

FULL OFFICIAL HISTORY

OF

THE WAR WITH SPAIN

WRITTEN OVER THE WIRES IN THE DISCHARGE OF PUBLIC DUTY

By the Highest Authorities of the Government, Heads of Departments and Bureaus of State, War and Navy, Cabinet Secretaries, the Adjutant General, the Commanders of Fleets and Armies in Active Service, and the

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

THE EARLIEST EXAMPLE OF HISTORICAL WORK WROUGHT FROM THE RECORDS AUTOMATICALLY AUTHENTIC,
OF THE INNER TRUTHS OF WAR, WITH THE LATEST FACILITIES OF SCIENTIFIC INVENTIONS

The Figures Touched with Life and the Scenery with Colors

BY MURAT HALSTEAD

Author of "The Story of the Philippines," "Our New Possessions," "History of American Expansion," "The Story of Cuba," "Our Country in War," "The White Dollar," "The Life of William McKinley," "The Conventions of 1860," etc.

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
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GOVERNMENT BUILDING AT WASHINGTON, OCCUPIED BY THE STATE, WAR, AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS.



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Inscribed
to the
History Makers of the United States,
The President, The Cabinet, The Congress
and the
Officers and Enlisted Men
of the
American Army and Navy,
Whose Deeds Officially Written
In Action
Are Recorded in These Pages,
Edited by the Author;
A War for Humanity in the
Name of Liberty
Became One of Beneficent Conquest,
Imposing Duties of Emancipation and Dominion,
Adding to the Broad Lands of the free,
Spanning the Continent,
The Islands of the Southern Seas,
While the Energy of the Conquerors
Was Merciful to the Vanquished
for the Startling Strokes of Conclusive Victory
Brought the Swift Return
Of the Security of
Peace.

copy 10 mar. 1944
Frank





THE PUBLISHERS' PREFACE.

The Full Official History of the War with Spain is, in essentials, composed exclusively of material for which the highest authorities of the government of the United States are responsible. The true way to impart to biography its greater charm is to use the words of the person portrayed, and the better way to write history is in the authoritative language of its makers.

Modern inventions have afforded such facilities for communication between capitals and camps, the departments of war and navy, and the commanders of armies and fleets in action, that there is centralization of supreme command, and the work of war, as well as of diplomacy, is absolutely in the hands of the Great Officer, charged by the Constitution of the United States with the command-in-chief of our armed forces, naval and military. This wise provision of the republican form of government significantly subordinates all generals and admirals to the Chief Magistrate of the nation, conclusively as the colonel of the regiment is the superior of the captains of the companies that compose it.

When the flag of this country flies over the White House, the President is there in the discharge of public duty, and near the executive mansion, westward, in an immense building, are grouped the departments of State, War, and Navy, through which our government comes in contact, whether in peace or war, with the nations of the earth. Thus within a small space are gathered the executive offices and appliances of the American people.

The wires in the White House place the President in touch with all the departments represented in his Cabinet and joined to the wonderful web spun round the world, over which is wrought the mighty magic of telegraphy; and in the recent war the defense of our coast, and the offense of our ships and battalions in the Indies, East and West, the President was constantly in swift and sure communication with the front—and no word of his is found that did not command and cheer the advance and testify his courage and vigilance.

The intelligence of the world's business day by day—the order and reports of affairs, large and small, flash continually on the wires, and from the beginning of history there has been no material of and for it, comparable with the dispatches reduced to writing at both ends of the lightning lines. Never in all the countless experiences of mankind was the story of a war recorded and made definite and certain by the leading actors in it as in our combat with Spain that began and was fought to a finish in the year 1898. It was the first case of the kind, and this book is in a striking degree the fruit of it. All enlightened peoples participated in our current information, but the general dependence was on formal reports—statements in greater part always, and, as a rule, prepared entirely for the public by officers for their superior officers, or writers of features for the press, according to the colors or the theories that the proprietorship of the papers preferred.

The inner truths, passing clouds, transient impressions, local atmosphere, the very tints of the scenery, were in the private and confidential telegrams, official and pertinent as possible—words of command and of explanation, admonition and suggestion, that passed between the President, the Cabinet Secretaries, the Heads of Bureaus, the Adjutant-General, and the Generals and Admirals Commanding. These were incessantly interchanged, and will be forever the highest authority as to the points contested. It is what a man wrote on the spot, the immediate, unrevised impression, that will be called forth to settle disputes. Each dispatch is a flash-light of the scene as it was—with every attribute and incident of verity. There are thousands of them in the reports of the War and Navy Secretaries, and in the bureaus and in the Adjutant-General's office especially, filling bulky volumes, and given to the public with unprecedented candor. Such a thing as this library of revelations of bottom facts, no matter whom they helped or hurt, never before was presented to the people. The volumes printed from bales of telegrams, inestimable as evidence and incontestable, are supported by marvels of photography. The kodaks had the effect upon ships and armies in activity of the kinetoscope. It is aptly stated in the title-page of this book that there is in *The Official History of the War with Spain*, automatic accuracy. There is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, told infallibly by the greatest energies and illuminants of the universe, electricity and sunshine.

The author's embarrassment was the excessive riches of the matter with which the astonishing official publications are filled, surpassing all example

alike in quality and quantity. He has brought to his unprecedented task of the presentation in popular form of this Full Official History, the expert training of long and laborious journalism.

The Official History of the War with Spain is the first of its kind among historical volumes—because the appliances of modern invention affording the facilities have not existed and been employed through other wars; and as surely as it is the earliest of the official character it bears, it is the forerunner of the war books that tell the truth in the future—in which the instrumentalities of our advanced civilization will make conspicuous the sacred veracity of history; when the fiction that betrays and the formalities that obscure will be eliminated from the established record of deeds great and good; and the measure in which men accomplish them, so that there will be gain and glory through the solid simplicity of faultless justice.

The imperfections of the historical work are admitted, but the surpassing excellence of the material embodied is manifest in these pages.


THE PUBLISHERS







PRESIDENT MCKINLEY AND HIS CABINET.



MURAT HALSTEAD, THE AUTHOR.




THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

In modern wars the relations between the staff correspondents of the newspapers, and the staff officers of the armies engaged, have been understood, by those who have knowledge of the administration of the Press and that of the military establishments, as full of difficulty; and there has been no approximation to a satisfactory solution of the embarrassments found in the course of our recent experiments. One of the vital matters when nations lift the sword against each other is to restrict the circulation of intelligence, and the incessant increase of wires whose business is to convey news over continents and under seas, magnifies the problem of the adjustments of military necessities and the rights of the people represented by the Press. Inferior as Spain was in resources to the United States, the fact that for some weeks she knew the movements of our ships, and we were largely mystified as to the location of her squadrons, placed us at a disadvantage. If there had been equality in the naval strength of the belligerents, the one where the current intelligence was irrepressible would have been exposed to dangers in the dark, from which the one capable of suppressing the swift diffusion of truth would have been exempt. As it was, we credited the Spaniards with greater activities than they undertook, and felt unwarranted apprehensions of aggressive adventures on their part. The maneuvers of Cervera's fleet of swift cruisers for a time caused great perplexities. It was not absolutely ascertained for some time that Cervera was in Santiago harbor. We were slow in making out that his supplies were so scanty he was constrained to go there as a refuge, instead of making the port of Cienfuegos, and having railroad connection with Havana. A rumor of Spanish cruisers detained our troops when embarked at Tampa for Santiago. There were Spanish gunboats on the Pacific Ocean thought capable of attacking some of our transports, and Admiral Dewey was watchful more than three months to prevent attempts of the Spaniards at Manila to attack his ships with torpedoes. Once he had news that a

superior Spanish fleet was in the Red Sea on the way to the Philippines. It was known in Spain better than in the United States that General Merritt was on the Newport with three tons of gold coin, and that our transports, with more than a thousand men on each, were steaming westward on the twentieth parallel of latitude. Cervera's fleet was expected to sail from the Cape Verde Islands to intercept the Oregon, which ran out of her way eastward of the West Indies and appeared off the coast of Florida. If we should have war with a power whose sea force is strong as our own, on either or both our ocean fronts, there would be, for the sake of fair-play for public safety, an imperative requirement that the Press should not publish—that the wires should not carry—information of the movements of our ships of war. General Sherman said the attack upon his left wing by Johnston in North Carolina, when on his way from Savannah to Washington, was caused by an item in the shipping news of the New York *Tribune*, that a ship loaded with forage had cleared for Newberne. It is not wise, however, for military or naval commanders to regard the items the papers contain from day to day. The fact that four ships of war, believed to be American, were seen from the coast of Luzon was stated in a Manila paper on the day before Dewey surprised those who were presumably defenders of the harbor.

The Press of the United States largely took very extraordinary attitudes with respect to the war of our country with Spain. It was the belief of several great journals and journalists that they must be held accountable for the state of hostilities. They assumed airs of authority as to its management, its objects; and, as General Halleck wrote on the back of a letter of good advice from an able editor, "Halstead M. writes—how this war should be carried on." The Press, in its most ostentatious illustrations of public policy, gave as much prominence to views as to news, and pursued the cultivation and vindication of theories with even greater warmth and energy than they gathered and displayed from day to day the incidents of intelligence that were of the nature of information about the conduct of hostilities. In no war that ever took place did the Press go so expensively into the enterprise of reporting the current history, through special representatives, employ so many young men of courage and talent as historians on the spot, as in this Spanish-American combat of three and one-half months. The sums of money spent in newspaper enterprise were enormous. The expense account of the Associated Press was unexampled. Several newspaper proprietors employed



steamers for their personal convenience and to supply newspaper service such as never before was imagined. It is said the foundation of the fortune of the Rothschilds was much augmented by the success of a representative of the house, who witnessed the ruin of Napoleon's army at Waterloo, and had luck in catching a boat, landing in England, hastening to London and using his knowledge in the market. If the fashion of last summer is to prevail, the time will come when the war correspondents will be a factor in the physical force of armies in the midst of operations; and when there are contentions as to supremacy in "sea power," the private yachts of the newspapers, and the spectators, may outnumber the battleships and their crews. After all the prodigious effort and extravagance of the Press to assist in various ways and with a variety of means to carry on the late war, and shape it according to their policy, the general result is not symmetrical. There are many imposing fragments, but they are at once colossal and sinister, not an edifice—not a structure with cornerstones and walls that reveal an architect, but a Stonehenge, massive yet fragmentary,—features stalwart without sequence but significant,—a stoneyard clogged with roughly-cut pillars and chips of rock that need the hammer and chisel and mortar. It is not a case of building wiser than the builders knew, but of not working on the straight pursuit of truth,—not building according to knowledge. There has been an indulgence in personalities and conceits, in phantoms, the very vanities of morbid fancies.

There has been in the work of the Press mechanical obstacles not overcome—wasteful haste in slamming at the world daily chapters constructed not to enlighten but to startle—not to lay each day a brick of fact—but to erect a tower of Babel, no matter if it leaned like that of Pisa, or tottered to ruin before the design was achieved—the whole subordinated to the principle that accuracy is not so important as precedence—that no matter about the yester-days, the great day is always this afternoon or to-morrow. The magazines have been picture galleries, many of the paintings brilliant—some splendid strokes with pen and pencil; but one would not go to the galleries of Versailles,—rather to the libraries and official records and the files of newspapers that tell their respective stories in a representative way, for the history of France. The certainty that the history of the war of the United States and Spain in 1898 has not been written as a whole and in due proportion, has been for some time obvious to observers of experience, and students faithful to facts.

The task of historical writing has been remarkably simplified by the open door policy of the President and his Cabinet, in officially telling the people "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth," the secrets of a war in its evolution in the drift of events at first glacial, then torrential, "shooting Niagara" into the whirlpool, in the course of preparations and plans, the conduct of campaigns, the talk over wires from battle-fields to the White House and the War Department—all this never until now has been so unreservedly placed before the world. It does not seem to be in the way of the newspapers to go back and enrich their columns with the sweeping confidences that the government of the people has made to the people—but it seems that the task of writing a Full Official History of the War with Spain is distinctly in the line of the work of one who has had the training of many years in the valuation and presentation in condensed and consecutive form, of the news of the times. It is this precisely that the author of this volume proposed in the beginning of his task, gaining confidence in the accomplishment of it, which is as attractive, he feels, as he hopes it may be useful—as the treasures stored in the ample and open official records are revealed rich in the golden ore of history—imperishable in truthfulness and excellent in testimony—that our country in the expansion of victory is supported by the might of its manliness and the grace of its womanliness, going to the front accepting a call of duty, gaining land for the people—providing the resources of all climes for the hereafter of the Republic that is stronger for order than monarchy—with a freedom that is fairer than the anarchies that the broods of oppression conceive—lifting up for the children of the people the flag of the free, all the brighter because it floats over the Indies, Asiatic and American, and the Hawaiian and Aleutian archipelagoes—and above all this the radiant atmosphere of the righteousness that exalts men and nations.

MURAT HALSTEAD.





INTRODUCTION.

Since Spain lost her colonies on the American continents it has been in evidence that she must lose her islands, unless the character of her government and people should be so changed as to radically reform her colonial system. The wars of independence by Mexico, Peru, Chili, Argentina, and the central and northern South American States, were caused by like grievances and marked by the same characteristics. The tedious tragedies of the redemption from Spanish misrule southwest of us have common distinctions, kindred features, familiar paths trampled with bloody footsteps, marking the march of destiny—the trail of the serpent over all! Spain, not unaware of her fatality, but without ability to change her course, has long consciously confronted the doom that has overtaken her. It was the foreshadowed misfortune in Cuba that embittered the Spaniards, who could read on the map that displays the West Indies and the Atlantic and Gulf coast of the United States, the inevitable, irresistible attraction of gravitation of the bulk of the continent for the islands of the seas southeast. As certainly as we shall dominate the Gulf, and have won and maintained with the sword, all from the keys of Florida to the mouth of the Rio Grande, the great island of Cuba will be Americanized and our possession, the other Indies will be leagued with her, and accept our protection, glad to be our dependencies—this by the processes of the principles of our dominion and the growth of our homes. In due time it will be as evidently the order of nature and the course of empire, that we shall supersede European influences, and wield the sovereignty of peace over the islands, that were the prizes of the living Western nations of the older civilization beyond the Atlantic for three centuries, as that we have acquired, assimilated and Americanized the Mississippi valley and the Pacific slope; and the great Republic as an armed nation will be an empire of peace. We shall not permanently have the enmity of Spain because we have gained the islands she has lost. If she had wisely administered the government of her depend-

encies she would have sustained the position they once gave her of the foremost of the kingdoms, but the fact that neither the people of Spain nor the colonies had rights the crown was bound to respect, caused the combination of greed and cruelty, corruption and tyranny, that has wrought the downfall of Spain abroad and her decline at home. The peninsula is still rich in resources, and the people, in ceasing to waste their energies in the oppression of others, may teach themselves the lessons of orderly liberty, that will restore their country to the prosperity that has perished and the dignity that disappeared when pride became pretension. The Spanish people, carried into a war that was hopeless, have not been found lacking in devotion to their country, and the honor of the Spanish arms has been upheld by the valor of their soldiers, when their ranks were so steadfast that it conferred glory upon the American army that overcame them; and the chivalry of Cervera will be held in honorable remembrance by the generous manhood that overmatched him and rescued his slaughtered sailors from their burning and sinking ships. More than once Cuban influences have profoundly impressed the politics of the great organizations through which the American people govern themselves. The commanding votes in the government of the Union of our States were once, in the words of Abraham Lincoln, "half free and half slave"; and the States involved in the peculiar domestic institution were dominated by its influences. The issue was made that the slave system must hold the balance of power in the Senate, if nowhere else, and by consolidated force prevent the predominance of the free States by holding in one of the essential factors of the government, a veto power. Cuba was wanted, as Texas and California were, in this interest. In the case of the great State on the Gulf and the great State on the Pacific, the increase of territory, the extension of our boundaries, profited the cause of the larger liberty. The foundations of the Republic were broadened, even the urgency of the slave propaganda magnifying the area of freedom. It was in the interest of possessing Cuba to preserve the balance that the power identified with slavery might not be successfully assailed in the States, that the claim the constitution carried slaves into the territories, until forbidden by State sovereignty thereon founded, was made, that the Ostend conference was called and the manifesto bearing that name promulgated by the assembled American ministers, to Spain, France and England,—and the influence of the very able Mr. Soule, of Louisiana, turned the tide in the Cincinnati National Convention of the Democracy in 1856, from Douglas to

Buchanan, making incalculable changes in the history of the country so far as incidents and individuals are concerned. The direction of the general movements of mankind, it is safe to say, must have been about the same, though possibly varying widely in time, place and circumstance. Humanity does not stagnate, though there are centuries that are as years. The Ostend Conference, though composed of men of high place in diplomatic functions, did not partake of the nature of the proceedings of diplomacy. If the motive of the meeting was to open negotiations with Spain for the purchase of Cuba, the words employed were too pungent. If the purpose was to provoke war the expression was awkward. Spain was not seriously influenced beyond an agitation that was effusive in lofty language. It was the United States that was deeply disturbed. Filibustering in the name of Cuban liberties became a romantic occupation of American adventures, some of which were conducted and advertised as festivals. The sailing of the ill-fated Crittenden expedition from New Orleans was without shadow of concealment, and the Spaniards were especially well-informed. Spanish spies are believed to have largely personally conducted the enterprise. The Virginius affair was flagrant, and resulted in an execution at Santiago that was a massacre. There never was, however, any rational question as to the character of the filibuster ship. The scene of this tragedy has witnessed a desperate battle, in which the blood of a thousand American soldiers was shed, the surrender of a Spanish army; and those rugged hills and rocky shores were shaken by a cannonade that destroyed a Spanish fleet. The place of the sacrifice is under the Stars and Stripes! It has been known in Spain for half a century that the United States would pay liberally for Cuba and Porto Rico, but the Spanish cabinets have been too sensitive about the public opinion of the country, made dangerous to rulers by Carlists and anarchists, to transact business on its merits. The masses of Spaniards were not informed of the power of the American nation. In this they have been accompanied by the bulk of the people of other nations, whose average enlightenment it would perhaps be discourteous to doubt. It must be confessed, however, that Americans have not thoroughly measured and comprehended themselves, though it has often been in the minds of our people that such armies as were put into the field by the Nation and the Confederacy, a generation ago, would, all marching one way, be equal to self-defense, no matter how large the coalition against us, and competent to conquer a bigger world than Alexander overcame.

Cuba as a Spanish possession represented the worst form of European dominion in the Americas, and the growth of a great nation in North America, defiantly independent of the great Powers of Europe, was an increasing threatening of the inheritance of the mediæval monarchy that held the fairest of American islands situated within a few hours of our shores, that as our influence augmented in proportion to our power, the airs and the water, the winds and the waves, would waft in unison the magnetic doctrine that the lands of America, whether drained by vast rivers or surrounded by seas, should be the property of America. Cuba and the United States had attractions for each other, and while there was obvious the reciprocity of nations, there was a racial antagonism—an effervescence of contentious civilization—a repulsion of conditions and friction of characteristic institutions.

If it had not been for Cuban politics Stephen A. Douglas would have held the Democratic party together, deferring the time for the summons to arms to fight out the "irrepressible conflict"; and then our great heroes and statesmen would have had other names than those now of highest fame, names now not known, for it is the personal genius of republican government that great men are developed by events, and are representatives of the masses, and revealed by movements they do not originate and that widen into magnitude like streams running riverward.

Cuba, in the mouth of the Mediterranean of our hemisphere, was a volcano. The explosion of the Maine in the harbor of Havana was an indigenous eruption. It was in the chemistry of the conditions. Repeatedly we were on the verge of war. Hostilities between the United States and Spain were for half a century a question of time. During the administration of Millard Fillmore, we were so near a collision with England and France about Spanish-Cuban affairs that there was a state paper from the pen of John J. Crittenden, of Kentucky, that even yet has the alarm-bell ring in its sentences. We quote from Mrs. Chapman Coleman, the daughter and biographer of Mr. Crittenden:

"In 1851 Mr. Webster was Secretary of State and Mr. Crittenden Attorney-General in Mr. Fillmore's cabinet. Mr. Webster's health failed, and he was compelled for awhile to withdraw from Washington, and during this vacation Mr. Crittenden was Acting Secretary of State. At that time an expedition of about five hundred men escaped from New Orleans, and landed upon the island of Cuba. They were soon captured, and many of them

executed, and M. Sartiges, Minister of France, communicated to the United States government that the French government had issued orders to its ships of war to prevent by force any adventurers of any nation from landing with hostile intent on the island of Cuba. The British government gave notice also to the State Department that it had issued similar orders to its naval force. The following is the letter addressed by Mr. Crittenden (then Acting Secretary of State) to M. Sartiges. A distinguished gentleman who has occupied a high position in this government has written to me that this diplomatic letter was pronounced perfect in tone and style, and would compare favorably with any paper which had ever emanated from the State Department:

“Department of State, Washington, October 22, 1851.

