget, retiring scores of old generals and cutting manpower levels by more than a million men. Up to now, the high command has given strong backing to the reforms, but it is not hard to imagine discontent within the military resolving itself into a desire for political retribution later on.

For now, Deng is doing what he can to help, shifting the burdens of day-to-day power to the younger men, sending them on high-profile trips abroad, and voicing their praises whenever he can. The effort is reminiscent of a time when Mao spent some of his last energies on the political fortunes of his own group of younger men. One of those, Wang Hongwen, was barely 40 when he was made a vice chairman of the party, and Mao spared no words in his praise.

Wang is past 50 now, serving a prison term as a member of the Gang of Four. Hardly anybody ever mentions his name, but when they do, it serves as a reminder of how changeable Chinese political fortunes can be. Not many years from now, perhaps quite soon, the moment will come when Deng's plans for the succession will be put to the test. Only then will the world learn whether he has succeeded any better than Mao. ■

Tolerance – of critics at home as well as Western ideas – may collide with 4,000 years of tradition.

Washington Times, 5/22/85

After 4-year delay, Radio Free Cuba goes on air today

Washington Times, 5/20/85

FROM COMBINED DISPATCHES

The United States will begin Radio Marti broadcasts to all parts of Cuba today on a 14½ hour-a-day schedule, according to administration officials. But the administration also expressed concern that Fidel Castro's Marxist regime might retaliate by using powerful jamming equipment to interfere with the broadcasts.

"I'm pleased that the voice of freedom and truth will at long last be heard in Cuba," Sen. Paula Hawkins, R-Fla., said. "It's a lot less expensive and often more effective to fight communism with truth instead of with bullets." Sen. Hawkins helped prepare legislation leading to the creation of the station, a move that went into the planning stages in early 1981.

The transmitter for Radio Marti, named after Cuba's national hero Jose Marti is located at Marathon Key, Fla. It is rated at 50,000 watts and is beamed to Cuba on the 1180 kilohertz AM band. This means almost any Cuban with a small radio receiver will be able to tune in at any point along the 600-mile length of the island.

Cubans and Floridians are already able to receive radio and TV broadcasts across the 90-mile straits.

The broadcasting debut at 5:30 a.m. EDT May 20 marks the 83rd anniversary of Cuban independence which followed the ending of the U.S. military occupation from the Spanish-American War in which Cuba won its freedom from Spain. In a videotape prepared for a banquet in Miami Saturday celebrating the anniversary, President Reagan said Cuban patriot Jose Marti dedicated his life to freedom of speech and press in the island nation.

"He is a symbol for the need for the unfettered flow of ideas," Mr. Reagan said. "It is for this reason that his name was chosen for Radio Marti.

"It is our hope that Radio Marti will help defuse the war hysteria on which much of current Cuban government policy is predicated," Mr. Reagan said. "There's no reason why the peoples of Cuba and the United States should not live together in peace and friendship. But you can't shake hands with someone whose fists are clenched."

Antonio Navarro, senior Vice President for W. R. Grace and Co. was nominated May 16 by President Reagan to the board of advisors that will oversee Radio Marti. Mr. Navarro, 62, was born in Havana and served in various capacities with Shell Chemical Corp. in the U.S. and in the sugar and textile industries in Cuba from 1950 to 1961.

In 1981, Mr.Navarro published a book titled "Tocayo," which

see **MARTI**, *page 10A*

MARTI

From page 1A

describes his experiences during and after the Cuban revolution.

Radio Marti's news will be impartial, Mr. Navarro pledged. The advisory board will oversee the station's programming.

A Radio Free Cuba, subsequently dubbed Radio Marti had long and strong support from the Cuban-American community, and became one of the staple items in Ronald Reagan's campaign for the presidency in 1980.

Preliminary planning at the National Security Council staff and the State Department for such a station first named Radio Free Cuba began in the early months of 1981, and the administration's intention to open such a service was formally announced in September of that year — an announcement that also included the establishment of a presidential commission to make recommendations about the structure and nature of Radio Marti.

Nearly two years went by, however, before Radio Marti was initially authorized by Congress in June 1983.

During the course of the debate, Radio Marti attracted wide opposition and criticism. Among the leading opponents were the two conservative senators from Iowa, Sens. Charles Grassely, R-Iowa, and Roger Jepsen, R-Iowa, who believed that Cuban retaliatory measures could damage Iowa's most powerful radio station, WHO, in Des Moines.

At the time of the approval, liberal Sen. Claiborne Pell, D-R.I., said the plan was "ill conceived" and that the station is "likely to become a propaganda organ of the anti-Castro exile community."

"Jose Marti once wrote that a nation is not established the way a military encampment is run," Mr. Reagan said Saturday in his videotape address. "Today, the most prominent achievements of Fidel Castro's regime are the militarization of Cuban society and the propagation of malice and hatred."

The Voice of America is in charge of Radio Marti broadcasts and began recruiting employes in 1983.

"We are concerned that Castro also might attempt to jam commercial stations in the southeastern U.S. as well as Radio Marti," said an administration official. He said the U.S. notified the Havana regime Saturday that the broadcasts will begin and Washington is watching closely for Mr. Castro's reaction.

A spokeswoman for the National Association of Broadcasters told a Senate committee as many as 200 U.S. stations could be adversely affected by Cuban jamming

Radio Free Cuba stirs quick retaliation

By Roger Fontaine
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Reacting sharply and instantly to the first broadcast by Radio Marti, Cuba yesterday suspended an immigration accord signed just last December, the first of any kind with the Reagan administration, and an anti-hijacking agreement.

There were also indications that the Cuban government may begin jamming broadcasts soon.

The first news beamed to the Cuban populace by Radio Free Cuba, as broadcasting began yesterday,

see **MARTI**, *page 6A*

USIA Director Charles Z. Wick (left) and Voice of America Director-designate Gene Pell discuss Radio Marti's startup

Photo by Lawrence A. Cumbert/The Washington

Washington Times, 5/22/85

MARTI

From page 1A

reported the retaliatory action of their own government.

In contrast to the sharp Cuban reaction, the opening of the new radio service in its Washington studios was low-keyed. It was launched without ceremony and was followed by a brief press conference conducted by Charles Z. Wick, director of the U.S. Information Agency, under which Radio Marti operates.

Mr. Wick called the Cuban retaliatory action "inappropriate."

The canceled accord would have permitted 20,000 Cuban immigrants to come to the United States each year if Cuba took back 2,700 so-called "excludables" now in U.S. jails and mental health facilities. The latter arrived in Florida among some 100,000 refugees during the Mariel boatlift in summer 1980.

Under a special provision of the treaty, 3,000 Cuban political prisoners had been scheduled to be freed and sent to the United States this year. A chartered plane carrying 28 political prisoners and 104 relatives landed in Miami just hours before the new agreement was suspended by Havana.

Several charter jets already have flown 201 of the "excludables" to Cuba.

Radio Havana said yesterday that "relations with the United States would be more difficult for a long time" and that Radio Marti would "impede the possibility of progress in bilateral matters."

Calling the debut of Radio Marti "cynical and provocative," Radio Havana said the Cuban government would "adopt additional measures relating to the communications between the United States and Cuba," but did not spell out those measures.

Radio Havana also said Cuban-Americans would no longer be able to travel to Cuba.

Additional measures could include jamming of Radio Marti or counter-broadcasting that would disrupt radio transmission in this country.

Yesterday, a Federal Communications Commission spokesman said U.S. government monitoring stations had detected a tone being transmitted from Cuba on the same frequency as Radio Marti within hours of its first broadcast, but it was not known if the tone was actually preventing Cubans from listening to Radio Marti's first day of programming.

However, the FCC spokesman, William Russell Jr., said he had no indication of any power increase on the Cuban station, which is operating on a normal broadcasting channel.

According to one Radio Marti official, Havana is already jamming Voice of America broadcasts to Cuba.

There were no reports of interference with other American radio stations, however.

In the Cuban exile community in Miami, the inauguration of Radio Marti was received as a signal that President Reagan will retake the initiative against Soviet strategy in the Caribbean and Central America.

Callers to Miami radio stations said the retaliatory measures appear to reflect panic by the Cuban leader that the truth will reach the people of Cuba.

"We are broadcasting in a legal fashion," Mr. Wick said, citing Radio Marti's right to broadcast to Cuba under Article 19 of the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights, which provides for the right "to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers."

At the White House, Reagan administration officials yesterday expressed little surprise at Cuba's retaliatory moves.

Regarding Cuba's announcement that it was suspending immigration accords with the United States, White House spokesman Larry Speakes said, "We're not exactly clear what they mean by suspension of these agreements."

But, he added, "If that is their reaction to the lawful presentation of accurate, balanced and objective news reports, then that speaks volumes of the Cuban government."

Mr. Speakes said he was not aware of any attempt by Cuba to jam Radio Marti broadcasts from Florida. "They have the capability of extensive jamming throughout the United States," he said.

"Cuba has been broadcasting themselves over 400 hours a week in a number of languages throughout the world," he pointed out.

The State Department said Radio Marti broadcasts to Cuba would counter "years of propaganda and disinformation" but expressed regret at Fidel Castro's cancellation of an immigration agreement.

"We hope that the Cubans will reconsider this action," department spokesman Bernard Kalb said of the Cuban president's announcement that Cuba would suspend the December 1984 immigration agreement.

Jorge Mas Canosa, chairman of Radio Marti's advisory board, told The Washington Times that Mr. Castro's reactions to the start of Radio Marti broadcasts "show great contempt . . . for us for providing a little bit of freedom for the Cuban people."

"It shows he is a totalitarian man. He's an old man with old ideas," he added.

Privately, Radio Marti officials called Mr. Castro's retaliation a tactical mistake, giving the new service welcome publicity on the island. "It has given us a boost," said one official.

Meanwhile, Mr. Wick and other officials said repeatedly under questioning from the press at the opening broadcast that Radio Marti will abide by congressional requirements on reliable, objective and factual newscasting.

The USIA director denied that the intention of the broadcasting was "to undermine anybody," but it was "to push the free flow of information" to Cuba.

"We don't plan a revolution," he added.

At precisely 5:30 a.m. yesterday, Radio Marti sprang to life with its signature tune, a sweet and sad Cuban folksong, "Clave a Marti," or "The key to Marti." It was written shortly after the death of the Cuban patriot Jose Marti at the hands of the Spanish rulers of his island.

"*There is a voice missing here*
The voice of that Cuban mockingbird
Of that brother martyr
Whose name was Marti."

A pause and then the first words, "Aqui Radio Marti. Buenos Dias, Cuba."

The opening moments barely concealed the emotions — the tribute to Marti through the use of the symbol of the sinsonte Cubano, the Cuban mockingbird, a creature that cannot live in captivity.

The theme song was immediately followed by the news, and that was all business.

The lead item: Cuba's response to Radio Marti.

Occupying nearly two floors of a federal office building in Southwest Washington and jammed with news and broadcasting equipment, the quarters of Radio Marti still have an unfinished look. Permanent broadcast studios have yet to be built in a large vacant area adjacent to the news room, while 62 members of a staff of 188 have yet to be hired.

MARTI

From page 1A

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
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GARNER '85
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Party Leadership Reorganized in Cuba

Veterans of '59 Revolution Replaced; Woman Named to Politburo

Reuter

HAVANA, Feb. 8—Cuba has revamped its ruling Communist Party hierarchy in what diplomats today described as a major break with the past, long dominated by veterans of the 1959 revolution.

About one-third of the Central Committee, including 12 full and candidate members of the Politburo, were voted out at yesterday's final session of the party congress, held every five years.

"The changes in party leadership often used to be merely symbolic, but this time it was necessary to renovate," President Fidel Castro said in a closing speech.

The four full Politburo members demoted include two of only five "commanders of the Cuban revolution"—former interior minister Ramiro Valdes and former transport minister Guillermo Garcia. Both led guerrilla columns in Castro's struggle against the Fulgencio Batista dictatorship of the 1950s, and most Cubans regarded them as permament fixtures in the party leadership.

"Castro seems determined to make a break with the past by demonstrating that even those at the highest level must make way for a new generation," one European diplomat said.

Castro made clear the party's intentions when he told 1,790 delegates that "the introduction of more women, blacks and young people into the ranks of the party must continue."

Vilma Espin, wife of Castro's younger brother, Raul, yesterday became the party's first woman Politburo member and Esteban Lazo Hernandez, who is black, was promoted to provincial party chief.

The Associated Press reported the following:

In his speech, Castro suggested that some of the 35,000 Cuban troops would be withdrawn from Angola if independence and black majority rule are granted to Namibia, or South-West Africa, now governed by South Africa.

Castro said most of Cuba's forces would stay in Angola until "apartheid ceases to be" in South Africa. "As long as apartheid exists, there will be danger to Angola," he said.

Apartheid is South Africa's policy of legal racial segregation under which 4.6 million whites rule 28 million voteless blacks who are denied many rights.

The United States has long sought through the negotiating process to persuade Angola to ask Cuban troops to leave once Namibia is independent. Namibia lies between Angola and South Africa.

By linking the Cuban military presence to the internal situation in South Africa, Castro appeared to harden his terms for a troop withdrawal.

The Washington Times TUESDAY, MAY 21, 1985

Cuba operates as KGB's chief errand boy in Mexico

THE WASHINGTON TIMES

MEXICO CITY — In this city's secret world of intelligence operations, the Soviet Union does not act alone. Every Soviet bloc country — including remote Mongolia — has an embassy in the Mexican capital.

According to well-informed sources, each supports the Soviet effort in one way or the other.

"All are running errands for the Soviet Union," says one Western diplomat.

It is Cubans, however, who are said to be one of the most active of Moscow's allies. Their center for operations is their embassy — a massive, modernistic building in Polanco, an upscale section of Mexico City.

The Cuban Embassy is located on a broad, palm-lined avenue running through the western part of the city, just beyond elegant furniture stores (Galeria Chippendale) and boutiques (Gloria Vanderbilt). It takes up a full square city block — a gift from the Mexican government ("along with the bugs they left behind," according to one Western diplomatic source).

One former U.S. intelligence officer with experience in Mexico says there are 95 officers in the Cuban embassy — the largest such representation after the Soviet Union itself.

It was not always so. For the first decade of Castro's rule, the embassy was far more modest, having no more than 35 officers. After 1968, when Cuban foreign policy fully aligned itself with Moscow, the number of officers mushroomed.

Havana has the most active intelligence station in this city after Moscow's, with both of Cuba's intelligence arms — the Direccion General de Inteligencia (DGI) and the Americas Department — represented. This large presence demonstrates the importance Fidel Castro attaches to Mexico in his overall intelligence and political effort.

While the DGI has become the Spanish-language branch of the KGB since the early '60s and has been used to supplement Soviet intelligence efforts, it differs from East European services in that its efforts are not principally aimed at U.S. industrial espionage but handles Mexican operations as well.

There are reports that the DGI has been involved in training Mexican terrorists, but this is largely unsubstantiated. One State Department official said Mexicans were taken to Cuba for training, but doubted that terrorists had been trained for operations here.

That view is shared by several former U.S. intelligence officials who remain up-to-date on Soviet and Cuban activities in Mexico. At least one West European intelligence service reported in a confidential analysis late last year that Cuba was "unlikely to promote any dissidence" in Mexico.

The widely held belief by intelligence sources here and in Washington is that Mexico and Cuba have agreed to an unwritten code of conduct. In this, Havana doesn't foment social unrest in Mexico and Mexico City supports Cuba's foreign policies.

But other sources say the Cubans are indeed active in this country. They report that they have been agitating peasant groups in southern Mexico, specifically in Chiapas, a state that borders Guatemala — a region with a long history of separatism.

One effort in which Cuban intelligence has actively participated is disinformation — the fabrication of misinformation and planting it in the generally pliant and generally anti-American Mexican press. From there it frequently gets picked up and repeated by U.S. and other media representatives.

According to well-informed sources here and in Washington, some Mexican journalists have been on the Cuban payroll.

The Cuban Americas Department's portfolio also includes running operations out of Mexico directed at Central America — primarily Guatemala — and providing support for left-wing revolutionaries based in Mexico, according to U.S. diplomatic and intelligence sources.

Cuban operations are not limited to Mexico City. Havana also has a small consulate in Merida, the capital of Yucutan. What Merida does is a matter of dispute within U.S. intelligence circles. Estimates range from it being a conduit into Guatemala for guerrilla operations to it serving as another transit point for Mexicans going to Cuba.

The Cubans are not the only Soviet partners working in Mexico. The Czechs, in particular, have a reputation of being especially active among the Eastern bloc.

According to reliable sources here and in Washington, the Czechs perform standard aspects of intelligence tradecraft, and are considered specialists in planting bugs in Western embassies and residences.

They also are used in attempting to recruit Mexican and U.S. citizens working for the American Embassy here. "It's the lonely secretary" they attempt to recruit, says one former American intelligence official with four years experience in Mexico City.

"Sometimes they use Czechs, but more often they use some Mexican gigolo," he said.

— Roger Fontaine

PLAYBOY
August 1985

PLAYBOY INTERVIEW: FIDEL CASTRO

a candid conversation about reagan, revolution, dictators, drugs, debt and personal life with cuba's communist leader—and washington's nemesis

* * * * *

PLAYBOY: But isn't it true that Duarte was elected president by the people of El Salvador in an open and free election?

CASTRO: No! [*Pounds table*] Everyone knows under what conditions the elections took place: amid the most ferocious repression, terror and war; everyone knows that the electoral campaign was planned by the United States, that the political parties were manipulated by the United States and that the electoral campaigns were funded by the CIA. The present government and all other allegedly legal bodies are the result of all that manipulation and all those maneuvers by the United States. Augusto Pinochet of Chile could also say that his government was legal after the fascist constitution was imposed upon the people in an alleged plebiscite in which no one but he and his constitution took part. Actually, one can't help wondering why the United States considers the El Salvador elections to be legal and, in turn, considers the Nicaragua elections illegal. In spite of the fact that the elections in Nicaragua were sabotaged by the United States, the people turned out to vote with enthusiasm, granting the *Sandinistas* and the left more than 70 percent of the vote. This was witnessed by more than 1000 people from all over the world: representatives of governments, political organizations and parties and journalists from everywhere.

PLAYBOY: As you say, it can be argued both ways. The question remains, Isn't it true that Cuba has worked, and is actively working, to overthrow the government of President Duarte? If so, what right does Cuba have to intervene in the internal affairs of another country?

CASTRO: I'm not concerned in the least about charges against Cuba in relation to our solidarity with El Salvador. We have stated that the United States knows perfectly well that sending weapons to the Salvadoran revolutionaries is very difficult, in practice almost impossible; but I have no interest whatever in clarifying anything on this subject, because I consider that morally, it is absolutely fair to help the Salvadoran revolutionaries. They are fighting for their country; it's not a war from abroad, like the dirty war the CIA carries out in Nicaragua; it's a war born inside the country that has been going on for many years.

What I can assure you is that, in fact, the main supplier of the Salvadoran revolutionaries is the Pentagon, through the weapons given to the Salvadoran army. That also happened in Vietnam; the revolutionaries there seized huge amounts of weapons delivered by the United States to the puppet army. I really don't know who could feel morally entitled to criticize Cuba for allegedly supplying weapons to the Salvadorans when the United States admits to supplying weapons to the Somoza mercenaries to overthrow the government of Nicaragua.

PLAYBOY: What evidence do you have that the CIA manipulated the presidential elections in El Salvador? Didn't they have the same kind of scrutiny as Nicaragua's elections, which you claim were fair?

CASTRO: The information was published in the United States—and the CIA admitted it publicly. It gave money not only to the Christian Democrats but also to all the other parties and covered the expenses of the election campaign. Proof is not necessary in the face of a confession.

PLAYBOY: You've mentioned Grenada. How do you explain the failure of the socialist revolution in that country?

CASTRO: The invasion of Grenada by the United States was, in my view, one of the most inglorious and infamous deeds that a powerful country like the United States could ever commit against a small country. What was occurring there had nothing to do with the failure of socialism. What had been taking place in Grenada was a process of social change, not a socialist revolution. I believe that what opened the doors for invading that country, what gave the United States a pretext on a silver platter, were the activities of an ambitious and extremist sectarian group. I believe that the main responsibility for the domestic situation created there lies with Bernard Coard, an alleged theoretician of the revolution, who was really advancing his own ambitions to conspire against the popular leader, Maurice Bishop.

PLAYBOY: Do you believe that the United States would have intervened in Grenada had Bishop still been in power?

CASTRO: No. If Bishop had been alive and leading the people, it would have been very difficult for the United States to orchestrate the political aspects of its intervention and to bring together that group of Caribbean stooges in a so-called policing coalition that didn't include a single policeman from the Caribbean—it was exclusively U.S. soldiers.

PLAYBOY: You say the U.S. invaded on a pretext. But President Reagan argued that the United States had no choice but to intervene in Grenada, because Cuba was building an airport and stockpiling weapons with which to export revolution—and, of course, because the American medical students studying in Grenada were in mortal danger. Why didn't the U.S. have a right to protect its citizens and prevent the spread of revolution?

CASTRO: The U.S. invasion was accompanied by unscrupulous lies, because for one thing, U.S. students on the island never ran any risk. The first thing the coup group did was to give assurances of safety to everyone, particularly the medical students. The safest people in Grenada were the U.S. students. As to the airport, Washington claimed a thousand times that was a military airport, but not a single brick that went into that airport was military. It was built with the participation of the European Economic Council and England, Canada and other United States allies.

PLAYBOY: What explains the fact that the Grenadian people cheered the United States intervention and rallied behind its goals and objectives?

CASTRO: I doubt very much that that support is as deep and widespread as you suggest. Bishop was a man greatly loved by the people. He was the leader of the Grenadian people. He had the real, sincere and enthusiastic support of the people. The group involved in the coup plotted against Bishop, arrested him, fired on the people when they revolted and, furthermore, assassinated Bishop and other leaders. Naturally, this caused great outrage and confusion among the masses. The United States intervened, stating its sole purpose as the noble aim of liberating the country from those people and that it would

Continued

punish Bishop's murderers and those who had fired on the people. It was logical for a large number of people in that country, even most of the population, to be susceptible to accepting invasion as desirable.

PLAYBOY: What about public support in the U.S.? The overwhelming majority of the American people rallied behind President Reagan's decision.

CASTRO: Public opinion in the United States was manipulated by a pack of lies told over and over again. Melodramatic elements were brought into play: the students kissing U.S. soil on their arrival; the bitterness and frustration resulting from the Vietnam adventure and its humiliating defeat; the problem of the Marines killed in Lebanon and the memory of the Iran hostages; all these elements, latent in the spirit of the U.S. people, were manipulated in a cold, calculated manner. People can be manipulated; they can even applaud crimes. When the Nazis annexed Austria, the German people applauded; when they occupied Warsaw, the vast majority of Germans applauded. Some Americans applauded at the start of the invasion of Vietnam; later we saw the consequences. I believe future generations of U.S. citizens will be ashamed of the way their people were manipulated.

PLAYBOY: You compare the "shameful" Grenada invasion to actions by Nazi Germany; some would say that the actions of Soviet troops in Afghanistan are a more appropriate comparison. How can the bloodshed caused by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan be anything but a shame and an embarrassment to socialist countries?

CASTRO: Afghanistan is one of the most backward countries in the world, where a feudal regime had existed until April 1978. It had an illiteracy rate of 90 percent and an infant mortality rate of 235 for every 1000 live births—one of the highest in the world. Two thousand families owned 70 percent of the land, and the population consisted of around 1500 tribes. I believe that Afghanistan was one of the places in the world where a revolution was becoming more and more indispensable. As soon as that revolution took place—as it inevitably had to—the CIA began its subversive activities, exactly like the ones being carried out in Nicaragua. The United States has invested one billion dollars in helping the counterrevolutionary gangs since the beginning of that Revolution.

The Afghan Revolution led to a series of tensions in the region. Cuba was involved in trying to find solutions, including hosting the sixth summit meeting of the nonaligned countries in Havana, in 1979. There I met President Taraki of Afghanistan. I had also met the man who was to overthrow him and cause him to be murdered—Amin. He was a man who came to resemble Pol Pot, the genocidal leader of Cambodia. You can't imagine what a pleasant man he was! You know, I've had the rare privilege of meeting some figures whom you would find courteous, well educated, who have studied in Europe or the United States, and later on you find out that they've done horrible things. It's as if at some moment, people go mad. It seems that there are people whose brain neurons aren't adapted to the complexities of revolutionary political problems, so they do crazy things that are really amazing.

In any case, everyone had a hand in that situation until the events that took place in Afghanistan in later 1979. The Soviets were helping the Afghans—that is true—because Taraki originally requested their help. Amin also asked the Soviets for help later, and a lot of Soviets were there, assisting in a wide range of fields—military, economic, technical, all kinds—up until Soviet troops were sent into the country on a massive scale.

PLAYBOY: That is, when they invaded. You say that was based on what provocation?

CASTRO: Essentially, counterrevolutionary actions fostered from abroad. Revolutions always entail more than a few complications and headaches. No revolution has ever avoided that; not the French Revolution of 1789, the Russian Revolution of 1917, the Chinese Revolution, the Vietnamese Revolution, the Cuban Revolution or the Nicaraguan Revolution. There are no exceptions, and all the problems arise from the invariable attempts made from abroad to overthrow the revolution. This is also what happened with the revolution in Afghanistan.

PLAYBOY: You blame the invasion on the CIA, then?

CASTRO: The CIA was doing, and continues to do, everything in its power to create problems for the government of Afghanistan and for the Soviets. It's pouring enormous numbers of weapons and amounts of money into Afghanistan, using the *émigrés*, playing on the political backwardness of a part of the Afghan people, using religion—it's making use of every tool it can to create difficulties for the Afghan revolutionaries and for the Soviets. I don't think the CIA is particularly interested in promoting peace in the country.

PLAYBOY: Yet there was a bloody invasion. How can you defend the Soviet action, and at the same time preach the philosophy of revolution and liberation?

CASTRO: I sincerely believe that the Afghan Revolution was just and necessary, and we could support nothing that would jeopardize it. We sympathize with and support the Afghan Revolution; I say this frankly. But I think Afghanistan could be a nonaligned country—but one in which the revolutionary regime was maintained. If a solution is sought that is based on the idea that Afghanistan should go back to the old regime and sacrifice the Revolution, then, unfortunately, I don't think there will be peace there for a long time. I think it's in the interest of all the neighboring countries, including the Soviet Union, to find a solution. And I believe that the observance of the principle of respect for Afghanistan's sovereignty and for its right to make social changes, build the political system it deems best and correct and have a nonaligned government—as a Third World country—should serve as the basis of a solution for the problems there.

* * * * * EXCERPTED

Why Castro's Cuba Chases the Yankee Dollar

Moscow's handouts cannot keep the economy afloat. To survive, the nation needs hard cash—American greenbacks.

HAVANA

The U.S. dollar, symbol of the capitalist system hated by Fidel Castro, once again is the preferred currency here in revolutionary Cuba.

With his Marxist economy in trouble, 58-year-old Castro has launched a campaign to raise as many dollars as possible as quickly as possible.

Reason: Cuba needs hard cash to pay for essential imports that it can buy only in the West.

Not long ago, consumerism was despised in Cuba as a disease of the past that would wither away. Now, it is sharply on the rise. Hard-currency shops are crowded with Cubans scrambling to buy foreign-made electric fans, jeans, refrigerators and color-television sets.

A visitor need not change dollars into Cuban pesos. Hotels and restaurants prefer clients with U.S. greenbacks. Transportation, critically short in Cuba since Castro came to power in 1959, is no problem for anyone with U.S. currency. Government-owned cabs are available immediately to those with dollars in their pockets.

Cubans with relatives among the million who went into exile rather than live under Marxist rule plead for dollar money orders from banks in Canada and Western Europe. "You can get anything you want in Cuba today," says a housewife who receives funds from relatives abroad. "You just have to have dollars to pay for it."

Cuban leaders blame economic need for the emphasis on consumer spending. Even with the Soviet Union providing more than 4 billion dollars a year in subsidies, Cuba still is an agricultural and fishing nation that has trouble providing for its 10 million people, almost double the population at the time Castro came to power.

Great strides have been made in improving health and education. Hunger has been eliminated by a rationing system that guarantees basic foods at low state-subsidized prices. But the heavily centralized economy is chronically inefficient. Workers, with jobs guaranteed by the government, have little motivation to work hard.

About 85 percent of Cuba's trade is with its Communist allies. The remaining 15 percent—described by Cuban economists as essential imports of chemicals and fertilizers that make the 85 percent possible—is with the West.

But the world price of sugar, Cuba's main export, is down to 5 cents a pound, against production costs of almost 10 cents. This puts great strain on the island nation to come up with the 1.3 billion dollars it needs this year for imports from Western Europe, Japan and Canada. The U.S. still maintains an embargo against exports to Cuba.

Moscow allows Cuba to resell to the West some of the oil it gets from the Soviet Union. That cuts 500 million dollars out of the shortfall. But sales of tobacco, nickel, textiles and fruits are not enough to cover the remaining 800 million needed to keep the Cuban economy alive. "That's why we turned to tourism and dollar sales," says an economist. "It's a fast way to earn dollars."

The government reports that it earned a gross income of 100 million dollars from 206,000 visitors in 1984. Its goal by 1990 is to attract 400,000 tourists who will spend 250 million.

Havana's hotels now are filled with delegations and technicians from Communist countries and tourists from Western Europe, Canada and Latin America. And the Castro regime goes all out to please visitors. It recently started a television channel for tourist hotels, with commercials for restaurants, sightseeing and rent-a-car companies copied from those on American TV.

But tourists complain—and officials admit they are right—that hotels are dirty, food is bad and service is inefficient. Tipping, once regarded as an insult to the dignity of labor, is back. Prostitution, denounced years ago as a capitalistic evil, has reappeared.

Greasing palms. Cubans boast that there is no government corruption. Visiting Western business executives tell a different story. Official hands are out, they report. Bribes are in the form of high-quality television sets, other electronic equipment and, in one case, a car.

Because all family members usually

U.S.NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 9, 1985

work, there is no shortage of pesos. Decent housing is a critical problem, but more than 40 percent of all Cubans own their apartments or houses. The rest pay 6 to 10 percent of their monthly income for rent. Cubans without currency from the West spend their surplus pesos in nonration, better-quality supermarkets where prices run around four times higher than those of rationed goods.

After a quarter of a century of life under a Marxist government, the basic problem for many Cubans is a sense of boredom and repression. Their lives are controlled by an ever vigilant state. Yet they are resigned to the permanent continuation of their Marxist society.

Escaping boredom. The ambition of many Cubans, even fervent supporters of the revolution, is to find ways to go abroad occasionally to escape the sameness of Cuban life. Educators, writers and technicians constantly search for invitations that will enable them to leave their island temporarily.

Cubans chafe at their regimented lives. Yet they obey when the government orders people to turn out for a demonstration because jobs and the quality of the education of their children may be at stake. "It may be senseless, but the government likes to keep people mobilized," says a writer.

A former union leader, who fought for the revolution, says many workers are unhappy with the system. "But they have no choice. There is no possibility of opposition." Government pressure can be so intense, he reports, that young people who balked at volunteering for military service in Angola finally agreed to go to protect their families.

Despite close ties with the Soviet bloc, Cubans still hanker for Western music. The top song on the Cuban radio hit parade for months has been "We Are the World." Long lines form outside movie theaters to see "Indiana Jones and the Temple of Doom." The government tapes films from American TV and usually shows them on its own stations on Saturday evenings. "If you see someone out on the street on a Saturday night, it means a Soviet film is being shown," a housewife comments.

The longing for Western culture does not mean, however, that intensive Marxist indoctrination has failed to change attitudes here, especially about the United States. Cubans are not taught to hate Americans. But from childhood, they are told that the capitalist U.S. is the citadel of repression of the working class. Even highly intelligent Cubans who are friendly to individual Americans consider the U.S. the land of unrestrained violence and crime, racial discrimination and drug addiction.

Steady diet. From nursery school, children are indoctrinated through Marxist-oriented textbooks and class discussions. At the same time, they are pampered with the best food and living conditions Castro can provide.

Castro's officials prefer to keep children in boarding schools, away from parental influence. Group activities are designed to develop a collective spirit. Individuality is discouraged.

Careful records are kept of each child. Grades reflect proficiency in educational subjects but also track social and political attitudes. Advancement into the better schools is based on a student's overall record and on the family's political reliability.

Castro, personally, is as popular with many Cubans as he was in 1959. But there are mounting signs of doubts among revolution-educated youths about life under Communism and its daily diet of political speeches.

Until recently, officials claimed that "There is no boredom that leads to alcoholism" on the island. But parents say that young Cubans now are turning to alcohol to escape reality. Because rum is expensive in the stores, some youths make their own.

A Cuban sociologist reports that the suicide rate among the young is up sharply. No statistics are available, but he believes the rate in Cuba may be the highest in Latin America. "Think of the state of mind of a frightened 17-year-old who agrees to be sent off to Angola because he and his family are under government pressure," he says.

The Roman Catholic Church estimates that there still are about 4 million believers here, despite the teaching of atheism in schools and adult study groups. Interest in religion also is said to be growing among the young. But the Communist Party frowns on religion, and known believers find their advancement blocked in both schools and jobs.

Nowhere to go. Cuban officials concede that their revolution has reached a plateau. Economists say the standard of living is at the level of Soviet-bloc countries in 1970-71. But there it may stay. Soviet subsidies are not expected to increase, and there is scant chance for additional industrialization.

Therefore, experts in Havana say, Cuba will concentrate during the next decade on efficiency and decentralization to make the economy more productive. The only major breakthrough would be a renewal of ties with the U.S., which would give Cuba access to American markets, trade and technology.

But there is a realization in Cuba that normalization is not in the works and that the Reagan administration has no intention of moving to mend relations anytime in the foreseeable future. □

By CARL J. MIGDAIL

WASHINGTON TIMES
26 July 1985

Czechs teaching Sandinistas terror

By Tom Diaz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Sixty-five Sandinista security officers have been attending a secret police school and participating in interrogation of political prisoners in communist Czechoslovakia over the last eight months, a group of Czech exiles has charged.

The Nicaraguans have been taking advanced training in interrogation techniques from the Faculty of Interrogation at the University of State Security and Forces of Internal Order in Vokovice, a suburb of Prague, according to Jiri Kotas, chairman of the Czechoslovak Federal Council in Exile.

A State Department official said he believes the report is probably true but could not confirm it after checking with intelligence sources.

"We do not have hard intelligence of that training. However, we would not be surprised because it fits a pattern of other Eastern Bloc countries training Nicaraguans," he said.

"We've seen it with the Bulgarians and East Germans. The Czechs train everybody else [officers assigned from other client states in the Soviet bloc], so there is no reason to think they are not training the Sandinistas," he said.

A Central Intelligence Agency spokesman said the agency would have no comment on Mr. Kotas' charges.

Mr. Kotas said the Sandinista officials also have helped in interrogation of prisoners in two of "Czechoslovakia's most notorious prisons" — at Ruzyne, near Prague, and Valdice, near Jicin.

Mr. Kotas said the two prisons are reserved for especially dangerous criminals and for "the most dangerous opponents of the communist regime," including human rights activists, clergy and soldiers who have taken or attempted to take weapons.

"Our information comes from a highly placed source within the Czechoslovak power structure," Mr. Kotas said in a telephone interview.

"We know that it is accurate," he said. "It came from an identical source which in several other instances has given us information which has later been confirmed by official U.S. authorities. The source is beyond reproach."

Mr. Kotas said that his group's source "gave us information about the Soviet nuclear deployment in Czechoslovakia" before the Soviet Union first said in 1983 that it had deployed nuclear weapons in Warsaw Pact countries.

The Czechoslovak Federal Council, with headquarters in Canada, is a group of young refugees, 90 percent of whom "escaped from Czechoslovakia in the early 1980s," Mr. Kotas said.

He said he fled Czechoslovakia in 1979 and was formerly employed by the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences in Prague.

Mr. Kotas described the secret police university to a reporter, saying that "if you looked at it only for the architecture, it looks very nice for a communist country."

He said the school is "highly penetrated" by Russian officials, "as in other [Czech] institutions of that caliber." He specifically emphasized "Russian" as opposed to other Soviet nationalities, and said care is always taken to be sure that the Russian presence never amounts to a majority in such institutions.

The university exists, said Mr. Kotas, specifically to train Czech state police and internal security personnel.

"They [the Sandinistas] are attending this school to learn the method of 'cold terror,' " he said.

Mr. Kotas said the "cold terror" method of interrogation had been developed since the 1960s. He described it as "much more sophisticated" and less directly brutal than the methods used by communist regimes during the 1950s. Earlier methods emphasized beatings and other physical violence. The new "cold terror" method relies more on psychological methods to confuse the subject as to who his enemies and friends are.

"Now you succumb more easily," he said. "The [former method of] beatings built a wall between the prisoner and the interrogator. But now to draw the line [between friends and enemies during interrogation] is very, very difficult."

Mr. Kotas said it was not known for sure from which Nicaraguan agency the trainees have been drawn but they are believed to be from the Ministry of Interior, which is responsible for state police activity under the Marxist Sandinista regime.

There would not necessarily be a language barrier that would hamper Spanish-speaking Nicaraguans involved in the interrogation of Czechoslovakian prisoners, Mr. Kotas said.

He said a number of Nicaraguan exiles studied in Czechoslovakia during the Somoza regime and became fluent in Czech, that many Czech functionaries speak Spanish because of the regime's long association with Cuba, and that Russian is also a fairly common tongue among both Czechs and Nicaraguans.

W. Germany Investigates Spy Ring

Missing Employes Sought by Police

By William Drozdiak
Washington Post Foreign Service

BONN, Aug. 21—West German investigators said today they are searching for a third suspect in an apparent Soviet Bloc espionage ring that came to light following the disappearance of two secretaries who are believed to have worked here as East German agents.

The federal prosecutor's office announced today that it is looking for a messenger from an Army administrative office in Bonn who vanished last weekend. The missing man, identified by security officials only as Lorenz B., is said to be a close friend of Ursula Richter, 52, one of the secretaries who police believe was infiltrated into the country by East German intelligence two decades ago.

In his previous employment with an elevator firm, the messenger helped install air-conditioning equipment in a massive bunker built under the Eifel Mountains. The bunker was to be used by the Bonn government as a command center in time of war. His work there would have given him full knowledge of the layout and life-support systems of the underground complex, security officials said.

The missing man later worked as a maintenance engineer in several government buildings, including one that housed the offices of members of parliament, according to a spokesman for the elevator firm Flohr-Otis, where Lorenz B. worked.

Security investigators, however, said they are even more concerned about the nature of the espionage work believed to have been carried out by the two missing secretaries, who now show signs of having worked here as important and well-trained East German spies for many years.

Police said evidence had been found at Richter's apartment indicating that she served as a control officer in charge of a network of secret agents operating in Bonn. She disappeared last Friday, a week after authorities reported that Sonja Lueneburg, 61, the personal secretary for the past 12 years of Economics Minister Martin Bangemann, was suspected of espionage and probably had fled to East Berlin.

Police subsequently have learned that both women lived under false identities after entering West Germany through third countries, a technique used by East German intelligence to cover suspicion about the backgrounds of their agents.

Richter, who had been under surveillance for some time as a possible spy, was a secretary in the accounts department at the League of Expellees, a lobbying group representing Germans driven out of Eastern European territories after World War II. Such a position would fit the kind of unobtrusive employment, with little or no security risks, used by East German control officers who manage several data-gathering spies.

Richter moved from Montreal to Bonn in the 1960's with the identification papers of another woman. Lueneburg entered West Germany about the same time through Colmar, France, with the identity of a West Berlin hairdresser who had settled in East Germany, police officials said.

If it is determined that Lueneburg was linked to East Germany espionage operations, the case could emerge as the most politically volatile one since Guenter Guillaume, a close aide to former chancellor Willy Brandt, was exposed as a communist spy in 1974. The scandal forced Brandt to resign from office.

While Lueneburg did not have top security clearance, her close working relationship with Bangemann enabled her to glean extraordinary insights into the government and political party structure. She was considered an intimate family friend, and Bangemann is said to have trusted her completely.

Investigators have interviewed the minister intensively about his dealings with Lueneburg. As head of the Free Democratic Party, which has participated in governing coalitions since 1969, Bangemann attends meetings of the Federal Security Council, which gives him access to the country's most highly classified information.

Bangemann, who broke off a trip to the Far East when he learned that his secretary had vanished, is said to be immensely distraught by the case and its implications for his career and the political fortunes of his party, according to well-informed sources.

The latest spy scandal demonstrates again the ease with which approximately 3,000 East German agents are said to have penetrated West Germany's institutions. Besides the absence of any language or cultural barriers, East Germany is known to exploit Bonn's willingness to give all Germans a passport by infiltrating agents within groups of political refugees who come to the West.

Moreover, the East German secret service is said to have enormous success in recruiting lonely West German women who work as secretaries in the Bonn government to perform espionage tasks.

Since 1975, 10 secretaries have been tried and convicted of spying for East Germany during the course of their work at Bonn's Defense and Foreign ministries as well as the Chancellery. Agents also have been discovered working as secretaries in key political party posts.

WASH POST 22 Aug

Spy Spectacular

In all the long history of spies, no country has managed to make itself leakproof. Right now the United States is prosecuting a special agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on charges of passing secret documents to a female agent of the Soviet KGB. A Navy spy ring that operated for years has recently been broken up. Great Britain has never lived down the case of Kim Philby, a spy for the Soviets who served at the very center of British intelligence before fleeing to Moscow in 1963.

But nobody in recent years has topped the record of the West Germans as an open book in which spies browse undetected for years on end.

In 1954 Otto John, the head of Bonn's counter-intelligence operation, turned out to have been a Soviet agent all along. Twenty years later Chancellor Willy Brandt was forced to resign because Guenter Guillaume, a close aide, was exposed as a Communist agent. Now we have the spectacle of a key official in the counter-intelligence service defecting to East Germany, and secretaries to the president and the economics minister fleeing to avoid arrest.

The embarrassment of the West German government is understandable. It's as though, over a period of years, Communist spies had turned up on the White House staff, in the highest levels of the FBI and in the anteroom to the secretary of the Treasury.

The West Germans do face some uniquely difficult problems. People in East and West Germany speak the same language, frequently have relatives in the other zone and tend to consider themselves as two halves of one nation. The flow of immigrants from the East is enormous, and it is inevitable that sleeper agents are among them. Estimates of the number of East German spies in West Germany run as high as 25,000.

By any standard, though, the present spy case is mind-boggling. Hans Joachim Tiedge, the central character, was a veteran of 19 years in the counterspy service. For the last three years he had headed the department charged with ferreting out East German spies. Up to the very minute when East Germany announced that he was in East Berlin, government officials were pooh-poohing the notion that he might have gone over to the other side.

Yet Tiedge's superiors had known for years that he drank heavily, was disastrously in debt and suffered fits of depression. His housekeeper warned authorities long ago that he had a habit of leaving top-secret documents strewn around his flat. The lame excuse of his superiors is that, had he been fired, he would have been a greater security threat than if left undisturbed in his job. They know better now.

It is being recalled, belatedly, that 200 West German agents in East Germany have been arrested in the last 18 months, while arrests of East German spies had decreased considerably since Tiedge took over the spy-catching job three years ago.

The Tiedge case is an unmitigated disaster for West Germany, which must now assume that the East Germans and the Russians know just about everything that there is to know about the personnel and operating techniques of the West German intelligence services.

The effect on the United States and other Western allies is less clear. Some officials in Washington and other Western capitals suggest that the damage to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's overall intelligence operations will be slight. Others say that the damage, including the possible exposure of American and other Western agents, may be grave indeed.

The most unsettling thing about the case is its open-ended nature. It is impossible to escape the conclusion that, sensational as the disclosures of the past week may be, they are not the end of the story—that many other Communist agents remain in place in Bonn, prepared to pass on the innermost secrets of the Western alliance.

Editorial

The Washington Post ___
The Washington Times ___
Daily News (New York) ___
The New York Times ___
The Wall Street Journal ___
The Chicago Tribune ___
The Los Angeles Times Pt. 2, p. 4
The Christian Science Monitor ___
USA Today ___

Date 8-28-85

Washington Post
9/19/85

Kohl Said No to Tap On Ex-Aide

Suspicions Termed Insufficiently Firm

By William Drozdiak
Washington Post Foreign Service

BONN, Sept. 18—West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl refused to allow close surveillance of a secretary in his office and her husband only three weeks before the couple defected to East Berlin, a senior government official said today.

Hans Neusel, the second-ranking official in the Interior Ministry, told a press conference today that Kohl was informed on Aug. 28 that the couple was suspected of espionage but decided against putting them under full-time observation because the evidence was not conclusive.

The Bonn government announced yesterday that Herta-Astrid Willner, a secretary for Kohl's leading domestic affairs adviser, sent a letter from East Germany notifying the Chancellery that she was leaving her post and joining her husband in East Berlin.

Herbert Willner, a senior associate at a research institute financed by the the Free Democratic Party, a coalition partner in Kohl's government, also sent a letter to his employer saying he feared arrest on "a criminal offense against the security of the Federal Republic."

According to Neusel, Kohl believed that placing the couple under full scrutiny was "inopportune" even though Hans Joachim Tiedge, a leading West German counterintelligence officer, had fled to East Berlin the week before and could have informed the communist authorities about any agents under investigation in the West.

Heribert Hellenbroich, the former intelligence director, recently was forced into early retirement because he failed to remove Tiedge as a security risk even though he knew for some time of the counter-

See BONN, A29, Col. 1

Kohl Rejected Wiretap On Defecting Spy Couple

BONN, From A25

spy's severe drinking and debt problems.

Neusel, who attended the Aug. 28 meeting along with Interior Minister Friedrich Zimmermann, admitted that he counseled Kohl that evidence was not hard enough to warrant wiretapping and round-the-clock surveillance. "Perhaps we made the wrong decision," he said.

The opposition Social Democrats intensified their demands today for Zimmermann to take political responsibility for the country's most serious spy scandal and resign from his post. Zimmermann has rebuffed earlier calls to step down and Kohl has backed the minister if only to thwart a right-wing rebellion within his fractious conservative coalition.

Tiedge was in charge of tracking East German spies and was intimately involved in the Willner case before his defection. Neusel said it was highly plausible that East Berlin, after interrogating Tiedge, could have tipped off the Willners and warned them to seek sanctuary.

The couple, who were vacationing in Spain at the time, also could have decided on their own to leave for East Germany after seeing a front-page headline in the mass circulation daily Bild Linting that authorities were hunting for a spy in the chancellor's office, Neusel said.

He acknowledged that the government is taking urgent action on two other espionage cases in the wake of the Willners' defection, but Bild reported today that at least five cases are now under urgent investigation, including one involving the Defense Ministry.

Herbert Willner first came under suspicion in 1973 when a western embassy reported that he was probing too insistently on defense matters. He then worked at the Free Democratic Party headquarters.

Counterintelligence officers last May sought to place Willner under a close watch, but their request was refused. Hellenbroich complained to Zimmermann in late June about the rejected wiretap request but was told he lacked sufficient grounds.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 1986

East Germans Deny They Killed a Top West German Agent

By JAMES M. MARKHAM
Special to The New York Times

BONN, Feb. 1 — East Germany has taken the unusual step of denying that it eliminated a top West German agent reportedly betrayed by a West German official who defected last year

The East German Government's press agency denied Friday that the the agent, who has not been identified, had been killed as a result of information supplied by the defector, Hans Joachim Tiedge, a West German internal security official.

The agency was responding to testimony last week in a West German parliamentary inquiry by the former chief of the West German internal security agency, Heribert Hellenbroich.

The East German press agency said Mr. Hellenbroich had told "a fairy story." "He need not worry about the alleged top agent, since he never existed," the agency said.

Mr. Hellenbroich was dismissed as head of the security agency after it was disclosed that he had kept Mr. Tiedge on despite a history of alcoholism, debts and family problems.

Mr. Hellenbroich told the parliamentary inquiry into the Tiedge affair that he assumed the agent "is no longer alive, even if I have not seen the body."

The East German press agency, making the first mention of Mr. Tiedge since reporting his defection in August, hinted that he might soon give a full account of his activities.

"Tiedge," it said, "can give the lie to Hellenbroich's stories about the German Democratic Republic by statements that have not yet been published."

Mr. Tiedge has not been seen since he defected to East Germany. His teenage daughters are believed to have visited him at Christmas.

In parliamentary testimony on Friday, Holger Pfahls, the new head of the West German internal security agency, also challenged Mr. Hellenbroich's contention that a West German agent in East Germany had been eliminated

Mr. Pfahls said Mr. Hellenbroich's comments had aroused "considerable irritation" among NATO intelligence services, which had also found no proof that an agent had been killed by the East Germans.

THE WASHINGTON POST · TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1984



PERISCOPE

The FBI's New Orders on Nicaragua

Stung by complaints that its efforts to gather intelligence on Nicaragua from returning Americans is a form of political intimidation, the FBI has ordered agents conducting the interviews not to express their personal views on the Sandinista government. Agents have been told to stress that the FBI is not trying to inhibit criticism of the Reagan administration or discourage travel to Nicaragua. FBI officials insist there are legitimate counterintelligence reasons for questioning Americans who have met with the Sandinistas. But privately some agents admit the bureau has gotten very little information and entirely too much grief out of the project.

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 3

NEW YORK POST
9 August 1985

'Peaceniks' just dupes for dictator

By FREDRIC DICKER

THE self-styled "peace activists" who provoked the potentially explosive incident along the Nicaraguan-Costa Rican border are actually Sandinista dupes and apologists for the Nicaraguan dictatorship.

That's the view of longtime Nicaragua watchers both inside and outside of the U.S. government.

They note that the group, Witness for Peace, has done little to hide its sympathies for the ruling Sandinistas' cause.

And it has done nothing to actively protest brutal Sandinista aggressions against Miskito, Sumo and Rama Indian populations on Nicaragua's east coast, or the government's forced eviction of thousands of innocent peasants.

Witness for Peace was founded two years ago by a group of liberal-to-left-wing activists, some with radical "Liberation Theology" Catholic Church connections, bent on helping "protect" the Marxist Sandinistas from assault by U.S.-backed forces.

Today, it sends cadres of Americans into Nicaragua for short, sanitized visits, then uses them to propagandize for the Sandinista cause when they return to the U.S.

The insiders said there's little doubt those on the San Juan River had the explicit approval of Nicaragua's Marxist leaders, a tipoff to the group's intentions.

"This is good public relations for the Sandinistas — the poor peace activists in the hands of the evil Contras," said one U.S. official.

"Democratic Costa Rica, which supports the U.S., is embarrassed because it looks like they can't control their borders.

"And the Russians can have a field day."

Intelligence sources said there also was a good chance that some of the Nicaraguan "journalists" traveling with the group were actually Sandinista spies.

"This would have been a good opportunity for the Sandinistas to get some on-site intelligence about rebel fortifications and troop strength along the river," said one intelligence expert.

"Either way, the Sandinistas win with this group. If Witness for Peace was seized, then it makes the contras look like bad guys.

"And if the group had made it down the river, they would have picked up some important intelligence information."

Abducted New Yorkers Rev. G. Siubert Frey (left) and Rev. Thomas Fenton.

Defector Assails Sandinistas on Human Rights

Drug Trafficking Alleged to Finance Intelligence and Espionage Network

By Charles R. Babcock
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Sandinista government of Nicaragua has covered up thousands of cases of human rights violations and murder while financing its intelligence and espionage network through drug trafficking, a defector charged yesterday.

Alvaro Jose Baldizon Aviles, 26, who said he was the chief investigator of human rights allegations for Interior Minister Tomas Borge from late 1982 until July, told reporters at a briefing arranged by the State Department that he fled because "I came to realize how corrupt and bloody the Nicaraguan government was."

Baldizon, speaking through an interpreter, said one case he investigated involved the execution by firing squad of more than 150 Miskito Indians during the summer of 1982. But when Baldizon presented his 100-page report, which included sworn statements from soldiers and survivors, Borge "instructed that a second report be done up, giving a different and falsified version to cover up the responsibility of the Nicaraguan government in these human rights violations," Baldizon said.

He said he attended part of a meeting where officials from the ministry suggested that they could explain the disappearances by saying the Indians either went to fight for the armed resistance, known as contras, or else crossed the border to Honduras.

Baldizon said it was his idea to appear before the press.

"I am speaking voluntarily," he said. "I consider speaking out to be a right and a duty as a witness." In 1982, another Nicaraguan defector embarrassed the State Department by renouncing his hosts at a news conference and saying he had been coerced into talking.

Baldizon also said he had been told by a captain in Borge's office that Borge, one of the leaders of the Sandinista ruling body, personally removed bags of cocaine from a plane in the fall of 1984 and drove the drugs back to Managua. He said he was also told that the government made planes available and permitted the refueling of drug flights from Colombia to earn dollars to finance espionage. Baldizon acknowledged that he had no direct knowledge of such matters.

A Borge aide was indicted in Miami in July 1984 on cocaine smuggling charges.

The Nicaraguan Embassy issued a statement yesterday calling Baldizon's charges "one more desperate attempt by the administration to distract attention from the case brought by Nicaragua against the United States in the World Court. Sound policy must be based on facts and not on absurd and groundless accusations."

The United States has chosen not to appear at the World Court hearings in The Hague, where Nicaragua has charged the U.S. government with violations of international law by financing rebel operations.

John D. Blacken, deputy director of the State Department's Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America, said Baldizon is considered one of the most valuable recent defectors from Nicaragua because of his work for Borge and his knowledge of the drug trafficking.

Blacken said that Luis Carrion, who was Borge's vice minister and heads the Nicaraguan delegation to the World Court, was implicated by Baldizon for signing what the defector called "special measures, a technical term to mean the physical elimination of human beings." Baldizon said "special measures" were performed in a "helter-skelter" manner after the Sandinistas first took power. But since 1981, such actions required approval by Borge or a top aide, Baldizon added.

He also alleged that prisoners in Nicaraguan jails are routinely kept naked in small cells before being questioned, still naked, in larger rooms with huge air conditioners blowing on them.

In a related matter yesterday, Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams met with contra leaders at the department and said afterward that the first part of $27 million in humanitarian aid approved by Congress should be released to the resistance by the end of the month.

Poles Argue Over It

Church Decries 'Moral Disaster'

By Jackson Diehl
Washington Post Foreign Service

WARSAW, Aug. 27—One cool night this month, small knots of men gathered around the darkened corners of the Plaza of the Savior to buy and sell home-brewed alcohol. The stream of cars darting into the shadows indicated that business was booming.

On a hot August afternoon, passers-by seemed unfazed by a worker sprawled unconscious on the lawn outside a television factory. His face was flushed crimson. The popular diagnosis was delivered in a word: vodka.

Then, last week, the communist daily Tribuna Ludu reported that Poland ranks third in the world in consumption of high-proof spirits—a ranking that is much disputed by other sources.

The next day, another paper told of the arrest of an intoxicated mechanic in the town of Zgierz. He had commandeered a train to fetch a bottle of vodka from a friend, explaining that he was thirsty.

Such items are unremarkable in a country long plagued with a destructive pastime: excessive drinking. What is startling is that all this has happened in August, the

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Polish Church and State Conflict Over Approach to Alcohol Issue

POLAND, From A21

"Month of Sobriety" declared by Poland's Roman Catholic Church.

Church officials say that up to 50 percent of the population will respond to their call for giving up vodka this month in the "protest against the plague of alcoholism." Yet the scale of Polish drinking, they concede, is such that little may seem to change.

Vodka, in its myriad Polish flavors and forms, remains even in August a staple of national life. It is the drink for every occasion, the hidden tonic of the workplace, even a weapon of political battle between the government and its church and political opposition.

"The dimensions of the present moral and social disaster," said a recent church statement, pose "a danger for the very existence of the Polish family and fatherland caused by drunkenness."

Despite two years of antialcohol campaigns by both the government and its opponents, 5 million Poles—nearly 15 percent of the population—are estimated to be problem drinkers. More than 320,000 were taken to the country's 52 sobering-up stations last year alone. Authorities recorded 11,500 cases of illegal alcohol production and linked alcohol to 85 percent of violent crimes.

Only in the Soviet Union, say experts and diplomats here, is the threat of alcoholism as grave as it is in Poland. Even as Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev has launched a campaign against drunkenness, Poland's experience is showing that a national habit so advanced is not cured easily by either decree or persuasion.

"Above all, drinking is a reaction of escape and exclusion," sociologist Mikolaj Kozakiewicz told the weekly paper Polityka. "We shall learn something about it when we examine the economic situation, people's anxieties and sense of danger, frustrations and feelings of impotence."

Shortages of food and goods, the lack of variety in entertainment and media and a national sense of depression following the downfall of the independent trade union Solidarity in 1981 all have frustrated authorities' efforts to control Poland's drinking, say Kozakiewicz and other sociologists.

History is also a factor. Experts here say Poland has had a drinking problem since it was first occupied and partitioned by foreign powers two centuries ago. With each foreign occupation since then—and there have been several—the intake of alcohol has increased, encouraged in some instances by authorities eager to pacify the populace.

Consequently, Polish nationalist opposition groups always have taken an interest in sobriety. The first trade unions opposing foreign occupation grew out of an antialcohol movement. A century later, shipyard workers in Gdansk banned alcohol during the strike that led to the formation of Solidarity.

"Vodka is public enemy number one, not of Polish health but of Polish independence," said opposition historian Bronislaw Geremek. "It is the best instrument for inducing the social state of passivity."

Under such circumstances, the battle against alcoholism in post-Solidarity Poland inevitably has turned political, pitting church against state, party reformists against entrenched bureaucrats, and supporters of the banned trade union against the administration of Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski.

Perhaps the most vivid image of this year's antidrinking campaign was not the church-led pledges of Poles to swear off vodka but the sight of police arresting activists holding a "Sober in Solidarity" banner outside a liquor store.

"The government has the intention to combat alcoholism, and we also support the efforts of the church in this matter," said spokesman Jerzy Urban at a recent press conference when asked about the arrests. "But there are certain regulations about demonstrations that have to be respected."

The arrest of store pickets was not the first time government officals had attempted to undercut independent antialcohol campaigns. Last year, following a similar August sobriety appeal by the church and Solidarity, Urban announced that sales and consumption of alcohol were well above average during the month. The church said its surveys showed half of big-city residents did not drink.

"The authorities cannot tolerate any independent action, any spontaneous movement, even about alcoholism," said Marcin Przybytowicz, a former Solidarity activist who leads one of the several Brotherhood of Sobriety groups formed with the encouragement of the church. "And the problem with drinking in Poland is that there is no independent organization to fight against it."

Critics say the government has financial and political motives not to crack down on liquor. According to government figures, the state's alcohol enterprises are its most profitable and the government has obtained as much as 15 percent of its revenues in recent years from selling spirits.

Two years ago, the legislature passed a tough antialcoholism law that banned drinking in state offices, limited hours for sales by shops, funded treatment centers and led to sharp increases in vodka prices. A year later, the law was modified to eliminate plans for concentrating alcohol production and distribution in a central authority, apparently under pressure from local authorities and distilleries that had profited under the old system.

Meanwhile, many Poles responded to shorter shop hours and higher prices by buying or producing potent—and often more dangerous—substitutes. "An increasing number of people reach out for moonshine and even for such 'liquors' as methylated spirit, windshield spray, brake fluid or hair tonic," noted a writer in the Warsaw daily newspaper Kurier Polski.

Church and Solidarity activists say their appeals for sobriety have been more effective. But some concede that their motives, too, are mixed. "We have a double purpose," said Andrzej Stankiewicz, one of four Brotherhood of Sobriety members arrested for picketing a Warsaw liquor store. "What we want to do is, under the pretext of telling people not to drink, teach them to open their minds to reality and to the ideals of Solidarity."

Thus, when police quietly suggested that the alcohol picketers would be tolerated if they only changed the graphic style of the word "solidarity"—done in their banner as in the union's logo—the group refused. "We have to use symbols that give people the right information," said Przybytowicz.

Benign Official Interest Leaves Outspoken Pole at a Loss

By Jackson Diehl
Washington Post Foreign Service

WARSAW—Ever since Poland's military leadership launched a broad campaign for support in next month's parliamentary elections, Mikolaj Kozakiewicz has found himself surprisingly in the public spotlight and granted extraordinary personal rights.

An outspoken critic of recent government policies, Kozakiewicz nevertheless was named in August to the prestigious "national list" of unopposed candidates for the Sejm, or parliament. Since then, his attacks on censorship, controls on education and toughened criminal laws have been covered by Poland's official media with an enthusiasm that has left the 61-year-old sociologist slightly bewildered.

Even Rzeczpospolita, the official government daily, granted him ample space when he lambasted the Movement for National Rebirth (PRON), the Communist-controlled front that nominated him to the parliamentary ticket.

"The only explanation is that I am repeating some attitudes that are well known in the country," Kozakiewicz says. "Perhaps I was chosen to represent these attitudes."

In almost any other Soviet Bloc nation, such a concession to dissident views in a parliamentary election would be almost inconceivable. In the context of Poland's many-sided political struggle, however, Kozakiewicz has become less a symbol of liberalism than a token.

For more than three years, Kozakiewicz has been a leader of a substantial movement of moderates who believe that a program of aggressive political and social reforms is needed to bridge the gulf between Poland's Communist authorities and a society alienated by the suppression of the independent trade union Solidarity.

Now Kozakiewicz believes the change he sought has been smothered and its proponents reduced to dissidents powerless to prevent a trend toward national polarization.

"We are moving further from the ideals of 1980 and 1981, rather than closer," he said one recent morning in his cluttered, book-lined study. "We have in Poland a split society—and the government is deepening this division."

In preparing for the elections, Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski's government increasingly has appeared to prefer repression to efforts to win over the disaffected, Kozakiewicz and other critics say.

"The government's frustration comes from the fact that all actions from its side to increase social consensus have no effect," said Bronislaw Geremek, an opposition historian and adviser to Solidarity. "So what can they do to get national support? The only solution is to try to introduce the feelings of uncertainty and fear."

Weeks before launching the election campaign, Communist authorities introduced measures that reversed a liberalization of university government, toughened many provisions of the penal code and eliminated the prospect of multiple unions at the factory level. A year after a general amnesty emptied jails of dissidents, three top Solidarity leaders were given jail sentences and the number of political prisoners climbed to more than 230.

Government spokesman Jerzy Urban was quoted recently as saying that such measures were "a kind of retreat on what was a bold attempt to move forward."

"The last few months have brought a number of moves that were not easy to receive by some milieus," Jaruzelski conceded in a speech to a Central Committee plenum called to plan election strategy. But, he warned, "The party does not and will not forget . . . a struggle against what hampers and threatens it, a struggle first of all with political means, but also with means of protection of state order, if necessary."

"The government's new toughness has been matched by a new challenge from the banned Solidarity, which has called on Poles to boycott the voting Oct. 13. After a similar campaign by the union last year, the government reported a turnout of only 75 percent in local elections, far below the norm for elections in Communist countries.

Both sides portray the upcoming elections as a major test, and many Poles seem to be stranded between the two sides. Recent official polls have shown that a substantial majority of the public disapproves of government policies. But Solidarity's strike efforts and other protests this year have failed.

"Quite a large part of the population is uncertain what to do," said Geremek. "The problem [for Solidarity] is that these people will be frightened by the new measures."

It is exactly this disaffected mass that Kozakiewicz and other moderates in and outside the party hoped to reach after the declaration of martial law and crackdown on Solidarity in December 1981.

"My whole activity is directed at the search for a *modus vivendi* between the opposition and the so-called establishment," he told Rzeczpospolita.

The would-be reformers generally believed that Solidarity had been unrealistic in some of its demands. But they hoped that by decentralizing and overhauling the economy, loosening controls on social and intellectual movements, and allowing room for independent criticism and debate in the media and public life, Jaruzelski's government could build a national consensus that would include Solidarity's former leaders.

Kozakiewicz, a teacher and prolific author who had been a member of the officially sanctioned Peasant Party, was one of the founders of PRON, an organization promoted by the government as an independent social movement for reform.

"We thought and dreamed that PRON would be an agent of systematic change in Poland, a kind of not-so-aggressive form of Solidarity," he said.

Slowly but surely, however, PRON's original aims were diluted and its nominal independence was proved illusory, Kozakiewicz said: "PRON became an element of the system, not an independent side."

At the same time, liberals in the party and government have seen economic and political reforms watered down, resisted by an entrenched bureaucracy and, finally, reversed in some cases.

"The steps being taken are pushing us backward," Kozakiewicz said. "It is understandable from the government point of view, but it is also harmful."

The election itself has been one of the sharper reverses to moderates' hopes. Reformist leaders had hoped that the authorities would allow voters a real choice on ballots.

Instead, the electoral law approved by the outgoing Sejm provides for nominal two-candidate competition for 410 of the 460 seats but leaves control of the election and the choice of candidates to the Communist authorities. After failing this summer to enlist a group of independents close to the church for the candidates' list, authorities presented a selection that includes more nonparty "independents" than in the past but offers scant variety. The most notable political independent in the previous Sejm, Edmund Osmanczyk, was excluded.

Kozakiewicz, in fact, said he knew of no other Sejm candidate who is an open critic of government.

"The changes in the election law are not sufficient," he said. "From the point of view of open critical activity or open debate with the authorities, I don't know of another person on this list like myself."

That isolation, combined with the onslaught of official press attention, has left Kozakiewicz feeling uneasy. Quietly, he seems to acknowledge that he has been turned from a reform movement leader into an instrument of election propaganda.

"I am not avoiding difficult problems," he said. "I say true things, but things that are inconvenient and unpleasant. People are finding in these articles their own opinions. In that way, I serve a useful role."

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SATURDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1985

Romania Braces For Dim Winter

Shortages of Energy, Food Are Worst Since World War II

By Jackson Diehl
Washington Post Foreign Service

BUCHAREST—The suburbs of Romania's capital are dark and eerily still these cool October nights as electricity is abruptly switched off. By day, residents can be seen unloading firewood into fuel storage bins meant to hold coal.

Even as the stately ranks of trees along Bucharest's broad boulevards glow with the colors of autumn, Romanians are grimly preparing for another dark winter of austerity. Severe energy shortages, heavy foreign debt payments and the worst grain harvest in at least 15 years are threatening this Communist-ruled Balkan nation with privation unknown in Eastern Europe since its recovery from World War II.

"It's been a very bad year for Romania, and things aren't getting any better," a western diplomat said. "They're living on the ragged edge here. The energy situation is going to be very bad. Malnutrition is going to be a real problem."

Romania's industry and its 22 million people are still reeling from an unusually cold winter that blocked production and fuel transportation and prompted the government of President Nicolae Ceausescu to put a ban on private autos and drastic limitations on citizens' use of lights, heating and household appliances.

The restrictions eased, and cars returned to the roads with the coming of spring. But since then a drought has contributed to a poor summer harvest that has left Romania with only half its target supply of wheat, barley and corn, according to western estimates, and the electrical power crisis has worsened.

[Two top officials with responsibility for energy—Deputy Premier Ion Avram and Electrical Power Minister Nicolae Busui—were fired Friday for "grave deficiencies," and troops were deployed to run power stations, the Manchester Guardian reported. It said the moves came after a Communist Party executive committee meeting presided over by Ceausescu.]

Romanian officials, while reticent about agriculture, say export earnings dropped 5 percent in the first eight months of this year compared with 1984 and that the growth of industrial output is 30 percent below expectations. Oil and coal production has slackened and hydroelectric plants have operated at low capacity because of water shortages in reservoirs, they say.

Moreover, officials insist that no grain will be imported this year, even though the estimated harvest of 14.7 million tons is well below normal consumption needs of 19 million, according to western experts. As a result, western experts predict—and Romanian officials do not deny—that more months of sacrifice lie ahead.

"The people will be asked to comply with the need to be reasonable and judicious about their consumption," said Radu Opincaru, a ministry official.

The hardships are already easily glimpsed in Bucharest, where dimmed street lights, long lines outside shops and street scenes of impoverishment stand in glaring contrast to the feverish work on two monumental construction projects—a subway system and a mile-long complex of government buildings—ordered by Ceausescu.

Residents, urged by authorities not to use more than one light bulb of 60 watts in each room of their homes, say electricity in some suburbs is regularly cut during the night beginning at 11 p.m. and during daytime working hours. Television broadcasting lasts only two hours a day.

Western embassies, urged by authorities to install costly oil-burning heat systems, have heard of scarce coal supplies being replaced with firewood in some areas and of residential blocks being disconnected from the hard-pressed central gas system.

Flour, sugar and cooking oil are rationed, and butter and meat other than sausage are usually unavailable. Travelers report that farmer's markets in towns of the northeastern interior are seriously undersupplied and residents are scrambling to arrange private food sources or access to diplomatic shops.

In Bucharest's large central market, carrots are finger-sized, potatoes are moldy and there are no tomatoes or other vegetables.

One recent evening, several men could be seen sleeping on grimy sidewalks, and one group had built a small wood fire on the pavement facing the construction site of the new government center, which even after midnight was brightly lit with floodlights.

While denying most reports of shortages and restrictions for private citizens, officials acknowledge some emergency measures for industry. These include a new program under which managers and ministry functionaries will suffer salary cuts of up to 50 percent if production quotas are not met in export-related industries. Managers deemed responsible for exceeding quotas can receive bonuses of up to 20 percent.

Electrical Ministry official Gheorghe Plavitu said utility rates are increased for families using more than 1,000 kilowatt-hours a year—roughly equal to two 60-watt bulbs left burning.

Government spokesmen blame the economic troubles on bad weather, poor international trends and declining prices for Romanian exports such as food and construction projects. Official figures suggest that despite the setbacks, Romania's economy is expanding at a booming pace unmatched in the rest of Europe.

Western experts, however, dismiss the official statistics and blame years of bad government policies and mismanagement for the worsening crisis. Romania borrowed heavily in the 1970s for huge expansions of industries such as steel and petrochemicals that now operate at a fraction of their capacity because of shortages of fuel and raw materials. Since 1981, critics say, the government has compounded its problems with a crash program to pay off its western debts through severe austerity.

Stelian Marin, a Finance Ministry director, confirmed in an interview that Romania is pressing ahead with debt payments despite its internal problems. The foreign debt is now $6.4 billion, he said, compared with $7.1 billion at the end of 1984 and $10 billion four years ago. Net debt to the West should be eliminated by 1987, he said.

The increasing hardships of this policy seem to have no effect on Ceausescu's 20-year-old monopoly on power in the government and party, or on the ability of security forces to erase all traces of public dissent with minimal overt repression.

Diplomats watching for change in Romania have been reduced to speculating over the health of the 67-year-old strongman, rumored to be afflicted with problems including cancer. Although such reports are taken seriously by diplomats here, a variety of observers who have seen Ceausescu recently said he appears healthy and active.

Romanian spy calls Russian ties strong

By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

A former top-level Romanian intelligence officer believes covert ties between Romanian and Soviet intelligence services remain strong despite appearances that the Eastern European nation has maintained an "independent" foreign policy from Moscow.

Former Romanian Deputy Chief of Foreign Intelligence Ion M. Pacepa in written testimony released last week by the Senate investigations subcommittee said the Romanian spy service, known by its acronym CIE, supplies its "intelligence product" to Moscow on a regular basis.

"Even in cases where the Romanian government has given the West its solemn guarantees that information provided to it would be kept secret and that sensitive equipment sold to it would not be released to any third party, it has not kept its word," Mr. Pacepa states.

Secretary of State George Shultz is expected to travel to Romania Dec. 15 for talks with Romanian leaders.

A State Department spokesman said the discussions will include human rights and religious issues and an explanation of congressional attitudes toward Romania's Most Favored Nation trading status with the United States. Romania's trade status links favorable tariff rates to free emigration policies.

Last week spokesman Bernard Kalb said the State Department opposes recent proposals in Congress to deny Romania favorable trading status since MFN "is important in encouraging Romania's relative foreign policy independence."

But Mr. Pacepa, in his testimony, urged canceling Romania's MFN status unless the government there agrees to renounce espionage against the United States. He said the Warsaw Pact foreign intelligence services operating against the United States are "the largest and best organized."

Mr. Pacepa, a former adviser to Romanian strongman Nicolae Ceausescu, said that before defecting in 1978 he was the official responsible for getting Western governments to sell technology and military equipment to Romania to promote its independence from Moscow.

Mr. Pacepa said as Mr. Ceausescu's personal emissary he was instructed to "use my imagination in supplying the highest guarantees of secrecy."

Mr. Pacepa provided an example of how Romania exploited its psuedo-independence in 1977-78. He said Mr. Ceausescu wrote to then-West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt providing "solemn guarantees" that a proposed transfer of German airplane and tank technology would not be passed on to other countries.

But after West Germany signed an agreement with Romania, "Ceausescu secretly informed Libya's strongman, Col. Muammar Qaddaffi, that Romania would produce bombers and airplanes for parachute jumping patterned after West German Fokker models, and tanks patterned after NATO's Leopard II," Mr. Pacepa said.

"[Mr. Ceausescu] asked Qaddaffi to finance these projects with the understanding that he would be able to buy as much of the production as he wanted at preferential prices," Mr. Pacepa said.

After Soviet troops left Romania in the early 1960s, "subordination to Moscow was changed," Mr. Pacepa said. From that period on, Moscow has not received "specific data" on Romanian intelligence sources and operations. "But it has received the significant intelligence product." During trips to Moscow, Mr. Pacepa found "information in the KGB computer system that Romania had sent only to Budapest or Sofia and not to Moscow."

On the issue of Romanian emigration, Mr. Pacepa said Mr. Ceausescu in 1972 decreed that "no Romanian citizen . . . should receive an emigration visa unless he is a security agent and has a previous written secret agreement to cooperate with a security unit."

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Envoy Quits, Faults Policy

Funderburk Sees Romania Coddled

By Bradley Graham
Washington Post Foreign Service

MUNICH—After 3½ years of trying to persuade officials in Washington to toughen their approach to Romania, David Funderburk has resigned as the U.S. ambassador to Bucharest and decided to publicize the policy dispute he has waged with senior administration officials. Funderburk argues that U.S. policy toward Romania at present is largely misconceived and ineffective.

