

Narrative
of events by Gen. Beauregard - relat-
ing to the Dept. of So. Ca., Ga. & Fla.,
from Sept. 1862 to April 1864.

copy of a letter
with which
is inserted
to begin the
writing of the
same.

About the end of Aug^r,
my health being much improved
by my stay at Bladon & the use
of its mineral waters, I departed
on the 23rd of that month, for duty
in the field, thinking that an ac-
tive life would be preferable to a
sedentary one. When white I
departed, on or about the 1st of Sept^r
to Mobile, where in being a fine com-
munication with the outside world,
& have greater mail facilities.

Having reached Mobile & not
hearing from the Dept. Gen^l, I
departed my former communi-
cation & on the 30th of Sept^r rec^d
the following telegram from G. W. Logan,
Adj. Gen. at Rich^d.

"Special Order No. 22, Dated Aug^r
29th, assigns you to the command
of the Dept. of So. Ca. & Fla. head-
quartered at Charleston. It was this
matters were mailed to you ad-

out on page

In writing about the above
 period of the war, I met with
 two obstacles difficult to over-
 come: first, having to condense
 into two chapters a narrative
 which would require at least
 one whole volume; second,
 the loss of nearly all my office
 papers before that period,
 which occurred as follows: When
 in the Spring of 1862, I was ordered
 to go to assist Gen. Lee in the defence
 of Richmond, I sent all my books
 & papers to the War Office, and
 the remainder of them to the
 residence of Mr. J. H. [?]
 myself at Washington. In April
 1862, I fled to Gen. Lee to find them
 books & papers, but in some
 half a dozen days, he was com-
 pelled to retreat. When I returned there
 about ten or twelve days after the
 surrender, he was informed that
 they had not arrived. When I
 reached Mobile, I received a
 gun boat letter saying that they
 had been sent there by Gen.
 Wilson, Comd. of the Federal Cavalry.
 Gen. who had taken possession
 of them in transit to Atlanta.
 My friends in Augusta, hearing of
 the gross violation of the orders
 of Gen. Lee at Mobile, sent

Press at Bladen Sp. This was
 occ'd the next day & I ans'd mine-
 rately. I heard to day from Charles-
 ton. Please forward three copies
 of orders & instructions - I've rec'd
 yet from Bladen.

During the same days
 I was in Mobile I was in-
 ite for I again suspected the
 rule I never neglected Albany
 with its Lord of Officers, Brig. Gen.
 Thompson, & others. I am in
 mind relative to those Defenses
 respecting to the main line that
 they were too close to the City
 & forming a system of fire from
 the main opposite side of the
 river, up to Bladon, which was
 subsequently done.

I arrived in Charleston
 after a slow & tedious journey
 by Boat & by rail, on or about
 the 15th of Sept. where I was
 received by the people & the au-
 thorities with great demonstration
 of joy. As they all appeared to
 have decided the fate of the City
 that cradle of the rebellion.

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Charleston & some of the State
that Gen. Pickens had urged
by recommendation to the President
his immediate removal, & he
had at the same time begged
me to consent to relieve him,
which I had declined, as I
thought my services were
more needed in Com^d of Dept
No 2 & of the Army of Tenn.
As soon as I had arrived at
Charleston, Gen. Pickens de-
-signed to be relieved by
the Command of his Dept. to
me. but I declined to accept
until we had examined
together all the important
parts of it - since on the 16th
of the month we commenced
a regular inspection
which lasted until the 27th,
when, as I observed, the bad
weather put a stop to inspec-
-tion & we returned the
next day to Charleston, where
we will thro' with the regular
proximity of turning over the
Command.