“The undersigned, Acting Secretary of State of the United States, has the honor to remind M. de Sartiges, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the French Republic, that in the interview which he had with him on the 8th instant, he stated that he might have occasion to address him in writing on the subject of the information which M. de Sartiges then communicated, that the French government had issued orders to its ships of war, then in the West Indies, to give assistance to Spain, and to prevent by force any adventurers of any nation from landing with hostile intent on the island of Cuba. Having imparted that information to the President, the undersigned has now the honor, by his direction, to address M. de Sartiges in regard to it.”

We quote the paper in part:

“M. de Sartiges is apprised that a few days prior to the interview adverted to the charge d'affaires of her Britannic Majesty had given to this Department official notice that his government had issued similar orders to its naval forces. The President had regarded this as a matter of grave importance, but its gravity is greatly increased by the concurrence and coöperation of France in the same measure. It cannot be doubted that those orders have been occasioned by the recent unlawful expedition of less than five hundred men, which, having evaded the vigilance of this government, and escaped from New Orleans, were landed by the steamer Pampero upon the island of Cuba, and were soon captured, and many of them executed.

“The geographical position of the island of Cuba in the Gulf of Mexico,

lying at no great distance from the mouth of the River Mississippi, and in the line of the greatest current of the commerce of the United States, would become, in the hands of any powerful European nation, an object of just jealousy and apprehension to the people of this country. A due regard to their own safety and interest must, therefore, make it a matter of importance to them who shall possess and hold dominion over that island. The government of France and those of other European nations were long since officially apprised by this government that the United States could not see without concern that island transferred by Spain to any other European state; President Fillmore fully concurs in that sentiment, and is apprehensive that the sort of protectorate introduced by the orders in question might, in contingencies not difficult to be imagined, lead to results equally objectionable.

“The system of government which prevails most generally in Europe is adverse to the principles upon which this government is founded, and the undersigned is well aware that the difference between them is calculated to produce distrust of, if not aversion to, the government of the United States. Sensible of this, the people of this country are naturally jealous of European interference in American affairs. And although they would not impute to France, now herself a republic, any participation in this distrustful and unfriendly feeling towards their government, yet the undersigned must repeat that her intervention in this instance, if attempted to be executed, in the only practicable mode for its effectual execution, could not fail to produce some irritation, if not worse consequences. The French cruisers, sailing up and down the shores of the United States to perform their needless task to protect Cuba and their ungracious office of watching the people of this country as if they were fruitful of piracies, would be regarded with some feeling of resentment, and the flag they bore—a flag which should always be welcome to the sight of Americans—would be looked at as casting a shadow of unmerited and dishonoring suspicion upon them and their government. The undersigned will add that all experience seems to prove that the rights, interests, and peace of the continents of Europe and America will be best preserved by the forbearance of each to interfere in the affairs of the other. The government of the United States has constantly acted on that principle and has never intermeddled in European questions. The President has deemed it proper to the occasion that his views should be fully and frankly

presented for the friendly consideration of M. de Sartiges and his government, in order that all possible precautions may be used to avert any misunderstanding, and every cause or consequence that might disturb the peace or alienate, in the least, the sentiments of confidence and friendship which now bind together the republics of the United States and France. The undersigned avails himself of this occasion to offer to M. de Sartiges the assurance of his very distinguished consideration.

"JOHN J. CRITTENDEN."

Spanish diplomacy had been at work with England and France, and engaged them to interference with the United States filibusters. Spain had managed to persuade the governments of the two countries that she was engaged in the abolishment of the slave trade, and that this was preparing the way for emancipation, while the United States was a slave power and wanted the extension of slavery, as was witnessed by the enterprise of lawless expeditions. Mr. Crittenden's vigorous protest was presently followed by a notification from England and France that the dangerous orders had been revoked. It requires only the simple recitation of the facts to demonstrate that the triple alliance of the powers most interested, traditionally, historically, politically and commercially, in the West Indies against the United States, was a most grave affair. Hardly less so was the Black Warrior Case, that culminated in a war message from President Franklin Pierce—appended:

XXXIII^d Congress, 1st Session.

Ex. Doc. No. 76.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
Transmitting a Report in Reference to the Seizure
of the "Black Warrior."

March 15, 1854.

To the House of Representatives:

In compliance with the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 10th inst., I herewith transmit a report containing all the information received at the Department in relation to the seizure of the Black Warrior, at Havana, on the 28th ultimo.

There have been, in the course of a few years past, many other instances of aggression upon our commerce, violations of the rights of American citizens, and insults to the national flag, by the Spanish authorities in Cuba, and

all attempts to obtain redress have led to protracted and as yet fruitless negotiation.

The documents in these cases are voluminous, and, when prepared, will be sent to Congress.

Those now transmitted relate exclusively to the seizure of the Black Warrior, and present so clear a case of wrong that it would be reasonable to expect full indemnity therefor, as soon as this unjustifiable and offensive conduct shall be made known to her Catholic Majesty's Government; but similar expectations, in other cases, have not been realized.

The offending authority is at our doors, with large powers for aggression, but none, it is alleged, for reparation. The source of redress is in another hemisphere; and the answers to our just complaint, made to the home government, are but the repetition of excuses rendered by inferior officials to their superiors, in reply to representations of misconduct. The peculiar situation of the parties has undoubtedly much aggravated the annoyances and injuries which our citizens have suffered from the Cuban authorities, and Spain does not seem to appreciate, to its full extent, her responsibility for the conduct of these authorities. In giving very extraordinary powers to them she owes it to justice, and to her friendly relations with this government, to guard with great vigilance against the exorbitant exercise of these powers, and, in case of injury, to provide for prompt redress.

I have already taken measures to present to the government of Spain the wanton injury of the Cuban authorities, in the detention and seizure of the Black Warrior, and to demand immediate indemnity for the injury which has thereby resulted to our citizens.

In view of the position of the island of Cuba, its proximity to our coast, the relations which it must ever bear to our commercial and other interests, it is vain to expect that a series of unfriendly acts infringing our commercial rights, and the adoption of a policy threatening the honor and security of these States can long consist with peaceful relations.

In case the measures taken for amicable adjustment of our difficulties with Spain should unfortunately fail, I shall not hesitate to use the authority and means which Congress may grant, to insure the observance of our rights, to obtain redress for injuries received, and to vindicate the honor of our flag.

In anticipation of that contingency, which I earnestly hope may not arise,

I suggest to Congress the propriety of adopting such provisional measures as the exigency may seem to demand. FRANKLIN PIERCE.

Washington, March 15, 1854.

This message is one of the most trenchant that has emanated from our Executive Department of the Government. It is a plain suggestion to Congress to give the President authority to make war on Spain. It did not have the desired effect, as it produced comparative peace. It is another illustration that the United States has long been subjected to the inconvenience of a house on fire next door. There was a time in the course of the negotiations in the *Virginius* case that President Grant assembled a powerful fleet at Key West. This was so soon after the war of the sections and states that we had a strong array of war ships.

We quote from the report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1874, page 9, the official record of the mustering of a squadron at Key West, to promote Spanish-Cuban negotiations. Here is a passage of Secretary Robson's report:

"The North Atlantic Station.—At the date of the last report the whole available force of the navy which could be put afloat on the Atlantic Ocean was under orders to reinforce this station. In addition to the regular force as stated in the last report, every available wooden and iron-clad ship in ordinary was dispatched as rapidly as it could be put in order and properly manned and organized. The *Lancaster* and the *Ticonderoga* were recalled from the South Atlantic, and the whole European fleet from the Mediterranean, and ordered to concentrate at Key West. The force thus concentrated on the Station consisted of the *Franklin*, *Minnesota*, *Wabash*, *Colorado*, *Lancaster*, *Brooklyn*, *Congress*, *Worcester*, *Alaska*, *Ticonderoga*, *Canandaigua*, *Shenandoah*, *Juniata*, *Ossipee*, *Wachusett*, *Powhatan*, *Wyoming*, *Kansas*, *Shawmut*, *Sangus*, *Mahopac*, *Manhattan*, *Ajax*, *Canonicus*, *Dictator*, *Despatch*, *Pinta*, *Fortune*, and *Mayflower*; and Rear-Admiral Case, as senior officer present, assumed command, in pursuance of orders to that effect, January 3, 1874, the date of his arrival at Key West. Rear-Admiral Scott remained in command of a division.

"The causes which led to this concentration of force were generally and briefly alluded to in my last report, and it may now be proper, in order to complete the record of the action of the navy in connection with the *Virginius* affair, to recite the more prominent of the proceedings in relation thereto in which it took part."

It was while the American fleet of thirty ships of war was at Key West that the proceedings in the case of the *Virginius* were closed by the agreement of Spain to surrender the captured ship, a filibuster taken on the high seas, to salute the American flag restored to her, and pay an indemnity. The United States at this time had not resumed specie payments or established high credit, while the great fleet at Key West was enough to shake the stock market and alarm men of business in general, and President Grant was not moved by the demand that Spain should have been attacked. Spain was stronger then than now in her European relations, though suffering from home disorders.

The chapter of this volume that is of "The American Minister in Madrid" refers particularly to the period of General Sickles and General Cushing. The latter was a man of genius in literature and law, the former a man of affairs who made the closest approach to doing business with the Spaniards, proposing the purchase of the Spanish rights in the West Indies, and suggesting that we might pay \$125,000,000. It was believed in Madrid at the time that Marshal Prim, the Spanish Premier, was about to sell Cuba and Porto Rico, asking for the two islands \$200,000,000, and it is the opinion of General Sickles that Prim's assassination was on that account. The influence behind the assassins was so strong that they were protected. The act of murder is not attributed to a patriotic emotion, but to the resentment of a corrupt circle that Cuba should not be retained for the harvesting of plunder by favorites. Prim was the foremost man of his time in his country.

Many Spaniards knew when rushing into war with us their country would be better off to sell Cuba than to exhaust all resources in a hopeless combat, and yet they did not know the weakness of their country. The swift destruction of their fleets and the surrender of the armies were stunning surprises. The military government of Cuba under Gomez, with a civil accompaniment of inferior consideration, embarrassed all advances to Spain looking to the relinquishment of Cuba, because the Cubans were in the way, and the Gomez policy of destroying industries to deprive the Spaniards of revenue to carry on the war, and recruit the insurgent forces by annihilating the chances of peaceful occupation, impoverished Cubans, so that they could have no credit unless their bonds were guaranteed by the United States; and that could not be done on a basis of bloody ashes. Cuban combinations were meant to force this country to make war upon Spain, and while they were being worked, that

accommodation should be impracticable, the blowing up of the *Maine* made peaceful solution impossible, and with the inflammatory conditions excited, the inevitable conflict was, to our disadvantage, for the moment precipitated, when the situation was not more serious than when there were Cuban crises during the administrations of Fillmore, Pierce and Grant.






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
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GENERAL NELSON A. MILES, COMMANDER OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY.



THE "IOWA." IN COMMAND OF "FIGHTING BOB" EVANS. (Copyrighted, 1898, by J. S. Johnston, New York.)

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
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
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QUEEN REGENT AND BOY KING OF SPAIN.



STEWART L. WOODFORD, MINISTER TO SPAIN WHEN WAR WAS DECLARED.

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


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CHAPTER I.

The Origin of the War Between the United States and Spain.

American Good Will for Spain—The Situation in 1869—The Sickles and Prim Negotiation—Prim Willing to Sell Cuba—"The Honor of Spain"—Diplomatic Papers that Should be Studied—Spain Sends an Army to Cuba—The Valmaseda Proclamation—The Wrongs of Cuba—We Must Find the Real People of Cuba.

More than four centuries after the discovery of the West Indies by Christopher Columbus, there was in the celebration of that event in the vanished yet memorable White City at Chicago, a revelation to the nations and people accustomed to regard us as a mass of material rudely fashioned, of the advance of American art and the accomplishments of our higher civilization. There was also manifest, to the students of the progress of mankind, a tremendous force of public opinion, and an augmented excellence in character and fervor of expression, of a distinctive national character, clean cut and glowing with public pride and patriotism. One of the features of the celebration was the kindly popular sentiment respecting Spain, and a regard for the people of the peninsula of Europe that enters the Atlantic. One of the treasured and consecrated figures shining in our traditions was Isabella, the friend of Columbus (who offered to pledge her jewels that he might sail westward and expand the area of cultivation and Christianity)—Columbus, the first of our heroes, not a Spaniard, but one who gave Spain a new world and his ashes, whose incomparable discoveries became august through the ages by the misfortunes that closed his illustrious life in gloom. The pen of Washington Irving made the Alhambra dear to Americans, and in the mellow splendor of his pages the ancient romantic traditions and tragic histories of the land of Cervantes were enriched in a golden atmosphere like that of the

masterpieces of Murillo. The descendants of Columbus, coming by way of Havana; the Princess of the royal reigning house of Spain; and the chosen ships of her navy, were welcomed to our shores, homes and harbors, and entertained with a superb hospitality, so profuse that the fault of its pomp was forgiven on account of its sincerity. Almost forgotten were the stories of Spain's cruelties; nearly effaced from American soil the crimson of her footsteps. The olden grandeur of Spain was for the youth of our country a fascinating story, half history, half romance. So far as we knew how far we were misjudged by Spain, our resentment was softened by remembrance of her fallen fortunes, and compassion for austere vanity and solemn conceit that was content with ignorance. We were even hopeful of Spanish Republicanism. There was something that Whittier sang, "The north wind told to the pines, the wild duck to the sea." It was that the Lord was showing signs the slaves should sometime be free. There were many signs that the day was soon coming that Cuba should be free, and few Americans have ever doubted that the freedom of Cuba meant she was to be under the wing of the Great Republic of the North. This was written when the island first grew green in the summer seas, and the Americas emerged from chaos. This was not a secret held in the mind of Spain, though an arrow piercing the Spanish heart.

Secretary of State Hamilton Fish, whose grandson fell foremost in the charge of the Rough Riders at Santiago, wrote July 29, 1869, to General Sickles at Madrid in terms that equally well described that time and the situation in 1897. The official synopsis of the State papers describes the communication of Mr. Fish in these terms: "The insurrection of Cuba is causing great devastation, and will result, if continued, in the destruction of the productive capacity of the island. Reasons why the United States have a peculiar interest in the fortunes and prosperity of the island. Contest one for self-government and freedom. Self-government for every part of the American hemisphere and freedom from transatlantic rule a growing sentiment in the United States. This has been recognized by other powers. Spain may, with honor, recognize it and treat for the surrender of her rights in Cuba."

Marshal Prim's reply on behalf of Spain was that he recognized the inevitable termination of colonial relations in America, but Spain could not be reconciled to that till hostilities ceased. General Sickles replied that Spain was not asked to treat with insurgents, but with a friendly power and old ally. Prim responded that the United States might be assured of the good

faith of Spain, but that the insurrection had not assumed proportions that could require a government to treat during hostilities. The insurgents held no port or ships, and had no army that offered or accepted battle. The language of Mr. Fish in writing to Mr. Sickles at this juncture was: "It can no longer be a question of national dignity, nor can the proper pride or the just susceptibilities of a great power refuse to consider the question of a voluntary severance of past relations between itself and distant possessions. Spain herself was one of the first of the great European powers to cede voluntarily its distant colonial possessions, for she transferred Louisiana to France and subsequently ceded Florida to the United States."

The Secretary proceeded: "The strife still continues in Cuba. It has already marked its track by devastation and ruin—towns sacked, houses burned, plantations destroyed, and lives lost. On either side the war has been one of desolation, and, if continued, must result in the entire destruction of a large part of the productive capacity of the island as well as of an immense amount of property and of human life.

"It is not impossible that the Cubans may be conquered, if Spain devotes her whole energies to the work; but they can never again be contented, happy, faithful, or quiet subjects of that power. Assuming that Spain may eventually subdue the present insurrection, she will find herself in possession of a devastated and ruined territory, inhabited by a discontented people. The enlightened statesmen of Spain cannot fail to appreciate that the feelings and the affections of the entire native population of the island are not only estranged, but they are deeply hostile to the continuance of Spanish rule. Nor can they fail to recognize the advancing growth of that sentiment which claims for every part of the American hemisphere the right of self-government and freedom from transatlantic dependence.

"England, bound as she has been to the traditions of the past, tenacious as she has been of her possessions, and conservative of all her rights and interests, has recognized the force of this feeling, and has anticipated events by granting self-government to her North American provinces. Denmark, approving the policy of the separation of colonies from the parent state, is endeavoring to part with her insular possessions."

The example of Russia in selling Alaska was pertinently quoted.

In a striking picture of recent conditions the fate of Porto Rico was foreshadowed by Secretary Fish June 29, 1869: "The same causes which have

produced the present convulsion in Cuba exist latent in Porto Rico, and may be fanned into flames hereafter should free government and a system of free labor be brought in immediate contact with that island by establishing them in Cuba. It is not improbable, therefore, that the cabinet of Madrid may think it wise to determine the political condition of both islands at the same time."

There is close correspondence between the situations of 1869 and of 1897 in the relations of the United States and Spain, respecting the final disposition of the Cuban question. The ten years of civil war in Cuba had been in progress one year when Secretary Fish sent a special observer and negotiator to Madrid and wrote Minister Sickles to propose to the Spanish government the purchase of Cuba, which was not, it should be well remarked, received as intolerable insolence, but as a business affair to be given the most considerate attention. The Spanish executive authorities were cautious and sensitive, but consoled by the customary diplomatic flatteries, and after shrinking from the attitude of expectant but favorable attention, resumed the use of tentative phrases, suggesting additional offers of compensation, always saying much of the essential requirements of the dignity and honor that must be at all hazards maintained. Marshal Prim, after stating that Spain had lost Cuba practically, and desiring to know how much would be paid for the relinquishment of Spanish sovereignty over Cuba and Porto Rico, discovered and declared that his colleagues were less inclined than himself to entertain that form of finding a solution of the making of peace in Cuba by the abandonment of the island. The Spanish statesman knew that Minister Sickles had been a factor in the Ostend Conference, and intimately associated with the influences that made James Buchanan President of the United States, and that it could hardly be accidental Sickles had been chosen Minister of the United States to Spain, by President Grant, who looked to intervention and the annexation of Cuba, and whose military prestige had so considerably been manifested in our international affairs. Two telegrams from General Sickles to Secretary Fish signify too much to allow omission:

"August 1, 1869.—Communicated to Prim informally basis of convention. He pressed me to say how much Cuba and Porto Rico would give. I said I had no instructions, and suggested one hundred and twenty-five millions as probable. Prim said Spain might arrange preliminaries with United States and concede autonomy of Cuba and Porto Rico for satisfactory equivalent as

soon as hostilities ceased. He promised to bring the whole subject before the council to-night."

"August 6, 1869.—Prim says sudden illness of Secretary of State has delayed reply."

In conversation with Senor Silvela, a few days after the delay on account of the sudden illness of the Secretary of State, Senor Silvela said to Minister Sickles: "The liberal party in Spain finds itself, to its own infinite regret, forced into a seeming sympathy with the reactionary party in Cuba; and the liberals of Cuba, who ought to be its firm friends, are converted, by the fatality of the situation, into its bitterest enemies. There is no sentiment dearer to the hearts of the liberal leaders than that of freedom to all men; yet they stand before the world, in this Cuban conflict, as opposed to self-government and resisting the abolition of slavery." He considered the insurrection as a most deplorable misfortune and mistake, both for Cuba and for Spain, saying:

"If a way could be found to settle all these questions in such a manner as to do justice to Cuba, without infringing upon the honor of Spain, the government would be greatly gratified. There is no intention or desire among the liberals of Spain ever again to work (*exploiter*) the island of Cuba on the old selfish system. It has been their constant hope and wish to grant to the Cubans the administration of their own affairs and the full fruits of their own labor, preserving their commercial connections, and some shadow of their political relations."

Before the utterance of these somewhat vague but pleasing sentiments, marked with the sonorous cadence of the diplomacy of Spain, with which her decline and fall as a great nation has been accompanied from the beginning of her decadence to the signing of the Treaty of Paris, the Minister evaded with the necessary courtesies the line of business conversation in which Marshal Prim had indulged. On the day after the interview of General Sickles with the Minister of State, who had infinite regrets that the position of the liberal party was so painfully involved with the Cuban insurrection, the Minister General made a "prescribed visit of ceremony" to Marshal Prim, the President of the Council of the Ministers of Spain, and the Marshal, "with much animation and even warmth of manner, protested that Spain would not entertain the suggestion of an armistice with the insurgents, nor consider the question of the independence of Cuba, while the insurgents were

in arms against the government; that Spain would grant a full and complete amnesty as soon as the insurgents laid down their arms; and that being done, the whole subject would be open for consideration; that he was disposed to meet the question frankly and practically; that perhaps he was somewhat in advance of the views of his colleagues, but he had no doubt they were unanimous in the hope that the influence of the United States might be successfully exerted to relieve the question from the embarrassments which now surrounded it." He added that, in regard to emancipation, Spain would prefer to leave that matter to the Cubans themselves, saying, "That is your glory in America, the reward of your philanthropy, and we do not wish to deprive you of it."