Funderburk, in an interview here Monday, called for a revision of U.S. policy and a possible end to the most-favored-nation trading status and other concessions Washington grants the Bucharest government.

Romania has received preferential U.S. treatment since the late 1960s on the basis of a foreign policy that often diverges from Moscow's. But Funderburk contends that Romania's independence is exaggerated and its ties to the Soviet Union are more extensive than Washington policy makers are willing to recognize. Moreover, he says, Romania's abysmal record on human rights and its lack of internal reforms are a mockery of declared U.S. policy goals.

For example, he said, on the surface, it looked recently as if the Romanians were complying with U.S. wishes to relax emigration constraints. Hundreds were being granted permission to leave Romania and were flooding the U.S. Embassy requesting visas.

But on closer examination, U.S. officials found they had been outwitted by Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu, he said. Many Romanians being let go turned out to be unqualified for admission to the United States.

"We were outfoxed by Ceau-

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U.S. Envoy Quits, Charges Policy Coddles Romania

FUNDERBURK, From A1

sescu," Funderburk said. "He in effect dumped people on us like a mini-Mariel," a reference to the massive boatlift of Cubans to the United States in 1980. "Hundreds of those approved for emigration were undesirables. Meantime, many of those we wanted out are still waiting for official permission.

"This situation has created a dilemma for us," Funderburk said. "We have this long list of people asking to come to the States. About 30 or 40 of them protested outside the embassy several weeks ago. They were put up to it by Romanian authorities at the passport office.

"Ceausescu is trying to turn the tables on us. At human rights conferences, to defuse the emigration issue, the Romanians now say to us, look, you can't criticize us for not letting enough people out because many of those we've already approved to go have yet to be let into the United States."

Funderburk tells the story as an example of what he says is the need to be wary of the Romanian regime. He thinks the Reagan administration has not been wary enough.

"There is a street term the Romanians use, *smecher*, meaning someone who is sneaky, crafty, a wheeler-dealer," he said. "That applies to the government in Bucharest."

Funderburk, 41, a former university professor of history with links to conservative Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N. Car.), was appointed ambassador in 1981. He speaks Romanian and studied in Romania for two years in the 1970s on a Fulbright and other foundation grants.

In a letter accepting his resignation "with deep regret," President Reagan expressed appreciation for Funderburk's "efforts to improve the human rights situation in Romania" and commended him for "steadfast support of our national security interests in Europe."

Funderburk's 1981 Senate confirmation hearing was marked by controversy over ill-tempered statements he had authored in a 1978 pamphlet alleging the "misteaching of communism" in U.S. universities and accusing the State Department of whitewashing human rights reports on Eastern Europe.

Such remarks strained his relations with some foreign service professionals from the start. But he said he is not alone among U.S. diplomats in advocating a harder line on Romania.

He said his views are supported by a majority of the principal officers at the Bucharest embassy, and he spoke of efforts by senior State Department officials to curb such nonconformist thinking.

Accusing the State Department of disapproving of dissent in its own ranks, Funderburk said a handful of embassy officers due for reassignment are being transferred to lesser posts than they deserve in apparent retribution for having challenged current policy on Romania.

"Two at the embassy, for instance, were recently moved to out-of-the-way positions back in Washington where they will be out of the limelight," he said. "They have been put in places where they can't step out publicly and where they can be monitored. It looks like a dead end for their careers."

[State Department spokesman Ed Djerejian, responding to Funderburk's charges, said that under a "longstanding policy" in effect since the 1970s, "constructive and creative dissent is something encouraged by the State Department." Djerejian said that in addition to regular channels for diplomats abroad to make dissenting views known to Washington, there are special channels "if they feel stymied," and the "dissent-channel messages go to the top." Djerejian said the State Department had no further comment on Funderburk's allegations.]

DAVID FUNDERBURK
...'we were outfoxed by Ceausescu'

Funderburk referred to a "network" of administration officials, primarily at the departments of State and Commerce and including some at the Central Intelligence Agency, who, he said, have dismissed or belittled evidence the embassy in Bucharest has collected documenting Romania's growing economic ties with the Soviet Union, the presence of large numbers of nonmilitary Soviet personnel in the country, the transfer to the Soviet Union of technology Romania has obtained from the West, and Bucharest's position as a major exporter of arms.

"Much evidence we sent in was overlooked and ignored," he said. "They scrambled to denigrate a lot of the material we put forward."

He complained of a tendency among some administration officials to soften criticism of human rights abuses in Romania and to lavish praise on the Bucharest government for foreign policy positions which, in Funderburk's view, often have more form than substance.

Funderburk said he raised some of his concerns directly with President Reagan in an August 1983 meeting at the White House that was attended also by Vice President Bush, then-national security adviser William P. Clark and then-presidential aide Edwin Meese III. "All seemed interested in and sympathetic with what I had to say," Funderburk said.

The problem, he alleged, rests mainly with others in the administration. "There's a difference between Reagan's stated goals and our policy as implemented," he said. "What I would like to see is the State Department implementing policy more consistently with Reagan's declared ideals."

He said he decided to speak out now after becoming free of the constraints of serving as an ambassador and after leaving a country as keenly sensitive to criticism as Romania is.

"When I went to Romania, I wasn't aware how much our policy needed change," he said. "When I realized it did, I thought that by working through the U.S. government system, we could have a major impact on policy.

"But I found that the people who we had to report to directly were unsympathetic to change or to new information. It's difficult to get anyone's attention at State if you have a view that's different because their minds are made up. That's what I found disappointing."

U.S. policy toward Romania has been based on the premise that the public displays of independence from Moscow by Ceausescu, who has ruled Romania since 1965, are a genuine irritant to the Soviet Union and a positive example to other East Bloc states, and therefore should be encouraged.

Ceausescu has criticized the Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. His country is the only Warsaw Pact member that refuses to let Soviet troops on its territory for maneuvers and that does not send troops to joint pact training exercises. He defied the Soviet-led boycott of the Olympic Games in Los Angeles last year, and he has scolded the Soviet Union as well as the United States for raising tensions in Europe over nuclear weapons.

Additionally, Ceausescu's ties with China and his relations with all parties in the Middle East have proved useful back channels for U.S. policy makers. Romania is the only East European nation to have maintained diplomatic contacts with Israel since 1967.

The U.S. position was spelled out by Bush in a 1983 speech explaining the basis on which Washington differentiates among East European regimes.

"We look to what degree countries pursue autonomous foreign policies, independent of Moscow's direction, and to what degree they foster domestic liberalization—politically, economically and in their respect for human rights," he said. "The United States will engage in closer political, economic and cultural relations with those countries such as Hungary and Romania which assert greater openness or independence. We will strengthen our dialogue and cooperation with such countries."

Referring to the Bush speech, Funderburk said: "If you take the two goals he mentioned and measure what success we've had in Romania, we've gone backwards. We've been unable to effect any reform in terms of the economy, the standard of living or human rights with the exception of a few individual cases."

He said he would "like to see a policy that brings about greater Romanian independence from the Soviets, internal reforms and improved human rights," or, failing that, a reduction of U.S. support, "including the possible withdrawal of MFN status, fewer high-level official visits and reduced economic assistance."

But standing in the way of a policy revision, according to Funderburk, are some senior U.S. officials with a vested interest in sustaining the image of Romania as a Soviet Bloc maverick deserving of U.S. concessions.

"There are people back in Washington who will go the limit to make excuses for and to defend Ceausescu, because their jobs, promotions, careers depend on proving they were right about Romania," he said.

"So every three or four weeks, we give them something—a high-level visit, a trade concession, whatever. We ought to get more from these people for the concessions we make."

Funderburk said other western countries are ahead of the United States in reassessing formerly positive approaches to Romania. He said he had seen diplomatic reports describing increasingly negative views of Romania among several Western European states and a report by an official of a neutral European country who, after visiting most East Bloc countries recently, concluded Romania ranked worst in observance of human rights and general conditions.

To support his charges against Washington officials, Funderburk cited several instances in which he said administration members sought to refute material contrary to Romania's independent image or to temper public criticism of Romania.

■ On Soviet presence: "Our guys observed a large Soviet presence in

Romania that was not welcome news to some officials in Washington. On our own initiative, we looked in registries, checked schools, traced license plates and came up with an ungodly number of resident Soviets, including Soviet agents in factories monitoring Romanian exports to the Soviet Union. This should have been an indication that Soviet-Romanian cooperation is closer than had been reported previously and a sign that Romania is a more reliable Warsaw Pact partner than is commonly thought. Instead, the information was ignored."

■ On Soviet-Romanian trade: "I've reported that Soviet-Romanian trade relations are getting closer. But this was downplayed by some in Washington who found ways of juggling figures to suggest the increase doesn't have much meaning. Part of my argument was that the Soviet percentage in overall Romanian trade has risen. They answered me with the argument that this was only a statistical aberration resulting from a drastic cutback of Romania's imports from the West."

■ On technology transfers: "There is evidence reported by various sources that Romania has transferred to the Soviet Union technology it obtained from the West, although it denies this. Those at State concerned about maintaining or improving good relations with Romania have tended to make light of such information. In virtually every case when the sale to Romania of a particular U.S. product has been disputed among American agencies, State has argued for the sale.

"To facilitate one deal, I was asked to reconsider a negative opinion I had sent in. We were considering selling the Romanians a ground station to receive geological and agricultural data from a Landsat satellite. I didn't change my mind, and the sale hasn't yet been approved.

■ On arms exports: Figures prepared by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency on the world's leading arms exporters were published last October in Business Week. They listed Romania as the fifth largest exporter in 1982. Funderburk said Deputy Defense Minister Ilie Ceausescu, Nicolae's brother, denied that Romania exported weaponry.

"When we reported the fact of Romania's ranking to Washington, they went bananas," Funderburk said. "Agencies scrambled and said it couldn't be true. But we hadn't fabricated a thing. We were just reading from ACDA figures. The first response from Washington came back to us saying, you nasty guys, Romania couldn't have been fifth. Weeks later, we got an acknowledgment, a short and quiet one, conceding that perhaps Romania ranked within a notch or two of the published figure."

■ On human rights: Funderburk said the European Bureau at the State Department has shown a willingness to water down or delete criticism of Romania's human rights abuses, although State's own Human Rights Bureau has forcefully condemned Romanian oppression.

Funderburk said he resigned not for political reasons but out of personal and family considerations and to return to Campbell University in North Carolina to teach government studies. He agreed to meet here with this reporter, whom Romania denied entry last week because of past articles.

Funderburk said his conflicts with some senior policy makers in Washington had been compounded by the cloud under which he began as a diplomat.

"From the beginning I was branded an unseasoned, naive political appointee, a Helmsite and a radical," he said. "Efforts were made to try to isolate me and the embassy from the policy-making process.

"Word filtered back to me that Eagleburger [Lawrence Eagleburger, undersecretary of state, who retired last year] thought I was carrying on a parallel policy. At one point, he sent me an eyes-only cable which I interpreted as saying, why are you calling so much attention to human rights and let's not allow it to get in the way of a good thing."

He said he sees "Eagleburger proteges" in the State Department's European Bureau as more responsible for the policy he faults.

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GOP ethnic groups seek tougher policy in E. Europe

By Bill Kling
THE WASHINGTON TIMES 5/20/85

Ethnic groups within the Republican Party privately hope David Funderburk's protest resignation as U.S. ambassador to Romania will spur President Reagan to toughen his administration's policies toward Soviet-bloc governments in Eastern Europe.

"We agree with him," Laszlo Pasztor, honorary chairman of the National Republican Heritage Groups' Council, said when asked about Mr. Funderburk's assertion that U.S. policy toward Romania is misguided and that Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu has "outfoxed" U.S. officials in retaining preferential trade treatment and other advantages from the United States.

But leaders at the GOP council's annual convention here over the weekend — all ardent anti-communists and staunch political supporters of Mr. Reagan — were reluctant to discuss the Funderburk case for direct quotation.

"Sure, we'd like to see the United States get tougher with the communists," said one, "but we don't want to look like we're taking a slap at the president. We love and trust Ronald Reagan. We know he's trying to do what's right."

Several mentioned the importance of new strategic arms talks between the Soviet Union and the United States at Geneva as a reason for moving cautiously on U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe.

The heritage groups' council, an official arm of the Republican National Committee and an impor-

see ETHNIC, *page 8A*

ETHNIC

From page 1A

tant element in GOP election victory nationally and in some state and local campaigns, is made up of ethnic groups representing mostly people of Eastern European and Asian ancestry or origin. Mr. Pasztor is one of its founders.

Mr. Funderburk, 41, a former university history professor, said early last week that he resigned his post in Bucharest because "a network of senior Reagan administration officials" continually overruled or ignored what he contended was clear evidence of Mr. Ceausescu's duplicity in dealing with the United States and the Romanian government's deepening economic and trade relationship with Moscow.

The former diplomat also cited overt human rights violations by the Ceausescu government.

"There's a difference between Reagan's stated goals and our policy as implemented," said Mr. Funderburk, who has close ties with Sen. Jesse Helms, R-N.C. "What I would like to see is the State Department implementing policy more consistently with Reagan's declared ideals."

Mr. Funderburk charged the State Department with covering up evidence of Romania's growing ties to the Soviet Union and said Romania's emigration policies do not qualify the country for the most-favored-nation trade status it has been granted since 1975.

"Our Romania policy has been in the hands of Richard Burt . . . who is ultimately responsible for this disaster," Mr. Helms charged in remarks before the Senate last week.

Mr. Burt could not be reached for comment on Mr. Helms' remarks.

In an interview from his suburban Washington residence, Mr. Funderburk expressed his frustration with the State Department's European Affairs Bureau. He said the bureau is attempting to weaken the Warsaw Pact by coaxing Romania away from the Soviet Union.

"My position is that their thesis is not valid," Mr. Funderburk said. U.S. policy, he added, has been "manipulated and used" by the Romanians as part of a concerted effort to obtain Western credits and technology, some of which ends up in the Soviet Union.

The GOP heritage organization received Mr. Reagan warmly at a Friday luncheon when he said "freedom and foreign policy are going to be the issues that move the voter" in coming years "even as they move the world." He drew applause with several references to his strong policies against Soviet intrusion in Central America and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

In the audience were many exiles from communism as well as descendants of persons who fled their homelands when communists took over.

On the platform as the president spoke was State Department Counsel Edward J. Derwinski, who, as an Illinois congressman, authored the law establishing the annual observance of Captive Nations Week to focus attention on the countries that have fallen victim to Soviet territorial expansion since World War II.

Before Mr. Reagan's speech, Republican National Chairman Frank J. Fahrenkopf Jr. introduced John Sabo, a member of the Pennsylvania governor's Heritage Affairs Commission and president of a national Hungarian-American ethnic group. Mr. Sabo, of Pittsburgh, last Wednesday changed his political party affiliation from Democratic to Republican.

Mr. Reagan, the first sitting president ever to appear at a convention of the GOP heritage counsel, said the Republican Party has "led the way" in supporting Afghan and Nicaraguan resistance fighters and "has been unstinting in its support of democratic development in the struggle against totalitarianism."

A "tidal wave called freedom" will, he said, "soon roll and crash its way across the desert that is 20th-century totalitarianism.

"Look around the world," Mr. Reagan said, "at the growing insurgencies against repressive rule in totalitarian countries, the revolt of intellectuals against the stale cliches and bogus prophecies of Marxism-Leninism, the steady growth of the power and especially the number of nations that are turning to democracy."

The president said many Democrats are questioning "a burden that some in their party would have them take on."

Staff writer Bill Gertz contributed to this report.

A broad cast of characters take the South African stage

By JAMES F. SMITH
of The Associated Press

JOHANNESBURG, South Africa — The leading characters in South Africa's bloodstained drama often engage in a dialogue in which everyone talks but nobody listens.

The white players speak in a kind of apartheid code, with such euphemisms as "minority rights," meaning white control, and "influx control," or keeping blacks out of cities. The blacks are more direct, shouting, "Amandla!" — Zulu for "power."

At stake in this halting dialogue is whether more than 30 million people work out an accommodation that suits a wide range of ethnic groups, or stagger on amid periodic riots, or consume themselves in a final, brutal revolution.

The players are split into two main groups, those working within apartheid's structures and those operating outside the system. And the factions themselves often are internally divided on such issues as civil disobedience, anti-South Africa economic sanctions and the pace of reform.

Here is a look at the principal actors:

NATIONAL PARTY

The white governing party first took power in a narrow election victory among white voters in 1948, and has never lost since, holding two-thirds of the seats in Parliament. It won on a pledge both to preserve white rights and to promote the then-rural, Dutch-descended Afrikaners, who make up about 60 percent of the nation's 5 million whites. It has institutionalized apartheid, Afrikaans for "separateness."



English-speaking whites dominated business and industry, were wealthier than the Afrikaners and tended to be more liberal. Those distinctions have blurred since 1948. But the English speakers and the Afrikaners attend separate schools, have separate TV and radio programs and travel in separate social circles.

MODERATES

The Progressive Federal Party, backed by about 18 percent of the white electorate, is led by an Afrikaner, Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, but the party is still dominated by English speakers, such as veteran Helen Suzman. The "Progs" oppose South Africa's sweeping security laws, and discrimination in housing, education and citizenship, and want a national convention — including black guerrilla leaders — to work out a new future. But most join the "Nats" in opposing a one-man, one-vote solution, fearing the black majority of 24 million would swamp the white minority.

FAR RIGHT

Ultra-conservatives are split between the Reformed National Party and the Conservative Party, both Afrikaner-led breakaway groups from the Nationalists. Together, the two command about 15 percent of white support for policies of strict racial segregation and white domination.

In common Western terms, President P.W. Botha's Nationalists are solidly right-wing, the Progressives are centrists and the Conservatives and Reformed National Party are on the far right.

ASIAN AND MIXED RACE

Last September, the government inaugurated new houses of Parliament for the 850,000 Asians and the 2.8 million people of mixed race, called "coloreds" in South Africa. These legislators are excoriated as sell-outs by apartheid foes, who say the new constitution not only excludes blacks but makes coloreds and Asians "junior partners" in apartheid.

UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT

The largest anti-apartheid coalition, the two-year-old UDF claims more than 600 affiliate groups with over 2 million followers. Local civic associations, grassroots groups set up in most black townships as rivals to the pro-government councils, are the backbone. Arrests and detentions without trial have hurt the UDF, but it is decentralized and less vulnerable to such action.

AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

The ANC is the main guerrilla group fighting white rule from exile. Banned in 1960, the ANC went underground and began an armed sabotage campaign. The ANC also is working to stir up mass opposition to make the townships "ungovernable." The government says the UDF is merely an internal front for the ANC, whose leader, Nelson Mandela, has been serving a life prison term since 1964 on charges of plotting sabotage.

GATSHA BUTHELEZI

Leader of the 6 million Zulus, Buthelezi is chief minister of the KwaZulu homeland, and therefore a target of criticism by more militant activists who oppose the homeland system, which denies blacks rights in South Africa. But Buthelezi is an outspoken foe of apartheid, and his large ethnic following, backed by the disciplined, 1-million-member Zulu Inkatha organization, makes him a potent force.

BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS

Steve Biko founded and led the movement from the late 1960s until his death from head injuries in police custody in September 1977. With the motto, "Black Man, you are on your own," Biko rejected white help in the liberation struggle. The Azanian People's Organization, using its favored name for the future South Africa, is the latest group extolling Biko's philosophy.

CHURCHES

Anglican Bishop Desmond Tutu, who won the Nobel Peace Prize last year, is the best known of many churchmen working for peaceful change. Because detentions have weakened other organizations, churches have stepped into the void, taking a more vocal role in urging change. Tutu and others say their influence among younger, more militant blacks is declining. The largest black church, the Zion Christian Church, is pro-government, but has almost no visible political role.

The largest Dutch Reformed church, the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk, supports separation of races but says all races must be treated equally.

TRADE UNIONS

Regarded as a potential political force, the emerging black unions have focused on building up economic muscle. Legalized in 1979, black unions claim more than a half-million members, and increasingly have taken stances in political disputes, for example backing a two-day general protest strike last November that kept about 800,000 workers off the job.

BLACK SASH

A small band of mainly English-speaking, well to-do women, Black Sash has won the respect of blacks throughout the country. It has set up aid centers for blacks, worked in the townships and helped rural blacks fight removal to the homelands from "white" areas. Sash picketers brandishing anti-apartheid placards can often be seen on city street corners.

A "Slide Into Anarchy" for Strife-Torn South Africa?

Widening divisions between blacks and whites bode ill for a nation where racial turmoil has become a fact of life.

JOHANNESBURG

The latest surge of violence here in South Africa has set back for years to come efforts to work out compromises between blacks and whites.

Nobody expects the turmoil to drive the powerfully entrenched white rulers from office or bring about any major easing of the rigid apartheid racial-separation system anytime soon. Nor is there much fear of a sudden countrywide eruption of black guerrilla warfare.

South Africa's white government is too strong and too willing to use force against badly divided blacks for either of those events to happen quickly. But the country's longer-range stability is being challenged as never before by a number of developments. Among them:

- Swift radicalization of young blacks who are rejecting older moderate leaders and turning to violence as the only effective means of ending three centuries of white domination.
- Growing doubts among whites that the government of President Pieter Botha has any overall goals, or clear ideas about how to achieve them, beyond harsh repression of black protests.
- Widening division of blacks and whites into two societies that are increasingly hostile to one another and unconcerned about needs and aspirations on the other side of racial barriers.

Despite continuing sporadic violence that has taken at least 22 lives in the past two weeks, the immediate prospect here is for another period of sullen, enforced calm even in the turbulent black residential areas surrounding Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth.

More than 1,300 persons have been rounded up by a security dragnet since a state of emergency took effect on July 21 in 36 of the country's 275 magisterial districts. The crackdown has decimated the United Democratic Front (UDF), an umbrella organization claiming 1.5 million members that has been at the forefront of black unrest.

In one of the latest incidents, four black men shot and killed Victoria Mxenge, a black civil-rights attorney who was defending 16 UDF leaders charged with treason. Her husband, a prominent antiapartheid lawyer, was murdered four years ago.

Although the Botha government is not in any immediate danger, rapidly building pressures now seem certain to generate the strongest challenges to apartheid since the system of legalized white supremacy was set up in 1948.

"We are sliding into anarchy," warns Joyce Harris, president of Black Sash, a white women's human-rights group based in Johannesburg. "Young blacks are beginning to use violence for fun, while the government is closing the door on negotiation instead of opening it. The country is moving in the opposite direction to compromise."

This undertone of violent challenge has been clearly evident during massive outdoor funerals, which replaced banned political rallies as an outlet for

Strikes by militant black labor unions are on the rise.

PHOTOS BY GIDEON MENDEL—AFP

black protest. Young activists trotted along the streets of black townships carrying coffins of slain demonstrators on their shoulders, shouting freedom slogans and waving clenched fists.

Some funerals have ended in bloody clashes between armed police and keyed-up mourners, often resulting in more deaths and still more funerals. The government finally banned outdoor services on July 31 in an attempt to close another channel of black protest.

To some of South Africa's 5 million whites, these incidents and numerous cases of black violence against other blacks strengthen the case for a go-slow approach to granting political equality to the country's 23 million blacks.

"We still suffer from mixed emotions," says Deon Geldenhuys, a leading political scientist and an Afrikaner descendant of Dutch settlers. "Plenty of whites realize that eventually they must negotiate with blacks. But there is great revulsion—I use that word deliberately—at seeing on television a black woman being burned to death by other blacks. Inevitably, this kind of scene raises questions in white minds about the wisdom of ceding power to blacks."

That kind of violence also disturbs black moderates such as Ernest Makheta, a 63-year-old community-affairs leader in Soweto, the sprawling black township just outside Johannesburg. He explains it this way: "I'm afraid the young regard us as cowards. These days they listen to me, then show me the door. They have a crazy kind of courage that involves fighting rifles with stones."

The push toward ever greater militancy is being felt even by well-known black leaders such as Anglican Bishop Desmond Tutu, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1984, and Gatsha Buthelezi, chief of the 5-million-strong Zulu tribe and a past critic of foreign economic sanctions against South Africa.

Tutu's threat. Only a few days ago, Tutu threatened to leave the country if black-against-black violence continued. Now he vows to ignore new decrees banning political activity at funerals. "If they [the government] try and promulgate laws that are unjust, I will break these laws," he said at August 1 services for riot victims in the township of Tumahole. "I will not be told by any secular authorities what gospel I must preach."

Some of this talk may reflect only an effort by traditional leaders to maintain credibility among militant blacks at a highly emotional time. But at least part of it goes much deeper.

"The ante gets upped every day," says a foreign diplomat. "We are close to the point where nothing will satisfy blacks short of majority rule."

Seeking a major or even an equal share in power is far different—and far more difficult—than obtaining it. Blacks are united by opposition to apartheid. But they are divided over almost everything else: Tactics, leadership, ideology and old tribal rivalries.



Army parade in Johannesburg sends this message to blacks: Whites hold all the power.

Black political ambitions are curbed further by government restrictions and the need to earn a living. Jobs in this resource-rich nation depend on white employers and priorities. The 47,000-member police force, for example, is 40 percent black, but its main task now is to suppress black dissent.

Black freedom of movement, organization and expression is limited. More than 60 groups are banned. An estimated 10,000 blacks had been jailed in the six months before the latest crackdown began. Activists also face the threat of forced removal to remote rural areas.

Opportunities for organizing guerrilla warfare are similarly restricted. Back-country regions are mostly arid semi-deserts rather than dense forests where insurgents could hide. Whites own 87 percent of the land and pay close attention to any strangers. The 85,000-strong white-run Army is highly trained in counterinsurgency operations.

Growing doubts. Many analysts are convinced, nevertheless, that worse troubles lie ahead. Notes *Frontline*, a current-affairs magazine: "Civil war does not start with a tidy formal declaration. It starts when people look upon the institutions of authority as an enemy force. That we have, and it grows."

Heightening the fear of future turmoil is a growing sense that the government is losing the confidence of the people, even though public-opinion polls show revived white support for Botha and his Nationalist Party since the state of emergency was proclaimed.

One reason for this is an economic downturn that began well before the imposition of foreign sanctions. There has been almost no economic growth this year; inflation has hit a 16-percent-a-year rate and living standards of both blacks and whites are falling.

Stimulated by current unrest, black consumer boycotts of white merchants in the Port Elizabeth industrial center are gaining momentum. Black-worker absenteeism has risen sharply. Strikes called by increasingly militant black trade unions occur almost daily.

Sagging foreign confidence in the country's future is underscored by a drop in overseas holdings of gold-mine shares, a near halt in foreign-capital investment and a 50 percent decline in the foreign-exchange value of the national currency in the past year.

Crisis of confidence. Equally grave doubts are generated by the failure of Botha's efforts to modernize apartheid without abolishing it. Even his grudging step-by-step dismantlement of apartheid has heightened white suspicions. Worse, say some analysts, it has stirred up racial hatred and encouraged revolution by falling so far short of black expectations.

"From now on," predicts a local banker, "any changes Botha proposes will be seen by whites as concessions to black violence and by blacks as laughably inadequate."

So far, these tensions and troubles have had little visible impact on the daily lives of whites. Major cities are calm. Newspapers emphasize sports more than martial law. Cold weather is a more common topic of cocktail-party talk than is the political crackdown.

But just beneath the surface is growing recognition that grounds for optimism about South Africa's future are becoming harder and harder to find. □

By ROBIN KNIGHT

The Washington Times — MONDAY, MAY 20, 198

S. Africa alarmed by Soviet subs at Cape

By Edward Neilan
THE WASHINGTON TIMES FOREIGN SERVICE

SIMONSTOWN, South Africa — Military, government and intelligence officials in South Africa are fearful that a Soviet naval blockade, using mines and submarines, could deal a death blow to this country's already sagging economy and disrupt the Cape sea route on which the West depends heavily.

The fears of South Africa's susceptibility to such a blockade have been heightened and sharpened in recent weeks due to increased Soviet submarine activity in the south Atlantic and Indian Oceans.

The worsening condition of South Africa's aging maritime patrol aircraft, the "spreading thin" of U.S. naval forces in other parts of the world and the mounting chorus of world opinion against South Africa on the apartheid issue have contributed to a creeping paranoia here on strategic vulnerability.

Details of the deteriorating state of South Africa's naval defenses and the intense concern over increased Soviet naval activity emerged from a series of discussions and briefings over the past few days with Deputy Foreign Minister Louis D.J. Nel and military intelligence chief Maj. Gen. Peter Groenewald in Pretoria and South Africa's top naval operations officer Commodore Victor F. Holderness at this best-equipped naval port on the continent of Africa.

The officials declined to be quoted directly but each expressed concern about the increasing Soviet maritime threat that could create a new and difficult dimension for embattled South Africa.

U.S. ships no longer call at Simonstown due to U.S. congressional concern about possible apartheid restrictions on black American sailors during shore leave. Arms embargo restrictions have blocked the United States from selling modern patrol aircraft and much-needed anti-submarine warfare vessels to South Africa.



Map by Elena Cunha The Washington Times

"There is some sharing with the U.S. of electronic intelligence from our radar and communications facility nearby," a South African naval spokesman said.

A four-page unclassified analysis made available to The Washington Times by South African naval sources revealed a startling total of 40 Soviet naval vessels now operating in the south Atlantic and Indian Oceans. The buildup has been steady since 1968.

Naval sources here point to the success of Nazi Germany's 56 submarines in sinking 138 allied ships in World War II. Today, according to the sources, the Soviet Union has 183 conventional and 179 nuclear submarines.

A blockade or even harassment of shipping at the ports of Durban, Port Elizabeth, Cape Town and the Mozambique port of Maputo would effectively bottle up export activity on which South Africa depends. It would also cut off to the West vital South African minerals.

Strategists worry that with world opinion presently tilted against South Africa and U.S. ships deployed elsewhere, it would be unlikely the United States would engage such a Soviet blockade.

Against the overpowering Soviet sub presence, South Africa has only three tiny Daphne French-made subs — a matchup roughly akin to a pollywog against a whale.

South African authorities say they would be willing to patrol the Cape routes if they had the tools but that now they are only looking after South African territorial waters.

In a recent year, 80 percent of the West's strategic minerals used the Cape route and 75 percent of the world's tanker tonnage passed the Cape.

Total U.S. tonnage (including Panama and Liberia registries) using the Cape sea route last year was 18 million tons. Soviet "merchant" tonnage on the route was 23 million and the United Kingdom merchant navy tonnage was 26 million.

This trade resulted in the passing of 3,237 ships around Cape point last year. Most of these ships depend on South Africa for fuel, food, weather reports and search and rescue services.

The South African naval analysis said "apart from gunboat diplomacy, the Soviet maritime forces in the Indian and south Atlantic oceans must thus be seen as the military component of the total strategic onslaught against the lifeline of the free world. Since the Soviets do not have a large transoceanic trade that would need protection, these naval forces could only be intended for war and one of the Soviet naval present prime functions could be to hinder ocean shipping of the United States and its NATO allies. One place where interdiction could occur is the Cape sea route."

The same analysis criticized Western — mainly U.S. — reliance on the highly vulnerable Diego Garcia base in the Indian Ocean. "It is an ideal target for tactical nuclear weapons with only nominal risk of escalating nuclear retaliation."

The Soviet Union knows all it needs to know about the base here. A few years ago it was discovered that the South African base commander was in fact a Soviet spy. He is now serving a life term.

South African government officials feel the base at Simonstown is a key to effective Western naval presence in the Indian and South Atlantic oceans.

Simonstown offers the best-equipped naval facilities between Singapore and Gibraltar and can accommodate up to 50 warships. It has a workforce of 2,500 uniformed personnel and 4,500 civilians.

The sophisticated command and control center near Simonstown at Silvermine is capable of tracking ships, aircraft and submarines in an area enclosed by South America, Antarctica, and the Indian Ocean. The facility is underground so as to survive either conventional or nuclear attack.

WASHINGTON TIMES
29 July 1985

In S. Africa, Soviets turn invisible screws

The "winds of change" that drove the colonial powers — Belgium, France, Britain and Portugal — from the African continent brought great hopes for democracy and economic development. More than a quarter century has passed since the wave of independence began. The shining hope has been supplanted by dictatorship, repression, brutality, venality, starvation and despair now commonplace throughout the continent. The exception has been South Africa, long an enclave of prosperity and order.

EDITOR'S PERSPECTIVE
by Arnaud de Borchgrave

Over the years, most recently in conversations with President Pieter W. Botha, I learned of the constructive changes and steady progress taking place in South Africa that would lead to the dismantling of the abhorrent apartheid system not by violent revolution and race war, but by a reasoned process. Mr. Botha spoke to me of the tremendous political risks he was taking to bring about constitutional and other internal reforms. He said, "We can see all of black Africa slowly dying, and we have no intention of abandoning our country to the same fate."

What South Africans once found unimaginable may now become a reality.

How curious it is to find the United States government expressing its "revulsion" at the South African state of emergency declared by the Pretoria government to put down a wave of terrorism in which an estimated 450 black South Africans have been the victims of systematic atrocities perpetrated by revolutionaries who also happen to be black. Would our State Department officials rather that South Africa decide that the lives and property of black people should not enjoy the protection of the law?

Ironically, the wave of violence washing over South Africa's urban black townships, bringing death to scores of black people at the hands of the revolutionary terrorists of the African National Congress, was generated in large part by the Nkomati accord, signed on March 16 last year between Mozambique and South Africa.

The crucial provision of Nkomati required Samora Machel, the Marxist leader of Mozambique, to close down the bases and facilities enjoyed by the African National Congress (ANC). This revolutionary movement has long been supported by the Soviet Union and has been under the political domination of the South African Communist Party for the past four decades. Mozambique had allowed ANC to use its territory to establish camps from which terrorist teams were infiltrated into South Africa. Mr. Machel immediately fulfilled his Nkomati pledge. The ANC's terror cadre was sent packing (to Zambia, Tanzania and Angola), and key personnel in the ANC political and terrorist command structure were expelled. ANC's terrorist operations were disrupted, and South Africa maintained the pressure by raiding ANC camps harbored by other neighboring countries.

President Botha's government had high expectations that Nkomati would signal the end of ANC as a terrorist problem. Then they could divert much of their defense budget into expanding their economy, and resume the ponderous pace of the progressive integration of black, Asian and mixed-race South Africans into the country's economic and political system. This is the key point: to bring black South Africans into the POLITICAL system would be to destroy the whole system of apartheid with its restrictions on areas of residence and property ownership.

Pretoria made this assumption, however, without considering that the only option left to the ANC, other than admission of defeat, was to mobilize their supporters inside South Africa, particularly in some of the black trade unions and in the United Democratic Front (UDF) coalition. Furthermore, for non-white South Africans, a climate of rising expectations had been created that encouraged militancy and pressure tactics to accelerate the sluggish pace of change. The dropping of a number of restrictive racial laws and the first officially sanctioned cracks in political segregation have contributed to that feeling of expectation, as has the fact that wages in South Africa are well above the African norm. Wages may be low compared with those in the United States, but they are so far above the norm for Africa that tens of thousands of blacks voluntarily leave their black-ruled bordering countries to take jobs in South Africa in spite of the inane, degrading humiliations of apartheid regulations.

ANC's regrouping after the Nkomati reverse was speedy. Last summer the ANC leadership held lengthy consultations with leading American anti-South Africa activists at the United Nations, then immediately went to Havana to work out details on creating external diplomatic pressure against South Africa in the United States and Western Europe, in which U.N. agencies would play a supporting role. By last October, the plans were ready for implementation. The opening round in "making South Africa ungovernable" commenced with illegal strikes by black trade unions. Some of the leaders were arrested, and those arrests were the focus of protests in Europe and America in the first two weeks of November.

On Thanksgiving, the campaign of American protests and sit-ins against South Africa moved into high gear. The U.S. protest coalition, known as the Free South Africa Movement (FSAM), is spearheaded by Randall Robinson's TransAfrica, a lobbying organization. They have made clear their commitment to the ANC and to other revolutionary movements and regimes sponsored by Moscow in Africa and the Caribbean.

Continued

Since then, Mr. Robinson has given the national media a daily, carefully orchestrated "story." He has de facto "*proprietary rights*" over protest at the South African Embassy. Two or three prominent people are lined up in advance to get arrested, which is a perfectly convenient thing to do since the U.S. attorney for the District of Columbia has refused to prosecute anyone demonstrating at the South African Embassy, while vigorously prosecuting those who protest at the Soviet Union's Embassy. A press conference is held at which the prominent people make statements, and then a group of demonstrators selected well in advance by TransAfrica goes to the embassy, where they demonstrate and are arrested.

Having learned from the civil rights and anti-Vietnam war protests, today's demonstrators are neatly dressed, orderly, polite — and in the long run as dangerous as the ANC-inspired mobs who have killed more than 450 black South Africans since the present terrorism campaign erupted. "On camera," the protestors are concerned, as indeed, most of us are, with human rights and the abuse of power. But the FSAM agenda aims at persuading the U.S. government to help economically isolate South Africa from the Free World and thus assist in overthrowing it and replacing it with a Soviet-dominated, pseudo-"nationalist" revolutionary regime. The polite dignitaries on the picket line, knowingly or unwittingly, are acting to transform South Africa into an Ethiopia, a Uganda, an Angola, a Tanzania or a Zimbabwe — a process in which democracy has meant one man, one vote, one time! And no less a personage than Richard Lugar, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is lending himself, albeit unwittingly, to this demolition exercise.

That is the ultimate purpose of the economic warfare campaigns to end economic relations and isolate South Africa from the United States. TransAfrica's FSAM crusaders are not fazed by the fact that such economic measures would force America to depend on the Soviet Union as the sole alternative supplier of a variety of strategic minerals we now buy freely from South Africa. After all, TransAfrica consistently promoted the nasty little pro-Soviet regime on Grenada.

Does it matter particularly whether South Africa is ruled in five years time by a government allied with the Soviet Union? The answer is yes, because ultimately our continued freedom depends on it.

South Africa is essential to the strategic survival of the United States and Western Europe. That strategic importance is the result of her geology and geography; and it is not a fact that is going to change for many years. South Africa is the sole source in the non-Communist world of a multitude of rare minerals which are critical to the industrial and military strength of the West — among them chromium, platinum and vanadium. These and other rare metals form the exotic alloys that enable rockets and jet engines to withstand intense heat, and which strengthen submarine hulls against the enormous pressures of the deep oceans, and have many specialized functions in our high technology. There is one alternative source for those minerals — the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, geography has placed South Africa astride the shipping lanes traveled by the oil tankers carrying crude oil from the Persian Gulf across the Indian Ocean and around the Cape of Good Hope into the Atlantic. The government which rules South Africa can control the tanker traffic carrying the Gulf's petroleum to Western Europe, Latin America and the United States.

The leaders of the Soviet Union obviously are aware of this. In sum, the blunt fact remains that South Africa represents the jugular vein of the West, and that even if South Africa had no controversial and unpopular racial and ethnic regulations, that country would be a target of Soviet imperialism. The Kremlin would prefer to win world power without provoking us to resist. The name of the geopolitical game is, after all, as Sun Tsu told us 25 centuries ago, to subdue the armies of one's enemies without ever having to fight them. Therefore, they use what is called in Soviet jargon "active measures" that entail propaganda, subversion, agents of influence, disinformation and other techniques implemented primarily by the KGB in cooperation with all Soviet agencies and assets to bring about the gradual collapse of our will to resist.

In the case of South Africa, as with Vietnam 15 years ago, the multifaceted Soviet "active measures" campaign aims to persuade our leaders to forget that America's strategic viability will be at risk in South Africa for many decades — regardless of the political and racial complexion of its government.

Is there proof that the Soviets are engaging in "active measures" to promote an ANC rule over South Africa? Yes, in fact the only time in history that the Soviets ever publicly admitted that such "active measures" existed came in a statement to the U.N. General Assembly four years ago. The U.S.S.R. formally stated, "Efforts are under way in the Soviet Union to mobilize world opinion in the fight to eliminate colonialism, racism and apartheid in southern Africa. Active measures in this direction are being carried out." The Soviets even named some of the agencies implementing "active measures." They were the Soviet organizations run by the International Department of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee in cooperation with the KGB that, in turn, control the international fronts,among which are the World Peace Council (WPC), International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL), Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF), and World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU).

However, most Western public officials, public opinion molders, and particularly Congress and the media are hesitant, if not unwilling, to acknowledge the fact that the Soviet Union is seeking directly and through local surrogates to detach South Africa from the West, deny the West access to its strategic minerals and, sooner or later, replace its government with a regime more to Moscow's liking. Some argue instead that "nationalists" will take over ANC and expel the Marxists; but to date, ANC's Marxists have regularly purged "nationalists" who chafed under their strict discipline.

The bottom line is that it is irrelevant whether anti-American "nationalists" or anti-American Marxists seize power in South Africa. The Soviets undoubtedly would prefer to see a Marxist-Leninist regime of the Angolan, Ethiopian or Cuban model take over. For many years, Soviet policy in the Third World has been to support any movement or regime so long as it was anti-American. They recognize that an ultra-nationalist or extremist regime determinedly hostile to American interests — Khomeini's Iran being a prime example — would serve Moscow's interests nearly as well in placing control of U.S. access to strategic minerals in hostile hands.

Without South Africa's minerals, America's high-technology defense industries would have to depend on the Soviets for those rare strategic minerals. If America did not buy minerals from South Africa, what price do you think the Soviets would set?

There is also a moral irony in this. Year by year over the past decade and more, as the urban black population has increased and skilled, educated black people play an expanding role in the modern urban economy, South Africa has been dropping racially restrictive laws and now is committed to opening the political power structure. On the other hand, Soviet gold, as Alexander Solzhenitsyn told us, is the product of the Soviet forced labor camps which comprise the Gulag Archipelago.

Continued

Forced labor accounts for nearly all of Soviet mining operations. How the Soviet cynics must jeer to see America and Europe urging abandonment of trade with South Africa when their only alternative must be to line up at the Soviet trade counter and, therefore, to encourage the Soviets to expand their use of forced labor.

When the Politburo first considered how South Africa might be brought into the Communist camp back in Stalin's time, they used a classic tactic; develop a well-organized Communist Party and Communist underground; then penetrate and take over the African National Congress (ANC); organize a "popular front"; use terror to dispose of political opponents, demoralize the population, bring them under control and escalate into mass confrontational protests in order to elicit a stern reaction on the part of the government and police; then use that as the "justification" for a move into terrorist "armed struggle."

But in more recent years, in the Third World, the Soviets have recognized that it is sufficient that a government merely be anti-American for Soviet interests to be served. Of course the Soviets eventually would like to see traditional Marxist-Leninist parties ruling the countries of the Third World. But they realize that revolution by stages is less likely to alarm Western governments, thus they can avoid armed confrontations. After all, is the loss of one more slice of salami worth fighting over? In this type of "cold" conflict, all the tactics short of armed confrontation — propaganda, "active measures," disinformation and deception — play a very important role in undermining America's will to act in defense of our national interest, and, in the case of South Africa, in persuading our government to isolate America from South Africa.

From secret information provided by a high-level Soviet official who has now defected to the West, it has been learned that Moscow's overall plan has four main points:

- Consolidate Soviet influence in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe; at the same time, enhance the military capabilities of these countries to act as Soviet surrogates; and provide aid sufficient to reduce their economic dependence on South Africa;
- Strengthen the underground organization of the African National Congress and its fronts inside South Africa;
- Weaken the South African military capacity and will to resist;
- Increase the international political and economic isolation of South Africa through an intensified "active measures" campaign in Europe and America.

The international campaign for United Nations imposition of a total mandatory and binding international economic boycott against South Africa is spearheaded by various African states backed to the hilt by the Soviet bloc. Both in America and in the European countries who are South Africa's major trading partners, the campaigns are coordinated by the ANC's solidarity networks. (Shades of the various Central American solidarity networks, e.g., CISPES).

There is some peculiar self-delusion found among ANC supporters. Some back ANC because they see it as their revolutionary duty to support so-called "national liberation movements." Overall, they are a minority. Many more among the public figures in the so-called "anti-apartheid" campaigns understand that the brutal assassinations of moderate black spokesmen, community leaders, individuals known to oppose ANC, police officers and those who work in some capacity for the government, the atrocities in which ANC-inspired mobs hack and burn alive the infants, children, wives and other relatives of their victims or intended victims, the car bombs and sabotage are prima facie evidence that ANC is a terrorist group of the most vicious nature. Even Bishop Desmond Tutu has implored the militants to stop their reign of terror — or "I'll pack my bags, collect my family and leave," as he himself put it last week. But our activists omit from their calculations those atrocities perpetrated on blacks by the ANC and South African Communist Party and deplore the fact that the white government has declared a state of emergency to put down the terror.

At bottom, the excuses for ANC terrorism amount to "the devil made them do it" — the devil being South Africa's racial policies. When did the fact that you do not like someone's presumed politics give you the right to disembowel his wife and burn his children to death? Individuals are responsible for their own actions; no one who argues that a grievance against society justifies murder can retain credibility as a "human rights" advocate. Those who take that position may well believe that similar tactics should be applied in America. Even six generations after civil war and 30 years after the civil rights movement was launched, we have failed to construct the racial utopia that is demanded overnight of South Africa. Thirty-five million Americans are living below the poverty line — most of them blacks. Does that justify terrorism?

The fact that South Africa has scrapped many repugnant racial rules seems to have no impact on the anti-South Africa lobby. Perhaps with their minds made up, they do not want to be confused by facts. They want revolution.

The strategic needs of our own people should be the overriding concern of Congress, but the anti-South Africa forces, including the Marxists, are arguing that apartheid problem is not a political one capable of rational political solutions involving formulae for opening the South African political power structure by degrees to all the people. Rather, they say it is a moral issue. So they preach that "apartheid" is a sin, and that those "sinners" should stop sinning at once without respect to any other consideration such as transferring power in an orderly manner and maintaining social order. Pretoria, for its part, should begin by bringing black leaders, who renounce violence, into a new power-sharing system.

KGB fronts push campaign to destabilize South Africa

Third of a four-part series

EDITOR'S PERSPECTIVE
by Arnaud de Borchgrave

The protest campaign against South Africa corresponds to a pattern established by the Soviet KGB as one part of a broad "active measures" campaign that is being implemented by the U.S.S.R.'s "assets" — witting and unwitting — in the United States and Western Europe.

Is there collateral for that assertion? Yes, from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. FBI Assistant Director Edward O'Malley, in testimony before the House Intelligence Committee, held up as an example of "specific Soviet active measures, activities and operations in the United States" a conference of anti-South African activists in New York. Many of the initiators and leaders of the present protest participated actively in that conference whose "stars" were the political leadership of the African National Congress (ANC), which resumed terrorist operations against civilian targets in South Africa after the former Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola achieved independence under Soviet-allied Marxist regimes and provided ANC with bases.

In 1961, at the instigation of the South African Communist Party (SACP), the ANC commenced a terrorist campaign. ANC formed a terrorist cadre called "Umkonto We Sizwe" (Spear of the Nation in Zulu), led by Nelson Mandela, who was not a member of the Communist Party but worked closely with it.

Not too long ago, The New York Times commented that Mr. Mandela would probably become the first black prime minister in the "new order" in South Africa. When he was on trial, Mr. Mandela delivered a statement in open court in which he said, "I admit immediately . . . that I was one of the persons who helped to form Umkonto We Sizwe, and that I played a prominent role in its affairs until I was arrested in August 1962." He said, "I do not deny that I planned sabotage;" and continued, "I did not plan it . . . because I have any love of violence. I planned it as a result of a calm and sober assessment of the political situation. . . ." (Note: Quoted in THE AFRICAN COMMUNIST, official publication of the SACP, 3rd Quarter, 1964.)

The terrorist campaign failed. There was no rebellion, and the ANC and the SACP were outlawed and dwindled. They became primarily exile movements based in London whose publications were produced in East Germany. During the late 1960s and through the 1970s, ANC cadre received training in the Soviet bloc, Algeria, Libya, several Marxist African states and in Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) camps. Johnstone Makatini, the ANC representative in Algiers during the early 1970s, now their U.N. observer, was responsible for organizing terrorist training for selected ANC members in the Soviet Union.

Following the Portuguese "carnation revolution" of 1974, pro-Soviet regimes took power in Mozambique and Angola which gave ANC training facilities after the 1976 Soweto riots produced a flood of new militant recruits. The camps were staffed by Cuban, East German, Soviet and other bloc experts. Selected ANC members were given advanced training in the Soviet Union, Cuba and several East European countries.

The principal coordinator of the Free South Africa Movement (FSAM) is Randall Robinson, executive director of TransAfrica, a self-described "lobby" formed eight years ago "to inform and organize popular opinion in the United States to advocate policies and practices that will help to achieve a more progressive U.S. foreign policy toward the nations of Africa and the Caribbean and peoples of African descent generally throughout the world." As translated into action, TransAfrica has promoted the interests of the ANC, SWAPO and Moscow-allied client regimes in Africa and the Caribbean. The link with the ANC has been open.

Recently, Dennis Brutus, a "political refugee" who successfully resisted U.S. efforts to deport him as an "excludable alien" under the McCarran act, and is one of the most influential interpreters of ANC's political wishes to the U.S. anti-South Africa movement, described the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), Washington Office on Africa (WOA), American Committee on Africa (ACOA), TransAfrica and its Free South Africa Coalition (FSAM), and the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) as providing the leadership for the U.S. anti-South Africa campaign.

Those ties are not recent developments. There was, for example, a conference on American divestment legislation supported by the United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid and nine American groups in June 1981. Organizations taking leadership roles included the AFSC, ACOA, IPS, TransAfrica and WOA, along with several projects set up jointly and separately by these groups. ANC president Oliver Tambo had met with some of the leading figures a week before the conference in Atlanta. Others prominent in the conference were members of TransAfrica's board along with some leaders of communist front organizations used by the Soviets as vehicles for "active measures" and "disinformation" operations.

During the last four years, Mr. Tambo has made repeated trips to the United States for meetings with his U.S. supporters.

The October 1981 "Conference in

The Washington Post ____
The Washington Times 14
Daily News (New York) ____
The New York Times ____
The Wall Street Journal ____
The Chicago Tribune ____
The Los Angeles Times ____
The Christian Science Monitor ____
USA Today ____

Date 7-31-85

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Solidarity with the Liberation Struggles of Southern Africa," named by FBI Assistant Director O'Malley as a classic example of Soviet "active measures," had at least 20 officials of the ANC present. ANC president Tambo was unable to attend, but the ANC delegation "working" the conference was ably headed by Thabo Mbeki, Mr. Tambo's personal aide; Johnstone Mfanafuthi Makatini, ANC's chief U.N. representative; Yusuf Saloojee, ANC's representative in Canada; David Ndaba of the U.N. observer delegation, and others.

As violence erupted in the black townships of South Africa, Mr. Ndaba, administrative secretary of ANC's U.N. group who said he was involved in the Soweto riots of 1976, explained ANC's rationale for violence against black and colored moderates. The aim is to destroy by terrorism any alternative or moderate voice to the ANC and to use terror to bring the urban black population under ANC control. Any form of cooperation with the system would bring death and would demonstrate to black moderates that the government was incapable of protecting them from ANC violence.

Mr. Ndaba described the riots as "mass struggles carried out ... to destroy the ... institutions which make it possible for that regime to dominate our people. These mass political actions are accompanied by armed actions carried out by the ... African National Congress."

Terming the violence that has killed an estimated 450 black South Africans "people's war," Mr. Ndaba noted that in a New Year's message last year, several weeks before South Africa and Mozambique signed the Nkomati pact that brought expulsion of the ANC from their Mozambican bases, Oliver Tambo called on ANC supporters "to make themselves ungovernable, to make apartheid institutions unworkable, and to challenge these institutions by confronting the most vulnerable links of the apartheid regime, and eventually, to change the racist rule in Pretoria."

The slaughter of black people at the hands of the ANC mobs did not seem to upset Mr. Ndaba, who said that "a number of black stooges have been killed; many heads of black townships have been petrol-bombed because the people are now challenging these collaborators. ... The issue of black collaborators is becoming ... a major issue." [NOTE: Interview was published in The Black Scholar, a Marxist monthly — contributing editors range from Angela Davis and several TransAfrica directors to leaders of terrorist Republic of New Afrika.]

During the congressional debates on economic sanctions against South Africa, many wondered whether U.S. measures to isolate South Africa were of any real significance. ANC's U.N. officials insist that the campaign against South Africa here is critical to their success.

Mr. Ndaba said at the start of the FSAM protests that "We will appeal to the black people in this country to take their place as the leading force of the anti-apartheid movement in this country. ... It won't be until the Afro-Americans have taken the struggles ... to the same level as Americans did in opposing the war in Vietnam that we will finally achieve our freedom." That ANC officials likened South Africa to "another Vietnam war" that produced over a million refugee "boat people" could indicate what lies in store for South Africa should ANC be victorious.

Mr. Ndaba said, "How long the struggle will be allowed to last depends to a great extent on how strong an anti-apartheid movement will develop in the United States to reverse the policies of the U.S. administration with whomever is in power — Republicans or Democrats. ... It is true that the liberation of the people of South Africa will be brought about by the people of South Africa. ... But the international community and Afro-Americans here can really play a complementary role. What we are saying is that this complementary role is indispensable. We can no longer do without your support, and the time for that support is now."

Mr. Ndaba's boss at the U.N. observer group, Mr. Makatini, confirmed the high value the ANC places on the U.S. anti-South Africa campaigns to ease the path for their armed revolution during his March 29 appearance on the MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour. During the interview, Mr. Makatini said the current level of violent protests in South Africa meant people were reaching "the position reached by the ANC in 1961 — that non-violence could not work against the apartheid regime." He continued indicating that ANC's 1961 venture into terrorist "armed struggle" failed in large part because South Africa was isolated and the neighboring territories were "under colonial domination themselves. ... But today, they are potential rear bases, and nothing can stop that revolution. Nothing."

Asked whether there was an alternative to violent revolution, Mr. Makatini did not directly answer. Instead he asked for "effective international action in the form of the imposition of comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against South Africa," and explained: "That would help to shorten the duration of the inevitable armed conflict. It would help lessen the loss of human lives. But nothing can stop the bloodshed now because we've been bleeding for the past 300 years, and it's soon that the bleeding has to be on both sides."

U.S. Measures Gains, Losses in South Africa

Whoever is hurt most by the economic sanctions Congress is considering, the impact is likely to be limited.

The continuing unrest in South Africa is forcing the United States to weigh its stake in the future of that racially polarized nation.

As Congress pushes for economic sanctions, questions are being raised about the potential consequences of such action. How would U.S. business interests be affected by moves aimed at punishing South Africa for its policy of apartheid? Would sanctions goad the white-dominated government in Pretoria to change its ways?

On the U.S. side, experts contend a break with South Africa could interrupt access to rare metals used in key industries, including defense. Some U.S. officials worry that this could hurt the economy, but those who back sanctions foresee only mild disruptions, even if the U.S. must pay higher prices for the metals.

In terms of trade and investment, America's stake in South Africa, although shrinking, still runs into the billions of dollars. Sanction advocates contend potential losses are acceptable, given what they regard as this country's long-term interest in disassociating itself from apartheid.

Slap on the wrist? For South Africa, most experts believe that sanctions by the U.S. would have a limited impact on that country's economy. The South Africans, they say, could quickly find alternative sources for the computers and other sophisticated equipment now provided by American companies.

In shaping its racial policies, Pretoria is likely to ignore any pain from sanctions. Nevertheless, Congress appears intent on adopting them, despite White House warnings of a likely veto. On August 1, the House passed a sanctions bill that awaits final Senate action after Congress reconvenes in September. The measure would halt new U.S. bank loans to South Africa, curb computer sales of $100,000 or more and deny the country U.S. nuclear technology. It also would ban the sale of krugerrand gold coins in the U.S.

In Helsinki, Finland, foreign ministers of the European Economic Community, while agreeing to call their ambassadors home from Pretoria for consultations, split August 1 on sanctions of their own. Britain and West Germany oppose economic penalties; France wants tough action. That breach is bound to lessen the impact of any sanctions imposed by Americans.

If imposed, the U.S. sanctions would be a largely symbolic expression of Congress's growing outrage over apartheid, a system the white minority uses to dominate the nonwhite majority. "The measures will not bite that hard, but they will make it that much easier to bring in tougher ones," says Robert Schrire, a professor of politics at the University of Cape Town.

Indeed, Congress contemplates stiffer sanctions if South Africa does not make progress toward ending apartheid in the next year. The second phase could include a ban on new private U.S. investment and higher tariffs with the loss of most-favored-nation status. A total break in economic ties, including divestiture by U.S. companies, would come only as a last resort.



GM plant, part of U.S. stake in South Africa.

The White House is stepping up its criticism of South Africa because of a violence-marred state of emergency in effect since July 21. President Reagan, however, wants no sanctions, preferring to push for racial reforms through diplomatic channels.

Even with the prospect of sanctions, the two countries are far from severing economic ties. William Mott, a retired admiral who heads a 25-member committee that advises the government on strategic resources, fears a cutoff could be costly to the U.S. economy. "The foreign policy of the U.S. should be conducted in such a way to insure access—the magic word is access—to the minerals of southern Africa," Mott's committee contends.



According to the Department of the Interior, South Africa supplies half of U.S. platinum, which is essential for pollution-control devices on U.S. automobiles. It provides 44 percent of U.S. vanadium, used to make alloys for aircraft frames and engines; 31 percent of the manganese, used mostly to harden steel, and 55 percent of the chromium, used to make stainless steel.

Some of these minerals are mined in Zambia, Zaire and Zimbabwe, South Africa's neighbors to the north, but the ore still must be shipped via railroads and ports in South Africa. The big worry for the United States: The chief suppliers of strategic minerals outside southern Africa are the Soviet Union and its allies.

To some analysts, fears of losing

rare metals from South Africa in peacetime are overplayed. "In today's world, it is virtually impossible to shut off any one country from access to critical materials," asserts a team of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology scientists.

Strategic metals aside, the U.S. does not rely on South Africa all that much. Only 9 percent of the diamonds and gold used in industry come from there. In total, U.S. imports from South Africa were somewhat less than 2.5 billion dollars in 1984, a scant 0.7 percent of what Americans bought on world markets.

U.S. direct investment in South Africa stood at 1.8 billion dollars at the end of 1984—less than 1 percent of U.S. overseas assets. Since 1981, the value of American holdings has tumbled from 2.6 billion. "There's very little new investment from the U.S. in South Africa," reports Stuart Butler, an economist at the Heritage Foundation in Washington, D.C. "There has been very little for a long time." America's investment in South Africa is about one fifth of Europe's.

Big names, little money. The Investor Responsibility Research Center in Washington, D.C., a monitoring group for stockholders, identifies 280 U.S. companies with holdings in South Africa. The list includes many of the biggest names in corporate America: Mobil, Ford, Burroughs, General Motors, Coca-Cola, Control Data, Xerox. No big American companies are overly dependent on South Africa; most have no more than 1 percent of their sales or assets in that country, according to the center report.

Loans from about 100 U.S. banks to South Africa add up to 3.9 billion dollars, the U.S. government says. Chase Manhattan, which decided August 1 to halt new loans to South African business, has 400 million dollars in outstanding loans, less than 1 percent of its portfolio. American lending, which goes mainly to finance purchases from the U.S., has been declining since the end of 1983. Most U.S. banks have been cutting back on credit to the South African government.

Whatever Washington does on sanctions, the Pretoria government claims not to be worried. "South Africa will cope," says Finance Minister Barend du Plessis.

The betting of most experts is that South Africa could find investors and trading partners in Japan, Britain and West Germany. After the U.S. cut off arms sales in 1964, South Africa found a willing supplier in Israel. Says a State Department official: "If we pull out, there are other countries that can't wait to jump in there." □

By RICHARD ALM

A PREFACE

The New York Times Magazine/NOVEMBER 10, 1985

HOW WE SEE EACH OTHER

TWO VERY DIFFERENT MEN FROM VERY DIFFERENT BACKGROUNDS WILL SOON MEET in a little chateau called Fleur d'Eau on the shores of Lake Geneva. This encounter, between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail S. Gorbachev, nine days from now, will mark the first time in more than six years that an American President and a Russian leader have taken the measure of each other at the summit.

Much has changed between the United States and the Soviet Union in those six years — but much has remained the same. Their fierce competition and mutual suspicions are still based on real and serious differences — issues like arms control, foreign policy, human rights — and these will be on the agenda in Geneva.

Such United States-Soviet meetings are rare historical events. In the four decades since Yalta, there have been, all told, only nine of these summits, and the outcome of this month's meeting, like those in the past, is likely to be shaped not only by the personalities of these two very different men but also by the unspoken perceptions of the people they represent.

True, President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev come from vastly dissimilar political systems. In a democracy like America's, public attitudes help define and set limits on what a leader can realistically hope to achieve when it comes to the conduct of foreign policy. For his part, Mr. Gorbachev may not have a grass-roots public to contend with, but he does have to consider the opinions of the members of the ruling Communist Party apparatus. Any hope for progress at Geneva, then, rests on an understanding of these defining limits.

To find out how far these limits extend, The New York Times asked two of its reporters — one in America, the other in the Soviet Union — to examine how the people of these nations learn about each other and form their perceptions. This special issue of The New York Times Magazine is based on their reports, along with a poll conducted by The Times, on how we Americans see the Russian people and how they see us.

— The Editors

Any hope for progress at the coming U.S.-Soviet summit rests on realizing the limits placed on each leader by his country's political system.

HOW WE SEE EACH OTHER

THE VIEW FROM AMERICA

Americans' freedom enables them to learn more about Soviet current events than Russians themselves know.

By David K. Shipler

ONE DAY LAST SUMMER, my family and I were wandering through a small museum in Concord, Mass., when we came to a diorama depicting the historic clash between British redcoats and American colonists at North Bridge. There, on a miniature landscape, toy soldiers faced each other across a tiny battlefield at the opening of the American Revolution. My 8-year-old son, Michael, pointed to one of the little redcoats that had been tipped over on its side. "Look," he said, "a dead Russian." Then he caught himself, laughed and shook his head at his slip. "I mean, *British* soldier."

After 11 years of living overseas, our family had returned to the United States only one year before, but Michael had quickly absorbed a view that has become as American as the shot heard 'round the world: The Russians are the enemy.

The concept has worked its way into our culture. The Russians have taken their place in film, advertising and popular literature beside the images of cruel Nazis and the earlier, sinister stereotypes of Chinese and Japanese. They are vilified by our Government leaders as militant aggressors devoted to conquering the world. Their reciprocal fears of us are usually ignored in the textbooks that introduce American teen-agers to world affairs.

And often, at a deeper level, we use the Russians to define ourselves. All nations have a way of demonizing their adversaries. And so do we, picturing our values as antitheses of the Russians' — our freedom, their slavery; our wealth, their poverty; our honesty, their deceit; our righteousness, their subversion; our peaceful intentions, their warlike militarism; our robust private enterprise, their stifling state socialism.

The Soviet Union has given us plenty of reason to think the worst, of course — as a brutal prosecutor of some of its own dissidents, a bully in Eastern Europe, a trainer of terrorists, an arms merchant in tense regions of the world, a nuclear power with a revolutionary ideology. Much Soviet behavior has been inimical to American interests and offensive to American beliefs.

David K. Shipler, Moscow correspondent of The New York Times from 1975 to 1979, is the author of "Russia: Broken Idols, Solemn Dreams." He is currently based in the Washington bureau of The Times.

ADAM J. STOLTMAN/DUOMO

But as I return now to my own society after a long absence that included four years in Moscow, I am struck by how incomplete our portrait of the Russians is, how much of a caricature we have drawn, how thoroughly the shadings and nuances and rich subtleties of Soviet society have escaped us.

The gaps in understanding were revealed in a telephone poll conducted by The New York Times of 1,277 adults across the country between Sept. 15 and 19 (page 37).

FOR MANY AMERICANS, IMAGES OF RUSSIA ARE DOMINATED BY THE FAMILiar events of political oppression and international tension. And because the Soviet system is undemocratic, giving the Russian people no real voice in selecting leaders or making policy, the people generally don't play a large role in our perceptions. We tend to imagine Russians as hostile to the regime that governs them — while overlooking the antidemocratic impulses that find deep roots among ordinary Soviet citizens.

The terrible reign of Stalin is fixed in our imaginations: his forced collectivization of Russian farmers, and particularly his madness in purging the Communist Party and sending millions of innocent people to prison camps and firing squads. Ultimately, this disillusioned even most of those Americans who had initially seen hope for human justice in Soviet socialism.

Moscow's actions after World War II crystallized our sense of the Soviet Union as an adversary. Communist parties were installed in Eastern Europe. West Berlin was blockaded in 1948. Missiles were sent to Cuba in 1962, then withdrawn only under an American ultimatum. Hungary was invaded in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979. The Helsinki accords of 1975 were violated as dissidents were arrested and most emigration was barred. Poland was induced to put down its free trade union, Solidarity, with martial law in 1981.

The record justifies our suspicion and outrage. But as a consequence, the political conflicts have overwhelmed our perceptions, obscuring the character of Soviet life. Most Americans rely on the news — and especially television news — which is shaped by momentary political events, not the longer-range, subtler elements of culture, tradition and attitude.

SOVFOTO

Fixed in the imagination of Americans is the terrible reign, the persecutions, of Joseph Stalin.

That kind of information is available in books, scholarly journals and the best newspapers, but it takes second place in the popular imagination to the daily drama of international politics. The easy news is all negative news, and for that you don't have to get up from your television set.

Indeed, news coverage of the Soviet Union, especially on television, tends to be dominated less by the knowledgeable correspondents in Moscow than by the frequent, scary pronouncements of officials in Washington on the Soviet threat. Important national perceptions can be shaped by a well-turned phrase or dramatic image, even when the underlying facts are in doubt. Describing Soviet intentions, for example, President Reagan recently used a quotation that he ascribed to Lenin: "We will take Eastern Europe. We will organize the hordes of Asia. And then we will move into Latin America and we won't have to take the United States; it will fall into our outstretched hands like overripe fruit." It turned out to be a phony, contained in a 1958 book by Robert Welch of the John Birch Society.

There is a great paradox here. Although Soviet society is largely closed and only partially visible to us, our freedom enables us to learn much more than the Russians themselves know about Soviet history and current affairs. In an open society, the facts are available to anyone who wants to dig through the serious writing. But more immediate and ubiquitous sources of information are more easily distorted by political fads and insidious stereotypes.

The resulting misperceptions seem less a function of politics than of emotion, less rooted in the various positions Americans occupy along their political spectrum than in their mythologies about the nature and intentions of the Soviet Union. Indeed, as the recent Times poll showed, many misperceptions are held across political lines — by Republicans and Democrats, conservatives and liberals, voters for Ronald Reagan and for Walter Mondale. The profound ideological conflict between the two countries transcends the divisions of American politics.

It sometimes even affects personal behavior. Russians who visit the United States are generally received with the same courtesy Americans are offered in the Soviet Union. But some contacts have been laced with tension.

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This is a dramatic misimpression of the Russians, whose habits on the job — with occasional exceptions — make the Soviet Union one of the world's greatest goof-off societies. Workers are virtually immune from dismissal, no matter how poorly they perform. The eight-hour day and the five-day week are normal features of Soviet life, as are holidays and vacations, of course. Long vacations and extra pay are offered as a way of attracting workers to the tough climate of Siberia. Given the country's labor shortage, low-skilled Russians have considerable latitude about the kind of job they take. Those with higher education are on narrower tracks, but with some free choice; they are usually able to select their areas of specialization before beginning their studies, and upon graduating from college are assigned three-year positions in their fields.

When a 1981 Roper Poll presented Americans with a choice of terms to describe Russians, practically every response was far off-target, in my experience. The Russian people were seen as aggressive and competitive, disciplined, insensitive and mean. Only 3 percent thought they were cheerful and fun-loving and had a sense of humor. Anyone who has lived in the Soviet Union would find these stereotypes utterly unrecognizable. To the extent that one can generalize about a nation more diverse than we care to realize, Russians are warm and compassionate, more complacent than competitive, more unruly in their souls than disciplined.

What may be happening here is that Americans, encouraged by their own films and advertising, are confusing politics with personality. You have to know Russians personally, and preferably in the cloistered privacy of their own apartments, to know the warmer side of them. A funny, nonsensical television commercial for Miller Lite beer, for example, shows a Soviet émigré extolling the virtue of America, which he says has parties everywhere. In the Soviet Union, he adds, you don't find the parties, the Party finds you.

This disparity between the public and private Russian came to the surface in Chatham High School, where one student called Russians "emotionless." When I asked him why, he gave an interesting answer. Watching Soviet athletes on television, he never noticed any expressions on their faces. "If they win, you expect them to be happy," he said. "Their athletes always look like they're upset all the time."

The comment drew objections from other students, especially a couple who had met Soviet citizens personally. "I find it hard to stereotype such a large country as being emotionless," one boy declared. A girl in the class then spoke movingly about a visit to the Soviet Union with her father, who sang in the Yale Russian Chorus. She was only 10 at the time, but remembered visiting a Russian family at home. The experience remained deeply engraved in her feelings. "In their homes they're very emotional people," she said. "On the street they're just being careful. This facade of being so cold and so hard is just a facade."

That is precisely right, and it's a shame that Soviet authorities don't realize how much good they could do for American perceptions by opening up a little. Officialdom's suspicion of infectious foreign influence makes most Russians wary of inviting Americans home, so even tourists who travel briefly to Moscow often come away with an image of Russians in their public posture — cold, unfeeling and rude.

Others go too far in the other direction, making the wondrous discovery that the Soviet Union is a real country with real people who eat, sleep, brush their teeth and love their children. This can produce gushing, naïve declarations about how we really don't have any conflicts at all.

One Harvard student, participating in a recent PBS television discussion, delivered herself of a perfectly wide-eyed appreciation. "When I got a chance to go I was really excited by the fact that they are just people," she said, "and they walk in the street and they talk and act just like people, like us. There were times when you could have just limited contact with people, and you could get an old woman on the street to smile at you if you did something that she thought was good." Who can argue with her? The sun also rises over Moscow from time to time.

OUR IMAGES OF THE RUSsian people as individuals reflect and reinforce the sense that Soviet society as a whole is bleak, regimented and wholly controlled from above. A recent television commercial for Royal Crown Cola, for example, begins with ranks of Soviet citizens in gray, Stalinesque tunics, their faces impassive as they stand in Red Square facing a stern leader who admonishes them to drink Coke and Pepsi. The scene then shifts to a cabin in the wintry countryside, where jovial Russians in old-fashioned Cossack costumes dance, sing and make merry with RC — until the door bursts open, two black-hatted secret policemen appear and the main reveler hides his RC Cola inside his coat.

The caricature of Soviet society as the ultimate in totalitarianism is widespread in American advertising, films and political cartoons. Even the film "Moscow on the Hudson," which compassionately portrays individual Russians, contains an absurd scene in which a Russian family sitting at home grows alarmed when the hero starts talking about American jazz and singing some tunes. "I know we'll get arrested for sure," one man says.

Similarly, an ad mailed out this autumn by Time-Life Books for a volume on the Soviet Union shows a full color picture of a uniformed Soviet schoolgirl holding an AK-47 assault rifle. The bold print declares: "Powerful. Defiant. Alert to every threat . . . ." Only in fine print is the girl identified as an honor guard at a war memorial. Inside, the blurb asks the reader to imagine himself as a Russian in Moscow, standing at a street corner and checking his impulse to curse at a speeding limousine as he notices a possible informer nearby. "No Party bigshot is worth a trip to Siberia." The ad invites the reader to discover "what life is *really* like inside a country where nothing — absolutely nothing — goes unnoticed under the unblinking gaze of the omnipotent state."

But life in the Soviet Union is not that way. Nor is it portrayed that way by the book itself, which is an excellent, fair-minded examination. The advertisement, in reinforcing the Stalinist image, ignores the extensive changes since Stalin's death in 1953. Although the structure of oppression remains intact, people do not disappear into Siberia for the relatively minor offenses of grumbling or telling political jokes; usually it takes an overt and deliberate act of dissent to provoke a political arrest, and lesser deviations mean lesser punishments, including the forfeit of material privileges, travel to the West and the like.

"It is not a totalitarian state," said Vasily Aksyonov, the dissident writer now living in Washington. "There is a second level full of confusion, full of idiocy, full of black markets, full of debauchery."

Soviet authorities reinforce the totalitarian image by persecuting highly visible, respected human-rights activists such as Andrei D. Sakharov and Anatoly B. Shcharansky, and by harassing and sometimes arresting Soviet Jews who want to study Hebrew, practice their Judaism or immigrate to Israel. The anti-Jewish oppression touches a powerful nerve in the United States, particularly for many American Jews whose parents or grandparents were born in Russia, came to this country and left their children and grandchildren with a legacy of gratitude and a sense of obligation. Rallies, newsletters and lobbying efforts on behalf of Soviet Jewry convey a justified sense of passion and outrage to large numbers of influential Americans.

For the most part, descriptions of Soviet life in American textbooks are frozen in the Stalinist era, when masses of Communist Party officials and others were arrested and shot capriciously. Few books update the picture, and when they do they are sometimes attacked by conservative groups who want them banned from schools for being too gentle with the Russians. One such text, used in Chatham, N.J.; Montgomery County, Md., and elsewhere, is "Unfinished Journey: A World History" by Marvin Perry. In 1981 it was dropped from the Alabama State Board of Education's approved list mainly for its passages on evolution and organized religion, but also because it noted that "under Communist leadership the Soviet Union had been transformed into a modern nation in record time."

"Both sides have inundated their populations with malicious propaganda for a long time," said Stephen F. Cohen, a professor of Soviet politics and history at Princeton University. Among the resulting misperceptions he lists the notions that "the Soviet elite is utterly monolithic because all Communists think alike," that "every Soviet leader is strong," that "there is no real politics in the system — it is a kind of an administrative despotism." This last perceptual problem stems partly from the public struggle between dissidents and the state, which creates an appearance of politics while the real politics, the jockeying among constituencies for resources and priorities, takes place behind the closed doors of Soviet officialdom.