Decisionville to Ft. Pung, on
 the Stone, 30 m. below Ft. Pung,
 which was not only a much
 shorter line but a steeper
 more advantageous one - & thus
 saving greatly the space on which
 the line could occupy, in any
 apparent view from the
 Stone -

Again, in his report on a line
 that I refer to the line put his
 infantry line in front of his
 artillery & the latter
 were in front of the former -
 so that when the line was oc-
 cupied by the Staff of the Redoubt
 & the line could use their
 heavy guns, the country being
 perfectly level. As you, the
 Redoubt being in front of the
 Redoubt, marked the line
 of the latter, passing com-
 pletely "Rogers's" system
 of field work, which ac-
 quires that the Redoubt
 should be in front, the Redoubt
 was in between the Redoubt
 before between the latter, the

They could not see of both
the Redoubt & the Bedans, so
as not to mask their fire
against the supporting dis-
tances of them, without being
exposed to the French guns
until required to repel the
attack.

On Morris Is^l. South of
St. James, a very important posi-
tion, there was commenced a
small open battery, about 3/4 of a mile
South of the Redoubt, & 1/2 m. from
Fort Minter; it ran across the
Island from the South Pacific
Creek, ^{over} a very narrow part of the
Island, but had no guns being
on the sea, or more properly the
"Water Harbor" as it is called. I
had the work enlarged, gave it
a bastioned front, closed its gorge
or rear, added numerous bomb
proofs, ^{& traverses} to it, & several heavy guns
bearing on the South Harbor
in other words made it so strong
as to resist, during some 20 days
the heaviest land & naval attacks
known in history. over

On Sullivan's Island, north of
St. Ignace, was old Fort Mifflin,
built by Beauregard half a mile east of
the latter place. I had planned to
send 5000 in specie, as well as
3 or 4 battalions of Artillery
some of which had taken part
in the attack of that period on St.
Ignace. A small post had also
been commenced by Gen. Van Buren
on the extreme east end of ~~Sullivan's~~ ^{the}
Island, which I afterwards increased
considerably, building also some de-
troit batteries. ~~There was~~ I ~~thought~~
sought to prevent the landing of
a force between ~~the~~ ~~two~~ ~~islands~~
altho' there was danger and much
less than ^{on} Morris Island, where there
was a good road ~~and~~ ^{immediate}
in front of it where the ~~strong~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~
land to the end of the road - (See my Re-
port of the Defense of Morris Island in July
Aug & Sept 1863) -

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p. 239

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 very terse & concise reply. I
 thought then, in a second article,
 I detailed the system of work
 in S. C. & Co to Gen. Gilman,
 who had no more to do with
 it than the man in the moon,
 as he reported to me in the
 summer of 1863, just before
 the evacuation of Morris Is.
 which took place, I think, a-
 bout the end of August of
 that year. After all the
 work in S. C. & Co. was
 finished, I received so. all
 my ^{little} ~~old~~ ^{plans} & ~~plans~~ ^{plans}
 & ~~plans~~ ^{plans} finished.

Before receiving G. P. Parker's
 report I thought proper to call
 on him for an estimate of the ^{minimum}
 no. of men & guns required for the
 proper defence of his Dept. (See my
 letter to him of Sep. 13. Book 1. p. 73
 & his answer of Sep. 24. p. ⁸¹ 84) which
 I accepted as the minimum esti-
 mate of what I thought necessary
 for the purpose stated.
 On the latter day I assumed

commands of the Dept. (See p. 25-
 the was relieved as per Sp. Order
 No 173 - Sep. 13] He left immen-
 diately for Richmond, where shortly
 after he was made a Lt. Col. &
 sent to command the Dept. of
 the Miss. with his Hd. Qrs. at
 Pickens, one of the most im-
 portant Dept. of the Conf.