The Marshal repelled the idea of a conference in Washington, in which Spain, Cuba and the Cubans should be represented, asserting that Cuba could be heard only through the deputies elected to the Cortes, adding that Spain might deal with the United States but not with Cuba. The next day Marshal Prim notified General Sickles that Spain "accepted the good offices of the United States." This was on impossible conditions, viz., that the Cuban insurgents should lay down their arms, Spain to give amnesty full and complete, Cubans by universal suffrage to vote on the question of independence, and if the majority were for it, the Cortes consenting,—Cuba should pay satisfactorily, guaranteed by the United States, safe conduct through Spanish lines to be given when preliminaries were settled. After the good offices of the United States had been accepted by Marshal Prim, President of the Council of Ministers, Senor Silvela, Minister of State, was restored to health, and General Sickles says: "I expressed my regret that the Spanish government, by choosing to treat the subject as a purely legal question to be settled by their own forms of procedure, had apparently closed the door to any arrangement by which the good offices of the United States could be made immediately effective."

The reply of the Minister of State was with great animation, and he thought the view Minister Sickles took was precisely wrong—for securing simultaneous disarmament and amnesty was "a great step in advance," and then Mr. Silvela "entered upon a very full analysis of Article 108 of the Spanish Constitution." The American Minister did not follow upon that, but pointed out that a "practical view should be taken," and something should be done speedily, as there would be "complications increasing the difficulties of

reaching an accommodation." Mr. Silvela referred to "the present temper and spirit of the Spanish people," which would not permit haste. This was doubtless true then, and never novel.

This is the Section of the Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy—of the transmarine provinces:

"Article 108.—The Cortes Constituyentes shall reform the present system of government in the transmarine provinces when the deputies of Cuba or Porto Rico shall have taken their seats, in order to extend to the same, with the modifications that shall be deemed necessary, the privileges set forth in the Constitution."

The memorandum of the conversation between the Spanish Minister of State and Minister Sickles August 10, 1869, was signed by Manuel Silvela and D. E. Sickles, and contained passages reporting the former, whose familiar flavor soon impresses the student of the negotiations that they proceed to "no thoroughfare." We quote them as illustrative of the fine flowing evasions of the literature of Spanish diplomacy: "After the revolution of September had taken place, and conformably to the principles thereby proclaimed, Spain would already have given all constitutional liberties to Cuba if the unfortunate insurrection of Yara and the cry of 'Death to Spain,' uttered by some Cubans, had not alienated the sympathies of the nation and obliged the government to accept the impolitic contest to which it was provoked; that a good proof of its desire to settle in a liberal sense the question of the Antilles is shown not only by the election of the deputies of Porto Rico, who are to take their seats in the Cortes Constituyentes at their next session, but also by the 108th Article of the Constitution, in which, notwithstanding the period in which it was adopted, it was provided that the concurrence of the deputies of that province is necessary to fix the future form of government of the island.

"In view of these indisputable facts, and taking account of and appreciating the traditional pride of the Spanish people, the government considers that it can come to no definite decision in regard to the political situation and future government of the island of Cuba, until the insurgents lay down their arms and cease the struggle.

"This being done, the government is disposed to grant a full and generous amnesty to the insurgents, and when quiet is established, to proceed to the freest election of representatives of Cuba.

"The national dignity being thus preserved intact, and it being practi-

cable to comply with the article of the Constitution, the moment will have arrived for concerting with its representatives the necessary measures in relation to the legal future of the island of Cuba, submitting them to the indispensable approbation of the Constituent Cortes.

"In conclusion, if the United States, by their natural influence in America, are able to contribute to the cessation of the effusion of blood, in the pacification of the island of Cuba, and its entrance, by the election of its deputies, into the exercise of its rights, the government of Spain cannot but be grateful for these good offices."

Secretary Fish, August 16th, telegraphed General Sickles to "urge acceptance on basis proposed by the United States." These were:

1. The independence of Cuba to be acknowledged by Spain.
2. Cuba to pay to Spain a sum, within a time and in a manner to be agreed upon by them, as an equivalent for the entire and definite relinquishment by Spain of all her rights in that island, including the public property of every description. If Cuba should not be able to pay the whole sum at once in cash, the future payments, by installments, are to be adequately secured by a pledge of the export and the import customs duties under an arrangement to be agreed upon for their collection, in trust, for the purpose of securing both the principal and interest of those installments until their final discharge.
3. The abolition of slavery in the island of Cuba.
4. An armistice pending the negotiations for the settlement above referred to.

Secretary Fish telegraphed that the Spanish proposition that the insurgents should lay down their arms as a preliminary was "incapable of attainment," and the ascertainment of the Cubans by a vote "impracticable because of the disorganization of society," and the prevalent terrorism, "the violence and insubordination of volunteers." The will of the majority had been "recognized and admitted."

On the date of this important dispatch of Secretary Fish (August 16, 1869), General Sickles wrote to him at length, marking the dispatch "as confidential for obviously prudential reasons." He reported General Prim as saying some of his colleagues did not realize as he did "the difficulty of carrying on a war in America," and they had great deference for the popular sentiment in Spain, which would sacrifice blood and money for honor. Mr.

Silvela, a lawyer and leader, inclined to a purely legal view, while as for himself he would say to the Cubans, "Go, if you will; make good the treasure you have cost us, and let me bring home our army and fleet, and consolidate the liberties of Spain." The Marshal, President of the Council, added, with much animation, that the great difficulty in the way was the defiant attitude of the insurgents; that here was the mistake of the United States, in proposing an armistice and asking Spain to treat on the basis of independence with insurgents with arms in their hands; and he added, emphatically, "I am sure no human power could obtain from the Spanish people the most insignificant concession as long as the rebellion maintains its footing."

The reply of General Sickles stated the case with uncommon brevity and force in these words:


"No one appreciated more highly than the President," and it should be remembered the President was General Grant, "the elevated tone of the Cabinet of Madrid, and that he would be the last to make any proposal derogatory to the honor of Spain; that in his view a measure that would stop the indiscriminate sacrifice of life and property in Cuba, pending negotiations for ulterior arrangements, was prompted as well by considerations of humanity as of policy; that Great Britain had recognized the independence of the United States simultaneously with the cessation of hostilities, and that if, as I was glad to be assured, the future relations of Cuba to the mother country admitted of adjustment hereafter on the basis of the independence of the colony, then surely some means might be devised by which, without offense to Spain, the conflict could be arrested pending the negotiations with the United States, a friendly power offering its good offices to promote a settlement." To this the General added "with emphasis" that there was a "pressure of events," and President Grant was embarrassed by the delay, and that "unless Spain was prepared to forego whatever advantage might be gained through the mediation of the United States, prompt action was necessary." General Sickles concluded this communication, which substantially summarizes the negotiations of this interesting period of our Cuban solicitudes and controversies, with this valuable paragraph of personal side-light:

"Observe the duplex form the negotiation receives in the Spanish Cabinet. The reserve of the Minister of State and the frankness of the President of the Council are in striking contrast. The explanation is to be found as well in the solicitude of the Minister of State to hold a position

easily defended in the Cortes, if the negotiation fail, as in the characteristics of the men; one deals with the question as a successful revolutionary leader wielding almost absolute power, the other purely as a jurist and a parliamentarian."

The dispatch of General Sickles to Mr. Fish, dated Madrid, August 20, 1869, has unusual historical importance. On that day General Sickles had met General Prim by appointment, who said he was ready to argue upon the basis of an arrangement contemplating the independence of Cuba, but that he could not give to the arrangement the sanctions of a treaty, nor submit the propositions to the Cortes for their ratification while the insurgents were in arms; he said he had no doubt that whatever might be the result of the conflict, Cuba would eventually be free; that he recognized with hesitation the manifest course of events on the American Continent and the inevitable termination of all colonial relations in their autonomy as soon as they were prepared for independence; but that no emergency and no consideration would reconcile Spain to such a concession until hostilities ceased.

The American Minister reminded the President of the Spanish Council "that Austria had transferred Venice to France, and assented to its immediate transfer to Italy, before peace was declared; that the independence of all the American States had been recognized at one time and another during the progress of hostilities; and that in coming to an agreement with the United States on the subject Spain would not treat with the insurgents, but with a friendly power, offering its good offices to an old ally." To these and like amplifications of the argument the President of the Spanish Council replied with great earnestness and emphasis: "Let the United States be assured of the good faith and the good disposition of Spain, and especially of the frankness and sincerity with which the President of the Council has promised to treat with the Cabinet at Washington, on the basis of the independence of Cuba, as soon as it is possible to do so consistently with the dignity and honor of Spain; formidable as the insurrection of Cuba may become, it has not yet approached the proportions of any of those conflicts in which governments have found themselves constrained to treat during hostilities. The Cuban insurgents hold no city or fortresses; they have no port, no ships; they have no army that presumes to offer or accept battle; and now, before the period arrives for active operations, when Spain will send the ample reinforcements she holds in readiness, it is only necessary for the Cubans to accept the assur-



TABLET COMMEMORATING THE EXECUTION OF THE "VIRGINIUS" PRISONERS. ONE OF THE EARLY CAUSES OF THE WAR WITH SPAIN.



By Courtesy of Frank R. Roberson.
ADMIRAL DEWEY UNDER THE "OLYMPIA'S" BIG GUNS.



By Courtesy of Frank R. Roberson.
ADMIRAL DEWEY AND STAFF ON THE "OLYMPIA."

ance of the United States, given on the faith of Spain, that they may have their independence by laying down their arms, electing their deputies, and declaring their wish to be free by vote of the people."

This conversation is able on both sides and sheds a strong light upon the Cuban-Spanish situation for a quarter of a century, reaching from the time since the Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain was signed.

In the course of the amplification of the conversation (August 20, 1869, of General Prim and General Sickles), the Spanish General said, "Between the revolutionary movements by which the Republics of the Western Continent gained their independence, and the Cuban insurrection, there was a vast difference." In the examples quoted, "negotiation was resorted to after campaigns had been fought, and battles lost and gained; they had armies in the field and organized governments supporting them. We see nothing of this in Cuba; only mere roving bands, who fly when they are pursued, and who have never been found in numbers sufficient to give or accept battle. It is very possible that in the lapse of time the insurrection may become more formidable; it may raise armies; it may take cities and fortified places; it may demonstrate, what has not yet been in any way demonstrated, that it is supported by the majority of the population. In that case Spain will have something tangible to treat with. But we hope to avoid all this bloodshed, disaster, and ruin by making some amicable arrangement now. It is impossible for us to treat with Cubans now, but the United States, when once convinced of the good intentions and good faith of the Spanish government, can then assure the Cubans that by following the programme I have indicated, they can have their liberty without firing another shot."

The reply of Mr. Fish by telegram, August 24, was:

"Washington, August 24, 1869.—The propositions of Spain are incompatible with any practicable negotiation. The representatives of the insurrectionary government are necessary parties to a negotiation. Free communication through the Spanish lines is immediately necessary.

"The United States cannot ask the insurgents to lay down their arms unless the volunteers are simultaneously effectually disarmed, and in good faith disbanded. This, if practicable, would require time. We want to arrest the destruction of life and property, and to stop the outrages and annoyances to our citizens. An armistice would effect this immediately, and the

terms of the compensation to be made to Spain by Cuba could then be arranged between them under the mediation of the United States.

"You may say that we deem an armistice indispensable to the success of any negotiation. Spain may in honor grant this at the request of the United States, and in deference to the wishes of a friendly power, whose good offices she is willing to accept. This being done, negotiations can immediately be opened that will probably result in peace, and her receiving a fair compensation."

This dispatch might have closed the negotiation, though there was a great deal more correspondence. There was a resulting difficulty then as later and now in the intangibility of the ostentatious Cuban government. It was unfortunate that there was on both sides a strained sense of the necessity of much formality, and there were far-reaching consequences that could not be measured with exactness and weighed as fixed and determining events for many days. The Spaniards might have recognized as something sufficiently formidable to demand their business as well as distinguished consideration, the bands of guerrillas who were so desperate and tenacious that a treaty was made with their leaders nine years later. Statesmanship in Spain could have saved the desolation of the island and the infliction of frightful calamities upon a million people who were innocent of political crime and of military belligerency. Spain did not close the ten years' war without negotiating with insurgents who did not put up their arms, and the vain presumption that caused long delay cost her dearly.

The words, "honor of Spain," that stood there obstructive, were often unrealities. The Spanish excitement about the rumors that the Cubans would be recognized as belligerents was not called for. They would themselves more than their enemies have been gainers by the acknowledgment of the United States that the Cubans were belligerents. If the claim of the Spanish Premier that there was a vast difference between the Cuban revolt and the revolutions that resulted in the independent States established in Spanish America was a detail in part true, then there should have been no objection to overlooking it. The grievances of the people of Cuba are the same as those of the Mexicans and the Central and Southern Americans; and there stands the poetic record that "freedom's battle once begun, bequeathed from bleeding sire to son, though baffled oft, is always won." The decision of the United States government, U. S. Grant, President, and Hamilton Fish,

Secretary of State, pronounced against the concession of belligerency to the Cubans, was on the grounds generally that the Spaniards rested their protest upon. The impossible issue, according to the correspondence, was imaginary. The study of our diplomatic correspondence, however, fails to be convincing that the government of the United States left nothing undone, to deal with Marshal Prim, taking him at his word that for a sum of money not extortionate or extravagant, the Cubans might have had their liberties under the protective possession of the United States without firing a gun after September, 1869. In the twenty-nine years that have passed, Cuba, no matter how made free, would have been Americanized and ours—and the most prosperous island in the world, instead of the most desolate and horror-haunted.

Mr. Fish, September 15th, telegraphed the Minister of Spain: "Omitting the plebiscite, can the President of Council give assurance that if the United States induced the insurgents to lay down arms, and deputies to the Cortes be elected by Cuba, that the Cortes will grant independence? The plebiscite is impracticable, because in the present circumstances and conditions of the island a popular vote can be no indication of the popular will."

There is an abiding embarrassment in Cuba, in the lack of means to record reliably the popular will. The telegram of the 15th approached the practical too nearly to be accepted as possible, but on September 25th a dispatch from the Minister at Madrid catalogued the following fair promises:

"Resumé of interview last evening with President of Council:

"Plebiscitum not insisted upon. Election of deputies required by constitution; indispensable preliminary to independence. Measures already taken to disarm volunteers simultaneously with cessation of hostilities. Severe and positive order given to stop the scandalous execution of captives and like cruelties. General de Rodas promises to do so at all hazards.

"A decree will be promulgated forthwith for the gradual abolition of slavery. Government will proceed with liberal reforms without waiting for termination of war."

But at this hopeful opening Spain insisted that our offer of mediation should be withdrawn, for "the Spanish Cabinet distinguish between *mediation* and *good offices*. To prevent recognition of belligerents they seem anxious to hold us to our offer of good offices, while declining mediation as long as there is hope of suppressing insurrection."

October 1, 1869, the Spanish Cortes met. The United States' offer of

"good offices" was withdrawn, and Mr. Silvela wrote to General Sickles that the Spanish government would not have consented to the independence of Cuba, because, even if they had wished it, it was "not within their competence to consent to a dismemberment of the territory of this monarchy, without the permission and the authorization of the Cortes; but the Cortes, far from permitting and authorizing this, manifested by a unanimous resolution of their permanent commission that they were ready to lend their entire support to the government, in an elevated and dignified policy in the Cuban question, calculated to preserve the integrity of the territory and the national honor."

September 11th Secretary Fish telegraphed the Minister of the United States to Spain:

"We hope there is no truth in the rumor that Spain is about to send additional troops to Cuba. It would exhibit a want of confidence in the pending negotiation that might compel the withdrawal of the offer of this government to attempt a reconciliation. It might prolong the struggle, and the destruction of life and property, with questionable influence on the result. It certainly would embarrass the negotiations."

The Secretary requested to be advised of the sending of additional Spanish troops to Cuba. The answer to this dispatch was in the form of a newspaper publication as follows, correctly described by Mr. Sickles in transmitting a translation as an "interesting document."

(From the Gaceta, December 5, 1869.)

"The President of the Council said: 'Last Saturday Senor Navarro y Rodrigo addressed certain inquiries to the minister of war which I could not answer immediately. I said, however, that there had gone to Cuba thirty-thousand men, and to-day I will read a statement of land and sea forces, and of the material which has gone to Cuba since the revolution, because this proves the vitality and energy of the government and of all Spain exercised in the preservation of the island of Cuba.

"The first forces which went there were 771 volunteers; then 5,400 men of the regular service, afterwards the series of battalions which were asked for by General Dulce* (may he rest in peace!); 1,000 went from Baza, 1,000 from Chiclana, 1,000 from San Quintin, and 1,000 from Simancas, who were so thoroughly equipped that they were about to take the field immediately on their arrival. Since that the successive departures have reached a

* Driven from Cuba by the Volunteers

total of 20,966 of the army of the peninsula; of marines, 2,600; of recruits, 1, 371; and of volunteers, 9,563; which gives a total of 34,500 men, according to the accompanying statement. I would call attention to the fact that this immense sum would represent a great effort for any nation whatever.

“There have gone also 14 ships of war, among them two iron-clad frigates; a complete equipment for a regiment of mountain artillery, with 24 pieces, 24 caissons for artillery of 8 centimeters bore; 20 Krupp steel guns, of 8 centimeters bore; 4,000 projectiles for the same; 5,000 kilograms of powder; 7,400,000 cartridges of 14½ caliber, model of 1857 and 1859; 1,000,000 metallic cartridges for needle guns; 10,500,000 caps; 15,000 kilograms of lead; 9,600 carbines, model of 1857; 3,600 muskets, model of 1859; 8,000 Enfield rifles; 3,000 Berdan; 500 short carbines; 1,000 lances; 2,000 sabers.’ ”

Estimate of the Spanish forces composing the “Army of Cuba,” compiled from the statement published in *La Iberia* of December 26, 1869, and from semi-official sources of information. The strength of battalions, batteries, and squadrons conforms to the regulations of the Spanish service:

INFANTRY.

Eight regiments of infantry of the line, two battalions of eight hundred each	12,800	
Twenty-five battalions of light infantry, one thousand each	25,000	
Two battalions of the guard—all veterans—one thousand each	2,000	
Two battalions of militia (estimated)	1,600	
Eleven battalions of infantry, organized in Cuba (estimated to be of the same strength as peninsular light infantry)	11,000	
	<hr/>	52,400

ARTILLERY.

One regiment, two battalions of four batteries each—eight companies	1,000	
One regiment of mountain artillery, two battalions of four batteries each—eight companies	1,000	
	<hr/>	2,000

Field artillery being organized, force not stated.

CAVALRY.

Twenty-five squadrons—fifty companies of one hundred and fifty each (full strength in Spanish army) 7,500

ENGINEERS.

One battalion—ten companies of one hundred and fifty each 1,500

MARINES.

Four battalions 4,000

67,400

Beside these forces in the field, there are more than forty thousand volunteer troops doing garrison duty 40,000

Grand total 107,400

RECAPITULATION.

Infantry, fifty-six battalions 52,000

Artillery, four battalions, sixty-four guns 2,000

Cavalry, twenty-five squadrons 7,500

Engineers, one battalion 1,500

Marines, four battalions 4,000

Volunteers doing garrison duty 40,000

Total 107,400

Responding to these figures, correctly described as "interesting," Secretary Fish, January 26, 1870, made the following very interesting and pertinent statement and suggestion:

"The public interest felt in the United States in the Cuban struggle has decreased since the flagrant violations of laws by the agents of the insurgents became known, and alienated the popular sympathy.

"Had the Cuban Junta expended their money and energy in sending to the insurgents arms and munitions of war, as they might have done consistently with our own statutes and with the law of nations, instead of devoting them to deliberate violation of the laws of the United States; and had they, in lieu of illegally employing persons within the dominion of the United States

to go in armed bands to Cuba, proceeded thither unarmed themselves to take personal part in the struggle for independence, it is possible that the result would have been different in Cuba, and it is certain that there would have been a more ardent feeling in the United States in favor of their cause, and more respect for their own sincerity and personal courage."

But the Secretary, as if foreseeing the emergency that confronted President McKinley, twenty-eight years after, remarked over the contention regarding the belligerency demanded, for and against:

"Should Spain, after her great and exhaustive effort, fail to restore a state of peace on the island, the President must reserve to himself a complete liberty of action in that event."

The favored Spanish method of putting down rebellion, the knowledge of which, no doubt, caused the inquiries of Secretary Fish about troops from Spain to pacificate Cuba, is found in the following proclamation of evil fame:

(From the *Diario de la Marina*, April 29, 1869—Translation.)