A final misperception holds that the regime has no legitimacy in the eyes of Soviet citizens. "Most Americans don't think of the Soviet system as having a social contract with its people," Cohen observed, citing the mistaken notion that a vast population of Russians detests its system and Government. Fifty-eight percent of those questioned in The Times survey thought Americans were more patriotic than Russians because, as one explained, "I don't think they are too proud of what they stand for, and their economy and life style is more of a grind."

In fact, as Americans who have lived in the Soviet Union have usually come to realize, a broad consensus seems to exist between the rulers and the ruled, one that transcends the widespread grumbling about shortages of goods and services, the acerbic political jokes, the yearning for material artifacts from the West. Despite their mediocre living standards, Russians have a feeling of economic se-

curity, an appreciation for the cradle-to-grave welfare that distinguishes their system from what they are told is the chaotic uncertainty of life in the United States. The importance of this in Russian minds rarely seems to leave its mark on American perceptions. The characteristic is far from comforting, and may lead us to miscalculation if we assume that Russians form a captive nation yearning to be free.

In The Times poll, 49 percent of those surveyed thought the Communist Party would lose a free election in the Soviet Union while 40 percent thought it would win; 51 percent thought that most Russians disliked their system and would prefer a democracy, while 35 percent believed that most preferred strong leadership and would not be attracted to democracy. Asked which they imagined the average Russian would choose, more consumer goods or more political freedom, 62 percent guessed more freedom and only 29 percent said more goods. After four years in the Soviet Union, my hunch is the opposite on each question; I came away convinced of the Russians' discomfort with weak leadership and of their aversion to the West's pluralistic array of political ideas.

That realization comes hard. It is a view of Russian political impulses that has only gradually and recently begun to gain acceptance among American academics, as Robert Kelley, a professor of history at the University of California at Santa Barbara, discovered upon his return from a semester of teaching at Moscow State University in 1979. When he described Russians' affinity for order and unanimity and their desire for a strong hand at the top, his colleagues "simply recoiled in disbelief," he recalled. "I remember being accused of being brainwashed when I said this at a faculty seminar. It seems to me that if I were coming back from Moscow now I wouldn't have the problem. People now are ready to accept this idea."

The academic world is as susceptible to fads as the population at large. It swings from one popular concept to the next. For many years following the launch of Sputnik in 1957, the Soviet Union seemed to have won the scientific and technological race with the United States. Soviet education seemed invincible, American schooling inferior. Now the coin has been flipped, and Soviet society is more widely seen as economically incompetent, technologically hopeless, gripped by imminent crisis and possible collapse. "Why?" asks Stephen Cohen, who has become a gadfly within his profession of Sovietology. "We hate the system and we want it to go away, and we know we can't make a war against it. So we want it to commit an act of self-abolition. It would solve our problems."

AT A CERTAIN level, American antipathy toward the Soviet system satisfies our own need for a villain. And the villain is an abstraction, an all-purpose enemy that often has little to do with the Russians themselves. Thus it is in "Red Dawn," John Milius's World War III film that was popular briefly in the summer of 1984. The scenario plays to the wildest fears and fantasies in American society: An invasion force of Soviet, Cuban and Nicaraguan troops takes over the western part of the United States, shoots up a school, murders townspeople and herds men into a concentration camp. A few high-school students escape with guns into the mountains, where they organize themselves into a band of guerrillas called the Wolverines, attacking Soviet soldiers, convoys and bases in a satisfying orgy of violence that ultimately helps overcome the sinister occupiers.

Virtually all the Chatham students who had seen the film liked it, identified with the Wolverines and enjoyed the idea that a bunch of kids like them could kill a lot of Communists.

"It kind of made you feel good," one boy remarked. "You came out hating the Russians." Another boy added: "Americans went through Vietnam and suffered terrorist attacks. People are sick of America always being wrong. Americans are sick of that. They want the movies to kick their butts around." Only a few in the honors class criticized the film as absurd, scary and bloodthirsty.

The specter of a Soviet takeover will also be exploited by ABC television in a 16-hour miniseries called "Amerika" scheduled for broadcast during the 1986-87 season. Set a decade after the United States has fallen to the Russians without a fight, the program portrays a materially deprived and politically fearful America run by villainous Soviet agents. A K.G.B. colonel will be drawn as a sympathetic character saddened by America's departure from its own values.

But the damaging potential rests in the film's reliance on the debatable assumption that the Soviet Union is out to conquer us. Donald Wrye, the program's writer, producer and director, conceded that most experts his staff consulted "held the opinion that this could not happen." But his plan to sketch a United States as something akin to Vichy France under the Nazi occupation seems likely to encourage those Americans who like to see Soviet Communists behind every unwelcome opinion and development.

If the Russians began producing films and television shows about a conquest of the Soviet Union by the United States, we might rightly accuse them of whipping up hysteria, anti-American hatred and international tension. And we would have some reason to fear the effects on their population, as we ourselves might now worry about the influence of this genre of entertainment on young Americans.

The Chatham High School girl who thought of Hitler when the word Russians was mentioned explained that both regimes treated their people similarly — an idea formed from the images of Nazi-like Russians that appear increasingly in American films.

"Rambo: First Blood Part II," in which an American superfighter goes into Vietnam in search of American POW's, announces the arrival of Soviet officers with a closeup of their black jackboots. The Soviet interrogator, a Lieut. Col. Podovsky, speaks English with a German accent; his precise manner, erect posture and cool sadism make him a carbon copy of Hollywood's typical Nazi S.S. officer. The ruthless Russians torture Rambo with electric shocks, threaten to burn out an American prisoner's eye with a red-hot knife blade, shoot an escaping POW in the back. As Rambo's helicopter seems to spin out of control, there is a searing shot of the satisfied face of a Soviet pilot, set in a cold, malicious grin.

All this could be dismissed more easily if it did not have such an impact. When I asked one group of Chatham students who their heroes were, they listed Rambo and the Wolverines along with President Reagan, General Patton and the United States Marines.

OUR CONFRONTATION with Soviet society is something of a confrontation with ourselves. Any thoughtful American who lives for a time in Moscow comes away with insights into his own fears about the darker sides of his political personality, questions about integrity, courage, principles, values. Some Americans who have read the chapters of my book on Soviet children learning hypocrisy and Soviet adults practicing political charades see aspects of American society there. At a seminar for Middlebury alumni last summer, several retired corporation executives said that they recognized the American business world in my descriptions of the Soviet drive for conformity.

We need an external villain to attack, an image, perhaps, of that villain we suspect lurks inside ourselves. The Russians fill the role conveniently, partly because they are in a real ideological conflict with us. At their cores, our two countries are both evangelical; each is possessed by what it conceives as the most righteous political and economic system in human history, and each is convinced that spreading its system would benefit all mankind. Each proselytizes out of its national interest, creating a mixture of ideological vision and military power that makes a potent chemistry.

Our images of Russia tend to define a certain intellectual orthodoxy in American Sovietology. Some on the political right, such as Polish-born Richard E. Pipes, a professor of history at Harvard, see the consensus as "slightly left of center," as he put it. Others believe that academic debate about the Soviet Union is focused by the political climate of the moment, that as American attitudes have moved to the right, "the aperture of permissible discussion" has moved right as well, in the phrase of Michael MccGwire, formerly a British naval attaché in Moscow and now a specialist in Soviet military affairs at the Brookings Institution in Washington. "It's like a spotlight," he said. "In Russia, you have a spotlight of permissible discussion, but it's fixed. In America, it swings."

Nevertheless, knowledge about the Soviet Union breeds neither affection nor unanimity among the American experts. They are fascinated by the Soviet system but rarely attracted to it. They argue among themselves about Soviet intentions and military capabilities, disagreeing on the most basic questions of whether Moscow is inherently aggressive or defensive in its motivations.

Many students and experts dislike the Soviet system. "That isn't necessarily bad," said Marshall D. Shulman, director of the Harriman Institute at Columbia. "If you train somebody who knows all the negative sides of it, he may be a better reporter, he may be a better negotiator than somebody who is pro-Soviet. The objective shouldn't be to make everybody pro-Soviet."

The penalty for straying beyond the beam in the United States is to be ignored, according to John Steinbruner, head of foreign policy studies at Brookings. "It is exceedingly difficult to get people to hear what you're saying if you're outside of that," he said. Being outside these days means arguing that the Soviet Government is complicated, makes decisions the way most organizations do — in a chaotic and disorganized way — and operates mostly defensively to hold onto what it has. The contrary assumption — that, despite its economic weaknesses, the Soviet Union is a logical, dedicated, expansionist enemy — "is the governing theology of the age, like the tenets of faith of the 14th century," Steinbruner declared. "It's easy to be an apostate."

There is a danger that if we accept our amalgam of images as the entire reality, we cannot deal with the real Russians; we can deal only with our own fears. Still, as I stood in my old high school, I saw a scattering of students in the honors classes whose questioning skepticism set them apart from the crowd. I had come back to my cloistered, homogeneous town wondering whether I would find the mirror image of a group of Moscow teen-agers I once met. They were youngsters of the elite — well-scrubbed, patriotic leaders of Komsomol, the Communist Youth League — who thought their country was the font of all virtue and the United States the focus of evil. They were comforted by the certainty of simplicity, and they reminded me of my hometown, in which the world had seemed neatly divided into good guys and bad guys.

The only heroes the Soviet students could think of were Lenin and Che Guevara, and some of the Chatham youngsters were equally conformist. But the few questioning Chatham kids were quite different from those Komsomol kids in Moscow — and from most of their peers in Chatham — for their heroes included more than models of toughness. They mentioned Martin Luther King, John F. Kennedy, Bishop Desmond Tutu, Gandhi. They had a long list of wrongs to set right in the world, a more searching and self-critical list — poverty, crime, racism, hunger, the nuclear threat, and so on — than the Soviet students had given me. They were ready to learn.

POLLING AMERICANS

By Adam Clymer

AMERICANS THINK of Russians as being quite different from themselves, much more different than the British, Germans or Japanese. The political differences between the United States and the Soviet Union appear to mean more to Americans than, for example, ethnic or other differences between America and Japan. Fifty-six percent of the 1,277 respondents to a New York Times poll thought Russians were "quite different" from Americans; only 38 percent said Japanese were "quite different."

This sense that Russians are not like us is a dominant feature of American attitudes toward the Soviet Union, according to the poll. Fifty-three percent of those questioned said that political differences — or the military threat from the Soviet Union — were the first things that came to mind when they thought of the Soviet Union. Just one-half of 1 percent cited World War II, when the two countries fought together against Nazi Germany.

The telephone poll, which was conducted Sept. 15-19 and had a margin of sampling error of plus or minus three percentage points, revealed that Americans generally regard Russians as less patriotic, less religious and less loving than Americans. Ironically, in light of these impressions of personal differences, Americans saw Russians as sharing their own political aspirations, craving freedom and democracy. Thirty percent of Americans thought at least half the people in the Soviet Union would emigrate if they could.

Another key finding was that those Americans who know most about the Russians do not necessarily feel more sympathetic toward the U.S.S.R. than other Americans. While knowledge of the Soviet Union may lead to a better image of the Russian people, it leads to a worse view of the Soviet Government.

Hostility toward the Kremlin was strongest, in fact, among those respondents who knew most about Soviet history and the current Soviet leadership. That hostility, however, was not absolute; the same group was both especially likely to think of Russia as a threat *and* especially likely to think the United States should try harder to reduce tensions.

Most categories of Americans gave similar answers to questions comparing the American and Russian peoples. Among the old and the young, men and women, educated and not, nearly three-fifths of the public thought Russians worked harder and Americans were more patriotic. Where there were differences, political affiliations were not the key to disagreements. Education and age sometimes mattered, with the young and the educated somewhat more sympathetic to the Russian people.

But the clearest differences emerged when answers were analyzed on the basis of the respondents' knowledge of Russia.

Respondents were asked whether they knew that United States troops had intervened in Russia at the time of the Soviet Revolution; whether they could name the current Soviet leader, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, or identify the K.G.B.; which side the Russians fought on in World War II, and whether they knew that the number of Russian casualties in that war exceeded that of American casualties.

The 24 percent who answered none of the five questions correctly were most likely to think Russians cared less about their families than Americans did, and to think American schools were better.

On the other hand, the 14 percent who correctly answered four or five historical questions differed from the rest of the population in seeing Russians as not very different from Americans when it comes to caring about their families.

Yet their sympathies did not make them doves. Fifty-nine percent of those who knew most about Russia agreed with President Reagan that the Soviet Union is a real and constantly growing threat, while 49 percent of those who answered none of the historical questions correctly thought so.

Even so, it was the group of knowledgeable Americans who most wanted a reduction in tensions between the two countries. ☐

Adam Clymer, an assistant to the executive editor, is in charge of polling at The Times.



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This sense that Russians are not like us is a dominant feature of American attitudes toward the Soviet Union, according to the poll. Fifty-three percent of those questioned said that political differences — or the military threat from the Soviet Union — were the first things that came to mind when they thought of the Soviet Union. Just one-half of 1 percent cited World War II, when the two countries fought together against Nazi Germany.

The telephone poll, which was conducted Sept. 15-19 and had a margin of sampling error of plus or minus three percentage points, revealed that Americans generally regard Russians as less patriotic, less religious and less loving than Americans. Ironically, in light of these impressions of personal differences, Americans saw Russians as sharing their own political aspirations, craving freedom and democracy. Thirty percent of Americans thought at least half the people in the Soviet Union would emigrate if they could.

Another key finding was that those Americans who know most about the Russians do not necessarily feel more sympathetic toward the U.S.S.R. than other Americans. While knowledge of the Soviet Union may lead to a better image of the Russian people, it leads to a worse view of the Soviet Government.

Hostility toward the Kremlin was strongest, in fact, among those respondents who knew most about Soviet history and the current Soviet leadership. That hostility, however, was not absolute; the same group was both especially likely to think of Russia as a threat *and* especially likely to think the United States should try harder to reduce tensions.

Most categories of Americans gave similar answers to questions comparing the American and Russian peoples. Among the old and the young, men and women, educated and not, nearly three-fifths of the public thought Russians worked harder and Americans were more patriotic. Where there were differences, political affiliations were not the key to disagreements. Education and age sometimes mattered, with the young and the educated somewhat more sympathetic to the Russian people.

But the clearest differences emerged when answers were analyzed on the basis of the respondents' knowledge of Russia.

Respondents were asked whether they knew that United States troops had intervened in Russia at the time of the Soviet Revolution; whether they could name the current Soviet leader, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, or identify the K.G.B.; which side the Russians fought on in World War II, and whether they knew that the number of Russian casualties in that war exceeded that of American casualties.

The 24 percent who answered none of the five questions correctly were most likely to think Russians cared less about their families than Americans did, and to think American schools were better.

On the other hand, the 14 percent who correctly answered four or five historical questions differed from the rest of the population in seeing Russians as not very different from Americans when it comes to caring about their families.

Yet their sympathies did not make them doves. Fifty-nine percent of those who knew most about Russia agreed with President Reagan that the Soviet Union is a real and constantly growing threat, while 49 percent of those who answered none of the historical questions correctly thought so.

Even so, it was the group of knowledgeable Americans who most wanted a reduction in tensions between the two countries.

Adam Clymer, an assistant to the executive editor, is in charge of polling at The Times.



SOURCE: 1985 NEW YORK TIMES POLL
ILLUSTRATIONS BY RANDALL ENOS

A Muscovite of 47 wrote: "Giant sequoias, a dazzling limousine gliding among them; the surf, the Golden Gate Bridge in Frisco, the immortal Ella Fitzgerald."

To a middle-aged woman, the images were "prairies, Thoreau (his 'Walden'), Hollywood, Kennedy and Dallas, jazz, whites and Negroes." Another Russian cited cars, billboards, suburbs and "lots of unemployed."

The questions, based on those used in a Times poll of Americans (page 37), were presented to about 30 Muscovites either directly or through friends, since wariness of foreigners tends to produce fairly formal replies to a foreign correspondent. The respondents were promised anonymity, to assure they would not be intimidated. In addition, I talked to knowledgeable Russians about how they thought Russians generally might respond. While there are public-opinion polls in the Soviet Union, few are ever published, and it is doubtful that any are conducted that ask such questions as "What do you think of Americans?" More likely, they ask people how they feel about such things as transportation and retail trade.

THE BRIEFEST RESPONSE TO MY INQUIRIES WAS SIGNED "UNDER 33." It said simply: "Superb roads, clean toilets, businesslike people and well-dressed women."

The most common sources for perceptions of America cited by most of the respondents were officially permitted books, followed by films. Everybody had grown up on Huckleberry Finn and Jack London's "White Fang," and to this day, Russians get a thrill recalling Yul Brynner's fast draw in the "The Magnificent Seven."

"It would not be an exaggeration to say that in childhood we all were reared on American adventure literature — James Fenimore Cooper, Jack London, Edgar Allan Poe, Mark Twain, O. Henry — a whole constellation of names," wrote a Muscovite in his 30's. "All subsequent attitudes toward Americans are bent through this prism — not consciously, of course. Every person looks at the world in his own way, but we all played at cowboys and Indians in our childhood."

And of course there is American pop culture.

"Those who are today in their 20's and 30's," wrote a man of that generation, "passed their whole adolescence in the belief that to have something American was the highest chic — American jeans, American rock, American chewing gum."

None of the respondents had been to the United States, and their images were a pastiche of a land glimpsed dimly from a distance — romantic vistas and homeless people, dazzling culture and broad highways, demonstrators and jazz.

Yet there were curious omissions. Though some talked of the homeless and unemployed, and most seemed sympathetic, even warm, toward Americans, none talked about American democracy or civil rights, and those who bothered to talk about official United States policies seemed uniformly critical. From these and many other interviews, books and articles there emerges a pattern of images and preconceptions about America and Americans, often contradictory and complex, that derives both from the Russian character and from the way an enormously curious people, denied direct contact and information, forms its views of a distant land.

FOR MANY RUSSIANS, ESPECIALLY THE INTELLIGENTSIA, IT IS CULture above all that seems to define their America. Rare is the Russian who was not reared on "The Deerslayer" and "The Adventures of Tom Sawyer," who is not familiar with "The Catcher in the Rye," Ernest Hemingway, William Faulkner and John Steinbeck. Classics and contemporary American literature are a mainstay of the Soviet reading diet, either through dog-eared copies or through translations in the enormously popular monthly journal Foreign Literature. Russian readers are familiar with Theodore Dreiser, Erskine Caldwell, Sinclair Lewis, John Updike, Kurt Vonnegut, Gore Vidal, Isaac Asimov and Arthur Hailey. The books chosen for Russian translation usually are heavy with social criticism.

Then there is the enormous popularity of American jazz, rock, film and theater. Benny Goodman's triumphant 1962 tour is still recalled as a milestone in Soviet music. Movies ranging from "They Shoot Horses, Don't They?" to "Kramer vs. Kramer" and "Tootsie" pack Soviet movie houses. At last count, eight plays by Tennessee Williams were in the repertoires of Moscow theaters, and not so long ago "Porgy and Bess" was spotted in the repertory of the theater in Yakutsk, in remotest Siberia.

One film cited by many Russians as a major source of their impressions of America is Charles Chaplin's "City Lights," which depicts an America of malevolent tycoons and oppressed workers. The Soviet-selected American entry in the feature-film category at the Moscow Film Festival last summer was "A Soldier's Story," about racial conflicts in the United States Army.

In addition to the selective importing of specific books and films, there is a long history of official opposition — usually futile — to more general American influences that are felt to be ideologically dangerous, such as jazz, rock and even jeans. Senior ideologues still write occasional diatribes against the hostile influence of Western pop culture. One knowledgeable Russian, who was a member of the Communist Party at the time, recalls the anxious party meetings called in the early 1960's to consider measures against the runaway popularity of "The Magnificent Seven," which was deemed to give too heroic and attractive an image of Americans. That film was not banned, but it led to the end of the importing of American westerns for the average comrade, although Leonid I. Brezhnev was reputed to have a weakness for cowboy movies and to watch them in the privacy of his official dacha.

BEYOND THE BOOKS, FILMS AND MUSIC, THE SOURCES OF RUSsians' perceptions grow hazier. Many images, like those of car-glutted highways and crowds of people walking briskly through streets, seem to come from the Russians' practice of watching television news not for the news, but for glimpses of distant and unknown places behind the foreign correspondents, who generally choose pretty scenes as backgrounds for their "stand-up" reports. "Television could teach us so much more," wrote a middle-aged Moscow woman, "but still I really like the American backgrounds against which our correspondents talk — the streams of cars flowing down real streets, the throngs of unfamiliar people flowing with their own thoughts."

Since hearsay and rumor are important in the education of a people whose access to solid information is sharply restricted, legends about America brought back by travelers spread rapidly, mingling with images of American tourists and chance contacts with American residents in Moscow.

In recent years, the émigré Russian Jews in Brighton Beach in Brooklyn have supplied a whole new body of lore. Their books and letters and cassettes filter back by various means, including tourists from America and sometimes through the mail, and every hip Muscovite knows the boozy, raspy voice of Willy Tokarev, an émigré who sings of Manhattan from the vantage of a cynical, profane night-shift cabdriver and sometime thief. His songs, "Big Apple," "Skyscrapers, Skyscrapers" and "Over the Hudson," on poorly copied cassettes, rasp from many a Moscow taxi or kitchen window:

"In Central Park, as in the gardens of Semiramis,
The marvels are beyond description.
I only know you have no business there at night.
Pop in, and that's all the New York you'll ever see."

CAMERA PRESS / JEANETTE HARRIS

"Washington rings the nuclear bell," proclaims a banner in Red Square at last year's celebration of the October Revolution.

SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICA ARE FOR THE MOST PART AS YOUNG AS THE SOVIET state. Before this century, at least from the time of Peter the Great, the Russian elite identified with Europe, and France seems to have been the source of language and style. But they imagined the United States, if they thought about it at all, as a wild and woolly land of cowboys and Indians. There are few Americans in prerevolutionary Russian literature, and America itself is mentioned in novels usually only as an exotic and distant place to which characters like Dostoevsky's Dmitri Karamazov or Tolstoy's Stiva Oblonsky threaten to run in moments of extreme despair.

It was after the Bolshevik Revolution and the aftermath of World War I that an image of an industrial, capitalist, powerful America began to take shape. The United States was the industrial model that the young socialist state planned to match and surpass, and it was the major force in the doomed and rotting world that Communism promised to supplant.

The first images of America to gain wide dissemination in the Soviet Union — ones that survive to this day — were created by Soviet poets and writers who traveled to the United States. Works such as Vladimir Mayakovsky's "My Discovery of America," first published in 1926; Maxim Gorky's "The City of the Yellow Devil" (1906) and Ilya Ilf and Yevgeny Petrov's "One-Storied America" (1936) supplied the pioneering pictures of rapacious monopolists and soaring skyscrapers, industrious workers and throbbing factories, millionaires and beggars. They became a source of indelible first images against which all subsequent perceptions have been tested.

Gorky's polemical tract (the yellow devil was gold, of course), which developed out of a trip to the United States early in the century to stir up revolutionary support, was a beginning effort in the genre of bloated capitalist versus oppressed worker.

Ilya Ilf and Yevgeny Petrov's "One-Storied America," by contrast, was an enormously popular, although somewhat superficial, tour of the United States conducted by the Soviet Union's all-time favorite comic writers. Ilf and Petrov crisscrossed the United States and compiled a witty, mildly critical, but basically sympathetic catalogue of American types and peculiarities. If Gorky introduced the callous capitalist, then Ilf and Petrov gave shape to the image of the efficient, ultra-productive "Amerikansky biznessmen." It is a dual image that has persisted through innumerable updates and fine shifts to the present day.

Delovitosts — as a noun it means efficiency, industriousness; as an adjective it means businesslike — is the term for one image that is firmly wedded in the Soviet mind with American business. Stalin himself declared in 1924 that the Leninist approach to work was "to combine Russian revolutionary sweep with American *delovitosts*." During the heady industrialization of the 1920's and 1930's, Russians like Vasily V. Kuznetsov, now 84 and the Soviet Vice President, traveled to Detroit to absorb American technology and industrial techniques.

Today, West Germany and Japan have made considerable inroads into the American reputation for innovation, and Russians may think more in terms of "Western" than "American" technology. Yet *delovitosts* is still firmly associated with America, and one of the reasons for the acute fear of war with the United States is the common image of technological supermen across the waters.

"In the U.S. you think you can find a technological solution to every problem," says Melor Sturua, a longtime writer on American affairs for the newspaper Izvestia. "Sometimes we think you can, too. In fact, Russians can't figure out why Americans have not cured cancer."

FOR THE GENERATION OF RUSSIANS NOW OVER 50, THE GOLDEN ERA OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELAtions was World War II, the great patriotic war. America's entry into the war seemed to many Russians to guarantee an early end to their long ordeal, and many fondly remember the tall, yellow cans of pork and the Studebaker trucks brought in under the lend-lease program.

Roy Medvedev, the dissident historian, recalls that "there was genuine good feeling among people, bordering on gratitude. I was a boy, and the Germans were moving east. They had seized the Ukraine, Byelorussia, the northern Caucasus. I was in Georgia and felt the threat. And suddenly the American Studebaker trucks began arriving — big, heavy trucks moving north — and we felt genuine strength on the move, a strength that would change things."

Pro-American feelings rose to a dramatic high on Victory Day in May 1945, when a crowd converged on the United States Embassy, then near Red Square, in a mass demonstration of what George F. Kennan, then a diplomat in Moscow, called "almost delirious friendship." The wartime infatuation fizzled almost immediately after that, with the atomic bomb, the cold war and Stalin's reimposition of harsh repression of those who had any dealings with foreigners. Spy mania became rife, an official campaign was launched against "bowing low before foreigners," and it became dangerous even to show enthusiasm for things foreign.

In the years since, feelings toward America and Americans have ebbed and flowed with the tides of Soviet-American relations. Yet even in the low times, the longing for American culture has thrived. Not surprisingly, one of the frequent questions in Moscow about the impending Soviet-American summit meeting is whether it might produce a new cultural agreement and renew the trickle of officially sponsored American cultural visits to the Soviet Union. The last exchange agreement lapsed at the end of 1979, and there have been no touring bands or orchestras or theater groups since, although there have been a few films, an occasional performer like John Denver and a handful of American contestants in ballet or music competitions.

The hunger for more exchanges was dramatized most recently at the Moscow Book Fair. Among the most sought-after items was a bilingual catalogue of American books distributed by the Association of American Publishers. So great was the demand that in the closing days of the exhibition some uniformed police were called in, and the American organizers simply threw books into a forest of waiting hands.

Yet when one discusses with Russians their impressions of America, it soon becomes evident that something is missing. None list Abraham Lincoln, the Constitution, human rights, freedom or any other term that might reflect an appreciation of the American political system, of the values that Americans feel most distinguish them from the Russians.

One young Muscovite, who wrote excitedly in the informal survey about the allure of American culture, expressed considerably less enthusiasm for American politics: "When I try to analyze the general attitude among youth to America's domestic and foreign policies, then, despite the fuzziness and lack of clarity, I would still have to say that on the whole it is negative.

"Soviet youth cannot assess the merits of the American democratic political system — our propaganda is silent on this, and for an ordinary Soviet person to get a tourist or official trip to the U.S.A. is an unachievable dream. The flaws and misdoings of the American system, on the other hand, are immediately served up by Soviet propaganda. And, though Soviet young people often treat these propaganda tricks skeptically, their effect is nonetheless great."

This attitude may come as something of a surprise to Americans accustomed to thinking of people in the Soviet Union as yearning to shed Communism or escape to a free America. Some do, of course. But the fact is that in the popular Russian vision of the United States, democracy takes a distant back seat to the American novel, jazz, whisky and business.

One reason, of course, is that very few Russians get to see the United States, and those who do are carefully selected for ideological trustworthiness. According to the State Department, the number of Soviet citizens who visited the United States in 1984 totaled 5,757, and of these only 1,743 were classified as tourists; the rest were primarily diplomats, businessmen and those connected with international organizations like the International Monetary Fund.

But the major reason is that a Russian's view of the American way of life is shaped from childhood by official ideology, propaganda and double talk. Terms like democracy, rights and freedoms are so freely applied by the Kremlin to its own political system that the words become hollow. (Typical was the occasion recently when Gorbachev declared, "If there is a country where political and other rights have been gained by Jews more than in ours, I would be very happy to hear about it. There is no place where they have more rights than in our country.")

In grade school, Russians learn a history of the United States tailored to the tenets of Marxist ideology and the needs of the state. The denigration of the American system is relentlessly pursued in the press and on television. An issue of Pravda, selected at random, poured vitriol on the United States, which was charged with everything from setting up labor camps for dissidents to complicity in the Israeli raid on Palestinian bases in Tunisia. On the same day, Tass, the Soviet press agency, accused Washington of "pursuing a policy of state-sponsored terrorism in international affairs" and waging "an all-out offensive at home on basic human rights." Officials in Washington, Tass added, "evade giving a straight answer to the question on the number of political prisoners in the United States."

Uncle Sam is lampooned almost daily in the press as a fiendish charlatan guiding one global atrocity or another. The themes of repressed blacks, unemployment and the homeless are relentlessly repeated, and American statements or positions are ignored, distorted or miscast. Few Russians, of course, take this stuff seriously. The art of reading between the lines is as old as manipulated information, and the clumsy propaganda often ends up as grist for the renowned Soviet political joke.

There's the one that asks, "What is the difference between the Soviet Constitution and the American Constitution?" Reply: "The Soviet Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and freedom of gathering. The American Constitution guarantees freedom after speech and freedom after gathering."

Or there's the old one about an American and a Russian debating who has more freedom. The American says: "I can walk in front of the White House and shout 'Down with Reagan,' and nothing will happen to me." The Russian retorts: "I can walk in front of the Kremlin and yell 'Down with Reagan,' too, and nothing will happen to me, either."

Yet the steady flow of half-truths and lies, backed by the rigorous control of all other sources of information, does take a toll. The images of poverty and racial oppression take hold, while the dimly perceived concepts of rights and freedoms blend with their own country's often distorted use of those terms.

Excluded almost entirely from the secretive political processes of their own country, Russians acquire little experience against which to assess political democracy in the West. Most of them come to agree vaguely with the fundamental tenet of Marxist ideology, that while capitalist "ruling circles" are bad, the people are good.

Even to Russians who understand its basic workings, the American political system often seems contradictory, unwieldly and disorderly. To Soviet eyes, the public wrangling among officials of the same Administration in Washington, the harsh accusations of competing politicians, the demonstrations and strikes — all these merge with reports of rampant crime and violence to create a frightening image of discord and chaos.

Russians set great store by order and a single governing voice in their own society, perhaps because they fear that without it they would face anarchy and chaos. The portraits of Stalin that still grace many truck windows speak of a nostalgia for a strong master, *khozyain*, and Gorbachev's crackdown on drinking, for all the grumbling about the queues that resulted when liquor stores curtailed their hours, is the type of move most Russians understand and support.

What emerges from Russians' accounts of their impressions of America is a contradictory image of a land both alluring and threatening. Yet however ambivalent the image of America, wherever the political winds are blowing, whatever the inroads of Japan or West Germany into America's reputation for technological might, the United States has always had a unique and powerful place in Soviet perceptions.

FROM THE TIME OF THE Bolshevik Revolution, Russians have perceived the United States as their main rival and main model. It is a nation with which they have felt a kinship in size, breadth and might, and Americans are a people with whom the Russians have perceived themselves twinned by history, rivalry, even by the "mutual assured destruction" of nuclear power.

Reared on James Fenimore Cooper's romantic frontier, Jack London's wild North and Mark Twain's broad Midwest, Russians discern echoes of American legends in their own land. In the American frontier they see their own Siberia, in the Midwest they recognize their own great rivers and steppes and in the melting pot of American history they find reflections of their own multinational state.

But from the enormous differences in the social organization and development of two such kindred lands, they conclude that the Russians and Americans must be diametrically opposed as peoples. The image that develops is of Americans as industrious, practical, businesslike; and of Russians as custodians of a legendary "soul."

The poet Andrei Voznesensky once spoke of the two peoples as two halves of the brain — Americans are reasonable and industrious, Russians are intuitive and subjective. "Americans translate emotion into concrete action," he said. "Confronted with tragedy, a Russian will embrace, weep, kiss, spend the night. An American will write a check."

However they formulate the similarities and differences, the point is that the United States is *the* other big power. China may be mysterious and threatening, Western Europe may be enticing and nettlesome, the third world may be rich in opportunity and risk. But ultimately the Russian's view of the world is bipolar, and the other side is America — rich, contradictory, big, powerful, dazzling, dangerous.

Nikita S. Khrushchev expressed the feeling in his memoirs when he described his emotions on approaching the United States for the first time: "It wouldn't be my first trip abroad. After all, I'd been to England, Switzerland, France, India, Indonesia, Burma and so on. These were all foreign countries, but they weren't America. America occupied a special position in our thinking and our view of the world. And why shouldn't it? It was our strongest opponent among the capitalist countries, the leader that called the tune of anti-Sovietism for the rest."

Yet the feeling is usually not as hostile as Khruschev might have wanted to make it sound. More often the opposite is the case. "The basic difference between us," maintains the poet Voznesensky, "is that Russians like Americans." He is voicing a common assumption among Russians — that their fundamental sympathy and respect for Americans is not reciprocated, that many Americans nurture an irrational hostility for the Soviet Union.

The Soviet sympathy is often tangible. American visitors frequently remark that in a roomful of foreigners, they seem to be the biggest attraction, the most honored guests. To announce *Ya Amerikanets* (I'm an American) is often enough to provoke even ordinary Russians into protestations of peaceful intentions and hatred of war.

Hostile receptions are virtually unknown; on the contrary, Russians often joke that the Soviet Union is the last bastion of pro-Americanism in the world. "Having lived on earth more than half a century," wrote a Moscow woman, "I have never heard an unfriendly word spoken by Russians in respect to American people."

BUT RUSSIAN FEELings about Americans do have their dark side, in the fears and suspicions nurtured by propaganda, by the nuclear threat and more deeply by the inherent Russian distrust of foreigners.

"The Russian psychology is quite fascinating," said Izvestia's Sturua. "We are fascinated by your technology and culture, but at the same time we know you are our main adversary. We fear you. This fact, that we are afraid of you as you are afraid of us, distorts our fascination with the United States. It is simply impossible to bypass the reality that you can annihilate us. This is always present, in any discussion."

This fear of war with the United States is often strikingly real, especially among older people, who on meeting Americans earnestly try to convince them that the Soviet Union does not want war, and who seem certain that President Reagan does. At times, the protestations pass into aggressiveness, and the same Russian who has been vowing his hatred of war may abruptly warn that if conflict does break out, the Soviet Union will surely teach the United States a lesson.

Russians presume, usually correctly, that Americans do not appreciate how terribly the Soviet Union suffered in

World War II, and that Americans, with their limited exposure, do not fully understand the horrors of war. But underlying much of the dark side of Soviet feelings about America is a suspiciousness, a collective insecurity that still lurks in all Soviet attitudes toward the world outside its "sacred borders."

It is evident in the extraordinary security in which the Soviet Union wraps itself, in the instinctive action against the Korean jetliner, in the obsession with espionage, in the control and surveillance of foreigners, in the stringent restrictions on all foreign sources of information.

Things may not be as terrible as they were in Stalin's day, when an accidental meeting with a foreigner could lead to a labor camp. But contact with foreigners and the outside world still remains a carefully and stingily rationed privilege, and unsanctioned dealings are risky. Foreigners in Moscow remain segregated in carefully guarded compounds under intensive surveillance, barred from vast swatches of Soviet territory. The press and television regularly carry horror stories about perfidious foreigners who are provocateurs, spies or worse, and Soviet ideologues inveigh against rock music, Western fashions and current fads as "diversions" concocted by "Western special services." The Voice of America, which was allowed briefly to broadcast untrammeled during the years of détente, has been jammed again since 1980. Western journals and newspapers, of course, cannot be had by the general public.

The list is long and familiar. What is less known, however, is the effect of all this on Russian perceptions of the world. An inevitable result is that the outside world takes on the aura of a forbidden fruit: dangerous, but so very enticing. The chic of wearing a T-shirt with an American logo is enhanced by the element of defiance, and American jeans are infinitely preferable to, say, Czechoslovak jeans, precisely because they come from the "other side."

Another result is that Russians themselves come to treat contacts with foreigners as somehow illicit. Friends of mine who want to take me along to somebody else's party often urge me to say I'm from Estonia "or somewhere like that. Otherwise they'll get all up-tight."

The suspiciousness seems to emanate from a collective sense of insecurity about the outside world, one that manifests itself in shrill Soviet demands to be recognized as equal, particularly by the United States. Even educated Russians who have extensive contacts with foreigners often have difficulty understanding why the propaganda in Pravda, or the treatment of the dissident physicist Andrei Sakharov, or the bland dismissal of the Stalin era as a "cult of personality," or the closed borders, or the proliferation of Soviet spies the world over — why any of this can or should affect the way Americans feel about Russians.

Raising subjects such as dissidents at a meeting with Soviet officials is often viewed as a deliberate provocation. That was Gorbachev's instant reaction when questioned recently about human rights by French interviewers. The issue, he said, was being "artificially played up by Western propaganda and exploited to poison relations between nations and states."

Ordinary Russians feel they have no control over such matters, just as they have no direct input into their domestic political processes, and therefore they feel no responsibility. In the relativist view nurtured by Soviet propaganda, a Russian might retort that America, too, has its oppressed blacks and its homeless, so why dwell on such problems?

It hardly seems surprising, then, that Russians have difficulty appreciating Western reservations about the Soviet system, or understanding that the Western approach may be qualitatively different.

Russians often maintain, in fact, that they know and understand the United States better than Americans understand them, and that Americans labor under an irrational distrust of the Soviet Union.

"Despite the so-called freedom of the press, your people know less about our country than we know about yours," Sturua said. "Of course, everybody in the U.S. has the opportunity to read Pravda. But probably more people read The New York Times in Moscow than read Pravda in the United States."

Russians cite the voluminous body of literature and culture they have absorbed, the admiration for American *delovitosts*, the absence of anti-American feelings among Russians. This they compare to the anti-Soviet sentiments they believe are prevalent in the United States, to the ignorance they sense among Americans about the Soviet way of life, about the Soviet experience in World War II, and to Washington's refusal to accept the Soviet Union as an equal power. They feel slighted and even threatened by films like Sylvester Stallone's "Rambo," with its massacres of Soviet soldiers, or books like "Gorky Park" (neither of which are available in the Soviet Union), which they deem an unfair and inaccurate portrayal of Soviet reality.

"Maybe we don't understand America, but we don't misunderstand it," said Sturua. "You misunderstand us, and this can be dangerous." ☐

AMERICAN HISTORY, SOVIET-STYLE

In Russia's "New History," a Southern black is shown at the polls. "Women, slaves and Indians were not given voting rights."

Soviet schoolchildren first come in contact with American history at the age of 15. Following is a sampler of what they learn from their eighth- and ninth-grade textbooks, as translated by The Times's Moscow bureau.

ON THE CONCLUSION OF THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE IN 1783: "During the Revolutionary War, in the course of a fierce class struggle, power in the U.S.A. passed from one class to another — from landowners-aristocrats to the trade-manufacturing bourgeoisie of the North, which ruled in league with the slave-using plantation owners of the South."

ON THE CONSTITUTION: "The American Constitution secured the rule of the big bourgeoisie and slave owners. Several fundamental principles of the new American Constitution were directly aimed against the mass of the people. Almost all states required that to have voting rights a man must have property, whether land or capital. Women, slaves and Indians were not given voting rights."

ON DEMOCRACY: "On paper, there existed a democratic system in the U.S.A. — the people were sovereign. At the same time, not only the slave owners but also the bourgeoisie only hid behind this false facade. Under the capitalist system, when factories, plants and lands are the property of the bourgeoisie, there is no real democracy, and the mass of the people have to struggle to use democratic institutions, like the parliamentary system, in their interests."

ON THE TREATMENT OF INDIANS: "'The only good Indian is a dead Indian,' said the American generals. One of the means of exterminating Indians was the following: Blankets were scattered near an Indian settlement. Suspecting nothing, Indians picked them up and wrapped themselves in them. Then they would begin dying in masses from smallpox. The fact was that the Americans had earlier wrapped people who were afflicted or had died from smallpox in the blankets. In this way, already in the 19th century, American militarists were using the methods of terrible bacteriological warfare."

ON THE ASSASSINATION OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN: "On April 14, five days after the surrender of [the Confederate commander in chief Robert E.] Lee, during a celebratory show in Washington, Lincoln, a true son of the American people, was killed in his loge. He was killed by an actor, the hireling of the slave-owning South and, it is assumed, of big Northern capitalists. In the power struggle that went on after Abraham Lincoln's death, the big bourgeoisie won."

ON THE TWO-PARTY SYSTEM: "As capitalism developed, the difference between the parties faded. They began to represent the interests of monopoly capital and took turns in power. The monopolies bribed both parties. . . . The two-party system, by creating the illusion of democracy, hindered the emergence of a true people's party in the U.S.A."

ON THE AMERICAN PROLETARIAT AT THE START OF THE 20TH CENTURY: "In ideological terms, the American proletariat was not ripe. The socialist movement was considerably weaker in the U.S.A. than in Europe. . . . American workers were unable to create a mass Marxist party. They came under the control of the most reactionary trade-union leadership." ☐

MOMENTS OF RECOGNITION

From the portrait of the last czarist family in Siberian exile to newsreels of Stalin and a gaunt Roosevelt at Yalta to a button commemorating the downing of Flight 007, the images on these pages represent milestones in American public opinion of the Soviet Union since the Bolshevik takeover some seven decades ago.



The Czar and his children, shortly before they were shot in 1918.

M.N. LEVIN COLLECTION

A button for an American Communist convention, 1938.



DAVID KING COLLECTION, LONDON

International Harvester tractors sold to the Soviet Union in the early 1930's and serviced by American-trained factory workers.

PEACE MUSEUM, CHICAGO

Pencil-raising poster for an American group organized in Petrograd, 1917.



Russian Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov (left) and German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, who signed the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939.

Leon Trotsky dying after an assassin's attack, 1940.

UPI

Insignia of the U.S. military mission to Moscow, 1943.

GEORGE F. CHOLEWCZYNSKI COLLECTION

1917-39 Following the October Revolution of 1917, many Americans saw Bolshevism as evil incarnate — an impression that deepened with Stalin's murderous purges of the 1930's. But as the Depression in America persisted, home-grown Communist parties, which were first formed in 1919 by dissident factions of the Socialist Party, attracted a sizable following.

1939-45 The Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939 fell apart in 1941 when the Germans — alarmed by the Soviet push into Eastern Europe and the Baltic territories the Germans had wanted for themselves — invaded Russia. For Americans, Russian resistance to the might of the German Army turned the Soviet Union into an ally. In the Leningrad siege alone, almost a million people died.

For nearly 70 years, our images of the Russians have continually shifted.

GRANGER COLLECTION

Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin at Yalta in early 1945. In the ensuing cold war, the conference was criticized for lending respectability to Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe.

DAVID KING COLLECTION, LONDON

The Zim sedan of the early 1950's—a Soviet imitation of a Detroit model.

PHOTOREPORTERS

U.S. and Soviet soldiers meeting near the River Elbe, Germany, April 1945.

GEORGE F. CHOLEWCZYNSKI COLLECTION

Above: Insignia of the U.S. Air Forces in Europe, which directed the Berlin Airlift in 1948-49. Left: Medal awarded to those who helped break the Soviet blockade.

AP

Julius and Ethel Rosenberg leaving court after they were sentenced to death, April 1951.

SHOEMAKER, CHICAGO DAILY NEWS

American shock at the Russians' successful A-bomb test, 1949.

1945-53 In the ruins of postwar Europe, U.S.-Soviet amity turned into cold war. While the Marshall Plan enabled a devastated Europe to recover economically in less than a decade, the Soviet Union consolidated its control of Eastern Europe. Tensions worsened when the Soviet-sponsored regime of North Korea crossed the 38th parallel into the Western-supported republic in the south in June 1950. And in June 1953, the Rosenbergs were executed for conspiring to deliver vital A-bomb data to the Soviet Union.

PHOTOS OF BUTTON, INSIGNIA AND MEDALS ON THESE PAGES BY RICARDO SALAS



OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, DEPT. OF DEFENSE

Diagram of a prefabricated backyard fallout shelter, 1961.

HANK WALKER, LIFE MAGAZINE © TIME INC.

Joseph McCarthy conducted a nationwide witch hunt of "Red subversives" in the early 1950's.



M. BERKOWITZ AND M. N. LEVIN COLLECTIONS

Above: The official national fallout-shelter sign of the 1960's. Right: A button of the cold war.



SOVFOTO

Left: Russian scientist with a model of Sputnik, the first satellite launched into space in 1957.

JOHN BRYSON

An American U-2 spy plane was downed over Russia in 1960.

Our fear of the nuclear enemy alternates with our hopes for détente.

JOHN SADOVY

During the Hungarian revolt of 1956, members of the security police were lined up against a wall (above, left) and shot (right) by their rebelling countrymen.

HANK WALKER, LIFE MAGAZINE © 1959 TIME INC.

Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev politicked in America during his tour of 1959.

1953-61
McCarthyism entered the American lexicon in the early 50's as the Senator from Wisconsin fanned a "Red scare."

The fear of Soviet power grew as the Russians exploded their first H-bomb, suppressed the Hungarian revolt and launched Sputnik — and the space age. A brief respite in the cold war came when Khrushchev met with President Eisenhower at Camp David in 1959, but a U.S.-Soviet summit conference was canceled in 1960 after an American spy plane was downed over the Soviet Union.

1961-69
A showdown between the U.S. and the Soviet Union came in 1962 with the discovery of Russian missile bases in Cuba. For a moment, nuclear war seemed a real possibility — until Khrushchev backed down. The cold war continued apace: The U.S. escalated its involvement in the Vietnam War and the Soviet Union snuffed out the liberalizing policies of the Czech Government.

KING NEW YORK DAILY NEWS

American protest at the installation of Soviet missile bases in Cuba, 1962.



J.P. /MAGNUM PHOTOS

Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia ended "Prague Spring," 1968.

DENNIS BRACK/BLACK STAR

Leonid Brezhnev and Richard Nixon, 1973, architects of U.S.-Soviet détente.



Soviet stamp of Apollo-Soyuz flight, 1975.

ALAIN DEJEAN/SYGMA

Rebel capture of an armored personnel carrier soon after Soviet troops occupied Afghanistan in 1979.

The actor Clark Gable giving Brezhnev a farewell hug, San Clemente, Calif., 1973.



DER STERN FROM BLACK STAR

The Wall: a 29-mile monument to the cold war, erected between East and West Berlin in August 1961.

LASZLO KUBINYI

M. BERKOWITZ AND M. LEVIN

Buttons supporting U.S.-Soviet friendship and Solidarity leader Lech Walesa, and protesting the Soviet downing of a jetliner in 1983.

1969-85

Beginning with Richard Nixon, three successive Presidents pursued a policy of détente with Russia. In 1975, the two superpowers even arranged for the Apollo-Soyuz flight — a historic joint manned space mission. In the 1980's, the Soviet Union has once again become the "evil empire" — by occupying Afghanistan, by encouraging the suppression of a liberalizing movement in Poland, by downing a commercial airliner flying into its air space (Representative Lawrence McDonald was among the 269 civilians killed).

PHOTOS OF BUTTONS ON THESE PAGES BY RICARDO SALAS

ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE A-1

WASHINGTON POST
28 July 1985

Andropov Rushed Renewal Into Motion

POWER IN THE KREMLIN
FROM BREZHNEV TO GORBACHEV

By Dusko Doder
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW—It all began and ended in the Arctic cold.

On a frigid November day in 1982, Yuri Andropov was facing the country for the first time as its new leader. The northern wind blew in stinging gusts across Red Square as he performed initiation rites facing the coffin of his predecessor, Leonid Brezhnev. His voice was clear and decisive. His bearing seemed to project hopes that the future was bright.

Fifteen months later it was Andropov's own coffin that rolled along the same vast square shimmering in the pale sunlight on a windswept February morning. And the question many thoughtful people asked at the time was whether Andropov's brief tenure as Kremlin leader would turn out to be a mere footnote in Soviet history books or one of its main chapters.

It was difficult to pass judgment on his administration on that freezing February day in 1984. In mourning him, the Russians seemed to mourn the potentially irretrievable loss of the new departures that he had promised and that had briefly offered a chance of moving the ossified Soviet system into a new era.

In retrospect, however, Andropov's 15 months in power marked a turning point in recent Soviet history. It left a lasting impact that his immediate successor, Konstantin Chernenko, could not undo. Ultimately, it created the basis of the current mood of optimism and activism that has sustained the 4½-month-old administration of the new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev.

When Chernenko died in March 1985, Gorbachev became the heir and executor of the Andropov legacy. Without the Andropov interlude, Gorbachev would not have been able to consolidate his power so quickly and move so forcefully in his efforts at national reconstruction.

The Soviet Union is a country of unfulfilled potential, a country constantly hoping for a chance for a new beginning. During the past four years, it has lived through a period of uncertainty and groping, yet one that also eventually yielded a potentially crucial political transition—from Brezhnev to Andropov to Chernenko to Gorbachev—

For this correspondent, who has spent almost seven of the past 17 years as a reporter in this country, it is still necessary to concede just how little one really knows about it. But in a country that treats information as a privilege to be distributed on a need-to-know basis, the truth is difficult to know, and outsiders can only approach it by piecing together and analyzing bits of information.

The tragic, coarse, brutal and at the same time human and delicate aspects of Russia have always struck me as almost biblical. Now, after the deaths of three leaders in three years, there are renewed hopes here for a new beginning. The chance seems to exist. Whether it will be seized or not remains to be seen.

That Andropov's brief tenure is proving to be the crucial turning point seems all the more remarkable since he was seriously ill for much of those 15 months. His kidneys collapsed four months into his administration, and he had to use a dialysis machine at least twice a week.

In late September 1983 his condition suddenly became so grave that he had to be hospitalized. In October, doctors removed one of his ailing kidneys, and from that point on, a high official recalled in a conversation, Andropov was restricted to a specially equipped apartment inside the government hospital at Kuntsevo, not far from his Moscow home, always attached to the dialysis machine.

Rule by Remote Control

And yet, he continued to run the country as if by remote control, the official noted. Only members of his family, close political associates, key personal aides and Gorbachev, the youngest member of the Politburo and his favorite, had access to the Kuntsevo hospital apartment that winter.

Continued

Everything had been done to fix the apartment in a way that would permit Andropov to forget that he was inside a hospital. He was constantly on the phone. When he called senior officials in for talks, he would greet them in his living room, wearing a soft house robe and seated in a comfortable armchair. A battery of phones was nearby.

Andropov had good days and bad days. On a bad day "his voice was weak," recalled an official who had known Andropov for nearly three decades. "It was in December, and when we finished discussing business at hand and I was about to leave, he got up from his armchair and embraced me. He did so as if he knew that we were seeing each other for the last time, and I was tremendously shaken and saddened. But then I talked to him by phone two weeks later and his voice was firm and cheerful and I thought, well, he was going to recover."

At the end of January 1984, Andropov's condition deteriorated sharply. In the first days of February he lapsed into a coma, never to regain consciousness. The phone calls stopped.

The government came to a standstill. Pavel Laptiev and two other close personal aides moved into the Kuntsevo apartment. Andropov died on Feb. 10 as his latest protege, Yegor Ligachev, was making his first speech as a Central Committee secretary.

When the death was announced the next day, it came as a surprise for the vast majority of Soviet citizens. As Andropov's health was deteriorating in the two previous months, the government's propaganda machinery had moved into high gear, creating an illusion that the leader was more active than ever.

The initial shock turned into widespread depression when it was announced that Konstantin Chernenko, 71 at the time, was elected the new general secretary of the Communist Party, the country's most powerful post.

Chernenko was not only older than Andropov and obviously in poor health, but he also was intimately connected to the Brezhnev "mafia" that had run the country for 18 years and had ushered in the time of decline and despondency at the start of the 1980s.

Was it a return to the Brezhnev era? What was to become of the hopes for national reconstruction that Andropov had raised?

Looking back, one can see why Andropov's brief tenure marked a turning point.

First, Andropov pushed Gorbachev to the fore and placed into the leadership a group of younger men who brought with them the ideas of national reconstruction and reform that had been percolating under the surface of Brezhnev's last years of inactivity. These men had had to wait on the sidelines for far too long while a complacent Brezhnev administration had ignored the signs of a gathering crisis.

In moving them up, Andropov brought about a real generational change.

The second point was more fundamental and hence more important.

For more than six decades the Soviets have lived in a propaganda paradise. For a long time, the utopian notions that served as part of the vision of the communist future guiding the elite had seemed attainable. But the old belief that Russia was riding the crest of history had been supplanted by a widespread feeling here during Brezhnev's last years that communism everywhere was in retreat and the Americans everywhere on the march.

Nothing else illuminates so obviously the discrepancy between utopian ideological constraints and reality as does the Communist Party program, which is supposed to be the bible of the Soviet party and which was adopted in 1961.

By the end of the 1970s, the program asserts, the Soviet state and economy would be so advanced that the population would be ensured an abundance of everything.

By the end of 1970s, the program specifies, among other things, there was to be so much food that all workers would be fed free of charge at factory restaurants; schoolchildren and students would get free clothing and books; all Soviet citizens would enjoy rent-free housing; water, gas and heating would be free, as would all transportation; all citizens would have two months of paid vacation per year; and, needless to say, such things as medical and other essential services would be free.

The program, in short, promised a paradise on Earth. For the farmers of Kazakhstan who did not read party documents, the promise was summarized by Nikita Khrushchev. By 1980, he said, the Soviet Union would "overtake America" in everything—food, wealth, comfort, industrial strength.

By the early 1970s, it had become all too apparent that the program's pledges were in the realm of fantasy. At the beginning of the 1980s, however, the gap between the verbiage and the reality had become intolerable. Most people knew it, yet the utopian rhetoric continued, as if by inertia.

A series of internal and external problems produced a deep crisis in Soviet society and deepened the feeling of gloom in its elite: the war in Afghanistan, the Polish crisis, Brezhnev's protracted illness that immobilized the government, the declining rates of industrial growth, repeated agricultural disasters and food shortages, widespread corruption and drunkenness, to name a few.

The authorities sought to put up a brave front to obscure public discontent and the loss of optimism and confidence. Yet it seemed all too clear that Soviet society was ready for changes.

The KGB Significance

Much has been made of the fact that Andropov served for 15 years as chairman of the KGB, the Soviet secret police. In the West, the KGB is associated with espionage and suppression of internal dissent, both accurate images. There is undoubtedly a cruel side to Andropov, who masterminded the destruction of the dissident movement here.

He took over as KGB chairman at a time when the dissident movement was gaining momentum, with many prominent Soviet personalities from the scientific and cultural communities joining in demands for greater liberalization. By the time he left the job, most prominent dissidents had been either forced into exile, such as Alexander Solzhenitsyn, or tried and sentenced. Some were placed in psychiatric hospitals while a few, such as physicist Andrei Sakharov, were sent into internal exile.

In its efforts to destroy the dissident movement, the KGB sought to prevent any form of organized opposition and to remove its prominent spokesmen. That left the movement without a sense of direction or leaders to rally around.

Here, however, the KGB is also regarded as an elite organization, the guardian of the Soviet system, an outfit that has been recruiting the best and the brightest young men and women. The job not only gave Andropov the best available information about the country and the world, but it also provided him with the aura of authority that Russians respect.

The image of the secret police as an all-knowing and all-powerful instrument of oppression is deeply imbedded in the Russian psyche. A friend recalled a remark by Andropov in 1967 that illustrates the point. Andropov was a secretary of the Central Committee at the time, one of the 21 top officials who run the Soviet Union, and he had just been appointed KGB chairman. As they walked together past the KGB headquarters on Moscow's Dzerzhinsky Square, his friend recalled, Andropov said: "All my life I have been walking past this building with a feeling of unease and awkwardness. Imagine, I'm going to become its boss."

The KGB reputation gave Andropov an image within the country of strength and firmness. As national leader he held out a promise of hope. The very picture of the new leader taking charge as smoothly and naturally as if he had been groomed for it all his life could not but create a surge of optimism.

What he told the people was hardly new—indeed the whole country was aware of the chasm between Soviet rhetoric and the reality. What was dramatically new was that the Kremlin leader himself was telling it without sugarcoating.

In doing so, he seemed determined to create a picture of purpose and resolve. Strict disciplinary measures were combined with appeals to logic and reason, the latter suggesting that intelligence was finally being applied to national business.

Many of the party's objectives, he said, had failed "the test of time." Many of its enshrined goals were unjustified and some contained "elements of separation from reality." The economy was being run on a trial-and-error basis, which was "irrational."

After 65 years of Soviet power, a Kremlin leader was telling the nation that the economy and society were seriously weakened, and that this feebleness was the result in large measure of the absence of rational understanding and rational direction.

"Frankly speaking," Andropov said, "we have not yet studied properly the society in which we live and work, and we have not yet fully discovered the laws governing its development, especially economic laws."

For a communist elite that was supposed to know the future and that claimed to be running the country on "scientific principles" of Marxism-Leninism, these were staggering admissions.

His aim, Andropov said, was to sort things out and bring order to the nation's existing social and industrial capacities. Then, he said, it would be necessary to make changes in "planning, management and the economic mechanism," or, in effect, in the entire system.

"I do not have a recipe," he said. But the country was ill prepared for a highly competitive future and "now we must make up for what we have lost."

Frightening the Bureaucrats

Not everyone was happy, however.

When one speaks of changes in the Soviet economy, it must be kept in mind that one is talking about the entire society. All Soviet citizens work for the state. A huge and strictly hierarchical bureaucracy presides over this edifice, the world's second-largest economy.

One of the hallmarks of Brezhnev's 18 years in power was stability. As he grew older, Brezhnev was increasingly reluctant to make personnel changes and felt comfortable only with the old, familiar faces. Top officials had acquired lifetime job security. For example, there were no changes in the composition of the Central Committee for the last 10 years of Brezhnev's life.

Given the hierarchical nature of authority, this also meant almost automatic job security for countless officials at the middle and lower levels of the bureaucracy. This produced an enormous resistance to changes, so that Andropov's tenure was marked by a covert political struggle not only along generational lines but also between an established and largely corrupt machinery impervious to reforms and a coalition of younger and better educated sections of the elite who favored national reconstruction.

But it would be a gross oversimplification to assume that only the corrupt elements of party bureaucracy were opposed to Andropov. Many orthodox communists feared systemic changes on grounds that, once initiated, they could acquire an uncontrollable life of their own. The question here was whether the party could hold the society together to make changes smoothly enough, particularly while confronted with President Reagan's rearmament program and Moscow's extended commitments to communist allies and various clients throughout the world.

The fact that Andropov openly confronted the party and country with the existing realities changed the tone of public debate. But the entrenched opposition was lying in wait, publicly agreeing with the new policy course but covertly speculating about how long the ailing leader would last.

The coalition for change led by Andropov included powerful groups in the society. Among them were technocrats, younger people in general, some senior officials who had become increasingly concerned about the feebleness of the economy, and the KGB.

Andropov must have known just how intractable the system was. In a one-party state, the new leader inherits the entrenched apparat of his predecessor. Only gradually can he bring in his own people, only cautiously can he challenge the sacred privileges of a bureaucracy wholly identified with the ruling party.

Looking back again, it seems remarkable how fast Andropov moved on all these fronts.

The men who run the country today are all Andropov's men. He singled out Gorbachev as his heir-apparent. All others were completely unknown only two years ago. Ligachev, who is now second in command, had been a provincial leader in Siberia for 18 years. Nikolai Ryzhkov, Vitali Vorotnikov and Viktor Chebrikov were so obscure that not even knowledgeable Soviet analysts knew who they were.

While there were relatively few changes at the top, at other levels the pace was quick. Hundreds of persons who held real power either in Moscow or in the provinces were removed. Thousands of middle-echelon officials were replaced or shifted to other duties.

Continued

A Focus on Corruption

In the struggle against the bureaucracy, Andropov seized on the issue of corruption. Members of Brezhnev's entourage and some close relatives had become involved in various corruption scandals and the feeling of political and social disgust in the country was fueling demands for change.

Apart from KGB reports, Andropov could witness manifestations of corruption and misuse of power almost daily.

An ascetic figure, for the last 16 years of his life he lived with his wife in a one-bedroom apartment on the sixth floor of a massive building at Kutuzovsky Prospekt 26. The apartment, consisting of a kitchen, dining room, living room and bedroom, comprised a total space of less than 900 square feet. He also had the use of a two-story *dacha* at Barikha, outside Moscow, whose living space was roughly equal to that of an average center-hall colonial house in Washington.

A few floors under Andropov's Moscow apartment lived Brezhnev, whose palatial apartment occupied the entire floor of the building, and Brezhnev's crony and interior minister, Nikolai Shchelokov, whose apartment was equally grand. Even distant relatives of these and other high officials drove Mercedes-Benz cars and had built palatial *dachas* at Barikha—at government expense.

Friends of Andropov say that even while he was in the KGB he had on several occasions expressed his anger and disgust over the elite's corruption. As Soviet leader, he used the issue to force personnel changes. The bureaucracy was deathly frightened of this gaunt and withdrawn man, assuming that he knew everything about each official from KGB files.

And yet these people could be replaced only gradually, since they were the mainstay of the party and the basis of the system. It was a difficult issue, and Andropov must have been aware of the magnitude of the task.

Before his kidneys gave out in February 1983, Andropov had met with a prominent Soviet novelist for a private conversation. "He told me that doctors were giving him about five years to live," the novelist recalled later. "But he said the things he wanted to do would require at least 10 years of work."

Once he became seriously ill, Andropov gave the impression of a man in a hurry. His speeches became bolder and more direct, and he announced that a comprehensive blueprint for economic changes would have to be completed in two years, or before the end of 1985.

At the same time, he initiated the most far-reaching internal economic debate among economists, managers, scientists, Central Committee experts and officials to determine the course of these changes. In his speeches he seemed to favor a new pricing system, fiscal incentives, reducing the authority of the state planning committee, and measures to "provide scope for individual and local initiatives." The trend was in the direction of market socialism.

The debate abated when he was hospitalized in September 1983 and no clear blueprint emerged from it. As he conducted business from the Kuntsevo hospital, he seemed to focus almost entirely on the personnel issue, sensing that he had only a short time to live.

He had seen the hidden dangers facing a leader seeking to make radical changes while he worked as a Central Committee secretary, first for Khrushchev and later for Brezhnev. Khrushchev was ousted when he precipitously initiated changes that threatened bureaucratic privileges but failed to put his men in key positions. Alexei Kosygin's reforms in 1965 died a slow death in the bowels of the bureaucracy while a passive Brezhnev waited on the sidelines and used the failure to consolidate his preeminence.

By focusing on the personnel changes and advancing young and energetic people who were building their careers, he was hoping that his strategy would be carried out by the new generation.

At the end of December 1983, he made Chebrikov an alternate Politburo member and pushed Vorotnikov and Mikhail Solomentsev to full membership. He had prepared a speech for the Central Committee but could not deliver it himself.

The last section of that speech, even at that time, seemed like his political testament. The course had been set, he said. "We have raised people's expectation." It was the duty of all Central Committee members to stay the course, he said, in what was almost an appeal to them.

Although his health was a state secret, and even Central Committee members did not know much about it, the word had filtered out that Andropov's days were numbered. His opponents were waiting.

A remark by a 74-year-old Central Committee member in January 1984 illuminates this point. "What's all this about Andropov?" he said with evident contempt to some young people at a wedding party. "He is just an old, sick man."

Gorbachev: Soviet Leader in a Hurry

He Urges Discipline and Work to Modernize the Society

By Dusko Doder
Washington Post Service

MOSCOW — The transformation of Mikhail S. Gorbachev from the youthful but still uncertain figure in the Politburo to a confident and powerful national leader has been so rapid, and seemingly so effortless, that it surprised even his most ardent boosters.

From the start, Mr. Gorbachev appeared to be a man in a hurry, a man who wanted the country to put aside the confusion and uncertainty of three leadership transitions in less than two and a half years, who wanted to demonstrate he was making policy for the long run.

Plunging into his work, he seemed to project action and purpose wherever he went, urging the people to roll up their sleeves, get to work and revitalize their country.

His activism, his instinct for maneuvering and, above all, his speaking abilities came across on television. He is the first Soviet leader to be a TV personality, bringing with him a casual tone, a dislike of verbosity and sloganeering, a man with a self-depreeating wit and also what many Soviet citizens sense as personal warmth.

His age alone — 53 when he took over — was a help, seeming to lift the nation's spirit. After a series of embarrassingly feeble old men at the top, the sight of a younger and energetic Kremlin leader seemed to symbolize the end of the leadership interregnum and its uncertainties.

Those disheartening years were marked by a loss of national confidence and the absence of reformist impulses. Mr. Gorbachev's accession to power, other things being equal, holds out the prospect of a significant modernization of Soviet society in the coming decade.

But other things are not equal. Quite apart from the magnitude of the task involved in national reconstruction of a highly centralized and hierarchical country, there remains the problem of a huge, entrenched party bureaucracy that is not likely to succumb to new rhetoric and changing public moods.

Moreover, Mr. Gorbachev and his men have only set the direction of the new "economic mechanism." They have yet to come up with specific policies on such intractable issues as prices, wages, fiscal incentives and managerial authority, not to speak of relations between enterprises and the state.

Although the guideposts are set, they appear clearly inadequate in the absence of a rational and coherent plan of action.

Nevertheless, in the course of the last four months, Yuri V. Andropov's protégé has emerged as a figure in his own right, a leader driven by ambition and determination to harness the country's potential and carry out a national reconstruction.

He seems to handle the job skillfully, more pragmatic on economic matters and lacking doctrinaire belief in the sanctity of tradition. He is concentrating on the future, clearly trying to disengage himself from an inheritance of stereotypes.

Undoubtedly, Mr. Gorbachev was fully aware of the importance of first impressions. In presenting his image to the country he may have been helped by the new and more sophisticated Soviet approach to public relations that has emerged during the past year. It is an approach of direct appeal to the people, with television cameras following him on his travels, and of reasoning with the people.

To the outside world, this is represented by the more personal and open attitude of the new government spokesman, Vladimir B. Lomeiko.

One of the most significant

(Continued on Page 5, Col. 1)

Power in the Kremlin

Brezhnev to Gorbachev

Last of three articles.

Gorbachev: Leader in a Hurry To Modernize Soviet Society

(Continued from Page 1)

trends under Mr. Gorbachev has been a revival of the impulse within the ruling elite to reshape society. And, while the basic stalemate with the bureaucracy remains, political conditions have changed.

In this context, it can be said that Mr. Gorbachev has a realistic opportunity to modernize the Soviet system, although observers here believe that this cannot be accomplished without a major political struggle. The odds are that it will be an uphill struggle.

Mr. Gorbachev brought considerable skill and talent to his job. Those who have dealt with him describe him as a tough and competitive person, with a gregarious approach and persuasive manner.

When Andrei A. Gromyko nominated him in March to succeed Konstantin U. Chernenko as general secretary of the Communist Party, he told the Central Committee, "Comrades, this man has a nice smile but he's got iron teeth."

For the past four months, Mr. Gorbachev has shown the country both his smile and his iron teeth.

During a trip to Leningrad, he was bantering with a jostling crowd in the street, seeking their support to "move the country forward." A woman in the crowd said, "Just get close to the people and we'll not let you down." Hemmed in by the crowd, Mr. Gorbachev shot back, laughing, "How can I get any closer?"

Speaking at the Smolny Institute later that day, he posed a rhetorical question with an affable smile: Why not enjoy life, resting and lying at anchor? Why insist on moving the country forward?

No, comrades, he said, his face turning serious. "This is not the choice. We do not have such a choice." Just to keep even on living standards and military needs, he said, the country needed a minimal growth rate of 4 percent a year instead of the present 3 percent.

There was a populist tone in his speech when he talked of the need to raise living standards. But there was another and novel notion to this. Not slogans and propaganda but the quality of life in the Soviet Union is ultimately the image the country presents to the world.

He also flashed some iron teeth in the speech. The program, he asserted, will have to be carried out. "We have no other options," he continued. "Those who do not intend to adjust and who are an obstacle to solving these new tasks must simply get out of the way." He added for emphasis, "Get out of the way. Don't be a hindrance."

In speech after speech he has hammered at what is the central theme of his pronouncements. The country, he said, must bring its economy to Western levels of efficiency and quality. To pull the country out of its long doldrums, he said, there must be a thorough change in the way the economy is run. The very "psychology of economic activity" must be altered.

In a relatively short time, Mr. Gorbachev seems to have become more than a mere heir and executor of the Andropov legacy. He has acted more quickly and boldly in pushing his program and consolidating his power than any of his predecessors.

There was another novel thing in this. While he has absorbed much of the traditional party code, Mr. Gorbachev's instincts seem contemporary and he appears to reflect the disquietude and longings of the generation after World War II, a war in which he was too young to fight.

All this does not mean a change in Kremlin goals. But it may indicate a change of means as well as a greater social concern, which Mr. Gorbachev has repeatedly articulated by talking about the lot of Soviet consumers and urging efforts to improve the quality of life.

Everyone here, naturally, favors a better life. The conflict is between those who insist it can be achieved by making the system work better, and those who contend that the system itself must be improved and adjusted to new conditions.

For while everybody speaks about the need for reform, a radical

change would be resisted from below. Just an adjustment of the pricing system would be a revolutionary measure, for it would involve at least partial cuts in huge subsidies on basic food commodities, rents and transportation.

Although Mr. Gorbachev seems to favor radical changes in the future, he has only revealed his policies for what he has described as the "first phase" of his program.

To spur the economy, he has continued the campaign for discipline, introduced anti-drinking laws and ordered a shift of investments into modernization of existing industrial plants. He has also proposed greater independence for individual enterprises and modest cuts in the number of agencies that supervise industry.

What the remainder of his program will be is as yet unclear.

Whatever the shape of the program, its fate will likely be decided over the next seven months.

Despite the enormous powers of his office, a Soviet leader must have support throughout the party hierarchy to be able to institute significant reforms. This means key people in key posts in the provinces.

Camera Press

Mikhail S. Gorbachev

Plunging into his work, Gorbachev seemed to project action and purpose wherever he went, urging the people to roll up their sleeves, get to work and revitalize their country.

Mr. Gorbachev already dominates the Politburo and the Central Committee machinery in Moscow. But to be successful, he must have his supporters throughout this vast country to mobilize people for work and sacrifice.

In moving quickly to consolidate his power, Mr. Gorbachev had benefited from his position as heir to Andropov, who initiated most of the economic and organizational changes now under way. It can be said without qualification that without Andropov's 15-month interlude it would have been impossible for Mr. Gorbachev to move so quickly and on so many fronts.

The key men around the new leader, as far as policy is concerned, are Yegor K. Ligachev, Nikolai I. Ryzhkov, Viktor M. Chebrikov and Vitali I. Vorotnikov, all handpicked by Andropov.

There was ample evidence that personal relations between Andropov and Mr. Gorbachev were very

close. They had met in the early 1970s after Mr. Gorbachev became party chief of Stavropol Oblast, a region just north of the Caucasus, near Andropov's favorite resort, Kislovodsk.

The older man liked the younger one's wit and intelligence and, particularly, the fact that not a whiff of corruption touched Mr. Gorbachev or his family. They frequently walked in the woods around Kislovodsk and discussed politics.

It was Andropov who recommended Mr. Gorbachev to Leonid I. Brezhnev in 1978 and proposed him for a position in the party secretariat. When Andropov became the Soviet leader there was no doubt that he was relying on Mr. Gorbachev and regarding him as a future leader.

That the old guard managed to block Mr. Gorbachev at the time of Andropov's death was a signal of resistance to change. But the ages of the old guard and the positions of Andropov's men in the leadership made it almost inevitable that Mr. Gorbachev was next in line after Chernenko.

When his time came, Mr. Gorbachev was in position to move with exceptional speed. In the first four months he managed to put four new people into the ruling Politburo as full members, two of them — Mr. Ryzhkov and Mr. Ligachev — bypassing the usual stage of being candidate, or nonvoting, members.

His two other appointments — Mr. Chebrikov and Eduard A. Sheverdnadze, the Communist leader of Soviet Georgia — had been candidate members.

Mr. Ligachev, who is in charge of ideology and personnel, is now second-in-command to Mr. Gorbachev. Mr. Ryzhkov supervises the economy. Mr. Chebrikov runs the KGB, while Mr. Sheverdnadze has replaced Mr. Gromyko as foreign minister. Mr. Gromyko moved up to the post of titular head of state.

By moving his men into the key positions and at the same time removing from the Politburo one of its strongest conservative members, Grigori V. Romanov, Mr. Gorbachev achieved unquestionable control over Kremlin power.

While essential, this control is not sufficient for the kind of changes Mr. Gorbachev is talking about. His power base and support must be far broader if he is to move the country forward, revamp the Stalinist economic system and change the mentality of the party.

During the coming months, Mr. Gorbachev and his men will have a chance to rejuvenate the policy-making Central Committee and the government and bring in younger and better educated people in leading local positions throughout the country. But all this has to be done before the next Communist Party congress in February.

According to foreign and Soviet observers, Mr. Gorbachev will have a realistic chance to embark on the path of national revitalization only if he manages to change the leadership structure before the party congress. A failure to do so, on the other hand, would mean that internal political differences would linger and that they would gradually sap the reformist trend.

Mr. Gorbachev's preoccupation with internal economic and political issues has been such that his attitude on foreign affairs remains unclear to the world.

His No. 1 priority, as it was with his predecessors, is the Soviet bloc and China. One can expect from Mr. Gorbachev a greater emphasis on bloc cohesion. On China, more than any of his four predecessors, he has voiced firm hopes that relations will be normalized and he has suggested a readiness to go the extra mile for this.

In general, his administration has shown signs of flexibility and realism with respect to Europe, Asia and other parts of the world and the willingness to recognize facts as they are.