This is another of the crying
 cases of favoritism of which
 Mr. Davis was guilty during
 the War. He had not yet
 taken a part in any of the battles
 of the Conf. when he succeeded the
 resigned Brig Gen. of Major of
 Art. I think, to join his fortunes
 with his adopted State - for he
 was from Va. but had married
 a charming Va. Lady. He was
 appointed a Col. in the Va. Service.
 When Gen. Lee was ordered to Va.
 & Gen. he took Col. Porter with him
 had been ordered there with the
 rank of Brig. Gen. After a few
 months he was promoted
 to the rank of Major General
 a Major Gen. I succeeded him

He participated there in no
 engagement with the enemy,
 but he was in camp when
 the brilliant fight at Shiloh
 took place. As already
 related he unfortunately be-
 came himself exposed to the
 people & authorities of So. Ca. &
 the latter demanded his removal.
 when I was sent there to bring
 him. He had no choice but
 to go to Rich. when Dr. Davis
 took him under his special
 protection, & after some time
 on the head of the Army Conf.
 Brigade of Major General, who
 had greatly distinguished them-
 selves by their valor & other
 soldierly qualities. And from
 that time the U.S. Government
 only endeavored to protect
 him as its protector.

After having familiarized
 myself with the condition of Miss.
 So. Ca. into three & Ga. into one. I
 determined to bring the question
 of the defense of Charleston its harbor
 for

The scarcity of iron at that time was so great that it became difficult to procure what was needed for the construction of the boom across the main channel from the water to the mouth. It was the same with regard to anchors for anchoring the boom. Hence we had to resort to large granite blocks collected at Columbia S.C. for the construction of the State House. Gov. Pickens first called my attention to this substance.

At the same time, the Chief Engineer was specially instructed as to the construction of heavy guns in the best use of iron, cast-iron & steel, when they could be used with greatest advantage against long range attack (see my letter to him of Oct 21st or p. 2 of book 2). An order was also made on the 11th Sept. for some heavy guns considered useless where they were then, at Cross Bluff on the Pamlico River & at Chestnut Bluff on the Roanoke River. This application was granted provided they could be shipped by the Coast Officer of the Dept. of War & Navy. An urgent appeal was also made on the 11th Sept. for additional heavy guns which were considered indispensable for the safety of Beaufort and Currituck.

not place much reliance in the
 strength & stability of the boom as
 they being constructed - A strong
 letter on the subject (Sept. 17) was
 written & addressed to the Hon. W. P.
 Shepley, Mr. of C. & Chairman of
 the Navy Com. Thanking him for
 his exertions in procuring a
 boom for my Dept. & expressing
 the hope that his efforts would
 continue until enough could be
 had to replace the Booms which
 might at any time be carried off
 by the strength of ice or by a great snow
 load moving against them which
 when already put to a strain but
 by a flood tide. The channel being
 very deep, some 70 ft, & the bottom
 rocky & rather smooth, of course
 good hold to be made or stones
 used as such -

On the 3rd (p. 10) Gen. Pickens
 was advised to have placed a
 boom prepared, outside of Charleston,
 for the use of the boats if it were
 the intention of the people of that
 part to defend the city to the
 last extremity, which I now dispen-
 ded. Preparations were ordered made
 by Mr. Ch. Dyer to obstruct & defend the
 mouth of the Cooper & Ashley Ri-
 vers. He was instructed, also, to main-
 tain closely both sides of the Stone

River from Church flats to Wappoo
cut, so as to obstruct that stream
at the most favorable point, to
prevent the enemy from using
it for the purpose of turning the
works in that vicinity.

The enemy not being yet pre-
pared to commence their attack on
Charleston or York, had determined
to strike a blow further south, on
the S. Johns River, in the Dept. of
Fla, commanded by Brig. Gen. Jas.
Morgan, who had but a very small
force under his control. Unknown
aware of the fact, that ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~officer~~ ^{officer} ~~belong~~ ^{belong}
~~at~~ ^{the} ~~War~~ ^{Dept} ~~had~~ ^{been} ~~in~~ ^{the} ~~service~~ ^{of} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~Government~~ ^{Government}, & on the 3^d Dec. orders
from the Secy of War to send imme-
diately two Regts of the 1st Fla. Cav. to
his assistance. Altho' my forces
were very limited & I was in fear
of an offensive movement, also,
by the Rebels, I simplified my force
with the view but called the atten-
tion of the War Dept. to my great
weakness & the great importance
of preventing the enemy from per-
taining my post. That to effect a
combined movement in Fla. I was thereupon
ordered to call my two Regts,
which I did not delay in doing for
they could have been of no service
then to Gen. Morgan, who had only