"The Redactor (of St. Jago de Cuba), in its number of 21st instant, publishes the following important proclamation of General Count Valmaseda:

"Inhabitants of the country! The reinforcements of troops that I have been waiting for have arrived; with them I shall give protection to the good, and punish promptly those that still remain in rebellion against the government of the metropolis.

"You know that I have pardoned those that have fought us with arms; that your wives, mothers, and sisters have found in me the unexpected protection that you have refused them. You know, also, that many of those I have pardoned have turned against us again.

"Before such ingratitude, such villainy, it is not possible for me to be the man that I have been; there is no longer a place for a falsified neutrality; he that is not for me is against me, and that my soldiers may know how to distinguish, you hear the order they carry:

"1st. Every man, from the age of fifteen years, upward, found away from his habitation (finca), and does not prove a justified motive therefor, will be shot.

"2d. Every habitation unoccupied will be burned by the troops.

"3d. Every habitation from which does not float a white flag, as a signal that its occupants desire peace, will be reduced to ashes.

"Women that are not living at their own homes, or at the house of their

relatives, will collect in the town of Jiguani, or Bayamo, where maintenance will be provided. Those who do not present themselves will be conducted forcibly.

"The foregoing determinations will commence to take effect on the 14th of the present month.

EL CONDE DE VALMASEDA.

"BAYAMO, April 4, 1869."

This proclamation offered an ample reason for the objection, which was regarded as somewhat obstinate, of the insurgents to throw down their arms, if promised by Spain "simultaneous amnesty." However "liberal," according to their views, the Spanish ministers and commanding officers in the army might be, there were many things that displayed the implacable temper of the populace of Spain, and of the Spanish volunteers in Cuba. The spirit of the volunteers was shown in deposing Captain General Dulce June 2, 1869. Mr. Hall, consul at Matanzas, reported the governor of that important jurisdiction thrown out by the volunteers because he was a friend of Dulce and refused to deliver up to them an insurgent; and it appeared to be a part of their programme to displace every Cuban holding any official position whatever, as also every "peninsular" Spaniard whose family connections might lead him in any way to sympathize with the natives of Cuba. These incidents identify the character of the Cuban insurrection with the movements in continental colonies. Mr. Plum, Consul at Havana, wrote Mr. Fish, two days after the deposition of Dulce:

"On the 2d instant, a captain-general of Cuba was displaced from his command by the resident Spaniards of the island. This event, without precedent here, opens an epoch in the history of this Spanish possession. Some fifty years ago a similar event occurred in Mexico. An insurrection had been for some time in progress there, and either induced by the course of events at home, or from dissatisfaction at the conduct of the war, the resident Spaniards deposed the viceroy. A new viceroy was sent out, but arrived too late, and no other representative of the mother country ever succeeded to the place. The resident Spaniards there, as soon as they cut loose from entire obedience to the home authorities, turned the scale in favor of independence." The core of the subject was stated by Mr. Plum, describing the business men of the island: "They incline to the idea of taking the management of affairs here, in the name of the mother country, more or less in their own hands. They are residents, identified to a great extent with the prosperity of the

island, having their business and their property here, and as the island has to pay its own expenses, contributing largely, many of them, to the burden of the support of the war, both by their money, and now by their time as volunteers. They desire to see the war ended, and to have the former tranquillity, upon which their prosperity depends, restored. They may believe, especially as liberal institutions are urged in Spain, that they have as full right and are as capable to manage the affairs of the island, of which they are the loyal residents, as officials without any local interests or responsibilities, sent out from home to make their fortunes from the public revenues, not in commerce and industry, here. Yet, until now the resident Spaniards in business or having property here have had little more chance than the native Cubans to participate in the government of the island. All the offices, mainly, have been filled by frequently renewed officials, sent out for the purpose from Spain. The consequence has been that the public burdens are felt to be unnecessarily increased, and now the feeling has been engendered that the military operations against the insurrection have not been energetically conducted by those who, if they fail here, not having any identification with the island, simply return home to the mother country, leaving the Spanish residents to their fate, or, in some instances, it may be believed that these officials have been too lenient, or have inclined too much in favor of the insurrection, which, if it is successful, would place the control of the island in native Cuban rather than resident Spanish hands."

It is in these men, not of the Spanish residents, the volunteers or the professional rural insurgents, that the United States will find *the people of Cuba* capable of political organization and policy. It should be the popular understanding in this country that there is a distinction between the people of Cuba and the representatives of the New York Junta, a community of Cubans who should not be allowed to monopolize the patriotism of the island or to have exclusive charge of its resources.





CHAPTER II.

The American Minister to Spain in our Centennial Year Feared War.

A Remarkable Correspondence—Suggestive of the Doom of Spanish Rule—The Gradual Approaches of the Spanish War—A Circular Claiming the Cuban Rebellion was Crushed—Cushing as Master of Ceremonies—General Grant's Personality.

Mr. Cushing attached the greatest importance to the meeting of General Schenck and Lord Derby, even disturbing Secretary Fish with a lurid dream of war, if England did not stand shoulder to shoulder with us. This was a matter evidently in which Mr. Cushing took his intellectual exercises too seriously. He conferred fully with the British Minister to Spain, on the evening of December 5, 1875, and the Minister, whose words were expected to be so momentous, was found of the opinion that "the present is a very unfavorable moment for attempting intervention, friendly or other, between Spain and the insurgent Cubans. People in Spain are now animated and hopeful as to both civil wars, in view of the large reinforcements recently sent to Cuba, of the pacification of Valencia and Cataluna, and of the extensive military preparations for moving on the positions of the Vasco-Navarrese. Spain needs, he thinks, to be left to try the experiment of the operations of this winter. They are not likely to succeed, at least not in Cuba; and if interfered with now, she will attribute the failure which is to come not to her own weakness or the strength of the insurgents, but to the disturbing action of the United States. But, left to herself, and thus failing, she will then feel discouraged in proportion as she now feels exalted, and will be in the mood to listen to judicious counsels, whether coming from the United States or from Great Britain.

"These remarks of Mr. Layard could not fail to impress me, and so much the more, in consonance as they were with the views expressed in my note of the 30th of October.

"The impression which Lord Derby's observations to General Schenck

make on my mind is that of a disposition on the part of the British government to aid us in a mediatory form rather than as a coöperator in the exercise of forcible pressure on Spain.

“Our advance to Great Britain in the present question insures good offices at least, and may go further.”

Nothing turned out precisely as Mr. Cushing feared and prophesied, but there was no effacement of his superb complacency, and no abatement in the course of his admirable confidence. January 4th he wrote in his international capacity to the State Department:

“Speculation is active as to the ultimate question of what the United States will do if left alone by other powers—whether the President will intervene by force, and if so, whether in armed alliance with Spain, or whether in arms against her and in aid of the insurgents, which it is assumed would be war. Observation of what is going on at the present time in Constantinople respecting Bosnia and Herzegovina, and what occurred there formerly in the matter of Greece, leads many persons to anticipate the development of a similar series of incidents at Madrid as respects Cuba.”

Nothing in the newspapers escaped Mr. Cushing. The journals of Madrid, Paris, London and New York were searched with ceaseless assiduity. One day Mr. Cushing reviewed the London Times, the next the Madrid sheets were scrutinized and annotated. The *Galignani Messenger* and the *Havas Agency* were mustered in and reviewed. Even the dispatches from Philadelphia to the London Times could not escape, and at last the Minister appeared as a New York newspaper expert in the paragraph annexed:

“A letter, purporting to be addressed from Madrid to the New York Herald of the 15th ultimo, puzzles me. Supposing that the pretense of interview with Mr. Cánovas del Castillo and Mr. Ruiz Gomez, two of the Spanish gentlemen plainly alluded to, is fictitious, yet the fact remains that although the Herald has a correspondent here, yet he did not arrive until after the date of this letter; and no American has been here capable of entering so minutely or intelligently into the question at issue. On the other hand, it is not easy to suppose (although it is possible) that with the aid of some Spaniard of considerable political and juridical experience, such as are continually passing between Spain and Cuba, the letter may have been got up in New York.

“On the whole, although the letter contains errors of fact and of language

which a Spaniard of the instruction of Mr. Ruiz Gomez, for instance, would not have committed, still the matter of the letter may have been prepared here by some Spaniard of intelligence desirous of thus making his views known to the people of the United States, and sent to New York to be worked into its present shape in the office."

Of course, it is improbable that Mr. Cushing, in the plenitude of his labors, could have dictated the production of the mysterious letter that puzzled him, but it is not impossible. The facilities of journalism are equal to inventions even more involved than this presumption.

Speedily Mr. Cushing quoted "the Epoca ministerial journal," and El Cornista, El Tempo, The Cologne Gazette, and the Presse of Vienna, took turns of examination along with New York and London papers, and January 8 and 10, 1876, the annexed papers were produced:

(Mr. Cushing to Mr. Fish.)

"Legation of the United States, Madrid, January 8, 1876.—Sir: The ministerial journals of last evening continue to rejoice over the tenor of the communiqué of the Marquis de Molins, reported in my No. 748, of the 4th instant.

"They now publish a variation by way of New York and London, as follows:

"The [American] government admits having sent to the European Powers a circular respecting the affairs of Cuba.

"It denies having proposed a confederation of Cuba and Porto Rico under a Spanish governor, but it does not publish the text of the circular.'

"All this, pursue the journals in question, is nothing but the document so coldly received by the Powers to which it was read by the representatives of the United States.

"But, nevertheless, in the very same journals appears the following telegraphic item, which seems likely to put a new face on things, namely:

"Berlin, January 7.—It is positively asserted that the German government shows itself favorable to the American circular relative to Cuba, in consequence of the injuries which the present situation of the island involves to the commerce of Germany.'

"I hear nothing further as to the alleged intentions of Great Britain.

"I have, etc.,

C. CUSHING.

"P. S.—Since the above dispatch was written the London Times has come

to hand, containing a telegram from Vienna, which is annexed. It is confused, illogical, and incorrect, like all such telegraphic reports.

“If ‘Cuba’ is a European question, of ‘incalculable consequences,’ as the telegram asserts, then you had good cause to consult Europe, and Europe has good cause to act in the premises.”

(Mr. Cushing to Mr. Fish.)

“Legation of the United States, Madrid, January 10, 1876.—Sir: I annex translation of an article from the *Cronista*, a serious ministerial paper, containing a very formal semi-official denial of the alleged concurrence of Germany in the suggestion by the United States of intervention in Cuba.

“There is report here of the capture of a German vessel charged with supplying arms to rebels in the Filipinas. Count Hatzfeldt informs me that he has no information respecting the affair, but apprehends it will be the occasion of unpleasant controversy.

“I annex translation of an article on the subject from a ministerial journal of respectability, the *Tiempo*.

“I have the honor, etc.,

C. CUSHING.”

(Translation of article from *El Cronista* of January 8, 1876.)

“A dispatch of the *Agencia Fabra* from Berlin, which we published yesterday, as did our contemporaries, gave news, which would be grave if true, that the German government showed itself favorable toward the American circular referring to Cuba, because of the damage brought upon German commerce by the condition of the island.

“Duly informed, we are able to assert that the statement referred to is not true, and that the Cabinet of Berlin continues to express the greatest sympathies for our country.

“The circular of the Government of the United States has not met with a favorable reception from any European power.”

(Translation of article from *El Tiempo* of January 8, 1876.)

“We again call the attention of the government toward our possessions in the Philippine Archipelago. We know that the enemies of Spanish integrity rest not, although their affairs in London have recently assumed a bad aspect, and that the English government looks upon them with suspicion.

“Upon that immense network of islands of Oceanica belonging to Spain they have fixed their vision. They do not overlook that these offer excellent

positions, and they will take advantage of every opportunity to snatch some one of the rich pearls of so precious a jewel.

“There, more than anywhere, will they direct their efforts, because elsewhere they will find immediate opposition from first-class powers. If there be vigilance, more than sufficient is Spanish patriotism against all conspiracies, native or foreign; and not for a moment do we doubt that there will be such (conspiracies), as is proved by the news which gives rise to these lines.”

Mr. Cushing's frequent translations from Spanish papers were full of information, and certainly gave the Secretary of State the phases of the public opinion of Madrid, and so clear were they that they lighted up later events.

The *Epoca* of Madrid, January 14, 1876, said of the Cubans: “The only thing we know for certain is that the religion of the insurgents is idolatry, which must be very gratifying for the traitors, who, in order to escape merited chastisement, go to swell the ranks of the rebels.” And here is an editorial article from *El Cronista*, Madrid, January 14, 1876: “The right which is now the right of Spain in the affairs of Cuba is so clear and so patent that it could not fail to have been recognized, even though shamefacedly and in private circles, by the President of the United States, General Grant. We were right in asserting, as we have repeatedly done, that the parliamentary curvetts (*excarceos*) of the government of the American Republic with respect to the question of Cuba, obeyed, rather than its own opinions, electoral machinations, and the pressure of the filibuster element, so numerous in the United States.

“We say this apropos of an important piece of news which we received to-day by the Cuban mail. A Habana paper publishes correspondence from New York, in which it is positively said that the President of the United States has declared in private circles that he considers the independence of the island of Cuba as impossible, and that its annexation to the United States would cause immense injuries to the country.

“The island of Cuba, not being able to govern itself well as an independent and sovereign State, could still less do so as an autonomic semi-State, and in such circumstances it were in every way impossible for Spain to reserve to herself a protectorate which, without positive benefit to Cuba, would drag the mother country into the most serious complications within and without this territory.

“To prove this absolute impossibility so many considerations throug

to the subject that it is no small task to select the prominent ones. In the island of Cuba there exists an immense majority which does not desire separation, which does not desire annexation, which does not desire autonomy, which wishes to keep on in the same conditions as those in which they have lived with respect to the mother country. In the island of Cuba there exists a slender minority which is split up into 'independents,' 'annexationists,' and 'autonomists.' The immense majority reject autonomy, which would weaken their ties with the mother country. The independents and the annexationists are not content with autonomy, which does not satisfy their aspirations. The autonomists would be the only ones left satisfied, but they are so few in number that they would lack moral and material strength.

"The *Eco de Cuba*, then, is right: the Great Antilla is not fitted to be anything save what it has been hitherto. Thus it is that the right of Spain is supported by every kind of reason based upon expedience. Therefore, in spite of all the efforts of the ambitious ojalateros (sans-culottes) of New York, and in spite of the misdeeds of the criminals of the Managua, the island of Cuba will continue to be a Spanish province."

Mr. Cushing had a conversation with the Spanish Minister of State, who said that "the United States could desire nothing in the sense of peace, good government, or liberty in Cuba," that the Spanish government did not want more than we desire. This made an impression upon Mr. Cushing's mind, that may or may not have been intended, nevertheless, it seemed to him that "the inner thought behind the words" was:

"If the United States, whether by the use of their naval squadron or by landing troops, intervene by force to prevent Spain from subduing the insurrection in Cuba, that is war, and Spain must, of necessity, fight, at whatever cost and ultimate loss, or cease to hold up her head as an independent nation in Europe or America.

"But if the view of the United States is to act by mediation in behalf of the insurgents, to induce them to lay down their arms, to make acceptable terms for them, to secure the execution of these terms, to provide for the introduction of good government and the abolition of slavery in officious concert or in formal treaty with Spain, then Spain is ready to meet the United States half-way in such action, to receive, and even invite, their interposition in the affairs of Cuba.

"The impression on my mind to this effect was so strong as to half tempt

me to say, 'Will you then accept our mediation?' But I restrained myself, in the doubt whether my present instructions would justify me in thus committing the United States.

"I limited myself, therefore, to thanking him cordially for the frankness and friendliness which seemed to inspire what he said, and to assure him that I would lose no time in communicating the same to you, as nearly as possible in his own words, and regretting that no mere written report could do justice to the impressiveness of oral representation.

"He then referred briefly to the mere robber character of what there is now in insurrection in Cuba, composed of scattered parties of negroes and mulattoes, without the slightest pretension to any government—directed, so far as they had any general direction, by foreigners, mere desperado adventurers, without right or stake in the country (I interrupted him here to say there were no citizens of the United States among them, to which he assented, and then continued), engaged in mere plunder and incendiarism, not in war—the worst form of that tendency to guerrilla hostilities in the place of the regular warfare which the Spaniards inherited from their remote Celtiberian progenitors, and which, if one of the glories, was not the less one of the national calamities, of Spain.

"But of all this, he said, the President's message showed that we in the United States had a clear conception; and he added that neither such bad foreigners as Maximo Gomez in the Managua, nor worse Spaniards like Miguel Aldama in New York, could ever make of Cuba any better republic than Hayti; and that appeared to be their only purpose—to ruin where they could not rule.


"It was impossible for me conscientiously to contradict these appreciations, and therefore, I could but listen attentively, and, when he had concluded, take leave, assuring him that he would be informed at once when my expected instructions should arrive in Washington.

"The concluding remarks of Mr. Calderon y Collantes suggest to me some considerations, which you will permit me to subjoin by way of commentary.

"The Spaniards have great qualities, as many a page in their history demonstrates, but they have also the defects of those qualities; and my dispatches have not been sparing in the exhibition of those defects, such as intolerance of opinion, exaggerated individualism, ill-regulated ambitions,



THE CATHEDRAL AT SANTIAGO.



KIOSK IN MAIN PLAZA AT PONCE, PORTO RICO.

dispositions to pronunciamientos, insurrection, civil war, and especially guerilla warfare."

No man of his generation exceeded Mr. Cushing in knowledge of the current history of the world, and his intimate acquaintance with the Spanish language and people gives what he had to say as Minister to Spain during the closing years of General Grant's administration a force and sharpness of application having much more than official weight, and his papers are full of matter in which the interest abides. The way the desperate antagonism in Cuba between the peninsular and Cuban Spaniards arose is thus sketched by Mr. Cushing:

"When the insurrection in French Santo Domingo put an end to the cultivation of sugar and coffee there, that cultivation passed to Cuba; it flourished there, with the consequent development of slavery and the slave trade; how overflowing wealth ensued, and with it came ill-directed education, unwholesome ambitions, and traitorous plots of annexation to the United States, not for the promotion of liberty, but for the security of slavery; how, thereupon and therefore, came acts and measures of angry repression on the part of Spain.

"If the Cuban emigrants in the United States are a proper sample, as they possibly may be, of the better Cuban Spaniards, what are we to think of those of average or inferior degree?

"While those emigrants have made themselves ridiculous in spending their time in quarreling with one another in the newspapers and in public meetings, instead of fighting the common enemy in the field, they have rendered themselves odious by their systematic violation of the law of the land of their asylum, and the acts of fraud and perjury which that implies, and by their frantic hostility to the government of the United States.

"Meanwhile, we see what the insurgents at home are, after six years' experience—incapable, as the President so clearly shows, of independence, unworthy even of the concession of belligerence.

"If the emigrants in the United States were now in Cuba, if the insurgents in arms were to lay down their arms, could they and the rich sugar-planters and merchants of the seaports of the western part of the island, with or without anterior solution of the slavery question, live in peace together as a republic based on free popular suffrage, which is the only intelligible conception of a republic? To me it seems impossible. To say nothing of Santo

Domingo, we may look to the case of Jamaica, where, without any civil war to embitter men against one another, with generously regulated emancipation, with a colonial policy just, nay, amicable and even kind, it has been found impossible to maintain the existence of well-ordered society except by the constant exercise of paternal authority on the part of the metropolis.

"All which leads me to the conclusion that the United States would have an immense task on their hands in undertaking the pacification of Cuba alone and by hostile force, inferring the necessity not only of a fleet and an army of operations, but also of occupation to keep the peace, but might well contribute efficiently to the result in coöperation with Spain."

In February, 1876, Mr. Cushing wrote: "The concentration of ships of war at Port Royal impresses the Spaniards as a menace against Spain. They say: 'We have not made any naval demonstrations in the waters of the Antilles; we have done nothing to call for defensive preparations on the part of the United States, and we are unable to account for these naval preparations of theirs unless intended for the invasion of Cuba in aid of the insurgents, in imitation of the action of Navarino.'

"Their suspicions in this respect stand greatly in the way of more friendly diplomatic negotiation in the sense of mediation.

"Now, as to the naked question of intervention or mediation in Cuba, the only foreign minister here who speaks to me in a helpful spirit is Mr. Layard."

Mr. Cushing did not seem to see that "mediation" was a dream. However, it is clear that the policy of the most able Minister was severely against intervention, and he no doubt felt the necessity of an affirmative policy.

Through Mr. Layard, the British Minister, appeared in 1876, as through other representatives of English policy in 1897, the sympathy of the Empire of Great Britain with our tentative as with our finally positive measures of intervention in Cuba. *La Politica*, Madrid, February 4, 1876, contained a long editorial on "American Affairs," referring especially to the agitation in Europe caused by the policy of President Grant to invite European coöperation. The government of the United States, "having passed to its representatives in Europe a note to the end that, without having a copy of it, may be read to the European Ministers of Foreign affairs."