This is reflected in Moscow's attitude to the European Community and in its proposal for a pan-Asian security conference.

Mr. Gorbachev's attitude toward the United States seems more conventional. Like his predecessors, he has argued that the Soviet Union had tried for a long time to develop friendly relations with the United States but that the Americans have not responded.

Specifically, he charged that it was the United States that abandoned détente and meaningful arms control efforts, seeking instead to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union.

While Mr. Chernenko's policy remains in effect, Mr. Gorbachev threatened recently to break off the Geneva arms talks if the Reagan administration did not take a "more reasonable" position.

But there is a clear impression that Mr. Gorbachev wants to reach some sort of accommodation with the United States that would limit the arms race. His readiness to meet President Ronald Reagan in Geneva next November seems to point in that direction.

Another distinct impression is that Mr. Gorbachev's interest in foreign affairs at this point is primarily linked to his domestic policies, as the continued arms buildup and other foreign commitments would inevitably interfere with his plans to modernize Soviet society and improve living standards.

In one of his speeches, he said that the two great nations, with different social systems confronting each other across the world, should have a "civilized" relationship to avoid a nuclear collision.

Maybe the meeting with President Reagan in Geneva will clarify what Mr. Gorbachev had in mind.

Grishin Dropped From Politburo

By Gary Lee
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, Feb. 18—Victor Grishin, former Communist Party boss of the Soviet capital and by reputation one of the staunchest holdovers of the Kremlin's old guard, was retired from the ruling Politburo today in a meeting of the Central Committee, the official news agency Tass reported.

Boris Yeltsin, who two months ago replaced Grishin as leader of Moscow's Communist Party, was elected a candidate, or nonvoting, Politburo member, Tass said.

Yeltsin, 55, raised a citywide furor last month with a hard-hitting speech criticizing corruption and calling the city's management inept. He is widely regarded here as a senior-level recruit brought in to rid Moscow of some of the inefficiencies that have stifled its growth in recent years.

Tass said the Central Committee relieved Grishin, 71, of his duties "in connection with his retirement on pension." The fact that Grishin would receive a pension after being cast as head of a party machine rife with corruption affirmed the view among some western analysts here that old guard members would be retired gracefully, rather than fired under a cloud.

Like Nikolai Ryzhkov, who was named premier last fall, and several others in the inner circle of new economic advisers, Yeltsin comes from Sverdlovsk, in the Urals.

In its final session before the 27th party congress begins next Tuesday, the Central Committee also approved several documents to be presented to the 5,000 delegates, including a revised Communist Party program, the new five-year economic plan, and proposed rule changes in the party charter.

Western analysts and Soviet officials said they expect that at least half of the 300 members of the Central Committee will be replaced at the congress.

One of the first acts of the Central Committee at the end of the congress will be to elect the Politburo.

Grishin had been a candidate member of the Politburo since 1961 and a full member since 1971, under the late Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. In the shuffle for power before Mikhail Gorbachev became party leader last year, Grishin had been widely regarded as a possible successor to the Kremlin leadership.

Several western analysts have included him in the group of opponents to Gorbachev.

Under Gorbachev, Grishin's fortunes faded. A press campaign against corruption scandals involving city officials climaxed on Dec. 24 when he was stripped of his duties as head of the biggest local Communist Party in the Soviet Union.

Grishin is the third member of the Politburo to lose his seat in the 11 months since Gorbachev came to office. Previously, Grigori Romanov, the former Leningrad party leader, and Nikolai Tikhonov, then premier, were dropped.

The Central Committee also retired one of its secretaries, K.V. Rusakov, who headed the department on relations with East Bloc countries. Rusakov, 77, had been ailing and inactive for some time, according to Soviet sources. Tass said he was removed "in connection with his retirement on pension for health reasons."

Members of the Soviet Communist Party Politburo

Associated Press

MOSCOW, Feb. 18—Here is a list of the 11 full and seven candidate members of the ruling Communist Party Politburo, including ages, years of appointment and responsibilities. Full members:

Mikhail Gorbachev, 54, 1980, Soviet leader as party general secretary since March 1985.

Andrei Gromyko, 76, 1973, named president in July 1985 after 28 years as foreign minister.

Gaidar Aliyev, 62, 1982, first deputy premier and major general.

Vitaliy Vorotnikov, 60, 1983, chairman of Russian Federation Council of Ministers.

Viktor Chebrikov, 62, 1985, head of KGB with rank of general.

Dinmukhamed Kunaev, 74, 1977, party chief in the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Yegor Ligachev, 65, 1985, Central Committee secretary in charge of ideology, considered the second-ranking Politburo member.

Nikolai Ryzhkov, 56, 1985, named premier Sept. 27, 1985.

Mikhail Solomentsev, 72, 1983, Central Committee secretary for party control.

Eduard Shevardnadze, 58, 1985, foreign minister.

Vladimir Shcherbitsky, 68, 1979, party chief in the Republic of the Ukraine.

Candidate members:

Pyotr Demichev, 68, 1964, minister of culture.

Vladimir Dolgikh, 61, 1982, Central Committee secretary responsible for heavy industry.

Vasily Kuznetsov, 85, 1972, Soviet vice president.

Boris Ponomarev, 81, 1972, chief of the Central Committee international department, secretary for world communism affairs.

Sergei Sokolov, 74, 1985, defense minister, rank of marshal.

Nikolai Talyzin, 57, chairman of the state planning committee and first deputy premier.

Boris Yeltsin, 55, head of the Moscow Communist Party.

New 'Hands-On' Leader Is Shaking Up Moscow

Party Head Tries to Make Capital Livable

THE WASHINGTON POST

TUESDAY, JANUARY 28, 1986

By Celestine Bohlen
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW—After he took over the Moscow city Communist Party leadership in late December, Boris Yeltsin went to see for himself what life is like for the more than 8 million people who live in the Soviet capital.

According to stories now making the rounds, the tall, broad-shouldered, 55-year-old party leader stood in lines for pastry on Gorki Street and tried to buy a cut of good meat from a surly waitress at a food counter at the Hotel Minsk.

To see how snow removal was going, he is said to have walked the back streets. To find out about the city's cheap but overcrowded transit system, he rode the bus.

Late last month, at a conference of the Moscow city party, Yeltsin delivered his verdict in a detailed and scathing speech that quickly became the city's most popular reading: Moscow, rather than showcase of the nation, was something of an embarrassment.

The public critique of Moscow and Yeltsin's firsthand investigations are characteristic of the new team forming around Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev's solution—a wholesale purge of the Moscow city party leadership, which followed shortly—was a local reflection of the rapid turnover of personnel pushed by Gorbachev at higher levels of party and government.

To Moscow, Yeltsin is an outsider. For nine years until 1985, he was party chief in Sverdlovsk, a military and industrial center in the Urals. He first came to the capital in July, as one of Gorbachev's first additions to the powerful Secretariat of the Central Committee.

Like a mayor elected to sweep out an old machine, Yeltsin apparently came to Moscow's city hall with a mandate to weed out the old gang and their old ways. His targeting of the old guard here is also an echo of the criticism accumulating against the late Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev and his associates.

See MOSCOW, A15, Col. 1

Outsider Shakes Up Moscow's Administrators

MOSCOW, From A13

In his speech to the Moscow party, Yeltsin never explicitly said who bore the brunt of the blame for the incompetence and inefficiency in the city's management. But to those present, it was clear that the chief culprit was Viktor Grishin, Politburo member, close Brezhnev associate and for 18 years chief of the Moscow party committee, who was sitting on the dais, along with other Politburo members.

Grishin, 71, was eased from his Moscow job on Dec. 24, as Yeltsin was ushered in, and he is expected to be retired officially from the Politburo soon.

His ally, Moscow Mayor Vladimir Promyslov, 77, who had held his job for 22 years, also has been retired, and replaced by Valery Saikov, manager of a major auto factory.

The pressure on Grishin and Promyslov began last summer when newspapers ran articles about a Moscow housing swindle that involved falsifying reports on the completion of construction. The investigation into this and other problems at city hall resulted in hundreds of city officials being accused of receiving kickbacks.

Although neither Promyslov nor Grishin has been charged with direct complicity in the building scheme, critics long have complained that the two treated the city and its resources like a private fiefdom. Certainly, if there was anything wrong, they never said so.

"Owing to the party's unabating concern, the city has been successfully settling the task of promoting the people's welfare," Grishin said at a city party conference five years ago.

In contrast, Yeltsin, in his speech last month, passed briefly over the accomplishments and then said bluntly:

"Comrades, today we will talk mainly not about what was done, but what was neglected and the nature of our mistakes."

Yeltsin not only ticked off the problems—in housing, in transport, in services, in health care—but he also named names.

"The time to remove the head of the health department has long past," he said, for example.

But mainly the speech was a list of the broken promises and unfulfilled plans, the fraud, corruption and cronyism of the previous regime.

"It is necessary to stop the lies," he said at one point.

"Frankly speaking," he said in the speech, printed in full in Moscow papers and broadcast in part on national television, "it must be said that the city party committee, Politburo and Secretariat failed to carry out the necessary reordering of the party and other personnel."

He said there had been "a tendency to stress achievements and a silence about shortcomings, which has resulted in complacency and inertia."

In general, he concluded, it was no wonder that complaints from city residents had doubled in the past three years: Moscow—which has amenities that provincial cities only dream of—has fallen behind norms for the supply of social needs.

Yeltsin mentioned his experiences on Moscow buses, where at rush hour, passengers can find themselves literally lifted off the ground by the press of bodies.

"Muscovites are not simply complaining; they are indignant," he said, explaining that he had found that up to 35 percent of the vehicles fail to make it onto the roads daily.

Yeltsin's critique was followed the next day by complaints from all sectors in the city. A school director complained about equipment that dated from the "stone age." A health official complained about poor conditions at city hospitals. The first secretary of the Moscow's writers' organization called for more criticism of "weak" works by well-placed or famous writers.

This sort of free-for-all delighted many Muscovites. "It is like a detective story," said one young woman. "For us, it is something new," a hospital worker said.

Yeltsin's speech last month was to the Moscow city party, which, with 1.2 million members, is one of the nation's largest. The meeting was held to prepare for the 27th national party congress this month.

Like Gorbachev, Yeltsin, in his cleanup campaign, has focused first on personnel. The results of his crackdown were published in city newspapers: of the 175 members of the city party committee, only 37 were holdovers from five years ago. Of the 14 members of the governing party bureau, only two had served since 1981, and 10 were appointed last month.

Yeltsin said 86 managers of factories and organizations were expelled from the party during the past two years, many of them prosecuted and fired.

He is also said to like novel approaches. One report said that in Sverdlovsk, to make managers more aware of the need to clean up city streets, he took away their government cars so they could experience the problems for themselves.

In Moscow, he forced the head of the transportation department to ride the public transit system Muscovites are so indignant about.

Soviets Curb Alcohol;

Moscow Raises Price Of Vodka 25 Percent

By Celestine Bohlen
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, Aug. 27—Today brought another blow for the Soviet Union's harried drinkers. After standing one, even two hours in a line to buy from a dwindling supply of vodka, they got to the counter to find that the price had gone up by more than 25 percent.

The campaign against alcoholism, launched in June, has entered a stage that threatens to frazzle the nerves of Russians who at first approved of the crackdown but now find it cutting into their personal lives.

Today's newspapers carried an announcement that the price of a typical pint of vodka would be the ruble equivalent of $6.80, an increase of $1.75. Similarly, prices rose for wines and beer.

The price increases were accompanied by news from the Ministry of Food Industry that a majority of distilleries would be closed or diverted to food production. It said that in Moscow, champagne makers were working at 20 percent of capacity, while sales of beer were down 25 percent.

To people who have watched the lines at the liquor counters snake through food stores and onto

See SOVIET, A24, Col. 1

Washington Post, 8/28/85

Soviets Increase Liquor Prices By 25 Percent

SOVIET, From A21

the streets, the revelation that alcohol is harder to buy comes as no surprise. As a hot spell settled over Moscow this August, sober people buying a bottle of wine or vodka for a weekend party could be heard to grumble that they were being penalized because other people drank too much.

"I had to wait two hours in line to buy vodka to take to my father at the dacha," said one woman. "Two hours—for what? What are we supposed to do? Serve tea?"

Few Muscovites would deny that drinking had been getting out of hand in the Soviet Union and was hurting the economy. In that sense, new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's antidrinking initiative, his first major campaign, met with approval.

But lately there have barbed comments about "Lemonade Joe," a nickname for Gorbachev, who reportedly is a teetotaler. Some people also have joked that his title as Communist Party general secretary should been amended to "mineral" secretary, because of the new push to drink bottled water.

Still, the papers and television continue on the antialcohol campaign, pouring out accounts of medical and genetic deformities, social deterioration and criminal activity as consequences of drunkenness, while pumping the virtues of wineless weddings and alcohol-free drinks.

Under the new rules, no alcoholic beverages can be sold or served before 2 p.m. The number of restaurants in Moscow serving drinks has been cut to 97 from 600.

Arrests for public drinking are up. Vodka and other hard liquors have been swept from the tables at official banquets. To help push sobriety, the government has lowered the price of fruit juices. Fruit-juice stands have proliferated, offering solace in the current hot weather.

While sales of alcohol have gone down, alcoholics have taken to drinking perfume and industrial fluids, increasing cases of poisoning, a newspaper said yesterday.

Moscow's rumor mill had anticipated today's price. Last week, people stood in line for as long as two hours to buy bags and boxes of bottles. This, plus the cut in production, has depleted the store shelves. Today, at one usually well-stocked store, the only vodkas available were Polish, at $9, or deluxe Soviet lines starting at about $15.

JACK ANDERSON and DALE VAN ATTA

Meet 'Spetsnaz,' Soviet Special Forces

They are the true mystery men of the Soviet Union, that riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma. The few Kremlin officials who know about their existence refer to them by the name "Spetsnaz," or special purpose forces.

Needless to say, the Soviet man on the street knows exactly "nitchevo" about the Spetsnaz. He has read no tales of their derring-do in far-off lands; he knows none of their names, though some could be classified as Soviet heroes.

A secret Defense Department report explains why the Spetsnaz have been kept a deep secret: "Considering these units as clandestine assets and being an integral part of their intelligence and security organization, the Soviets have kept these units out of public scrutiny to a far greater degree than their conventional forces.

"Glorious descriptions of their achievements in training exercises are never published [and] there is no distinctive uniform or insignia identifying them. Instead, the usual uniform is that of the airborne forces, or in the case of naval [Spetsnaz] simply the standard navy uniform."

Because of this, it has taken Western intelligence services years to form even the murkiest picture of Spetsalnaya Naznacheniya. What Western analysts have determined is that the Spetsnaz are used for special missions at the behest of Soviet intelligence and security services.

Whether these special agents report to the GRU (military intelligence), the Red Army or some other Soviet agency, U.S. intelligence experts have decided that the KGB retains ultimate control and responsibility, under direct supervision of the Soviet Central Committee.

In addition, though, the KGB has its own Spetsnaz people, the most notorious of whom are the professional killers of Department Eight of the KGB's First Chief Directorate. Department Eight "has been connected with assassinations, kidnapings, sabotage and other direct action operations for decades," according to one Defense Intelligence Agency expert.

There are also the KGB troops on the Soviet Union's borders, numbering at least 250,000, who could be classified as special forces. And while the Pentagon and Central Intelligence Agency experts may haggle over the fine points, they agree that certain units under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which maintains Communist Party control, should count as Spetsnaz.

But the most dangerous Spetsnaz operatives are those who report to the Soviet military intelligence organization, which is the second-largest spy outfit in the world (second only to the KGB).

In each Spetsnaz brigade, the career officers "are the most highly trained individuals and are fluent in one or more foreign languages," the Pentagon report states, adding: "Their primary mission is reported to be the assassination of enemy leadership."

Each brigade includes three reconnaissance and destruction battalions of some 30 teams of 10 men each, plus signal, engineer and medical units. Naval Spetsnaz units, though smaller, include paratroops, frogmen and minisubmarine forces.

The Washington Post D-13
The Washington Times ___
Daily News (New York) ___
The New York Times ___
The Wall Street Journal ___
The Chicago Tribune ___
The Los Angeles Times ___
The Christian Science Monitor ___
USA Today ___

Date 5-16-86

JACK ANDERSON and DALE VAN ATTA

Training the Soviets' Elite Troops

The Soviet special forces, or Spetsnaz, are an anomaly in the Soviet Union: elitists in a collectivist society, encouraged to operate independently and to improvise, instead of following the strict letter of the rules according to Marx. Their generals must envy them at times.

The 30,000 Spetsnaz men and women are "determined, well-trained troops selected for their political reliability, athletic skill and intelligence," according to a secret Pentagon report. Because they are special, they earn more and qualify for retirement earlier; each year as a Spetsnaz equates with 18 months of regular military service.

But unlike the special forces of any country, the Spetsnaz earn their perks. Though they train along with regular army officers, once they are assigned to Spetsnaz units they get training that is probably unequaled in its rigors.

A common training exercise is to parachute small groups in uninhabited regions of the frozen taiga, hundreds or even thousands of miles from their rendezvous point. They spend days or weeks on their own, scrounging food and transport.

Often, special troops from the Interior Ministry are put on the trail of the Spetsnaz trainees—who probably have a better chance than most Russians to evade the KGB. An annual three-month exercise in the Kirovograd region of the Ukraine pits the best Spetsnaz units against each other.

Spetsnaz troops risk death during training, which includes the routine use of deadly chemicals, explosive barrages and live ammunition.

According to U.S. intelligence reports, Spetsnaz training includes infiltration techniques; reconnaissance and target location; survival behind enemy lines; language and customs of target nations, like France or West Germany; clandestine communications; sabotage with explosives, incendiary devices, acids, abrasives and bacteriological weapons; hand-to-hand combat and silent killing methods; skiing, mountain-climbing and rigorous physical conditioning.

Spetsnaz parachute training includes conventional static-line drops; high-altitude, low-opening drops, and high-altitude, high-opening drops with directional chutes that allow the troopers to drift, undetected by radar, for 30 miles or more behind enemy lines. Airborne Spetsnaz units prefer silent, ultra-light planes to glide in on an isolated target. Naval Spetsnaz use mini-submarines.

In addition to rifles, pistols, hand grenades and other standard weaponry, each Spetsnaz unit carries SA7 antiaircraft missiles. They also are equipped with R350M radios with encryption and burst-transmission capabilities—meaning coded messages are sent in quick, hard-to-detect bursts to a satellite overhead.

Despite reports of Spetsnaz prowess, an Army intelligence officer warned that it would be wrong to consider them an unbeatable force that never makes mistakes. "They are not peasants in leg wrappings," he said. "Neither are they 10 feet tall."

In fact, defectors say the regular Soviet army once one-upped the Spetsnaz. Staging a sneak attack on a nuclear weapons store in the Far Eastern Military District, Spetsnaz troops were humiliated. The alarm sounded and prerigged vehicles shone spotlights on the intruders.

The Washington Post C16
The Washington Times ___
Daily News (New York) ___
The New York Times ___
The Wall Street Journal ___
The Chicago Tribune ___
The Los Angeles Times ___
The Christian Science Monitor ___
USA Today ___

Date 5-26-86

TAIWAN

Sorting the Suspects In a Political Murder

The morning of Oct. 15 started routinely in Henry and Helen Liu's home in Daly City, Calif. After breakfast, Henry took some boxes to the car while his wife got ready to go to work in nearby San Francisco. She stepped outside a few minutes later and found her husband dead, shot once in the face and twice in the stomach. Mrs. Liu had few doubts about who had killed her husband: the two Asian strangers she had seen on bicycles that morning. She contended that they were Taiwanese agents, and last week the Taipei government admitted that she might be right. It suspended the director of military intelligence, arrested several officials and launched an investigation into the killing.

Liu, 52, had written critical articles about the government of Nationalist President Chiang Ching-kuo for Chinese-language magazines in Taiwan. He recently published a gossipy 374-page biography of Chiang disclosing personal details about the president's late father, Chiang Kai-shek—and even some racy tidbits about his great-grandmother. (She had allegedly "sold herself to a wealthy man," according to Liu's book.) But there was another side to Liu's life. NEWSWEEK has learned that he was an informant for the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, passing on information about Chinese-Americans.

Liu's link with the FBI was probably not the motive for his murder. But it was clearly the reason why FBI agents were on the case within hours after Liu was killed. They were aided by Daly City police officers, who, remarkably, had traced the two bicycles and a rented station wagon that the killers used during their getaway.

Liu: Assassins on bikes, friends at the FBI

In November two of the five suspects sought by American police were arrested in Taiwan. At first Taiwan's Nationalist government refused to investigate U.S. suspicions that Taiwanese agents may have been involved in Liu's murder, even after one of the suspects—Chen Chi-li, a 41-year-old reputed gang leader—reportedly confessed. But NEWSWEEK has learned that the government changed its mind after being told that the FBI now possesses a tape recording in which Chen purportedly implicates several Taiwanese intelligence officials—including the agency's chief, Vice Adm. Wong Hsi-ling—in the murder.

But it is still unclear who gave the orders. President Chiang empowered a special commission to investigate. Wong was first suspended and went into seclusion, unavailable for comment. Later he was arrested and held for interrogation. At least three other high-ranking intelligence officials were also arrested, including Col. Chen Humen. A Taiwan spokesman in Los Angeles said the colonel, who used Chen Chi-li as an informant, knew that the gang leader planned to kill someone in the United States but that he did not know who it would be. Other sources, however, said Chen Chi-li was acting on orders. To protect himself, the sources added, Chen made one or more tape recordings naming names in the Taiwan intelligence bureau. Just how a tape got to the FBI is unknown.

Cooperation: Taiwan is allowing Daly City police Lt. Thomas Reese and an FBI agent to interrogate Chen Chi-li and a second suspect. But it will probably not agree to extradition because of the lack of diplomatic ties with the United States. Taiwan could put the two suspects on a direct commercial flight to the United States, where they would be promptly arrested. Meanwhile, a third suspect has contacted U.S. authorities in the Philippines promising to cooperate with the prosecution in exchange for not being returned to Taiwan.

The incident has hurt the island's relationship with Washington, which broke diplomatic ties with Taipei to recognize Peking in 1979. The situation grew worse two years later when Chen Wen-chen, a Chinese scholar at the Carnegie-Mellon Institute in Pittsburgh, was found dead in Taipei after a lengthy interrogation by security police. The Taiwanese insisted that he had committed suicide, but the death prompted the United States to enact legislation banning arms sales to any government harassing U.S. residents. A congressional subcommittee will hold its hearings soon on whether to invoke the legislation in the Liu case. But Chinese-American critics predict that little will happen. The United States hopes to sell Taiwan about $800 million in arms this fiscal year, and they doubt that either country wants to jeopardize the sale.

JOSEPH TREEN with RICHARD SANDZA in Daly City, NICHOLAS M. HORROCK in Washington and DIRK BENNETT in Taipei

Newsweek
Page 38
January 28, 1985

Image of Taiwan Tarnished by Writer's Slaying

By JIM MANN, *Times Staff Writer*

TAIPEI, Taiwan—For several years, Taiwan has presented itself to the world as Asia's new economic wonder child, a Japan in the making.

Now, the slaying in California of dissident writer Henry Liu and the disclosure that Taiwan intelligence officials have been linked to the case have revived images of the Nationalist China of the old days, a world of intrigue and violence, of government officials cooperating with the underworld.

The Liu case is shaping up as the biggest political crisis in years for the government of President Chiang Ching-kuo, the biggest since late 1978 when the United States announced its decision to shift its diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China.

Investigations Continue

All the details and ramifications of the Liu case are not yet apparent. Investigations by U.S. and Taiwan authorities are continuing, and there may be further revelations, including publication of evidence that the victim once worked with Taiwan's intelligence bureau.

"It will have a very heavy impact," said Fu Hu, a Yale University-trained professor of political science at National Taiwan University. "It may destroy the image of the government which has been established for many years. . . . I believe it's more serious than Watergate."

Observers here believe that among other things the Liu case will:

—Undermine public trust in the government and in the Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party, which, under the martial law that has been in effect here for more than three decades, is still the only sizable political party allowed in Taiwan.

—Greatly lessen the possibility—considered increasingly likely in the months before the Liu slaying—that Chiang Hsiao-wu, the grandson of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the second son of President Chiang Ching-kuo, will be able to take over the full range of authority from his father. The case could force the president and other party leaders to take dramatic new action to ensure a smooth transfer of power.

—Weaken the position of older Kuomintang members who have close ties to the military and security apparatus, and strengthen the hand of younger, less conservative members.

—Increase the pressure on the Kuomintang to grant some new recognition or legal status to the political opposition. The opposition, which is known as Tangwai—Chinese for "outside the party"—has in recent months been talking with the Kuomintang about the possibility of forming some sort of political association to represent the opposition.

Liu, the author of a critical biography of President Chiang, was killed outside his home in Daly City, Calif., on Oct. 15. U.S. investigators have blamed the killing on three members of a Taiwan underworld gang known as the United Bamboo. Two of the three are in police custody here.

Intelligence Bureau Tie

Earlier this month, before a team of U.S. investigators arrived to question the alleged underworld figures, Taiwan authorities announced that officials of the intelligence bureau of the Defense Ministry had been linked to the case. Three intelligence officers, including the man who until recently headed the bureau, are now in military custody here.

Taiwan officials now maintain that whatever the head of the intelligence bureau and his subordinates may have done, they were acting on their own and not as agents of the Taiwan government. "The government is not involved in this (Liu) case," one Taiwan official said in an interview.

The effort by Taiwan officials to portray the intelligence officials as individuals acting outside any governmental capacity is significant because of a 1982 U.S. law authorizing Congress to cut off arms to countries that engage in a "consistent pattern" of "intimidation and harassment" against people in the United States.

That law, an amendment to the Arms Export Control Act, was written by Rep. Stephen J. Solarz (D-N.Y.) after the death of Chen Wen-cheng, a Chinese-American professor, during a trip to Taiwan in 1981. Chen died after being questioned by government agents, and critics of the Kuomintang have charged that he was beaten to death by security personnel.

Solarz, who is chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee's subcommittee on Asian and Pacific affairs, has announced that he will hold hearings on the Liu case. Taiwan officials will apparently argue that a cutoff in arms sales is not justified under the law because the intelligence officials involved in the Liu case were not the "government."

Taiwan now receives approximately $800 million in arms a year from the United States.

A number of government officials and Kuomintang members have complained that Liu's death is being exploited for propaganda purposes by the Communist Party of the People's Republic of China and its supporters.

Raymond S.H. Hoo, chairman of Taiwan's Coordination Council for North American Affairs, said, "It (the Liu case) is being played up by the Communist and left-wing papers in the States, especially the Chinese newspapers."

However, Antonio Chiang, editor of a group of Taiwan magazines and an opposition leader, said he does not believe these complaints are valid.

"In the past, they (Taiwan officials) always blamed the Communists or the Taiwan independence movement," Chiang said. "Now, there is no one to blame but themselves."

According to several observers here, the first and most significant

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The Christian Science Monitor _____
USA Today _____

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effect of the Liu case will be to reduce Taiwan citizens' confidence in the government and the ruling party.

Political Alienation

Yang Kuo-shu, a psychology professor at National Taiwan University, said, "If people are rational or sensible enough, they will have questions about this case. With Mr. Liu's case, many people no longer trust the KMT (Kuomintang). It will produce some sort of temporary political alienation. I myself feel a little alienated."

Yang, who recently served as an intermediary between the Kuomintang and the opposition, said he feels that "no one can be trusted and nothing is stable."

"How can someone do such a thing so stupid and distasteful?" he went on. "How can the KMT allow such a thing?"

Local and foreign analysts agree that the Liu case has been particularly damaging for the prospects of President Chiang's son, Chiang Hsiao-wu,

The younger Chiang is the head of the Broadcasting Corporation of China.

The case is politically damaging to the younger Chiang because many Taiwan residents believe he has been playing an influential behind-the-scenes role in the affairs of Taiwan's National Security Council. Associates of the young man and government officials deny that he has played any such role.

Chiang Hsiao-wu declined to be interviewed for this article. "He said now is not the time," an intermediary said.

The intermediary said that Chiang, 39, is personally acquainted with Vice Adm. Wang Hsi-ling, a former director of the military intelligence bureau who was taken into custody this month in connection with the Liu case. He said this is not significant, though, because many people in Taiwan know the admiral.

An article in the New York Times' last December said the younger Chiang also had links to Chen Chi-li, the leader of the underworld United Bamboo and, according to the FBI, the central figure in the Liu killing. An associate of Chiang said that this is not true, that Chiang has never met Chen Chi-li.

There is no obvious political successor for President Chiang, who is 74 and not in good health. Last year, a Taiwan-born technocrat named Lee Teng-hui was named vice president, and Yu Kuo-hua, a former banker, was named premier. Observers say Lee has failed to build any political power base and that Yu has been so unpopular that, according to rumor, he may soon resign.

Taiwan sources say that in the past year the president's son has gradually been maneuvering toward a position of power.

"We heard that he was making his move," one political analyst said. "It appeared he was moving towards the premiership."

No matter what happens in the top leadership, many analysts agree that the fallout from the Liu case will help the younger technocrats and economists in the Kuomintang and lessen the influence of military and security officials.

Pressure to Liberalize

"I believe the liberal wing within the KMT will have some benefit," Hu, the political science professor, said. "It is no good for the right wing of the party."

Whether the Liu case will increase public support of the opposition is not yet clear. In past elections, the Kuomintang has received about 70% of the vote, and opposition or independent politicians about 30%. The next election is not until December.

Some analysts said they believe that the Liu case has already increased the pressure on Taiwan's leadership to open the door for a more democratic political system and for legal recognition of other political parties.

"Now there is heavy pressure on the KMT to do something in response (to the Liu case), to show that we are an open, democratic society," Antonio Chiang, the editor and opposition leader, said.

Recently a group of scholars, among them professors Hu and Yang, served as go-between in negotiations involving Kuomintang officials and opposition leaders. In the negotiations, the Kuomintang offered for the first time to grant a form of legal recognition to the opposition. It suggested a deal in which the opposition would be allowed to form some sort of association or committee.

The opposition leaders rejected the offer, which would not have given them the same legal rights the Kuomintang has. They would not have been permitted to form an official political party, would have been required to get approval from the government for some of their meetings and would have been barred from using the Tangwai label.

Yet the scholars who took part in the negotiation consider it to be of great importance that for the first time in 35 years the Kuomintang is apparently willing to grant some form of official status to the opposition.

According to Yang, the negotiations were opened in December, just as investigation into the Liu case was gathering steam.

"I think this offer was because of the Henry Liu case," Yang said. "I just don't think they want to increase their political difficulties right now."

Taiwan's Meddling in American Lives Poses Problems for U.S. Government

Taipei Seen Acting as Both Friend and Foe

By Jay Mathews
Washington Post Staff Writer

LOS ANGELES—When a Taiwanese diplomat secretly organized a Washington demonstration against visiting Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, angry State Department officials called in the diplomat's supervisors for an afternoon chat.

But before the U.S. officials could ask their Taiwanese counterparts to send the offending diplomat home, a call came from the office of a powerful U.S. senator, objecting to this harassment of a friendly nation.

It was one more telling example of potent underground maneuvers on the American scene by an Asian nation with fewer people than California and no official relations with the U.S. government.

With the recent arrest of several Taiwanese intelligence officers in connection with the October murder of Chinese-American author and businessman Henry Liu in California, American officials are concerned once more about espionage by Taipei and the pitfalls of dealing with a country that may act as a U.S. friend and foe simultaneously.

It is an especially ticklish problem for U.S. policy-makers trying to strengthen new ties with the communist Chinese in Peking while not forsaking the anti-communists who have turned Taiwan into a compelling advertisement for free enterprise and democracy in Asia.

The Liu case may be the most serious revelation in some time of Taiwan's meddling in American lives, but U.S. government experts say that there are many earlier examples. Among them:

■ In 1974, FBI agents broke up a conspiracy by Taiwanese intelligence agents to obtain U.S.-made submarine torpedoes illegally, using gang members in San Francisco's Chinatown and unscrupulous American businessmen.

■ During the Carter administration, one official complained that classified reports circulated at the State Department on a Friday were in the hands of the Taipei government Monday.

■ One Taiwanese agent obtained a secret U.S. military contingency plan in 1979 and leaked it to embarrass the State Department, U.S. officials said.

■ American scholars say some of the more than 20,000 Taiwanese students on U.S. campuses are spending some time keeping an eye on their fellow students for Taipei.

But the murder of Liu, allegedly in retaliation for his published attacks on Taiwan's leadership, has surprised many American experts who thought that Taipei was moving away from the hard-edged approach it has taken in many underground activities in the United States.

When Gen. Wang Sheng, a principal exponent of harsh treatment of dissidents, was transferred last year from a key military post in Taipei to be ambassador to Paraguay, many interpreted this as a signal from President Chiang Ching-kuo that a new approach was in order. Chiang was bothered by suggestions that Wang might succeed him, American and Taiwanese officials said. He also partially blamed Wang's disciples for the mysterious 1981 death of Chinese-American professor Cheng Wen-chen, which caused an uproar in the U.S. Congress.

The murder of Liu, said a former U.S. intelligence officer, "shows that not everybody got the word" after Wang's transfer.

American news services have reported, however, not only the arrest of some military intelligence officers but the dismissal, detention and interrogation of Adm. Wang Hsi-ling, a key figure in past Taiwanese espionage efforts in the United States. The unusually swift and public admission of official wrongdoing in the Liu case suggests a concerted effort by Chiang's government to stress its new policy and prevent further harsh reaction from the U.S. government.

As a sign of distress in the growing and politically potent Asian-American community, Rep. Norman Y. Mineta (D-Calif.) has written Attorney General William French Smith to protest the "apparent lack of interest and activity by the Justice Department in pursuing the killers of Henry Liu."

"Given this administration's vociferous claim to be serious about stamping out terrorism, your silence is inexplicable," Mineta said. "I am sorry to report that there is a growing feeling among Americans of Asian ancestry that this administration is not seriously concerned with the most basic rights of minority citizens."

A detective from Daly City, Calif., where Liu was killed, and at least one FBI agent were sent to Taiwan to interview two Taiwan-based gang members said to have particpated in the murder. Several members of Congress and the Committee to Obtain Justice for Henry Liu, organized by the victim's friends and family, have demanded the suspects be extradited for trial in the United States. But Taiwan and the United States have never had an extradition treaty.

If Chiang's government pursues a case against the men it has in custody, their punishment may be much swifter and surer. Taiwan is not enamored of many American-style guarantees of due process, such as those that allowed the release for insufficient evidence of David Yu, a Taiwanese immigrant arrested in San Gabriel, Calif., for his alleged role in Liu's murder.

Whether Congress or President Reagan will be willing to threaten a cutoff of vital U.S. arms sales to Taiwan to force extradition of Liu's alleged killers remains to be seen, U.S. experts said.

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As one Taiwanese journalist here said, "some if not all of our intelligence people have good connections with the underworld figures" in many Chinese-American communities. Those connections are expected to continue, and even the semi-official Taiwanese presence in the United States thrives.

At last count, the Coordination Council for North American Affairs, the official name of Taiwan's unofficial diplomatic offices in the United States, had branches in Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Honolulu, Houston, Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, Seattle and Bethesda and is scheduled to open one in Kansas City.

This is far more U.S. offices than are maintained by mainland China's government, which is officially recognized by this country.

Staff writer Patrick E. Tyler contributed to this report.



Illustration by Gene Garbowski/The Washington Times

Washington Times, 5/20/85

DEFECTORS

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1985

New York Times

Letters

Political Asylum: Who Is Eligible and Who Is Not

To the Editor:

A recent article discussed a group called the Nicaraguan Humanitarian Coalition and its efforts to mount an extensive lobbying campaign to allow thousands of Nicaraguans who have been denied asylum to stay in the United States (news story, Aug. 29). As one who has responsibility for the political asylum division of the Department of State's Bureau of Human Rights, I am surprised we were not asked to comment.

The approval rate for Nicaraguans in fiscal 1984 was about 12 percent — 1,018 cases approved, 7,274 denied. If this figure seems low, perhaps it is important to point out that in that year Nicaraguans ranked second in the world in terms of actual claims approved by nationality group.

Your article did not adequately cover current U.S. law and the basis on which an asylum claim is either approved or denied. Perhaps in response to the allegations in the story, it would be easiest to describe what our law does *not* cover.

The Refugee Act of 1980 does not say that political asylum shall be granted to an individual based on U.S. foreign policy considerations or statements; it does not say that it be granted based on general conditions of poverty or civil unrest in the country of nationality; it does not even say that people fleeing Communist governments shall be given asylum.

If anything, the act, signed into law on March 17, 1980, eliminated the "preference" language of former section 203(a)(7), which said that refugee status could be given to a person with a well-founded fear of persecution who was fleeing "from any Communist or Communist-dominated country . . ."

U.S. immigration law, in conformity with the language adopted in the U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, permits any alien in the U.S. to apply for asylum and provides that asylum may be granted if the individual can show a well-founded fear of persecution (in the country of nationality) because of race, religion, nationality, membership in a social group or political opinion.

It is not enough for the applicant to state that he faces the same conditions that every other citizen of that country faces — no matter how terrible, no matter how often we may publicly draw attention to those conditions.

There is only one standard against which an applicant is judged, and it is the same standard applied to all applicants, from anywhere in the world. The standard is one of fear of persecution as defined by the five reasons stated above, and the questions we ask are very specific: Why are you different from everyone else in your country? How have you been singled out, threatened, imprisoned, tortured, harassed?

The reason for the individual standard of proof for asylum is obvious: Should, in addition to 430,000 immigrant visas issued plus 70,000 refugees admitted last year, anyone who says he comes from a troubled country simply move to the United States? Clearly the answer is "no." The political asylum program was never meant to serve as a magnet for people from Nicaragua or anywhere else.

Most Nicaraguan asylum applicants state that they do not like the Sandinistas, do not want to serve in the military and have come to the U.S. because we are a free country. However sympathetic this Administration may be to their plight, under our laws, these are not grounds for granting asylum, and for the Nicaraguan Humanitarian Coalition to assume the Administration can wave a wand and make it so is pure fantasy.

LAURA J. DIETRICH
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Washington, Sept. 13, 1985

In From the Cold

The intrigue has run both East and West

The greatest defection scandal to rock British intelligence had its roots at Cambridge University, where tutor Anthony Blunt recruited a ring of students to work for Moscow in the 1930s. Among them were **Donald Maclean** and **Guy Burgess,** homosexual lovers, and **Harold (Kim) Philby.** Blunt later became the queen's curator, and in 1944 Maclean was posted to the British Embassy in Washington, where he had access to U.S. atomic secrets. Leaks of such data fired tensions between Britain and America, and evidence pointed to Maclean. But in 1951 he was tipped off and escaped with Burgess. In 1956 they turned up in Moscow, where they lived the rest of their lives.

Philby, by then Britain's Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) liaison with the CIA in Washington, came under suspicion as the "third man" who tipped off his Cambridge colleagues. But British authorities didn't believe that their leading expert on counterintelligence was himself a double agent. Philby was interrogated and forced to resign, but never tried—even after another British diplomat, **George Blake,** confessed to being a spy and fingered Philby. Blake later escaped from prison and went to Moscow. Philby fled to Russia in 1963 and was made a KGB colonel general—but only after the Philby affair dealt a devastating blow to British intelligence, forcing a complete overhaul of the SIS.

The fallout from Cambridge's spy ring did not end there. When senior KGB officer **Anatoli Golitsin** defected to America in 1961, he brought with him tales of KGB operations inside Western intelligence services. He convinced CIA counterintelligence chief **James Angleton** that an "American Philby" was operating inside the CIA, and for 12 years the agency was rent by the search for the mole. The CIA's turmoil was compounded by **Yuri Nosenko,** a KGB officer who defected in 1964. Nosenko denied Golitsin's big-mole thesis. He also insisted that as Lee Harvey Oswald's "case officer" in Russia, he knew that the KGB had never recruited John F. Kennedy's assassin. Convinced that Nosenko was a Soviet plant sent to debunk Golitsin, Angleton kept him in solitary confinement for more than three years. Nosenko never changed his story. No spy was ever found. The CIA abandoned Golitsin as a source but still uses Nosenko as a consultant.

The career of **Arkady Shevchenko,** a top member of the Soviet U.N. delegation, has also been controversial. Recruited as a CIA mole in 1975, Shevchenko defected in 1978, becoming the highest-ranking Soviet diplomat to cross over since 1945. A protégé of Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Shevchenko was considered a major espionage coup. But the value of his information has been widely debated.

In 1979 **Stanislav Levchenko,** a KGB major and undercover agent in Tokyo, was granted political asylum in America and brought a wealth of information about KGB activities in Japan. Last May **Sergei Bokhan,** a senior Soviet military-intelligence official in Athens, bolted to the CIA and provided the agency with the names of Greek spies and information on how Moscow obtained military technology through Greece and supported some terrorist activities in the West. And **Oleg Gordiyevsky,** the KGB's London station chief and a double agent, sought asylum this summer from the British. Gordiyevsky fingered 25 alleged Soviet spies, who were swiftly expelled from Britain.

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By David Seavey, USA TODAY

The Washington Post ____
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The Chicago Tribune ____
The Los Angeles Times ____
The Christian Science Monitor ____
USA Today 12A

Date 11-6-85

KGB Defector Told U.S. of 'Spy Dust' Use

By ROBERT C. TOTH
and RONALD J. OSTROW,
Times Staff Writers

WASHINGTON—A high-ranking KGB defector's disclosure that the Soviets were making repeated use of potentially hazardous "spy dust" to track the movement of U.S. diplomats in Moscow led to the State Department's unusual accusation against the Soviets last month, government sources said Friday.

The warning by Vitaly Yurchenko, who defected Aug. 1 while on a temporary assignment in Italy, came atop earlier indications that the Soviets were using the chemical sporadically and persuaded U.S. officials to go public with the accusation.

The sources said key information obtained from Yurchenko by the CIA and FBI, which are questioning him at an undisclosed site in the United States, ranks him as a "much more important" defector than Oleg A. Gordievski, the head of the KGB's London operation who defected to the British earlier this month.

Yurchenko—whose name was spelled Dzhurtchenko in initial reports of his defection—served as first secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington from August, 1975, until late 1980, giving him access to crucial details of KGB operations in the United States. The assignment also helps explain why government sources have attached such significance to his defection.

"More will be unraveling in months to come, and that's why this is so sensitive," one source said.

Yurchenko has told U.S. interrogators that Soviet intelligence has "never" penetrated the State Department, according to government sources, who declined to be identified by name or agency.

The sources said CIA officials were disturbed that Yurchenko's defection became public as quickly as it did, saying that he had wanted his action kept quiet because his family remains in the Soviet Union.

In accusing the Soviets of using the chemical nitrophenylpentadienal, or NPPD, to track the movement of Americans in Moscow, the State Department said it had determined that the chemical is a mutagen, or capable of altering cells, and thus a potential cause of cancer, though its precise effects were not known.

The government sources said Yurchenko had alerted the United States that Soviet security police were using increasing amounts of NPPD and that this led to the decision to make a public accusation. The charge was made Aug. 21 in Moscow and Washington.

Afterward, a team of U.S. medical investigators traveled to Moscow to study the Soviets' alleged use of the chemical dust and assess its potential for harm. In addition to gathering samples, the study includes an effort to determine whether NPPD can actually be absorbed through the skin, and thus pose a danger to health.

The team hopes to have developed solid information about the chemical by next month.

Meanwhile, the Justice Department and the CIA denied a New York Times report that Yurchenko had identified several CIA employees as Soviet agents.

"Yurchenko has not indicated that there are any employees of the CIA working as Soviet agents," the Justice Department said in an unusual break from its practice of making no comment on such reports.

In addition, a government source informed on intelligence matters denied an Associated Press report that quoted an unidentified congressional source as saying that Yurchenko had implicated several former employees of the intelligence agency.

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Soviet defector led KGB in U.S.

By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Senior Soviet KGB defector Vitaly Yurchenko has been identified as Moscow's top North American spy operations expert, according to the U.S. State Department.

After weeks of official silence, the State Department said that Mr. Yurchenko has been in the United States "for some time" after defecting in Rome.

"Prior to his voluntary arrival in the United States in August 1985, Mr. Yurchenko served as deputy chief in the North American Department of the KGB's First Chief Directorate," the statement said. "The First Chief Directorate handles KGB intelligence operations worldwide."

Mr. Yurchenko "had previously asked that his presence here not be publicized," the statement said, explaining why official comment had been withheld prior to last week.

"Mr. Yurchenko was specifically responsible for KGB intelligence operations in the United States and Canada," the statement said.

During what was described as a "lengthy career" in the KGB, Mr. Yurchenko held "various key positions" in the KGB, including the most sensitive post of global counterintelligence — directing all penetrations of foreign governments and policing the KGB and GRU, the military spy service. He also ran KGB operations out of the Soviet embassy in Washington between 1975 and 1980, the State Department said.

As deputy chief in the North American department, Mr. Yurchenko would have directed several categories of KGB operations in the United States and Canada.

These activities, according to one intelligence expert who declined to be identified, would have included political, military and technological espionage, such as handling Americans and foreign nationals spying for Moscow; "active measures," — various covert action and "disinformation" programs; and a network of "illegal" agents operating independently of Soviet and East bloc diplomatic representatives.

The statement provided no dates for Mr. Yurchenko's duties before or after his 1980 posting in Washington. But he is believed to have directed KGB counterintelligence operations after leaving the Soviet embassy in Washington and prior to his promotion to chief of the North American department, a post he held until Aug. 1.

The State Department identified Mr. Yurchenko's counterspy role as "chief of Department 5 of Directorate K [worldwide counterintelligence] of the First Chief Directorate," a position that would have provided him with access to some aspects of virtually every operation of the KGB, GRU and East bloc foreign intelligence services throughout the world.

Soviet security services conduct very active counterspy programs that require officers to monitor, to some degree, all Soviet and East bloc agents and the information they provide to the KGB and GRU, the intelligence expert said.

Intelligence sources close to Mr. Yurchenko's debriefing said the KGB officer has been providing U.S. authorities with a windfall of intelligence data about KGB operations and operational methods since August. His debriefing by Justice Department and CIA officials began then at an undisclosed location in the United States and is expected to continue for several years, these sources said.

So far, Mr. Yurchenko has uncovered two Americans — both former CIA operations officers — who are suspected of spying for the Soviet Union after leaving the agency. One of the former CIA operatives, Edward Lee Howard, eluded FBI surveillance agents late last month in New Mexico. He is being sought on espionage charges and is believed to have fled the country.

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NEW YORK TIMES
13 November 1985

Publicity Said to Have Upset Defector

By JOEL BRINKLEY
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 12 — Vitaly S. Yurchenko, once portrayed by the United States as a valuable Soviet defector, had hoped to live anonymously with a woman on the West Coast after he had been thoroughly questioned by the Central Intelligence Agency, a senior intelligence official said today.

But during his interviews, the official said, Federal Bureau of Investigation officers who participated in the C.I.A. interrogations repeatedly showed Mr. Yurchenko newspaper clippings describing his defection. That is when "he began thinking maybe he'd made a big mistake," the official said.

"He was very, very upset," the official added.

In his comments, the official sought to lay some of the blame for Mr. Yurchenko's decision to return to the Soviet Union on the F.B.I.

At the F.B.I. today, Lane Bonner, a press officer; said that when Mr. Yurchenko "was in the United States, he had free access to television, radio and newspapers. It's absurd to say any person provided him with clips when he had free access to that."

But Mr. Yurchenko said at a news conference last week that he was shown newspaper clippings describing his disclosures, and that the officials who brought them "were looking at me as if they were looking at zoo animals," to see how he would respond.

The senior intelligence official, who has been briefed on Mr. Yurchenko's interviews, said, "He thought he could keep even the Soviet Union from knowing where he was. He thought he could beat the system and just disappear into the great, blue yonder."

Mr. Yurchenko, described by many American officials as a senior K.G.B. officer who defected to the United States in August, had been portrayed one of the most significant defectors of recent times. But he left his C.I.A. escort last week and walked to the Soviet diplomatic compound here.

After holding a news conference there denouncing the C.I.A., he returned to the Soviet Union. In the days since, the C.I.A. has been under increasing attack, from the White House, Congress and elsewhere, for its handling of Mr. Yurchenko. Questions have also been raised about the quality of information he provided, and whether he was even as senior a member of the K.G.B. as some American officials have maintained.

A senior official said the prevailing view among Reagan Administration officials was that the affair was "a major embarrassment." A White House official called it "quite a blunder."

But the intelligence official said the agency had to allow Mr. Yurchenko some freedom because "he had to adjust to life in the United States."

'They Couldn't Lock Him Up'

Even when officers realized Mr. Yurchenko was growing restive, "they couldn't lock him up. What are they going to do: put a ball and chain on him?" the official asked.

Still, he said, Mr. Yurchenko was watched most of the time, "for his own protection" since Soviet defectors are often afraid they will be kidnapped or assassinated. "He didn't spend much time alone."

Even when Mr. Yurchenko visited a Washington-area bowling alley to sign up for a bowling league, "someone was with him," an official said. "He was nicely treated — as a colleague."

But ultimately, the intelligence official said, "If he had said he wanted to go home, they would have talked to him about it, but if he still wanted to go they would have taken him to the Department of State and let him go. Why have a guy on our hands forever who doesn't want to be here?"

In recent days, members of Congress and others have said they believed the C.I.A. should have done a better job of trying to help Mr. Yurchenko cope with the emotional trauma that defectors almost invariably experience, if emotional turmoil was in fact the reason he returned to the Soviet Union. Some officials believe Mr. Yurchenko was a double agent, sent here by the K.G.B.

"Either a mistake was made in getting into this situation, or a colossal mistake was made in not spotting a double agent," said Senator Patrick J. Leahy, Democrat of Vermont, the Intelligence Committee's vice chairman.

Administration officials "were sucked in" by the C.I.A, a senior official said, adding that for two or three months agency officials touted Yurchenko as a wholly reliable defector.

"The more we pressed," the Administration official added, "the more reassurance we got. Then Yurchenko goes back, and all of a sudden the agency says they had doubts all along."

'Too Much Terrific Data'

Although the C.I.A. can never know for certain, officials said, agency officers do not believe the theory that Mr. Yurchenko was a plant because "he gave too much terrific data," an official said.

Mr. Yurchenko gave his debriefers "the locations of scores of Soviet spies throughout the world, in the United States and in Canada," the official said. "He described where the K.G.B.'s internal security problems are."

"It's always conceivable that it's all a big put-on," the official added. "But so far we have no reason to doubt him because all the leads checked so far have been good," although he added that much of Mr. Yurchenko's information still has not been checked.

Last week, the C.I.A. released a biography of Mr. Yurchenko, an unusual step that some officials viewed as an effort to counter criticism of the agency's handling of Mr. Yurchenko, an explanation the C.I.A. denies.

In September, Mr. Yurchenko visited the wife of a Soviet official in Canada. Officials said Mr. Yurchenko had been romantically involved with the woman while they both were stationed in Washington during the late 1970's.

In September, he tried to persuade her to join him in the United States, officials said, but she declined, because "he looked better as a K.G.B. officer than as a defector," an Administration official said today.

THE STRANGE ODYSSEY OF VITALY YURCHENKO

EDWARD LEE HOWARD — VITALY YURCHENKO — WILLIAM J. CASEY

JUNE

Early June—The spy saga begins with the secret arrest in Moscow of A.G. Tolkachev, an employe of a Moscow aeronautical institute who long ago was a CIA "asset" providing valuable information to the U.S. Tolkachev was apparently put under KGB surveillance because of information provided the Soviets by Edward Lee Howard, a disaffected former CIA employe who was trained to be Tolkachev's secret handler in Moscow but who was fired from the agency before he took up that post.

June 14—By following Tolkachev, the KGB apparently catches him in the act of passing secrets to Paul Stombaugh, a diplomat in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. The Soviets announce that they have caught Stombaugh "in the act" of espionage and expel him from the Soviet Union.

JULY

July 24—Vitaly Yurchenko, deputy chief of the KGB directorate that supervises all spy operations in the United States and a former first secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington from 1975 to 1980, arrives in Rome on an Aeroflot flight. His stated mission is to prepare security for Soviet scientists attending a conference on nuclear war later that month in Erice, Sicily.

End of July—Yurchenko, walking with Soviet colleagues, tells them he wants to visit the Vatican museums, and disappears. The Soviet government asks Italian authorities to investigate his whereabouts.

AUGUST

Early August—Italian newspapers report Yurchenko has defected to West.

SEPTEMBER

Mid-September—Yurchenko allegedly provides CIA information leading to the identification of Howard as a Soviet spy who betrayed Tolkachev to the KGB.

The FBI and Justice Department prepare a lengthy, detailed affidavit on Howard's espionage activities, based on information from their debriefing of Yurchenko and confirmed by a subsequent FBI investigation. The affidavit is filed under seal in U.S. District Court in Albuquerque, N.M., where Howard is living.

Sept. 21—After Yurchenko names Howard, the FBI begins surveillance of Howard's home. Howard flees.

Sept. 25—Ralph De Toledano, in The Washington Times, carries the first report in an American newspaper of Yurchenko's apparent defection. He says Yurchenko defected in Rome on July 24 and "is now in CIA hands."

OCTOBER

Oct. 28—NBC reports that Yurchenko cleared up a decade-old mystery by explaining that Nicholas G. Shadrin, an American double agent who disappeared in December 1975 in Vienna, was accidentally and fatally chloroformed while struggling in a car with Soviet agents.

Newsweek, in its Nov. 4 edition, reports that William J. Casey, director of the CIA, had personally met Yurchenko.

NOVEMBER

Nov. 4—Yurchenko, flanked by Soviet officials, says at a news conference that he was kidnaped by CIA agents, drugged and held in isolation, finally escaping from a house in Fredericksburg, Va., Nov. 2 while being watched by six CIA agents. He says he wants to return to the Soviet Union, his wife and 16-year-old son as soon as possible.

THE WASHINGTON POST

Soviets: 'A Preplanned, Inhumane Operation'

Text of the note delivered to the State Department by the Soviet Embassy in Washington:

The Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the United States of America deems it necessary to state the following to the Department of State of the United States of America.

On Aug. 1, 1985, in Rome, Italy, Soviet diplomatic officer V.S. Yurchenko, who was there on a short-term business trip, vanished without a trace.

In mid-October, that is, 2½ months after that, the State Department officially confirmed that V.S. Yurchenko was on the territory of the United States. In that context it was asserted that he had allegedly made a request that political asylum be granted him in the United States. However, despite the numerous persistent demands of the U.S.S.R. Embassy in the U.S.A. that a personal meeting be arranged for the Soviet representatives with V.S. Yurchenko, the embassy was constantly denied such a meeting under the pretext that Yurchenko himself allegedly did not want it. At the same time, clearly with the connivance of the U.S. special services, an unbridled anti-Soviet campaign was unleashed in the U.S. mass media to discredit V.S. Yurchenko, to create an impression that he had betrayed his country and had been cooperating with the U.S. intelligence services already for many years.

On Nov. 2, V.S. Yurchenko came in person to the Soviet Embassy in Washington and said that he had been forcibly abducted by some unknown persons in a street in Rome. Unconscious and under the effect of some strong drugs, he was brought from Italy to the U.S.A., where all this time he was kept in isolation and denied the possibility to get in touch with Soviet official representatives. During all this time, while in the hands of the U.S. special services, V.S. Yurchenko was constantly under intensive psychological pressure, was forced to take some drugs in the attempt to get from him information of interest to the American intelligence services.

Due only to the momentary lapse of attention on the part of the persons watching him, V.S. Yurchenko was able to break out to freedom and come to the Soviet Embassy.

It is quite clear that what is involved is a preplanned monstrously inhumane operation of the American special services to abduct and forcibly detain a Soviet diplomat. The above unprecedented actions cannot be described as other than a flagrant trampling upon human rights and dignity, a gross violation of elementary norms of relations between states and of international law, as another concrete manifestation of state terrorism on the part of the U.S. authorities.

The embassy declares a resolute protest to the Department of State and demands that the persons guilty of the criminal act committed against V.S. Yurchenko be severely punished and that the American side apologize for its actions. It goes without saying that V.S. Yurchenko should be given an unimpeded possibility to depart for the Soviet Union.

U.S.: Story 'False, Without Any Foundation'

Statement by State Department spokesman Charles Redman issued last night:

On Nov. 4, 1985, Vitaly Sergeyevich Yurchenko, appeared at a press conference at the Soviet Embassy in Washington where he made a series of allegations which are completely false and without any foundation. Accordingly the United States government wishes to set the record straight.

On Aug. 1, 1985, Mr. Yurchenko, a senior officer of the Soviet KGB, defected of his own volition to the American Embassy in Rome, Italy. He requested asylum in the U.S. and signed a statement to that effect and asylum was granted.

Since his arrival in the United States on Aug. 2, Mr. Yurchenko has willingly cooperated with both the Central Intelligence Agency and the FBI in providing information about Soviet intelligence activities throughout the world and the organization of the KGB. At no time was Mr. Yurchenko held or coerced by improper, illegal or unethical means. It is Mr. Yurchenko's right to return to the Soviet Union once the United States government is, in fact, assured that this action is genuinely of his own choosing. The information he provided over the last three months continues to be processed and assessed by the intelligence community.

At 5:30 p.m. on Nov. 4, the Soviet charge, Mr. Oleg Sokolov, informed the acting secretary of state John Whitehead that Mr. Yurchenko was in the Soviet Embassy. He repeated Yurchenko's story of "abduction," protested his alleged mistreatment and said Mr. Yurchenko was requesting permission to return to the U.S.S.R. Mr. Whitehead refuted the various Soviet charges, including the charge that Yurchenko had been drugged and brought to this country against his will.

Mr. Whitehead told the Soviets that before we allow Yurchenko to leave this country, we will insist on a meeting with him in an environment free of Soviet coercion to satisfy ourselves about his real intentions.

The Spy Who Returned to the Cold

Defecting back to an uncertain future, Yurchenko spooks the CIA

He looked rather like a businessman in a hurry, clad in a tan trench coat and bounding up the stairs of the plane. As he neared the top, he turned and gave a wide wave, as if bidding farewell to friends. Though his behavior seemed unexceptional, even banal, that was no ordinary traveler boarding the Aeroflot jet at Dulles Airport last week. He was Vitaly Yurchenko, the Soviet KGB agent who had disappeared from a Rome street one sunny day last summer and turned up several weeks later as a defector in CIA hands. Identified initially as the fifth-highest official in the KGB, Yurchenko was touted as the most important catch in decades and a striking example of how Moscow's finest have grown disillusioned with the Soviet system. If CIA officials were to be believed, Yurchenko's defection had jolted the Kremlin.

Yet it was Washington's turn last week to be stunned. In an astonishing turnaround, Yurchenko, in effect, redefected to Moscow, leaving behind a furor of questions, doubts and recriminations that promise to echo for months. Did Yurchenko simply have a change of heart, one brought about by the dark gremlins haunting a homesick mind, or by despair over being spurned by a Soviet girlfriend living in Canada? Or was he an ingenious fake, his flight to the U.S. and subsequent reversal shrewdly planned by the Soviets to humiliate the Reagan Administration and to glean secrets from debriefing sessions with the CIA? Either way, Yurchenko's flip-flop deeply embarrassed CIA Director William Casey and his agency. "You've either got a defector who was allowed to just walk away under circumstances I can't accept or you have a double agent planted on the U.S.," said Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont, vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. "No matter what, something is wrong."

The saga of Yurchenko was played out against a backdrop of defection politics that further taxed the Administration. In Afghanistan a Soviet soldier who had sought refuge at the U.S. embassy in Kabul finally left in the company of the Soviet Ambassador last week, but only after the embassy had been ringed by hundreds of Soviet and Afghan troops for five days and its electricity and phone lines cut off. In New Orleans, a dispute continued to simmer over the fate of Miroslav Medvid, the Ukrainian sailor from a Soviet grain freighter who jumped ship twice, only to be returned both times. After Ukrainian-American groups protested that Medvid had been pressured by the Soviets into retracting his request for asylum, Republican Senator Jesse Helms took the extraordinary step of issuing a subpoena for Medvid to appear before a Senate committee *(see following story).*

The aborted defections prompted Ronald Reagan to suggest that they might be a "maneuver" by the Soviet Union on the eve of the Geneva summit. "Coming as they do together," he told reporters, "you can't rule out the possibility that this might have been a deliberate ploy." But, Reagan candidly admitted, "there is no way we can prove or disprove it." As for Yurchenko, the President acknowledged that he was genuinely confounded. Said Reagan: "I think it's awfully easy for any American to be perplexed by anyone who could live in the United States and would prefer to live in Russia."

All that seemed certain about the drama of the turncoat's return was that the last act began at a casual bistro in bustling Georgetown, Au Pied de Cochon, where he went for dinner with a junior CIA security officer on Saturday night. As his escort was paying the check, Yurchenko suddenly asked a question. "What would you do if I got up and walked out? Would you shoot me?" Replied the CIA agent: "No, we don't treat defectors that way." "I'll be back in 15 or 20 minutes," Yurchenko said. Pause. "If I'm not, it will not be your fault."

He did not come back, and it was not until late Monday afternoon that his whereabouts became public. At 4 p.m., Soviet Embassy Press Counselor Boris Malakhov called the Associated Press's State Department correspondent to inform him that there would be a press conference in 90 minutes. "We'll have Vitaly Yurchenko," he said. Replied Reporter George Gedda: "Wait a minute. Did I miss something? He defected three months ago." Said Malakhov: "Ah, there have been reports that he defected, but come to the embassy to find out what really happened."

Across Washington, even the highest officials snapped their heads in disbelief upon hearing the news of the impending press conference. CIA Director Casey, who had not told the White House about Yurchenko's disappearance over the weekend, quickly called Chief of Staff Donald Regan, who in turn told the President. Reagan apparently showed little emotion, but others in the West Wing gathered in front of televisions to watch CNN's live broadcast of the conference. What they saw for the next hour was one of the most amazing public performances ever to emerge from the foggy world of spy intrigue.

In front of some 50 journalists gathered in the new bunker-like Soviet compound atop Mount Alto in northwest Washington, Yurchenko vehemently insisted that he had never defected. Occasionally smirking, often scowling, always looking tough and in command, he freely alternated between Russian and English as he spun his tale of being "forcibly abducted" in Rome by American agents, drugged and flown to the U.S. against his will. For "three horrible months" he was held at a safe house in Fredericksburg, Va., Yurchenko claimed, taking apparent glee at revealing its exact location and details. Only on Nov. 2, when his CIA "torturers" let down their guard, so he said, was he able to escape.

Yurchenko described how CIA officials tried to buy his cooperation by offering him a $1 million payment plus $62,500 a year for life. The agency, he said, was even willing to throw in the safe house's furniture, worth about $48,000. He met with Casey over dinner at the CIA's Langley, Va., headquarters, but claimed he did not recall the conversation very well because he had been drugged before the meal by agents eager to make Casey think he was a willing defector.

Yurchenko denied he had willingly given any Soviet secrets to the CIA, but added that he did not know what he had said while drugged. "Please ask CIA officials what kind of secret information I gave them," Yurchenko said in English. "It would be very interesting for me to know too, because I don't know." When questioned about whether he was in the KGB, Yurchenko said that "I'm not going to make any comments about spying business."

Though Yurchenko gave a confident performance, many of his answers were vague or contradictory. He refused to explain how he had escaped from the CIA. He said he had been held in isolation, but when one reporter identified himself, Yurchenko mentioned he had received a letter from him during his alleged captivity. Prompted by questions from two Soviet correspondents, Yurchenko compared his kidnaping to "state-sponsored terrorism" and accused the U.S. of "hypocrisy" for preaching about human rights yet violating his. As farfetched as his tale was, it provides the Soviets with a handy riposte at home and abroad to undercut Reagan when he brings up Soviet human rights violations at the Geneva summit. "What lawlessness!" commented *Pravda* after running Yurchenko's account. "And it takes place in a country whose leaders trumpet all over the world about 'democracy' and 'liberties,' who seek to teach everybody how one should

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observe human rights."

Washington officials, agog over what they had just seen on their TV sets, immediately denied Yurchenko's allegations. State Department Spokesman Charles Redman called the charges "completely false and without any foundation." State Department officials informed the Soviets they would not allow Yurchenko to leave the U.S. until he had satisfied them he was going voluntarily. On Tuesday evening he was driven to the State Department for a meeting with senior officials and a psychiatrist. After the 30-minute visit, U.S. officials concluded that Yurchenko indeed wished to leave. As he emerged from the building, he clasped his hands above his head and shouted to reporters, "Yes, home!"

According to his CIA biography, released at the end of last week, Yurchenko, 49, is indeed a master spy. He served as a submarine navigation officer for a year before joining the KGB in 1960. After several assignments in naval counterintelligence and security, he became in 1972 deputy chief of the third department of the KGB's Third Chief Directorate, a daunting mouthful that essentially meant Yurchenko helped recruit and run foreign agents. Yurchenko came to Washington in 1975, charged with overseeing security arrangements for the embassy. In 1980 Yurchenko returned to Moscow, where he became head of the section responsible for, among other things, ferreting out double agents and leaks within the KGB. In April of this year Yurchenko was named deputy chief of intelligence operations in the U.S. and Canada, a position that theoretically would allow him to know the identity of every Soviet agent in those countries. Reports that Yurchenko was the No. 5 man in the KGB are overblown, according to an intelligence source, but he "was a very senior person who had a high-ranking position within the organization."

In late July Yurchenko arrived in Rome from Moscow and was driven to Villa Abamelek, the Soviet embassy compound on the city's outskirts. On the morning of July 28, according to original accounts, Yurchenko told his guards he wanted to go by himself to the Vatican museums, less than a mile away. He never returned. Though stories have circulated about how Yurchenko disappeared, including an account carried this month by *Actuel*, a French magazine, which claims that Yurchenko met his CIA contact in the Sistine Chapel, U.S. officials refuse to reveal details. The State Department, however, reiterated last week that Yurchenko requested political asylum at the U.S. embassy on Aug. 1.

Yurchenko's defection was not publicly acknowledged by Administration officials until late September. Privately, U.S. officials credited him with supplying information about the "spy dust" that Soviet secret police supposedly used to track Americans in Moscow. Yurchenko blew the whistle on Edward Lee Howard, the former CIA trainee who allegedly gave Moscow information about a U.S. agent in the Soviet Union. Howard, who had been fired by the agency in 1983, vanished two months ago in Santa Fe while under FBI surveillance; he is now believed to be in Moscow.* The CIA also leaked word that Yurchenko had solved the mystery of Nicholas Shadrin, a defector who, while working for the CIA, disappeared in Vienna in 1975. Yurchenko said that Shadrin had been kidnaped and killed by KGB agents.

The prevailing view within the CIA is that Yurchenko was a genuine defector who grew homesick. The CIA paints Yurchenko at the time of his defection as an unhappy man, disenchanted with the KGB, fed up with his wife of nearly 30 years and teenage son, and eager for a fresh start in the West. Indeed, Yurchenko may have contemplated switching sides long ago. During his Washington stay in the late 1970s, according to one high-level source, Yurchenko became friendly with the FBI agents whom he met in his job and began trading tidbits of information.

Yet depression is the constant enemy of any defector, and Soviets seem especially prone to what intelligence experts call "the postpartum blues." Yurchenko's case reminded many diplomats of Soviet Journalist Oleg Bitov, who returned to Moscow last year after defecting to Great Britain in 1983. Though Bitov offered a kidnap tale similar to Yurchenko's, British officials are convinced that both men simply had a change of heart. "A feeling arises that . . . 'Mother Russia beckons,' that the West, nice as it has been, is not 'me,'" explains a British intelligence officer.

Yurchenko also was the victim of a romance gone sour. According to intelligence experts, Yurchenko was deeply in love with the wife of a Soviet diplomat whom he had met while posted in Washington. After Yurchenko defected, the CIA arranged for him to visit the woman in Ottawa, where her husband is now assigned. Exactly what happened is not known, but in the end she rejected him. (In what appears to be only an eerie coincidence, the wife of a Soviet trade official committed suicide in Toronto last week by jumping from her 27th-floor apartment. Canadian and U.S. authorities claimed that the dead woman was not Yurchenko's lover.)

After the woman spurned Yurchenko, he became morose. He had trouble sleeping. A bit of a hypochondriac, Yurchenko insisted on drinking only boiled water. He supposedly had wanted the news of his defection kept secret, and was quite upset that the stories about Howard and Shadrin had been leaked to the press.

Some in Washington feel that Yurchenko was a KGB plant all along, that his defection in Rome was just a ruse. They say it is nonsense to believe that he was a real defector who decided to go back and face likely death because of a change of heart. Given his apparent access to the names and details of KGB agents in the U.S. and other nations, a former senior CIA counterintelligence official argues, a flood of arrests and expulsions would have followed his debriefings if his defection were legitimate. Instead, the skeptics point out, Yurchenko offered only meager pickings, a contention that Reagan seemed to support last week when he told reporters that Yurchenko had not provided "anything new or sensational."

Those who believe his defection was real counter by saying that Yurchenko may have been holding back information for his own reasons, parceling it out carefully as he watched how the CIA treated him. The official CIA line is that Yurchenko was in fact quite forthcoming and supplied details about the KGB network in the U.S. and abroad. As for Reagan's downplaying of Yurchenko's revelations, some espionage experts contend that it is the only sensible response for a President who wants to keep Moscow guessing how much the U.S. now knows about Soviet operations.

It is difficult to believe that the Soviets would risk using a KGB official as important as Yurchenko in a sting operation against the CIA. There is always the chance that the agent might defect for good or be forced to reveal valuable information. "If you were chief of the KGB, would you pick an agent who knew all your agents and send him on a mission like this?" asks former CIA Director Richard Helms.

Even many who support the CIA's contention that it was not hoodwinked by a fake question the agency's treatment of Yurchenko. Though the CIA in the past has kept defectors virtually imprisoned (KGB Officer Yuri Nosenko, who defected in 1964, was held in a tiny prison cell for nearly four years while U.S. intelligence officials bickered over whether he was a Soviet plant), the policy today is to give them as much freedom as possible in order to reinforce their belief in the American system. Yet sometimes that approach is sloppily executed. Yurchenko, for example, allegedly was left pretty much alone on weekends, with only one junior officer as his companion. How Yurchenko, already feeling depressed, could be allowed to eat at a restaurant within walking distance of the Soviet residential compound also mystified CIA critics. "The mishandling is obvious," says Republican Senator Frank Murkowski. "If you catch a fish this big . . . you usually check your nets to see if there are holes in them."

Many CIA officials agree that Yurchenko's handlers failed to establish a strong bond with their client. Though few believe Yurchenko took away any U.S. secrets other than a firsthand account of how the CIA conducts debriefings, the episode is still deeply embarrassing to Casey, who acted as the defector's top case officer and wrote personal memos about him to Reagan. Though the CIA plans to com-

*TIME learned last week that Howard eluded the FBI with a crude ruse. One day Howard and his wife got into their car and drove off. At some point during the journey, his wife inflated a balloon dummy and placed it in her husband's seat while Howard slipped away. Howard's wife is now cooperating with the Government.

plete an internal inquiry about what went wrong in about six weeks, there are no White House plans for a separate investigation. Casey, however, is certain to face tough grilling on the Hill, where the Senate Intelligence Committee plans to hold hearings.

Many are resigned to never knowing the whole story behind Yurchenko and how much he helped—or hurt—U.S. intelligence. As Republican Senator William Cohen put it last week, pondering the world of espionage is akin to stepping "into an infinite line of mirrors where it's impossible to detect reality from reflection." The world may never even learn the ultimate fate of Yurchenko, who is now probably undergoing another heavy bout of debriefing, this time, of course, by the KGB. "Yurchenko will go home to a hero's welcome, be put on the lecture circuit there, and then, when nobody's looking, be shot—if he's lucky," predicts a senior official of the U.S. intelligence community. That scenario assumes, of course, that Yurchenko is what he appears to be: a onetime defector who changed his mind. Yet sometimes, even in the land of mirrors, the most obvious image is the real one. —*By James Kelly. Reported by David Halevy and Gregory H. Wierzynski/Washington*

Did Yurchenko Fool the CIA?

A prize catch returns to Moscow—and Washington wonders if he was a KGB plant.

He was trumpeted as one of the most important defectors in years—a career Soviet agent who, U.S. intelligence sources said, had risen through the ranks to become deputy director of KGB intelligence operations in all of North America. A big fish, U.S. officials said, the genuine article—a master spy and a font of invaluable information about Soviet tactics in the never-ending secret war between the KGB and the CIA. But last week the CIA's bubble burst wide open—for in a startling news conference at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, Vitaly Sergeyevich Yurchenko, 49, announced his redefection to the Soviet Union.

Speaking mostly in Russian and sometimes in heavily accented English, Yurchenko told a lurid tale that seemed designed to make the CIA look like a gang of incompetent thugs. He said he had been kidnapped, drugged and kept in isolation at a CIA safe house near Fredericksburg, Va., for three "horrible" months. His guards were "fat" and "stupid" and his chief caretaker was a "psychologically sick" Vietnam veteran who seemed to "hate all humanity." At one point he had been offered $1 million to tell what he knew—and at another he was [illegible] to CIA headquarters in a drug-induced "fog" to have dinner with CIA Director William J. Casey. Finally, Yurchenko said, he was "able to break out to freedom" due to a "momentary lapse" by his captors. He fled to the Soviet Embassy compound, where he was welcomed back to the fold and ordered to tell his story to the world—and the worst of it for the CIA was that too many of the details were true.