could his
not there
it only
to test
relatively

for the troops on the 2^d Oct. & on the 3^d
 sent the following telegram to the Secy of
 War, from Jacksville, Va. Colony
 arrival on the River last night, I
 found that the Post at S. Boston Camp
 had been vacated. The Garrison made
 a landing some five miles in rear of the
 "battery, Va." (see pamphlet marked "A. A. p. 6.")
 & six days after the telegram. The enemy
 have embarked on their boats for
 gunboats, & are, I understand, going
 down the River this evening. They
 have taken all the magazines, & see
 stores, they could find in the place.
 My troops could not have reached
 them in several days from the 3^d,
 owing to a gap of some 25 or 30
 m. of R. R., between the Gas Co. Sep-
 aration of Roads, to which I will have
 again to refer in long.

Being much concerned about the
 safety & efficiency of the boom, I gave
 the Chief Engr. special instructions, on
 the 3^d (book 2, p. 14) for altering its
 construction so as to increase its float-
 ing capacity & reduce the resistance
 it offered to the strong flood & ebb
 tides. I also intended, ^{to} to protect
 the pile foundations of Fort Hully,
 which were exposed to view at very
 low tide. On the same day, I wrote
 you an important Report to the Chief Engr.
 at Richmond, giving you the result.

of my observations in S. C., when I made my tour of inspection with Genl. Ross & the officers, from Sep 16th, before I had received Mr. G's correspondence, but follow them, the notes already given in Book 1. p. 21.

The Reports of the Comdr. Officer at N. Charleston, 3rd Dist, incidently indicated the Enemy's early intention of taking the offensive in that direction, & Miscell. of Oct 3rd - p. 26. Book 2. gives a clear & correct statement of the condition of this Dist.

It may be well to remark here, that on my arrival at Charleston I found no regular system by which news of the movements of the Enemy along the Coast of S. C. could be ascertained or once, & I determined to correct that deficiency, & measure will prove necessary. When the war added (Oct 4th - p. 37 Book 2) was expected to my Regt, without additional troops. What was already there & otherwise to be insufficient. The system I propose to use is as follows: I established Signal (flag) stations at the most important points along the Coast of S. C. (from Georgetown) - Ga & Fla, where the movements of the Enemy's ships or fleets could be observed. An exact register was kept in my Office

of all the ships along those coasts
 & where located. Whenever any change
 took place among them, it was re-
 -ported at once to my Office, & an acc.
 -kept of it; whenever any accom-
 -paniment of vessels occurred anywhere
 in direction an attack, the special
 reserves I kept, at Charleston or
 Savannah, were gotten ready, to move
 by rail in that direction, with the
 usual amount of provisions & am-
 -munition, one or more trains being
 always ready to receive them at
 the moment. We had to make up by
 vigilance, for the inferiority of the
 force. By the help of these flag stations,
 along the coast, & the communication
 with the nearest R.R. Station by sub-
 -flag stations or by carriers in cir-
 -cumstances required. Every
 morning, I found in my Office
 a Register containing the move-
 -ments of the Enemy's ships or land
 forces during the last 24 hrs. &
 I issued my orders accordingly.
 Hence, during the 20 Mo. I was in
 command of that extended Dept.
 I had the satisfaction of never hav-
 -ing been surprised. My re-inforce-
 -ments always arrived at the points
 threatened as soon as our limited
 means of transportation permitted.

Second Charleston Continued

My solicitude relative to the ap-
 proaches to Charleston were very
 great. Many works had been
 thrown up but not being direc-
 ted by any kind of experience great
 errors had been committed not
 only in their location but in their
 plans & even profiles. Guns were
 put in position without regard
 to their range & calibre. Batteries
 seemed to be ignored when most
 needed. Infiltrating fires by the
 enemy, the worst of all, had been
 almost entirely overlooked; yet one
 gun well placed by its courses
 & track was considered sufficient
 to fire unprotected. During the
 defence of Charleston, Lee's Ser-
 vants ^{battle} my ^{ground} ^{with}
 meadows & swamps that they ap-
 peared increased in them, ^{as if a chamber} & by put-
 ting bomb proofs & similar frag-
 mines in those trenches the ar-
 tillery felt a confidence which
 was "half the battle".

