[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

3. Suspension of Arms Shipments to Cuba

Admiral Burke stated that Defense is concerned over two aspects of the decision to suspend arms shipments to Cuba. First, Defense had not been informed in advance of this decision, and second, the U.S. had cancelled valid contracts with a free government.

Mr. Stewart said that Assistant Secretary of Defense Sprague's office had been advised. Mr. Irwin (Mr. Sprague's deputy) said he had not known about the suspension until May 1.

Admiral Burke said that Admiral Calderon, Cuban Chief of Navy General Staff, had written him a personal letter[2] saying that the U.S. suspension did not affect official relations between the governments but that Calderon personally thought it was a terrible thing for the U.S. to do. Admiral Burke said that the Cubans are extremely eager to buy PT boats and that the ones they are now planning to purchase are simply a pile of junk.

Mr. Stewart noted that the only shipment affected by the suspension is the delivery of 1,950 Garand rifles, the remaining portion of a 5,000 rifle contract entered into several years ago. Shipment of spare parts of non-combat material, although first suspended, has been resumed.

Mr. Stewart described some of the political considerations involved in the U.S. decision. There is considerable opposition within Cuba to Batista, who obtained power through a military coup and rigged elections. Batista probably does not command the support of a majority of the Cuban people today. He promised free elections in June but had not convinced the people that they would in fact be free and has recently imposed very severe restrictions and abrogations of civil rights. In addition to internal problems in Cuba, there is considerable Congressional and public sentiment in the U.S. opposed to shipment of arms to Batista. Assistant Secretary Rubottom met this opposition during recent testimony on the Hill [3] about Latin American policy and in connection with the Mutual Security Program. Senators Morse, Mansfield and Fulbright were particularly outspoken in their criticism of U.S. aid to Latin American dictators. In view of all these considerations, Mr. Stewart said, the State Department had decided to apply rigidly a policy of non-intervention in Cuba. He noted that members of both of the Foreign Affairs Committees of the Congress, after briefings by Departmental officers, had indicated that the Department had no alternative but take the action it did on the suspension of arms shipments.

Admiral Burke commented that there are a number of dictators in Latin America and said that there might be considerable difficulty if Latin American countries felt they could not rely on the U.S. to carry out valid contracts for shipment of arms. These countries would only look elsewhere for military equipment. Mr. Stewart said that there has recently been a trend in Latin America away from dictatorships starting with the overthrow of Peron. He also said that continued shipment of arms to Batista was gaining considerable bad will for the U.S. in Cuba.

Mr. Murphy inquired as to the terms of the contract for sale of arms to Cuba, asking specifically whether there was not some kind of escape clause. Admiral Burke said that he thought it was a straight contract for sale and that our suspension was in violation of the terms of the contract. Mr. Stewart said the Department, through MC, had final authority in deciding whether a shipment of arms should be sent. Admiral Burke said in reply to Mr. Murphy's question that his recommendation would be to carry out the contract, since it was a valid contract and even though certain hopes which we entertained at the time we entered into the contract had not been borne out. Admiral Burke said that if 1,950 rifles were the only problem it was probably not a serious problem, but he still felt we should carry out our agreement. It was pointed out that Cuba has cancelled all its orders with the U.S. for combat weapons. Admiral Burke thought this changed the situation somewhat.

Regarding future prospects in Cuba, Mr. Stewart said that the country is in a state of great instability with terrorism and brutality being practiced by both sides. If Castro obtains power, he has said that for 18 months he will impose a dictatorship and this might well be as bad as the present regime. On the other hand, there is the prospect that the pattern of Argentina might eventually be followed and that a democratic regime would ultimately emerge.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

NOTES:

1. Source: Department of State, State-JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417, May 1958. Top Secret. The drafting officer is not indicated, but the source text bears the following notation: "State draft. Not cleared with Department of Defense." A cover sheet lists 28 attendees at the meeting, including representatives of the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of State, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

2. No such message has been found in the Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers, Incoming Letters-Calderon.

3. Apparently a reference to Rubottom's testimony cited in footnote 4, Document 29.