'Totally False': Yurchenko took off for Moscow two days later, leaving embarrassed administration officials to wonder what went wrong. For starters, the State Department denied that he had been kidnapped or coerced: Secretary of State George Shultz, in Moscow for a round of presummit meetings with party leader Mikhail Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders (page 48), said Yurchenko's charges of brutality were "totally false." Other U.S. officials worried that the incident might poison the atmosphere in Geneva, and some suggested that Yurchenko may have been sent by the KGB to mislead Ronald Reagan about Soviet intentions at the summit. The president's senior advisers maintained that fear was groundless, however, and Reagan himself said that Yurchenko's information was "not anything new or sensational." But in the wake of the diplomatic wrangle over Ukrainian sailor Miroslav Medvid in New Orleans, defector controversies seemed to be part of a nerve-jangling buildup to the summit (page 36). Reagan was struck by the odd coincidence of three different Soviet redefections in a single week. "You can't rule out the possibility that this might have been a deliberate ploy, a maneuver," Reagan said. "[But] we just have to live with it."

Perhaps—but it was already plain that Yurchenko's disappearance had thrown the American intelligence community into turmoil. There was little doubt the CIA had bungled: the only questions were how, and how badly. If Yurchenko were a genuine defector who had a genuine change of heart, the agency was guilty of sloppy or amateurish handling of a prized intelligence "asset." But if, as Reagan implied, Yurchenko had been a KGB plant all along, the damage was far worse: CIA officials from top to bottom had swallowed his story whole, and the agency had suffered an embarrassing defeat whose consequences might be felt for years. There were hard questions ahead, careers on the line and a widening search for scapegoats that could, in the end, lead to a wholesale shake-up within the agency; the most anyone would say last week was that the 72-year-old Casey, a favorite of conservatives and the president alike, was himself likely to survive any impending purge.

Meanwhile, the episode provided fascinating glimpses of the secret world of espionage—for if nothing else, the Yurchenko case was a great spy yarn. U.S. intelligence sources confirmed a number of hitherto-secret details about the CIA's handling of its lost defector. It was evidently true, for example, that the agency had debriefed Yurchenko in a private home ouside Fredericksburg, and it was evidently true that the agency at one point had offered him a $1 million bonus and a lifetime contract for his cooperation. It was true that Yurchenko met with Casey, and it was true that he had "escaped" from the agency's custody by giving his handler the slip. Sources also confirmed a melodramatic wrinkle the defector failed to mention to the press: that Yurchenko was pursuing a longtime romance with the wife of a Soviet diplomat stationed in Canada, and that he had apparently changed his mind when his mistress refused to defect with him.

'Flying Colors': The bare outlines of Yurchenko's story, so far as it was known, suggested that his journey to America had been anything but a kidnapping—and indeed, there was every indication that he had been treated with extravagant hospitality. According to the State Department, Yurchenko arrived at the U.S. Embassy in Rome on Aug. 1. Sometime thereafter he was flown to the United States, where Yurchenko said he was guarded by a six-man team headed by a CIA employee named Colin Thompson. Yurchenko submitted to a battery of lie-detector tests and passed, according to Reagan administration sources, "with flying colors." He and his guards reportedly were sequestered for the duration of his interrogation in a "safe house" outside Fredericksburg, an easy commute from CIA headquarters in Langley, Va. The rented house, a comfortable modern Colonial, sits on a secluded lot in a sparsely developed subdivision called Coventry.

To hear Yurchenko tell it, the CIA had indeed sent him to Coventry—for one of his biggest complaints was that he "did not have any chance to speak Russian." His press-conference allegations that the CIA kidnapped, tortured and drugged him, however, were a near-perfect rendition of Soviet propaganda, and a CIA spokesman, in a rare on-the-record statement, said Yurchenko's version of events was "a fairy tale." "When you are in such isolation, you are helpless," he told reporters. "Nobody pays attention to what you are protesting. And even if I try to commit suicide they won't give me such chance to escape. Because 24 hours, even when I was sleeping, they prohibited even to close the door. And [in the] next room was sitting such [a] fat, quiet, stupid, excuse me, nonemotional person . . . if I tried to close the door he immediately opened the door and [was] sitting [watching] TV. I practically don't have normal rest or sleep." Chief interrogator Thompson, he said, was a "veteran in Vietnam, he was wounded. It seemed to me he was [a] killer, too, and it seems to me he has continued to do the same thing here." Thompson "hate[s] all humanity," Yurchenko said, "because he is a psychologically sick person." (A CIA spokesman said, "We stand by our men.")

His handlers, Yurchenko said, used a combination of threats and promises to soften him up. At times, he said, they warned him, "If you flee and return to the Soviet Union anyway, a prison and death is awaiting you. We'll send the KGB all the materials we got from you, and you will be jailed there." At other times they offered him a lucrative contract as a CIA consultant. "I was supposed to get $1 million beginning Nov. 1 . . . as a down payment. And to the end of my life they were going to pay me annually $62,500, and that sum would grow taking into account inflation," he said. The agreement included fringe benefits as well: free medical care for life and all the furniture in the rented safe house, which cost the CIA $48,000. All told, Yurchenko said, he would be paid something like $180,000 a year—which is more, he said, "than the

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income of the U.S. president when he retires."

They also tried to help him with his love life. Yurchenko has a wife, a married daughter and a 16-year-old adopted son in the Soviet Union—but he told the CIA he wanted to start a new life in the United States with a longtime lady friend, whom he identified as the wife of a Soviet diplomat stationed in Canada. Trying desperately to keep him happy, the CIA team reportedly took Yurchenko north in late September for a tryst with the diplomat's wife. They drove to Ottawa, where the diplomat is stationed. But the diplomat's wife spurned the overture—and, according to one source, "that was a big disappointment" to Yurchenko.*

Big Policy: The debriefing seemed to go badly after that. Intelligence sources insist that Yurchenko provided much valuable information early on—but they concede that he clammed up during the last five weeks of his captivity. Yurchenko said he gave them no information at all unless he was drugged—which he implied was much of the time. He said he was drugged, for instance, when his handlers took him to CIA headquarters in Langley to have dinner with Casey. "I remember that I was brought to the main building . . . and that I was taken by elevator to the seventh floor to Mr. Casey's office," he said. "That was the point of the strongest effect of the drug, [so] that when Mr. Casey entered the office I did not recognize him. I rose, greeted him and later we went to Mr. Casey's dining room and had dinner." Their talk, he scoffed, "was kind of general conversation of big policy issues regarding the summit—things which they usually write about in the newspapers."

By October Yurchenko was banging on the bars of his golden cage. He was distressed, he said, that his case had attracted so much attention in the media, and he was even more distressed that the CIA passed along a number of letters from reporters asking him questions about the information he had given. Burton Gerber, chief of the CIA's Soviet desk, played middleman for the media. "Alex, we have received many requests from our media—NBC, ABC companies would like to speak with you," Yurchenko recalled Gerber telling him. "I answered him, 'Mr. Gerber, I'm not ready now'." Yurchenko was particularly troubled by a Washington Post story saying he had confirmed that the KGB had kidnapped and killed double agent Nicholas Shadrin in Vienna in 1975. Shadrin's widow is suing the CIA for damages; Yurchenko thought he would be called to testify. "I asked Mr. Gerber, 'Aren't you ashamed? I will be taken to an American court . . . because it seems to me I'm going to be the only witness for that.' And [Gerber] told me, 'Don't worry, we'll settle everything. The main thing is to influence people'."

The uneasy rapport with his warders vanished. On one occasion, when the safe house had women visitors, Yurchenko noticed one of the guards sitting with his feet up on a cocktail table, jacket thrown open to reveal his gun. "From my point of view, to sit together with some ladies [with] his gun open and his feets on the table . . . it's not polite," Yurchenko said. "I said, 'What are you doing?' And he—that's his mentality—he said, 'Oh, I understand, it's your furniture.' He decided I am worrying about [the furniture] because they know all about the agreement. He respects private property and immediately takes a piece of paper and began to polish" the table.

'Not Your Fault': Yurchenko's "breakout" came on Nov. 2—but it was hardly a great escape. In fact, he was having dinner at a restaurant in Washington with a single CIA handler when, according to sources, the defector simply walked away. The restaurant, Au Pied de Cochon, is a popular Georgetown bistro much frequented by the city's international crowd; it was so crowded on the evening of Nov. 2, according to owner Yves Courbois, that Yurchenko and his companion must have waited in line for at least 10 minutes to get a table. The two men ate dinner without attracting the attention of Courbois's staff, which suggests that the ensuing drama was strictly low key. Yurchenko waited to spring his surprise until the CIA man was picking up the check. "What would you do if I got up and walked out? Would you shoot me?" he reportedly asked. "No, we don't treat defectors that way," the CIA man replied. "I'll be back in 15 or 20 minutes," Yurchenko said. "If I'm not, it's not your fault."

To U.S. intelligence experts, Yurchenko's litany of accusations and complaints was nothing more than blatant Soviet propaganda. His three main charges—that he was kidnapped, tortured and drugged—were ludicrous, they said. "Anybody who has eyes, ears and half a brain knows that his account of being drugged, kidnapped and tortured was made up of whole cloth," says former CIA man George Carver. In truth, Carver and other experts say, strong-arm methods gain little in defection cases—for the subject will either resist interrogation or fabricate what he thinks his interrogators want to hear. The use of truth serums, by the same token, is said to be largely myth. There are legal, ethical and moral problems, says one CIA veteran, but the agency doesn't use drugs—even sodium pentothal—because they usually don't work. "If there's something down deep inside someone's psyche, drugs won't get it out," this source says. "You're not going to get a guy's brain to tell you something he doesn't *want* to tell you."

Debriefing a defector, particularly a knowledgeable agent like Yurchenko, is essentially a process of eliciting his voluntary cooperation—though carrot-and-stick pressure, such as Yurchenko described, may well be used. The stick is mostly bluff: the CIA has no real sanctions, legal or otherwise, that it can use. That means CIA interrogators must bank heavily on using the carrot—and Yurchenko's debriefing, despite his many complaints, illustrates that fact well. He was housed in comfort, nursed through his romantic problems and offered the CIA's equivalent of the golden handshake: all in all, a senior U.S. official says, he was treated "like a colleague."

Indeed, most of the CIA's critics now say the agency should have coddled him even more. Carver says the interrogation team should have provided a Russian-speaking "babysitter"—someone who could play chess, drink vodka and swap dirty stories by the hour; someone who knows the Russian soul and the defector's mind. Another mistake, according to Carver, was the Reagan administration's eagerness to publicize its prize catch. "Yurchenko was ticked off at the way his information was leaked, and he was ticked off not only in the abstract but in the sense that he may have seen the leaks as having a direct bearing on the situation of his wife and family," Carver says. "But the very fact that we had a senior defector shouldn't have been blabbed, and the little nuggets he provided shouldn't have been spread over the networks and the newspapers the way they were. We should have absolutely stonewalled on this guy."

In a Funk: Most of all, these critics say, the CIA team failed to ease Yurchenko through a wholly predictable bout of the defector blues (page 40). Like most Soviet turncoats, Yurchenko seemed to have been motivated by a combination of disillusionment with the Soviet system and personal problems. He "hated his wife, hated his two kids, hated the system," one official says. As a result, the theory goes, his lady friend's rejection came as a crushing blow that led Yurchenko to reconsider his defection. "My personal opinion was always that he was in a tough emotional state and maybe . . . that he wasn't handled as well as he could have been," says Sen. Dave Durenberger, a member of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee. "We could see for the last five weeks that he was in that kind of funk." Given his mood, this theory goes, the probability that he would be jailed or punished by the KGB was not enough to deter his redefection: just last year another Soviet defector, journalist Oleg Bitov, apparently redefected without disappearing into the Gulag. Bitov returned to Moscow, claiming he had been kidnapped and coerced by British intelligence agents—similar to Yurchenko's allegations last week.

The fact remains, however, that all of this psychologizing may be wholly beside the point—for there are those who simply do not believe that Yurchenko was ever a genuine defector. In their view, his crossover in Rome was only the beginning of a deliberate KGB maneuver to spread "disinformation" among U.S. policymakers on the eve of the Reagan-Gorbachev summit. Another objective could have been to humiliate and

*U.S. and Canadian officials denied that the death of a Soviet trade official's wife in Toronto last week had any connection to the Yurchenko case. The Russian woman, an apparent suicide, fell to her death the day before Yurchenko flew back to Moscow; a Soviet spokesman said she had been under treatment for depression for some time.

FBI Chief Doubts Defection Of Yurchenko Was Staged

Soviet Gave Valuable Data, Webster Says

By John Mintz
Washington Post Staff Writer

FBI Director William H. Webster said yesterday that if Soviet KGB official Vitaly Yurchenko staged his July defection to embarrass this country before the Reagan-Gorbachev summit, it was "an act of folly" for him to give the United States so much valuable intelligence.

Webster, in an interview on ABC News' "This Week With David Brinkley," said Yurchenko had helped the Justice Department open a "substantial" number of spying investigations and reopen others.

Yurchenko—a colonel in the KGB, the Soviet secret police, with a high position in the department responsible for intelligence operations against the United States and Canada—announced his intention to return to the Soviet Union at a dramatic news conference on Nov. 4 at the Soviet Embassy here. He said he had been kidnaped and drugged by the Central Intelligence Agency, an allegation denied by U.S. officials.

Webster confirmed government officials' private assertions in recent days that Yurchenko had alerted authorities to at least two alleged Soviet spies: Edward Lee Howard, a former CIA trainee who allegedly told the Soviets about a U.S. agent in the Soviet Union before being unmasked and disappearing from his New Mexico home; and Ronald William Pelton, a former communications specialist with the National Security Agency charged last week with selling secrets to the Soviets.

Asked whether Yurchenko might have been a Soviet double agent who was trying to gain U.S. officials' trust by giving them the identities of some inactive former Soviet agents, while not harming active Soviet intelligence efforts, Webster said, "That analysis is ongoing, and I don't think we should close our eyes to that possibility.

"But certainly," Webster continued, "everything I know about it is that it would be an act of folly to have given up that kind information simply to have some embarrassment going on at the time of the summit.

"We have opened a substantial number of cases based on very useful information he has supplied," he said. "Not only new cases, but reviewing old information that might reflect on other [security] holes that were open in prior years."

U.S. officials are debating whether Yurchenko was a phony defector or was a bona fide defector who became depressed and decided to go home.

Bill Baker, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's assistant director for public affairs, said yesterday that Webster would not elaborate on his televised comments.

Webster reiterated that FBI counterintelligence agents are stretched to their limits in trying to keep track of the approximately 2,500 Soviet-bloc diplomats and consular officials in this country.

He said Soviet students who come to the United States under a Geneva summit agreement will probably include spies.

Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, also expressed concern about the number of Soviet-bloc officials here. On NBC News' "Meet the Press," Leahy said yesterday that the State Department is "lobbying heavily" against implementation of a law, originally proposed by Leahy and Sen. William S. Cohen (R-Maine), to eliminate the Soviets' longstanding advantage in numbers of diplomatic officials here compared with U.S. officials in the Soviet Union.

Leahy said there is "almost a war going on between the State Department and the rest of the government about how they should implement the law." State Department officials have said they fear the measure would lead to Soviet expulsion of U.S. diplomats.

The comments of Webster and Leahy came amid revelations in the last two weeks about new spy arrests. Besides Pelton, the others arrested are Larry Wu-Tai Chin, 63, a retired CIA analyst who allegedly has been spying for China since the early 1950s; Jonathan Jay Pollard, 31, a civilian Navy counterterrorism expert who allegedly sold classified information to the Israeli government, and Pollard's wife, Anne Henderson-Pollard, 25, charged with unauthorized possession of classified documents.

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Director's Sec'y ____

The Washington Post A-1
The Washington Times ____
Daily News (New York) ____
The New York Times ____
The Wall Street Journal ____
The Chicago Tribune ____
The Los Angeles Times ____
The Christian Science Monitor ____
USA Today ____

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disrupt the CIA.* Yurchenko's dramatic redefection, they say, was merely the final act—a propaganda charade made all the more clever by his selective use of the truth. "What he did was to take the truth and . . . subject it to ridicule and satire," one counterintelligence veteran says. "[It] was for the purpose of embarrassing and immobilizing the rank and file at the CIA." Republican Sen. William S. Cohen says Yurchenko's defection to the CIA "seemed too convenient. But they were riding a wave of euphoria out at Langley—they had landed the biggest fish of all time, and they were eager to proceed." Another skeptic, Democratic Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, says, "The worst possible case is that [Yurchenko] was a double agent who was sent out to embarrass and disrupt the CIA." If so, Leahy says, "this was a real calamity" that casts serious doubt on the CIA's methods for verifying defector information. "Personally," Leahy adds, "I think he was a plant. I hope I'm wrong."

The truth about Yurchenko may never be known—though the debate is almost guaranteed to continue for many months to come. In the meantime the CIA is sticking to its guns: Yurchenko was a genuine defector, sources say, and a valuable one. "The main reason to believe he wasn't a plant is that he brought information that he wouldn't have given if he were a plant," one official says. "He gave us a great deal." Yurchenko is said to have tipped the CIA to Edward L. Howard, a disgruntled former agency employee who gave the KGB crucial information leading to a Russian scientist spying for the CIA. Howard disappeared last September from his home in New Mexico, presumably for the Soviet Union. Ironically, however, Yurchenko's redefection has now undermined the FBI's case against Howard. "We didn't have a case before, and now we have even less of one," a Justice Department official said.

Even senior officials conceded, however, that Yurchenko should have been more tightly guarded that night at the Georgetown restaurant—and one official promises that the agency will now "take a good look" at the whole Yurchenko affair, including the basic question of whether Yurchenko's defection was genuine. Leahy would like "a real hard look" at Yurchenko's bona fides and the CIA's handling of the case, with an impartial "ombudsman" conducting the review. Others say the agency must improve its counterintelligence arm, which would be the CIA's first line of defense against a phony defector. "Casey is not in trouble unless he fails to make some changes out there," says Sen. Malcolm Wallop. In the Yurchenko case, he adds, the CIA professionals "weren't humble enough to believe they could be fooled."

The agency is under fire on another front as well. The reason: the leaked disclosure of a top-secret CIA plan to undermine Libyan strongman Muammar Kaddafi, which appeared in The Washington Post the day before Yurchenko's press conference. The Post story outlined a 29-page "vulnerability assessment" compiled by the CIA in 1984; the report concluded that Libyan dissidents "could be spurred to assassination attempts" on Kaddafi if he became entangled in some foreign adventure. The CIA proposed a broad campaign of covert political and paramilitary action in concert with unnamed third countries to bring that about—and the president, according to the Post, has already approved the plan. Last week Reagan ordered a full-bore investigation into the damaging leak, but the controversy is far from over.

Political Target: The bottom line on a turbulent week is that the CIA may become a political target again, much as it was in the 1970s, when liberals uncovered the dark secrets of its assassination attempts and domestic spying. Now, however, it is conservatives who are pushing the agency to get tough in the cold war against Soviet espionage—and the Yurchenko debacle may be just enough to give the hawks what they want, which is a selective purge within Casey's senior staff. Even if such a shake-up could strengthen the CIA in the long run, it would almost certainly *entail* short-term trauma for the agency. And that may be why Yurchenko, leaving the State Department on the eve of his return to Moscow, clasped both hands above his head in a gesture of triumph.

TOM MORGANTHAU with KIM WILLENSON, RICHARD SANDZA and JOHN WALCOTT in Washington and bureau reports

*One of the more exotic theories about why the KGB may have sent Yurchenko to defect involves Oleg Gordiyevsky, head of the KGB in London and a double agent who defected in London last summer. Just before his defection, Gordiyevsky was recalled to KGB headquarters in Moscow for "consultations" and, according to a BBC documentary airing this week, British agents somehow managed to rescue him from within the Soviet Union itself—a brilliant bit of derring-do and a bitter defeat for the KGB. Seen against that background, the Yurchenko case may have been the KGB's way of getting even—and its attempt to force Western intelligence agencies to be more cautious in recruiting future defectors.

Yurchenko Regales Moscow Audience

Soviet Says CIA Used Drugs to Hold Him

By Celestine Bohlen
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, Nov. 14—Vitaly Yurchenko, who claims he was the victim of a CIA kidnaping plot, starred in a dramatic two-hour press conference here today, at which he and other Soviet officials accused the United States of "state terrorism."

Held so soon before the U.S.-Soviet talks in Geneva next week, Yurchenko's first public appearance here added a sour note to the pre-summit atmospherics, as a medical official accompanying Yurchenko compared his treatment at a CIA safe house to Nazi treatment of Soviet prisoners during World War II.

In a room packed with Soviet and foreign journalists, Yurchenko, appearing agitated and tense, gave rambling answers, often straying from the point.

Yurchenko, 49, has been described by U.S. intelligence sources as an officer of the Soviet secret police, KGB, who defected in Rome Aug. 1 and was taken to the United States. He said today he was a Foreign Ministry security adviser who had served five years at the embassy in Washington. The Tass news agency described him as a "high-ranking Soviet diplomat."

Yurchenko denied allegations that he had had a love affair with a Soviet woman in Canada. U.S. intelligence sources have suggested that the collapse of the affair was a key factor in his "redefection."

Yurchenko said his family had been friendly with the woman's family in the late 1970s when they were stationed in Washington together. Any suggestion of a romantic involvement, he said, was a "cheap trick to try to compromise me from a moral point of view."

Yurchenko added details to the story he told a press conference in Washington Nov. 4. Then, and in later printed interviews here, he said he was given mind-altering drugs and kept prisoner in a house by a lake in Fredericksburg, Va.

For the first time, Yurchenko described how he gave his alleged captors the slip, first to call the Soviet Embassy from a Manassas store, and then walking out of a Georgetown restaurant to the Soviet Embassy compound, his only disguise being a new hat and an umbrella.

He also described a dinner with CIA Director William Casey at which Yurchenko said Casey appeared "with his trousers unbuttoned" and popped pills during the meal. "I thought that maybe he was also on drugs like me," said Yurchenko as the audience laughed.

[CIA spokeswoman Patti Volz said, "Mr. Yurchenko's statements are ridiculous and we have more important things to do than respond to obvious Soviet propaganda."]

The Yurchenko affair has already appeared in the Soviet media as an example of U.S. violation of human rights, part of a campaign to turn the issue so often used against the Soviets back at their accusers.

Seated next to Yurchenko, the director of a Soviet legal institute gave chapter and verse on how the kidnaping of a Soviet citizen in Rome broke local and international laws, while a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry chastised the United States for posing as "teachers" on human rights issues.

"I hope these teachers, if they read the materials from this press conference, will find somewhere inside themselves a residual of what people call conscience," said spokesman Vladimir Lomeiko.

Starting with his alleged kidnaping in Rome, Yurchenko's account might have come straight out of a spy novel, although there were occasional inconsistencies. There were a few hints of moments that were not so unpleasant.

It all began on Aug. 1 in Rome, where he had been on a business trip since July 24, Yurchenko said. He had left a group of Soviets and headed for the Vatican, when he sat down in St. Peter's Square between two pillars to drink boiled water, required for his delicate stomach, out of a Coca-Cola bottle.

"I was reaching to put the top back on, when I felt something like liquid splashed on me, a feeling as if I had been plunged in water. Everything went dark and I felt like I was falling . . . then someone grabbed me," he said.

Yurchenko said he was taken to a villa in Virginia, where, he said, he began planning his escape within a few hours of his arrival. "When you concentrate you can come up with quite sophisticated plans," he said.

On Nov. 2, Yurchenko said he decided to make his move. He asked if he could go shopping in Manassas, and was taken there by a guard he identified as Tom Hanna, whom he described as a kind man. In the Manassas department store, Yurchenko said, he eluded Hanna and walked to a phone, called the Soviet Embassy and said that if they did not get in touch with him soon, they would not see him alive.

At the store, Yurchenko said he bought a razor—thinking he would shave off his tell-tale mustache—and a hat. He and "Tom" then went off to Georgetown after determining, Yurchenko said, that there were no good French restaurants in Manassas.

At the resturant—Au Pied du Cochon—the agent ordered "a very sophisticated soup and a lobster," Yurchenko said, adding parenthetically that CIA agents liked to dine with him "because I always picked up the tab."

Yurchenko described a relentless regime of medication that he said he was told he would have to take for the rest of his life, otherwise his "brain and arteries would blow up."

Yet Yurchenko said his CIA keepers were anxious to make him look healthy. "They made me play golf," he said. "They also let me get a suntan to change the greenish color of my face."

The Washington Post A-3
The Washington Times
Daily News (New York)
The New York Times
The Wall Street Journal
The Chicago Tribune
The Los Angeles Times
The Christian Science Monitor
USA Today

Date 11-15-8

THE OBSERVER, SUNDAY 15 SEPTEMBER 1985

SPIES WHO CAME IN FROM THE COLD : SIX SOVIET DEFECTORS

IGOR GOUZENKO (Soviet embassy in Ottawa, former cypher clerk of GRU—Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff—in Moscow), defected to Canadians, 1945. Exposed large Soviet spy ring in Canada. More importantly brought first information that the Soviet Union had acquired the secrets of the atomic bomb thanks to information from Klaus Fuchs and others. Early source of intelligence about the extent to which the KGB and GRU were using diplomatic cover for espionage in Western capitals.

OLEG PENKOVSKY (GRU colonel), defected to British in 1961, with help of MI6 courier, businessman Greville Wynne. Previously rebuffed by US and Canadians. Debriefed on visit to London. Provided high-grade information on forthcoming Soviet missile deployments in Cuba and names of several hundred Soviet spies in Britain and other NATO countries. Remained ' defector in place ' in Moscow until discovered, tried and executed, 1963. Reckoned to be the most important defector since the war.

OLEG LYALIN (KGB), defected in London in 1971 after being controlled by MI5 ' in place ' in the Soviet embassy. Provided extensive information about Soviet agents in Britain and confirmed the names of 105 diplomats and others subsequently expelled by Foreign Secretary Lord Home. Lyalin was said by Western intelligence to have worked for KGB Department V, responsible for sabotage and assassinations. His defection caused the immediate disappearance or withdrawal by Moscow of a large number of Department V officers known to be operating in Europe, the Americas and Asia.

VLADIMIR PETROV (KGB ' resident,' i.e. chief, Canberra), in 1954 defected with his wife to the Australian security authorities. Said at the time to have provided extensive intelligence on identity of agents and plans to recruit spies in Australia. Also told Australians about early KGB recruitment of British spies Burgess and Maclean, forcing British Foreign Office to publish White Paper on the latters' 1951 defection. Since reckoned by some experts to have been a less important figure than made out.

JOSEF FROLIK (Czechoslovak intelligence service), defected in London in 1969. Provided information about Czechoslovak and Soviet attempts to acquire agents among British politicians and trade union leaders. Later told the US Senate Judiciary Committee that he had in fact recruited a number. Most names, however, turned out to have been merely ' targets,' not recruits. One year earlier a Czech general, Jan Sejna, had defected to the United States with allegedly valuable information about plans for Warsaw Pact agents to commit sabotage in NATO countries in time of war.

ARKADY SHEVCHENKO (senior Soviet bureaucrat, United Nations) sought asylum in the United States in 1978. For previous 32 months had been supplying intelligence to the CIA. Information given included Soviet positions in strategic arms limitation talks, reports on divisions within the Kremlin, and secrets concerning Soviet plans in Western Europe, Africa and Central America. Shevchenko had allegedly been a close assistant to Sovet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and trusted by Kremlin leaders. Experts suspect that some of his reminiscences were inaccurately ' ghosted ' by the CIA.

ANDREW WILSON

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Casey Confronts His Critics

The defector's legacy

He faced the assembled crowd of Kremlin correspondents, nervously sipping water and showering insults on his former American hosts at the Central Intelligence Agency. Building on the charges first leveled in Washington a week earlier, the repentant KGB defector talked about being kidnapped, drugged and psychologically brutalized by insensitive CIA personnel. As for CIA Director William J. Casey, with whom he says he was forced to dine, the veteran Soviet spy remembered "an old man—excuse me—with pants unbuttoned."

After a dubious defection lasting all of three months, Vitaly Yurchenko was back in Moscow last week, still casting a harsh spotlight on Bill Casey and his CIA. At home, the case also continued to draw fresh criticism of the agency's performance while adding fuel to longstanding complaints about the CIA. The boiling point was reached when Senate Intelligence Committee chairman Dave Durenberger, a Minnesota Republican, declared that the CIA "is not getting enough direction." Casey slashed back with a public letter that charged Durenberger with "repeated compromise of intelligence sources and methods" and "unsubstantiated appraisals of performance" that had a "disheartening impact on our officers."

That was just the beginning. Next day Durenberger rejected Casey's letter outright, saying, "An issue has been created where none exists. I continue to fully support Director Casey." And Democratic Sen. Patrick J. Leahy of Vermont, the intelligence committee vice chairman, charged that Casey's real motive in "lobbing bombs this way may be to do away with congressional oversight." Some in the administration dream of "the good old days" of total secrecy and CIA independence, Leahy argued. "Well, the good old days are what brought us the Bay of Pigs, the Allende coup and the Patrice Lumumba scandal."

As if to emphasize how far the agency has come since those days, a full post-mortem on the Yurchenko affair—where everyone connected to the defector will be interviewed and changes or disciplinary action may be recommended—seems almost assured. But even after that review is done, the debate over Yurchenko is likely to continue. By last week there was mounting evidence that he was probably not the fifth-ranking KGB official, as he had claimed. Clearly, though, he was someone whose information on Soviet intelligence in general and spying in North America—to the degree it could be corroborated—was potentially quite useful. There were still conflicting theories on whether he provided the data only to set the stage for an embarrassing redefection, or suffered a sincere change of heart.

More clear-cut were deficiencies in Yurchenko's handling by the CIA. Likely to come under official scrutiny were the decision to keep him so near Washington—and the Soviet Embassy—and the shortage of experienced, Russian-speaking handlers sensitive to his shifting moods. Indeed, it turned out that the CIA had failed to ask several previous Soviet defectors who knew him to help ease Yurchenko's transition. Also, despite Yurchenko's request for anonymity, his story quickly made its way into the media, and back to the increasingly edgy defector himself.

Faulty system: "Somewhere down the line heads are going to roll," says one former intelligence adviser to Ronald Reagan. Some agency critics have also proposed the creation of a more comprehensive service within the CIA to handle all defectors—replacing units in the territorial branches that handle defectors from the nations they cover.*

As for the CIA's basic mission—gathering and analyzing intelligence—there have been lingering complaints that the final product is not what it should be. Recently, says Durenberger, he arranged a series of luncheons with academic experts on Soviet affairs and "got much better information from them than from the agency." The problem, Durenberger says, is that there is a lack of a long-range national intelligence strategy that would help the CIA define its priorities into the 1990s. Some congressional intelligence experts also criticize the agency for failing to develop human as well as technical intelligence sources. They particularly stress the CIA's failure to devote greater resources to cultivating "sleepers"—foreign-born agents—in critical countries, like the Philippines, that might fall to unfriendly hands. "I'm not faulting the people. I'm faulting the system that does not let them look five years down the road," says Durenberger. Indeed, Durenberger may suggest a radical reorganization that would make the president's national-security adviser coordinator of all U.S. intelligence operations—reducing the CIA director to "the pro who runs the agency."

In his scathing response, Casey defended CIA analyses by citing Henry Kissinger, who called agency studies on arms control "far better than anything I saw on the subject when I was in government." To attack the agency for a lack of long-range analyses, wrote Casey, betrays "a lack of familiarity with the many intelligence studies in the [committee] vault." Nonetheless, Casey intends to proceed with his earlier commitment to prepare a national intelligence strategy for the CIA—in part to codify the long-range planning papers that have been guiding the agency for years.

'Cooking the books': Former CIA official George Carver dismissed Durenberger's notion of letting the White House national-security adviser coordinate U.S. intelligence. "The guy who runs the National Security Council has more than enough on his plate," says Carver. "And if you give him this function, too, you're going to have the perception he's cooking the books"—by forcing intelligence analyses to conform to policy goals. He blames the shortage of sleepers on Congress's refusal to pay for years of inactivity. "If you want the interior minister on your payroll, you have to recruit him as a struggling young law student 30 years earlier," Carver says. "But who in this government is willing to pay for that?" Clearly there will be tough questions *for* Congress as well as *from* Congress in the building debate over intelligence.

DAVID M ALPERN *with* KIM WILLENSON *and* RICHARD SANDZA *in Washington*

*The agency's counterintelligence (CI) capabilities also are split among its geographical departments and similar proposals have been made to reunite them into a single, strong CI branch. But according to one senior intelligence official, a centralized CI service might itself be more vulnerable to KGB penetration. Reagan, meanwhile, has approved steps to thwart Soviet intelligence operations here—including tightening travel restrictions on Soviet-bloc diplomats.

Newsweek
Page 48
November 25, 198

CIA should still handle defections, Meese says

By Bill Gertz and John McCaslin
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Attorney General Edwin Meese III said yesterday he opposes plans to shift responsibility for the handling of Soviet intelligence defectors from the Central Intelligence Agency to the FBI.

In a wide-ranging interview during a Washington Times luncheon, Mr. Meese also said the Justice Department could take action against Nation of Islam leader Louis Farrakhan if he defies President Reagan's ban on travel to Libya.

The White House announced last month it was considering several proposals on reforming the CIA's procedures for dealing with defectors. The proposals were drawn up following the case of Soviet KGB intelligence officer Vitaly Yurchenko who defected to the United States, recanted and returned to Moscow last November after denouncing the CIA.

"I don't see any great reason for changing who handles defectors," Mr. Meese said. "If there were problems in regard to the handling of Yurchenko, or anybody else, those can be corrected by the [CIA]."

His comments were the first official Justice Department response to the White House statements of the proposed policy change.

Mr. Meese said he did not know what went wrong with the Yurchenko case since the defector was handled by CIA officials.

Reforming current procedures, he said, would be more effective than attempting to put the FBI into a role for which it has no experience.

On the Yurchenko defection, Mr. Meese said, "We do think he gave us valuable information, which has been proved out."

Mr. Yurchenko supplied leads that resulted in the arrest of former National Security Agency analyst Ronald Pelton and helped uncover former CIA operations officer Edward L. Howard, who fled the United States to avoid arrest on spy charges.

FBI officials have said a number of other cases have been opened that were based on Mr. Yurchenko's information, but so far no further arrests have been made.

Regarding Mr. Farrakhan, Mr. Meese said the Justice Department would be prepared to take action against the Islamic leader, who, during a press conference Wednesday, said he would go to Libya in defiance of a presidential ban.

Mr. Reagan has blamed Libyan leader Col. Muammar Qaddafi for promoting terrorism throughout the world, and recently issued a ban on travel by Americans to the north African state.

"Depending on what [Farrakhan] does or how he does it, if the law is violated, I think he should be prosecuted," Mr. Meese said.

On a seperate issue, Mr. Meese said he believed a proposal would soon be submitted to President Reagan that would prohibit numerical hiring "quotas" for federal contractors.

"There's been a lot more press disinformation than there has been information — statements, for example, that I want to roll back . . . the 1965 executive order" on affirmative action.

"Nothing could be further from the truth," Mr. Meese said.

Signed by President Lyndon B. Johnson, the presidential order's guidelines require contractors doing business with the government to hire women and minorities in certain numbers to prevent job discrimination.

On U.S. counterespionage efforts, Mr. Meese said the Justice Department has been working to limit the number of Soviet bloc spies in the United States.

"I once said, somewhat kidding, that we ought to have an agreement with the Soviets that they would not send over more spies than we have FBI agents to follow them — make that a function of the budget," Mr. Meese said. "Obviously that continues to be a problem."

On domestic security, Mr. Meese said he was satisfied with FBI guidelines for investigation of domestic political groups. Those guidelines, set up by former Attorney General William French Smith, "have served the country well" by protecting citizens from oppressive police work but allowing security operations to be carried out, Mr. Meese said.

Date unknown Source unknown

Yurchenko Affair Isn't First to Disrupt U.S. Intelligence

By ELMO R. ZUMWALT and WORTH H. BAGLEY

With the coming and going of Soviet spymaster Vitaly Yurchenko, the American intelligence community is experiencing internal turmoil and external attack. But it is not the first time the defection of a Soviet spy has disrupted our intelligence network.

In the early 1950s, another Soviet spy, Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko, defected to the United States after toying with American agents for two years. He brought with him information that would impact substantially on the relationship between the CIA and FBI, end the careers of high-ranking U.S. intelligence officers and derail our ability to conduct counter-intelligence operations.

The recent Yurchenko defection then return to the Soviet Union has initiated again that same ominous prospect in the United States. The issue centers on whether Moscow intended to add to the cover of an important "mole" in the American intelligence apparatus by establishing Yurchenko's credibility — allowing him to expose old spies who no longer had access to U.S. secrets.

Six months before the Nosenko defection, another Soviet agent, Anatoli M. Golitsin, had defected to the CIA. He claimed that a "mole" had been placed at high levels of the U.S. intelligence organization. But Nosenko raised enduring questions about Golitsin's claim with a carefully fashioned story.

In September 1985, a few weeks before Yurchenko defected to the United States in Rome, the top Soviet KGB Agent in Britain, a man named Gordievsky, rejected Russia for the West. Gordievsky fingered at least 31 routine spies operating around London and, we are told, revealed the names of one or more high-level Soviet agents elsewhere, including in the United States. Yet, Yurchenko, during his short-lived defection, is said to have insisted that the U.S. intelligence hierarchy is clean of Soviet moles.

Nosenko remains in the United States, reportedly as a paid CIA consultant. But if the true test of a defector's legitimacy is a conclusive investigation, the legitimacy of Nosenko's defection would still be in question today. His bonafides, instead, were asserted through separate investigations, chartered by successive CIA chiefs, whose own objectivity was called into question. Pressures from Congress and the media to get tighter controls over CIA counter-intelligence and covert operations raised self-doubts within the agency about the style and form of their operations. What was required to cope with Soviet deceit was made secondary to eliminating any appearance of CIA malfeasance.

The internal investigations which emanated as a result of pressures exerted by Congress and the media brought about a number of firings and resignations of U.S. covert operatives as well as the downgrading of U.S. covert operations. Where once we would doggedly sort through the angular mirrors and deceptive practices of Soviet intelligence and counter-intelligence operations, we now act on the premise that such Soviet actions will conform to behavioral standards fashioned by Western religion and morality.

This perspective on Soviet intelligence activity remained in vogue through the 1970s. Only with the rise of the Reagan administration has an effort been made to focus, once again, on the immoral thinking (e.g., the plotting of the assassination attempt on the Pope) that guides Soviet intelligence planning.

At least, circumstantially, the timing of the temporary Yurchenko defection is right. If Nosenko succeeded in disabling American intelligence capability by his revelations, then an American intelligence apparatus in the process of being rebuilt could be disabled again by a similar Soviet counter-intelligence initiative. Such an initiative would have many purposes: — If a real high-level mole exists in the U.S. intelligence hierarchy, it would seek to protect him. If there is no high-level mole, it would seek to prompt the American intelligence community to look for one, which would immediately give rise to inter- and intra-agency suspicions and distrust.

— If the CIA and FBI are beginning to cooperate, it would seek to plant the seeds for argument and jealousy.

— Since U.S. counter-intelligence operations are regaining strength, it would seek to make such operations appear to be incompetent.

— It would seek to stimulate Congress to debate the fairness and wisdom of U.S. counter-intelligence operations.

It is quite a mandate for Yurchenko to achieve in a few weeks, that which Nosenko provoked over a 10-year period. But why else would Yurchenko appear now? He entered the Soviet intelligence hierarchy under KGB Chief Yuri Andropov, continued to important jobs when Andropov became chairman of the Soviet Communist Party, and could only have been encouraged about his future when Andropov's protege, Mikhail Gorbachev, rose ruthlessly to the top rung of the party ladder. The future could not have looked brighter for him.

In the 1970s, strong disagreements continued over the legitimacy of the Nosenko defection. By the time it was finally resolved in 1974, however, one thing was very clear — the real victim of the inquisition was the U.S. intelligence community. Now, with the Yurchenko case posing similar questions, the Reagan White House should act quickly to consider the immediate dangers to U.S. security and to head off an inquisition aimed, once again, to disable our intelligence apparatus.

Accordingly, an investigative commission should now be appointed, preferably excluding as members those involved in intelligence community politics and those whose reputations would be dependent upon its outcome. A member of the President's Foreign Intelligence board should head the commission — possibly a man like Albert Wohlstetter on whom the President pinned a national medal a few weeks ago for longtime services to national security.

Zumwalt was Chief of Naval Operations from 1970 to 1974. Bagley served as Vice CNO in 1974-75.

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C.I.A. Revamps Its Handling Of Defectors Like Yurchenko

By STEPHEN ENGELBERG
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 10 — A senior C.I.A. official said today that the agency had made major changes in its procedures for handling defectors like Vitaly S. Yurchenko, the high-level Soviet official who fled to the West last year and then returned to Moscow.

The official, Robert M. Gates, disclosed the new approaches at his confirmation hearing for deputy director, the No. 2 post in the Central Intelligence Agency. At the hearing, senior members of the committee from both parties criticized the Reagan Administration's policy of providing covert aid to guerrilla movements around the world.

Mr. Gates, who is now the C.I.A.'s deputy director for intelligence, was unanimously approved by the committee, and his nomination is expected to go before the full Senate next week.

At the 90-minute hearing, held in the windowless room normally used by the committee for its secret sessions, Mr. Gates defended the use of covert action as a tool in foreign policy, saying:

"The experience of the last 10 years suggests that in many cases diplomacy alone is not an effective institution. That experience also would show that overt military action by the United States is either not appropriate or would not be supported by the American people or Congress. At that point, the United States has two options: develop other instruments to carry out its policies, or turn and walk away."

On the subject of defectors, Mr. Gates said that in the future they would be given less freedom than Mr. Yurchenko, who bolted to the Soviet Embassy after dining with a single security guard at a restaurant.

There has been a continuing debate in the various intelligence agencies over whether Mr. Yurchenko was a genuine defector who had a change in heart or a planted agent designed to wreak havoc on the C.I.A. President Reagan speculated last year that Mr. Yurchenko's defection might have been a ploy.

Mr. Gates told the committee that there had been "organizational deficiencies" in the handling of Mr. Yurchencko. He said the agency had now put the care of defectors under the direction of a single office.

Each defector, he said, will be assigned to an individual case officer to insure "that there's somebody there he gets to know and can depend on and who understands him and can identify with him when he's going through particular psychological changes."

Mr. Gates also said the agency would change a policy that has been in effect for nearly 40 years of allowing defectors a maximum amount of freedom.

The Washington Post ____
The Washington Times ____
Daily News (New York) ____
The New York Times A13
The Wall Street Journal ____
The Chicago Tribune ____
The Los Angeles Times ____
The Christian Science Monitor ____
USA Today ____

Date 4-11-86

CIA can stay nursemaid to defectors, says FBI

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

FBI officials are not interested in supplanting the CIA as the primary handler of foreign defectors, even though some White House aides think a shift could remedy some blunders that surfaced in the Vitaly Yurchenko affair.

Responding to a White House official's private assessment earlier this month that such a shift would be "a great move," two Justice Department officials explained the FBI's view in separate interviews this week on condition that they not be identified by name.

Spokesmen for the FBI, CIA and Justice would not comment. At the White House, spokesman Edward Djerejian has acknowledged that a review of defector handling is under way.

"It's a bucket of worms," said one Justice official in describing the task of handling and resettling defecting officials, most of whom come from Communist countries and who may not speak fluent English but need new jobs, homes and, sometimes, even new identities.

Justice officials say such a change could reignite old rivalries between the CIA and the FBI that have been largely been put aside in recent years. They add that the FBI, like every other federal agency, is not looking for extra work at a time when it faces budget cuts imposed by the Gramm-Rudman deficit reduction law.

Furthermore, FBI officials have watched another Justice agency, the U.S. Marshals Service, struggle with a domestic version of defector handling, the witness protection program that provides new identities for those who testify against organized crime figures. Congress has repeatedly investigated the witness program.

The FBI officials are well aware that some of the witness program's worst problems — like how to allow divorced spouses continued visitation rights to their children — were turned into a popular movie, "Hide in Plain Sight," in which department officials received a less-than-sympathetic portrayal.

One Justice source said, "The bureau doesn't want the witness protection program, why would they want this. They're not pushing it."

Another Justice official laid out two reasons for the FBI's lack of interest: "First, we feel we've got good relations with the CIA and we want it to stay that way. Second, the bureau's got enough to do. This is not strictly their area; it would be a new field for them."

One knowledgeable observer says CIA Director William Casey does not want to give up the responsibility.

U.S. officials believe that Mr. Yurchenko, a KGB general-designate, decided to return to the Soviets last fall just three months after he had defected to this country in part because he was upset over how his CIA handlers treated him.

At the White House, the National Security Council staff has received a recommendation from the Jamestown Foundation, a private group set up to work with top-level defectors, that the duties be shifted to the FBI, which participates in interrogating all defectors.

Jamestown director William Geimer said most defectors found their CIA handlers insensitive and untrained while the FBI agents were seen as friendly, unpretentious and more sensitive.

The Washington Post
The Washington Times 3-A
Daily News (New York)
The New York Times
The Wall Street Journal
The Chicago Tribune
The Los Angeles Times
The Christian Science Monitor
USA Today

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Missing U.S. Agent Dead

Shadrin Disappeared 10 Years Ago in Vienna

By Patrick E. Tyler
Washington Post Staff Writer

A high-level Soviet defector has explained the decade-old mystery of the disappearance of Nicholas G. Shadrin, an American double agent who disappeared while meeting with KGB agents in Vienna Dec. 20, 1975.

Shadrin, then 47, was accidentally and fatally chloroformed while struggling in the back seat of a sedan with Soviet agents trying to spirit him out of Austria and away from his Central Intelligence Agency protectors.

This account was relayed yesterday from government officials to the lawyer for Ewa Shadrin, widow of the agent. In an interview, Shadrin said yesterday that two FBI agents went to her McLean house just before 2 p.m. Sunday and told her they had confirmed beyond doubt that her husband is dead.

"I was sort of prepared for something like this," she said, "but at the same time it is very disturbing. I would like to know more about what happened, and what they did with the body. One consolation is that he really didn't suffer. I have worried so many times about that."

After the FBI agents left her house, Shadrin said, she relived events of the night 10 years ago when she passed the time waiting for her husband at the Vienna opera house. "I was . . . reliving those moments, they were killing Nikki while I was in the opera," she said.

Shadrin's disappearance while he reportedly was in the care of CIA officers has been a controversial episode in the murky history of U.S.-Soviet espionage.

Concern for his safety led President Gerald R. Ford in December 1976 to make an unusual personal appeal to then-Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev to investigate the case and reunite Shadrin with his wife, even if it meant they had to live secretly to conceal such extraordinary Soviet cooperation.

Using private diplomatic channels, Brezhnev told Ford that Shadrin had not appeared for the fateful meeting with KGB agents.

The role of the three U.S. intelligence agencies for whom Shadrin was working has been examined in thousands of inches of press accounts and in a book-length study of Shadrin's life as a spy and his mysterious disappearance. News of his death, first reported by NBC News Monday night, is the latest revelation to leak from the top-secret debriefing of Soviet defector Vitaly Yurchenko, a senior officer of the KGB, the Soviet secret police, who defected last July on a visit to Rome.

Yurchenko, being debriefed at an undisclosed location near here, served in several senior KGB posts over the last two decades, including those of deputy chief for North American spy operations, chief of worldwide counterintelligence operations and from 1975-80 as a political officer in the Soviet Embassy here.

His first known contribution to U.S. intelligence was to identify Edward L. Howard, a former CIA officer trained for duty in Moscow, as a Soviet spy who provided details about U.S. information-gathering techniques in Moscow.

Yurchenko also has reportedly told debriefers that, based on Howard's information, the Soviets were able last June to arrest a Soviet aviation scientist who had been providing the CIA with data about Soviet research to conceal planes and missiles from U.S. radar.

Shadrin and her attorney said yesterday that they would like to interview Yurchenko to seek answers to questions remaining in the case.

Richard D. Copaken, who has represented Shadrin in her longstanding effort to pry information from the FBI and the CIA about the disappearance, said the FBI has not responded to his request.

Copekan said he is disturbed that FBI officials did not notify Shadrin of her husband's death until it appeared imminent that the news would be reported on television.

"I think this country owes Shadrin a great deal . . . and at least owes him enough to be truthful to his widow," Copekan said.

Shadrin was born Nikolai F. Artamonov and defected to the West in 1959 as a young Soviet naval officer. He became a consultant to the Defense Intelligence Agency and, in 1966, after being contacted by KGB agents in this country, went to work for FBI counterintelligence and the CIA as a double agent.

His trip to Vienna in 1975 was one of several contacts intended to persuade the KGB that he was working for his native country as a spy in the United States.

The Defector's Mind: Captive of the Psyche

The guilt and crushing loneliness linger for years.

Their motives may be love, money or deep ideological conviction—any of a complex web of personal and political concerns. But once they decide to abandon their country, most defectors share a common emotional anguish that lingers years after they go over the wall. Many of the estimated 1,000 Eastern-bloc defectors who have crossed over since World War II abandoned spouses, careers and reputations for freedom—only to find themselves captives of a more demanding master: the human psyche. "When you defect you give up all that you know—your country, your political beliefs, your family, your relatives, your friends, your entire position in life," says Ladislav Bittman, a Czech intelligence officer in Vienna who defected when the Soviets invaded his country in 1968. "You come out like a child. You have to come to a new place with totally new rules for the game, which you have to learn from the bottom up. It takes a long time."

'Like a Prisoner': The process is particularly grueling for defecting intelligence officers, who are greeted with extreme suspicion and relentless interrogation while their stories are checked and their motives scrutinized. Until the initial screening and lie-detector test establish that they are "clean," intelligence defectors are regarded as possible spies, sent to embarrass the agency or to collect information on the debriefing procedure. Even those who work for years as double agents for the West find the reception chilly when they come in from the cold. Russian diplomat Vladmir Sakharov, for example, worked secretly for the CIA in Cairo and Kuwait—and begged for asylum in 1971 when Moscow sought to order him home. Instead of a hero's welcome in the United States, he was flown to Greece, taken to a safe house and swiftly wired to a lie detector. "I was sweating," he recalls. "I thought I was going to die . . . They kept insisting over and over I must admit I was a GRU [military intelligence] officer. They repeated it over and over again until I thought they were going to shoot me if I didn't say it." Sakharov was held for 1½ months in Greece, then installed in an apartment in Washington and watched day and night by two handlers. His debriefing lasted a full year, with a team of CIA agents arriving every morning at 9 and departing at 4. "I was, frankly, made to feel like a prisoner," he says.

At times Sakharov was paralyzed with guilt over leaving his four-year-old daughter. But what worried him most, he says, was the future: "When do I start working —and where? . . . They kept saying to me, 'Wait, wait, wait,' and then they told me, 'Forget about being an elite like you were in the Soviet Union'." The agency saddled him with a new identity as a German émigré—even though he couldn't speak the language—and $400 a month subsistence. To his horror, he learned that the CIA planned to send him to motel-management school in Hollywood. Only after he complained bitterly did the agency provide him with enough money to earn a master's degree, but they still never found him a job. Years later Sakharov defiantly abandoned his cover—more frustrated than frightened of reprisal—and assumed his real identity and began a career teaching and lecturing about his experiences.

Ladislav Bittman's initial reception was warmer. He was ensconced, he says, in "a luxury villa equipped with all a guy would need." But he, too, had little help in adjusting to a new life in America. When they were through with him, the CIA never bothered to find him work or even provide a living allowance: "The gentleman from the CIA shook my hand and said, 'Good luck'," he recalls. Bittman did odd jobs until, by chance, he met a Boston University professor who helped him land a teaching position at the journalism school.

That relationship was critical for Bittman in other ways. "Most defectors will tell you that what they lack here above all else is deep human friendship—somebody you can rely on," he says. "In Eastern Europe, to have a *friend* is very, very important." Indeed, the sense of isolation and crushing loneliness is one of the toughest problems defectors face, particularly during the months or years of debriefing. "If you defect from Moscow and go to live in northern Virginia, you go from an intense environment to an alienated environment," says scholar and strategist Edward Luttwak of Georgetown University. "It's the most intense form of torture—sensory deprivation. That's what [Vitaly] Yurchenko was complaining about." Yelena Mitrokhina, who served as Yurchenko's secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Washington in the late 1970s, knew the problem from her own defection. She told reporters last week that she had offered to talk to Yurchenko, that perhaps she might have prevented his redefection, but that the CIA never responded to her offer.

Fading Stars: Even after they leave the CIA's viselike grip, many defectors are dogged by the fear that they have been marked for assassination by Soviet agents. As a result, some lead frightened, secretive lives. Nikolai Khokhlov, a KGB agent who defected in 1954, never shook his paranoia: he insisted on speaking at lectures with his back to the wall and having windows boarded up, and in 1958 he went into permanent hiding. At the same time, some defectors find they miss the limelight they are afforded when they first defect. Some are retained as consultants by the CIA. But in most cases their celebrity status lasts only as long as their information is fresh, and as their usefulness fades, so does their confidence. "These people are very high-priced commodities for a time," says Helmut Sonnenfeldt, a Soviet expert and former Nixon-administration adviser. "But then the interest drops off and they start thinking, 'What next?' Then they experience guilt . . . desolation, frustration and anxiety. And they start thinking about going back."

Whether Yurchenko proves to be a Soviet plant or a legitimate defector who fled in inner torment, his case has already focused new concern on the CIA's handling of defectors and their fragile mental states. Senate Intelligence Committee member Sam Nunn has suggested that the agency create a corps of agents specially trained in the defector psychology, and that it draw on the resources of private organizations like the two-year-old Jamestown Foundation, which provides a support network for defectors—including arranging speaking engagements and book contracts. As it is, says Sonnenfeldt, "sometimes these people are just squeezed dry and then thrown aside like dead fish, even though they are given a stipend and all." U.S. intelligence officials might take a cue from the Soviet's treatment of British master spy Kim Philby. When he defected after a 30-year career as an agent for Moscow, Philby—currently a general in the KGB—was afforded all the privileges of a hero of the Soviet motherland. The United States won't be decorating Soviet defectors anytime soon, but it could beam a friendlier message to those still waiting on the other side of the wall.

JENNET CONANT with KIM WILLENSON and RICHARD SANDZA in Washington

Washington Journal

Defectors Get By With a Little Help From Their Friends

By Patrick E. Tyler
Washington Post Staff Writer

Few historians have ever described Washington, the city of power, as a place known for its humanity. A story of uncynical, unambitious, uncalculating behavior here is something to be savored—for example, this one.

Recently, Viktor Ivanovich Belenko, who made a well-remembered exit from the Soviet Union a decade ago in the cockpit of his Mig25 jet fighter, passed through Washington on his way to a fishing trip somewhere in the northern woods. (The urge of some men to trail string through water in search of fish is apparently a global phenomenon.)

Belenko, who delivered his prized thunderbird to U.S. intelligence at an air base in Japan, is still described as "under cover."

He has lived since his arrival on Sept. 6, 1976, in relative obscurity in the American West as a well-paid consultant to U.S. intelligence agencies, to the fraternity of U.S. fighter pilots in the Air Force and Navy and to the principal defense contractors who build the high-performance jet fighters that would go up against the Soviet air force in a superpower conflict.

But with the urging and support of a small group of people in Washington, Belenko is planning to come out of the shadows. He is collaborating on a book with San Francisco writer John Joss and would like to talk publicly, according to Joss, about the Soviet system and its "unregenerative" nature. He also would like to film an unusual, "don't-leave-home-without-it" commercial for the American Express card.

In a year of harsh publicity about the Central Intelligence Agency's handling of defectors, Belenko is something of a success story—not necessarily because of anything the CIA did institutionally as part of its relocation program for Soviet defectors, but thanks to a personal network in this federal city and its far-reaching national security bureaucracy.

I first encountered another example of such a network a few months ago when I met Alexandra Costa, the only woman to have defected from the Soviet Embassy in Washington. She is the "lady in the blond wig" who decided to emerge from eight years of anonymity last November to decry the CIA's handling of Vitaly S. Yurchenko, the KGB colonel who bolted the Soviet apparatus in Rome, but who, after spending three months in the hands of what he described as a rather unpleasant CIA debriefing team, returned to the Soviet Union. (Whether Yurchenko was a genuine defector or a plant is still a matter of debate inside the "intelligence community.")

[The blond wig and sunglasses, worn for a photo session with The Washington Post and for her appearance on ABC News' "Nightline," were a last security barrier Costa used even as she was deciding to go public. They will be gone when her picture appears on the cover of her forthcoming memoir, "Stepping Down From The Star," to be published by Putnam this fall.]

Costa had suffered her own disappointments with the CIA defector program. A highly educated social scientist in Moscow, Yelena Mitrokhina (her Russian name, changed when the CIA gave her a new identity) was offered secretarial school by the CIA's relocation experts. It was only her personal network that saved her.

I met some of its members one night at dinner. There was Jim, the FBI counterintelligence agent who was there the day Costa came over; there was Lisa, the former CIA case officer who had tried to make up for some of the blunders the agency had committed in Costa's case; and there were assorted new friends that Costa had made after she came back from graduate school and set up a computer consulting business.

They had all helped her or stood up for her at one time or another and they comprised the emotional equivalent of the Russian social family—the Moscow network of friends and relations—which is the hardest thing for many defectors to replace. After a few hours over drinks and dinner, it seemed clear that these Americans took great solace from the bond they had formed with their Russian friend—someone they had helped to cross the cultural bridge from a beloved homeland under Soviet governance to the strange mosaic of the American system.

Though I have not met Belenko, I have spent time talking to members of his network. One of them is retired Air Force colonel George V. Wish, who played control agent and big brother to Belenko during the first difficult years, when the tempestuous youth who grew up in Soviet Siberia (Belenko was in his late 20s when he defected) encountered such things as the American shopping mall, Las Vegas and rock 'n' roll.

At one point, it had seemed that Belenko could not accept that America was real—could not understand it, could not reconcile the sensory glitter with the poverty-stricken and decadent slums he had read about in Soviet propaganda. That was when Wish had taken a big chance and handed Belenko the keys to a Dodge Charger and told him to get out of Washington and find America for himself.

After a few scrapes that are still buried in classified files, Belenko returned and declared that he had fallen in love with a waitress from a Midwest diner. (They later married). Wish, who lives in Annandale, still sees Belenko when he passes through Washington on regular trips to the Pentagon. The bond is still there, friends say.

Also in Washington is Navy Capt. Ernie Christensen, renowned fighter pilot and former commanding officer of the "Top Gun" fighter pilot school at Miramar Naval Air Station in California. Christensen introduced Belenko to several "Top Gun" classes.

Perhaps one of Belenko's closest friends and fishing companions is the legendary American fighter jock, Chuck Yeager, who this year has twice tramped up into the Sierra Nevada mountains to test the waters with the 38-year-old Belenko.

So when Belenko arrived in Washington for a small party in early May, a small group of his friends, some of them former CIA officials who had been with him in the beginning, gathered round to hear his plans and give him advice. It was in that Washington parlor that his friends helped him refine the script of his coming-out commerical with American Express.

ALEXANDRA COSTA
... defector emerged as a critic incognito

Since there are no Mig25's available for such a commercial (the U.S. and Japanese governments returned Belenko's Mig after they had disassembled it and studied it thoroughly), the scene would open with the roar of a supersonic fighter—nationality indistinguishable. After the plane swooped down from the sky, the camera would focus on the canopy as the fighter taxied to a halt, invisible hydraulics lifting the glass bubble to expose the pilot, a red star prominent on his helmet.

The viewer would see Belenko take off his oxygen mask and say in heavily accented English, "You are not knowing me, but as a Soviet pilot . . ."

At the conclusion, Belenko would hold up the American Express card and give his particularly Russian rendition of the banking conglomerate's slogan: "Not leaving home without it."

American Express, which operates a worldwide network of offices, including many in Soviet Bloc countries, wrote Belenko's agent that they loved the idea, but Belenko "did not quite fit our profile."

Belenko's Washington network is working on other ideas.

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ON PAGE A10

NEW YORK TIMES
4 January 1985

Soviet Physicist in Exchange Visit Granted U.S. Asylum in Chicago

CHICAGO, Jan. 3 (AP) — A Soviet physicist who was working in an exchange program at the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory has been granted political asylum in the United States, the Federal Immigration and Naturalization Service said today.

The 51-year-old scientist, Artem V. Kulikov, defected Christmas Eve at O'Hare International Airport as he and another Soviet physicist were about to board an airplane to return to the Soviet Union.

Dr. Kulikov is believed to be the first high-energy physicist from the Soviet Union to defect to the United States. He was granted asylum by the State Department on Dec. 26, according to a Federal immigration spokesman in Chicago who was not identified in a Chicago Tribune report of the case.

"He walked up to an immigration official at O'Hare and asked for asylum," the spokesman told The Tribune. "There was a struggle for his luggage with other Soviet scientists, and to say that they were unhappy is putting it mildly."

Meeting With Russians

Dr. Kulikov met today in Washington with officials of the Soviet Embassy, according to Cathleen Lang, a State Department spokesman. The meeting was reportedly held to assure the Russians that he was not being held against his will.

Dr. Kulikov, a senior scientist at the Leningrad Nuclear Physics Institute, was one of four Soviet physicists working on a major experiment at Fermilab, west of Chicago. The four were involved in building equipment for the experiment at the facility's atom smasher near Batavia.

Fermilab's atom smasher is the world's highest energy particle accelerator and allows physicists to measure the basic properties of matter by colliding subatomic particles at high speeds. From that, scientists can help determine the makeup of the particles and the forces that govern them.

Soviet scientists have been taking part in Fermilab programs since 1972. Dr. Kulikov had been there only three months.

"He is a well-known and very respected physicist," said Joseph Lach, a senior scientist at Fermilab who is in charge of the project that the Soviet scientists took part in. "His defection came as a surprise to everybody."

It was the first defection in the Fermilab's 12-year program, according to Margaret Pearson, a spokesman.

Dr. Bruce Chrisman, associate director for administration at Fermilab, said Dr. Kulikov had a wife in the Soviet Union.

Dr. Lach said Dr. Kulikov had been depressed since his only child, a daughter, died in a traffic accident in Leningrad two years ago.

Anson Franklin, an assistant press secretary, said in Washington that the White House would have no comment on the defection.

A man who identified himself only as "a soldier with the military attaché" at the Soviet Embassy in Washington said no one was immediately available to comment.

Soviet spy defects with terrorism secrets

By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

A defector from the Soviet military intelligence service — the GRU — has offered at first hand the details of a Soviet link to terrorism in the West, an Athens newspaper reported.

He further supplied Western security services with information on Soviet espionage activities in Greece and Soviet clandestine involvement in international labor movements, the "peace" movement and the media, the Athens Star reported, citing "sources with access to his testimony."

A senior U.S. official told The Washington Times yesterday that the Athens newspaper report is "on the right track."

A Pentagon official in Washington confirmed that Sergei Bokhane defected May 25, but would not elaborate on the details of what information he was supplying "at this time."

Mr. Bokhane held the position of first secretary attached to the Soviet Embassy in Athens, and operated as the deputy director of the GRU residency in Athens, the newspaper said.

He is believed to be in the custody of both the British and U.S. intelligence services.

While charges of Soviet involvement in international terrorism have been made before — always angrily denied — the defector was said to have first-hand knowledge of these operations, the newspaper said.

According to the Star, Mr. Bokhane, 44, supplied details of covert Soviet support for terrorist activities in the West. It said these operations fall under the GRU's purview, rather than under the direction of the companion Soviet intelligence service, the KGB.

Mr. Bokhane spent seven years in Greece as the GRU's No. 2 man in Athens and is considered an expert on Soviet intelligence activities in Greece, the newspaper said. He was sent to Greece under a Moscow directive to "aggravate" Greece's relations with the West after the fall of the military junta, which ruled Greece from 1967 to 1974. In 1978 he returned to Moscow to stay until 1982, when he was posted once more to Athens.

Denials of Soviet complicity in state-sponsored terrorism, meanwhile, were never angrier than the Soviet denials yesterday of accusations of "state-sponsored terrorism" made Monday by President Reagan. Pravda, the newspaper of the Soviet Communist party, even seemed to take offense in behalf of religious orthodoxy, which it otherwise routinely denounces.

Pravda decried Mr. Reagan's "attempt to attach the tag of international terrorism" to all nations which the newspaper said were fighting for political and economic self-determination.

"Against this background, Reagan's claim that the United States is loved all over the world and that for millions of people it remains a shining city on a hill sound particularly sacrilegious," Pravda said.

Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi reacted furiously, too, defending the five nations — Iran, Libya, North Korea, Cuba and Nicaragua — identified as terrorist sponsors. A Libyan radio called the five nations the only states opposed to American efforts to "swallow the world."

The radio broadcast, monitored in London, referred to the president as "terrorist Reagan" and said the five nations were opposed to "American policies that seek to contain the world . . .[and] guarantee U.S. superiority in the future nuclear confrontation with the opposite side."

In Havana, Fidel Castro lashed out at President Reagan, too, calling him a "madman," and charged the U.S. with organizing "American terrorism." Mr. Castro told a press conference in the Cuban capital that President Reagan was "the worst terrorist in the history of mankind." The president, he said, took all his ideas from "the era of Buffalo Bill."

Against the backdrop of these angry recriminations, official U.S. sources say, the disclosures of the Athens newspaper seemed likely to stir up a furious Soviet propaganda barrage against the defection of their agent in Greece.

Controversy was already growing on Capitol Hill. Sen. Richard Lugar of Indiana, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who has just returned from a trip through Central America, predicted last night that "action is coming" against supporters of worldwide terrorism.

He told interviewer George F. Will on ABC News, who asked why the administration has merely limited itself to talking tough, that "the president is setting the legal stage and framework for that action."

Mr. Lugar said he had "no doubt at all" that the Soviet Union and Syria have engaged in state-sponsored terrorism as well, though they were not on Mr. Reagan's list of the five nations that he characterized as "Murder, Inc."

In a letter to the president, Sen. Robert Byrd of West Virginia, the Democratic minority leader, urged President Reagan yesterday to strengthen U.S. intelligence against terrorists and to ask Congress for whatever additional money is needed to do it.

But Rep. Thomas P. (Tip) O'Neill of Massachusetts, the Democratic majority leader, called the president's designation of the five nations "a touchy thing." He reminded reporters of CIA participation in preparation of an "assassination manual" for rebels in Nicaragua, but did not elaborate.

Sen. Lloyd Bentsen, D-Texas, told CBS News he did not believe the nations named by Mr. Reagan were engaged in a conspiracy against the United States.

The Washington Post ____
The Washington Times 1A
Daily News (New York) ____
The New York Times ____
The Wall Street Journal ____
The Chicago Tribune ____
The Los Angeles Times ____
The Christian Science Monitor ____
USA Today ____

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WASHINGTON TIMES
19 July 1985

Greeks deny refusing asylum to Soviet wife

By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

A Greek Embassy spokesman has denied that the wife of a Soviet defector to the United States sought political asylum in Greece before Soviet authorities arranged her return to Moscow.

But Virginia Tsouderou, a member of the conservative New Democracy Party and a noted human rights activist, has charged that the family of the defector, Sergei Bokane, was in police custody and was not given the option of joining him.

Nikos Papaconstantinou, a Greek Embassy spokesman, dismissed Mrs. Tsouderou's charges as "nonsense."

"All the reports on this are inaccurate and unfounded," Mr. Papaconstantinou said Wednesday. "Mrs. Bokane never asked for political asylum from the Greek government," he said.

If Mrs. Bokane had sought political asylum, she would have made the request while she was at her residence or as she prepared to leave Athens aiport for Moscow, he said. Mr. Papaconstantinou said he did not know if Greek police were guarding the Bokane residence before she left the country.

Prior to his defection to the United States, Mr. Bokane had been first secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Athens and a Soviet GRU military intelligence officer.

Last week the State Department confirmed that Mr. Bokane entered the United States voluntarily after defecting in Athens last May 24.

An Athens newspaper, the Athens Star, reported July 4 that Mr. Bokane was providing U.S. intelligence officials with details of Soviet espionage activities in Greece and other parts of the world, including Moscow's involvement in international terrorism.

U.S. officials have placed a tight lid on further details of Mr. Bokane's revelations, fearing terrorist reprisals against Americans and possibly attacks during the Geneva summit between President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev scheduled for November, according to a senior U.S. official.

Knowledgable Greek sources said the Greek government's Ministry of Public Order was asked by Soviet Embassy officials to place the residence of Mrs. Bokane under police control. Mr. Bokane's wife and 7-year-old daughter were then flown out of Athens on an Aeroflot flight to Moscow.

Mr. Bokane left the Soviet diplomatic compound in Athens on Saturday, May 25, after telling his wife he was going for a walk. For unexplained reasons, his wife reportedly did not report the disappearance until the following Monday. Mr. Bokane's car was found abandoned in a northern section of Athens near Olympic Stadium, according to Greek press accounts.

In a question presented to the Greek Parliament this month, Mrs. Tsouderou demanded the Greek government explain "who was responsible for the immediate surrender of the family of the Soviet diplomat who was serving in Athens and asked for political asylum in the West."

A copy of Mrs. Tsouderou's statement in Parliament was obtained by The Washington Times.

She charged that denying the family the option of joining Mr. Bokane "is considered a violation of international practices" with regard to those seeking political asylum.

Mrs. Tsouderou raised other questions about the Greek government's policy toward terrorism in her statement. Several questions were directed to the secretary general of the Ministry of Public Order, Constantine Tsimas.

She charged that Mr. Tsimas had vetoed international conventions on terrorism at three conferences in Italy and that he had been trained at a Palestine Liberation Organization training camp in the Middle East.

Mr. Tsimas, at a press conference this month in Athens, reportedly denied having been trained at the PLO camp.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1986

Russian in Athens Said to Defect

Special to The New York Times

ATHENS, Feb. 17 — A Soviet trade official, believed to be an intelligence officer, defected this weekend and sought asylum in the United States after other Soviet officials failed to forcibly obstruct his defection, Athens police sources said today.

The sources said the defector, Viktor Gundarev, 50 years old, worked for the Soviet commercial mission. They said he was believed to be an officer of the G.R.U., Soviet military intelligence.

The sources added that Mr. Gundarev had defected along with his 8-year-old son and a 30-year-old Russian woman, Galina Grumova, who was reportedly employed as the boy's nanny.

The police sources said the defection was apparently linked to a weekend incident involving reported Soviet surveillance of the United States Embassy. They said the embassy put its security personnel on the alert Saturday and called in the police after two Soviet Embassy cars were spotted circling the premises. A United States Embassy spokesman confirmed the incident with the cars, but said no information was available on the reported defection.

A Greek Government spokesman, Miltiades Papaioannou, said at a press briefing today that the Government had not been officially informed of any defection.

The incident constitutes the third known Soviet bloc defection here since May, when Sergei Bokhane, a reported member of Soviet military intelligence, fled to the United States. Last month a Rumanian trade official also defected.

Mr. Bokhane named five Greeks as spying for Moscow, according to Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou. Three of them are in jail pending trial on charges of passing secrets on American technology. One of them confessed and named three Soviet officials as agents of military intelligence involved in technology thefts. Like the present defector, all three served with the commercial mission.

WASH POST 21 FEB 86

Soviet Intelligence Official Defects to the West in Athens

A man identified as a Soviet intelligence official has defected to the West in Athens, Greece, with his son and a Soviet woman, U.S. intelligence sources said yesterday. He is the second intelligence official to defect there in nine months.

The sources identified the defector as Viktor Gudarev, 50, and said he was a member of the state security organization, the KGB, and not a member of the GRU, the Soviet military intelligence agency, as earlier reported.

The State Department refused to comment on Gudarev, whose rank and importance remain unclear. He was not listed among Soviet diplomats stationed in Athens; he previously served in New Delhi, according to news agency reports.

One intelligence source said he understood Gudarev was considered more important to the West than the last Soviet defector in Athens, Sergei Bokhane, a military intelligence agent who fled in May. Bokhane reportedly disclosed the names of five Greeks spying for the Soviets.

But the source added that Gudarev appeared to be less of a prize than Vitaly Yurchenko, the high-ranking KGB agent who defected in Rome last July, came to the United States, and then changed his mind. Yurchenko escaped from CIA surveillance here in a Georgetown restaurant and redefected to the Soviet Union last November.

Gudarev took with him his son, Maxim, 8, and a woman who was identified in press reports from Athens as Galina Grumova. She was described as the son's nursemaid and Gudarev's lover. According to the reports, Gudarev left a wife and child in Moscow.

The reports said Gudarev, a member of the embassy's commercial mission in Athens since 1983, defected to the United States last weekend after other Soviet embassy officials sought to stop him.

It was not clear how the U.S. Embassy in Athens managed to get the three Soviets out of the country, but there is a U.S. Air Force base outside the Greek capital.

Gudarev is the third Soviet bloc person to defect in Athens in less than a year.

ON PAGE 1-A

17 July 1985

Mystery of vanished Soviet savant deepens

By Ted Agres
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

What happened to renowned Soviet scientist Vladimir Alexandrov?

Did he defect to the West while attending a conference in Spain? Was he killed or kidnapped by the Soviet intelligence agency, the KGB, because he was about to defect? Did right-wing terrorists in Europe do him in?

No one seems to know — not his wife in Moscow, nor his colleagues in Russia, California, London or Stockholm.

The Soviet authorities, if they know, aren't saying. They refer all questions to the International Red Cross, which doesn't have a clue.

What is known is that Dr. Vladimir Alexandrov is an expert in computer modeling and climate studies. He is director of the Climate Modeling Center of the Computational Sciences Center of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in Moscow.

As a prominent, trusted scientist, Dr. Alexandrov had been granted the unusual privilege of traveling abroad with his wife, Alya, and stepchild. He did so extensively, spending more than six months at a time as a visiting scientist at Lawrence Livermore Laboratories in California and at various U.S. and European centers for climate research.

He participated in scientific meetings around the world on the "nuclear winter" theme. This is the theory that any major nuclear exchange would so disrupt the atmosphere that the earth's climate would be drastically altered. The result would be a permanent "winter" in which life as we know it would suffer catastrophic consequences.

Although there is no consensus, many scientists in the United States and Europe agree with this hypothesis. Among themselves, some Soviet scientists dispute the theory, but the "official" party line, expressed by Boris Ponomarev in September's World Marxist Review, is that a 100-megaton exchange would virtually destroy the world.