I ordered the Adj. Genl. to enlarge
 the work at Rantowles Station, on
 the Savannah R.R., & to build a tele. de-
 part. battery at the New-bridge, Church Sts.
 I ^{also} ordered to prepare a plan for
 the defence of the streets & squares
 of Charleston, in case of a successful
 land attack.

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On the 7th Oct. a Special Order (no. 234) was issued by the War Dept. increasing my Dept. to include East & East Fla, with the Apalachicola River hereafter under Brig. Gen. Jos. Morgan, a brave & energetic Officer, who remained in com. but as a Dist. Comdr. - But as already remarked, my territory & Dept. was increased but not the no. of Troops in it.

On the next day I ordered to Gen. Pickens, at Columbia, a copy of the copies of Army & Naval Office Bulletin to the Superior of Charleston, which I think he would be glad to receive, for his health & soul were in the danger of that City, & his zeal & energy were flagged. I expressed to him the need of heavy guns & a supply of confidence in the Union original Brown - which finally gave way. I expressed in high praise to Capt. G. S. Lee's plan for a "torpedo Ram", which would be equivalent to several gunboats - I added that, I have not to put on record, that half a dozen of these "torpedo Rams" of small construction & cost, would keep the harbor clear of 4 times the no. of the Union's "iron clad gunboats".

On the 10th the 1st Regt was ordered to put a new fort on the left of the "Partridge", City side of Ashley River, & to repair the battery at New Bridge, "Chase's Point" & the "Chapin's" was specially

instructed as to the transfer ^{new} & location
of guns already in position.

On Oct 10 - p. 89 - I completed my
Report of Oct 3^d of inspection, from Sep^r
16th to 24th, giving my views "as an Eng^r
relative to the defenses of San Juan de
Civita. This fuller than my Notes
of Sep^r 24 - in Book 1 - p. 27.

Two days later I wrote to Mr. Lt.
Jesse of Charl^s Chair, State gun boat Com^{dr},
recommending that the materials, &c,
collected for the new State gun boat,
sh^d be turned over to the Sec^y of the Navy,
which would be gotten ready in shorter
time (2m) & is far preferable & more
effective.

The next day ^(13th) the indications along
the Coast, especially about Port Royal, being
greater that the Army would soon strike
a blow in that vicinity, I informed (p. 64)
Col. W. S. Walker, Lt. M^r Phosmille,
that every effort would be made to
support him, in case he was attacked,
but nevertheless it was prudent for
him to make all needful prepa-
rations for being driven back, if over-
powered - hence he must send to the
rear all heavy baggage, &c, & hold his
army ready for battle: with 3 days
cooked rations, 40 rounds of boxes, & 60
in wagons. His pickets must be on the
alert & his spies employed actively. Re-
inforcements will be sent from a

Most noble notice that must be in-
 formed where more likely to be
 needed - 2,000 lbs will come from
 Charleston, 1,000 from the 2^d District
 (Hugro's) & 2,000 from South Carolina.
 To give him "backbone" he was told
 that his opponent, Gen. Mitchell, was
 known to be more glib than danger-
 ous, & addicted to predatory excursions.