The effect of this note was, *La Politica* explains, "to discover immediately the impression that would be produced by its interference, direct or indirect,

in the relations of Spain with her Antillean province." The Spanish journal accuses American filibusters of responsibility for the insurrection in Cuba and provinces:

"When all the combustibles have been accumulated for a conflagration, and the blaze has been kept knowingly stirred up, it is a rare sight to see those who have done all this lamenting the ravages of that fire, shrinking appalled from its horrors, and clamoring before Europe for the rights of humanity."

After further sarcasm of the sort comes this:

"What remains besides that which has been set forth to serve as a support to the United States in order to pretend to the direct or indirect intervention which they propose? In our conception, it has for its basis no other thing than the eternal tendency which, from the beginning of the century and from one motive or another, has been ever manifested by the partisans of the Monroe Doctrine—a policy which served to rend from Mexico the greater part of her territory; a policy which has ever been sought to deprive Spain of the brightest jewel of her crown, of the jewel which symbolizes a world of memories for the nation which discovered America.

"The notes of Mr. Henry Clay to Mr. Everett, in 1825, to the end that Spain should conclude the wars of Mexico and Colombia for the sake of humanity; subsequently those of Mr. Buchanan to Mr. Saunders, Minister in Madrid, for the purchase of Cuba for one hundred millions of dollars, recommending him to get it as cheap as possible; the mission of Mr. Soulé; the Ostend Conference; the refusal of the United States to subscribe the compromise with England and France to guarantee to Spain the possession of the island of Cuba, and a thousand other antecedents which we might evoke, if the scope of this article permitted us to do so, are the key to explain this stroke of humanity with which the United States present themselves before Europe, soliciting its moral coöperation to end the war in Cuba."

The conclusion of this article is the same as the last communication from the Spanish Minister, DuPuy de Lome—that "what is undoubtedly indispensable as a measure of salvation is that this insensate insurrection in Cuba, which gives rise to so many conflicts, be terminated as soon as possible."

The 30,000 soldiers Spain had sent to Cuba to crush the rebellion here referred to, and the sum of the need of Spain was to make an end of the insurrection by crushing military forces. And yet the war dragged on two

years, and terminated in a treaty with the insurgents, who were, according to Spanish report, well convinced with hard cash that the time had arrived to be pacificated.

The question most discussed in Madrid, Mr. Cushing stated in a letter dated February 18, 1876, was as to the kind of "intervention" the United States meant to make in the affairs of Cuba and Spain, whenever, if they did ever intervene, and he said:

"In this connection there is much comment on the line of action pursued by the intervening powers in the matter of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as being the reverse of that pursued by the same powers in the matter of Greece. seeing that in the latter case the demonstration of force was against Turkey and in favor of her rebels; while in the former it is against the rebels and in favor of Turkey, as manifested by the concentration of Austrian troops in Croatia and of a fleet of the allies off Ragusa, in the avowed purpose of compelling the impenitent and persistent insurgents to accept the terms of reform arranged at Constantinople."

That is to say, the Spaniards wanted to know—so diplomatic were our forms of expression, as Mr. Cushing modulated them, that Spain wanted to know whether the threatened intervention was to be on her behalf or for the Cubans. At this time the Spanish Minister of State sent a diplomatic circular to the Powers of Europe and the United States, giving the following account of the beginning of the insurrection, that is now popularly characterized as the ten years' war:

"The first cry of insurrection was raised at Yara, an unimportant town situated in the eastern department of the island, on the 11th day of October, 1868, immediately after the receipt of the news of the revolution begun at Cadiz on the 17th of September, and consummated at Madrid on the 29th of the same month. The leaders of the rebellion availed themselves of the preparations which they had doubtless previously made, and of the favorable circumstance that the government had not more than 7,500 troops all told on the island at the time, and that, too, for a territory peopled by 1,400,000 inhabitants, and having an area of 12,000 square miles, including the keys and the adjacent islands. The flag of the independence of the island was not raised at the outset, much less that of annexation to any other State. The only cries were, 'Hurrah for Prim!' that general being there regarded as the leader of the Spanish revolution, and 'Hurrah for the revolution!' Thus it was that

many joined in the insurrection who, while really loving Spain, thought that the only object had in view was a political change, and, subsequently repenting when they became aware of the tendency which the enemies of the country were seeking to give to the movement, voluntarily took up arms against it."

The Spanish circular admits that the movement in Cuba for secession carried away a part—not the greater part—of the white population, "especially the unreflecting and rash youth," but the secession movement was disguised as a "desire of securing reforms"—but it became evident this was a pretext. The contest was carried on with a certain regularity, both parties respecting property, until the insurgent leader and soldiers became barbarous in their methods.

However, at this time—February, 1876—after eight years' war, "of the leaders of the secession movement, Cespedes, the Agramontes, Cavada, Donato, Marmol, Castilla, Mola, the Betancourts, the Angueros, Jesus del Sol, Bembeta, Salome Hernandez, Marcono, Inclan, Goicuria, Rosas, and others, all of whom were Cubans, and really opposed to Spain, not one is now living. Of those who have succeeded them in the command not a single one is a Cuban. Maximo Gomez, the principal one, and Modesta Diaz, the next in importance, are Dominicans; Kulof is a Pole; the person known by the nickname of 'el Inglesito' is an Englishman; and the rest, who are now few in number on account of the great diminution of the insurgent forces, are adventurers from various countries, without antecedents, and having no interest in the island. The same may be said of almost all the insurgents. Their forces now consist of negroes, mulattoes, Chinese, deserters from the battalions which were formed provisionally in Santo Domingo during our brief rule there, and a few independent bodies which were formed in Spain during the most disorderly period of the revolution, and which were largely composed of the most turbulent elements of the country, and it may be confidently asserted that there are to-day not more than eight hundred white natives of Cuba with arms in their hands in the insurgent ranks."

Here is manifested the Spanish policy which has been pursued to the present hour, to convince the great Powers of Europe that the release of Cuba from Spanish rule was necessarily to make of the island a greater San Domingo—and it is due the truth to say the way the insurgents carried on the war that was resumed by Marti and Gomez, has countenanced the malignant representation by the Spaniards. The destruction of the agricultural indus-

tries of the island was not in the interest of liberty, damaged Spaniards less than Cubans, and was barbaric, very largely accountable for the famine, and chargeable with much of the hideous suffering of the innocent in the camps of the reconcentrados. The diplomatic circular of Spain goes on to say that the insurgents were destroyers, while the Spaniards were preservers, and that it would be a "great error to suppose that the Cuban emigrants to the United States, who took good care to keep out of harm's way themselves," would be able to constitute a government. Those insurgents who were brave enough to face death on battlefields had fallen or surrendered.

In this circular the naval and land forces of Spain were set forth—"forty-five vessels of all classes, with a nominal force of 4,770 horses, 135 cannon, and 2,426 seamen, 55 battalions, 6 regiments of cavalry, 2 of artillery, 1 of light field troops, 1 company of naval mechanics, 3 regiments of civil guardsmen, 1 sanitary brigade, 1 battalion of engineers, 33 companies of skirmishers, 2 squadrons of dragoons, and 1 transport brigade, making altogether a total of 273 chiefs, 3,054 officers, 68,115 soldiers, 8,478 horses, 462 mules, and 42 pieces. Since the foregoing enumeration was made, moreover, 10,370 men have embarked for the island.

"There are also the volunteer bodies, consisting of natives of the Peninsula and Cubans, amounting to upward of fifty thousand men. These last figures are official and irrecusable, and show what is the true spirit of the island and its adhesion to the mother country; for while the Cubans who are fighting for the insurrection are less than one thousand in number, those who have voluntarily taken up arms against it number more than forty thousand."

The volunteers in Cuba have all the while been Peninsular Spaniards, given, by the policy of discrimination against Cuban Spaniards, places that should be filled by the natives of the island. This has been one of the most odious forms of oppression. At this point in the circular there was an effort to explain "one fact" that might seem incomprehensible to those not familiarly acquainted—and that "the duration of the contest, in spite of the disparity existing between the forces of the contending parties." As this is a matter that has perplexed Americans from the beginning of the Cuban conditions that interested them, we are sure the official explanation of that mystery will be read with exceedingly great interest.

The Spanish Minister of State said: "Cuban rebels are, for the most part, negroes and mulattoes, who do not experience the ordinary necessities of

civilization. They are able to live in the jungles and deserts of the island, and thence fall upon estates and other property like birds of prey, pillaging and applying the torch of the incendiary. They live on the fruits of the country, such as the plantain and others which grow spontaneously in that fertile soil. Salt, and hogs and other animals are so numerous that they are everywhere met with, and serve as food." There is a considerable amount of truth in this, but the prominence given the "negroes" is exaggerated. It is true, however, that the black men in the insurgent forces endured the hardships of guerrilla warfare in the Cuban jungles, in a greater proportion than their white compatriots, so that when the American army landed in Santiago, were in the eastern province of the island, the numbers of white Cuban soldiers were a small percentage, the whites generally finding occupation as officers. And the explanatory fact is mentioned in the circular.

"The Baracoa district, having an extent of ninety miles, had but forty-two inhabitants, while there was about the same number in Las Tunas and the territory which separates the Mayari district from Guantanamo. The average number of inhabitants to the square geographical league throughout the island is 350. It is not, therefore, to be wondered at that the insurgents should be able to sustain themselves as nomadic tribes in a country of such a character—uncultivated, almost a wilderness, extremely broken and mountainous, and covered with immense forests which cannot even be set on fire by reason of their constant and extraordinary humidity. Thus it is that they have never been able to establish even the shadow of a government."

There is a good deal of explanation in this, but it does not cover the whole ground of the mysterious incompetency of 100,000 Spanish troops in Cuba to overcome the bands of guerrillas led by Garcia in the eastern or more revolutionary end of the island. The circular we have been quoting continues: "If the insurgents were regular troops and carried on a civilized warfare, the contest would long since have been ended by two or three battles. The matter, however, becomes one of much greater difficulty when they avoid all fighting save from an ambushade, and run and hide when they see our troops, in order to meet again in their lurking places when the danger is past. It is thus seen why it has never been possible to entirely destroy the so-called palenques, or bands of fugitive negroes, who have fled from the estates, and who seek refuge in the aforesaid Baracoa district."

It was many years after this that Maximo Gomez made a march of five

hundred miles through the island, burning cane fields, and the inconsiderate boast of the insurgents was that the red skies displayed the progress of the army of liberation. It was an unhappy association that the cause of freedom should have been identified to that extent with a raid of devastation.

The ministerial circular continued: "In the western department there were and still are—for, far from diminishing, their number was increased during the war—1,070 sugar estates, while in the central department there were but 102, and in the eastern 200. The quantity of sugar produced in the first-named department amounted to 500,000,000 kilograms, which quantity has also been increased, while that of the second only amounted to 17,000,000, and that of the third to 35,250,000 kilograms. The quantity of tobacco produced in the western department is 44,000 quintals, in the central department only 5,500, and in the eastern 252,000. It must be remembered that in the territory comprised between Pinar del Rio and Guanajay, in the first of those departments, the exquisite tobacco known as that of La Vuelta de Abajo is exclusively produced. The price of this tobacco is constantly increasing, and is much higher than that produced in the eastern department, which is a second-class article. The quantity of coffee produced in the western department amounts to 3,750,000 kilograms, and that of the central department to 3,750, and that of the eastern to 5,000,000. Finally, the value of the cattle of all kinds in the western department is 2,000,000 pesetas, or \$4,000,000; in the central and eastern departments, \$1,000,000 each. It is therefore seen that the real wealth and the bulk of the population of the island of Cuba are in the western department, which has scarcely suffered at all from the insurrection, and which, for the most part, has remained perfectly tranquil."

All this official appeal to the Powers of Europe has been proven by events to have been utterly inadequate. The war was carried into the extreme eastern end of Cuba. Maximo Gomez was at a point on the coast, west of Havana, when Captain-General Weyler landed, from which he could see the Morro Castle light, and counted the guns of the salute.

Secretary Fish was constant in urging Mr. Cushing to force upon the Spaniards an impression of the danger of American "intervention." That he was influenced in this instance by the personal views of President Grant there is inner evidence—and yet it has been a part of the filibuster creed to hold that General Grant was too careful, and to assert that his conservation comprehended caution in the extreme. There is a close parallel between the

bearing of President Grant and that of President McKinley in the earnestness with which each sympathized with the Cuban cause. Grant failed to discover a public duty in the recognition of either the independence of the Cuban insurgents' Republic, or the belligerent rights of an organization that had no ports and no courts or fixed places of official residence or certainty of areas of authority.

Mr. Cushing found it necessary to explain repeatedly why he did not press the impending intervention, and his first point was that no Power in Europe would join with us. England had limited her coöperation to "good offices." Lord Derby wanted, in his talk with General Schenck, "postponement of definite action," and repelled in various forms of expression the idea of any pressure, and he instructed the British Minister to Spain that there should be "no thought of mediation" until after Spain had been further unsuccessful in trying to suppress the Cuban insurrection with her own forces. Charged by Secretary Fish with evading the great question of intervention by confining talk to "our particular griefs," Mr. Cushing stated the Spanish Minister introduced and dwelt upon our "private griefs," and did so evidently to evade the general question of the condition of Cuba as distinguished from our affairs. Mr. Cushing did not think it a convenient occasion "then and there to push him on the question of intervention." Mr. Cushing had supposed there was to be no pressure for intervention until it was known what action the Powers would take. "Why else invoke their moral support?"

Mr. Cushing, at this point having concluded his defense for not pushing intervention, advanced aggressively to the instruction of the State Department in these embattled paragraphs:

"The interests of Spain and of the United States in Cuba are identical. At present we derive great net benefits from it; she, none. The imminent destruction of its productiveness would be alike disastrous to her and to us.

"She is willing enough to confide in us if we will let her. The proof of that is to be found not in profession (although that we have), but in the analysis of the diplomatic relations of Spain with other powers, contained in previous dispatches. In fine, whatever causes of grief or jealousy she has against us, she has greater against others. Nevertheless, she is now anxious and suspicious with regard to the United States. She knows that thousands of bad Spaniards (called Cubans), having a holy horror of the smell of gunpowder, have fled to 'snug harbor' in New York, Key West, and New

Orleans, have been dedicating themselves there for years, by distribution of bonds, by speeches, newspapers, solicitations, exaggerated claims, violations of law, and in every other possible way, to the task of embroiling the two governments in war, and are the efficient authors of all our troubles with her, directly or indirectly, including the tragedy of the *Virginius*.

"I dread emigrant rebels. How fatal were the French emigrés to Prussia in the early years of the French Revolution! How frequently the Jacobites involved France in fruitless hostility with England! How the refugee Poles lured Napoleon I. to his destruction by Russia, and refugee Mexicans Napoleon III. to the commencement of his destruction in America! I do not yet forget the picture of the disastrous intrigues of the rebel emigrants of the Greek Republics, more prejudicial to their friends than to their enemies, as drawn by the masterly hand of Thucydides, or of those of the Italian Republics, so graphically described by Guicciardini and Machiavelli.

"God forbid that these dishonored men, who prate of the independence of Cuba, without manliness or courage to fight for it, preferring the safer occupation of trading in bogus bonds and calumniating the President and yourself, should succeed in making our country the instrument of their rancorous hatred of their own country, Spain.

"In this connection, be it remembered that the President's message asserts the absolute non-existence in Cuba at the present time of the essential elements of an independent State, and thus proclaims this fact to the world.

"Then, Spain is told every day, by leading newspapers of the United States, that the object of our naval preparations is to force the hand of Congress and of the people by producing some *casus belli* for electoral purposes; and although nobody really believes what newspapers say, yet they have their effect in the propagation of mischievous irritations and dangerous suspicions, as so well exposed in the late remarkable speech of Prince Bismarck in the German Reichsrath.

"I meet all these things as well as I may by pointing to the kindly assurances contained in your note of November 5, in the President's message, and in sundry special dispatches, such as your No. 281, notwithstanding their being dispatches of complaint against acts or omissions of the Spanish government.

"But the obstacles which thus far it has been impossible for me to get over are in the insolent assumption of the knots of Spanish traitors in New

York and Paris, who presume not only to dictate to Spain, but also to the United States, and in the impracticable character of the Dominican chiefs of the insurgents in Cuba.

“If you can answer for them, there is no hope for peaceful and harmonious action between the two nations, to the end of peace, emancipation, and good government in Cuba, by the mediation of the United States, with or without the aid of Great Britain or Germany.

“As for these European powers, suffer me to say, ‘Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes.’”

Mr. Cushing saw the Russian Minister, who was polite and vague and not informed, but “he spontaneously offered good offices and friendly advice, if this course should be in accordance with the wishes of the Emperor;” not, Mr. Cushing added, a very satisfactory reservation. This diplomat was “profuse in the utterance of courtier expressions, and in professions of sympathy with the United States;” and yet he represented to others that the United States was pressing Spain as a means of forwarding private claims! That, of course, was his ignorance. March 1, 1876, Mr. Fish wrote Mr. Cushing: “Discovery and long occupation have made the island of Cuba a possession of Spain, and the United States has no desire to disturb the relations which result therefrom. Part of the territory of the one power, it is the seat of immense trade for the other. But it has been found up to the present time impossible to conquer a peace by force of arms, and every suggestion that amnesty, reform, and the certainty of good government might be effective where force has failed has been repelled. More than six years ago such was the condition of affairs, and it remains the same to-day.”

Mr. Cushing wrote March 2d that the President's message had a salutary effect, that Spain “has been made more pliant by the confidence in the message of the disinterestedness of our government and in our recognition of the non-existence in Cuba at the present time of the necessary elements of independence.” And Spain longed to have peace.

Mr. Cushing sent March 7th a summary of the criticisms of the Spanish Press in these terms:

“Much is said of the discreditable character and acts of the pretended directors of the rebellion in New York, who, it is charged, are mainly occupied in criminal intrigues against the peace of the United States.

“It is alleged that most of the reclamations put forward by the

United States are for slave property, to the discredit of our emancipation professions.

"Much is alleged as to the dishonest character of the citizenship of the claimants; most of them Spaniards of recent naturalization, few of whom, it is said, ever had bona fide residence in the United States.

"The Minister of State has more than once alluded to this point in terms the more disagreeable for being founded on truth."

On July 11, 1876, Mr. Cushing administered "some observations of a consolatory tendency" to Secretary Fish, "in reference to the non-success of your earnest efforts to meliorate the condition of things in Cuba. First, neither party to the contest in Cuba was disposed to listen to the counsel of wisdom and friendship." The true cause and character of maladministration in Cuba was that "the governors are incapable of conducting and the governed equally incapable of receiving good government. They are all Spaniards alike, as General Prim so often said, whether you call them Peninsulars or Cubáns. And (to say nothing of the colored population) it is not the best of the Spaniards, Creole or Peninsular, which constitutes the population of Cuba. Have there been rebellions in Cuba, guerrilla warfare, burnings, sacking of towns, military executions, deportations, embargo of private property, banishments, suspension of suffrage, arbitrary domination of captains-general? So all these things have been occurring in Spain. She has had nought else for more than sixty years but alternations betwixt anarchy and despotism. The few periods of comparative, but transient, tranquillity she has enjoyed during the reign of Queen Isabel were due to the mere usurpation of two great generals, Narvaez and O'Donnell, to whose administrations of the sword men look back now as to the halcyon days of Spain. Since the dethronement of Queen Isabel—that is, during the very period of the civil war in Cuba—there has not only been civil war in Spain, but, simultaneous therewith, a rapid succession of provisional and experimental governments, each destitute of inherent stability, and every one of which subsisted only by means of irresponsible dictatorships, except that of King Amadeo alone, who fell simply, as men say, because he was the only man in Spain scrupulously faithful to his oath and obstinately adhesive to the constitution of the country.

"And yet, constitutionally honest as he was, his ministers betrayed him and assassins (not yet punished) fired on him on a bright moonlit evening in one of the most frequented and brilliantly lighted streets of Madrid. Possibly

if Prim had not been assassinated in the street (by men, they also not yet punished), Spain might have been saved from her extremest days of misery, the cantonal insurrection, but that is doubtful, since the misfortunes of Spain and of Cuba are conditions of the national character, as manifested alike in Spain and in all Spanish America.

“For, let me repeat, the governors and the governed, all the same in race, and with defects aggravated in the latter by tropical life and by association with slaves, are at least equally to blame for the calamities of Cuba.