Yet Soviet leaders believe nuclear war is survivable, as evidenced by their massive, nationwide civil defense program. Their casualties would be great, the Soviets say, but probably no more than the losses they incurred during World War II

Some analysts have come to believe that the Soviets are using the nuclear winter hypothesis as part of a larger "peace campaign," or "active measures" drive, to push the West further into unilateral disarmament or at least to drive a wedge between the Western allies over missile deployments.

Dr. Alexandrov had been privvy to the debates over whether nuclear war was indeed survivable. But some of his colleagues in the West say he privately showed signs of disillusionment. While he had published many scientific articles on the dangers of nuclear winter, as far back as April 1983 he had criticized some of the approaches taken by Dr. Carl Sagan and others involved in the issue.

Last March, Dr. Alexandrov was in Madrid to attend a meeting of the Scientific Committee on the Protection of the Environment. He arrived about 10 days before the conference was to start. He checked into his hotel and is reported to have shown signs of acute gastric distress.

He left his bags, passport and some airline tickets in his room and reportedly decided to take a walk. That was the last time he was seen.

U.S. and British intelligence sources say he did not seek asylum. Reports from Moscow and from former associates at Lawrence Livermore indicate that his wife called California from Moscow in mid-April in an effort to locate him.

A Russian Editor Is Missing From a Munich Radio Studio

THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, MARCH 4, 1980

By JAMES M. MARKHAM

Special to The New York Times

BONN, March 3 — The Soviet-born acting chief editor of Radio Liberty, an American-financed station that broadcasts to the Soviet Union, has been missing for a week, according to officials at the station in Munich.

The editor, Oleg Tumanov, 42 years old, has been missing since last Tuesday after having left work the previous day complaining that he felt unwell, according to the station.

"He is gone and has been gone since last week," said Nicholas Vaslef, station director. "For all we know he is sunning himself in Italy. It is certainly an unauthorized absence."

There has been speculation that Mr. Tumanov, who reportedly had a number of debts, had re-defected.

A sailor in the Soviet Navy, he jumped ship in the Mediterranean and swam six miles to Libya in 1965, according to Bill Mahoney, a station spokesman. As a deserter, he was sentenced to death in absentia. After a stay in Britain, he joined the Munich station in 1966. He was divorced from his English wife, who has custody of their daughter.

Friends at Radio Liberty said a woman friend, Tamara Poljanskaya, had been unaware of his disappearance and, when told of it on Thursday, regarded it as a joke. Mr. Tumanov was said to have emptied his bank account.

Victor Gregoriy, the station's deputy director, said: "He was very well balanced. He was a very quiet and reserved man."

Another staff member said, "It is a classic case of blackmail. The man was in debt, and he defected with his money and his fancy neckties." He speculated that if Mr. Tumanov had re-defected, the Soviet Union might attempt to exploit his knowledge of the station.

As acting chief editor, Mr. Tumanov organized programs and checked them before they were broadcast to the Soviet Union. Several colleagues spoke highly of the quality of his work.

Officials at the station said the Munich police had been informed of Mr. Tumanov's disappearance, but had found no trace of him.

Radio Liberty and its sister station, Radio Free Europe, which broadcasts to Eastern Europe, are financed by the Congress and overseen by the Board for International Broadcasting in Washington.

Richard Cummings, head of security at the stations, said there had been "less than a half dozen" cases of re-defections. The 1,700 staff members at the two stations are mostly émigrés.

WASHINGTON POST
16 November 1985

Ex-Soviet's Escape Into a Childhood Dream

By Kevin Klose
Washington Post Staff Writer

CHICAGO

One June day in 1983, Red Army Sgt. Mykola Movchan walked away from his grenadier unit in Afghanistan in search of a new life in a free country.

In the 2½ years since, he says he has never looked back. The soft-spoken former Soviet conscript has settled with increasing ease into a life of his own making, precisely what he was seeking. And while not sure "exactly where I will go," Movchan says he is "satisfied enough for now."

The outlines of his quiet existence are almost indistinguishable from the lives of many 22-year-olds at the threshold of American adulthood. He has an apartment in New Jersey, a job in New York City, friends who let him drive their cars now that he has his brand-new license. He enjoys watching wrestling on television and visited Madison Square Garden for a live taste of it recently, although he found the fans' fanaticism a bit overwhelming.

He finds opera and ballet beyond comprehension and, like many of his countrymen, has trouble making sense of American newspapers. "I read them, but truly, I don't understand them," he said in Russian, with a smile that spoke reams.

He likes to cook at home and, if pressed for time, does what many Americans do: He heads for a Big Mac.

He may buy a car someday but finds the profusion of choices confusing, just as the rest of us do. "In the Soviet Union," he recalled with a laugh, "there are only a few basic models: Volga, Zhiguli, Moskvich, Zaporozhets."

But the details of his existence mark him as an unusual and especially interesting figure amid the controversy and concern about defectors such as KGB agent Vitaly Yurchenko, who chose to return to the Soviet Union last week, and would-be defectors such as Ukrainian sailor Miroslav Medvid.

U.S. officials believe that Medvid jumped from the Soviet grain freighter Marshal Konev last month near New Orleans and was seeking asylum when he was returned by the Immigration and Naturalization Service; Soviet officials say he fell into the Mississippi River while making repairs on the ship. Like many former Soviet citizens and Ukrainians in this country, Movchan said he has no doubt that Medvid was trying to defect.

MYKOLA MOVCHAN
. . . "It would be a nightmare to go back."

"It would be a nightmare to go back," Movchan said, applying the idea to himself and the sailor. "Miroslav Medvid was very unlucky. There is no telling what will happen to him when he is returned to the Soviet Union. I can't say exactly what will happen to him, but it could be a long jail sentence, exile in Siberia . . . perhaps put him in a psychiatric hospital . . . . They could shoot him . . . whatever."

As for Yurchenko, Movchan said, "I'm not able to judge his case. I'm not familiar with his story. I was just a simple soldier, not on his level at all. But he was certainly crafty enough, and he knew what awaited him when he returned to the Soviet Union," unlike two Red Army soldiers who defected in Afghanistan and later returned to the U.S.S.R.

British newspapers reported recently that the two soldiers had been executed. "They were only simple guys," Movchan said. "They didn't realize what they were doing."

Movchan was reluctant to talk about his family in the Ukraine. He and his two brothers grew up in a rural town near Zhitomir, a provincial city west of the Ukrainian capital of Kiev. Of medium height, with a small mustache, hazel eyes and a soft voice, he was drafted into the army at 18 and sent to Afghanistan in the fall of 1982 as a member of a grenade-launching unit.

He and his fellow soldiers had been told that they would help save the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan from U.S., Pakistani and Chinese invaders. The invaders turned out to be the Soviets.

Morale among the troops was low; there was drug abuse, drunkenness, harsh discipline. There were numerous bloody clashes with Moslem mujaheddin freedom fighters.

Movchan said he was sickened by the sight of Soviet soldiers shooting Afghani civilians in reprisal for guerrilla attacks, and he determined to fulfill a childhood dream of escaping the Soviet Union. He stole away from his unit, was taken in by the guerrillas and, after months of uncertainty, made his way to the United States in July 1984.

Originally aided by Freedom House in New York City, Movchan is a legal resident alien, awaiting permanent citizenship. He has traveled widely in the country on behalf of the Afghani resistance movement and Ukrainian human rights activists jailed or in exile in the Soviet Union.

"I've seen a little of America, and I understand a little more about the country," Movchan said in an interview during a visit here sponsored by several Ukrainian-American organizations. There are more than 50,000 Chicago-area residents of Ukrainian descent, one of the largest Ukrainian communities outside the U.S.S.R.

"There is the freedom here of a person to make a life for himself. Americans are fortunate—they can do what they want, read what they want. While I still don't yet know exactly where my life will go, I feel like an American."

Movchan is enrolled in an adult education course to improve his rudimentary English. Meanwhile, for recreation, he reads Pravda, the official newspaper of the Soviet Communist Party. And his mind dwells on the new life stretching ahead: "I'm not able to live in my own country, and so I must learn to swim here."

Of all the places he has seen in his travels, from Disneyland to the Grand Canyon, he prefers New York City. This may have something to do with the swift and unexpected course of his own life.

"People there are temperamental. Everyone rushes all the time. This is as it should be, because life is short, and you must run."

WASHINGTON TIMES
12 July 1985

Czech diplomat defects in U.S.

By Bill Outlaw
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The deputy chief of the Czechoslovakian Embassy here has been granted asylum in the United States, the Immigration and Naturalization Service said last night.

INS spokesman Duke Austin identified the official as Milan Svec. Mr. Austin said Mr. Svec was granted asylum May 14.

There had been no previous announcement or acknowledgment of Mr. Svec's defection.

Mr. Austin said he did not have further information about the defection. Information about Mr. Svec's whereabouts is not given out as a matter of policy "for obvious reasons," he said.

"The only thing I can tell you is that he did apply for asylum to the United States and it was granted," Mr. Austin said.

It could not be learned immediately whether Mr. Svec has any relatives in this country. His willingness to allow his defection to be made public suggested that he might not have close relatives in Czechoslovakia who could be subject to reprisals.

Mr. Austin said the granting of asylum would apply to Mr. Svec's relatives, but he did not have information about Mr. Svec's relatives here.

Mr. Svec is believed to have spent most of the last two months in extensive conversations with FBI agents and other U.S. officials. Mr. Svec was identified by government sources as deputy chief of the Czech mission and carried the rank of minister-counselor at the time of his defection.

The sources would not elaborate on why Mr. Svec defected, but they said he was willing to have his defection made public at this time.

The U.S. government granted Mr. Svec political asylum on May 14, the sources said. They declined to describe the government's reasons for granting asylum, but generally political asylum is given to citizens of countries hostile to the United States who might be persecuted for their political beliefs if they returned home.

Asked about Mr. Svec, Jaroslav Kubista, the second secretary at the Czech Embassy, said, "Milan Svec is not any longer with the embassy. He has left on May 12."

Mr. Kubista would not describe the circumstances under which Mr. Svec left, and he declined to comment further.

It could not immediately be learned how old Mr. Svec was or what posts he had held in the Czech government.

A man who identified himself as Czech Ambassador Stanislav Suja told United Press International by telephone, "I don't know of any defection. I don't have any comment on the matter."

The State Department declined comment on the defection, referring questions to the immigration agency. This, too, is routine. But Mr. Austin said he could provide no other details.

WASHINGTON TIMES
25 March 1985

Cuban official, Soviet diplomat leave foreign posts, defect to U.S.

By Roger Fontaine
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

A senior Cuban officer with an extensive background in Cuban military and intelligence operations in Africa defected in Spain two months ago and is now safely in the United States, The Washington Times learned yesterday.

In New Delhi, a missing Soviet diplomat in the Indian capital was also reported to have defected to the United States.

The Cuban, Lt. Col. Joaquin Mourino Perez, defected in Madrid on Jan. 24, and shortly thereafter was flown to the United States for extensive debriefings.

According to one administration official, it will be several months before he will go public but, according to the same official, "evidently, he has a lot of information."

Another U.S. official contacted by The Times yesterday described the defector as "a jewel," and his role of "coordinator" as "the man who makes it happen," an equivalent to an American chief of staff.

Furthermore, his rank of lieutenant colonel — a relatively junior rank — indicates he is an officer in the Cuban ministry of the interior which has "all of Cuba's special operations assets," according to the same official. As such he was above and outside the regular armed forces structure "with a direct shot to [Cuban President Fidel] Castro," he added.

Until today, the defection had attracted the attention of only one small-circulation newspaper in Madrid, El Alcazar, which published an account of the defection on Jan. 26.

American intelligence officials, however, are still keeping the Cuban defector under tight wraps, both for security reasons and to determine his genuineness.

According to one retired U.S. intelligence officer, the process is called "establishing his bona fides."

In the case of defectors, it is a very "meticulous process" in which the defector's information is cross-checked and his motives for defection probed for ulterior purposes, he added.

Described by sources as "the coordinator" of Cuban troops in Angola, Ethiopia, and South Yemen, Col. Mourino first approached a Cuban exile club, the Circulo Cubano, in Madrid and expressed a wish to defect to the United States.

Later, he was put in touch with the U.S. Embassy in Madrid and was subsequently flown to the United States, where he has remained under the custody of U.S. intelligence officials.

Meanwhile, in New Delhi, the Indian government announced yesterday that a Soviet diplomat who had disappeared last week while jogging in a Delhi park had defected and left the country for the United States. He left a wife and daughter behind.

Igor Gezha, 37, a third secretary in the embassy's information department, had been in India for six years and was to return soon to the Soviet Union for a new assignment.

His principal job at the embassy was editor of the Soviet propaganda magazine, Soviet Land.

Neither the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi nor the State Department would comment on the announcement, citing the Reagan administration's policy of refusing to discuss defections.

State Department spokesman Brian Carlson had no statement, saying: "We never comment one way or another on asylum."

Fear for the safety of the defecting Soviet official grew after Victor Khitzichenko, a senior engineer in the Soviet Embassy's economic division, was slain in his car last week by a motorcycle gunman who escaped with an accomplice.

Indian police now believe, however, there was no connection between Mr. Gezha's disappearance and Khitzichenko's murder.

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NEW YORK TIMES
17 December 1985

HAVANA DEFECTOR KNOWS ARMS DATA

Spaniards Fill In Background on High Economic Official Cuba Tried to Get Back

By EDWARD SCHUMACHER
Special to The New York Times

MADRID, Dec. 16 — The Cuban defector who was the subject of a foiled kidnapping attempt last week had inside knowledge about Cuban arms sales and purchases and about overseas military ventures in such countries as Angola, according to Spanish officials and to Cuban exiles here.

Four embassy employees tried to kidnap the defector, Manuel Antonio Sánchez Pérez, in Madrid last Friday, but they were foiled when bystanders intervened. Mr. Sánchez, a former economic official in the Cuban Government, is being kept in a safe house.

The sources said that he held the rank of a deputy minister as a member of the State Planning Board. He was also said to have worked for a key agency known as the State Committee for Material and Technical Supply, which oversees purchase of supplies abroad. A few years ago, he was identified in the West as the chief of the agency's World Planning Directorate.

The Spanish sources said that Mr. Sánchez had been asssociated with the planning board, which oversees the economy, for nearly 15 years. The position made him a man of confidence inside the Government, they said.

Asylum Was Asked on Nov. 18

Officials declined to disclose the location of the safe house. They said Mr. Sánchez first applied for asylum on Nov. 18 in Zaragoza during a stopover en route to Eastern Europe on a purchasing trip. Some sources said he had applied for political asylum in the United States. The United States Embassy declined comment.

Nearly 70,000 Cubans have used Spain as a route to the United States since 1961, though most first moved to Spain with Cuban Government permission, according to refugee agencies. An air force officer active in Africa defected to the United States here earlier this year and another Government economist defected three years ago.

Mr. Sánchez' decision to defect may be related to a recent upheaval inside the Cuban Government, the sources said. Fidel Castro switched planning ministers two months ago. It was publicly unclear, however, where Mr. Sánchez stood in the in-fighting.

In the kidnapping attempt Friday, four Cuban Embassy employees seized the defector as he emerged from a bank here. Though two of the four had pistols out, a building guard intervened and asked for their identification as passers-by gathered around the car into which a screaming Mr. Sánchez had been pushed.

Getaway Car Was Blocked

The guard said in an interview over the weekend that a Cuban passport belonging to one of the assailants fell on the ground. The passers-by, along with two taxis, blocked the car from pulling away from the curb.

The Madrid daily ABC reported today that Spanish security agents who had been following Mr. Sánchez were also part of the group.

"What got me," said the guard, "was seeing this man, corpulent and bleeding from the mouth, crying with anguish when he saw me, as if he knew that I was his only salvation."

The incident has soured Cuban-Spanish relations. Spain has expelled the four embassy employees. Cuba said Saturday that Spain was protecting an "ordinary thief" who had gone to the bank to withdraw $500,000 in Cuban Government money. Spain said the Cuban version was false and contained "intolerable judgments on the behavior of the Spanish people."

Prime Minister Felipe González canceled a trip to Cuba last summer because, he said, of a political crisis in Spain. Mr. Castro angered Spaniards with a speech soon afterward, bring up long-past colonial atrocities.

Nicaraguan Defects

Human Rights Official Given Asylum in U.S.

By George Gedda
Associated Press

An official of Nicaragua's government-operated human rights commission has secretly defected to the United States, accusing Sandinista authorities of refusing to allow his office to investigate most abuses in that country, according to U.S. government documents.

Mateo Guerrero, former executive director of Nicaragua's National Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, told U.S. interrogators that Sandinista officials increasingly view the panel as a tool to improve Nicaragua's image abroad. It was established five years ago as an autonomous government agency.

Guerrero went to Miami four months ago, telling Nicaraguan authorities he wanted to take English lessons, U.S. sources said yesterday. There, he requested and was granted political asylum.

The Associated Press obtained a copy of a four-page U.S. government summary of the story he told U.S. officials. It includes the following allegations:

■ The commission, established in 1980 to probe human rights abuses, has gradually come under control of the Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry, which has tried to convert the office into a government propaganda arm.

■ The ministry's secretary general, Alejandro Bendana, has monitored commission activities since late 1983. Early this year, he told panel leaders not to investigate allegations of abuses concerning forced relocation of several communities in northern Nicaragua.

■ Bendana told two commission officials last January that the panel would help the government establish liaisons with foreign human rights groups to draw international attention to abuses by antigovernment rebels.

"The commission leaders were told to stop investigating any abuse committed by the government of Nicaragua and to concentrate their efforts on the anti-Sandinistas," the summary said.

■ When two U.S. lawyers visited Nicaragua last year to investigate abuses by anticommunist rebels, the commission paid their three-month hotel bill and provided office space and transportation.

■ Since 1982, commission members have not been permitted to probe prison-system abuses. The Interior Ministry's chief of prisons, Raul Cordon, "has delayed or refused to meet with commission officials and has torn up commission letters in front of the officials without reading them .... Cordon has rejected all of the commission's requests for the release of prisoners," it said.

■ Of nine commissioners appointed in 1983, six place the political goals of the Sandinista government above the panel's human rights interests.

Reached by telephone yesterday, Guerrero said he prefers not to discuss his defection in a phone conversation. In any case, he said, his views were adequately detailed in the summary.

A U.S. acquaintance, speaking on condition that he not be identified, said Guerrero feared for his personal safety because he believed that the Sandinistas might identify him as a counterrevolutionary because of his commission role.

U.S. officials asked the AP not to disclose Guerrero's whereabouts to ensure that his safety is not jeopardized. He was reported to have left Miami about two months ago and is living with relatives elsewhere in the United States.

The officials, who spoke only on condition that they not be identified, said that, before the revolution, Guerrero aided the Sandinista cause by transporting weapons and other equipment.

In April, the Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights, a private U.S. group, indicated in a report on the Nicaraguan justice system that the commission serves a useful purpose.

It said staff members serve an educational role by giving human rights seminars to government officials and publicizing human rights treaties, international conventions and domestic legislation.

8/21/85
Washington Post

LOS ANGELES TIMES
14 November 1985

Soviets Say Medvid Fell Off Ship

He Didn't Jump, Newspaper Says, Accusing U.S. Officials

By WILLIAM J. EATON, *Times Staff Writer*

MOSCOW—A Soviet newspaper charged Wednesday that U.S. officials "trampled on human rights" in the controversial New Orleans incident involving sailor Miroslav Medvid.

Rather than jumping from a Soviet grain ship—as American officials had contended—Medvid, 20, just slipped and fell overboard, the Soviet newspaper Trud also said.

It was the first Soviet account of the celebrated episode that began almost three weeks ago and ended with the Reagan Administration's decision that the Ukrainian seaman was not seeking asylum and that the grain ship could leave U.S. waters.

In another celebrated case, the Soviet Foreign Ministry called a news conference today for Vitaly Yurchenko to air accusations that he was abducted by the CIA.

Yurchenko, described by American officials as a high-ranking KGB officer who defected and then decided to return to Moscow, represents an acute embarrassment to the CIA and the White House.

Western diplomats said Yurchenko's promised appearance may be designed to tarnish the American human rights image just before President Reagan meets in Geneva with Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev next week.

The accusations about Medvid and the scheduling of Yurchenko's appearance came as the Soviet media kept up a steady pre-summit bombardment of anti-American charges.

Trud said Medvid "lost his bearings for some time" but was pulled from the water by a U.S. patrol boat. It did not report the American claim that he jumped into the water a second time as Border Patrol agents returned him to his ship or the assertion that he struggled against going back.

The newspaper reported, however, that U.S. officials "went berserk" the next day, taking Medvid to a Coast Guard ship for questioning and posting 11 police agents on the vessel for five days.

'Sailor Coming Home'

A delegation from the ship was taken by police escort to a U.S. naval base and questioned for 20 hours without a break, Soviet Capt. R. Tkachenko was quoted by Trud as saying.

"The American authorities wanted to take our man away at all costs, separating him from his fellow crew members, from his comrades, to persuade him to betray his motherland," Trud said. "The provocateurs achieved a big zero. . . . Our sailor is coming home."

State Department officials said they questioned Medvid and he said he did not want to defect. As a result, he and his ship were allowed to leave despite efforts by a Senate committee to stop the vessel and summon the sailor for questioning.

Yurchenko, whose defection was confirmed by the State Department in October, shocked official Washington by announcing at the Soviet Embassy on Nov. 4 that he had been kidnaped in Rome, drugged by the CIA at a safehouse in the Virginia countryside and that wanted to go home.

The State Department immediately branded his charges as "totally false," but the case raised questions about whether Yurchenko had been a KGB "plant" all along or whether he had defected and then changed his mind.

A steady stream of newspaper, radio and television reports and commentaries targeted the United States for heavy criticism in recent days.

"It could be a barrage in advance of the summit to hedge against possible disappointments in Geneva," said one Western diplomat.

For example, five national newspapers carried letters from artists, writers, academicians, workers and even schoolchildren on the Yurchenko case, expressing outrage at the treatment he allegedly received in the United States.

It bore the earmarks of an organized campaign, possibly to offset any accusations by Reagan of Soviet human rights violations during the Geneva meeting.

Tass, the official news agency, charged that Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger was trying to undermine the Geneva talks.

The Literary Gazette, a popular weekly, ran an article alleging that the United States violates human rights in many countries, including El Salvador, Guatemala, Chile, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Grenada and South Africa.

'Broad-Scale Violations'

The author, Vsevolod Sofinsky, also charged that "internal life in the United States abounds in gross and broad-scale violations of human rights," reiterating familiar accusations about racial violence linked to the Ku Klux Klan, poverty and mass unemployment.

Izvestia, the government newspaper, printed an interview with Boris Raushenbakh, a scientist, who said Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative would increase the risk of accidental war by computer miscalculations.

The Soviet media also have been responding with unaccustomed speed to the President's speeches relating to the summit, frequently accusing him of distorting or falsifying the record.

At the same time, a lead editorial in Pravda held out an olive branch to Western Europe, suggesting that it work for detente with the Soviet Union regardless of what the Americans do.

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WASHINGTON TIMES
15 November 1985

Medvid's future is grim, priest says

By P.J. Parisi
SPECIAL TO THE WASHINGTON TIMES

A Romanian Orthodox priest who came to the United States in August after spending more than 20 years in prison in that East European country predicts that the Soviet seaman who recently jumped ship in Louisiana and was returned will be "used like propaganda" against others considering defection.

The Rev. Georghe Calciu, 59, also said the seaman, Miroslav Medvid, will likely be imprisoned or "sent to Siberia" afterwards.

Furthermore, he said he believes the high-ranking KGB agent who returned to the Soviet Union last week, after denying that he had defected three months before, was operating for the Soviet intelligence agency from the beginning.

Father Calciu, who had been jailed for his religious and union-organizing activities before being allowed to emigrate, was here last weekend to speak at a conference sponsored by the Christian Rescue Effort for the Emancipation of Dissidents, held at Christ Church on Massachusetts Avenue NW.

A small, frail man with salt-and-pepper hair, moustache and beard, Father Calciu said in an interview that he was "absolutely certain" the Ukranian Soviet seaman wanted to defect. The U.S. State Department, after interviewing Mr. Medvid, said he had changed his mind and wanted to return home.

"He will be used like propaganda against those who try to leave Russia," said Father Calciu through a translator — his son, Andrei. "But later, when interest in him has diminished, he will be put in jail or sent to Siberia."

"I think he was blackmailed," Father Calciu added, suggesting that Soviet authorities on the ship may have changed the seaman's mind by making threats to hurt his family.

Andrei Calciu, 19, predicted that the 25-year-old seaman would be forced to recant publicly when the ship, which left American waters last Saturday, returns to the Soviet Union.

"[Soviet officials] will give him a paper that he will read on the TV, and he'll say how bad it is in America, how awful it is, 'I'd rather be here.' And after they finish those series of broadcasts, because they'll have a series with him on the TV and the radio, they'll throw him in a concentration camp somewhere on the Arctic Circle, and probably in a couple of years he'll be dead."

Father Calciu said that because of the way U.S. immigration officials handled this case, "All the people who are living in Russia and are fighting the Communists will be discouraged [from trying to defect]."

On a related matter, however, he said he does not believe Vitaly S. Yurchenko was a defector but thinks he was instead a KGB plant intended to embarrass the United States.

Mr. Yurchenko, said to be highly placed in the KGB's department overseeing espionage activities in North America, returned to the Soviet Union last week after denying he had defected three months earlier. He claimed that he had been kidnapped by the CIA.

"A man who really defected, and who was in the KGB, knows very well he will be killed [if he returns]. But that he [agreed] to return [proves] that he was, from the beginning, a Soviet agent all along," Father Calciu said.

Father Calciu urged President Reagan to raise the issue of human rights when he meets with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev at their summit next week in Geneva. "The only means for helping people [behind the Iron Curtain is pressuring] for human rights."

He added that Romania's Most Favored Nation trading status with the United States should be revoked unless it improves its human rights record.

"My advice [to President Reagan] would be not to have confidence in the Russian statement [at the summit], because they are liars," he said. "These meetings are needed for political reasons, but my advice for the American people is to put no hope in the meeting."

Father Calciu, a former professor of French and New Testament Studies at the University of Bucharest, was imprisoned from 1948 to 1963 and again from March, 1979, untill August, 1984 for his role in forming the Romanian Christian Committee for the Defense of Believers' Rights and the Romanian Free Trade Union.

He was still under house arrest when U.S. Senator Robert Dole, who was visiting Bucharest in May, appealed for the emigration of he and his family. Father Calciu is now a missionary priest associated with St. Mary's Orthodox Church in Cleveland.

Two face demotion for return of Medvid

By Rita McWilliams
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Two Border Patrol agents who returned a would-be Soviet defector to his ship near New Orleans on Oct. 25 acted on their own and should be demoted and suspended without pay, the Immigration and Naturalization Service said yesterday.

The veteran agents, J.C. Bashaw and Ernest Spurlock, face annual pay cuts of between $4,000 and $11,000, depending on their standing in the Civil Service pay scale, as a result of the recommendations, according to an INS spokesman.

Reached by telephone, neither Mr. Spurlock nor Mr Bashaw would comment. The men have 10 days to appeal the recommendations; INS Commissioner Alan Nelson by law has 30 days to act on them.

The two agents acted without consulting supervisors or the State Department on the evening of Oct. 24 and the early morning hours of Oct. 25, when they decided to return Miroslav Medvid, a Ukrainian seaman who jumped ship and swam ashore, according to a statement released last night by INS Deputy Commissioner Thomas C. Ferguson.

The agents made the decision to return the seaman, despite a plea he made through an interpreter "to live free in an honest country," according to the interpreter.

Mr. Medvid later was taken from the Soviet grain freighter by State Department officials for questioning, but the 25-year-old seaman signed a document stating his desire to return to the Soviet Union.

The Reagan administration has been criticized by some members of Congress and by Ukrainian-American groups for the handling of the case. And the Senate Agriculture Committee tried to halt the ship's Nov. 9 departure from Reserve, La., with a subpeona for Mr. Medvid.

But the administration refused to enforce the subpeona, and the ship left U.S. waters.

A Republican Senate source said that the Border Patrol agents "appear to be taking the fall" for the mishandling of the case. An internal report on the handling of the case, on which Mr. Ferguson's recommendation was based, has not been released.

The incident also has prompted Attorney General Edwin Meese III to recommend a "management review to assess the need for changes in procedures for the handling of asylum cases and the training of INS personnel," the statement said.

Mr. Ferguson, in a press release, said that the two men acted on their own and should have known better because they knew the Ukrainian seaman was from a Soviet ship.

"Mr. Medvid's Soviet nationality was an unusual factor and should have raised questions about the assumption that he was a routine ship-jumper," the release said.

If there was any doubt of not understanding the interpreter, Mr. Ferguson said, the men should have held Mr. Medvid overnight until the matter was clarified.

"The INS district director was not contacted, no supervisory review of the decision to return the seaman was sought, and neither the INS headquarters nor the Department of State was informed, as called for in the INS instructions to its officers," Mr. Ferguson said.

He recommended that the senior of the two Border Patrol agents be suspended without pay for 90 days and that the other officer be suspended without pay for 45 days.

Mr. Medvid jumped from the grain freighter Marshal Konev on Oct. 24 and was returned to his ship at about 2 a.m. the next morning by the ship's American agents, Universal Shipping Agencies. Border Patrol officers signed an order to return Mr. Medvid to the ship after they said an interpreter told them Mr. Medvid was not seeking political asylum.

But that interpreter, Irene Padoch, has testified that Mr. Medvid told her that he wanted asylum and that the Border Patrol agents told her to tell him he would be safe and would be questioned again later that day after he could sleep.

When the ship's agents were returning Mr. Medvid to his ship, he jumped into the Mississippi River again and made it to shore, where the Marshal Konev's second mate tackled him and helped the shipping agents tie him up until other Soviet seaman could be dispatched to carry him back to ship.

The State Department became involved in the case the next day, and three days later department officials questioned Mr. Medvid on shore. The seaman then signed a statement that he wanted to return home with the ship.

The INS recommendation released yesterday also called for reassignment of the two officers, and would order them to attend a two-week training session at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Brunswick, Ga.

Mr. Ferguson also recommended that a letter of reprimand be put in the morning supervisor's file in New Orleans because that officer apparently did not come to work because of a medical appointment and did not make sure another officer reviewed the night file.

"The supervisor's conduct, while having no bearing on the return of Mr. Medvid the evening before, was in violation of INS procedures," the statement said.

The Washington Post _
The Washington Times 1A
Daily News (New York)
The New York Times
The Wall Street Journal
The Chicago Tribune
The Los Angeles Times
The Christian Science Monitor
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BRIEFLY / Nation

Romanian decides not to defect

A Romanian acrobat detained by U.S. immigration officials shortly before he was to board a flight to West Germany decided he did not want to defect and was scheduled to fly out of New York last night, Sen. Dennis DeConcini said yesterday.

Mr. DeConcini, Arizona Democrat, told a Capitol Hill news conference that Andi Georgescu, 24, "surely thought of defecting" to remain in the United States with his American girlfriend, but "decided to go back."

Mr. Georgescu was detained by Immigration and Naturalization Service officials late Tuesday after his girlfriend, Sherri Meyer, 21, of Glendale, Ariz., called Mr. DeConcini's office. Ms. Meyer said she feared Mr. Georgescu was being forced to return against his will. Mr. DeConcini said he contacted the INS.

Ms. Meyer, who is expecting Mr. Georgescu's child in January, "said she plans to go to Romania and marry him," said Mr. DeConcini.

The Washington Post ___
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Daily News (New York) ___
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The Chicago Tribune ___
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USA Today ___

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NEW YORK NEWS 9 December 1985

Don't drive defectors away

There's a young man many miles away who's worth a moment of thought this holiday season. He may have hoped to be in the U.S. now—a free man. Miroslav Medvid is the Ukrainian seaman who last month dived off a Soviet freighter into the Mississippi. And who was forced back to his ship by the U.S. border patrol. Now he's in Soviet hands—for good.

When Medvid swam ashore near New Orleans, border cops set up an interview with a Ukrainian-speaking interpreter. The question: Did he want to defect? The interview was conducted *by telephone*. The interpreter says Medvid *did* want asylum. She says because of her own poor English she wasn't able to get that across before the sailor was returned.

Only then was the State Department notified—despite specific federal guidelines. Border agents are required to *hold* Soviet seamen until State reviews the case.

The State Department then insisted on seeing Medvid before his ship left U.S. waters. He was removed and questioned. In the presence of Soviet diplomats. It was plain he'd slashed his wrists. In addition, the ship's doctor had given him powerful drugs. But U.S. officials decided he didn't want to defect. And again returned him to Soviet custody.

IMMIGRATION OFFICIALS PLAN TO demote the border agents who first forced Medvid back. That's a start. But it's too easy. Punishing those lowest on the totem pole must not be the end of this sorry story.

Are the asylum guidelines adequate? Should an interview with a possible defector who's been drugged even be conducted? *No*. Medvid should have been hospitalized until the drugs wore off. The Soviets should have been told to wait.

And what about intimidation? With his Soviet handlers looking on, Medvid explained that he'd simply fallen overboard while doing repairs. Was the obvious lie a signal? Medvid should have been interviewed *alone*.

The State Department and the White House need to conduct a careful review of U.S. policy on defectors. If would-be defectors fear they'll be turned back, both asylum-seekers and the U.S. will be the losers. Remember the Lady with the Lamp—and what she stands for.

Tales From the Other Side

Yelena Mitrokhina, Remembering the Dark Secrets

By David Remnick
Washington Post Staff Writer

You know Yelena Mitrokhina.

She's the Woman in the Blond Wig.

One August afternoon seven years ago, while her husband was working at the Soviet Embassy, she met with four FBI agents and drove off in a taxi. She was the first person ever to defect from the Soviet Embassy in Washington.

Two weeks ago when high-ranking KGB officer Vitaly Yurchenko walked away from his CIA handlers in a Georgetown bistro and made headlines by redefecting, Yelena Mitrokhina donned a frumpy blond wig and sunglasses and, for the first time, spoke out in public, appearing on ABC's "Nightline," Cable News Network and the front page of The Washington Post. Although there is no way to check all the details of her story as she tells it, sources including the FBI and the Wharton School of Business, where she earned a degree in 1980, confirm Yelena's saga. She became an American citizen last year.

In her way, Yelena Mitrokhina knew Vitaliy Yurchenko like no one else:

"My closest encounter with Mr. Yurchenko was in October 1977. He was head of embassy counterintelligence. There had been a woman, an embassy wife, who had struck up a friendship with an American neighbor. She started seeing him, quite openly, just walking together, talking. When Yurchenko found out, she was sent home to Moscow within 24 hours.

"By that time I was in a similar situation. I was very friendly with an American man. He was my car dealer. I had a lot of problems and thought I could confide in him. The night that woman was sent home, Yurchenko called a meeting of all embassy wives. He started talking about the weakness inherent in women, about how we must not succumb.

"Have you ever been in a theater and you get the feeling that the actor is talking directly at you and no one else? That was how I felt. I thought Yurchenko knew all about me. I sat there, with 30 other women in the room, the wives of all the most powerful Russian diplomats in Washington, and I thought to myself, 'Well, Yelena, you're next.'"

In her wig and sunglasses, Yelena Mitrokhina suggests Tony Curtis' drag performance in "Some Like It Hot." In reality, she is dark-haired, dark-eyed, attractive and smartly dressed. Her English would shame a native.

"My friends say that I was born in Russia only by accident," she says. "And they're right. I was born to live in America." Yelena says, "I did not want to spend my life working for a system. I wanted to live for myself."

Born 41 years ago in Leningrad, she grew up a privileged and only child. Her father was an air force colonel "whose philosophy was the front page of Pravda." Her mother was more irreverent, "a free spirit who taught me how to live my own life."

Yelena, like many Russians, favors a certain bluntness of speech. She is not shy, announcing "that I got straight As in school. I have an IQ of 154." At the University of Leningrad she studied Norwegian and English. She worked summers as an interpreter for visiting delegations from Norway, Britain and the United States. "I guess that's when I first got a taste for the West," she says. "It wasn't really political, it was the people I met, their openness."

At 19, Yelena married the son of a prominent Soviet writer, "a kind of playboy" who was later diagnosed as schizophrenic. "I was very much in love with him, but we just could not live together," she says. "He threatened me and almost killed me. We divorced after a year. I was devastated."

While a graduate student in sociology, she met Lev Mitrokhina, a professor at the Academy of Sciences. As soon as he could divorce his first wife, they married in 1970. Yelena was again a member of the privileged class, the *nomenklatura*.

"People who know that I'm a defector assume that I was a dissident," she says, "but I was never anything close to that when I was living in Russia. I was born with a silver spoon in my mouth. When I moved to Moscow with my husband, my status just went up. Lev was a member of the Russian old boys' network. He'd been in charge of propaganda when he was young and in the Komsomol [Communist Party youth organization]. We had a car, good food, a nice apartment. Like any Russian with a little money and brains, I could get lots of foreign goods. I don't ever remember wearing any Soviet-made clothes."

One of Lev Mitrokhina's "old-boy" friends in 1975 was Boris Pankin, head of the newly formed Soviet copyright agency. Pankin asked Lev to become a first secretary at the embassy in Washington and open a copyright office on K Street. Yelena was delighted.

"At the embassy you get the best of the two worlds," she says. "You live with diplomatic immunity, a free apartment, medical care and an environment of familiar Russian people. The majority of the intellectual elite in Moscow paled by comparison with the top rank of diplomats in Washington.

"We had access to so many more books, to magazines and journals and the television news. I remember some friends and I played a game by comparing an issue of Pravda and The Washington Post, and we discovered

that in Russia certain events just do not exist. And the TV! I remember 'The Six Million Dollar Man' was very big. We would race back from Pioneer Point [the Soviet "dacha" in Maryland] on Sunday nights to watch it. I guess we didn't know about reruns yet."

There were a few restrictions. Embassy personnel were not allowed to have credit cards or checkbooks. "We always carried cash," Yelena says. "That made us the best mugging targets in the city."

The Mitrokhinas lived in Chevy Chase and worked together at the copyright office, but their marriage was coming apart slowly. Lev was drinking heavily. Yelena "felt like just another utility in the house." When she asked her husband to accompany her to the hospital for the birth of her second child [in January 1977] he refused to go. "I couldn't believe it," she says. "He said, 'Come on, what do you need me there for?' Well, that did it. I never got over that. I was an absolute doormat."

If she were to confide in her Russian friends, she thought, Yurchenko and the other embassy officials might find out and send the family back to Moscow.

"I was trapped," she says. But soon Yelena found an American friend. "I went to fix my car at a local Oldsmobile dealership and I met a nice older man in April 1977. He looked like Gregory Peck. His name was Ed."

Careful not to attract attention from the embassy, Yelena began meeting Ed for coffee, for long rides and walks. "It wasn't a love affair," she says, "he was a father figure, 30 years older than me," but Yelena would tell Ed about her problems, her husband, her isolation in the embassy.

But when Yurchenko held his "warning" meeting at the embassy in October 1977, Yelena became frightened. "I figured by then they had probably a couple of pictures of my friend and I. So I saw him one night and told him I couldn't see him for a while. I said, 'There are leaks and you Americans can't keep a secret.' He didn't reassure me, but he did say, 'Look, I understand, but if you ever decide you want to stay, tell me.' That's when I started to think."

After two months Yelena met once more with Ed. She told him she was ready to defect.

"I want to take you up on your offer," she told him.

"Okay," she recalls him saying. "But I have to tell you something. I'm cooperating with the FBI." He was not a career agent, he said, but the bureau had asked him to provide information on Yelena because of his friendship with her.

They arranged a meeting at a Holiday Inn in Rosslyn.

"We met at the Olds dealership and we drove to the hotel. He took me up to a room, introduced me to the FBI man, a guy named John," says Yelena. "I knew what John was thinking. He was thinking I might be a double agent, that I might have been out to set them up. I had no access to sensitive information at the embassy, so what was in it for them? I was afraid they might call the embassy and say, 'We don't want her.' "

"Why would you want me?" she asked the agent.

"First of all," he said, "this country was built on the principle that people should live where they want. And second, we want to set a precedent. There have been defectors in New York, but none from the embassy in Washington. We want to show it can be done."

Yelena thought she could trust the agent. But she told him she could not act immediately. She wanted to visit her parents in Leningrad. Her mother had never seen her infant grandson.

"That will be dangerous," the agent said. "It's crazy. You shouldn't go. We can provide protection here, but in Russia you're on your own."

"Maybe," Yelena said, "but that's what I'm going to do."

She flew to Moscow in March 1978.

"I had to accomplish a lot in three weeks. I wanted to fix up our flat in Moscow as much as possible. I knew that my husband would probably not want to defect with me. And even though our marriage was bad, I was worried about him. I wanted him to be comfortable if he went back to Moscow."

She and the children met with her mother. Yelena also sold off as many things as possible—clothing, jazz and rock records, a fake fur—that could be converted into cash. She gave the cash to her mother.

At the airport Yelena said goodbye to her mother for the last time.

"I never told her what was going to happen," she says. "But from the look in her eyes, I knew that she knew."

Within two weeks of returning to Washington, Yelena received the news that Arkady Sheychenko, a high-ranking diplomat in the Soviet mission in New York, had defected. It was a tremendous blow to the Soviets. Indeed, they were to learn later that Shevchenko had been a CIA informer for three years before defecting.

In Washington, Yurchenko increased security. Another blow came when Lev Mitrokhina's request for an extension to stay in Washington was rejected. He and Yelena were ordered to return to Moscow in early September.

"From then on I knew I had to act fast," she says.

One day Yelena was asked to ride with Soviet press attaché Valentin Kamenev to Dulles Airport for the weekly Aeroflot flight to Moscow and then drive the car back to the embassy. Kamenev was a friend and the favor seemed simple enough.

But within minutes Yelena got a phone message "from a buyer for her car." She was not selling her car. She knew it was a coded message and Yelena called her contact at the FBI.

"Don't go to the airport," the agent said. The agent warned her that the FBI had reason to believe that the KGB would force her onto the Aeroflot flight.

"I can't refuse," said Yelena. "He's one of our closest friends and he needs this favor. What should I do?"

"Look, don't go anywhere close to the tarmac or the lounge," the agent said. "At the first sign of trouble, take off your glasses and wipe them with a handkerchief."

At Dulles, Yelena stayed away from the lounge or the entrance to the plane. The airport was crowded with FBI agents. One even had a letter signed by President Carter ordering Aeroflot to hold the plane.

As it turned out, the agents did not have to act. Yelena never had to wipe her glasses.

"You read about these things in books all the time," she says. "All of a sudden it was happening to me."

By then the Mitrokhinas were no longer living in Chevy Chase. They had a ground floor apartment with a back porch in The Chatham, a high-rise building in Arlington just off Rte. 50.

Lev had cut down on his drinking and had learned to drive. Each morning he would call home when he had arrived at work.

On a day in early August, Yelena waited for his call.

"I might be out later," she told him. "The neighbors asked me over for tea, but I'll be here when you come home for lunch."

As soon as Lev had left for work, Yelena packed two suitcases. She put two letters on the dining room table. One was addressed to the embassy, saying she was defecting but that she

still loved her country. The second was addressed to Lev, asking him to consider defecting with her and the children.

Then, with her children in tow, Yelena took the elevator up to the second floor where the FBI had rented an apartment. Yelena was pale. Her year of perpetual nervousness had reached a terrible peak. "I was a wreck," she says. She took a mild tranquilizer.

After a brief planning session, Yelena, the children and the four agents went out to the street where they were met by a taxi driven by another agent. They drove to a motel on Rte. 50 in Arlington. An official from the Immigration and Naturalization Service met them there and handed Yelena a green card and papers saying that she had defected freely. She signed them "without hesitation." She then left the children in the motel room with a female agent.

Yelena and three agents drove back to The Chatham in the taxi. It was a hot day, and they waited in back of the building, watching the driveway and the porch for nearly a half hour. Finally Lev arrived. Other agents watched Lev enter the apartment, walk to the dining room table, open and read the two letters. When he was finished reading the letters Lev walked outside to the back yard where he met Yelena and three agents.

The FBI was worried that Lev would get violent, that he would panic. But he was composed.

"This is crazy," he told his wife. "You will ruin your life."

"I've made my decision."

The FBI badly wanted Lev to defect, too, but Lev told the FBI and his wife that he needed time to think. All the while Yelena was of two minds about her husband. She knew that they would eventually divorce. "I don't know if I wanted him to stay or come with me," she says now. "I was 50-50."

The FBI moved Yelena and the children to a hotel in Fredericksburg, Va. Late into the night Yelena and Lev talked by phone. At last Lev said no, he could not defect.

"In my heart I knew he could not do it," says Yelena. "He's 14 years older than me, and to start a new life at 48 was difficult. He had an incredibly comfortable life in Moscow. He really loved it there. You have to understand the Russian's love for his country. His father was a general in the MVD [the internal militia] but he was arrested on a trumped up charge in 1948. He died in a concentration camp. But still my husband was faithful to the motherland. It's a strange turn of the Russian mind."

At the end of their last phone call, Lev told Yelena, "I must be buried on Russian soil."

Five days after defecting, Yelena went through perhaps the most trying obstacle in the defection process, a last meeting with official Russia. Just as U.S. officials were allowed to interview Yurchenko before he flew to Moscow, two Soviet embassy officials interviewed Yelena at the State Department. Standard procedure.

"They were very clever," she recalls. "They had one guy who was the fatherly type. And he would say, 'Think of what this will do to your mother' and 'You know it's not too late to change your mind.' That sort of thing, playing on my sympathies. And the translator from the State Department was translating for everybody in the room. Meanwhile the other guy, KGB I'm sure, leaned across the table and mumbled, so the translator wouldn't hear, 'We'll get you. We know where your mother lives, too.' "

After the interview Yelena and the children moved to a "safe house" in McLean and there began a long series of debriefing sessions with the FBI and the CIA. For more than a month, from 9 to 5 every day, Yelena rendered her biography over and over. She answered questions about the embassy, about her husband, about Russia in general. All the while she knew the agents were aware that she could be a double agent.

Yelena was often upset by the debriefing process but she felt better when one CIA agent offered to take her and her children trick-or-treating. The Mitrokhinas had never heard of Halloween.

"They never told me their real names," she says of the agents. "But they had a tendency to slip. One woman took me to her optometrist to get some contact lenses, and the receptionist said, 'Oh, Miss So-and-So, your next appointment is next week.' She used her real name. The agent tried to tell me they were talking about her sister. They are not always as careful as they should be."

Yelena had made only two requests before her defection. She wanted absolutely no publicity, and she wanted the government to put her through business school. Her Soviet degrees would not do her much good in the Washington work place.

"When can I begin business school?" she asked an agent one night.

"We are going to send you to secretarial school," her CIA handler told her.

Yelena was shocked and depressed. "I was hysterical," she says. "I thought, 'Jesus Christ, I've risked my life to learn typing!' " The next morning she called one of her original FBI handlers, one of her "white knights."

"Look guys," she said. "What are they trying to do to me?"

The next day she received a phone call.

"They said, 'Cheer up, girl. You're going to Wharton.' "

Yelena and her two children moved to Devon, a Philadelphia suburb, in January 1979. The government provided the tuition at the University of Pennsylvania, day-care costs for Yelena's children, plus $13,000 a year, a small stipend compared with the $60,000 "salary" given Arkady Shevchenko and the alleged $1 million CIA chief William Casey offered Yurchenko.

In the meantime, Yelena learned that in Moscow her husband had denounced her publicly and that her parents had divorced. In the divorce suit, her father charged her mother with not bringing up Yelena properly.

Things were little better in Philadelphia.

"The loneliness there was incredible," Yelena says. "As a defector you have no past. I couldn't tell people the truth about myself. All you can do is lie, and when you lie you get tripped up, you contradict yourself. Being a defector, you must be an amnesiac.

"Sometimes I would drive to D.C. just to be with my FBI friends. The CIA doesn't like it when you do that. They want you to forget the past and stand on your own two feet. But I had to be myself once in a while."

Yelena finished the two-year MBA program in 18 months and moved back to the Washington area. Her children are in school now. They don't know a word of Russian. They know their mother is divorced. "I told them that sometimes two people just don't get along," says Yelena. "They handle it pretty well. Half their friends have divorced parents."

Yelena's social life is still difficult. She said she was in two relationships "that were headed to marriage until I told them my story.

"Honesty cost me. The first guy worked for the World Bank and he couldn't continue. His ex-wife threatened to complain to the bank and ruin his career. The other guy worked for a company and he was going through a security clearance for one of his business affairs. As soon as I told him,

he disappeared from my life. I never saw him again. When I hear that Washington men are career-oriented, I know it's true."

The children, who are 11 and 9 now, are thoroughly Americanized. "They can smell a Big Mac for miles," says Yelena. From Russia Yelena receives occasional (and censored) letters from her mother. Nothing from her father. She legally divorced her husband and has not heard from him.

Yelena tells most acquaintances she is an émigré "who got here by swimming across the ocean." She doesn't see many Russian friends and keeps only a few Russian books in her house. "I keep Bulgakov's books around. Some things I can't do without."

She is self-employed businesswoman, but she is reluctant to share her specific area of interest with everyone. She tells her visitor her profession, and it seems harmless enough, but says, "I'd rather my clients didn't know my story. People are people. Just say I make my $60,000 a year, like my work and live my life." Yelena says she will stop working if she can earn enough money from writing a book about her defection.

Every year she renews a notarized document that says that if she ever appears at a press conference saying she has decided to go back to the Soviet Union, Americans should consider it KGB coercion. Yelena says she will renew the statement "for as long as I live."

INQUIRY

Topic: SOVIET DEFECTORS

Arkady Shevchenko, 55, the highest ranking Soviet official to defect to the West, becomes a U.S. citizen Feb. 28. In April 1978, he walked away from power and prestige as senior Soviet at the United Nations. He had worked for Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and former Soviet leaders Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev. Shevchenko was interviewed for USA TODAY by Lee Michael Katz.

It's more important to be free than go back

USA TODAY: You're about to become a U.S. citizen. Do you ever have second thoughts about leaving the life and prestige you had?

SHEVCHENKO: I miss my country. There's no question about that. But for now, I have a new country, and I don't think that anything will happen in the Soviet Union which can change my mind. I've never had any regrets.

USA TODAY: What about your family? Your wife Lina died mysteriously a few weeks after you defected. And your son Gennady and daughter Anna — how could you leave them?

SHEVCHENKO: I didn't actually leave them. I gave my wife a full chance and opportunity to make up her own mind and decision. I strongly believe that the Soviets eliminated her. Of course, I have regrets about what happened with my wife, but I don't feel responsible for her death. I still haven't lost entirely the hope I can be reunited with my daughter. My son? It will be a pain for me always, but he preferred to stay in the Soviet Union. He told me in a letter I shouldn't bother him.

USA TODAY: You were a dedicated communist. Did you feel like you had betrayed your country by defecting?

SHEVCHENKO: Yes, I did betray a regime, an elite. I lost all my beliefs in the system. But I have no feeling that I've betrayed my country and the people.

USA TODAY: Did the U.S. government botch two recent defection cases — Miroslav Medvid, the Ukranian sailor who jumped ship, and Soviet master spy Vitaly Yurchenko, who defected then recanted?

SHEVCHENKO: Partly. I cannot say that in my case. But I will be frank, I didn't like the idea that the FBI said I had to be in a safe house, never appear in public, never write, never speak, never be a free man. The sailor's case is a clear-cut indication there is something wrong in the chain of command; it was really mishandled. The Yurchenko case will remain a mystery.

USA TODAY: There is a theory that Yurchenko was KGB all along, and that these incidents were planned to embarrass the U.S. government on the eve of the Geneva summit talks. Do you believe that?

SHEVCHENKO: No, for the simple reason I don't think (Soviet leader Mikhail) Gorbachev or the government wanted to embarrass the president on the eve of the summit. They were serious about the summit.

USA TODAY: Is it necessary for the USA and the U.S.S.R. to have talks?

SHEVCHENKO: It's absolutely essential and inevitable. We live on the same earth. With absolutely no dialogue, a miscalculation could escalate into a major confrontation, leading to a catastrophe, to nuclear war. Both we and Soviet-style socialism would be buried in the same grave.

USA TODAY: Would you favor a return to the detente of the Nixon and Carter years?

SHEVCHENKO: No. I was with the Soviet government, and I knew what the Soviet Union under Brezhnev's leadership actually had in mind at that time. The Soviets gained a lot during the period. There was an enormous military buildup, and they increased their sphere of interest.

USA TODAY: Do the Soviets really want normalization of relations between the USA and the U.S.S.R.?

SHEVCHENKO: On one hand, the Soviet leadership doesn't want any major confrontation with the West and the USA in the near future because of their preoccupation with domestic dilemmas. They want to improve the economy and to eliminate the growing gap in high technology between the West and the Soviet Union. But in the long range, you have to understand that the final objectives and goals of the Soviet leadership never change. It is the same thing — that they will win in the historical competition with capitalism, if not in this century, then in the next.

USA TODAY: Then the Soviet Union plans to take over the USA and the world eventually?

SHEVCHENKO: It's a fantasy to think that the Soviet leadership really has a specific timetable and kind of a master plan of how to dominate the world. It's rather a philosophical concept in which they believe that capitalism contains elements of self-destruction.

USA TODAY: Should what Nikita Khrushchev said at the United Nations — "We will bury you" — concern us?

SHEVCHENKO: I was present when Nikita Khrushchev said that. He was sorry he said it. We were trained: "Don't tell about this revolution. Don't frighten them about bloody revolution and everything."

USA TODAY: You briefed President Reagan before the

Geneva summit. What did you tell him?

SHEVCHENKO: Several things. One thing, which I've been saying for a long time, was that I have a strong belief now that the Soviet Union feels comfortable with its present military balance. It is really interested in arms control — there is more flexibility, which might even lead to more arms control agreements.

USA TODAY: What else did you tell President Reagan?

SHEVCHENKO: He wanted to know from someone who lived in the Soviet Union whether it's really true that the Soviet leaders believe in Marxism and Leninism or if that's just a cover for retaining power. I assured him there are some who've lost belief. But the core — Gromyko, Gorbachev — are true believers.

USA TODAY: Do you think Gorbachev's call for bilateral disarmament by the year 2000 is serious?

SHEVCHENKO: No. The Soviet Union has never been serious about that. That is a utopian idea. They will never trust us like we will never trust them. They will never trust an American president — Democrat or Republican.

USA TODAY: How do the Russians view Reagan?

SHEVCHENKO: Hatred mixed with respect — hatred because they cannot forgive the president two things: one, the strong effort at the beginning of the administration to modernize the strategic force, and secondly, Reagan was open and frank as far as the nature of the Soviet system.

USA TODAY: Did Reagan seem to have a grasp of the intricacies of Soviet government?

SHEVCHENKO: I think he did. I cannot say that he knew or even should know absolutely all the details of everything, but I think he has a very clear understanding of what he is talking about. He is equal if not superior to some of the Soviet leaders. He has an understanding of Soviet objectives and thinking.

USA TODAY: Is Gorbachev different as a Soviet leader?

SHEVCHENKO: He is a hard-core communist, a product of the Soviet system, a believer in the Soviet system. He has an acute sense that unless the Soviet economy is modernized, the tremendous technology gap with the West eliminated, survival of the Soviet system will be at stake. It's not so much because he is concerned about the well-being of the Soviet people. He is concerned about the future of the system. We can expect a major effort to reallocate the resources in the Soviet Union from the military to the civilian sectors.

USA TODAY: Last summer, Edward J. Epstein, in the *New Republic*, called your book, *Breaking With Moscow*, "a fraud," and said that you "made up sources and even fabricated direct conversations."

SHEVCHENKO: There is only one year which I confused. And when you put the right year in, everything would be in its place.

USA TODAY: Did you spy for the CIA?

SHEVCHENKO: No, I didn't feel that I was a spy. It was a secret cooperation with the CIA or the American government, that's true.

USA TODAY: Did you get paid by the CIA?

SHEVCHENKO: I have never been on the payroll of the CIA.

USA TODAY: No, but they gave you $90,000 a year to live on.

SHEVCHENKO: Do you know they gave it to me two years after my defection? I had hoped that my book soon would go through, and I could myself invest money and live without any kind of CIA help. The book was delayed for years, and I was at the bottom. I had to sell my car and everything and be on the street.

USA TODAY: Wasn't your credibility undermined by reports that you spent several thousand dollars a month supporting a call girl who later wrote a book called *Defector's Mistress*?

SHEVCHENKO: To a certain degree, yes. But I think it was a usual exaggeration by the American press. They made it a sensational story. I'm sorry it happened. But I'll be frank with you. I wanted a companion, a woman. I was in very bad shape.

USA TODAY: Now you get $20,000 a speech, and you made $500,000 from the sale of film rights from your books. Have you adjusted well to the capitalist system?

SHEVCHENKO: Of course, some of the things are a little bit exaggerated, I feel a success in the United States, and I like the system. My dream is to be absolutely financially secure in the nearest future, and then to join some solid, serious academic institution.

USA TODAY: You live openly. Aren't you worried that the KGB will track you down and kill you?

SHEVCHENKO: The KGB has a long memory and a long hand. My public profile is my defense. Anyway, I'm ready to take all these risks because it's more important for me to be free than to go back to the Soviet Union.

TIMELINE: Arkady Shevchenko

Arkady Shevchenko lives near Washington, D.C., with his second wife, Elaine.

Oct. 11, 1930: Born in the Ukraine, son of a physician.

1954: Graduated from Moscow State Institute of International Relations; later received a doctorate in international law.

1956: Joined Soviet Foreign Ministry.

1958: Began participation in United Nations General Assembly and disarmament negotiations in Geneva.

1963-1970: Served in the Soviet Mission to the United Nations in New York.

1970-1973: Personal adviser to Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko; named Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, highest Soviet diplomatic rank.

1973-1978: As undersecretary, he headed U.N. Political and Security Council Affairs

Summer 1975: Sought asylum in USA but was told he would have to prove loyalty by spying for the CIA.

April 1978: He defected; his wife returned to Russia and died under mysterious circumstances.

February 1985: In memoirs, *Breaking With Moscow*, Shevchenko said he spied for the CIA more than 2½ years before receiving asylum.

Feb. 28, 1986: Scheduled to become a U.S. citizen.

Source: USA TODAY research

Book Review

Defector Describes Activities of the Soviets' GRU

By BILL GERTZ

The story sounds more like a spy novel than a true-life account: An FBI counterintelligence agent meets a Soviet spy over drinks at a quiet restaurant in a southern California shopping center. It's Sept. 26, 1984.

The two are planning a trip together overseas to Vienna. They've done some shopping and found a coat. October in Austria is not like L.A.

The Soviet agent, a petite blonde posing as an emigre who calls herself Svetlana Ogorodnikov, tells her partner and sometime lover, Special Agent Richard Miller, not to forget the important papers. Miller, a 20-year veteran, has in his possession secret FBI counterintelligence files on Soviet activities in California. He has been promised $65,000 in cash and gold for the deal.

The blonde Russian outlines the itinerary for their little holiday in Vienna (she had preferred Warsaw, but Miller said no for obvious security reasons): October 9—leave for Vienna; October 10 — arrive in Vienna; October 11 — meeting with Mikhail, a GRU general. Mikhail, she tells him, is a very important person in the Soviet government; GRU stands for Soviet military intelligence.

The events above were described by Miller during an interview with FBI agents shortly before his arrest on espionage charges last October 2. Mrs. Ogorodnikov, along with her husband, recently pleaded guilty to the charges, and Miller is scheduled for trial shortly.

By coincidence, Viktor Suvorov's *Inside Soviet Military Intelligence* was published the day after Miller's arrest. It contains an appendix listing the GRU's High Command and top officers. Mikhail is among them.

According to Suvorov, the blonde Russian was right — Mikhail is a very important person in the Soviet government. Mikhail is the codename listed for Lt. Gen. Moshe Milstein, GRU Deputy Chief for Disinformation and a veteran "illegal" spy. The venerable Mikhail is well known to GRU operatives as the author of a spy manual with the sardonic title *Honorable Service.*

"Inside Soviet Military Intelligence"
By Viktor Suvorov
Macmillan, Inc.
866 3rd Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022
193 pages, $15.95

FBI officials would not comment on the timing of Miller's arrest, but anyone with cursory knowledge of Soviet intelligence capabilities knows how easy it would have been for Soviet agents to kidnap Miller in Vienna, load him with chemicals and pull a trove of FBI secrets out of him.

Suvorov, a pseudonym, was a major in the GRU before defecting sometime in the 1970s. His real name and the exact date of his defection remain a secret; he fears revealing those details would endanger relatives still living in the Soviet Union.

For defecting, he was sentenced to death-in-absentia under article 64a of the Soviet Constitution ("betrayal of the homeland"). But the book's final chapter, "For GRU Officers Only," contains a plea of not guilty: "The real betrayers of the homeland are those in the Kremlin." He urges would-be GRU defectors to consider carefully "the agonizing way," but says, "If you are prepared to risk your life for one minute of freedom, then go."

Inside Soviet Military Intelligence provides the first post-Stalin account of the massive Soviet military intelligence complex that is virtually unknown inside the Soviet Union. It presents both a history and the complete structure, secret methods and operational techniques of the Soviet military spy agency.

"GRU" is the acronym for a Russian name virtually unpronounceable by the untrained tongue: *Glavnoe Razvedyvatel 'noe Upravlenie.* It translates more easily into the Chief Intelligence Directorate, General Staff of the Ministry of Defense, USSR.

Similar to its sister, the notorious KGB, the GRU is a lessor-known but equally powerful intelligence service. But its priorities range far beyond the boundaries of traditional martial intelligence targets — assessing an enemy's military strength.

Besides military intelligence collection, the GRU's peacetime role involves the wholesale theft of military industrial secrets as well as conducting political and strategic operations against the West — all under the close supervision of the Soviet Communist party.

During military conflicts, crack paramilitary units known as "Spetnaz" can be mobilized from deep cover within Western societies. These "illegal" units, operating without diplomatic back-up, are trained to paralyze political and military infrastructures through assassinations of political leaders, sabotage of utilities and attacks on command and communications centers.

Suvorov's details of the GRU are sometimes too intricate and seem written for the benefit of intelligence professionals. It seems as though he committed to paper most of what he provided Western intelligence analysts — a wealth of information and additional pieces of the puzzle of the Soviet secret service.

Suvorov paints some fascinating vignettes which show the GRU in action. For instance, the GRU sends teams of operatives to hundreds of Western trade fairs each year. Before an exhibition featuring military elec-

The Washington Post ___
The Washington Times ___
Daily News (New York) ___
The New York Times ___
The Wall Street Journal ___
The Chicago Tribune ___
The Los Angeles Times ___
The Christian Science Monitor ___
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Date 7-20-85

STANISLAV LEVCHENKO

Inside advice on disrupting the KGB

As a result of recent U.S. and West German espionage cases, many people now ask themselves a quite logical question: what can be done to disrupt the activities of Soviet intelligence in this country? Are there efficient ways to enhance the security of the United States, to prevent leakage of political, military, and economic secrets to the Soviet Union?

In my opinion, the most effective tool against the KGB in this country is public awareness of its methods of operation, especially the recruitment techniques it uses, its aims, and its targets.

The role of the media in a free society is of enormous importance in revealing KGB methods and operations. Success in combating the KGB depends in large part upon whether the media do their job effectively. The CIA and FBI reveal very little about KGB activities, so the role of the free press is that much more important.

The main thrust of KGB recruitment is aimed at Americans residing abroad, where the KGB operates in more relaxed circumstances than in the United States and has the time and manpower to study the vulnerabilities of potential recruits thoroughly. Americans recruited by the Soviets are encouraged to return to the United States, where they are controlled by experienced case officers, often Soviet officials or "journalists." Some American agents for the KGB are recruited in the United States, but recruiting is easier and more common abroad.

The KGB uses many different covers to conceal its intelligence activities. There are no "clean" Soviets in this country — whether they are stationed here for years or just visiting for a short time. The KGB is one of the major power centers of the Soviet dictatorship, which makes it easy for the KGB to require every Soviet citizen visiting the United States to collect intelligence information.

The most practical means of disrupting KGB operations in America is to require parity in the number of Soviet diplomats in the United States and American diplomats in the Soviet Union, and to limit drastically the size and operations of the huge Soviet mission to the United Nations.

If such steps lead to a reduction of 100 or more Soviet officials, KGB activities in the United States would



be seriously disrupted. The KGB would lose many officers who otherwise would be handling active cases. But Moscow still would need to maintain contact with various offices of the U.S. government. So more of the remaining officials would be occupied with legitimate diplomatic activities, rather than with espionage.

Some Americans fear that the Soviets would take reprisals if the United States insisted on parity of official personnel. There are no grounds for such concerns. The only reprisal is likely to be the usual propaganda and demagoguery, which would last for a few weeks or months and then die out.

Another matter is the large number of Soviet employees working in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. All of them, without exception, are KGB informants. They collect information, study American members of the embassy staff for possible operations against them, and install eavesdropping devices. Having Soviet employees there is like giving the KGB a floor in the embassy. Most, if not all, should be fired.

These measures would not stop KGB operations against this country, but would make them more controllable.

Stanislav Levchenko, a KGB major who defected in 1979 while operating under cover as a Russian journalist in Japan, wrote this essay for the Heritage Foundation's National Security Record. *It is reprinted with permission.*

The Washington Post ___
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Daily News (New York) ___
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The Wall Street Journal ___
The Chicago Tribune ___
The Los Angeles Times ___
The Christian Science Monitor ___
USA Today ___

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tronics, armaments and military technology or similar wares, a GRU delegation shows up at the local Soviet Embassy with a wish list of samples to be begged, borrowed or stolen. (West Germany's Interior Ministry recently netted one of the "red books" the size of a Manhattan telephone directory).

The GRU team goes from exhibit to exhibit carrying suitcases full of cash in an effort to buy samples whose sale to the Soviet bloc is strictly prohibited. Target samples can be small parts or jet engines that are quickly shipped off to Soviet research institutes where copies are made and then put into production. Exhibitions by struggling high-tech firms also provide a wonderful environment for recruiting GRU agents who, once ensnared, can be used in operations against larger defense contractors.

The GRU effort has provided the Soviets with a technology windfall. Suvorov notes that GRU headquarters in Moscow uses the most modern American computers to keep its analysts busy.

Another spy story in Suvorov's book involves an unnamed American Army major stationed in West Germany who snookered a hapless GRU residency out of thousands of dollars.

The major approached the GRU with an offer to sell a U.S. nuclear-tipped artillery shell. To sweeten the deal, and to his discredit, the officer turned over details on NATO nuclear weapons depots to the GRU.

A week later, the transfer of the shell took place on a rainy night. The major met three GRU men and turned over the shell. Its serial numbers, markings and radiation level all checked out. A suitcase full of cash was turned over to the major and the GRU agreed to return in two months to give the shell back.

The artillery warhead was whisked off to Moscow, without considering if it was booby-trapped to explode. When GRU Command found out the shell was in Moscow, "a long and largely unprintable tirade ensued," Suvorov writes. It seemed the GRU leaders were concerned the shell could have turned Moscow into another Hiroshima.

After it was dismantled at a GRU facility outside Moscow, the shell turned out to be a beautifully replicated copy of the real thing with the inside coated with radioactive waste.

The GRU was not happy about the deal and asked permission to assassinate the major. The request was denied, but in any case the major had timed the sale to coincide with the end of his tour of duty in Germany.

Suvorov concludes his book with an appeal to Western security services:

"Be human — do expel Soviet spies occasionally. By expelling one, you enable others to reduce their frantic activities." The first to go? Suvorov urges getting rid of the top GRU officer in each country. Once he goes, the GRU network will be an army without a commander. ■

KGB Ex-Double Agent Turns Author

Former Spy in Bonn Reappears to Promote His Memoirs

By William Drozdiak
Washington Post Foreign Service

EAST BERLIN, March 12—For 10 years at the peak of the cold war, he served as the chief of West Germany's espionage activities against the Soviet Bloc. But his true employers sat in KGB headquarters in Moscow, and he loyally fed them the most precious information that crossed his desk.

The saga of Heinz Felfe, one of the most proficient known Soviet agents to pass through the looking glass of the East-West intelligence war, is never distant from the minds of western spy chiefs when they ponder Bonn's vulnerability to infiltrators and consider how much sensitive material they can share with their West German allies.

Twenty-five years after his arrest in West Germany for high treason, Felfe emerged today from his sheltered life as a former Soviet Bloc agent to launch the publication of his autobiography, "In Service of the Adversary." In his solemn blue suit, gray hair and thick eyeglasses, he looked more like a professor than a double agent who inflicted some of the worst damage to western intelligence at a critical stage in postwar history.

"I am satisfied with my life," he declared at a press conference in one of East Berlin's plushest hotels. "I have lived my life and made a contribution to society as I understand it. I am happy here, and I still get my pension from the KGB."

The rare spectacle of a Soviet agent hawking his memoirs stirred speculation among diplomats and other foreign analysts that apart from disseminating Soviet-approved perspectives through a Hamburg publishing house, Moscow's intelligence elite wanted to signal its foreign agents that a pleasant retirement warranted the risks of a jail sentence in the West.

Felfe said he was allowed to conduct research for his book in KGB archives in Moscow, where he says he was able "to read all that my own hand had put there." He contended that his "KGB friends" said he could write what he wished and that he deleted upon their request only a few incidents.

"I have my Mercedes and my video recorder; I am very comfortable," Felfe added later, as he signed copies of his book. Asked about his family, he said he was divorced, then lowered his eyes and mentioned that his children remain in West Germany and do not wish to speak to him.

Felfe was released in 1969 as part of a major East-West spy swap after serving six years of a 15-year sentence. He settled in East Berlin and was named professor of criminology at Humboldt University.

In his press conference, Felfe sketched an extraordinary spying career that evolved from his wartime service as a SS criminal officer and his recruitment, as a prisoner of war, by Soviet intelligence officers in the ruins of Berlin.

He said he developed strong sympathies with the Soviet cause and accepted the delicate task of penetrating West German intelligence services being set up under supervision of the U.S. intelligence.

"It was absolutely clear to me that the hope for the future lay with the Soviet Union and not in the United States," Felfe said. He said he became disgusted with the western allies because of the carpet-bombing raids that destroyed his native city of Dresden.

During his tenure as head of West German intelligence activities targeted on the Soviet Union, Felfe was able to supply Moscow with what Bonn government officials admitted was some of the most highly classified information exchanged at that time between West Germany and its allies.

Felfe's work for Moscow reportedly compromised even the basic structure and techniques utilized by West German intelligence, which was thoroughly revamped after his exposure as a double agent.

His treason, according to his former West German intelligence boss, Reinhard Gehlen, also led to the arrest and deaths of many agents during the 1950s. But Felfe refused to confess to any guilt, saying that his colleagues harbored political opinions that he could not share.

In response to questions by western reporters, Felfe said he has not yet met Hans-Joachim Tiedge, the West German counterintelligence officer who defected to the East last year amid mounting personal problems with debts and alcoholism.

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The Wall Street Journal ___
The Chicago Tribune ___
The Los Angeles Times ___
The Christian Science Monitor ___
USA Today ___

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WASHINGTONIAN
December 1985

THE DEFECTOR'S STORY

He Is the Highest-Ranking Intelligence Officer from a Soviet-Bloc Country to Defect to the West. He Paints Rumanian President Nicolae Ceausescu as Napoleonic in His Obsessions. His Defection Led to Purges in His Homeland and to the Recall of Rumania's Ambassador to the United States. He Suggests That Everyone Is Corruptible. For the First Time, He Tells His Story.

BY ION MIHAI PACEPA

When Ion Mihai Pacepa arrived at Andrews Air Force Base on July 28, 1978, aboard a US military aircraft that had taken off in West Germany, he was described by State Department spokesmen and newspaper reports as a "high-ranking aide" to Rumanian president Nicolae Ceausescu.

In fact, Pacepa, who quickly was granted political asylum by the United States, had been personal adviser to Ceausescu and deputy director of the Department of Foreign Intelligence—called DIE from its Rumanian name, Departamentul de Informatii Externe. He is the highest-ranking Soviet-bloc intelligence officer ever to defect to the West.

Within months of Pacepa's defection, the Rumanian ambassadors to the United States and the United Nations were replaced. In a November 19, 1978, report on Rumania, Michael Dobbs of the Washington Post wrote that the Pacepa affair "has contributed to the most thorough purge of ranking Communist-party and government officials since Ceausescu came to power thirteen years ago."

Educated as an engineer at the Polytechnical Institute in Bucharest, Pacepa entered the Rumanian intelligence service in 1951, when he was 23 years old. By the time of his defection he had been a frequent visitor to the United States.

Pacepa made advance arrangements for President Ceausescu's official trips to visit President Richard Nixon in 1973, President Gerald Ford in 1975, and President Jimmy Carter in 1978. He then accompanied the Rumanian president and his wife, Elena, on all three of the White House visits. During these state visits, Pacepa not only arranged discussions with American Presidents but even provided a food taster for the security-obsessed Ceausescu. Pacepa also arranged for special Rumanian intelligence teams to electronically sweep Ceausescu's quarters in the US for listening devices, including rooms at Blair House.

Pacepa, whose father worked in Rumania for General Motors before World War II, is now 57 years old and living under a new identity in the US. His daughter, Dana, an artist, remains in Rumania with her husband and family. Despite making repeated attempts, Pacepa has had no contact with her since he called her from West Germany in 1978, just before his defection. An "open letter" sent to her last year through a Paris newspaper—and repeated time and again over Radio Free Europe—ended:

"There is a picture on my desk. I took it on a sunny day, of you eating an apple. Bite the apple again, my daughter, for infinitely more sunny days. I love you incredibly much, my Dana."

Pacepa is at work on a book about life at the top in the Communist world and about what he calls "the first Communist dynasty"—Nicolae Ceausescu and his family. These excerpts from the book manuscript represent the first time Pacepa has told his story for publication.

HEADS OF STATE

BLAIR HOUSE: THE LADY WASN'T IMPRESSED

Rumanian president Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife, Elena, arrived in Washington on April 11, 1978, for a state visit with Jimmy Carter. Ceausescu has not returned to the United States since.