My anxiety at that time was
 so great to have one of Capt. Lee's
 "Imped. Rivers" built, that I sent Mr.
 (p. 67) to Richmond, to explain his plan & my
 views on the urgent necessity of get-
 ting as many as possible built for

the War Dept. & if possible from
 the Navy Dept. for I considered ^{these Rivers} ~~them~~
 superior to the enemy's iron clad gun-
 boat, ^{with these Rivers} would cost about 1/3 less & be finished
 in 1/3 of the time of those we were building
 in Charleston, which could not be com-
 pared to its inefficiency. I informed
 the Gov. that the S. C. authorities
 were so well pleased with it, that
 they had applied for a view for its con-
 struction, but so the much sooner fini-
 shed & in better style by the Navy Dept.
 & if successful ^{as I had no doubt it would} it could be built for
 the Miss. & James Rivers, Pot. River & South
 hence I strongly urged the War Dept. to
 give the matter a favorable considera-
 tion, & earnestly recommended Capt. Lee
 for his zeal, energy & capacity as a practical Eng.

The invention of the Spanish
 pedo, & its successful use by the
 "David" against the "New Side",
 & the "Fish boat" against the
 off the Harbor of Charleston,
 are fully given by me in the
 1st Vol. of the Ph. Weekly Times,
 as well as some other matters
 regarding the defence of Charle-
 ston.

On the 3rd of ^{1844th} Sept. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 & 13) Col. Walker
 Gen. Lee & many
 were ordered to hold their troops ready,
 as frequently advised, with the usual
 instructions as to permission & a permis-
 sion & R. R. preparation. I have made
 a note for the transcription of
 several orders, & a memorial
 sent to Col. Walker.

On the same day, Gen. Milledore
 at Fort Mifflin, was ordered to have made
 a careful reconnaissance of the bet-
 ter, with a view to its effectual
 destruction, & protection by a fort.

About this period a remarkable
 occurrence took place which shows
 how singularly "justice" is at times
 administered in this world. When
 Mr. Lee was in about the vacua-
 ted in April 1842, the Civil & Milly.
 authorities advised the British &
 Gen. Lee to put their goods in
 security beyond the reach of the
 enemy. They nearly all did so,

Among them the wealthiest of
 the Banks, the "Bk of Cal." which sur-
 its assets, mostly of gold & silver,
 to the extent of ^{over} \$3,000,000 of
 dollars, in Mobile, to Col. C. C.
 Ga. under the care of its President,
 who placed them under the charge
 of W. H. Young, Pres. of the Bk of
 Columbus Ga, thinking that they
 would there be perfectly safe. On
 the 11th of Oct., however, unexpectedly,
 a telegram (see page of July 1864
 Oct.) from the Secy of War, Gen. S.
 to R. Randolph, Major, without in-
 dication of the name of the Bank, or of the
 place in charge of Boston, the Gov. de-
 pointing at Gen. S. immediately, but
 reluctantly, sent an officer of my Staff,
 Col. O. Rice, Col. A. C. to execute the
 order. On the 4th he reported that Mr.
 Young refused to deliver the coin
 under advice of Mr. Manning, Secy
 of the Treasry. He then graciously possession
 was taken of it, & was applying to him
 in the Bk of Cal., & was referred
 by the Secy of War to Gen. S. in the
 hands of Mr. Young, who had just
 been appointed a public Depository,
 provided he would give a receipt
 in that capacity. But he declined
 doing so. I was then ordered (see
 the Secy of War's telegram of the 15th) to have
 the coin turned over to Mr. J. S. Murray

Govt. Department, Augusta Ga.,
which was done singly done, Col
Rice taking triplicates. Receipts from
him one for himself, one for my
Official Files & one for the Secy of
War.

Thus it was, that property which
belonged to citizens of Ga, & was
being suspended by the Army, who
had possession of the State, had
taken, by its lawful protector &
friend, the Gov of the Conf States.
The little that they had purchased
saved from the general wreck.
What was because of that was
in the case, where no money was
doubtless spent for the benefit
of the Confy, but how wisely,
not having been aptly & regularly
applied by Congress, has never, in
believe, been made known to the
South, especially to the Stockholders
& Superintors of the Bk of Ga. which
was, of course, entirely ruined.
This degree of its worth & value
assess.

It appears to me, that it would
have been more generous and
equitable, to have taken, also, a
fair proportion of the coins of all
the other Banks in the Confedng.