“In fine, looking at the subject from the point of view of the interests of the United States, which alone is of account in the face of a civil contest where both parties are deaf to the counsels of friendship and to considerations of sympathy and humanity, it seems to me that we have much to lose and nothing to gain by compromising ourselves in the matter of Cuba, it being superabundantly evident that, whether as to Lopez and his companions laboring professedly to betray their country to a foreign nation for the promotion of slavery, or in case of Aldama and his associates, laboring to betray it to the same nation for the gratification of personal resentment and ambition, they all have but one thought as respects us, namely, to make a cat's paw of our government, while ready to emulate, on the earliest possible opportunity, the 'sublime ingratitude' of Schwartzenberg. C. CUSHING.”

This formidable indictment of Spain and Spaniards is made the more tremendous by the proof in the Madrid dispatches of the author that he was not a partisan of the Cuban insurgents, but distrusted them and was high-tempered against their representatives in the United States. As to “intervention” in Cuba, it was never perfectly defined until President McKinley did it, in his message so coldly received by the warlike element in Congress, when he calmly stated the situation in which it would be necessary to “intervene with force,” and intervention with force is war—and was war.

Of course, there was no change in the Spanish system. Mr. Cushing by mail mentioned that the Spanish Minister of State said he would not have consented to leave the post of minister of grace and justice, which best suited him as a lawyer and a magistrate, and to take that of state, which was out of the line of his lifetime pursuits, “save only in the hope of being able to cooperate with me in healing all differences, in order to do which he counted much on our long-standing personal friendship and mutual confidence; that he had carefully read and considered the contents of your No. 266, and must confess

that the United States had good reason to complain, not only of unjustifiable acts on the part of the local authorities of Cuba, but of the delays and half-measures of the Spanish government to accord redress; that the local administration of Cuba, civil and military alike, had, in his conception, been greatly injurious to the interests of Spain herself, even more than to the United States; that, as a jurist, he repudiated on principle the sequestration of the property of foreigners in Cuba; that if the Spanish note of the 15th ultimo should prove acceptable to the President as a basis, he should be prepared to take up each individual grief as presented, and consider and decide promptly; that while not able conscientiously to admit that by the letter of the treaty civil courts were stipulated for to the exclusion of military, yet he was ready so to arrange the ground of controversy in that relation as to put an end to all reasonable complaint in the premises on the part of the United States.

"I could but declare the high gratification it afforded me to receive from his lips the communication of these just and elevated statements, which it would be my pleasure to transmit immediately to my government."

Mr. Cushing could not fail to exercise his brilliant imagination on the international aspects of the questions arising in our relations with Spain; he quoted an article in the *Epoca* newspaper that seemed to be inspired by the government, and set it forth in a series of flashing fancies as follows:

"The definite references of the *Epoca* to my interview with Mr. Calderon y Collantes on the 30th, and to the telegrams received from Mr. Mantilla, sufficiently show that the *Epoca* received its information from some member of the government.

"I have never mentioned the contents, date, or even existence of your No. 266 to anybody except Mr. Calderon y Collantes, not even to Mr. Layard, until he came to speak to me concerning it, on the 1st instant, by telegraphic direction from Lord Derby, as reported in another dispatch.

"Of course, all which the *Epoca* says of the contents of that note must have been derived from the government.

"Four things are, it seems to me, worth noting in that article:

"1st. In speaking of your No. 266, it undertakes to characterize the first part, devoted to the exposition of particular grievances, but makes no allusion to the second part.

"2d. It gives quite a novel turn to the question of intervention and the relations of Great Britain to that subject, supposing it to be on the part of

some 'great continental Power' between the United States and Spain. I have no knowledge, nor any ground of conjecture even, as to what Power is thus intended. Is it Germany? Or France? Or Russia?

"3d. The Epoca seems to put forward the article of the Herald by way of insinuating the opposition of Great Britain to any positive action of ours on the side of Cuba.

"4th. It is observable that the Epoca, thus inspired by the government, does not speak excitedly, or otherwise betray signs of irritation on the part of the government on occasion of the suggestion of our possible intervention, *ex nomine*, as intimated in your instructions, and also expressly in the oral statement made by me to Mr. Calderon y Collantes."

Secretary Fish was constant and strong in urging Mr. Cushing to force upon the Spaniards an impression of the danger of American "intervention." That he was influenced in this insistence by the personal views of President Grant there is inner evidence, and yet it has been a part of the filibuster creed to hold that General Grant was too careful, and to assert that his conservatism comprehended caution in the extreme.





CHAPTER III.

The Old, Old Story in Spain.

European Newspaper Comment on the Cuban-Spanish-American Situation Twenty-two Years Ago—Not Much New in Later Commentary—"Stable Government" Not a New Phrase—Cuban Troubles Those of Inheritance—Disastrous Influences of the Rebel Policy of the Torch—Suggestion of Bombardment of Our Cities by Spaniards.

Considerable agitation was produced in the diplomatic circles of Europe by the steady pressure of Secretary Fish with his instructions to Minister Cushing to bring the Spaniards to conclusions. Repeatedly the Secretary had to qualify the forms of expression of the several ministers intrusted with copies of the formal paper. Mr. Baker was admonished that he had been too strenuous in St. Petersburg in making the most of a prince's politeness, and explained that he quoted the Russian Prince Gortchakoff by an almost unconscious recollection. Mr. Orth, at Vienna, over-played his part a shade, and a supplementary direction was that he should not require a reply in writing to his suggestive communication. The Vienna Presse, of January 5, 1876, contained this expression of Austrian pulchritude:

"North America labors vigorously and incessantly to make the Cuban question an international one, and to elevate it to the position of a burning one before the Spanish arms can succeed in making it disappear from the world. To-day it is announced by telegram from New York that the note of the government of the United States to the Powers relative to Cuba proposed the union of Cuba and Porto Rico under one Spanish governor-general. The European diplomacy, which was enlightened with the hearing of the extraordinarily long American document—a copy of the same was not left—might be not disagreeably astonished to learn what actually might be the small meaning of the long discourse. The omission of every conclusion in the document of Mr. Secretary Fish was until now everywhere remarked; he had hitherto excused the European governments from the duty of giving an



THE CAPTAIN-GENERAL'S PALACE IN HAVANA.

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ARTILLERY WAGON PARK, PORTO RICO.



THE PLAZA IN PONCE, PORTO RICO.



**CAPT. BETHEL AND GEN. ERNST RECONNOITERING
IN PORTO RICO.**



CHURCH AND PALMS IN JUANA, PORTO RICO.

answer to the Washington Government, and the Madrid government did not at this time require, as with the message of President Grant, to answer with a formal memorandum. Substantially, the long and short of the American note was to the effect that the insurrection in Cuba must come to an end. It was careful to represent, in constantly recurring phrases, that no individual interest of any kind had actuated the United States, who positively had not the least thought of appropriating the Pearl of the Antilles."

As there was a Carlist war on hand, it did not seem to the European governments a striking opportunity to be especially urgent in demands that Spain should mend her ways in Cuba. There was at least propriety in the precedence of home rule. The edge of the policy set forth by Mr. Fish was that Spain should make a finish of the Cuban war by abandoning the attempt to conquer the island, if military success was impracticable. Precisely the contention of the Secretary was the thing not possible for Spain—and, there were many insinuations abroad that President Grant was playing for a third term by contriving a war with Spain. The London Times, January 24, 1876, put in this weighty observation apropos of the stirring communications of Mr. Fish:

"This remarkable correspondence can hardly fail to excite American politicians, not because there is likely to be any difference of opinion in the United States as to the iniquities of Spain, but because the policy of inviting the coöperation of the European powers is a bold departure from the political traditions of the United States. The invitation has not been addressed to Great Britain alone, but also to the governments of France and Italy, and to the three Empires. This is manifestly an abandonment of the 'Monroe Doctrine,' which has so long controlled American policy, and has disconnected it, at all events in theory, from the general web of political interests throughout the civilized world. To exclude from the American continent not only every advance by annexation or colonization of the monarchical powers of Europe, but every direct influence of those governments for good or evil, was in substance the political dogma which takes its name from President Monroe. This monstrous pretension at the time when the Democratic party and the slave power were in close alliance had nearly assumed an aggressive form, and if events had not checked and rebuked it, would probably have tempted the Union into a ruinous filibustering policy.

"The civil war prevented the United States from actively asserting the

Monroe Doctrine, though the intervention of France, England, and Spain in the affairs of Mexico, excited vehement protests on the other side of the Atlantic. But Mr. Fish's invitation to the European powers, recognizing, as it does, the fact that the nations of Europe have interests to watch and defend on the American continent, marks very distinctly the progress of the people of the United States in political good sense. It is sheer folly for any country, however powerful and however confident in its destiny, to take upon itself to wall off half the world, and say to the commonwealth of nations, 'You have nothing to do with all on this side.' The claim is as inadmissible as that of the Holy See to partition the unknown lands of the East and the West between Spain and Portugal."

The Pall Mall Gazette, January 25, 1876, editorially called attention to the statement that Mr. Fish communicated the substance of his instructions "on the eve of the November elections," and presented an essay dwelling with varied application upon the difficulties of the establishment of a "stable government" in Cuba.

It has not been forgotten that at the time President McKinley used the phrase, "stable government," the members of Congress distinguished for high temperature held that it was fatally lacking in propriety, because the word "government" was not qualified by "Republican form," which was the only sort of thing we could endure. We quote the Pall Mall Gazette:

"Whatever force there may prove to be in the plea that General Grant must be elected President a third time in order to carry on a war with the Vatican, there is seemingly no popular conviction that it is worth while to provoke a war with Spain in order to overcome the prejudice against a third term. It does not indeed require any keen political acumen to detect the difficulties which surround both the alternatives suggested in Mr. Fish's dispatch. It is a cheap exercise of international officiousness to hope that Spain may spontaneously adopt measures for the organization of a stable and satisfactory system of government in Cuba, but if Mr. Fish had to state in words what the measures in question should be, the impossibility of framing them would be at once apparent. If Spain succeeds in putting down the insurrection, a stable government of a certain kind may be established. If the United States go to war and annex Cuba, a stable government of a certain kind may be established.

"But to talk of a stable government in an island in which the passions

excited by quarrels of race, of color, of social position, have raged with scarcely any restriction for more than five years, while proclaiming in the same breath the impropriety of these passions being subdued by the hand of any external power, is to use words which have no meaning. The concession of independence to Cuba might mean peace as between the mother country and her emancipated colony, but it would not mean peace in Cuba itself. On the contrary, it would only mean war, renewed with greater determination, and conducted with greater fierceness, between the insurgents and that part of the population which, as Mr. Fish very truly puts it, 'has sustained and upheld, if it has not controlled, successive governors-general.' How this conflict would end we do not pretend to say, but is safe to predict that while it lasted it would be characterized by yet greater atrocities, and inflict yet greater annoyances on foreign residents than the war which has gone on so long.

"After a time the exhaustion of resources and the partial extermination of the fighting population would bring active hostilities to an end; but the experience of West Indian and South American independence does not make their subsequent resumption at all unlikely. It is to create this sort of wilderness within sight of the United States that the American people were invited to run the risk of a war with Spain. For that a war with Spain involves very grave risk to the United States is undoubted. At the outset of a contest which can only be carried on at sea, the comparative wealth, numbers, and resources of the combatants go for little, except so far as they are embodied in actual ships.

"The power of Spain, such as it is, is so embodied; the power of the United States is not; and it is at least possible that the first act of a war between the two countries might be the bombardment of every American seaport. It does credit to the good sense of the American people that they have not cared to run this risk for the doubtful benefits of annexing an island which they do not want and being ruled for four years longer by General Grant."

The recklessness of a large portion of this utterance does not remove the pertinence of the discussion of the troublesome responsibilities attendant upon governing Cuba—even after the Spanish have departed, and when the chances of the bombardment of our ports seem to be very remote. We have Cuba under the American flag, and it is there the symbol first of order, for the state of the country demands the direct care of the military method of preserving the peace of society.

The domination of Spain in Cuba for four centuries and six years has stamped upon the people characteristics that will not for a long time cease from troubling, and the first installment of difficulty comes in the extravagant presumption of the insurgents, who have throughout the warfare that the Spaniards have been too sluggish to suppress, failed utterly in candor with the friends of the freedom of Cuba, and they have with system grievously falsified the situation. The cause of Cuba would have been far better presented if the truth had been told, but sensations, red and yellow—the colors of Spain—were in endless demand by those engaged in the preparation of bulletins, the primary purpose of which was to bring on war between the United States and Spain, assuming that we would conquer the island and turn it over to the first comers claiming to have provided a Republican Cuban government. It is fortunate that we are pledged to give Cuba, as the first fruits of victory, a “stable government.” Stability is the first necessity. The only way of redeeming the promise of stability is through military government, and that must continue until we have discovered the constituency of a “stable government.” It was the policy of Maximo Gomez to annihilate the two great industries in Cuba—sugar and tobacco production—and he did it ruthlessly, that the Spaniards might be impoverished. In a greater degree he has made the Cubans poor. He desired to combine with the desolation of the cane and tobacco fields the abolishment of peaceable occupation, so that the laboring men could be driven to fight with him. The disorganization of civilization was, with this stroke of barbarism, made complete. Notwithstanding the armies under Gomez declined in numbers and active service, and he has been more and more cautious in actual warfare, content to hold areas of tropical wilderness by scattered squads with a system of speedy dispersion and concentration. Maceo was hard pressed in Pinar del Rio, west of Captain-General Weyler's trocha, and for months had maintained against great odds, with high courage and consummate address, a combat in the theretofore unviolated Paradise of tobacco, hoping for the return of Gomez from the east, where after his wonderful westward march he receded to the mountains and swamps, in whose shelter it was the explanation of friends that he was gathering a host of freedom to swoop down upon Havana, after the manner of many Key West bulletins, relieving Maceo from the strain of a situation of desperate hardihood. The more certain it was that Gomez could only move from one obscure retirement to another, the wilder grew the Key West music



THE MILITARY HOSPITAL AT PONCE, PORTO RICO.



BATTERY B, 4TH ARTILLERY, IN ACTION IN PORTO RICO.



FIRE DEPARTMENT BUILDING, PONCE, PORTO RICO.



ON THE PICKET LINE IN PORTO RICO.



CATHOLIC CHURCH IN PONCE, PORTO RICO.

on the wires announcing the invincible hero proceeding by forced marches on the way to Havana, which certainly he would assault in a few days! This methodical fabrication was in its nature the same discovered in the official Spanish dispatches. The truth was not valued on either side. Maceo fell in a skirmish after he had crossed Weyler's trocha and met four hundred men who were advised of his coming. He was not "lured" by the Spaniards under a flag of truce and assassinated, as stated with all the pomp of fiction. He rode up to the firing when a Spanish column was, not unexpectedly, encountered, and was killed by a Mauser bullet through the neck. The story of his betrayal and murder was frantically worked, in the hope that Americans might be exasperated to madness and rushed headlong into war. The Spanish falsehood for this incident was that there was a "battle" in which the soldiers of Spain were most brave and that the rebels were routed, Maceo falling in the midst of the affray. The "battle" was a skirmish-line affair, over in a few minutes, and Maceo's men, recovering his body, gave it secret burial. With his fall the aggressive impulse of the insurgents ceased, with the exception of the operations conducted in the eastern provinces by General Garcia. There was no intermission, however, in the triumphant chapters of militant Cuban literature, transmitted from Key West. The Cuban army, as it appeared when the American army landed in Cuba, was not what had been represented, and it was evident that there had been deliberate deception carried on by the Cuban Bureau of Intelligence, specially provided for its effect upon the American people. However, the Gomez policy had been successful in stopping work in the fields, and the "troops" of the Cuban government were willing to receive rations from the American army of liberation, but they were resolute to retain their arms until they could find a paymaster; and they will not go into another rebellion while their names are on a payroll. It is their misfortune that under the guidance of Gomez they destroyed the industries of their country that Spain might be harmed, but made themselves poor indeed.

When the ten years' war in Cuba began in 1868, there were less than seven thousand Spanish regulars on the island, and after reinforcements, one hundred thousand strong, had been sent across the Atlantic, neither the military nor the civil administration of Spain in the last of her great provinces had been improved. The sharpest offense that could be given the Spaniards was to propose as a tentative alternative that the insurgents should have

rights as belligerents, and yet the greatest army any nation ever transported three thousand miles was year after year unable to report decisive progress in campaigns of pacification. There was not a public man in Spain who did not know that the one thing needful to the Spanish cause in Cuba was military success, and there was an army of regulars that should number nearly or quite one hundred thousand, with firemen, policemen and volunteers nearly fifty thousand, and a swarm of gunboats and ships of war forming a coast guard; and yet there were no results from the presence of this immense array which was consuming the life of Spain. The Spanish Cabinet and diplomatic representatives prayed for military success to build a hope upon, but the only victories for the Spaniards were the extension of deserts, the spread of famine, and the stalking abroad of pestilence. The distance from Spain to Cuba was greater than the fleets or legions of the Romans covered, and the British armies that crossed the Atlantic in the attempted subjugation of the thirteen revolted colonies, never showed fifty per cent of the numerical strength of the Spaniards of the regular army in Cuba. The Spanish volunteers were additional, and yet, until in the final strife that preceded the armed intervention of the United States, the western provinces of Cuba were not seriously molested, and the sugar and tobacco crops up to that time increased. It is only in the studies of Spanish character, both in the peninsula and the island, by Caleb Cushing, our Minister to Spain in the closing years of Grant's administration, that the phenomenon of the inability of the Spanish forces to take a vigorous initiative is explained. The military capacity of the Spanish race has in modern times been almost exclusively defensive. The side that has the privilege of ambushes and can pursue the strategy and the tactics of evasion, elusion and procrastination is unconquerable, except by soldiers of a tougher fiber and a more alert and determined spirit in advancing upon concealed foes than themselves. The Cubans could no more fight battles with Spanish regulars in the open field than the Spaniards could fight the French in regular order in the warfare with Napoleon. Wellington found his Spanish allies, during the Peninsular war, uncertain and fantastic, as the American generals discovered the Cubans, who emerged from the swamps and mountains when Shafter's divisions were climbing the hills of Santiago, alternately scorched and drenched, and stricken with ghastly fevers. It turned out that the Spaniards, ineffectual in attacking the Cuban guerrillas in familiar fastnesses, when intrenched

behind entanglements of barbed wire, were keen and steady as defenders, standing up to their work manfully; but their courage in resisting assaults was no more testimony that their colonial system was not disastrous infamy, than the success of the Cubans in bushwhacking was evidence that they had organized a Republic and should resume the art of government where the Spaniards left it.

All there was of the Cuban question that concerned us was thrashed over during the ten years' war, 1868-78. Out of a hundred thousand men the Spaniards then had in Cuba, they lost seventeen thousand from sickness in 1877, and the next year treated with the armed insurgents, bribing some, cajoling others, promising all things with a broad profusion that was proof they attached no value to their words. There was peace for a few years—that is, there were intrigues in place of skirmishes, when, as has been the stated custom in the stories of Spanish colonial conflicts, the stipulations of reformation without performance having run their course, hostilities were resumed at the old stands in the well-known ways, with the usual Junta in New York, and the regular equipments all around. This time the brain that organized the customary outbreak was in a civil capacity José Marti, with Maximo Gomez as the military chieftain, supreme in general direction, and Antonio Maceo, a soldier of personal daring and many high qualities. Early in the conflict Marti, exposing himself to encourage followers, was slain, and within two years the two Maceos, plunging into desperate situations, perished. The chieftains of the insurgents invaded eastern Cuba in small boats, finding their way from Hayti to appointed Cuban coves, where friends awaited them, and it was not long before the development that a revolt against the Spaniards of the Peninsula, of a more sanguinary and destructive nature than ever, had been encountered. The constant cry of the Spanish through the years of bloody contention was that the Cuban rebels would, if it was in their power, make of the splendid island an enlarged San Domingo—and the horrors of French experience were recited to terrorize all who were unwilling to accept barbarism as freedom. The Spanish cartoons on display in Havana always represented the rebellion as personified by a black man, uncouth and horrid, torch and knife in hand, grossly threatening Cuba drawn as a beautiful white woman; Uncle Sam—an unwieldy hog with snout and tail, a starry hat and striped coat-tails and trousers—instigating the black monster to violence. It was the Gomez policy to accept this issue by the use of the

torch, and the war took on a dreadful aspect, in widespread plantation fires rolling westward, the fiery clouds of conflagrations consuming the cane fields and mills, and finally the tobacco houses stored with leaves precious as fine gold. The insurgents burned the better houses and laid waste the areas of black and red sugar and tobacco land, whose cultivation had yielded marvelous opulence. In turn the Spaniards burned the humbler dwellings and the villages they could not garrison. The Cubans were accomplished horsemen, and domestic animals and the fruit trees afforded the shifty, irregular cavaliers food supplies. The Spaniards slaughtered the horses and cattle they could not ride or drive away, and the sheep and pigs it was inconvenient to capture and hold in pens were massacred. On both sides there was infuriated savagery, and the wretched camps, where famine and pestilence made war most hideous, were the result. The responsibility rested upon both parties to the interminable conflict of barbarities. Weyler and Gomez were the representative men of this diabolical warfare. More and more, the people in Cuba of intelligence equal to understanding that there must be order before prosperity could be restored, and that authority must be found and applied, not committed to the everlasting confusion and reprisals of the partisans of vengeance, before the restoration of hopefulness would be rational, were persuaded and convinced that with the people of the United States and their army and navy must rest the responsibility, and in them be found the capacity for saving jurisdiction. The Cuban Republic, if the island should be turned over to the Key West and New York colonies, and the bands that are in arms looking for money, that they may continue to be an army, and play the part the Spaniards have played out, would make the fruition of American sacrifices the extension of unmitigated San Domingo terrors. It is the first obligation of the United States in possession of Cuba, to American civilization, to use the force necessary to prevent this consummation, most devoutly to be deprecated, and the fact should be fearlessly presented, discussed without hesitation, declared without the shadow of misgiving, that the correct policy of our country is and always has been that of the ultimate annexation of Cuba. The island wants American rule, and not a continuance of the Spanish styles of tyranny, corruption and spoliation, whether direct or indirect. We did not make war in Cuba for our health, and in the island of the palm and the orange, coffee and cane, tropic woods and iron ores, of fruits and flowers, birds and fishes of surpassing beauty and

utility, the government must change hands actually and the wholesome healing American influences prevail through stable government under the law sustained by the American people, armed and puissant.

