By Serge F. Kovaleski
Washington Post Foreign Service
Monday, January 10, 2000; Page A14
PANAMA CITY, Panama—In handing over the Panama Canal, the
United States also bestowed on the Panamanian government something far
less desirable--thousands of acres littered with unexploded mortar shells,
grenades and other munitions from decades of arms testing and training
by
the U.S. military.
As stipulated by the 1977 canal treaties, the U.S. government on Dec. 31
relinquished jurisdiction over the 360,240-acre Canal Zone, which includes
the waterway and numerous properties formerly used by American armed
forces--among them the Empire, Pina and Balboa West practice ranges.
While the accords ended a U.S. troop presence in Panama that spanned
nearly a century, they also required the United States "to take all measures
to ensure insofar as may be practicable that every hazard to human life,
health and safety is removed."
But the cleanup carried out by the U.S. military has been criticized as
inadequate by Panamanian officials and environmentalists. It left at least
7,700 acres of rain forest with residual explosives that have rendered
those
areas too dangerous for human habitation or development.
U.S. officials said dense jungle and steep slopes made the task of clearing
more unexploded ordnance too difficult and at times too dangerous. They
also noted that further work would have caused significant environmental
damage to the canal's watershed.
Much to the dismay of President Mireya Moscoso's government, U.S.
Defense Department officials said that, based on empirical evidence and
rough assumptions about munitions, they estimate that at least 110,000
pieces of undetonated ordnance may be scattered along the ground or
buried under jungle cover in the most heavily used range areas. Before
leaving Panama, the U.S. military recommended that those 7,700 acres of
high impact--almost 20 percent of the ranges--remain closed to the public
permanently.
"We have always said a small portion of the ranges would have to remain
off limits to people because cleaning them up was not practicable or even
possible in some cases," said Susan Wood, a deputy assistant secretary
of
state for Western Hemisphere affairs. Overall, she added: "We did the
cleanup in good faith and complied with treaties. But there is always this
problem of the definition of the term 'practicable.' "
For years, the U.S. military has posted warning signs around hazardous
sections of the ranges, but Moscoso's government said the areas still pose
a threat to residents of adjacent poor communities who venture into the
fields to collect scrap metal for sale or to hunt for food and plant crops.
An estimated 60,000 people live in neighborhoods surrounding the ranges,
a population that is expected to grow to around 100,000 in the next few
years as Panamanians move closer to the capital in search of opportunities.
In the last two decades, at least 21 Panamanians have been killed and
others injured on or near the ranges by explosives that they stepped on
or
tinkered with.
The failure of the United States to clear more land has prompted
Panamanian officials to accuse Washington of violating the treaties and
to
explore legal and diplomatic means of persuading the Clinton
administration to complete the cleanup. The Moscoso government
contends the United States undertook the ordnance removal late--not
beginning in earnest until December 1997--failed to share information and
ultimately skirted its responsibility by falling back on the word
"practicable."
"I think the interpretation of the word is unilateral and self-serving,"
said
Juan Mendez, director of the office of treaty affairs at the Foreign Ministry.
"We do not want money or compensation. We want the ranges clean . . .
and we will pursue it firmly and responsibly until that is done."
Panamanian officials and environmentalists acknowledged that getting rid
of
the unexploded ordnance could take years and cost tens of millions of
dollars. But, remarked John Lindsay-Poland, director of Latin American
programs for the Fellowship of Reconciliation, an American group that is
urging the United States to clear the properties: "How feasible is it to
clean
up the areas? How feasible was it to build the canal?"
The dispute has raised questions about future bilateral relations following
an otherwise smooth transfer of the Canal Zone to Panamanian control that
marked the end of an era dating to 1903, when the United States
facilitated Panama's independence from Colombia to construct the
50-mile-long waterway.
"The United States should be ashamed of [the contamination] that it has
left
behind. What a legacy," said Fernando Manfredo, a Panamanian who
helped preside over a U.S.-Panama working group on the cleanup. He
added: "Now we have to do the same thing we did to get the 1977
treaties. We have to build international support to convince the United
States to finish the job."
In the meantime, the Panamanian government has retained the Washington
law firm Arnold & Porter to provide legal analysis of U.S. obligations
and
to oversee an independent assessment. The report, which includes more
than 60 photographs, contests the U.S. position that the vast majority
of
land outside the high-impact areas is cleared and ready for full use.
One of the photos shows what is said to be an unexploded 60mm mortar
shell on the Empire range that is slightly visible above the surface of
a road
leading up a hill. Another photo identified a live rocket warhead lying
in
jungle terrain, while others showed practice grenades lying outside the
impact areas as well as mounds believed to contain undetonated munitions.
Researchers also found unexploded ordnance on surfaces of hilly terrain
that were less steep than the maximum grade the U.S. military generally
used as a limit for its cleanup effort.
"We are not sure we concur with their findings," said Wood. "The first
step
is to determine whether our assessment is the same as the government of
Panama's."
The U.S. government said it cleaned up as much contamination from the
ranges as was possible before starting to turn over control of the ranges
in
July. Officials estimated that the U.S. military cleared about 80 percent
of
the ranges, removing more than 8,500 pieces of unexploded ordnance and
about 2.1 million pounds of scrap metal, mostly from the surface of
maneuver areas where the prevalence of munitions was dramatically less
than in the zones designated as high impact.
The U.S. government said that the cleanup did not begin earlier in part
because portions of the ranges were still being used by the few remaining
troops in Panama and because the United States had been negotiating with
the previous government about maintaining a military presence in the
country at a proposed regional anti-drug base. Those discussions
eventually collapsed.
According to several sources familiar with the ordnance clearing
operations, even some U.S. troops complained that the cleanup was not
thorough enough. On many occasions, the sources said, troops were
instructed to look only for unexploded munitions at ground level,
particularly near paths, and often were not equipped with metal detection
devices, relying only on visual assessments.
Robert Pastor, an adviser on Latin America in the Carter administration
who was involved in the 1977 treaty negotiations, said: "It is clear that
the
U.S. government was slow to address the issue . . . and did as little as
it
could get away with.
It is expensive, the Pentagon is concerned with precedent, and the current
administration never really attached itself to Panama."
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