The movements of the French along the coast of Spain, still inspired Genl. Miquez with a sense of his responsibility on the 14th Sep. he gave a clear statement of the condition of his Army, mentioning his small force, asking that it should be increased by two or three Regts of Infantry, at the earliest moment practical. I felt that necessity, but could not comply with his request, for I was very apprehensive of the loss of important material stock, at or about Pootaligo, in Col. Walker's list; so much so that, on the 16th I sent two officers of my Staff, Messrs. Mitchell & Bacon, to confer with him, on his condition & assurance that he would rely on being reinforced as soon as the General had developed his movements. He retracted his mention of want of rifles for his Cavalry, which would have to go to as before, owing to the nature of the country in which the contest would be likely take place. He signalled the following points for concentrating his force & his forces, according to the movements of the Army, viz: Pootaligo, Grahamville, & Beville, detailing his preparatory arrangements for meeting the foe at any of these points.

On the 17th (p. 84), I received a
 dispatch from the Secy of War, in-
 forming me that news from
 Baltimore stated that a Federal
 cabinet meeting had been held in
 Washington, at which Gen. ^{Wm. B. Ruffin}
 commanding in front of Charleston
 had been ordered to attack that
 city within the next two weeks.

This information was at once
 communicated to Gen. Ingraham
 C.S.A., comd^g of Naval forces, & to the
 Mayor of the City, Mr. Chas. Mackey,
 & the people of Charleston
 might be prepared for such an
 event. I instructed, at the same time,
 Dr. Cheves, in charge of the harbor
 obstructions, to hurry up the laying
 of the "rope entanglement" in front
 of the "Boom" in which I had set
 as much faith.

By the way, when I first arrived
 in Charleston, I found the place
 in a constant state of alarm from
 the most improbable (at times)
 reports. I determined to put a
 stop to this at once. I gave orders
 to all officers in the City, to take down
 in writing, the names of any party
 making an alarming report, & then
 issued to trace it to its originator
 who was to be arrested forthwith,
 unless or until, he could furnish

good evidence of the authenticity of the Report. It required about two weeks only, two or three weeks, to put a stop to that nuisance.

On the 18th (p. 89), I received an important letter relative to an important matter which had already attracted my attention, the construction or rather completion of a R.R. from Thomasville to Bainbridge, on Flint River, 36 m., & of a branch from Crossville to the Tallahassee R.R., 16 m., which would add greatly to the military facilities for the defence of Florida. Gen. & Co. Va. & for Gen. D. G. Terry's rapidly from Va. to the interior of Georgia, point threatened in Va. I judged strongly in the Govt. the construction of those Short Roads, but the want of iron & the fear, I think, of exciting the anger & ill-will of the Hon. Mr. Scales, of Va., the iron on whose "Key-Block R.R." I wish to take up for the object referred to, but refused prevented the construction of either of said roads, until the last year of the war, when it was sanctioned but too late, I think, to be completed.

This was done later as will be seen in the course of the Narrative

is in the 1st Com. of the 1st Mil. Dist. for the construction of roads at Praygo's Bluff, by a little strategem, as the enemy seemed to be in the town District. I did with the 1st Mil. Dist. on the bay or entrance into the River. See 1-Book 3-

Oct. 19 (p. 91) Instructions were given to the Command of the 1st Mil. Dist. for the construction of roads at Praygo's Bluff, by a little strategem, as the enemy seemed

At about that period of the War being commenced that the Conf. Gov. and not disposed to open the door again to peace negotiations with the Fed. Gov. it occurred to me that the result might be indirectly achieved by getting the Gov. of the So. States to propose a conference at Memphis on the subject, to the effect of the North Western States, under flag of truce, with the tacit consent of our Gov. to decide on a treaty of peace to be submitted to the U.S. & British Federal & Congress. So, on the 21st I wrote a telegraphed letter to effect to Gov. Pickens, of So. Car., Brown of Ga. & Milton of Fla. & to Col. Wm. P. Miles, Chair. of Mil. Com. in Congress. but nothing was heard out of it.