The presidential Boeing 707 landed at Andrews Air Force Base at 6 PM. A few minutes later Evan Dobelle, the US chief of protocol, came on board the plane and invited the Rumanian guests onto American soil. At the plane's steps, Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife, Elena, were greeted by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and his wife, Grace, as well as by other American and Rumanian repre-

sentatives. From the airport the Ceausescus rode in the same car with the Vances. Half an hour later, the motorcade arrived at the official residence for visitors, Blair House.

Blair House was already familiar to me from Ceausescu's last two visits to Washington, in 1973 and 1975. To alleviate Elena's traditional scene over not yet having her luggage when she arrived, I asked one of the people in charge of the house to show her around.

"Blair House was built by Dr. Joseph Lovell, America's first surgeon general, 154 years ago," the distinguished lady said with professional competence. "After his death, in 1836, the family sold the house for $6,500 to Mr. Blair, who had just come to Washington as the new editor of the *Globe*. . . ."

The tour began with the first floor's Blair drawing room and its beautiful Queen Anne desk and magnificent Sully portrait of Montgomery Blair, then it continued to the Abraham Lincoln Room.

"It was in this room full of memorabilia that Mr. Lincoln signed the Emancipation Proclamation," the guide went on, pointing to a pen-and-ink drawing of President Lincoln. "The portrait of General Robert E. Lee is a reminder of the fact that, in this same room, Lee refused the command of the Union Army, which was offered to him by Lincoln through Blair, who was related to Lee by marriage." The table in the first-floor dining room was set with heavy linen damask cloths for the private dinner on this evening.

On the second floor Elena was shown Ceausescu's large bedroom, adjoining a spacious library, both decorated with fresh flowers. That morning's *Washington Post* and *New York Times*, as well as the just-arrived evening newspaper, the *Washington Star*, lay on a table in the library.

"This is your bedroom suite, madam," said the guide, pointing to a room with a lovely, canopied four-poster bed. "Although it could not be refurbished in time for the 1957 visit of Queen Elizabeth, it is still called the Queen's Suite to this day," finished the guide, wishing Elena an enjoyable stay.

"Close the door, Pacepa," Elena's acid voice suddenly rasped out. After I had executed the order, she exploded. "Just look at the harpy. She has never seen me before in her life, and she decides I should sleep here, not with the Comrade. Just so she can make up stories about the Comrade to tell other people who stay here."

Imitating the guide's voice, she went on, " 'We have an Emancipation Proclamation.' It's a long way from that piece of paper until these idiots will really be emancipated." Then, suddenly changing the subject, she ordered me, "Tell our press correspondents to include in their articles that 'the Vances came to the airport on behalf of the President of the United States and Mrs. Rosalynn Carter.' Idiots that they are, they may forget that."



FRIENDLY PERSUASION

Jean-Bédel Bokassa became leader of the Central African Republic in a coup staged December 31, 1965. On December 4, 1977, he crowned himself emperor of the impoverished nation in a lavish ceremony. Ousted in a coup nearly two years later and sentenced to death in absentia for atrocities commited during his reign, Bokassa lives now in France.

Before the infamous president of the Central African Republic Jean-Bédel Bokassa made a visit to Rumania, the DIE spent months on intensive intelligence operations to study him. The most important vulnerabilities found were his insatiable desire for women and a primitive impulse to collect jewels, money, and personal bank accounts and safe-deposit boxes in Switzerland. Several days after Ceausescu received a complete study on Bokassa, he took me for a walk in the enormous garden surrounding his personal residence.

"Central Africa has huge diamond reserves, which could spell a fortune for us. The problem is we cannot compete with the experienced capitalist sharks in obtaining concessions for diamond mining there. We'll have to steal them. Bokassa has five wives in Bangui. Let's give him another one, prettier and more high-class than he could ever dream of having. Get a good-looker ready for his visit, and then let Bokassa find her himself. And then I'll be magnanimous with him."

During his visit to Bucharest, Bokassa fell head over heels in love with a comely Rumanian doctor who was a security agent sent to him when he gave the first sneeze of an apparent cold. Following Bokassa's repeated requests to Ceausescu, the doctor was sent to Africa on a special presidential airplane to further treat the cold he had allegedly contracted in Rumania. The doctor was overwhelmed with jewels, was given a personal villa full of servants, and became Bokassa's unofficial but favorite wife.

When she asked for fresh tomatoes and other vegetables, Bokassa implored the Rumanian ambassador to help him. Military airplanes brought an agricultural team and equipment into the country,

and soon a modern vegetable farm started producing for Bokassa and the doctor. The manager of the farm, an agricultural engineer, was actually a DIE officer who became the doctor's case officer.

Soon after that, Vasile Pungan and Nicolae Doicaru, two of Ceausescu's personal advisers, made a secret trip to Bangui. When they returned home, they reported that Bokassa had accepted 10 percent of the Rumanian profits from diamond mines developed on preferential terrains in his country, taking the business away from Western companies with experience in diamond mining.

Several years later, the doctor decided to take her life in her own hands. She escaped from Bangui with some of the jewels Bokassa had given her and began a new life in France. Discovered by the French press, she made history telling of her romance with Bokassa, but she carefully omitted all mention of her connections with the DIE.

"MAKE USE OF CARTER'S INEXPERIENCE"

We were walking along the garden path at his Bucharest residence when Ceausescu suddenly started talking.

"I read through the whole file you gave me on Carter and his family twice." I had given him a briefing file on American President Jimmy Carter, based on material in DIE records.

"I can see that, despite his innocent smile, his soft voice, and shy manner, Carter is not an easy or predictable fellow. But he is not contradictory, as you describe him. The file says that, although he graduated from the Naval Academy only in 60th place out of 820, he has the intelligence of a near genius, a fantastic memory, an unusual capacity to absorb masses of information, and is a very good listener and a very hard worker. That's not a contradiction. I never graduated from any university before becoming a political leader. His rivals accuse him of having concealed a high degree of stubbornness and a vindictiveness behind his smile when he was the governor of Georgia. That's not a contradiction, either. It's probably normal for a politician.

"In my opinion, his weak points are other ones. One is his ridiculous religiousness. . . . Another weakness is his intense inner life, which is detrimental to the dynamism he needs to have.

"Nevertheless, as I read in your file and between its lines, Carter has enough qualities to succeed. You probably haven't realized that there are even some similarities between him and me. Both of us consider that the people elected us not just as an individual but as a paterfamilias, that our wives and children were also elected together with us. Apropos, you might pull together everything you have on Carter's deep respect for his wife and children and on his commitment to giving them a high profile during his presidency, and then give it to Comrade Elena. That may help to change her broken record that Carter is nothing but a peasant.

"Carter's biggest disadvantage is that he is totally inexperienced—what can you expect from somebody who raised and sold peanuts all his life? That's one of the worst sides of the American system: Anybody can become President, if he has money and a nice smile, and then, just when he starts to learn something, he has to leave. They just can't understand that being chief of state is a profession. . . .

"Anyway, that's their problem, isn't that true? And we should make use of Carter's inexperience and friendship as long as he is President. That's why I insisted on having my visit there in the very first days of his presidency, to find him virgin, uncontaminated by the influence of others."

Suddenly Ceausescu stopped, hung onto a button of my jacket, and, looking me in the eye, continued in a low, conspiratorial tone. "In your file on Carter's family, I see that his brother, Billy, is some kind of drunk, a corruptible fellow who doesn't know how to do anything but is trying to turn a fast buck any way he can. I see also that the DIE has turned up a foreign agent who might manage to build up some business relations with Carter's farm and with Billy. Isn't that a Liberian who has an export-import company in London?"

"Yes, Comrade," came my answer.

"We should do everything we can to encourage this operation. We import enough peanuts into Rumania, so let's buy them from him, from his farm. We can use so many peanuts that we could buy up his whole production for at least the next ten years. Let's make Billy our representative for importing peanuts and other things. But for the beginning, let's work under a foreign flag. Let's import peanuts through the London company of your Liberian agent's. When Billy has gotten enough of a taste for this money, then we can tell him that it's not English or Liberian money, but ours. But only when we are sure that Billy won't be able to do without his new source of income."

Rumanian president Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife, Elena, arrive at Washington's Andrews Air Force Base in December 1973. The hatless man in hornrims behind them is the author of this story, Ion Mihai Pacepa, then a Rumanian intelligence officer and personal adviser to Ceausescu.

ADVICE FOR KOJAK

Although Ceausescu has never been in a public movie theater, he is a movie fanatic. Each of his four residences has a fully equipped projection room and a permanent film library. His favorites are movies about the Roman empire and Napoleon and American police films and television shows.

During a movie at his private residence, where he does not have to worry about protocol or what people looking at him will think, Ceausescu is a normal human being, relaxed and entirely different from his public image. He loves to watch *Kojak* shows, not only because they are full of action, but especially because with his quick mind he has no trouble figuring out the dénouement of a *Kojak* episode. Savoring the thought that he would once again be one step ahead of Kojak, he settled down into his chair, disappearing completely from my sight from where I was sitting behind him.

"Come on. Don't waste your time on him, Commissar. He's a friend. You'd do better to keep your eye on the dead man's girlfriend. Hey, Ropoteanu, tell him that in English."

Ropoteanu was an English teacher who had become an intelligence officer and was Ceausescu's favorite interpreter for movies.

"Don't listen to the captain, Kojak," Ceausescu continued his advice. "He didn't know anything in the last movie, either. In Rumania I wouldn't keep him on the payroll a single day longer."

"An idiot, Nick. An idiot," piped up Elena, who was sitting in the chair beside him. "All security officers are idiots. I've told you that many times. Wouldn't it be better to show a war movie, with the army in it? They're idiots, too, but at least they carry out orders without asking any questions."

At the end of the movie the lights revealed Elena fast asleep, with her head resting on the soft back of her easy chair. Her mouth and her robe had both fallen indecorously open.



Shortly after Ion Mihai Pacepa defected in 1978, Nicolae Nicolae, then Rumanian ambassador to the US, was recalled from his country's embassy on Sheridan Circle (above), where Pacepa had served as an intelligence operative.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND WRONGS

CEAUSESCU'S GRAND PLAN

"Horizon" was by far the most secret DIE operation, and its files were locked in the DIE's super-secure vault, continuously covered by closed-circuit television cameras and accessible only to the minister of interior, the political chief of the DIE, and me. Everything in its files is written only by hand.

"Horizon" was Ceausescu's grand plan, an extension of Euro-Communism, for strengthening his Communist rule in Rumania with help from capitalist governments. It was created by him as a masterpiece of a political-influence operation, aimed at gaining Western good will, political support, credits, and prohibited technologies, without in the least compromising Bucharest's orthodox Marxist rule.

"Horizon," contained in several bulky files organized by geographic area, was the only place where one could find a distillation of Ceausescu's overall goals and concrete objectives for each non-Communist country of interest, starting with the United States and ending with Bokassa's Central African Republic, as well as data on the most important influence agents created by the DIE over the years.

Concealed in the "Horizon" files was information on every major successful influence operations created by Ceausescu. Among the oldest was the operation to provide clandestine support for Willy Brandt, the chairman of West Germany's Social Democratic party, in two parliamentarian votes of confidence, in 1973 and 1974, which he won only by also having two supporting votes from the opposition. According to the DIE station chief in West Germany, the two deputies in question had been approached by Rumanian intelligence officers, who plied them with valuable gifts and persuaded them to vote against their own party.

One of the newest operations documented there, and by far the most important, was the annual effort to have the United States Congress renew most-favored-nation trade status from Rumania.

For this operation, almost every Rumanian representative in the United States, including the ambassador, was replaced by an intelligence officer. More than 10,000 Rumanians were recruited as agents and sent to the West as émigrés in a mass operation designed to influence the governments of the United States and its allies, especially West Germany and Israel. Intelligence officers and agents were secretly sent to the United States to take over control of émigré organizations and direct their publications and social activities.

The file showed that the DIE had helped finance and direct the activities of such émigré organizations as the American-Rumanian Central Foundation, the American-Rumanian National Institute, and the American-Rumanian National

Committee for Human Rights. Through such organizations, the DIE conducted an intensive lobby on Capitol Hill and led street domonstrations in Washington. In 1975, when Rumania first received most-favored-nation status, the DIE's chief was rewarded by being made a Hero of the Rumanian Socialist Republic, and the chief of the US Brigade was promoted to the rank of general.

Ceausescu considered that this operation gave Communist Rumania the most valuable political, financial, and technological benefits in its history.

TARGETS OF ASSASSINATION

At the conclusion of his 1978 visit to the US, Ceausescu and Jimmy Carter issued a joint declaration in which both affirmed the "observance of and promotion of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including all the conditions required for a free, dignified, and prosperous life."

Three months later, during a walk in his garden, Ceausescu ordered Pacepa to arrange the assassination of Emil Georgescu, a supervising editor in Radio Free Europe's Rumanian Department.

"Emil Georgescu must be killed, without involving the Rumanian government," Pacepa recalls Ceausescu saying. "Foreign professional criminals must be used, and that wasps' nest, Radio Free Europe headquarters, must be wiped out with powerful explosives."

Pacepa defected one week later.

In the totalitarian logic of the Rumanian government, émigrés are Rumanian citizens subject to Rumanian laws, regardless of their current citizenship. In dealing with them, the DIE has the same role as the security forces have inside Rumania: It acts as the "extended arm of the proletarian dictatorship."

In 1975 the DIE began an ambitious project to set up a complete, computerized data bank on the more than 600,000 native or second-generation Rumanians living in the West, using consular, mail-censorship, and intelligence information. Undercover officers and agents sent abroad to take over control of émigré organizations, publications, and social activities used various covers, from folk-art instructor to priest.

Because the Rumanian government has no prisons abroad, it uses beatings, kidnappings, and unattributable assassinations to "discipline" émigrés in the West. It has become a matter of political prestige for Bucharest to try to execute defectors who have been granted political asylum in such countries as the United States, France, and West Germany. Explosive letters and packages are sent to Rumanian anti-Communist leaders in exile, such as those mailed during the 1981 Madrid Conference on Security in Europe.

Dissidents who have been given exit visas from Rumania have also become DIE targets for assassination in the West. In April 1982, Matei Haiducu, a Rumanian who moved to France in 1975, confessed to French authorities that he was a Rumanian illegal officer and that his current assignment was to assassinate dissident writers Paul Goma and Virgil Tanase in France "by any means," the only condition being that Rumanian government involvement not become known. Haiducu turned over to the French a fountain pen loaded with a toxic chemical that he had been given to accomplish the deed, in true spy-thriller fashion.

Orders have repeatedly been given for the silencing of émigré journalists and others who publicly criticize the Rumanian dictatorship, including US government employees working for Radio Free Europe. Monica Lovinescu, a respected but outspoken French citizen who for years has been an employee of Radio Free Europe in France, has particularly incensed Ceausescu.

"Lovinescu must be silenced," Ceausescu ordered at one point. "Not killed. We don't need any uncomfortable French and American investigations just now. She should be beaten to a pulp and have her jaw, teeth, and arms broken, so that she will never again be able to speak or write—beaten in her own home so she and others will learn that no place is safe for people who calumniate the proletarian dictatorship, not even their own homes. She should become a living corpse, an unforgettable example for others."

In November 1976 Lovinescu was severely beaten in her home by a Palestine Liberation Organization group acting on Rumania's behalf.

Emil Georgescu, the program editor at Radio Free Europe in Munich whom Ceausescu had ordered me to have killed in 1978, was brutally stabbed 22 times at his own home on July 28, 1981, and barely escaped with his life. That order played a decisive role in my final break with Bucharest.

THE FLESH TRADE

Trade in human beings became another important business for the DIE. Ceausescu was obliged to open the door for emigration, despite his personal repugnance to it, by the international movement for human rights and the freedom

The Ceausescus join President and Mrs. Nixon on the White House balcony in October 1970. Earlier in the month Ceausescu had addressed the UN General Assembly, where he called for the "abolition of military blocs."

of movement, in particular the Helsinki Agreement on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the decision by the US Congress to tie most-favored-nation trade status to emigration rights. Emigration provided Ceausescu with political gain, and he soon decided to use it for financial profit as well, in a highly confidential operation kept so secret that at his direction it was handled only through the DIE.

The DIE initiated discreet contacts in Israel and West Germany and cautiously suggested that, if Rumania could be reimbursed in hard currency for the social and education expenses incurred for the ethnic German and Jewish émigrés seeking to leave Rumania, the emigration process might be accelerated.

Secret, unwritten agreements were made with the Israeli foreign intelligence service and with the West German Ministry of Interior. The Israelis and the West Germans paid thousands of dollars for each Rumanian Jew and ethnic German granted an exit visa, in some cases as much as $50,000 per person, depending on his or her level of education and profession.

Over the years, many hundreds of millions of dollars were secretly paid to Rumania, along with low-interest credits issued through the DIE as bonuses for increasing the emigration quotas. For reasons of secrecy, most of the payments were made in cash and only in US dollars. No other member of the Rumanian government knew anything about them except the prime minister, who was given only a general briefing and instructed that, if the matter even came up, he should vehemently deny any suggestion that Jews and Germans were being sold.

In February 1972 Ceausescu decided that additional side benefits might be had from the emigration of Jews and Germans. "No Rumanian citizen," Ceausescu stated, "whether of Rumanian, Jewish, or German ancestry, should be given an emigration visa unless he is a security agent, has signed a secret, written agreement with the security forces, and has agreed to act as an intelligence agent abroad." More than 10,000 emigrating Rumanians were recruited in a mass operation between 1972 and 1978 and instructed to penetrate the governments, political life, and scientific and technological circles of the United States, Israel, West Germany, and other Western countries.

Most of the Jewish and many of the German émigrés never used their secret communications systems and simply disappeared as agents.

AS OTHERS SEE US

THE AMERICAN WAY

During a previous visit to the United States, I was in the Cabinet Room with Ceausescu, when, counting the labeled chairs, he suddenly said, "Can you believe it? Only thirteen secretaries! Why do we have to have a president and a prime minister? Why do we keep a prime minister, twelve deputy prime ministers, and 40 ministers? Why does the prime minister need 53 labeled chairs for a government meeting? We should learn from the American system of democracy. We should apply the same principles. And if some journalist says we have a dictatorship, we should an-

swer that our government is a faithful copy of the American government. As here, we should have only one boss and several secretaries carrying out his orders."

That was when Ceausescu gave me the order to give him a complete study on the American system of government. Based on this order, a DIE officer under deep cover, Colonel Dumitru Mazilu, was sent to the United States for six months to prepare the study.

When I gave the final report to Ceausescu, he promptly said: "You don't understand anything! I don't need to know anything about the Congress and the judicial system. Stop talking about the three branches of their government. Rewrite the report covering only the administration, and strongly emphasize that the American government has only a President, a Vice President, and a few secretaries, that they don't have and never have had any prime ministers! Write that they have a presidential system without any prime minister or deputy prime ministers and that that's all they need. Someday we have to finish with the wastefulness we have. We don't need two governments, one run by the president and the other by the prime minister."

THE AIR-CONDITIONED NIGHTMARE

Air conditioning was probably my biggest headache for all the presidential visits I prepared.

Shortly after he had taken over, after the death of his predecessor, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Ceausescu returned from a secret visit to Moscow and began worrying about a protracted pain in his throat. Gheorghiu-Dej had died from a fast-developing form of cancer, its first symptoms having appeared as throat pains not long after his return from a vacation in the USSR together with the Italian Communist leader Palmiro Togliatti, who had died very suddenly after his return under circumstances considered strange. Ceausescu was convinced beyond the shadow of a doubt that both had been assassinated by the Kremlin through secret radiation with a strong source of isotopes, and his throat pains therefore caused him indescribable panic.

Doctors from all around the world were secretly brought to Bucharest over an anguishing period of long weeks. Finally an old, very conservative West German doctor put it to him very bluntly: "You, sir, talk too much and too loudly, and your vocal chords are terribly irritated. If you want to keep them, you must protect them."

The doctor's prescriptions were old-fashioned: chamomile tea as often as possible, but always when he had to speak longer and louder than usual, and protection from any kind of drafts, including fans and air conditioners. Since then, during every speech Ceausescu makes, a waiter changes his chamomile-tea glass every half hour, no matter whether it is a routine meeting, a Politbureau session, or a Party Congress. Every single fan had to be removed from all his residences, and the central air-conditioning system installed at the Central Committee of the Communist Party was dismantled.

During his foreign visits, especially to North and South America, I encountered indescribable difficulties in having the air conditioning and heating turned off in every building he was to visit and closing or at least covering every vent. In Venezuela, for instance, he ordered me to disconnect the air conditioner in his official vehicle, so that the Venezuelan driver would not under any circumstances be able to turn it on. As it was an armored car, the windows of which could not be opened, the trips around Caracas quickly became a nightmare.

I also had never-ending discussions with the management of the Waldorf Astoria in New York and other hotels used by Ceausescu, when I would ask them to turn off the central air-conditioning or heating systems and to seal off every vent. It repeatedly happened that Rumanian dignitaries accompanying Ceausescu abroad spent their nights trying to find and seal off hidden vents or leaky windows.

DISTINGUISHED AMERICANS

"Pacepa's just been telling me some interesting information about the American President," Ceausescu told Elena as she entered the room. "Carter looks unexpectedly nice, even distinguished, showing esteem for his wife and devotion to his family. I've asked him [Pacepa] to prepare a file for you that I hope you'll like."

"Go soak your head, Nick! Have you ever seen a 'distinguished American'?" Elena squawked, trying to put all her knowledge of English into the last two words. "Name me just one movie where you've seen such an American, and on top of it all a loving husband and devoted father, and I'll eat it, Nick. And you," she went on, turning toward me. "Don't you fill the Comrade's head with your intrigues and fantasies. Do you understand?" Then turning back to Ceauses-

cu. "You'd better come to bed, Nick, rather than wasting your night away listening to fairy tales. You want to learn about Americans? You have your *Kojak* movies. They are at least authentic, made by Americans!"

BOOKS, BLACKS, AND BARBARA WALTERS

The following conversation took place at Blair House on April 11, 1978, the first day of Ceausescu's visit to Jimmy Carter.

"What about the book exhibition I ordered?" Ceausescu asked me.

"It opened today at the Martin Luther King Library, with books printed in all the languages of the various ethnic groups living in Rumania and with a special exhibit case containing books written by and about you. The report says that the director of the library opened the exhibition with an address presenting you as a brilliant thinker and political personality, whose love of books has favorably influenced the whole course of publishing activity in Rumania."

"Listen to him, Nick," Elena broke in. "In all of America, they couldn't find any better place than a library for black people!"

"Anything new on the television interview?" Ceausescu intervened.

"Yes. ABC insists on taping the interview tomorrow afternoon so they can put parts of it on the air during the prime-time news tomorrow evening, the first day of the visit, and broadcast the entire interview on Sunday, April 16, on the *Issues and Answers* show."

"Is the interviewer somebody?" he asked.

"Yes, Comrade. Barbara Walters, one of the ABC's best television interviewers."

"A woman? A woman to interview you, Nick? That's ridiculous! Isn't she the harpy who interviewed Castro and made a whole circus out of his personal life, his estranged wife, and his love affairs? Isn't she that one?"

"I think, Comrade Elena, that she interviewed Fidel Castro several years ago."

"Fiddlers! That's all they all are, nothing but fiddlers. I told you so. It's all a plot against you, no question about it. Why else, out of 200 million Americans, could they find only that harpy to interview you? It's a plot to compromise you, Comrade. Can't you see that?"

After reaching this decision, Elena furiously left the dining area. During Ceausescu's visits abroad, Elena was always dissatisfied with everything and everybody.

TRADECRAFT

THE NUCLEAR GO-BETWEEN

In 1975 I showed Ceausescu credible DIE information indicating that Pakistan was conducting secret operations to develop its own nuclear capability. Two days later he ordered me to arrange a secret meeting for him with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan's prime minister. With the help of Andrei Stefan, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist party and chief of its international department, a short stopover was arranged to take place in Karachi, with Bhutto welcoming Ceausescu at the airport.

When Ceausescu's airplane landed in Karachi, Bhutto was there, accompanied by numerous local dignitaries. He invited Ceausescu for lunch to a nearby palace, where we arrived after almost an hour's ride on a hot, dusty day. In the palace garden tents were already waiting, filled with food in large silver pots. For each guest there were several servants ready to carry out his least wish at the slightest signal. In the main tent, the highest Rumanian and Pakistani dignitaries joined their two leaders for lunch.

Ceausescu has a great talent for personal diplomacy, most of his successes having been brought about by personal discussions. A good psychologist, he pays a great deal of attention to knowing his discussion partners, and he tries to impress and subdue them with a deliberately open and direct manner and with discreet anti-Soviet allusions.

Bhutto was a relatively easy prize for the experienced and well-prepared Ceausescu. By the end of the luncheon, Bhutto was addressing Ceausescu only in superlatives.

After lunch, Ceausescu asked for a private discussion, accompanied only by a DIE interpreter and me. He opened his frontal attack on Bhutto. "You and I share the same dream, to make a place in history for our countries, and the best way to do that is to build their power. In our time the only real power is nuclear power. We should build it secretly. Working separately, our intelligence services"—pointing toward me—"have obtained remarkable results. Together we might be able to realize our dreams. In this envelope is a sample of what we can do. Read it later on. If you agree, give me a sign. If not, you may forget the whole thing."

Bhutto put the envelope carefully into

his pocket, without opening it. It contained a detailed inventory of the nuclear-intelligence information Rumania could secretly provide to Pakistan.

Then there was a short break in the meeting.

When Bhutto came back into the room, he proposed that he and Ceausescu make a public declaration. Ceausescu spontaneously gave a public speech, followed by Bhutto.

Intelligent, sensitive, and ambitious, Bhutto reacted almost exactly as Ceausescu had expected. Just before our departure, he gave Ceausescu an envelope. "Inside is a name, one of our most secret names. Don't try to find him," Bhutto said in my direction, "because he doesn't have any official positions. I will personally instruct him and send him to Bucharest. I will send you the date and flight number through your ambassador, without further explanation. In Bucharest one of your people should meet him and organize future cooperation. It should be a personal contact between two individuals, not two governments. I hope we never need discuss this matter again in our future cooperation, my dear friend."

Two weeks later I had a meeting in a safe house with the man who would become "235," and the next day Ceausescu had both of us for a private dinner at his residence in Snagov, not far from Bucharest. Radu Andreescu was the operational name of a brilliant DIE engineer who became his case officer. Ten days later Andreescu left for Pakistan with a voluminous diplomatic pouch containing the whole documentation secretly obtained from Canada and used to construct a Rumanian heavy-water plant.

He came back with the complete project for a small Canadian Candu reactor that the Pakistani government had bought as well as significant intelligence data on the industrial-size Candu nuclear reactor.

On further visits to Pakistan, Andreescu took with him technical intelligence on West German and French nuclear reactors and security systems, and he brought back to Rumania the Degussa centrifugal system for enriching uranium, data on the industrial production of uranium 235, and other military technical nuclear intelligence that Pakistan had obtained.

A recently arrived postcard was the first sign of life we had gotten from "235" after the July 5, 1977, coup, when General Muhammed Zia ul-Haq arrested Bhutto and declared himself chief administrator of martial law.

"You must be terribly careful! We badly need to keep our Rosenberg," said Ceausescu.

THE CORN CAPER

Technological espionage was also extended to unclassified projects, in order to save costs on legal imports. The complete blueprints for newly designed American aluminum rolling mills were used as the basis for constructing high-capacity aluminum-foil and sheet-metal factories, which were scheduled to go into production between 1982 and 1984. Three glass factories were built from 1976 to 1980 based on illegally obtained intelligence provided by an American engineer in exchange for the initial sum of $200,000. The intention was to flood the American market with glass products at dumping prices. Today Rumanian glass products are for sale at attractive prices all over the United States and Western Europe.

Through an agent recruited at the United States Department of Agriculture's Research Center in Beltsville, Rumania secretly obtained the entire US national hybrid-corn collection, containing more than 14,000 assortments and species, which became the basis for further research in Rumania. Together with other genetic materials also illegally obtained from the United States, American brands of corn, such as Pioneer or Wyoming, soon began to be replaced by Rumanian hybrid strains. As of 1978 they numbered from RH-101 up to RH-291, RH standing for "Rumanian hybrid."

In July 1978 the Rumanian ministry of agriculture estimated the total savings for Rumania generated by this operation over the years at a staggering 300 billion dollars.

SHALLOW PENETRATION

Accompanied by Pacepa and others, Ceausescu visited the Dallas headquarters of Texas Instruments during his April 1978 trip to the United States. Afterwards, at a dinner arranged by the Texas Chamber of Commerce, Ceausescu said, in part:

"Some of the products turned out by Texas Instruments also have a strategic character. We are not concerned with turning out such products, because we stand for disarmament, for the destruction of atomic armaments and of weapons in general. We stand for a world without weapons, a world of peaceful cooperation."

In all of Eastern Europe, and in their foreign intelligence services, Texas Instruments was considered to be the most advanced producer of microelectronics and chips in the whole world, and also

The Ceausescus join the Carters in 1978 for more waving from the White House balcony. On this trip Elena Ceausescu was not pleased with the sleeping arrangements at Blair House.

one of the best-protected private companies working on classified government contracts.

During the Brezhnev-Ustinov-Andropov militarization era, I was repeatedly asked by Soviet KGB representatives to direct the DIE toward penetrating Texas Instruments and obtaining its highly secret microelectronic technologies, but the intensive efforts made in this direction over many years were without success.

Some technological information was later obtained indirectly, however, through cooperation with a prestigious British firm producing microelectronics under a Texas Instruments license. Several hundred volumes, containing tens of thousands of pages of classified American documents, were photographed and turned over by a newly recruited and well-paid British agent.

These documents almost entirely filled Ceausescu's executive-committee room when they were presented to him. He considered this operation one of the most valuable producers of technological intelligence for Rumania, and he directed that it be used as the basis for the secret production of chips and other microelectronics in a top-secret military plant close to Bucharest especially created for this purpose. But this beginning only whetted his appetite for a real penetration of Texas Instruments.

After Leonid Brezhnev had personally asked him for information on American microelectronics, Ceausescu asked me to include a visit to Texas Instruments in the itinerary of his April 1978 visit to the US, as a way of opening the door to a direct intelligence operation. At the end of March, when I was sent to the US by Ceausescu to prepare for his visit, he ordered me to go personally to Texas Instruments in my official capacity as presidential adviser and to open its doors for officers from both the Washington and the New York DIE stations. But up until the time of Ceausescu's visit there, the Rumanians had been totally unable to talk with any engineers or technicians from Texas Instruments, being restricted to meeting with only public-relations or security officers.

Several weeks later as Ceausescu stepped inside the company's building, he shot me a triumphant look, then turned to the other people present, his face and eyes lighted up with enormous self-satisfaction. He had accomplished his wish to be the first Communist president to set foot inside Texas Instruments, to do something Brezhnev had been unable to do. Indeed, Ceausescu was at last able to walk into that prohibited microelectronics empire, but the equipment and the people working there could be seen by him only through a protective window wall.

STEALING NASA'S SECRETS

On Saturday, April 15, 1978, we were flying from Dallas to Houston on an Air Force One airplane provided by the White House for Ceausescu's visit to the United States. Without enthusiasm we began a new game of chess.

"Was the contact with 'ARMAND'

gy were sentenced to jail, official relations with the Vatican were broken, and the seat of the Papal Nuncio was closed.

In the 1950s operations against the Catholic Church inside the Soviet bloc began to be closely coordinated by the Kremlin. A fanatical and experienced member of the Politburo in each country was put in charge of measures against the Catholic Church. In Rumania it was Emil Bodnaras, a former colonel in the Soviet Army during World War II whose real name was Bodnarenko. In 1945, backed by the Red Army, he had been the main person behind the overthrow of the recently elected Rumanian democratic government. Bodnaras remained in charge of measures against the Catholic Church until his death shortly before my defection in 1978.

By 1949, special departments charged with supervising the activities of the Catholic Church had been created in all Soviet-bloc security forces. Every Catholic Church building and religious servant became a target. An operation coordinated by Moscow placed microphones in every Catholic church, especially in the confessionals and priests' residences. In Rumania, they were still there at the time of my defection.

THE FIRST COMMUNIST DYNASTY

IS RUMANIA REALLY A MAVERICK?

Should the West support "maverick" Rumania? Within the limits of Marxist-Leninist principles and Warsaw Pact obligations, Bucharest does display a certain degree of independence from Moscow, deciding its own day-to-day foreign and domestic policies. The nature of this administrative independence is strongly influenced by the kind of personal relationship existing at any given moment between Rumania's leader and the top man in the Kremlin.

Under Nikita Khrushchev, who was considerate of Rumania's leader, Bucharest took pains to inform the Kremlin about all its overt and covert decisions. Leonid Brezhnev, however, ignored the Rumanian leader, an extension of Brezhnev's earlier career as First Secretary of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic, where he forcibly ejected the Rumanians living there after the province came to the Soviet Union following World War II. As a result, Ceausescu kept Brezhnev at a distance. Under Yuri Andropov and now under Mikhail Gorbachev, who seems to show less rigidity toward him, Ceausescu has evidently resumed closer ties with Moscow.

It is true that Rumania's political position within the Warsaw Pact embodies a degree of genuine independence and is an irritant to the Soviet Union. Until now, however, the pragmatic purpose of that posture has been solely to increase Ceausescu's personal stature and to attract Western money and technology to help build Communism in Rumania.

Rumania has today the second-most orthodox Marxist domestic policy in the whole Warsaw Pact, topped only by Albania, in the entire world. The West's support to Rumania over the past seventeen years, since its spectacular reaction to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, has not brought about any change in Ceausescu's policies toward his own people, in terms of the economy, the standard of living, or human rights. Rumania's political police are now the most oppressive in the entire Soviet bloc. The ratio of security forces to the total population is one to fifteen, higher than that in any Western jail.

In order to export more fuel, presidential decrees signed in November 1984 forbid the illumination of the streets at night and drastically restrict the use of private automobiles throughout the whole country. According to the Western press, during this past winter the highest temperature permitted indoors in all public buildings in Rumania, including hospitals, was only 40 degrees Fahrenheit, which reportedly caused the deaths of numerous newborn babies in maternity hospitals.

Despite these dramatic signs of economic distress, Rumania has not stopped its politically motivated practice of providing long-term, low-interest—4 percent—credits to Third World countries.

In another recent announcement, the Greek newspaper *Acropolis* called attention to confidential negotiations taking place for the sale of Aristotle Onassis's famous personal yacht *Christina* (now *Aristoteles*), which was given to the Greek government after his death. It is to be purchased as a presidential yacht for Ceausescu. One of the most publicized yachts in the world, the 325-foot *Christina* is fitted with such niceties as a canary-yellow amphibian airplane on the upper deck, a lapis-lazuli fireplace, and bar stools covered with whale foreskin, which may strike only a Ceausescu as not being too much.

At the same time, Ceausescu's messengers have been visiting the United States and other Western countries asking for new financial assistance and the renewal of most-favored-nation status, all of which they claim is vitally needed to support Rumania's independence.

PORTRAIT OF NICU

Now 67 years old, Ceausescu is thought to be seriously, perhaps terminally ill. His death, though, would not necessarily mean that control of Rumania would pass from the Ceausescu family.

Among Ceausescu's most likely successors are his wife, Elena, and his son Nicu. First deputy prime minister and head of the National Council for Science and Technology, Elena has been called by the Rumanian press "a scientist of world reknown." Nicu was once hailed by the newspaper Rumania Libera as being a part of "the line of great continuity of the revolutionary, patriotic spirit."

In the small portrait that follows, Nicu is at the Ceausescus' Bucharest residence. Located on Primaverii Street, it is enclosed by a nine-foot, gray-brick-and-concrete wall. Ceausescu has a weekend home in nearby Snagov, a summer home in Neptun on the Black Sea, and a winter home near Predeal in the Carpathian mountains.

Ceausescu continued silently on the fast walk with me through his Bucharest garden, without looking at me or at anything around him. We passed around the indoor swimming pool, a massive, modern building constructed of concrete and glass, illuminated now in the evening. Through the open sliding door I could hear noisy rock-and-roll music and then splashes, not loud enough to have been made by someone diving but too loud to have been made by someone swimming.

As we pased the open door, I glanced inside to my right and saw Ceausescu's son Nicu throwing Scotch bottles into the pool. He was probably drunk again. Nicu had been a hard drinker ever since his middle teens, when he would often disappear from home and be found days later, drunk as a lord, at some friend's house or in some seedy restaurant. At that time he would drink anything, from *tsuica*—a strong plum brandy similar to *slivovitz*, and the Rumanian national drink—to Cointreau or champagne. Now he drinks only Johnny Walker Black Label Scotch.

A passionate automobile driver, Nicu has demolished at least a dozen cars on his drunken sprees, killed one young Rumanian girl, and injured many people.

LADY MACBETH OF TRANSYLVANIA

When we returned from a reception and dinner given by the mayor of New Orleans during the 1978 visit to the United States, Elena was in good spirits. Ordering her favorite champagne, she said, "I had an interesting conversation with the 'mayoress.' You know, Nick? They are serious people. They don't want abortions. The 'mayoress' said that there's an anti-abortion movement in all of Louisiana and that the Catholic Church played an important role in it."

Draining her glass at one swallow, she continued: "Church or no, I've told you many times, Nick, that we should sign a presidential decree prohibiting abortions in Rumania and obliging every family to have at least four children."

Elena asked for another glass of champagne and emptied it before going on. "Everybody agrees that you are the greatest contemporary statesman and economist. Even the mayor, who met you for the first time tonight, said that you were a visionary, a personality that would live for centuries. A man like you is born once every 500 years."

Elena got yet another glass of champagne. "How do you feel, being so big, so important, and yet the head of such a little country? Only Albania is smaller than our country. If we sign such a decree, in less than ten years Rumania will grow to at least 40 million people. It will be entirely different then," she concluded.

"Hey, woman, be serious—shut up," said Ceausescu, laughing but flattered.

That was not the first time I had heard Elena trying to push through an anti-abortion law. During the countless hours I spent with her, I often saw her dreaming. Her most cherished dream is to become president herself in Rumania as her idol, Isabel Perón, did in Argentina. She dreams of having her name go down in history as the only woman president who during her presidency doubled the population of her country.

In the summer of 1977 Elena sent me to Paris for two weeks with her daughter, Zoia, in order to arrange there for an "accidental" meeting with the man she had selected to become Zoia's husband. A passionate mathematician, Zoia is a genuine dissident, fighting against her father's cult of personality and her mother's reign of terror.

One evening, when we were together in a striptease nightclub in Montmartre, Zoia exploded, having understood very well what was going on: "I don't want my husband to be picked by anybody but myself. I don't want to spend my whole life just having babies. I want a life decided by myself, not by ridiculous rules and laws. If I hear the harpy trying just once more to persuade Papa to sign an anti-abortion law, I'll crack her skull open. She doesn't know how to do anything else but dream about becoming a queen over 40 million idiots!"

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ON PAGE 1-A

WASHINGTON TIMES
10 December 1985

Romanian spy calls Russian ties strong

By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

A former top-level Romanian intelligence officer believes covert ties between Romanian and Soviet intelligence services remain strong despite appearances that the Eastern European nation has maintained an "independent" foreign policy from Moscow.

Former Romanian Deputy Chief of Foreign Intelligence Ion M. Pacepa in written testimony released last week by the Senate investigations subcommittee said the Romanian spy service, known by its acronym CIE, supplies its "intelligence product" to Moscow on a regular basis.

"Even in cases where the Romanian government has given the West its solemn guarantees that information provided to it would be kept secret and that sensitive equipment sold to it would not be released to any third party, it has not kept its word," Mr. Pacepa states.

Secretary of State George Shultz is expected to travel to Romania Dec. 15 for talks with Romanian leaders.

A State Department spokesman said the discussions will include human rights and religious issues and an explanation of congressional attitudes toward Romania's Most Favored Nation trading status with the United States. Romania's trade status links favorable tariff rates to free emigration policies.

Last week spokesman Bernard Kalb said the State Department opposes recent proposals in Congress to deny Romania favorable trading status since MFN "is important in encouraging Romania's relative foreign policy independence."

But Mr. Pacepa, in his testimony, urged canceling Romania's MFN status unless the government there agrees to renounce espionage against the United States. He said the Warsaw Pact foreign intelligence services operating against the United States are "the largest and best organized."

Mr. Pacepa, a former adviser to Romanian strongman Nicolae Ceausescu, said that before defecting in 1978 he was the official responsible for getting Western governments to sell technology and military equipment to Romania to promote its independence from Moscow.

Mr. Pacepa said as Mr. Ceausescu's personal emissary he was instructed to "use my imagination in supplying the highest guarantees of secrecy."

Mr. Pacepa provided an example of how Romania exploited its psuedo-independence in 1977-78. He said Mr. Ceausescu wrote to then-West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt providing "solemn guarantees" that a proposed transfer of German airplane and tank technology would not be passed on to other countries.

But after West Germany signed an agreement with Romania, "Ceausescu secretly informed Libya's strongman, Col. Muammar Qaddaffi, that Romania would produce bombers and airplanes for parachute jumping patterned after West German Fokker models, and tanks patterned after NATO's Leopard II," Mr. Pacepa said.

"[Mr. Ceausescu] asked Qaddaffi to finance these projects with the understanding that he would be able to buy as much of the production as he wanted at preferential prices," Mr. Pacepa said.

After Soviet troops left Romania in the early 1960s, "subordination to Moscow was changed," Mr. Pacepa said. From that period on, Moscow has not received "specific data" on Romanian intelligence sources and operations. "But it has received the significant intelligence product." During trips to Moscow, Mr. Pacepa found "information in the KGB computer system that Romania had sent only to Budapest or Sofia and not to Moscow."

On the issue of Romanian emigration, Mr. Pacepa said Mr. Ceausescu in 1972 decreed that "no Romanian citizen . . . should receive an emigration visa unless he is a security agent and has a previous written secret agreement to cooperate with a security unit."

Breaking With Moscow

By Arkady Shevchenko



The moment the two Soviet officials arrived at their offices at the United Nations Secretariat building in New York City, they knew something was very, very wrong. The inner office was closed off. The lock on the door had been changed, and a printed notice said that the office had been sealed by U.N. security forces. The date was Friday, April 6, 1978.

The distraught Soviets summoned building guards and demanded an explanation. What had happened to their countryman and boss, Arkady Shevchenko? He was a ranking Soviet diplomat, a former top adviser to Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and, for the past five years Under Secretary-General of the U.N., one of Kurt Waldheim's senior deputies. The two Soviets were told that the office had in fact been sealed at Shevchenko's own request the night before. More alarmed than ever, Shevchenko's assistants hurried to their real headquarters, the Soviet mission on East 67th Street in Manhattan.

Five days later the world learned what the Soviets had immediately suspected. SOVIET CITIZEN, WALDHEIM AIDE, DEFECTS AT U.N., *read the headline over the front-page story in the New York Times. Shevchenko was his country's highest-ranking diplomatic defector since World War II. At 47 he was already a 22-year veteran of the Soviet foreign service, and he had risen quickly in its ranks. Far more important than his highly visible assignment in New York was the one that occupied him from late 1970 until early 1973 when, as an adviser to Gromyko, he was able to observe at first hand the inner workings of the Politburo, the U.S.S.R.'s ruling body.*

Says a former American intelligence officer: "Shevchenko was a very big catch indeed. He had been in a lot of key places deep inside the Soviet apparatus at key times—places where we rarely get any kind of glimpse at all. He had a lot to tell us." Now, seven years later, he is telling the world. His memoir, Breaking with Moscow, *is to be published this month (Knopf; 378 pages; $18.95). A resident of Washington, Shevchenko lives comfortably off lecture fees ($6,000 to $12,000 a speech). His American wife Elaine, whom he married in late 1978, helped him write his book.*

The most sensational revelation in Shevchenko's memoir is that he had been working as an agent-in-place for the CIA *for 2½ years before his defection. But the book is far more than a true-life spy story. It is rich in insights into the life of the Soviet elite, the personal rivalries and bureaucratic infighting, the sycophancy and nepotism, and the workings of Kremlin policy-making. Examples:*

▶ *En route to the U.S. in 1960 as part of the entourage accompanying Nikita Khrushchev, Shevchenko hears the bumptious Premier mutter threats against the life of then U.N. Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold, who died mysteriously in a plane crash in the Congo a year later.*

▶ *Chatting with a colleague, he learns of a heated Politburo debate over launching a nuclear strike against China.*

▶ *He describes Moscow's campaign to conclude a treaty liquidating all chemical and biological weapons as a propaganda sham and notes, "There is no question that the U.S.S.R. is much better prepared than the U.S. for this type of warfare."*

▶ *Friends with KGB and Central Committee sources tell him of a growing move to get rid of Egypt's President Anwar Sadat, "one way or another."*

On the following pages, TIME *presents the first of two excerpts from* Breaking with Moscow, *carrying Shevchenko from his early days as a diplomat through his participation on the edges of the summit meeting between Brezhnev and Richard Nixon in 1972.*

Despite Shevchenko's distaste for the system he left behind, he maintains a high degree of respect for his erstwhile mentor, Gromyko, the book's dominant figure.

During the deep chill between Moscow and Washington over the past several years, many American specialists on Soviet affairs speculated that Gromyko had become the No. 1 hard-liner in the Kremlin and, as such, the principal obstacle to an improvement in relations. Nonsense, says Shevchenko. He is convinced that Gromyko is committed to the restoration of détente—a policy that Shevchenko, too, favors. Thus, paradoxically, Shevchenko's book is not just a denunciation of the Soviet leadership. It is also a grudging defense of one of that leadership's most powerful and conspicuous members.

Time
Page 48
February 11, 1985

■ "YOU KNOW, THE POLES HATE US"

From 1949 until 1954, I was a student in the dingy gray four-story building, half hidden by the ramparts of Krymsky Bridge, that housed the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). Many of its graduates are now approaching top official status. This is particularly true of the Foreign Ministry, where two current deputy ministers, numerous ambassadors and chiefs of many key departments are alumni.

After graduation, I went on to do graduate work in disarmament. My study of this issue led to my first meeting with Andrei Gromyko, then First Deputy Foreign Minister. Gromyko's son and my fellow student, Anatoly, proposed in 1955 that we write a joint article on the role of parliaments in the struggle for peace and disarmament. Anatoly suggested we show the article to his father. He received us cordially at his apartment, a spacious set of rooms in one of the central Moscow buildings reserved for high government and party officials. His intent brown eyes, his whole appearance, reflected authority and self-confidence. After reading our manuscript attentively, Gromyko gave it his approval, making a few brief comments, sensible and to the point.

ENDING THE HUNGARIAN UPRISING, 1956

"Andropov's advice [led to] the decision to crush the rebellion with tanks."

In the conversation that followed, Gromyko impressed me with the warmth of his remarks about the wartime Soviet-American alliance against Hitler's Germany. His favorite foreign films are those made in the U.S. during the war and postwar years when he lived in Washington and New York as a young diplomat. He remembers the actors' names and gives running commentaries on their performances and backgrounds. It is almost as though the Soviet-American alliance was the high point of his life, the idyl he seeks to recapture through his dealings with Americans. When Gromyko critiqued our article, the iciest days of the cold war were behind us, but his observations on the necessity and the possibility of restoring good if not truly friendly relations with the U.S. went well beyond the official Soviet stand.

I was nearly finished with my dissertation when I was summoned to see Semyon Tsarapkin, head of the Foreign Ministry department in charge of United Nations and disarmament affairs. I found him posing like a czar behind his desk, strutting amid the disorder of an office piled with heaps of papers and books, ornamented by a battery of telephones, and infused with an oppressive sense of his abrasive personality.

"We're starting a new policy that will mean serious negotiating on disarmament," he began. "It's one thing to study such matters, but it's something else to be involved in the real work. Why don't you come on for a time and find out for yourself how you like it?" I joined the ministry in October 1956.

Almost immediately, nearly everyone's attention was focused on Poland and Hungary. In October, Wladyslaw Gomulka had been elected First Secretary of the Polish party's Central Committee in defiance of the Soviets. Khrushchev and other leaders felt constrained to accept Gomulka because they were loath to suppress the Poles by force. "You know," a friend in the Foreign Ministry told me, "the Poles hate us; they would fight at the drop of a hat." I knew it was true. Still, there was no danger that Poland could break away from us.

More shocking to me were events in Hungary. In the explosion following the "Polish October," I thought that Imre Nagy had gone too far in declaring Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and his attempt at disrupting that nation's socialist system. Still, I was shaken by the brutality of the reprisals. It was in this context that I first heard of Yuri Andropov, our Ambassador to Hungary. A classmate at our embassy in Budapest described how Andropov handled the erupting crisis: "He was so calm, even while the bullets were flying—when everyone else at the embassy felt as if we were in a besieged fortress."

My friend also told me that before and during the critical days of the uprising Moscow's instructions were sometimes confusing and occasionally betrayed a lack of understanding of what was really going on. Andropov's advice to Moscow, however, was extensive and served as a basis for swift decisions, including the decision to crush the rebellion with tanks.

■ FOILING A PALACE COUP

As I began work in the United Nations and disarmament section, I discovered how lucky I was. The "Germanists," the "disarmament boys," the "Americanists," the "Europeans" (chiefly concerned with Soviet-French relations) and a small group of others belonged to a privileged caste. We were envied by the "provincials," who frequently spent their entire careers in Africa and Asia. Not only was this an unattractive fate because of the unpleasant climates, low salaries and lack of consumer goods, but diplomats assigned to these areas seldom advanced to senior positions.

The privileged ones, on the other hand, were almost constantly in close proximity to the leadership. Gromyko knew many of them personally, remembered their names, and fostered the careers of the most able. This group formed the backbone of the younger generation in the ministry.

In 1957, my job, as a third secretary, was to monitor the disarmament negotiations then taking place in London under the auspices of the U.N. I was convinced that the Soviet Union was more interested in disarmament than the U.S. was. So was the First Secretary of the party, Nikita Khrushchev. The head of our department, Tsarapkin, told me that Khrushchev was very bitter that at the London negotiations, there had been sudden changes in the American position, and the U.S. had withdrawn what our side considered a significant concession.

At that time, Khrushchev was facing opposition at home. The Stalinists who survived the purges of the '30s were the sternest guardians of Communist doctrine, and they often grum-

bled about Khrushchev. One of them was Tsarapkin's deputy and my superior, Kirill Novikov. Along with Tsarapkin, Novikov had sat behind Stalin during the Potsdam Conference in 1945. He would reveal himself in the way he reminisced: "In Stalin's time we had real order. There were none of these rhetorical flourishes and vacillations." Moscow was rife with gossip about intrigues. A clique in the Presidium [Khrushchev's name for the Politburo], labeled the "anti-party group" and including Foreign Minister Dmitri Shepilov, nearly engineered a palace coup against Khrushchev. But he convened the Central Committee, stronghold of his support, and stripped his rivals of their positions. Around this time Andrei Gromyko became Foreign Minister.

Not long afterward, I joined the party for very practical reasons: without the right political credentials I would not get party and KGB approval for promotions or assignments abroad. I cannot count the hours I spent in party organization meetings in the ministry, listening to or delivering dull reports on doctrinal matters or on the foibles and failings of other "comrades." As a rule, the pettier the subject, the longer the discussion of it.

The most unpleasant aspect of party responsibility, and the party chore I found most demeaning, was the task of snooping into and supervising the personal lives of others. Communists are expected to set shining examples of behavior. When, instead, they engage in *amoralka* (misconduct)—the most common forms being heavy drinking, philandering and, among diplomats, smuggling Western consumer goods—their peers are supposed to recall them to righteousness. The party had a series of weapons for these situations, ranging from a slap on the wrist, *vygovor* (a reprimand), to expulsion. But the party prefers to redeem rather than punish. The higher a transgressor's rank, moreover, the greater the tendency to cover up his misdeeds.



DOWNED AMERICAN U-2 RECONNAISSANCE PLANE, 1960

"Khrushchev decided . . . to disgrace Dwight Eisenhower publicly."

In early February 1958, Novikov took me to a meeting with Gromyko. It was the first time I had seen him since joining the ministry. Gromyko opened the discussion with a propaganda tirade. He said that Khrushchev considered it necessary to develop a campaign to stop nuclear weapons testing: "He has decided that we must set an example and unilaterally discontinue the testing of nuclear weapons."

I asked Gromyko how we could explain our position when we had recently declared that the Soviet Union could not take such a step, as it would place us at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the U.S. Rather testily, he replied that he was encouraged to see that I had paid attention to our former position. Frowning, he added, "No explanation of the change is necessary. The crux of the matter is that our decision will have tremendous political effect. That's our main objective."

In 1959, Khrushchev visited the U.S. and appeared before the U.N. General Assembly with a proposal for general and complete disarmament. He achieved his predicted propaganda success. Western leaders recognized it as a ploy, but no one spoke out openly against it.

Khrushchev's next venture was to bring him trouble on the domestic front. Claiming that "the clouds of war have begun to disperse," as a result of his "historic" visit to the U.S., he initiated a cutback of 1.2 million personnel in the armed forces, and he justified the decision by saying that modern defense capabilities were determined by nuclear firepower and the quality of delivery systems: "Military aviation and the navy have lost their former significance." The military leaders and the armaments industries could not let this pass unchallenged.

The decline in morale in the armed forces reached alarming proportions. In 1960, a navy captain described to us how officers had wept as they watched nearly completed cruisers and destroyers at the docks in Leningrad being cut up for scrap on Khrushchev's orders.

More significant than the navy's chagrin, however, was the alarm felt by the Central Committee ideologists. By reducing the conventional forces, especially the navy, Khrushchev was undercutting the most efficient means of aiding pro-Moscow liberation movements and the Soviet Union's allies in the Third World. In the long run, these moves cost him dearly.

■ SETTING A TRAP FOR EISENHOWER

In concentrating on his Western initiatives, Khrushchev made yet another mistake, turning his back on China. Friends in the Central Committee told me that when he met with Mao Tse-tung in Peking in 1959, the Chinese accused him of sacrificing revolutionary struggle for détente with "imperialists." This threatened to undermine Kremlin claims of leadership in revolutionary movements. The Soviets had to compete with the Chinese in leading the world revolution, and the result was a resuscitated militancy in Soviet foreign policy.

One manifestation of this reversal was the U-2 incident of 1960. American reconnaissance aircraft had been making overflights of Soviet territory for some years, and the Soviet leadership was well aware of them. Gromyko advised Khrushchev not to shoot down the planes so as to avoid excessive deterioration in Soviet-American relations. In Gromyko's judgment, a strong protest and warning could forestall further overflights. Khrushchev dismissed Gromyko's counsel, and when Soviet antiaircraft defenses shot down a U-2 and captured the pilot, Francis Gary Powers, Khrushchev decided to set a trap to disgrace Dwight Eisenhower publicly. Powers was alive in Soviet hands, but Khrushchev, concealing this, tricked Eisenhower, luring him into denials concerning the overflights.

Khrushchev's scheme was nearly revealed prematurely. In conversation with an ambassador from one of the socialist countries, Deputy Foreign Minister Yakov Malik could not resist the temptation to show off. He told the envoy that the U-2 pilot was alive and would testify publicly. Fortunately for Khrushchev's hoax, the ambassador was security conscious and immediately informed the Central Committee of this chat.

Furious, Khrushchev decided to expel Malik from the party

and dismiss him from his post. During an audience with the Premier, Malik apparently fell to his knees and wept as he begged forgiveness. By this time Khrushchev's U-2 scheme had come to fruition, and he contented himself with a humiliating punishment for Malik: ordering him to make a public confession at a party meeting of the entire Foreign Ministry.

The ministry's conference hall, with its marble columns and rostrum, was overflowing. Mounting the rostrum, obviously pained and embarrassed, Malik bleated, "Comrades, I have never before revealed state secrets." Everyone howled with laughter. In another time he would have ended up in prison or worse; now he received only a *strogach* (severe reprimand).

■ AT SEA WITH A HARDY LEADER

In 1960 I sailed aboard the small Soviet passenger liner *Baltika* from Kaliningrad to New York with Khrushchev and the leaders of several other socialist countries. At age 29, an anonymous foot soldier of Soviet diplomacy, I had the extraordinary opportunity of being assigned to work with the head of our party and the Premier of our country on what was to be a major presentation on decolonization and disarmament to the U.N. General Assembly.

A savage gale broke out, and the little, 7,500-ton ship tossed as the Atlantic heaved. The majority of the passengers and a good half of the ship's crew were seasick. Khrushchev, however, remained hardy and undaunted. He continued to go to the restaurant in high spirits, deriding those who, in his words, had shown themselves to be weaklings.

ABOARD THE *BALTIKA* BOUND FOR NEW YORK, 1960

"Khrushchev, drinking heavily, decided to have some fun with Nikolai Podgorny."

I lay in my berth almost the entire day, getting up only to run to the bathroom. But Nikolai Molyakov, deputy chief of the Department of International Organizations, taunted me. The best medicine for seasickness was to toss down "200 grams" of vodka, he said, urging me to accompany him to the bar. His suggestion made me feel even sicker, but I thought perhaps it would be more pleasant to die in the bar than on my bunk.

A number of Khrushchev's intimates were there, all tipsy, telling bawdy stories and evaluating the charms of the stewardesses, waitresses and secretaries on the staff of the delegation. Those of us from the Foreign Ministry were usually careful because Gromyko did not like us drinking and talking too much. But we knew that he, unlike Khrushchev, would never appear in the bar, considering it beneath his dignity.

Although Khrushchev valued Gromyko's diplomatic experience, he could not resist teasing him, often calling him an arid bureaucrat. "Look at that," Khrushchev would say, nodding toward Gromyko and smiling. "How young Andrei Andreyevich looks." (He really did look very young for his years.) "He doesn't have a single gray hair. It's obvious he just sits in a cozy little place and drinks tea." These jests were not at all pleasing to Gromyko, but he always managed to force a smile.

Khrushchev said on another occasion, "Andrei Andreyevich is an excellent diplomat and tactician; he knows negotiations from A to Z. But as an ideologist and theoretician he's rather poor. He has little taste for theorizing. But we're working on him. We'll make something of him yet."

One evening Khrushchev, who as usual had been drinking heavily, decided to have some fun with Nikolai Podgorny, who at the time held Khrushchev's old job as party boss of the Ukraine and later became a member of the Politburo. Khrushchev turned to Podgorny. "Why don't you dance a *gopak* for us? I miss Ukrainian dances and songs."

The *gopak* is a strenuous national dance, performed in a squatting position, with the men rapidly kicking one leg out and then the other, all the time moving around a large circle. Podgorny looked at Khrushchev in amazement. He was in his 60s. Khrushchev egged him on. Podgorny realized his leader was not joking. With obvious reluctance, he stood up and awkwardly bobbed up and down a few times. Khrushchev clapped loudly and praised Podgorny. "Well done!" he said. "You are in the right place there in Kiev."

Emboldened by the gregarious informality aboard ship, I decided to risk voicing my concerns about our latest approach to disarmament. The promise of "serious negotiations" on arms reductions had drawn me to the Foreign Ministry, but now there was a shift away from realistic talks toward the propaganda program of general and complete disarmament. Cautiously, I suggested to Khrushchev that propaganda could not replace the real talks needed to make progress in stopping the arms race.

I was somewhat surprised that he heard me out. Then he said that there could be two levels of work in the field: his campaign for general and complete disarmament as a propaganda effort with a foundation of real negotiations on concrete, if limited steps. "Every vegetable has its season," he said. "Never forget the appeal that the idea of disarmament has in the outside world. All you have to do is say, 'I'm in favor of it,' and that pays big dividends."

Admitting with a grin that he expected neither the West nor the Soviet Union to disarm completely, he added, "A seductive slogan is the most powerful political instrument. The Americans don't understand that. They only hurt themselves in struggling against the idea of general and complete disarmament. What they are doing is as futile as Don Quixote's fighting the windmills." Propaganda and true negotiations, he said, should be not contradictory but complementary.

After we sailed south to avoid the storm, Khrushchev began to spend more time on deck. Once I saw him standing alone, leaning on the ship's railing and looking through his binoculars at the bright ocean. Just as I approached him his arm slipped and he lost his balance. I held him up. He turned to me and said with a gay sparkle in his eyes, "If I were to fall overboard that wouldn't be a calamity. Right now we aren't too far from Cuba, and they'd probably receive me there better than the Americans will in New York.

"I hope," he mused more seriously, "that Cuba will become a beacon of socialism in Latin America. Castro offers that hope.

and the Americans are helping us." He said that instead of establishing normal relations with Cuba, the U.S. was doing all it could to drive Castro to the wall by organizing a campaign against him, stirring up the Latin American countries and imposing an economic blockade on Cuba. "That's stupid," he exclaimed, "and it's a result of the howls of zealous anti-Communists in the U.S. who see red everywhere, though possibly something is only rose-colored or even white."

Then, having smacked his lips with gusto as if anticipating a tasty meal, he predicted, "Castro will have to gravitate to us like an iron filing to a magnet."

While Cuba was a subject that gave him pleasure, the Congo was an annoyance to him. Throughout the voyage he was obsessed with the U.N.'s involvement in the Congo, especially the performance of the U.N. peacekeeping troops there and the activities of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold. "I spit on the U.N.," he raged. "It's not our organization. That good-for-nothing Ham [the Russian word for boor applied as a nickname to the U.N. chief] is sticking his nose in important affairs which are none of his business. He has seized authority that doesn't belong to him. He must pay for that. We have to get rid of him by any means. We'll really make it hot for him," he growled.

PUNCTUATING A POINT AT THE U.N., 1960

"We were stunned at Khrushchev's behavior."

Khrushchev's personal threat against Hammarskjold returned to my memory in September 1961, when the Secretary-General died in a mysterious plane crash in the Congo. Friends working on African affairs once told me they had seen a top-secret KGB report indicating that the aircraft had been shot down by pro-Soviet Congolese forces penetrated and guided by operatives from the U.S.S.R.

After our arrival in New York, during a session at the U.N., Spain's Foreign Minister Fernando Castiella took the floor to respond to an attack by Khrushchev on General Franco. Khrushchev blew up. He began to shout insults at the Spaniard, punctuating them by pounding his fists on the desk and then, having removed his shoe, banging it resoundingly on the desk too. Then he leaped from his chair and brandished his fists at the frail, undersized Castiella, who assumed a comical defensive pose. Security guards rushed up and separated them. We were stunned at Khrushchev's behavior. At the mission afterward, everyone was embarrassed and upset. Gromyko, noted for his strict, impeccable behavior, was white-lipped with agitation. But Khrushchev acted as if nothing at all had happened. He was laughing loudly and joking. It had been necessary, he said, to "inject a little life into the stuffy atmosphere of the U.N."

■ KENNEDY AND THE MISSILE CRISIS

When Khrushchev left New York in mid-October 1960, the U.S. was nearing its presidential election. Publicly, Khrushchev claimed to be indifferent to the outcome. He had called Richard Nixon and John Kennedy "a pair of boots," explaining: "You can't say which is better, the left or the right." In private he had a different attitude. At a luncheon before his departure, he became angry at the mention of Nixon's name: "He's a typical product of McCarthyism, a puppet of the most reactionary circles in the U.S. We'll never be able to find a common language with him." He said that "we can influence the American presidential election." He related how he saw through the Americans when the Eisenhower Administration asked us to release U-2 Pilot Powers. "We would never give Nixon such a present!" he exclaimed.

Khrushchev and Kennedy met in Vienna in June 1961. Leonid Zamyatin, deputy chief of the Department of the U.S. in the Foreign Ministry, told me about it. Zamyatin's amazing aplomb and self-assurance helped compensate for a lack of talent and enabled him to promote himself. He later became director-general of TASS and eventually chief of the Central Committee's International Information Department. With Georgi Arbatov and Vadim Zagladin, he was part of a troika of the most familiar Soviet faces appearing in the West when the Kremlin needed to influence public opinion.

Zamyatin told me that the Vienna meeting had amounted to no more than the two heads of state taking each other's measure. The Premier, Zamyatin said, had concluded that Kennedy was a mere "boy," who would be vulnerable to pressure. "At present," he continued, "Nikita Sergeyevich is thinking about what we can do in our interest and at the same time subject Kennedy to a test of strength."

Khrushchev figured that Kennedy would accept almost anything to avoid nuclear war. The lack of confidence the President displayed during both the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961 and the Berlin Wall crisis four months later further confirmed this view. At the end of 1961 I attended a meeting in the office of Khrushchev's personal assistants. Someone remarked that Khrushchev, to put it mildly, didn't think very highly of Kennedy. At that moment, the Premier entered the room and immediately began to lecture us about Kennedy's "wishy-washy" behavior, saying: "I know for certain that Kennedy doesn't have a strong backbone, nor, generally speaking, does he have the courage to stand up to a serious challenge."

By installing several dozen medium-range missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev aimed to create a nuclear "fist" close to the U.S. The Soviet Union could get a "cheap" nuclear deterrent that would threaten New York, Washington and other vital centers along the East Coast, accomplishing much with very little.

In the West, there has been a view that Khrushchev undertook the Cuban operation at the instigation of the military. This is incorrect. Khrushchev imposed an arbitrary decision on the political and military leaders. They were not interested in "quick fixes" and surrogate nuclear missile capability. They wanted solid, long-range programs to achieve parity with the U.S. in both quantity and quality of strategic nuclear weaponry

and later to pursue superiority. That would take time and would involve astronomical expense, but there was no risk. But such expenditures would inevitably undermine Khrushchev's plans to aid the consumer. Khrushchev had unrealistically committed himself with widely touted promises "to catch up with and surpass America" by 1970 in overall production. He wanted guns and butter, or a modest amount of butter anyway.

Once the Cuban missile crisis developed, in October 1962, Khrushchev had only two options: nuclear war, for which the U.S. was much better prepared; or a war limited to the area, also advantageous to the U.S. Given the American geographical position and strength in the area, the Soviets would find it costly to penetrate the blockade imposed by Kennedy or defend their ships. Vladimir Buzykin, head of the Latin American Department of the Foreign Ministry, told me that there was no contingency plan in the event the Cuban operation failed. By establishing the quarantine, Kennedy had presented Khrushchev with a *fait accompli* instead of the other way around.

As a result of the missile crisis, military arguments prevailed: the Soviet Union opted for numbers and quality of strategic nuclear weapons. In ensuing years, whenever opposition to the idea was voiced, someone would be sure to say, "Remember Cuba?" I recall a usually calm Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov declaring emotionally that in the future we would "never tolerate such humiliation as we suffered in the missile crisis." Khrushchev had to forget butter.

■ SUDDEN CHANGES AT THE TOP

In the summer of 1963 I joined the Soviet mission to the U.N. Ambassador Nikolai Fedorenko, head of the mission, was an elegant man and a lenient boss whose consuming interest in foreign affairs lay in China. He was a true expert, a member of the Academy of Sciences. As time went on, he delegated more and more responsibility to others and retreated into scholarly pursuits. This earned him Gromyko's distrust.

To Gromyko, there could be no greater sin than a casual approach to one's duties. His reputation had earned him the nickname Grom, the Russian word for thunder. One victim of his thunderbolts was Rolland Timerbayev, a senior political officer in the U.N. mission, who had the thankless task of supervising the mission's move from Park Avenue to East 67th Street. When Gromyko was shown the completed work that autumn, he spent more than half an hour stuck between floors in a faulty elevator. Finally freed, he decided that Timerbayev should have a new career. "Let him sit at the reception desk and keep an eye on the elevator to make sure it's working." The poor man occupied his new post for the rest of Gromyko's stay.

But Gromyko's annoyance with Fedorenko went further than deep dislike for his personal style—long hair, flashy clothes, bow ties, all of which clashed with the strict, official appearance Gromyko thought should be standard for serious men. Gromyko also envied his status in the Academy of Sciences. Fedorenko, like Yakov Malik, who later replaced him as Ambassador, detested Gromyko. But unlike Malik, who was a lion with his subordinates and a mouse with Gromyko, Fedorenko did not fear the minister.

By 1963, after the Cuban missile crisis, Khrushchev's view of Kennedy had changed. He perceived Kennedy as the one who had accelerated improvement of relations and as a man of strength and determination, the one thing the Kremlin understands and respects.

When Kennedy was shot, Moscow firmly believed that the assassination was a scheme by "reactionary forces" within the U.S. seeking to damage the new trend in relations. The Kremlin ridiculed the Warren Commission's conclusion that Oswald had acted on his own. There was widespread specula-

■ America the Baffling: How the Soviets See It

While intrigued by American freedoms, political plurality and cultural diversity, the Soviet leadership is unable to comprehend fully the mechanism of the U.S. political system. There is little grasp of the relationship of American Congressmen to their constituencies, the real role of public opinion and that worst bugaboo, freedom of information, which they see as a threat to security. The idealism of the American Revolution, carried over into both domestic and foreign policy more than 200 years later, the Soviets perceive as crippling naiveté. Its manifestations sometimes make them doubt American seriousness. Because such institutions are nonexistent in their own country, the Soviets are simply baffled by the American system.

It puzzles them how a complex and little-regulated society can maintain such a high level of production, efficiency and technological innovation. Many are inclined toward the fantastic notion that there must be a secret control center somewhere in the U.S. They continue to chew on Lenin's dogma that bourgeois governments are just the "servants" of monopoly capital. Is that not the secret control center?

The great gap in Soviet understanding of U.S. policies and practices sometimes means that even experienced message carriers and advisers of the Politburo like Anatoly Dobrynin, the longtime Ambassador in Washington, do not necessarily convey accurate information. Americans would be astonished if they knew how little Gromyko, who has lived in America and visits regularly, knows about day-to-day life in their country. One of Dobrynin's important functions has been to correct the limited and distorted picture Soviet rulers have of America. On a visit to New York, Gromyko, spooning honey into his tea, remarked that American bees were turning out a distinctly poor product.

The mission, in fact, had served the Foreign Minister the cheapest available honey, as I explained to him. He immediately wanted to know the price, which he thought was high, and then the cost of other goods—better honey, shirts, Manhattan apartments. As Dobrynin and I answered his questions, Gromyko expressed surprise at the expense of each item. He had never visited American stores and knew barely anything of the costs or real standard of living in the U.S.

Dobrynin tried to enlighten him in a broader way. To please Gromyko, he agreed that prices were high (though he knew they were not, compared with the portion of their salaries Soviets must spend for food and consumer goods). But he also added that the variety of items available in American markets was extensive. Gromyko wrinkled his nose in a characteristic gesture of distaste for an inconvenient truth. "Maybe you're right," he admitted, "but they have so many problems too. Poverty. Massive unemployment. Race hatred."

"Of course there are those things. No one denies that." Dobrynin sugared the pill he wanted Gromyko to swallow. "But it seems to me that Soviet correspondents tend to overemphasize that side of things. They create a mistaken impression of the situation here. You know, when I go home to Moscow, people ask me about America as though they thought it was about to fall apart." He laughed loudly. "Our people should think more realistically. They ought to have more accurate information, not just the exaggerations of hack writers."

Gromyko mulled this for a bit before conceding that Soviet propaganda would be sounder if it came closer to reality and that Soviet journalists were too likely to report what they thought Moscow wanted to hear. In practical terms, however, the lesson was wasted.

tion among Soviet diplomats that Lyndon Johnson, along with the CIA and the Mafia, had masterminded the plot.

Johnson was anathema to Khrushchev. Because he was a Southerner, Moscow considered him a racist (the stereotype of any American politician from below the Mason-Dixon line), an anti-Soviet, and anti-Communist to boot. Further, since Johnson was from Texas, a center of the reactionary forces in the U.S., according to the Soviets, he was associated with the big-time capitalism of the oil industry, also known to be anti-Soviet. He "smells oily," it was said in Moscow.

Almost a year later, in October 1964, there was an upheaval in our leadership—another palace coup against Khrushchev, this time successful. Americans invariably seek a single main reason for any important action. Soviets don't approach things that way. There were many reasons—all important—why Khrushchev was evicted from power.

Bureaucrats had been alarmed over the new rules governing party organization that Khrushchev had virtually imposed. City and regional officials were to have more frequent elections and a tenure of no more than six years. Nothing could have disturbed functionaries more. They could no longer count on a sinecure as a lifelong career.

Khrushchev's revelation of Stalin's crimes antagonized the KGB. The military resented his decision to reduce excess manpower in the army, forcing a large number of officers into retirement. His adventure in Cuba had ended in disgrace.

If there was a last straw, however, it was probably his determination to order yet another shake-up of the party apparatus at the coming November plenum of the Central Committee. This time it was to involve not only mid-level apparatchiki but higher cadre as well. Thus he encroached upon the holy of holies, the sanctum of the ruling class. Khrushchev's meddling could no longer be tolerated.

ISRAEL DEMOLISHES EGYPT'S AIR FORCE, 1967

"The Egyptian [said], 'We shall see who wins this war.'"

Fedorenko told me what happened next. Mikhail Suslov and Alexei Kosygin were the prime movers against Khrushchev. Suslov seemed satisfied to be the party patriarch and main ideologist. Kosygin was happy to be Chairman of the Council of Ministers and play the major role in both domestic economic and foreign policies. But it was hard for them to agree on who should be First Secretary of the Central Committee.

They finally settled on a dark horse: Leonid Brezhnev, then the figurehead Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the rubber-stamp parliament. They did not anticipate his further advance. Aware of his rather low intellect, they were convinced that this unprepossessing man would be unable to hold his own against them.

One exception was Gromyko. During Khrushchev's time he made a decision, which proved to be inspired, to cultivate Brezhnev. While others saw Brezhnev as a colorless, unimaginative party careerist without distinction, luck and instinct made Gromyko see something more. Gromyko took Brezhnev's responsibilities as nominal head of state seriously.

Gromyko also strengthened his personal ties to Brezhnev, taking up hunting so that he could join Brezhnev at his favorite sport. Until then, Gromyko had limited his exercise to morning workouts with barbells and occasional walks. If his hunting started as a political avocation, however, it became a real delight to him. I have never seen him as cheerful as he was one Sunday in 1972 when he entered his Vnukovo dacha before lunchtime proudly bearing a mangled duck he had brought down that morning, smiling with a sincere pleasure he rarely, if ever, shows the world. Through Brezhnev, whom he called by the nickname Lyonya, Gromyko achieved not just security but genuine authority over Soviet foreign policy.