The correspondence of our State Department has for a generation been unnecessarily littered with disavowals of the logic of history and the teachings of geography on this subject of the occupation and possession of Cuba by and for ourselves. We would at any time have paid Spain one hundred millions of dollars for the island, and twenty-five millions for Porto Rico, and the actual trouble, deeper than any other in embarrassing the negotiations, has been the necessity of providing a large margin for the middleman. It would be a strange official transaction in Spain, and one certain to decline and perish by the way, if there were not a reserved fund amounting to a large percentage for the gentlemen who took the risks of the delicate antecedent manipulations. The Cuban Republic—that is, the civil side of the guerrilla war—lost the opportunity to gain the first foothold and title to the island, and finance the rebellion when under the Gomez policy, of destroying Spanish resources by desolating Cuban plantations; the credit of the country itself, with all its wealth of plantations, was annihilated. Cuba might have been purchased by Cubans, if the war had not been made a sacrifice of civilization. Cuba, with the sugar and tobacco fields preserved, would have been good for a loan of \$150,000,000, at 6 per cent. The customs of the two principal ports guaranteed in the hands of American appointees for the interest on the bonds—\$100,000,000 purchase money, and the \$50,000,000 judiciously distributed, it is demonstrated that the Cubans by themselves could never have freed themselves. Whatever good there was, or harm, in extinguishing the \$150,000,000 scheme belongs to the torches of Gomez, but in the fires of the plantations were consumed the one opportunity for the Republic of Cuba to become, in the language that so often rings around the walls of the halls of Congress, one of the nations of the earth. The insurgents burned their ability to establish a stable government. We, the people of the United States, only, have the will and the power to dispose of the sovereignty of Cuba, and the duty of our destiny confronts us upon that line, and imposes upon us the accomplishment of the purposes of the war, upon which we entered with generous sentiments, unprepared save in the reserved forces of our inherent strength—the war which we conducted speedily to a triumphant and glorious conclusion.

During the twenty years following our centennial celebration of the declaration of our independence, when we were seeking in the courts of Europe coöperation in demanding of Spain actual concessions that would prevent her exhaustion in a struggle that the character of her people made them incapable of conducting to success—or to terminate at all—the prestige of the Spaniards as a nation has declined, while our advancement has been incessant, and conspicuous. The statistics of our progress have notified all whom it might concern that here was one of the great Powers, and that when she came to the front there would be none to dispute her right to be heard at the ends of the earth, and at the opening and closing of great questions. The Spanish people should not be decried, but rather there ought to be free affirmation that they made extravagant sacrifices for Cuba of the young men of the country, and called upon the last scrap of credit—indeed, of everything but her incompetent pride and prejudice—to save the province. Spain was the less reasonable because dealing with her children. The qualities of those in the name of liberty insurgents were the same possessed by the oppressors whose perpetual outcry was of the dignity and honor of Spain, both of which were perverted from the ways of wisdom in which were alone the paths of peace. Spain had not appreciated human decadence, or estimated the proportions of our gigantic consolidation of force. She counted a great army and many ships of war, and in the course of her many years of strife in Cuba she had relied upon bulk and severity, not upon the keenness of weapons and the relentless energies that strike quickly and pursue without sleep a fixed purpose to the end. The Spanish armies were handled in columns, like droves of patient cattle. The men were excellent soldierly material, but there was the taint of corruption in every detail of the management, and the marches to and fro were without a common purpose, or a special object. The Spanish soldiers were not instructed to go into the fire, to penetrate the hearts of ambuscades with rushes of steel. They were not equipped for mobility, and the fairest of islands, with the gift of beauty and endowment of riches, was ill provided with roads, a deadly disability for Spanish columns. Finding themselves at last committed to war with the United States, and presently realizing that they were overmatched, the Spanish statesmen remembered the diplomatic situation of twenty years before, when no court in Europe countenanced President Grant's administration in putting a pressure upon Spain to part with Cuba, except upon the condition of

an impossible conquest of the island for herself. It was the last reliance of the Spaniards that there would be European intervention to fix limitations upon our ambitious aggrandizement. When Spain sued for peace she soon became conscious that the world was changed. She had expended herself upon her own faults in Cuba, and had to surrender islands as she had given up continents. It was for her an old story. The Powers that were aloof when Secretary Fish pleaded so ably and with perseverance for intervention in the name of peace in Cuba, and gave Spain two decades to adjust the affairs that she claimed as her own, refused to intervene in behalf of Spain beaten down, and there was something more than the wreck of her fleets and the captivity of her armies or the poverty of her treasury. She was primarily accountable for the elements of discordance that brought woe and ruin upon the island and humiliation upon the peninsula, and the cruelties of the system of warfare pursued on both sides were her own. Even more, it was the fault of the misgovernment of Spain at home and abroad that the world was shocked by incidents of atrocity incredible with other surroundings, from the individual ferocities of slaughter and the vengeful, remorseless, cowardly executions, to the massacre of the crew of the *Maine*! The consensus of human judgment had declared, after four hundred years, the execution of sentence of death upon the colonial system of Spain.





CHAPTER IV.

The Ten Years' War in Cuba.

The Stir About It in Europe—The Money Resources of Spain Stated by Minister Cushing—Europe Against Our Intervention in Cuba—The Filibuster Hostility to President Grant—The London Times on Hamilton Fish—A Minister Promises Too Much.


The Senate of the United States, March 24, 1896, requested the State Department to furnish the papers relating to the "mediation" or "intervention" of the United States, between November 5, 1875, and "the date of the pacification" of Cuba in 1878. The resolution called for the letter of the Secretary, Hamilton Fish, to Minister Caleb Cushing, of the date of November, 1875, and all notes, dispatches, and telegrams, so far as compatible with the public interest. Mr. Fish said that when Mr. Cushing departed for Madrid, apart from the generally unsatisfactory state of things in Spanish relations, there were several prominent questions unadjusted, the settlement of which was deemed necessary before affairs with Spain could be established in a satisfactory way. Among these questions, Mr. Fish said some arose from the embargo and confiscation of estates of American citizens in Cuba in violation of treaty obligations, and the claims arising out of the capture of the *Virginus*, including the trial and punishment of General Burriel. It had not been pretended, so far as the Secretary was aware, that any legal justification for these wrongs had been attempted on the part of the authorities of Spain, or that the proceedings in Cuba were defended or upheld.

On the contrary, pursuant to the decree issued by the government on the 12th of July, 1873, the illegality and indefensible character of the acts were admitted, "and the embargoes ordered to be removed and the property restored. This decree was at first received in Cuba with calm indifference, not even published or adverted to, and the proceedings of the authorities were in no notable respect changed thereby."

This shows the protracted power of the inertia of Spain. Mr. Fish cited in this connection specimen cases, and the promises of the Spanish Ministers,



LEADING GENERALS WHO COMMANDED INSURGENT FORCES IN CUBA.



MILITARY TELEGRAPH OFFICE AND BARRACKS AT PONCE, PORTO RICO.

unperformed, and the Secretary remarked the simple mention of the facts, of "the promises made and repeated, the assurances given from time to time, that something should be done, the admission of the justice of the demands of this country, at least to the extent of expressing regret for these wrongs and promising redress, followed as they have been by absolutely no performance, and no practical steps whatever toward performance, need no extended comment." He added:

"In the cases of embargo and confiscation, not only have wrongs been long since done, but continuing and repeated wrongs are daily inflicted. The authorities of Spain in Cuba, during all this time, have been and are using the revenues of the confiscated or embargoed estates, appropriating much of the property itself, and in some cases executing long leases, or actually making sales, either on the allegation that taxes were due or without any excuse whatever.

"In the cases of arrest and punishment, citizens of the United States, in like manner, have undergone punishment because the authorities of Spain do not meet the issue and decide the question." This ought to have been like a live coal on the Spanish back, but there were no results.

After referring to the Virginus case, and the payment of a sum of money by Spain, settling claims of English and American citizens, the Secretary added impressively:

"I regret to say that the authorities of Spain have not at all times appreciated our intentions or our purposes in these respects, and, while insisting that a state of war does not exist in Cuba and that no rights as belligerents should be accorded to the insurrectionists, have at the same time demanded for themselves all the rights and privileges which flow from actual and acknowledged war.

"It will be apparent that such a state of things cannot continue. [But they did nearly twenty-three years, long after the honorable career of Mr. Fish had terminated.—*Editor.*] It is absolutely necessary to the maintenance of our relations with Spain, even on their present footing, that our just demands for the return to citizens of the United States of their estates in Cuba, unincumbered, and for securing to them a trial for offenses according to treaty provisions and all other rights guaranteed by treaty and by public law, should be complied with.

"Whether the Spanish government, appreciating the forbearance of this

country, will speedily and satisfactorily adjust the pending questions, not by the issue of empty orders or decrees without force or effect in Cuba, but by comprehensive and firm measures which shall everywhere be respected, I anxiously await further intelligence.

"Moreover, apart from these particular questions, in the opinion of the President the time has arrived when the interests of this country, the preservation of its commerce, and the instincts of humanity alike demand that some speedy and satisfactory ending be made of the strife that is devastating Cuba.

"A disastrous conflict of more than seven years' duration has demonstrated the inability of Spain to maintain peace and order in an island lying at our door. Desolation and destruction of life and property have been the only results of this conflict.

"The United States sympathizes in the fact that this inability results in a large degree from the unhappy condition of Spain at home and to some extent from the distractions which are dividing her people. But the fact remains. Added to this are the large expanse of ocean separating the peninsula from the island and the want of harmony and of personal sympathy between the inhabitants of the territory of the home government and those of the colony, the distinction of classes in the latter between rulers and subjects, the want of adaptation of the ancient colonial system of Spain to the present times and to the ideas which the events of the past age have impressed upon the peoples of every reading and thinking country."

The aggravations of the case of Spain in provoking the United States to take summary methods have not been stated with greater force than in these quiet sentences. There are two other passages necessary to complete the statement of facts, with the calm solidity that bears down opponents, with the inherent moderation that shows the weaknesses of the exaggeration that impairs the integrity of true strength. The note of Mr. Fish to Mr. Cushing was duplicated to General Schenck, Minister of the United States to England, who was instructed to read it to Lord Derby, and Cushing was directed to wait for the result of the effort to obtain the cooperation of England. Mr. Cushing was of the judgment that this letter of instructions from Secretary Fish was dangerous, and might result in war. To this effect he wrote a letter and sent a telegram November 25th, saying in the letter he "almost wished" his instructions "were less specific." He said the condition of Spain was a temptation to her to go to war.

Many of the most thoughtful men in Spain, he affirmed, really longed for a foreign war as the only efficient remedy for the domestic dissensions that distracted the country.

"Moreover, the statesmen of the country foresaw that on the close of the war in the North (the Carlist conflict), which cannot fail to come in the course of the winter or early in the spring, there will be an army of two or three hundred thousand men to dispose of, with its officers, who will be but too much disposed to dominate in public affairs and push the civilians into the background." In addition to which, there was a multitude of "unthoughtful men, proud, angry, resentful, who would gladly rush into a war with the United States." Finally, there were "the mercenary, the ambitious, the déclassés and the bad, to whom war presents the usual attractions. 'Multis utile bellum,' says Sallust."

More than this, Mr. Cushing declared: "It is the received opinion in Spain that for the commencing period of a war she has a more efficient navy than ours," and, "In these circumstances, if Great Britain declines to coöperate with us, Spain will, at the least, despatch to Cuba at once a large fleet laden with troops, there to await the eventualities of diplomacy, and she may break off relations, with a hostile appeal to the European Powers."

In his telegram of November 25th, General Cushing said of the mission of General Schenck to sound Lord Derby, that if England joined us Spain would "succumb in sullen despair," but if England stood off Spain would think she had the sympathy of Europe, especially as by her note of the 15th she had gone to "the ultimate point in satisfaction of each of the particular griefs of the United States." Mr. Cushing urgently pressed the Secretary, "in proportion" as he "desired peace," to give explicit and specific replies in regard "to certain most needful instructions he would ask for by telegraph if a negative answer came from Great Britain." In case of that negative answer, Cushing cabled: "There will be war, and a popular though desperate one on the part of Spain, unless she can be convinced that the real and true object of the contemplated measure is to prevent war, as I understand it to be intended. But to ward off war will exact the steady exercise of all my personal influence here (which my colleagues tell me is great), and will require that influence to be efficiently backed by my government both here and at Washington. I am to 'obey orders though it break owners,' as the shipmasters say."

The Spanish note to Mr. Cushing contained proposals for adjustment for existing differences between the United States and Spain. Its substance was telegraphed to Mr. Fish by Mr. Cushing November 16, 1875. It had no reference to mediation or intervention by the United States in the affairs of Cuba.

November 27th, Cushing was telegraphed that in consequence of his telegram Schenck was instructed to delay the reading of the Cushing instructions to Derby! and the Secretary said the instruction was "not intended to be minatory in any sense, but in the spirit of friendship."

Mr. Cushing was a man of extraordinary range of information and a faculty of literary expression very rare. His paper addressed to the State Department on the financial situation of Spain is an excellent example. We quote in full:

"Madrid, November 26, 1875.—The finances of Spain are in a very bad condition, simply for want of credit in the stock market of Europe.

"Nevertheless, she is enabled to carry a large floating debt by loans on short time, say six months or a year, and to renew the bonds as they fall due by merely adding the interest to the mass of such floating debt.

"But she has considerable resources in reserve for times and occasions of desperation.

"1st. The Bank of Spain possesses a large metallic fund which the government could and would seize upon in such emergency, in imitation of what Great Britain did in wars of the French Revolution.

"2d. There is really much wealth in the country, and it would be drawn forth in a war with the United States. Patriotic gifts would come in, forced loans would be submitted to, and the domestic capitalists would more freely advance to the government.

"3d. Spain might recur to forms of credit which all other nations resort to in the last necessity, as we ourselves did in the legal-tender act. The process would begin with indefinite issue of bills of the Bank of Spain in the whole country, instead of, as now, in the province of Madrid alone; and would extend to the issue of treasury notes or certificates. To be sure, such action would speedily raise the price of gold, but not to a higher point than it reached with us in similar circumstances.

"Meanwhile, the augmented circulation would serve, as it did with us, to prompt new enterprises, and thus add to the actual productive resources of



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THE QUAY, SAN JUAN, PORTO RICO. (Copyrighted, 1898, by J. M. Jordan.)

the country, not only in industries dependent on war, but in mines and in undeveloped agriculture, to the ultimate advantages of Spain.

"The Spaniards are a people preëminently sober in food and drink, economical, and enduring under privations and hardships—as you may infer from the wages of labor, which vary according to the quality from two to three or four pesetas a day, where, in the United States, similar labor would be reckoned at the same number of dollars. Hence, armies are contentedly supported here, and always have been, so cheaply as to constitute a real addition to the relative military resources of Spain. The contrast in this respect between Spanish and English soldiers struck the Duke of Wellington.

"I note these facts as being material and important in the present question. That is, we must not confide in a deficiency of financial resources standing in the way if Spain be hard pushed and stirred up to make sacrifices in case of a war with the United States.

"And the finances of Spain are not in a much worse condition than they were in the time of Charles V. and his successors of the Austrian dynasty. Great loans were rarer then than now. Spain relied much on wealthy Jews for anticipations, although Jews and Gentiles, in the matter of money lending, incurred hazards quite in proportion to the profits, as illustrated in the hardships of the Jews in Spain and the case of Jacques Cœur in France. In truth, the Fuggers of Augsburg are among the few houses of that class which remain to this day. Hence the terrible financial straits which the Philips—II., III., and IV.—were constantly suffering in Spain. Nevertheless, they sustained great wars all over the world.

"I add that, according to telegrams received from Havana, the mission of Mr. Rubi has already produced important results, so that he is able to make assurance of having equalized the revenue and the expenditures and of undertaking to pay regularly all current obligations after the 1st of January.

"I have, etc.,—

C. CUSHING."

Of this it is now to be remarked that Spain has exhausted all these resources, and if it is the opinion of that country that the honor of the nation is saved, there should be no disputation of that consolation.

Mr. Cushing reports his interview with the Spanish Minister of State on November 30th, saying, "A little to my surprise, he took the whole matter very coolly," notwithstanding possible "intervention" was expressly mentioned. The Minister of State said Spain was not in a hurry to go to war

with the United States, and was assured the United States was not in a hurry to go to war with Spain. In his remarks to the Spanish Minister of State, Mr. Cushing said: "In the hope that the contents of the Spanish note may be satisfactory, the President desists from the concrete purpose expressed in the dispatch of the 5th and substitutes a proposition which is merely expectant. Meanwhile, I am charged in the first place to explain to you confidentially what will be the actual text of the message. The President will discountenance the concession of the recognition of either independence or belligerence to the insurgents of Cuba; he will allude to the injuries inflicted upon the United States and on their citizens by the prolonged struggle in Cuba, and the absence as yet of clear indications of its termination; he will intimate, as an ulterior necessity, intervention, unless positive results be soon reached, but he will abstain from advising it at present.

"I am instructed to deliver to you a copy of the said dispatch of the 5th instant, written before the delivery to me of the Spanish note, and, as is to be supposed, without knowledge of the intention of the government of His Majesty.

"This dispatch is not conceived in any minatory sense, but on the contrary, in a spirit of friendship, as a notice of a pressing necessity, which may force the President in given circumstances from which he desires to save himself and desires Spain to aid him in escaping them."

This is an entertaining example of Mr. Cushing's views for obeying the letter of his instructions, and imparting to his conversation a spirit of conciliation in contradiction of the administration of the State Department. He certainly succeeded in conveying the intimation of intervention, and the fact of the impatience of President Grant, in terms so gentle that there was no agitation. Mr. Cushing knew well the current ideas of the Spaniards, their understanding that they had a navy superior to ours in the seventies, and the ultimate capacity of the government to find money for war purposes, but there had not been within the range of his observation any experience that would warrant the anticipation of public opinion on the Peninsula for giving up the distant colonies. But with all his versatile astuteness, Mr. Cushing could send this effusive telegram:

"Madrid, December 4, 1875.—Brief important interview with Minister of State. He takes office solely in the hope of settlement with us; has carefully read your 266; admits our grievances; is opposed in principle to sequestra-

tion of property of foreigners; condemns the delays of redress; will take up and promptly settle each case; will remove all cause of complaint as to treaty; reprobates conduct of local authorities in Cuba as more injurious to Spain than to the United States. CUSHING."