On the 22nd p 110. will be found the report of Capt. J. G. Lee, of his visit to Richmond to submit to the War & Navy Dept. his plan of a "Torpedo Boat", already referred to. He reports that the Secy. of the Navy, the Chf. Eng. & the Chf. of Ordnance of the Navy, were all well pleased with the plan. The Torpedo Boat, but he might naturally left before he had obtained all the necessary orders to procure its construction, which occasioned many delays & much correspondence on the subject.

At last the long expected attack of the Federals occurred, on the 22^d against Col. W. S. Walker at Potomac & Crosscut Station, & they were badly defeated, as will be seen in Book 2. from p. 114 top 125; & in pamphlet "AA", from p. 11 top 25. & in the detached telegraph (see page Page of Act telegraph) from Oct 22^d to 26th, from Col. Walker & other Officers engaged in that brilliant affair.

The evolutions, intelligence & foresight of Col. W. on that occasion when the enemy had prepared his expedition with so much care & preparation were so conspicuous, that I recommended him at once for promotion. See my despatch of Oct. 23^d p. 12, pamphlet "AA" & p. 117 letter B-2.

I classed him, then, as a very promising Officer, who will make his mark in the circumstances of his position.

The reports & telegraphs mentioned are so full & complete that I will pass the other matters requiring my attention.

Having to trust my own judgment, alone, relative to the deficiency of troops, in the 1st Regt. Art. I called on its commanding Officer for an estimate of the men & material he

be thought necessary for a prolon-
 gued, successful resistance to any
 attack which the resources of
 the enemy may enable him to make.
 See my answer of Oct 25. p. 180 to 144 -
 also of Gen. Pitts, sub. comd, p. 125. 647.

By these answers which show
 that the actual forces of all arms
 in the 1st Dist. were as follows:

On James Island, Gallatin,	2,910 men.
City of Charleston & the main,	" " 1,279 "
In all	<u>4,189 "</u>

Whereas the total required would
 be 21,850 men, which gives a deficit
 of 17,661 men, for a proper defence
 of that District!

Those letters of Gen. Ripley &
 Dist should be read carefully &
 commented upon judiciously &
 especially when later, in August
 & Sept. 1863, I was accused by
 the Hon. Secy of War, old Mr. Sed-
 don, who was probably in his dot-
 age, to have lost Morris Island,
 not for the want of troops, but
 through my negligence or the
 ignorance of my duties. For his
 remarks on the subject (see my letter
 transmitting my Report of the defence
 of Morris Island, marked "BB") will be
 found to bear the impress of an old man's
 opinions. Mil. & Min. who thought
 himself a great Mil. genius, in his own

was bound
 to doubt
 to Ripley
 only light
 would visit

bridge over the cross hatch, quite near the enemy's position, while he had only 5 Co's of Cavalry & 1 of Druff & one Small Co. of Artillery. He desired, in addition, one good Co. of Artillery - 2 more of Cavalry & two of Druff. The Cavalry he asked, should come from those of his Regt stationed at Adams Run & Charleston.

This letter is cool & well considered stating only palpable facts.

p. 182. 31st To S. B. Mallory - Secy of War.

This communication is important as showing my strong faith in the Sec "Torpedo Ram", which I had asked him, before, to assist me in having built & which he had promised to do.

In it I say, "I confidently believe that, with 3 of those light draft 'T. R.' & as many 'Iron clad gunboats' this harbor (Charleston) could be held against any Naval force of the enemy." & I added that, "the same means can also be used with one less of each class - for Savannah & Mobile." I disclaimed, also, wishing to take the matter out of the hands of incompetent Naval Officers - "all I desired

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was, to see ^{it} (the "Torpedo Ram") afloat
& ready for action as soon as
possible."

Time & the progress of
Naval Warfare has only
confirmed me the more in
the above opinion entertained
20 years ago —

Comd of Port 2. for Oct 1862