Brezhnev moved very cautiously at first. A professional party apparatchik, he began to strengthen his position among his cronies and those with similar experiences and like views. By the spring of 1966, when I arrived back in Moscow from New York, Brezhnev had created a broader base of support. His power was becoming entrenched. Moscow jokesters were among the first to depict the attitude of the new leadership. Fedorenko told me a story that illustrated Brezhnev's power and the age-old Russian love of wordplay. A worker asked Brezhnev how to address him. He responded bashfully: "Just call me Ilyich." That was Brezhnev's patronymic—the same as Lenin's—and indicated that Brezhnev was far from bashful.

I saw that the egotistical image portrayed in the anecdotes around town was not far off the mark when I met Brezhnev while working on President de Gaulle's visit to Moscow in June 1966. For a long time after World War II, De Gaulle was portrayed by students at the Institute of International Relations as a chicken-brained cog in the military wheel, with pompous ambitions and fascistic dictatorial tendencies. Top political people regularly disparaged him, calling him a "long-nosed frog's legs." But now he was paying an official visit to Moscow, and I was asked to help in preparations.

During a meeting about the De Gaulle visit, I was struck by the contrast between Brezhnev and Khrushchev. Brezhnev's well-tailored suit, an elegant shirt with French cuffs and a pretentiously mannered style were very far from Khrushchev's baggy clothes and hearty, unaffected approach. Brezhnev exuded smug self-confidence, but he was also pleasant and cordial. After some small talk he slowly read the material prepared by us. I sensed in his platitudinous observations about our proposals that he was not sure what he was talking about.

Unlike Khrushchev, Brezhnev seemed to have no ideas of his own to contribute. He seemed to dramatize the truth of another joke making the rounds: "There can be no personality cult where there is no personality." Brezhnev was certainly no visionary, or even an intellectual. His strength was that he was a man of unusual organizational ability. He also had a gift for compromise and was adept at maintaining a fine balance among different—even opposing—forces. He was an uninspiring leader whose illusion of strong and steady helmsmanship was mainly a scaffolding built by his subordinates.

Kosygin retained his role as Kremlin spokesman on foreign affairs, although his position was much weakened by Brezhnev's

expanded authority in the field. Kosygin had risen and survived by pursuing a technocrat's career. Dry even by Soviet standards, free of personal foibles or idiosyncrasies, he was so ascetic that in New York, his daughter Ludmilla, armed with a long shopping list of her own, could not think of anything to buy that her father would want or need.

I believed that Kosygin, out of self-preservation, deliberately chose to avoid the many intrigues and power plays in the Kremlin. Later on, Brezhnev pushed him still further aside, and several times Kosygin submitted his resignation to the Politburo. Although there was little rapport between the two men, Brezhnev turned these offers down and continued to pretend respect for Kosygin while in fact ignoring his views more and more. Once Brezhnev took command of foreign affairs, he edged Kosygin aside altogether and moved Gromyko from the role of mentor and confidant to that of co-architect.

■ THE SIX-DAY WAR

On Sunday evening, June 4, 1967, I was with Fedorenko at Glen Cove. Over a glass of cognac we discussed the growing tensions in the Middle East. About 4 a.m. the next morning we got word that war had broken out between Egypt and Israel. Fedorenko said we should return to the Soviet mission immediately for instructions from Moscow.

Our first meeting was with the Egyptian representative, Mohammed El-Kony, a total mediocrity. He was cheerful, insisting that reports of Egypt's loss of its air force were inaccurate. "We deceived the Israelis. They bombed some of our false airfields, where we deliberately placed fake plywood airplane models. We shall see who wins this war."

GRECHKO AFTER CHINA'S BORDER ATTACK, 1969

"The Defense Minister advocated a plan 'to get rid of the Chinese threat.'"

I was far from sure his evaluation was correct, and I said as much to Fedorenko, who agreed: "One can hardly trust the Arabs. There is no limit to their stupidity. Let's wait and see what Moscow says."

In the Security Council, the figure who stood out was Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, the American permanent representative, our vigorous and formidable opponent. Fedorenko and others in our delegation referred to him as a "slick Jew who could fool the devil himself." But while they disparaged him, they envied his talents.

Goldberg insisted there be an immediate cease-fire. He informally suggested that the cease-fire be coupled with a pullback of Israeli and Arab forces (Syria, Jordan and Iraq had also begun operations against Israel). I advised Fedorenko to try to influence the Arabs to accept. He agreed, but El-Kony was adamant. I thought the Arabs were making a terrible mistake. They seemed to be quickly losing the war.

Around mid-morning on June 6, we received a telephone call on an open line from Moscow—an extraordinary occurrence—from the Deputy Foreign Minister, Vladimir Semyonov. Our new orders were to accept Goldberg's idea. If it proved impossible to get a decision on that basis, we were to agree to the Security Council's proposed resolution on a cease-fire as the first step. The instructions, signed by Gromyko, stressed, "You must do that, even if the Arab countries do not agree—repeat do not agree."

When Fedorenko finally got to Goldberg, it was too late. The U.S. now insisted only upon an immediate cease-fire. The battle had quickly proved decisively to favor Israel, and the U.S. was no longer willing to settle for a pullback.

The lesson of the Six-Day War should have been clear. Whether the client was Egypt or Syria, South Yemen, Iraq or the Palestinians, the Kremlin's purpose was always the same: to establish and widen Soviet power in the Middle East, to use the area and its rivalries as a means of contesting and undermining Western strength. Party policymakers regarded the Arab world as fertile ground for furthering Soviet ideology. Military strategists saw its geography in terms of transit and servicing for Soviet ships in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, as staging areas for troops, as proving grounds for Soviet weaponry. Against these drives diplomats could bring little moderating force to bear.

But while the Soviet Union was ready to supply weapons to some Arab countries, to train their armies with Soviet advisers, to give them economic aid, it was not prepared to risk military confrontation with the U.S. in the region. Soviet leaders were eager to establish their influence in Arab countries, but had never been willing to defend their clients effectively. On the contrary, the war demonstrated the Soviet willingness to turn away from these countries in a critical moment after having encouraged the passions that precipitated the showdown.

■ TROUBLESOME NEIGHBORS

The following year, in early August 1968, I left New York for vacation in the Soviet Union. When I arrived at the Foreign Ministry in Moscow, I found the offices of Gromyko and Kuznetsov in turmoil. In Czechoslovakia, liberalizing reforms had got out of hand, at least in the Politburo's view, and led to an invasion by Soviet tanks and troops in August 1968.

After Khrushchev's ouster, the military was directed by the party Presidium to create a mobile force for such emergencies, for use not only in Soviet bloc countries but in any part of the world. This program provided for construction of aircraft carriers, helicopters and military transport planes capable of carrying light tanks, cannons and tactical missiles, and also for training a special paratrooper force headed by officers who spoke foreign languages. The mobile force is much stronger and more sophisticated today than when it moved against the Prague government in 1968. When I learned of the preparations for an invasion of Czechoslovakia, I felt lucky not to be in New York trying to defend the Soviet position.

The next major crisis I witnessed came in early March 1969, and that one I did observe from New York. Fedorenko's successor Yakov Malik and I were in his office when the code cable operator gave Malik a dispatch from Moscow marked VERY URGENT. A Chinese army unit had invaded Damansky

Island, in the Ussuri River on the Soviet-Chinese border, killing and wounding several dozen Soviet soldiers. This was the latest—and worst—of a series of border incidents over several years. Malik turned pale. I had seen him angry many times, but this was a level of fury I had never witnessed in him.

"Now those squint-eyed bastards will get a lesson they'll never forget," he screamed. "Who do they think they are? We'll kill those yellow sons of bitches." He raved on, calling the Chinese all the names he could think of, names in which the Russian language is rich.

The pre-eminent Soviet expert on Asia, and China in particular, was Mikhail Kapitsa. Erudite and capable, gregarious and jovial, Kapitsa would undoubtedly have moved faster if he had not received a black mark in his dossier and a deep scar on his head when, as Ambassador to Pakistan in 1961, he took up with his driver's wife. The chauffeur discovered the liaison. Rushing into the Ambassador's office, where Kapitsa was using his couch as a bed, the infuriated husband clouted the diplomat on the head with a crowbar. He might have killed Kapitsa if aides had not come to his rescue. But the incident was forgiven because Kapitsa's expertise was needed.

I later asked Kapitsa how it could have happened that more than 30 of our frontier guards had been killed on Damansky Island and why they had been so obviously unprepared to respond effectively. "The Chinese completely surprised us," he answered. "The Politburo, despite all the tensions in our relations with Peking, had no idea they would do anything like that." According to Kapitsa, the events on Damansky had had the effect of an electric shock on Moscow. The Politburo was terrified that the Chinese might make a large-scale intrusion into Soviet territory that China claimed. A nightmare vision of invasion by millions of Chinese made the Soviet leaders almost frantic. Despite our overwhelming superiority in weaponry, it would not be easy to cope with an assault of such magnitude.

Kapitsa also said the Soviet leadership had come close to using nuclear arms on China. He had been at the Politburo discussion. He said that Marshal Andrei Grechko, the Defense Minister, actively advocated a plan "once and for all to get rid of the Chinese threat." Grechko, a dim-witted martinet replaced by Dimitri Ustinov in 1976, called for unrestricted use of the multimegaton bomb known in the West as the "blockbuster." The bomb would release enormous amounts of radioactive fallout, not only killing millions of Chinese but threatening Soviet citizens in the Far East and people in other countries bordering China.

Fortunately, not many military men shared Grechko's mad, bellicose stance. In 1970 I talked with Nikolai Ogarkov, a well-educated, sophisticated and intelligent officer. Later named First Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of the General Staff, he has since been demoted. Ogarkov took a more realistic view of the prospect of war with China. He felt that the Soviet Union could not attack China with a nuclear barrage because it would inevitably mean world war.



GROMYKO OUTSIDE THE FOREIGN MINISTRY

"His daughter once said, 'All he sees of Moscow is the view from his car.'"

The alternative was to use a limited number of nuclear weapons in a "surgical operation" to intimidate the Chinese and destroy their nuclear facilities. But, according to Ogarkov, a bomb or two would hardly annihilate a country like China, and the Chinese, with their vast population and deep knowledge and experience of guerrilla warfare, would fight unrelentingly. The Soviet Union would be mired in an endless war with consequences similar to those suffered by America in Viet Nam.

Grechko's opponents prevailed, happily, and no military option was exercised, nuclear or otherwise. But the long border with China remained a highly volatile area.

■ AT GROMYKO'S RIGHT HAND

When Gromyko, on a visit to New York in 1969, offered me a post as his adviser, I accepted with alacrity and anticipation. In April 1970 my wife Lina, my daughter Anna, then eight years old, and I left New York to take up my new duties.

Gromyko's senior assistant was Vasily Makarov. High-ranking diplomats gave him expensive presents to grease the way for their reports to Gromyko or their appointments to coveted jobs. Makarov accepted these as his due; he would even commission purchases for himself, once telling me pointedly how much he needed a rug of a certain size and color.

Makarov was a surly, pompous, sarcastic contrast to Gromyko's cool but generally courteous personality. Gromyko kept him as the perfect watchdog. He scared off intruders. He sheltered his master from unnecessary contacts with lesser humans. Gromyko is an efficient machine, constructed to perform and to endure, and almost completely devoid of human warmth. He can joke and he can rage, but underlying any such expression is a cold discipline that makes him formidable as a superior or as an adversary.

Gromyko inhabits a cocoon as though born to it. I do not believe he has ever had close friends. Inside the Stalin-era skyscraper that houses the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Trade, Gromyko takes a special elevator, reserved for him and a few very senior officials, straight to his seventh-floor office. There, except for a meal in a private dining room, he stays all day, reading those documents that Makarov and others on his personal staff feel it is essential to show him, seeing a carefully screened group of senior ministry officials or top foreign visitors, talking on the special Kremlin telephone system, the *Vertushka*, to those of his rank outside the ministry.

As his daughter Emilia once said to me, "My father lives in the skies. For 25 years he has not set foot on the streets of Moscow. All he sees is the view from his car window."

At the same time, he is an excellent family man; he has a well-deserved reputation for being faithful and solicitous to his wife Lidiya. Her influence upon him is considerable; she is the one person he listens to attentively. Her advice extends beyond their personal life to government affairs, particularly in the selection of people for top posts at the ministry. A ministry wag once dubbed her "the real chief of the personnel department."

Gromyko is a tough boss. Not only does he expect anyone he calls to appear instantly, but his most desultory suggestion is to be observed as a crisis order. Shortly after I joined his staff, he put me to work on his address to the U.N. in the fall and told me casually to find the right people to work on the project. Early the following week he asked me whom I had chosen. I said I would soon have a roster for him. His head snapped toward me, and he fixed me with a finger stabbing the air as he raved for a good half-hour about my being a stupid, irresponsible ass who did not have the ears to hear his instructions. Yet the next day he greeted me in his usual manner.

An order to report to his office inevitably strikes dread in the recipient, even a Deputy Foreign Minister. Impatience rather than vindictiveness is Gromyko's hallmark in dealing with those who rank beneath him. That is typical of top Soviet bureaucrats. They are rude to their underlings to demonstrate their own importance. Gromyko will often call a meeting of his three or four ranking assistants and, if he is in a bad mood, vilify them as "dolts" or "schoolboys" who are "not fit to work in the Foreign Ministry." A report with a few minor errors or a document submitted late can touch off one of these explosions, though it usually passes quickly.

Gromyko has little interest in the Third World. He would rarely see Foreign Ministry officials concerned with developing countries and, despite countless invitations, has never visited any black African nation. Except for Cuba, he has never been to a Latin American country. China interests him primarily through the prism of Moscow-Washington-Peking politics. I once had an argument about all this with Vadim Zagladin, deputy to Boris Ponomarev, chief of the Central Committee's International Department. Speaking of Africa, I remarked on the futility of "playing with some pissant little 'liberation' committees that come into being overnight and disappear after a few months." Zagladin's response was revealing: "You sound just like your boss. Gromyko has no smell for the ideological side of things. He's just too pragmatic, and so are you. You Foreign Ministry people don't understand the power of Communist ideas in the world and the way to exploit them."

Gromyko sent me abroad several times as his representative. My diplomatic mission to Africa in 1971 was depressingly instructive. Because of economic deficiencies and bureaucratic inertia at home we would be hard put to meet the expectations our expansionist diplomacy aroused. Instead of gaining friends, we would, in many instances, lose credibility. In their own policies toward the Third World, it seemed difficult for Americans to realize that a number of these initially Moscow-oriented countries did not want to emulate the Soviet model. The West's great advantage is that, except in a state of war, in the long run economic assistance will always pay bigger dividends than will military aid.

That same year, 1971, I was also sent to sound out Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania on a treaty to liquidate chemical and biological weapons. The Soviet Union has consistently depicted itself as a leader in the effort to destroy these ghastly weapons. In fact, it has always continued to expand its sophisticated chemical and biological weapons production programs.

The military branch responsible for this sickening business has a huge department in the Defense Ministry. It has rejected any kind of international control. Several times I asked officials there why they were so adamant. The response: control [in the Soviet context, this word usually means on-site inspection] was out of the question because it could reveal the extent of the development of these weapons and Soviet readiness for their eventual use. There is no question that the U.S.S.R. is much better prepared than the U.S. for this type of warfare.

Because of my U.N. work, Gromyko regarded me as something of a Middle East expert. He ordered me to follow events in the area. Analysts in the Middle East Department were worried. "Things are bad," one of them told me early in 1971, referring to the fact that the Egyptians were stalling Moscow on concluding a long-sought treaty of friendship designed to bind Cairo firmly into an alliance. A friend told me, "Opinions are beginning to solidify in the leadership that we have to be rid of [Egyptian President Anwar] Sadat. Sadat is a scoundrel. The only problem is that we don't have a really strong figure to take over from him. But there are some possibilities."

I must have showed my surprise. "Are people really planning something? How do you know about this?"

"I don't know all the details myself," he admitted. "But I have my own contacts with the KGB. They've gone far enough in thinking this out so that they have a general plan to take care of Sadat—to liquidate him. Of course, not by their own hands. They have people, though, who are getting ready to act."

A friend on the Central Committee staff also remarked to me that Sadat should go "one way or another." In a short time, however, the option vanished: Sadat moved against his domestic opposition, arresting his Vice President, Ali Sabry, whom we favored, and six other Cabinet members, and eventually charging them with high treason.

■ NIXON, KISSINGER AND DÉTENTE

I was extensively involved in preparing for Richard Nixon's visit to Moscow in May 1972. In a pre-summit meeting in Gromyko's office, as we were trying to think of a suitable gift

■ The *Nomenklatura*, A Fossilized Elite

My personal reward for being Gromyko's adviser was that I became a member of the *nomenklatura* hierarchy. This is a list of the most important posts in the party, government administration and other institutions. These positions are filled by direct party appointment or with party approval. *Nomenklatura* is a caste system that applies only to the elite class. Its many levels enjoy varying degrees of privilege according to rank. For Politburo members there is no limit or restriction on privileges. Below this level the grading structure begins. The Central Committee defines the place of anyone eligible for inclusion in the various categories: high party apparatchiki, Cabinet ministers, diplomats or individuals with unusual abilities or exceptional talents such as artists, scientists, Olympic champions and the like. Factory workers, farmers, engineers, lawyers, doctors, store managers and other private citizens are excluded.

Members of the elite have extensive privileges: high salaries, good apartments, dachas, cars with chauffeurs, special railway cars and accommodations, VIP treatment at airports, resorts and hospitals off limits to outsiders, special schools for their children, access to stores selling consumer goods and food at reduced prices. They live far removed from the common man and, indeed, have to go out of their way if they wish to rub elbows with the less exalted. The highest group in the *nomenklatura* is separated from most citizens by a barrier as psychologically imposing as the Great Wall of China. This class constitutes virtually a state within a state.

Those designated under the system number many thousands. They form the backbone of the status quo in the governmental and societal structure. They will permit no one to transform that society or alter its foreign or domestic policy in any way that may affect their perquisites. It is no small irony to know that this fossilized elite controls the nation that calls on other countries to renounce stability for revolution, to give up privilege for the blessings of proletarianism.

for Nixon, Gromyko remarked, "Almost all Americans have some kind of hobby. Does anyone know what Nixon's is?" After a moment of head shaking around the table, Gromyko said dryly, "I think what he'd really like is a guarantee to stay in the White House forever." Soviet leaders did find in Nixon's behavior definite similarities to their own, and concluded that it might be possible to deal with him in the world of realpolitik.

When Henry Kissinger had begun his triangular diplomacy by secretly visiting Peking the year before, it was a shock to the Soviet leadership. Gromyko went about for weeks with a black expression. His deputy Makarov said that Brezhnev had given Gromyko a thorough dressing-down for not anticipating the American-Chinese rapprochement.

DEALING WITH KISSINGER, 1972

"'He's as slippery as a snake.' Gromyko made his observation without hostility."

At the same time, the Americans were able to put in place the Soviet side of the triangle by promising to accept the principle of equality between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. This was the most powerful boost to Soviet egos, suffering for years under an inferiority complex. Moscow would have been happy if the summit meeting with Nixon had produced nothing more than a declaration of principles including equality.

At one point I teased Anatoli Dobrynin about how easy a time he must be having in Washington with Kissinger. Dobrynin took my remark seriously and blurted out that Kissinger was not as nice in most negotiations and that you had to be constantly alert with him. "Before you can open your mouth, he'll find out things he can use against you later," he said.

Gromyko interjected, "And he's as slippery as a snake—he doesn't let anyone see what's on his mind." Gromyko made his observation without any hostility. Even with an adversary, what counted with Gromyko was seriousness. He found Kissinger serious. He took enormous pains to prepare for each meeting with him, approaching the sessions with the eagerness of a bridegroom on his wedding night.

The Soviet leaders enjoyed working with Kissinger so much that in Gromyko's inner cabinet after the Moscow summit he was referred to by his Russian nickname, Kisa (pussycat). In no way did this mean that they viewed him as easy to deal with or as being in their corner, but it has always been the Russian custom to devise fond nicknames for people they like and respect.

Gromyko assesses the U.S. in terms of its might and its potential as a rival in world affairs. Like many of his colleagues, Gromyko respects American power. Unlike a number of others, however, he strongly believes that the U.S. is not only the Soviet Union's main adversary but in some respects also a partner, as long as the interests of both nations—temporary or more long term—are parallel or coincide. To the extent that he can, he pursues a course of making the relationship with America the most important area of diplomacy.

Western speculation has given Gromyko the dubious honor of being the single most influential initiator of the Kremlin's ultrahard line toward the U.S. in the 1980s. This speculation seems to me far wide of the mark. Gromyko was much more an architect of détente with the U.S. than a simple executor, and he is associated with it more intimately than any other present Politburo member. He clashed with the staunchly anti-American Defense Minister Grechko over détente to such an extent that the two men were sometimes not on speaking terms for weeks. Gromyko's views prevailed in the end.

It was in fact Gromyko, not Dobrynin, who was at the Soviet end of the Kissinger-Dobrynin diplomatic channel during the Nixon Administration. When Dobrynin's reports arrived in Moscow, Gromyko was the first to receive them; he decided to whom they should be shown, and his proposals served as the basis for decisions on Soviet-American affairs. Gromyko also tried to restrain—often in vain—the anti-American zeal of that quintessential cold warrior at the U.N., Yakov Malik.

Why, then, has not Gromyko's ascendancy become a moderating factor in helping overcome the chill in relations between Moscow and Washington? The chill, of course, is the result neither of one man's policy, powerful though he may be, nor of any single event. Gromyko shares power with other key partners in the collective leadership that runs the Kremlin. And all of them, including Gromyko, are just now more belligerent and hypersensitive than usual. Not only has the Kremlin suffered serious setbacks, internationally and internally, in recent years, but it is still beleaguered by a transition in leadership. A hard, aggressive response and tight cohesion among themselves are the traditional Soviet defensive reflex whenever the leaders feel that the West might think them vulnerable.

This is also Gromyko's philosophy. But it is quite possible that he is even more distressed than his colleagues, as he views the best achievements of his life's work crumbling. Still, it is likely that, barring illness or accident, Gromyko will be around for some time. And I would not be surprised to see him, like the persistent bulldog he is and at the proper time, again try to restore Soviet-American détente, even if he must do it—in one of his own favorite phrases—"brick by brick." ■

■ Next Week

"If Machiavelli were alive and living in the Soviet elite today, he would be a student, not a professor." So writes Arkady Shevchenko in the second and concluding excerpt from his memoirs, to appear next week in TIME. Shevchenko recounts how, finally fed up with the Soviet system despite his privileged place in it, he seeks and is promised asylum in the U.S.—but only after he agrees to become "a reluctant spy." For the next 2½ years he lives in constant fear of discovery by the KGB and in constant guilt about the family he might have to leave behind. In 1978 he finally comes in from the cold, but with anguishing results.

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SPECIAL SECTION

BREAKING WITH MOSCOW: PART II

The Reluctant Spy

By Arkady Shevchenko

"I've decided to break with my government, and I want to know in advance what the American reaction would be if I asked for asylum." With that startling declaration to an American acquaintance at an official dinner in 1975, Arkady Shevchenko passed the point of no return. In the 2½ years that followed, he fed secrets to the CIA as a self-described "reluctant spy." When he finally broke openly with Moscow in 1978, he became the highest-ranking Soviet diplomat to defect since World War II.

A protégé of Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Shevchenko became Under Secretary-General of the United Nations at 42 and seemed destined for higher posts at "the Center" in Moscow and abroad. Yet he had already had his fill of a system so byzantine, so interlaced with intrigue that, as he writes, "if Machiavelli were alive and living in the Soviet elite today, he would be a student, not a professor."

In the second and final excerpt from Shevchenko's memoir, Breaking with Moscow, *he recounts his disillusionment with life at the top in the Soviet Union, his recruitment by the CIA, his terror that the KGB would find him out and, after his harrowing double life, his final defection and debriefing by U.S. agents. Shevchenko's is a tale of ambivalence and anguish, with more than a touch of the tawdry. Soon after he came in from the cold, the Soviets let it be known that his wife had committed suicide in Moscow (Shevchenko suspects that she was murdered). Then, when he took up with a woman from an escort service, she sold the story of their relationship to a publisher.*

Chastened, Shevchenko soon afterward married a court reporter he met through his American lawyer (she helped him write his book) and settled in Washington. He now lectures around the country and teaches courses to U.S. diplomats on Soviet foreign policy and negotiating strategy. He does occasional consulting for the CIA, and advised the Reagan Administration as it prepared for last month's Geneva talks between Secretary of State George Shultz and Shevchenko's old boss, Andrei Gromyko.

WHEN VICE IS CALLED VIRTUE

More than anything else, two events propelled me toward defection. Ironically both were promotions. In 1970 Andrei Gromyko, the durable Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, appointed me his personal political adviser. Before that, I had been only a spectator of high politics. Then I discovered what went on behind the scenes, how the system really worked, its unwritten laws. I saw the Soviet leaders as they were, not as they wanted to be seen.

I sat at the same table with Brezhnev, Gromyko and other members of the Politburo, and I learned a great deal about the men who were the masters of the Soviet Union. I saw how easily they called vice virtue, and just as easily reversed the words again. How their hypocrisy and corruption had penetrated their lives, how isolated they were from the population they ruled. Gromyko had not set foot in the streets of Moscow for almost 40 years. Almost all the others were no different.

The falsity of these men was everywhere, from their personal lives to their grand political designs. I watched them playing with détente. I saw them building military strength far beyond the needs of defense and security, at the expense of the Soviet people. I heard them express, with cynical jokes, their willingness to suppress freedom among their allies. I witnessed their duplicity with those who follow the Soviet line in the West or in the Third World, extending even to participation in conspiracies to kill "unsuitable" political figures of other countries. They avidly sought hegemony and were infected with the imperialistic sickness of which they accused others.

It is true that the top leadership contains elements that are more prone to advocate using direct force (some of the orthodox in the Central Committee and in the military) while others favor political measures (some in the Foreign Ministry and in the economic sector). But these are merely differences over means. Soviet leaders are all aggressive, all hawks with respect to the final goals of their policy. From Lenin through Chernenko, and whoever may succeed him, all are cut from the same cloth.

Détente was viewed by the U.S.S.R. not only as a temporary measure but also as a selective policy. The Politburo assumed it to be a tactical maneuver for a certain period that would in no way supersede the Marxist-Leninist idea of the final victory of

Continued

worldwide revolution. One cannot overemphasize that there is no disagreement among Soviet leaders—political or military, young or old—on ultimate goals. They view world development in terms of the continuing struggle between two opposing social and political systems. They believe in the inevitable, if long-forthcoming, victory of Soviet-style socialism.

Despite much touted programs to provide "the highest living standard in the world," Soviet economic experts admitted privately that the gap in consumption between the Soviet Union and the West, narrowed in the 1960s under Nikita Khrushchev, widened under Leonid Brezhnev. What had been achieved was nuclear "overkill" potential, inedible by the population.

In many respects my years as Gromyko's adviser were as revealing to me as Khrushchev's disclosures about Stalin. My feelings came into sharper relief after my appointment as Under Secretary-General of the U.N. in 1973.

It was to inform me of this promotion that Gromyko called me into his office in December 1972. "It has been suggested to me that your name be proposed for the post," he said. One such post is traditionally reserved for a Soviet. Gromyko needed someone in New York who belonged to his inner circle, as he had in Washington in Anatoly Dobrynin. And no doubt Gromyko's wife, Lidiya Dmitriyevna, would welcome the idea of my appointment. She and my wife Lina had become increasingly friendly.

SUSLOV LECTURES SHEVCHENKO ON HIS NEW DUTIES

"The Soviet Union's task, he said, was to prevent new, developing countries from falling victim to neocolonialist and bourgeois ideology."

As preparations for my new posting continued, I suggested that it might be a good idea for me to develop good working relations with the Secretary-General of the U.N., Kurt Waldheim. Gromyko frowned. "What important questions can you talk about with Waldheim? Neither he nor the U.N. as a whole is a great power. Never forget, Shevchenko, you're a Soviet ambassador first, not an international bureaucrat. Don't hesitate to meet with anybody, even representatives of those countries we publicly attack. I give you authority to see the ambassadors from the Republic of South Africa and South Korea, anyone from whom you can elicit information."

The day after that conversation I was summoned to the office of Mikhail Suslov, one of the last major figures from Stalin's time. He was cold, rigid, brusque, but enjoyed immense prestige. When Khrushchev was ousted in 1964, Suslov could have succeeded him as General Secretary, but he preferred to concentrate on ideological matters. Gromyko had distant and strained relations with him. Suslov, who died in January 1982, gave first priority to Communist doctrine and its purity in practice. Gromyko, more flexible but no less an exponent of Soviet power, dealt with the world as it was, not necessarily as Marxism-Leninism decreed it should be.

Slowly drumming his long, bony fingers on his desk, Suslov declared that I should look upon the U.N. as he did, as a setting to be used to the maximum extent for propagating progressive ideas. The Soviet task, the responsibility of all dedicated Communists, he said, was to prevent new, developing countries from falling victim to neocolonialist and bourgeois ideology.

He added that Gromyko regarded the U.N. first of all as an international organization where caution should be the rule in introducing ideological considerations into debate. "I disagree with that approach," he said flatly.

But Gromyko was able to stand up to Suslov. Gromyko's power was growing under Leonid Brezhnev. That power was formalized in 1973 when he became a Politburo member, one of the few without the usual party background to reach such eminence in the Soviet system. Along with Gromyko, Yuri Andropov, chairman of the Committee for State Security, or KGB, was elected to full Politburo membership that year. The two were not personal friends, but their relations were cordial.

Gromyko and, especially, his wife Lidiya Dmitriyevna were always suspicious of the secret police. My wife Lina told me of her warnings. "Keep as far away as you can from the KGB types," she said. She would stop Lina when she began to talk about personal matters. Pointing to the ceiling, she would whisper in Lina's ear, "We'll talk about that somewhere else."

Andropov's style was different from that of the men who had previously run the KGB. He did not "order" but "suggested," avoiding a peremptory tone. That softness, however, was misleading. He was a man of strong will, self-confident and decisive. An aide compared him to a fine feather bed you jump into only to find that the mattress is filled with bricks.

Gromyko did not look upon Andropov simply as the chief of the KGB. Andropov accorded similar special respect to Gromyko, his superior when he was a diplomat [Ambassador to Hungary, 1954-57]. That was manifested in Andropov's regular visits to the Foreign Ministry, where the two met privately and at length. Gromyko did not reciprocate; unlike others in the Kremlin group, he never went to KGB headquarters.

Gromyko's relations with Konstantin Chernenko were restrained. Chernenko was then chief of the General Department of the Central Committee, in charge of the flow of all documents to the leadership. Gromyko preferred to deal directly with Brezhnev and Andropov. Like others in the Politburo, he considered Chernenko a second-rate opportunist.

A WHIFF OF BLACKMAIL

In the spring of 1973, a month or so before I was due to leave Moscow for my new job, the KGB made a disturbing effort to bring me under its control. I received a summons to report to General Boris Semyonovich Ivanov, who was then deputy head of the KGB's First Chief Directorate, the foreign operations arm. "Congratulations on your new assignment." He smiled. "We're counting on your help. I don't have to tell you that the U.N. is our best watchtower in the West. Our people there collect valuable information. And you can help promote our officers in the Secretariat and protect them in case the CIA or FBI try to make trouble for them."

I wanted no part of Ivanov's proposal. Ever since Khrushchev had exposed Stalin's crimes and Lavrenti Beria's role in

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them as head of the KGB. I had associated the secret police with murder at home and terrorism abroad. I had learned to loathe the KGB's mistrust and disdain of their fellow citizens.

"My first priority," I said carefully, "has to be the Secretariat. My department has to be upgraded if I'm going to have any influence on Waldheim." Ivanov's round face wrinkled into a derisive grin. "That's hardly worth too much trouble. The West is always going to dominate the Secretariat, and we'll never succeed in re-educating Waldheim."

He pulled out two letters. "These will interest you," he said. "We don't take them seriously, of course, but we thought you should know about them." One was addressed to the Central Committee and denounced me for a life-style that could not be maintained, the anonymous author claimed, on my official income and for having religious pictures. The second letter, typewritten in English and addressed to me, was meant as a clever complement to the first. Purporting to be from an American, but unsigned, it "reminded" me of a promise I had supposedly given the writer at the previous session of the U.N. General Assembly to help a Russian Jew identified only as "Tamara" to emigrate. The letter mentioned the sum of $1,000 it said I had already received.

Thanks to Lina's business acumen and taste, our apartment was ornamented with icons, and we did live conspicuously well. But there was no Tamara, no $1,000 bribe, no promise to help anyone leave the Soviet Union. The letters had to be the work of someone who knew me and who wanted to ruin me.

My first reaction was fury. Ivanov was instantly soothing. "Now, now, there's no problem. We wouldn't have shown you the letters if we didn't have complete faith in you. Perhaps it's an effort by the FBI to compromise you." I shook my head. He continued, "If we find out who wrote these, we'll punish them."

As I got up to leave, he remarked casually, "You know, Arkady Nikolaevich, you're going to be in a prominent position in New York. You have to set an example." His words carried an obvious threat. I was to be under close scrutiny. The point of letting me see the letters was to show me the hook on which I was meant to wriggle. In the end, however, I was cleared.

When my family and I arrived in New York in April 1973, we found that suspicion, customary in the U.S.S.R., loomed larger among the Soviet community at the U.N. Practically any fellow Soviet—not just the KGB—was a potential *snukach* (informer). An anti-Soviet anecdote, "bourgeois consumerism," lack of zeal in one's work, admiring "decadent" American art too overtly or, crime of crimes, seeing an X-rated movie—these potential charges drove Soviets to elaborate caution. Conducted in a goldfish bowl, life for the Soviet colony was dull, monotonous, stewed in its own juice. With few exceptions, only KGB officers were permitted any latitude in their activities.

The KGB chief, or *rezident*, in New York, Boris Aleksandrovich Solomatin, was a short, stocky major general. His cover title was Deputy Permanent Representative of the U.S.S.R. to the U.N. Cynical, boorish and a drunk besides, he holed up in his smoke-filled apartment, where he summoned others. He did not participate in operations outside the Soviet mission, but directed the agents who did. After a weekend binge at the mission's retreat in Glen Cove, Long Island, he was often too hung over to keep appointments. But no one reported him; the KGB protected its own.



BORIS SOLOMATIN, KGB *REZIDENT* IN NEW YORK

"'Intelligence is top priority for all of us,' he said. 'The U.N. doesn't matter; it's how we can use it . . . That's why we're here.'"

To thwart American bugging of his apartment, which he was convinced was thorough, permanent and effective, Solomatin had two television sets and a stereo system, at least one of which was always on. He lived by his television sets.

Solomatin used to invite me for drinking sessions and "friendly talks." He was openly trying to involve me in KGB espionage. "We're not like your Foreign Ministry bureaucrats, forever sitting on valuable information like a brooding hen who never produces any chicks," he said smugly. "Collaboration with us will advance your career."

Solomatin's assurances were lies. When the KGB transmits information to Moscow, it never identifies the person who procured it. Solomatin merely wanted another foot soldier. As he said to me when I complained about how little work was done by agents assigned to my staff, "Our work comes first, Arkady Nikolaevich. We try to help you, but intelligence is top priority for all of us in New York. The U.N. doesn't matter; it's how we can use it to find out what we want. That's why we're here."

FIRST STEPS TOWARD DEFECTION

As I approached the pinnacle of influence, I found it a desert. The Cuban missile adventure, the Berlin Wall, propaganda campaigns about disarmament instead of negotiations, the economic mess at home, the unfulfilled promises, the rebirth of the "cult of personality," the "thaw" that proved to be a false spring—all led to disappointment, a loss of faith.

I had become part of the stratum that tried to portray itself as fighting what it coveted. While criticizing the bourgeois way of life, its only passion was to possess it; while condemning consumerism, the privileged valued above all else the consumer goods and comforts of the West. The cocoon of privilege in which we lived was warm, comfortable—and crippling.

After years spent among the elite, I had finally got my fill of its venality and coarseness. That life is unbelievably ugly. It even promoted personal betrayals. For the elite, betrayal is a necessary part of life. Suspicion and intrigue have become a high art. If Machiavelli were alive and living in the Soviet elite today, he would be a student, not a professor.

If I had been alone and free to decide my fate without regard for anyone else, I would have left the Soviets years before. But I had my family to consider: my wife Lina, to whom I had been married since I was 21, my son Gennady, now 32, and my daughter Anna, 23. Also, I had to wonder: Would the U.S. be willing to harbor me at the risk of dimming even slightly détente's rosy glow? Perhaps I should have stated my intentions directly to the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., John Scali. He was no friend of the Soviets. The Soviet ambassador, Yakov Malik, returned Scali's dislike, and behind his back would call him "the American

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Himmler" because of a physical resemblance he saw to the Gestapo chief. He never tired of telling us that it was a good thing Scali did not have a free hand, for that "devil would love to wring our necks."

I had never cared for Malik. He treated his subordinates with contempt. He considered himself a kind of Kremlin regent in the U.N. People were afraid of his power, and he was happy to feed their fear. His self-important, derisive attitude toward those of lower rank or social standing was typical of the Soviet ruling class.

One day I ran into an American acquaintance in a U.N. corridor. I was aware that he had connections in Washington. I decided on the spot that he was my opportunity. A week later we were both attending the same diplomatic dinner. I drew him aside and said, "I've decided to break with my government, and I want to know in advance what the American reaction would be if I asked for asylum."

He gaped at me. "What? Are you serious, Arkady?"

"I'm completely serious." He looked stunned. I said, "I wouldn't joke about something like this."

He agreed to help. He was going to Washington the week following and would make inquiries. We agreed to stage a chance encounter in the U.N. library after his return. There we would not talk but only exchange written messages.

At the arranged hour I found my friend casually leafing through a book. He slipped a piece of paper into the volume he was holding, replaced the book on the shelf and left. "A man is coming from Washington specifically to meet with you," said the message. "It is my feeling that you will be welcome, and I hope you will be reassured by your talk with him."

Through a series of such exchanges, we arranged that I would meet the man from Washington in Manhattan on a Friday evening between 8 and 9. On Fridays I usually dismissed my chauffeur for the weekend and drove myself. My chauffeur, who was somewhere beginning his weekend, was a KGB shadow. So was my top personal assistant. Lina routinely went to Glen Cove after lunch on Friday. Since the U.N. was normally busy on Fridays, she would not expect me until late.

I drove to Long Island, then doubled back to the city once I was sure no one had followed me. I found a parking space on a dark street on the Upper East Side. I hailed a taxi and took it to a corner in the East 60s. I hurried down an empty side street and descended the steps of an ordinary brownstone. The man who answered the doorbell introduced himself as Bert Johnson.* After letting me ramble for a while about how I detested the hypocrisy of my life and work and how I wanted to do something valuable with my life, he asked me whether I had informed my wife about our meeting. I said I had not, but that I intended to do so. I could see that he was pleased with my answer, but he made no further remark.

"I want to work and write and live without any government telling me what to do or say," I told him. "Will your government let me do that?"

Johnson walked to the bar in the corner of the room. "I'm going to have a double. How about you?" The tone of his remark made all the difference. It was friendly; he seemed to understand my tensions. He was suddenly a human being, not an institution or court before which I had to justify myself. I accepted his offer. He poured Scotch and soda and raised his glass to mine. For the first time we both smiled.

Back on the couch, he lit a cigarette. "O.K.," he said. "First of all, I'm authorized to offer you the protection you asked for. If you're ready to defect, we're ready to welcome you, to help you, to receive you right now if that's what you want."

"That's exactly what I want," I interjected.

"A minute ago, you said you wanted to do something worthwhile," Johnson said. "Do you think that defecting is the only way that you can do this?"

He described the excitement in Washington when it was learned that I wanted to defect. Everyone realized what a blow this would be to the Soviets. But there had been other ideas. Would I stay on as Under Secretary-General for a while? I could provide a lot of information from that vantage point.

"You want me to be a spy," I said.

"Well, not exactly. We wouldn't have to call it spying. Let's say, from time to time, you could provide us with information at meetings like this."

"What you're asking me to do is extremely dangerous. I don't have any training for that sort of thing."

"Please think about it," he said quietly. Almost automatically, I told Johnson I would think it over. We agreed to meet again and shook hands. I left, once again to journey out to Long Island, this time with a curious mixture of relief and dread.

Open defiance of the Soviet system would be an honorable course. But a secret life inside it . . . wasn't that just another form of the deceptions I wanted to leave behind? I knew I was already a "defector." There is no such word in Russian. This is, as the Soviets say, not accidental. Contemporary Russian has only two words for people who leave the Soviet Union: "traitor" and "emigrant." And in the eyes of the Soviet authorities, the two are synonymous. Both are used to describe persons who have betrayed their motherland.

The awful thought came to me that I really had no choice in the matter. If the Americans could prove to the Soviets that I was a traitor, they could blackmail me. I knew that the world of espionage had its own rules, and I suspected that the KGB had no exclusive claim on ruthlessness. I realized I was trapped. Now I was playing a dangerous form of Russian roulette.

PICKING UP A SECRET COMMUNIQUE IN THE U.N. LIBRARY

"I [had asked] what the American reaction would be if I asked for asylum. The message said, 'It is my feeling that you will be welcome.'"

ENTERING A SHADOW WORLD

The following week I was in turmoil, but to my surprise I slowly began to reconcile myself to Johnson's proposal. I resolved to prove myself not in words but in deeds. After all, my original plan had been to help the U.S. by exposing the secrets of the Soviet regime and speaking out against it; I wanted to help the West. Here was a way to do it in spades.

At our next meeting, Johnson stressed that the Americans

*The names of all CIA and FBI agents have been changed.

Continued

had no intention of involving me in dangerous operations. They did not want me to follow people around or steal and photograph documents. They would never ask me to do anything that would require the kind of maneuverings people read about, with secret drops and all kinds of fantastic gadgets. What they desired was information to which I already had access.

Johnson later suggested I start with the most recent cables received in the mission. I was startled. One minute he was reassuring, now he was asking me to risk my neck. To copy a coded cable inside the mission would invite almost certain detection. "We aren't even supposed to make notes on what we read in the code room," I protested. He responded that they did not expect full copies, just whatever I could remember of important messages—particularly nuance, new shades of meaning signaling a change in policy or indicating debates on certain issues.

I asked Johnson if he had people who could check whether the KGB showed any special interest in what I did and where I went. He promised to organize a special detail right away. He said he would let me know immediately if there were any signs of trouble, and the Americans would move in if necessary.

I was not entirely reassured. "I go to the mission almost every day. Once I'm inside, there is nothing any government on earth could do if the mission detains me. They could invent any pretext for holding me or for sending me back to Moscow. A sudden heart attack, a stroke, anything. They have used such excuses over and over."

But Johnson insisted. "If they did try to take you back to the Soviet Union, they'd have to get you through Kennedy Airport. There we can step in and make sure you're leaving of your own free will." I pictured myself being shuffled, heavily drugged, by a squad of KGB men through the airport lounge, unable to make any sign of distress at all.

I had entered a shadow world without defined boundaries. I had put no limit on the length of my secret service. Years of anxiety were before me, and the danger that I first thought I could not face would become my constant companion.

Secret Emperors and Shadowy Assassins

The Soviet KGB is one of the most ruthless organizations on earth. Its functions are comparable to most of those belonging to the CIA, the FBI, the Secret Service and parts of the departments of Justice and Defense. To control a population it can no longer inspire, the Kremlin relies upon security police and informers. To obtain military secrets and advanced technology it cannot develop efficiently at home, it employs espionage abroad. To subvert governments it cannot persuade through normal interaction, the U.S.S.R. has fielded a secret army—of mercenaries as well as Soviets—to advance its international goals.

The global scale of KGB operations is larger than the intelligence activities of all the West combined. Besides more than 100,000 professionals, the KGB has a specially trained elite army of roughly 500,000 equipped with the latest weapons, tanks and artillery. They guard frontiers, the Kremlin and other major government installations. They include highly developed sabotage units and special-purpose forces. The latter were used extensively to crush resistance to Soviet domination over Eastern Europe.

Secret emperors, the men of the KGB exercise preventive supervision of the population and its loyalty. The KGB could not halt the alienation that grew as Khrushchev's and Brezhnev's expansive promises of well-being went unfulfilled. But the "GehBeh," as the organization is nicknamed after its initials, can report what is happening to the leadership. The more disquieting evidence it produces, the more the KGB justifies its insistence on larger budgets and greater manpower. Since there really has been trouble—a food riot in Novocherkassk in 1962, for instance—the leadership has acquiesced to the KGB's demands.

Even the top men are constrained by the KGB. The *Vertushka*, the Kremlin telephone system, is installed, maintained and monitored by the secret police. Their agents serve as bodyguards, chauffeurs, cooks, valets and maids to Politburo members, guaranteeing not only security but surveillance.

Most sinister of the secret-police operatives are the shadowy assassins and terrorists whose specialty is *mokrie dela* (wet affairs), from the so-called Department V, the KGB's Executive Action Department. I had naively assumed that political murders, kidnapings, sabotage targeted against Western civilian sectors had been pretty much abandoned by the U.S.S.R. by the mid-1950s, after the Stalin-Beria era. I was wrong. I met some of those operatives when I first lived in New York as a junior diplomat.

One agent, expelled from the U.S. in 1969 after two tours at the mission, liked to brag suggestively about little matters he had "cleared up." One Sunday at lunch on the New Jersey Palisades in late 1965, he could not stop talking about New York's great blackout. "All those shining towers," he said, gesturing at the Manhattan skyline, "they look so strong, so tall, but they're just a house of cards. A few explosions in the right places and *do svidaniya* [goodbye]. We're only beginning to realize how vulnerable this country really is." No one commented. Even KGB personnel feared him.

He and other KGB agents were often seen with "medical advisers" at the mission. Their jobs were to acquire as much information as possible about American medicine. Some were epidemiologists. The agent who was later expelled had spoken with relish about the possibility of demolishing New York's electric-power systems. Perhaps he was working out plans of an even more sinister nature with the poison and plague specialists.

A policy of violence, intimidation and death has been a historic Kremlin method of quieting opposition, from the assassination of Leon Trotsky to attempts on the lives of foreign figures like Dag Hammarskjold and Anwar Sadat. Soviet ties to guerrilla groups are so well known that the Kalashnikov submachine gun has become the symbol for international terrorism. The U.S.S.R. continues training terrorists within and beyond its borders to subvert stable nations and particularly to feed upon unrest in the Third World.

In the Third World, and at the U.N., the KGB cooperates with intelligence services of the Soviet-bloc countries. Closest to the Soviets are the Bulgarians, Cubans and East Germans. Bulgarian intelligence was the most obedient Soviet servant in terrorist operations and had widely penetrated Southern Europe and the Middle East. The Bulgarians worked on the Arabs and Turks. I saw an example of this when KGB recruitment of a Turkish diplomat in New York was accomplished with Bulgarian help.

I also heard from KGB officers in New York that they were outraged when Ludmila, the Oxford-educated daughter of Bulgarian Party Chief and President Todor Zhivkov, tried to reawaken Bulgarian cultural identity in the late 1970s. They considered her activity an "undue liberty." Ludmila became a political figure and a member of the Bulgarian Politburo. She died suddenly at the age of 38. I always wondered whether this was another "wet affair" carried out by the KGB's Bulgarian agents.

It is probably no exaggeration to count over half of the more than 700 Soviets in New York City as either full-time spies or co-opts under orders or influence of the KGB and GRU (the Defense Ministry's military intelligence arm). The KGB has cemented its place in the U.S.S.R. to a point where its power is unshakable. Although I escaped from it once, I never underestimate its reach or its savagery.

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When I arrived at Yakov Malik's office the following Monday morning for the regular 9 o'clock staff meeting, I half imagined that some unseen X-ray machine would sound an alarm announcing to everyone that Shevchenko had become an American spy. Malik's office was a specially designed, secure room, a double-walled, soundproofed lair that was a proud piece of KGB handiwork. But it had a major flaw: it was so poorly ventilated that it could be suffocating if many people were in it for any length of time. Apparently, there was enough air for Malik. Meetings in the "murder chamber," as his staff called the room, sometimes lasted for hours.

At the end of the meeting, Malik turned to me. "Arkady Nikolaevich," he said, "could you stay just a minute?"

My apprehension rose, but all he wanted was that I review two draft cables on disarmament matters. I went up to the seventh floor, to the *referentura*, the special code and communications unit. The *referentura* was a fortress. I reached up to the button hidden behind the light fixture outside the unmarked outer door. In answer to my ring, a buzzer sounded, freeing the door to open as I pushed.

I entered the familiar small antechamber and stood in front of the peephole in the heavy steel door that led into the inner, soundproofed suite. An armed guard swung the portal back and admitted me. At another door, the top half of which was a bank teller's window, I asked the duty officer for the cables. I quickly checked them over and hurried out. I was certain that hidden peepholes let security men watch us as we read.

With this kind of access to secret communications, I kept my CIA contact up to date on what was going on in the Kremlin, particularly regarding the Brezhnev-Kosygin frictions over Soviet-American relations. Brezhnev was ready to go much further than Kosygin in developing political and economic ties. I also informed Johnson about Moscow's instructions to Dobrynin in Washington, details of Soviet policy and the political rationale for many plans and events. I told him about the Soviet positions on arms-control negotiations, including fallback provisions.

I told him of specific Soviet plans for continuing the fight with guerrilla movements in Angola that opposed Moscow's role there. From officials in Moscow involved in economic matters, I passed on the information that the original oilfields in the Volga-Ural region on the Ob River would soon decline and that in several years the Soviet Union would have difficulty expanding oil production in the smaller, less accessible fields.

At one meeting, Johnson said, "Some of my colleagues want to know who other Soviets are at the mission and in the Secretariat, what their real jobs are."

"You mean the KGB? There are hundreds of them, plus military intelligence agents."

"The FBI wants to make sure it's watching the right people," Johnson said. "You could help a lot by identifying as many as you can." At later meetings, Johnson was joined by an FBI agent, Tom Grogan, who brought files with him. I saw I could give him a number of answers. I balked, however, at Grogan's suggestion that I improve my ties with the KGB. The agents, he argued, could be valuable sources and dangerous enemies. "You'd be better off staying on their good side." I told him I didn't intend to make KGB friends to help him out.



SHEVCHENKO'S FIRST MEETING WITH HIS CIA CONTACT

"'You want me to be a spy,' I said. The awful thought came to me that I had no choice. Now I was playing a dangerous form of Russian roulette."

THE DILEMMA DEEPENS

By the end of 1975, I still had not disclosed to either Lina or Anna the new life I was planning for us. On New Year's Eve, while vacationing in Miami, I took Lina to a small Italian restaurant not far from our hotel. "We ought to think seriously about the future," I said, beginning a conversation I had been rehearsing to myself for days. "We should think about whether we should go back to Moscow, where I can find work that is less of a strain. Or maybe we can figure out something else."

"What are you talking about?" Lina was alarmed. "We have to stay in New York as long as possible. Let me remind you that even Politburo members don't have access to the kinds of things we have in New York."

"But people are already jealous of us," I said. "There's been gossip. You know that."

"You really are a coward, Arkady," she exploded. "All the *nachal'niki* [bosses] use their time abroad to get rich, to buy things. What do you think Lidiya Dmitriyevna and I do when Gromyko brings her to New York? Go to museums? No, we shop. I shop for her. I give her money, our money. And you have Gromyko's protection, just as I have hers. No one can touch us. Not the KGB. Nobody. With the Gromykos behind you, you can have a fantastic career. You could replace Malik in New York or Dobrynin as ambassador in Washington. Remember, Dobrynin once had your job. And then, who knows?"

I didn't dare tell her I had no desire to pursue such goals. I tried a softer approach. "Lina, we can't count on Washington. Dobrynin is going to be there a long time. I'm sure it's a constant irritation to Gromyko the way they gossip in Moscow about Dobrynin possibly replacing him. Gromyko will keep him as far from Moscow as possible, as long as possible."

Suddenly Lina returned to my vague hint. "What did you mean about going somewhere else, not returning to Moscow? You've gotten more and more hostile about things at home, the KGB, the party. You're full of praise for the Americans and depressed about everything else. What's the matter with you? Think about your future. It's not here, it's at home."

I had no way to reach her, to confide in her. I changed the subject. Obviously, Lina would not come willingly. But what if I were to defect suddenly, presenting her with a *fait accompli* and asking her to join me before the Soviets knew I had disappeared? She might very well see that she could not return to Moscow alone. She would be an outcast, with no privileges and no access to the elite society she loved. Deep inside, however, I was afraid of her choice.

The day after I returned from vacation, I set up a meeting with Johnson. I wanted to make this our last secret encounter.

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Johnson had other ideas. I wanted to come out of hiding; he was prepared only to change the locale to a new apartment within walking distance of the U.N. Plaza. I had been prepared to insist on a prompt termination of my double life, but I left agreeing instead to let it continue. As soon as I had agreed to cooperate with the CIA "for a while," I should have realized that I had indentured myself indefinitely. Seeking greater freedom, I had mortgaged what little I had.



LINA SHEVCHENKO, LEFT, AND LIDIYA GROMYKO ON A SPREE

"She exploded: 'What do you think Lidiya Dmitriyevna and I do when Gromyko brings her to New York? Go to museums? No, we shop.'"

CLOSE SHAVE

For a time, my routine settled into ordinary patterns. I began to relax. Then, suddenly, the sense of danger was back, stronger than ever. Waldheim decided that I would represent him at a seminar on apartheid to be held in Havana. In Cuba, I would not be able to count on CIA protection. If the KGB wanted to move against me, they could fly me straight to Moscow on any pretext, and no one would or could intervene.

Johnson was concerned. But he said quietly, "Even if you were taken to Moscow, we could help. I know you don't think so, but there are ways, things we can do."

"Like what? Sending a letter of protest to Brezhnev?"

"Calm down. Let me put together a contingency plan for Moscow so you'll see we aren't as helpless as you think."

Three nights later he described an arrangement for contacting Americans in the Soviet capital. I still wasn't convinced. The image of a cell in Lubyanka prison swam in my mind. "Listen, Bert!" I shouted. "They could grab me in Cuba and ship me back whole or in pieces to Moscow and you couldn't do a damn thing."

Abruptly Johnson asked, "What do you shave with?"

"An ordinary razor. One of those things that hold a flat blade with two edges. It can be set to different openings. Why?"

"It's a way to give you some extra help. Bring it here in a day or two. We'll give it back before you leave for Havana." Early in the week I dropped off my razor with Johnson, and the night before my departure I went to see him. Johnson pointed to a low coffee table and two razors lying on it side by side. "Which one is yours?" He grinned. I could find no difference.

"The one on the left isn't the kind you can buy at the drugstore," Johnson said. He set the numbers on the metal ring below the razor head at the minimum opening and then, pushing hard against the bottom of the handle, twisted it. The handle came apart; it was hollow. Into the opening Johnson slipped a tiny roll of microfilm.

"That has everything you need in case you forget the details of the contingency plan we went over the other night," he said. "It's got phone numbers, locations, people to contact in Moscow in case you need them." He made me practice opening and closing the razor until he pronounced me an expert. I didn't feel like one.

I packed both razors. In Havana, I stayed at a former luxury hotel that had become distinctly seedy. The bathrooms were a rusty mess. Plumbing fixtures were exactly the kind of thing the Cubans hoped the Soviet Union would supply to them. But the U.S.S.R. had too little for itself. Another item that the Cubans lacked was Coca-Cola. They missed their cuba libres. The Soviets were never able to produce Coca-Cola, so they asked the Czechs, but "Chenka-Cola" never worked as well. The Soviet Union found it much easier to be generous with military equipment, of which they had no shortage.

After the brief seminar, as I prepared to pack and return to New York, I told myself that my worry had been for nothing. But my mood didn't last. I noticed that two of my shirts were not where I had left them. When I went into the bathroom, the razor I had put on a shelf above the sink was not there.

Sweat broke out all over my body. Which razor had I left in the bathroom? Where had I left the other one? Walking as though I were underwater, I went back to the bedroom and fumbled through my suitcase until I grasped the razor. I stood a moment, trying to recall the procedure for opening it.

Set the number as low as possible. Twist the bottom part of the handle. Damn. It wouldn't move. I tried again. Nothing.

They had taken the hollow one. I was found out.

I collapsed into a sitting position on the edge of the bed, staring at the worn, dingy carpet, unable to get control of myself. Finally, I remembered that I had omitted a step. I tried a third time. Set the number. Push hard on the handle and twist. *Push hard.* That was what I had forgotten. Now turn. It turned. It unscrewed. The microfilm was still safe inside.

I gasped aloud with relief. Only a hotel maid stealing a few things from her socialist brother. But was it? Perhaps Castro's security police or the KGB had discovered something. Maybe there was a mole in the CIA or even, I thought with rage, one of their moronic, careless leaks.

Until I returned to New York, I kept the razor in my briefcase and never let the case out of my hands. At home, when Lina and Anna were asleep, I went into the bathroom with scissors and a pair of heavy pliers. I extracted the microfilm, minced it into slivers and flushed it away. Then I mangled the razor itself, twisting it into an unrecognizable lump. The remains went into the trash.

For some time, I was suspicious of anything unusual in anyone's behavior at the mission. But as winter turned to spring, the shock from my own "Cuban crisis" receded.

I discovered that there were many similarities between spies and diplomats. Both live double lives: one for outsiders and another among those whom they trust or for whom they work. Both jobs require constant vigilance, good nerves and time to collect information and compile it for reports. I began to feel that I was fishing in my own pond.

AMERICA WATCHING, SOVIET-STYLE

A frequent guest of the KGB *rezident* Solomatin was Georgi Arbatov, director of the Institute for the Study of the U.S. and Canada. My CIA contact had told me to report carefully on Arbatov. "A lot of people think he's very close to Brezh-

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nev," he said, "practically the Kremlin's spokesman."

Arbatov paid one of his visits in 1976. After several vodka toasts had warmed the conversational chill I always sensed in Solomatin's presence. Arbatov summarized the report he would be making to Moscow, giving Gerald Ford a good chance of winning the presidential race. "Of course, right now he does the usual zigzagging, taking hard-line positions, but that doesn't worry us very much. It's just the usual campaign bluster. After it's over, he'll be good old Jerry again."

None of us disputed Arbatov's assessment. We all knew that Moscow wanted reassurance on Ford's continuing in the White House, and none of us wished to be the bearer of bad news, even if we had strong presentiments of Ford's defeat. I turned the talk to arms control. Arbatov acknowledged that the SALT negotiations' momentum had dissipated. "It's too close to the elections for the Americans to move on something as controversial as SALT," he said with evident unhappiness. "We understand that reality. It's the way things are, but it's too bad."

Solomatin, whose interest was espionage, not disarmament, broke in. "Does it really matter that much? Why should we want to speed up the SALT business anyway?"

"I know what you mean," Arbatov said, "but things are serious." He then reiterated arguments about the connection between arms spending and the failing health of the Soviet economy, ticking off a depressing list of chronic shortcomings in management, in agriculture, in transport and distribution.

Solomatin finally burst out, "You're a pessimist. We've survived worse. Don't forget the war. We came through that, after all." It was the standard patriotic, orthodox, unthinking rebuttal to any hint of criticism.

In late September, Gromyko visited the U.N. for the opening of the General Assembly. Knowing what Gromyko wanted to hear—that Ford was the likely winner—Dobrynin tilted his analysis a little. Most of all, however, he hedged.

In November, Jimmy Carter was elected President and selected as his National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, a man the Soviets regarded as an unrelenting enemy. Carter's campaign declarations on human rights persuaded the Soviets that he sought to promote subversion in the U.S.S.R. His Inaugural Address, expressing the hope that "we will move this year a step toward" the elimination of nuclear weapons from the earth, was taken as a signal that America's new leader intended to shatter the existing framework of SALT negotiations.

In the summer of 1977, I took home leave. The Foreign Ministry's top American affairs expert, Georgi Kornienko, told me, "It's like a zoo here. It's always hard with the Americans, but with this new crowd we've had a very difficult beginning. We still don't know where they're going." Back in New York, I could only report to Bob Ellenberg, my new CIA contact, my impression that time was running short for the Moscow advocates of détente.

AN ABNORMAL SITUATION

The year 1977 had begun auspiciously enough for me personally. Yakov Malik, whom I couldn't stand, returned to the Foreign Ministry in late 1976, and Oleg Troyanovsky soon replaced him. The son of the first Soviet Ambassador to the U.N. and a longtime interpreter for Khrushchev, he was affable, a bon vivant. In contrast to Malik, he was a delight.

Then, in the spring of 1977, an unexpected security clampdown, mysterious in its motivation and potentially posing new threats to my safety, dissipated my sense of well-being. The first word of it came at a regular staff meeting when Troyanovsky told us that the KGB chief had a report to make.

"The special services of the imperialist state are intensifying their campaigns of provocation against Soviet citizens and institutions abroad," said Yuri Drozdov, who had replaced Solomatin as KGB *rezident* in 1976. "It is essential to give a fitting rebuff to these machinations of the enemy. Special vigilance is required of Soviets in capitalist countries."

Finally Drozdov got to the point: the tightest set of security restrictions imposed in my two decades as a diplomat. The main feature was a requirement that all contacts with foreigners be approved in advance, an unworkable restriction on diplomats and their normal procedures. These cumbersome security procedures had to be the result of something more than standard Soviet apprehensiveness. During my home leave that summer, I reported to the Foreign Ministry and asked for the files of coded cables so that I could "read in," as I did on every trip home. I was told that under the new regulations I would need special permission. I was amazed by the severity of the rules.

Victor Israelyan, the chief of the International Organizations Department [who currently heads the Soviet delegation to the Geneva disarmament conference], told me the reason for the crackdown. The KGB had begun to suspect the loyalty of a first secretary in a Soviet embassy in Latin America. While keeping track of his contacts with the CIA, the security men arranged for a "routine" transfer back to Moscow.

There the game continued. The young diplomat was assigned to the Foreign Ministry's Policy Planning Department, an office with wide access to coded cable traffic. For a few months he was closely watched until he was seen passing documents to an American agent. Arrested, he killed himself with a cyanide capsule before he could be interrogated.

"It's not just one case," Israelyan continued. "There have been incidents in other countries—attempts to recruit our people, quite a number of them. And we always have the problem of drunkenness and people sleeping around."

During my leave, while traveling with Lina to a mountain resort on the northern edge of the Caucasus, I became aware that I was shadowed and scrutinized by the secret police more

The Big Candy Store

The U.S. was a candy store for our diplomats. During their short tours of duty they amassed an unbelievable amount of goods unavailable or too expensive in the U.S.S.R. In the late 1970s, the average wage of mid-level diplomats in Moscow was 200 to 250 rubles ($270 to $280) a month. But with a $700 to $800 monthly salary in New York it was possible to purchase many things far beyond their reach at home. One could buy a Soviet car for about $2,000 if it was paid for in U.S. dollars, and receive it on returning to Moscow. In the Soviet Union the waiting list for an auto is three to ten years, and it costs more than 10,000 rubles ($13,000 to $14,000). Automatic washing machines (almost nonexistent and only semiautomatic), dishwashers, cameras, stereo systems, records, cassettes, crates of baby food and disposable diapers, irons, china, tissues and toilet paper, clothes, shoes and fabrics were all transported to the U.S.S.R. And everyone bought extra items that could be resold on Moscow's black market. From ambassadors to the lowliest clerks, all regularly sent thousands of pounds of goods home.

To do that, those paid at low rates severely economized on everything from daily diets to entertainment. Saving money was their permanent and often obsessive preoccupation. But diplomatic personnel could make their money go further than Americans because they paid no taxes and were skillful, relentless bargain hunters. Besides, their housing and medical care were inexpensive or free.

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than ever before. I could not help being worried. Anxiety returned, and the old frustration mounted to new heights.

Back in New York, I had a series of disagreements with Alexander Podshchekoldin, the boss of the local party cell, to which all Soviet mission and Secretariat members belong. After one of these disputes in early 1978, a Soviet national working in the Secretariat stopped me in a U.N. corridor to whisper a warning. Podshchekoldin had told him: "Shevchenko has been here long enough. He should go home." Lina had picked up similar vibrations from talks with other mission wives.

Bob Ellenberg and Carl McMillan, the FBI agent who became the other half of the team working with me in mid-1977, agreed that the situation was abnormal, possibly dangerous. But Ellenberg hoped I would stay on the job a few more months. Gromyko was coming to the special session on disarmament at the U.N. in May 1978, now only two months away. Couldn't I hold on until then? "When your daughter gets out of school," he said, "you can bring her to New York, and we'll have everything ready. If you move now, while she's still in Moscow, you know how hard it'll be to get her out."

The thought of never being able to see Anna again was too hard to bear. I agreed to keep going. But the plan was never implemented. An abrupt and ominous call to return to Moscow changed everything.

BREAKING AWAY

On March 31, 1978, a Friday, I received a late-afternoon call from Troyanovsky, asking to see me at the mission. His tone was normal, routine, cryptic only because all our conversations were cautious on lines that could be tapped. When I arrived, he told me, "There's a cable from Moscow for you."

The message was a summons home. The pretext was thin—"for several days of consultations in connection with the forthcoming special session of the U.N. General Assembly on disarmament"—and vague enough to be ominous—"as well as for a discussion of certain other questions." I was almost certain no consultations were scheduled on the special session. The Soviet position was set. I had already passed on its details to the CIA. If I had been discovered, the cable could be a death sentence.

Moscow may have thought that referring to consultations alone wouldn't be convincing enough, so someone decided to add the unusual phrase "certain other questions." It was a mistake. It put me on the alert. I don't understand how such a lapse could have occurred, but I'm very glad it did.

That Sunday afternoon, when the U.N. was deserted, I picked up the telephone in an unlocked office down the corridor from my own and dialed the familiar number. "This is Andy. It's urgent. I need to meet him as soon as possible." I felt as if I were standing in the aftermath of a thunderclap.

Bob and Carl were waiting for me in the CIA apartment. They seemed worried, but also a bit irritated. They were, after all, husbands and fathers whose Sunday I had interrupted. What I told them transformed their impatience to concern.

AMERICANOLOGIST GEORGI ARBATOV

"Arbatov summarized [his] report to Moscow, giving Gerald Ford a good chance of winning the race. None of us wished to be the bearer of bad news."

"I think this is it. I can't wait any longer," I said. There was no argument. We set our next meeting for Monday night.

Lina had spent the weekend in Glen Cove. When she arrived at our apartment, loaded with grocery bags from her regular weekend shopping expedition, I casually mentioned that I would be going to Moscow for consultations. The news made her cheerful, a mood I tried to match. I knew I would never see Moscow again, perhaps never be with Lina . . . or Anna . . . or Gennady. A wave of uncertainty came over me, a surge of love and doubt.

Monday morning I told Troyanovsky that because of my heavy work load, I was going to have to ask for a delay of at least a few weeks. "I wouldn't advise you to do it that way," he replied. "It's none of my business, but when the Center makes a request like this, it's best to go and be quick about it."

There seemed to be something other than cordiality in his tone. Was he giving me honest advice or a warning? Whichever it was, I decided not to ignore it. "Well, I just can't go today or tomorrow," I said. "I've got a ton of work, but I'll cable Moscow that I'll be on the Sunday flight."

I invited an old friend from the Soviet delegation to the U.N. to a Chinese restaurant on Second Avenue. I broached the subject about which I knew he would be thoroughly informed, the "consultations" in Moscow. I did not tell him I had been called home. "What's new from the Center on the committee?" I asked. "Anything brewing there?"

"Nothing new. Just the opposite. I got a letter last week telling me not even to send in a report until the committee finishes its work. The big boys don't want to be bothered. They've already made their decisions."

"So you don't think there's any need for me to go over, just to wrap up any loose ends?"

"Absolutely not. Don't even suggest it. They'll think you just want a chance to nose around Moscow."

There it was. The summons home had to be a trap. At my meeting with the Americans that night I asked that we set Thursday as the date, only three days away. It would give the Soviets less time to try to stop me.

When Thursday finally came, I called to tell Lina to have supper without me, I would be working late. As my office emptied out, I put the finishing touches on the life I was leaving. I wrote her a letter begging her to join me. "I am desperate," I wrote. "I can neither live nor work with people I hate, whether in New York or Moscow." I went on, "It will be a much better life here, and I will try to move the earth to get Annushka out of the Soviet Union." I told her I would call the next morning for her answer. I put down my pen in despair. Even if I had possessed more eloquence, I doubted that my arguments would bring Lina over to me. Lina had been obsessed with my getting to the top. Had my success spoiled everything? Or only the weight of years? Whatever it was, she would never forgive me.

I folded the pages and put them into an envelope along with a large sum of money that I had withdrawn to leave

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for her. I looked at my watch. Nearly midnight. Time to go.

I telephoned the mission to ask that my driver pick me up. When he dropped me off at my apartment, I told him, "Pick me up at the usual time tomorrow," and I stressed the final phrase, the continuity of my routine.

Lina was asleep. I gathered my things in an overnight bag, tiptoed to our bedroom door, took a last look at my sleeping wife, slid the envelope just inside the door and left the apartment. Because I might meet one of the other Soviet officials in the building if I took the elevator, I walked down the fire stairs, 20 flights. Finally outside, I could see a white car parked on the other side of 64th Street, just according to the escape plan. It was 50 yards away, but the distance seemed enormous, perilous. There could be a KGB agent waiting in a dark doorway, invisible to me, unseen by the Americans, with orders to stop me and a knife or a gun to execute the command. The escape plan suddenly seemed irrelevant: I ran.

By the time I reached the car, Bob was on the pavement holding the back door open for me. Carl was on the other side. We sat in silence as the driver pulled away from the curb. It was not until we had crossed into New Jersey that I broke the silence with a question. "Where are we going?"

"Pennsylvania. We have a safe house in the Poconos, about two hours from the city."

As we sped through the dark, I blanked out. My mind was numb and empty, too tired to be elated, too tense to feel safe.

The next morning, a few minutes after 9 o'clock, I called Lina. After one ring the telephone was answered.

"Da?" It was a man's voice.

"Lina?" I was puzzled at first.

"Yeeyo nyet doma [She's not at home]." The voice was that of a stranger. I dropped the receiver as though it had burned me. Lina must have awakened early, read my letter and panicked. She called someone at the mission. They took her away and left a KGB man in her place. She had acted like a lamb asking the wolves to help her. And she put herself beyond any help from me.



SHEVCHENKO DASHES TO A WAITING CIA CAR

"There could be a KGB agent waiting in a dark doorway with orders to stop me. The escape plan suddenly seemed irrelevant: I ran."

In late April I was taken to a CIA safe house in the suburbs of Washington. I was beginning to feel more confident about my future. Not long after I settled down, I received some materials forwarded to me from the U.N. They included some family photographs I had kept in my office, and I spent a good deal of time looking at them. Then, on May 11, one of my protectors, Sandy Greenfield of the FBI, told me, "Arkady, Lina is dead."

I was stunned. According to an article in the London *Evening News* by Victor Louis, a Soviet citizen whose ties to the KGB have made him a wealthy tipster for the Western press, my wife had committed suicide. That she was dead, I could believe; that she had taken her own life, never. My surmise is that she had been tricked into going back to Moscow, most likely with the promise that the Soviet government would get me back. When she realized that I was not returning, and that she would never be allowed to return to the U.S., she may have lashed out at the wrong people. It would not surprise me if she had threatened to reveal the sordid secrets she knew about the top Soviet officials. Thereby, she would have made herself a threat to several careers and a candidate for extermination by the KGB. Knowing them as I do, I'm inclined to think that is what happened.

I thought of my children. I felt fairly secure about Gennady; he was independent, he had a good job and a well-connected wife. But what about Anna, living in our apartment with her grandmother? I sent telegrams and letters to them, but got no answer; they were probably never received. I still have not given up hope of seeing them again some day. At the same time, I realize that the surest, cruelest way the Soviets can punish me is to keep us separated.

As the months passed, I grew lonely. I wanted to talk to women, to be in their company, to have them notice me and care about me. My contacts seemed at a loss. Whatever the resources of the CIA and FBI, ladies in waiting were not among them. I did not see myself picking up a girl in a bar, and I could hardly place a personal ad in the *New York Review of Books*: "Soviet defector, 47, seeks female help in making new life."

Finally, the FBI agents suggested trying an escort service. They would give me some numbers and look the other way. That is how I met Judy Chavez. At first, I was quite taken with this woman. I asked that she give up her other patrons and be my companion exclusively. She agreed. For several weeks I believed she was keeping her promise. She helped me settle into my new apartment, where I lived under an assumed name.

But I had been naive in trusting Chavez's sincerity. She soon told the story of our relationship to the news media and, more important, revealed my identity as well as my address. She embellished her story with the claim that I had paid her with money furnished by the CIA, although she knew very well that I had used my own funds, including my U.N. severance pay [a $76,000 package covering accrued pension, unused leave and termination pay]. I feel fortunate that that period of stress, confusion and bad judgment was relatively brief.

I have lived in the U.S. for nearly seven years now. In December 1978 I married my American wife, Elaine, whom I met through my lawyer Bill Geimer. Elaine has been with me through disappointment and success.

I have been asked many times whether the KGB poses a real threat to my life. It is a risk I have reconciled myself to, because I refuse to be driven underground. I have learned that I was sentenced to death in absentia in Moscow.

In my memoir I have tried to tell the truth. Plain truth is the most effective weapon against the falsehoods on which the Soviet system is built. I have searched for the truth about myself, about the country I grew up to love and the regime I learned to know and hate. I hope I have contributed to exposing the lies, to weakening its appeal, and to bringing nearer the day when the people to whom I still belong will be free as well to speak the truth openly for all the world to hear. ■

Illustrations for TIME by Daniel Maffia

Peter Steiner



"I was drugged and tortured but I managed to get away."