The filibuster opinion that President Grant and his Cabinet were guilty of a conservation touching closely timidity toward the Spaniards for their misdemeanors in Cuba, has had such free course that it has in some degree affected the popular intelligence and caused discoloration and distortion of affairs. The truth is President Grant did not respect the style of war-making of the champions of the Cuban cause with whom he came in contact. He understood perfectly that it was the policy of the insurgents in Cuba to cause by any means war between the United States and Spain and repay this country with a supercilious show of gratitude—the leaders in the war out of the island to assume the prerogatives and largely resume the methods of the peninsular Spaniards, so that the difference between the government overthrown and that established would be the sort of reform the fox referred to when he asked that the old swarm of fleas be allowed to remain, for the fresh ones would be the greater bloodsuckers. The filibuster expeditions were arranged and expected to cause the United States to rush into war. The demand for belligerent rights was expressly to increase the chances of conflict. This story is a generation old. It has been duplicated within recent years, and the game was being played with ever augmenting audacity, when the catastrophe of the *Maine* influenced public opinion and the hour struck for the settlement long deferred. The demand that the *Maine* should be sent to the harbor of Havana was started by those who hoped something would happen to make trouble, and the Spaniards, infatuated with their own animosities and verbose imbecility, played to the hand of the insurgents, for the lapse of time had taught them folly only; and when some of them were able to comprehend the power of the United States they thought of two things—the very small army of this country, the inefficiency of our military systems for the speedy mustering of our strength in the field, the deficiency of our docks for handling war ships and the slight our demagogues had put upon both army and navy. Our immense reserve of public spirit was not at all comprehended. The Spaniards had deceived themselves as to our character. They really believed we were not a warlike people. They forgot that we had taken grand lessons of war in fighting each other—had kept for four years an unparalleled war

school. Of course, there were Spaniards not so stupid as to suppose we should be unable to get upon our feet, with old boys enough to teach the young ones—but Spain felt herself after all her experiences of ill-fortune a great European power, and had faith that we would be called to account by the same combination of monarchs that throttled poor Greece, while Turkey reduced the plethora of the Greeks by blood-letting. The difference between life and death in nations was not appreciated by the moribund. The Spaniards read in the modern diplomatic history of their country, took courage from the attitude of the great monarchies when President Grant had them sounded as to “intervention” by the United States in the affairs of Cuba. Then none were pronounced in our favor, and the whole trend of monarchial opinion was against our policy, which, though well guarded in civil language, meant that the young American giant was ascertaining his strength, and proposing, perhaps deeply innocent but probably after meditation, the disturbance of the old scales in which the balance of power, understood to be the higher law of the military nations, had been adjusted. Only the very well informed in this country had a realizing sense of the persistent push of the purpose of intervention in Cuba if peace was not restored that took place in our centennial year. That was the epoch in which we were incomparably engaged in celebrating ourselves and at the same time the State Department was hard at work, and the courts of Europe incessantly but quietly advised of our tendencies to put forth our hands and stop the desolation of the noblest of American islands lying in a commercial and military sense at the mouth of the Mississippi, whose valley is the heart of America. The Spaniards wanted to know whether we would interfere for or against the insurgents, who no more then than now had commanded the admiration of competent witnesses, and deserved a good deal of what Mr. Cushing said of them, because they and their peninsular Spaniards had so many faults in common. How very much this article from the *Evening Standard of London*, January 29, 1876, reads as if it might have appeared two years instead of twenty-two years ago:

“The Cuban insurrection is as long-lived as the Carlist revolt. There is no calculating the amount of blood and treasure which have been drawn from the mother country to restore quiet to the island within the past few years. Reinforcements of troops have been sent periodically from Cadiz and Santander, not a tithe of whom will ever see Spain again; captain-general succeeds captain-general with the regularity of clockwork, and notwithstanding

the end never is, but always to be. The insurgents are beaten on the average twice a month, yet somehow they always turn up in excellent health and spirits as if they thrived on repeated defeat. It is very difficult to get at the truth about Cuba; but one prediction may be made with safety: As long as Don Carlos parades Navarre and the Vascongadas, the pacification of Cuba will be adjourned. No Spaniard with the spirit of a true hidalgo will allow for a moment in public controversy that his country can part with the island, and yet there is scarcely one traveled and educated Spaniard, we venture to affirm, who will not admit in the intimacy of private conversation that his country can not hold the island."

The London Times, of January 26th, said:

"In Europe at least there will be a tendency to do injustice to Mr. Fish's indictment of Spain, precisely for the reason which may render it effective among his own countrymen. When American diplomacy states a complaint, it usually makes a large call on those general terms of invective which please half-educated readers, but shock the taste and rouse the suspicions of the more fastidious students.

"Critical minds are apt to fancy that the rhetoric has been framed for the purpose of touching the Americans themselves, and when they mentally translate it into scholarly English they tend to cut away much of the truth as well as to improve the style. We speak the more frankly because Mr. Fish seeks to obtain the moral support of European countries in his contest with the Spanish Minister of foreign affairs respecting the civil war in Cuba. He would, we assure him, have been much more effective if he had given specific examples of the wrongs or hardships suffered by his countrymen and left his readers to supply general phrases of indictment. Nevertheless, there need be no doubt that his charges are substantially just, and the truth itself so grave as to need little ornament from rhetoric.

"In Cuba Spain owns one of the fairest and most fertile islands in the world, and it has been detestably misgoverned. While we have allowed our colonies to rule themselves in their own way, Spain has persisted in keeping Cuba in the same state of tutelage as when she herself was the greatest power in the world, and when the very idea of colonial rights had scarcely arisen. The island has been dependent on the will of a government changed every few years by a pronunciamiento or a popular revolution. It has been used as a place of honorable banishment for unruly soldiers. The dangerous spirits

of the army have been sent to Cuba to be kept out of mischief, and they have let loose in the colony the temper which had been found perilous at home. Freed from responsibility, they have often displayed a repetition of that domineering spirit, that contempt of the rights of others, and that cruelty which once added dark chapters to the history of the Spanish conquest. The slaughter of the crew of the *Virginius* was an act which would have been quite natural three centuries ago, but which, when committed in our time, seems wonderful on account of its folly as well as of its atrocity. If the author of such a deed had been an Englishman, he would assuredly have been hung; yet he is still at liberty, and we believe he has still some kind of command.

"We cannot wonder that Mr. Fish, who speaks for a people as proud in their own way as the Spaniards and immeasurably more powerful, should peremptorily demand the trial of General Burriel. America has also many other causes of complaint. Her citizens owned much property in Cuba, and a great deal of it has been confiscated by the Spanish government. Restitution has been promised and evaded."

It is amusing to note the *London Times* giving lessons in English to the Honorable Hamilton Fish. The *Times* had to say, January, 1876, further:

"If the documents just presented to Congress are serious at all, they are most important documents, and we incline, after making every allowance for the necessities and peculiarities of President Grant's position, to believe that they are more serious than is generally imagined. It is perfectly possible that General Grant has decided in his own mind that he will not quit office without inflicting punishment on Spain, and that he has renewed his complaints with an intention of making them heard, and that he is now deliberately warning Congress, the American people, and the European States that he means to have either redress or war.

"He may be trifling with the world, but it is much more probable that he is not; and if he is not he is taking precisely the steps European diplomatists would expect. He is demanding definitely and distinctly a just thing, the trial of General Burriel, which the Spanish government cannot, without risking a collision with the volunteers, concede, except on paper. He is telling Madrid in the plainest words he can use that unless he can obtain redress he shall propose to resort to force.

"It seems to us that to imagine President Grant, with a Democratic majority in the House of Representatives, a great Spanish fleet in the harbor

of Habana, and the Presidential convention almost at hand, is doing all this in order to court a slap in the face from Madrid, a slap which, unresented, would send him on his retirement into a discredited obscurity, is almost absurd; and if he is in earnest the situation is most serious. It is all very well to talk of the American Constitution and the Democratic majority and the absence of material preparations in the United States. The President can order any movement, either of fleet or army, that he pleases. The Spaniards are in no humor to bear interference, and if they defy the Union neither Democrats nor Republicans will remember party squabbles. They might refuse the President his third term, and might be ready to hang him, but they would plunge into war with none the less fierceness and carry it on with none the less decision."

This is a character sketch not quite friendly, but written after some studies that did not lead to total darkness.

Mr. George H. Boker, Minister to Russia, wrote from St. Petersburg, January, 1875, that Prince Gortchakoff was warmly sympathetic with the United States, and seemed surprised at the patience and the forbearance with which our government had acted, not only toward the government of Spain, but toward the more easily approached provincial authorities of Cuba. He said, significantly, that history does not show us that this has been the usual conduct of strong powers toward weaker ones. He commended the reluctance which the government of the United States seemed to feel in proceeding to serious measures with a country in the distracted condition of Spain, and he said that this last act, the laying of the question before the great powers for their consideration and possible action, was a display of candor and of magnanimity on our part that was almost without precedent in international affairs, and the prince was good enough to say it set forever at rest the report that the United States "had views of territorial extension in the direction of Cuba." And Gortchakoff told Boker that the course of Spain would depend altogether upon the action of the British government, and the representations which might be made by it at the court of Madrid, regarding the unsatisfactory relations between the United States and Spain. He said that the combined influence of all the other powers was not equal to that of Great Britain with the Spanish government.

The Hon. George P. Marsh had a full conversation at Rome in December, 1875, with Mr. Visconti Venosta, and stated that "the editorial

tone of many journals in the United States, and that of many articles in journals not professedly advocating the annexation, was prompted by fraudulently naturalized Cubans, refugees, and other persons interested in severing the connection between Spain and Cuba; that I knew no reason to think that the general population of the United States, still less the more enlightened and patriotic classes, desired the possession of the island." And Mr. Marsh referred, by way of illustration, to the pretense of French, and to some extent of Italian, journals that the intervention of the Emperor Napoleon III. in Mexico was rendered necessary by the ambitious views of the United States in regard to territorial extension, and pointed out that "after the capture of the City of Mexico by General Scott we were virtually in possession of the whole country, and could have retained it if we had so desired, but that we voluntarily surrendered it, retaining only California, and some other territory then thought to possess little value, and paying to Mexico a large sum as an indemnity." The painstaking of Mr. Marsh to free Americans from the charge of wanting more land seems to show that gentleman to have been more amiable in his sentiments than accurate in his observations.





CHAPTER V.

The Duty of Fair Play to the Spaniards of the Peninsula and of Cuba.

Some Testimony That is Not Partial to Cuban Insurgents—Caleb Cushing on Inherent Spanish Character—More Than One Kind of Our Naturalized Citizens—A List of Them and of Claims—Conflicting Testimony as to Cuban Armies—Two Picturesque Witnesses.

There is no duty plainer in writing the story of the conflict between the United States and Spain than that of showing fair play to the people who were so signally discomfited, and whose weaknesses have been uncovered by war. The Hon. Caleb Cushing had the lawyer's accomplishment of stating a case for friend or foe with little reference to personal judgment, and he always presented the facts that were the frame of his argument with a vividness peculiarly his own. In April, 1876, he took occasion to say, in the course of his correspondence with the State Department, that "all our troubles with Spain have been incidents of the delirium tremens of anarchy and revolution which seized upon her in 1868, involving civil war in Cuba, in the northern provinces, indeed all over the peninsula." Mr. Cushing proceeded to say that all Madrid believed that "faulty as has been the administration of Spain in Cuba, most of the maladministration has been the logical effect of the factious, ungovernable, and traitorous spirit and conduct of the Cubans themselves, rebellious, as all Spaniards are prone to be, by their hereditary national character." Beyond this it was alleged that "no repressive measures would ever have been adopted in Cuba but for the frequent rebellions or attempted rebellions there in times of complete order, tranquillity, and prosperity, as in 1823, 1829, 1837, and 1854, including the infamous acts of Narciso Lopez in twice recruiting armed foreign adventurers to invade the island, the worst of all forms of treason." This, however, is not the judicial department of the kind of which Mr. Cushing is speaking, but is the presenta-

tion of one side—that which was bitterly wrong—by one who was for the moment the passionate advocate of those whose case he was stating. In the next paragraph Mr. Cushing says all Americans bear witness, after seeing both Cubans and Spaniards that “Cubans are Spaniards, with all the faults of Spaniards in aggravated degree; and whereas discontent is the habit in Spain, and violence the ordinary manifestation of discontent—whereas in Spain opposition parties systematically pursue the practice of quarreling with any and all governments, however well-intentioned these may be, and deliberately provoking measures of repression in order to have pretext to declaim against oppression and tyranny—so the Spaniards say it always has been in Cuba.” Herein, however, Mr. Cushing loses sight of the teachings of American history. What he says of the excessive faults of the Cubans, would have applicability and would not be quickly and confidently contested, if the Spaniards had not been troubled in other colonies the same as in Cuba. The Cubans are Spaniards as the Mexicans, Peruvians, Chilians, and the rest of the free and independent States of what was once Spanish America were—but it was not the delirium tremens of 1868 that moved Mexico, Bolivia, Argentina, and all the rest of the American Spanish to rise up against the Spaniards of the peninsula. The methods of Cuban rebellions were disagreeable in the extreme, especially when they followed the examples of the ways and means of Spanish repression. We believe it to be true that the Spaniards thought it a justifiable act of war to fire the cane fields of Cubans known to be against the perpetuity of Spanish rule in the island, before Gomez carried the torch through the provinces of Matanzas, Havana and Pinar del Rio. Mr. Cushing drew a picture of the state of Spanish politics in a letter reviewing the debate in the Cortes on the address to the king, saying it mainly consisted of easy exhibition of the inconsistencies, the errors and the crimes, the tergiversations, pronunciamientos, treasons, and insurrections of which all parties have heretofore been guilty, as, one after the other, they attained the giddy heights of political power, or sank into the depths of angry, impatient, and factious opposition. In these mutual recriminations of parties, in this general settlement of political account between successive governments and administrations—which has only served to show that all of them, as they rose, ascended on the ruins of their country, and, as they fell, left behind a deplorable deficit of wisdom and usefulness to the debit of each—the home government of Spain passed through all the disorders of the dissolution of

greedy and corrupt tyranny and in the colonial wars following the Napoleonic occupation. The one binding tie in the peninsula became the oppression of the American Spaniards. Hence, at last, the chaos Cushing sketches, and out of a series of revolutions came an horrible confusion of cruelties.

In a general review of the diplomatic situation in Europe, written in March, 1876, Mr. Cushing closed:

"I stand behind the players here and see the cards they are playing. It is not our game. We can do much with Spain, but it will have to be done on our own ground. We have no cause, in my belief, to expect aid from the European Powers, not even from Great Britain. The problem rather is to work out our own policy in such way as to avoid obstructions on the part of those powers."

It was in 1878 that the Spaniards came to the conclusion, as the insurrection had lasted ten years, and one hundred thousand regular soldiers could not overcome it by force, that the rebels might be heard as to terms of peace without giving up their arms, and the result was the peace of Zanjón, negotiated with the insurgent leaders by Martínez Campos. The latest and last of the insurrections against the rule of the Spaniards broke out in February, 1895. In the twenty years before the United States and Spain found themselves at war, there had been in Cuba over thirteen years' warfare and less than seven of the comparative reduction of flagrant disorders characterized as peace. Martínez Campos was regarded as the great military chieftain of Spain, and his countrymen did not care to inquire too particularly into the preliminaries to the peace of Zanjón. He was commissioned as soon as the war broke out afresh in February, 1895, to put down the rebellion, and heavy masses of troops were hurried from the peninsula to the island. The old field marshal of Spain began his work with an appearance of confidence and exceptional vigor. It was soon ascertained that the spirit of the insurgents was more implacable than ever—that they had larger forces and better equipments, and were more resolute and desperate than on former occasions—while Campos was in the field there was sharp skirmishing—indeed, some of the fighting was the most severe that ever occurred in the island, until the American army moved upon Santiago. Campos made a strenuous effort to confine the scenes of warfare to the three eastern provinces, as had been the case from 1868 to 1878, but Gómez had a large following, horses were abundant, sugar carts numerous, and there was food in the pastures and fruity forests.

He did the unexpected thing moving west, and succeeded in opening new regions for devastation. Campos, with the utmost use of steamers and railways, and his superior forces, could not check the adventurous rush of the swarm with Gomez, whose right arm was the indomitable Antonio Maceo. The Spaniards were exasperated by their failures, and furious that the rebels had broken all bounds and records. The flood marks of rebellion were wider and higher than in the ten years; and then Campos was not killing prisoners in satisfactory numbers. He was attempting to carry on war according to the usages of civilization, and that was not the way the Spaniards desired to make peace. The prestige of the soldier faded rapidly, and there were fierce demands from the volunteers, of whom there were eleven regiments in Havana alone, for more bloodshed, not in battle, but in executions. A change was called for both in Madrid and Havana. Campos was recalled, and General Weyler designated for the vacancy, Ex-Captain-General Marin serving ad interim. The news of Weyler's appointment filled the Cubans with horror, and at once the steamers for all ports on the Gulf, and for Key West, Savannah, Charleston and New York, were crowded with fugitives. Weyler was already a man of terrible reputation. He had been in the ten years' war a lieutenant-colonel in charge of a Spanish column, distinguished for the personal havoc that was committed in its marches. He was boastful of his body-guard of black men, and always ready to receive men of color in camp or in the palace. He was alternatively claimed as and accused of being a Republican! There were many stories of his personal participation in outrages of an incredible nature, not a few of them physically impracticable. It is in this sort of fiendish romance that Spaniards and Cubans revel, as the only adequate expression of their astonishing animosities. The evil most keenly anticipated by the Cuban sympathizers in Havana from Weyler was that he would issue decrees ordering and commanding all business men to show their colors—to be explicitly for or against Spain in Cuba, and condone evasions only upon spending their fortunes in bribes rather than awaiting the more summary processes of execution and confiscation. Life and fortune might be preserved for a time by this giving up everything on the installment plan. The Cuban ladies were shocked by the very name of Weyler, saying there was no safety where he was for the innocent. There was a panic, and when Weyler was announced at Porto Rico, there was wild haste to get away to Yucatan, Venezuela, Mexico, or the United States. There was reported a

blood league among the Cubans, the purpose being the assassination of the new captain-general the moment he set foot on the soil of Cuba. He was duly warned but unmolested, and his safety was accounted for by the representation that those who had sworn to sacrifice themselves that the monster should die, were convinced that such an act as the murder of a captain-general would be injurious to the Cuban cause, and that the better way was to stand well with sympathetic public sentiment.

There was little time lost in the development of General Weyler's policy. It was rigorous and remorseless. He denied for a time the charges of cruelty, protested that he did not approve as many executions as Campos had done. His proceeding did not vary much from the regular course of Spanish suppression of rebellion, but never before had the system of the Spaniards in pacificating colonies been exhibited to the world in so strong a light. As the line was drawn between those true and false to the peninsular Spaniard, it became evident that the people of Cuba were almost unanimously against Spain. On the side of the peninsula were the Spanish army and navy, the swarms of office holders, and their subordinates, the volunteers given the situations that should be occupied by the Cubans, the contractors and all business men who made money out of the war—the officials of all descriptions, the sycophants of power, and those still striving by complacency to avoid the rugged issues of responsibility. The Spanish army was so numerous that garrisons were in all the considerable towns, and there were thousands of little forts; and some sugar plantations were paying taxes and assessments to Weyler and Gomez alike. The people at large outside the fortified lines were against Spain, with few exceptions. Weyler could not get information about the movements of insurgents, but there was not a Spanish column in motion, that was not signaled. The stones in the road and the trees by the wayside told from day to day of all Spanish activity. There was not a country store, not a magazine for the rebellion—not a swift pony or a fat pig, a drove of cattle or sheep, a tree full of fruit, or a potato patch, that was not contraband of war. The country houses and villages that the insurgents spared were fired by the Spaniards, and the massacre of domestic animals and destruction of food supplies of all kinds, made way for famine. It was the Spanish policy to make the country untenable by bodies of hostile irregulars.

The peasantry were not allowed to till the fields, and this was the answer to the rebel burning of cane and tobacco. As the Cubans at large gave the

news of Spaniards moving about, the country people were concentrated under the supervision of the regular garrisons. On both sides the conduct of the war forced this result, and due accountability was not admitted by either. Those who were wild for war between the United States and Spain found fault with the Spaniards alone, and the first material undertaking in the war by our country for humanity was in sending food to those perishing by starvation and medicine to those wasted by the plague of fever. It was plain to all observers that after all the sacrifices the Spaniards had made for Cuba they would conquer the island only by the annihilation of the elements of the prosperity that once had remarkable celebrity. Weyler's greatest military effort was to pen Maceo in the west end, by a fortified line—trocha—twenty-one miles long, the narrowest part of the island. Maceo broke through just before his death, but when he was gone the western province was generally quieted. There were the accustomed bulletins about the achievements of the successors of Maceo, but there were none who answered that description. The sheer weight of the Spanish columns was felt by their antagonists and the strength of the rebellion had largely declined, though holding a great deal of territory. There were symptoms of exhaustion all around, but on "Horror's head horrors" accumulated. That the insurgents took a part in forcing these dreadful issues is certain—for the devastation of plantations for five hundred miles was the visible sign of the memorable campaign of Gomez, the Dominican Commander-in-Chief. The Spanish government, March 1, 1897, addressed to the Hon. Hannis Taylor, the American Minister, a communication of explanation of the arrest of certain alleged citizens of the United States captured and taken to Santiago de Cuba, suspected of being American spies. When released they each claimed damages in the sum of ten thousand dollars. The defense was that the arrest of these people was not for landing in Cuba, but "at the beginning of a formidable insurrection," when "on every point of the coast landed large and small expeditions—arrived from several ports and shores of the Mexican Gulf. Many of those who afterwards took a part in the rebellion as chiefs, rank soldiers, and scouts, came precisely from Haiti, as is well known, using small crafts similar to that of the claimants. In no other manner did the well-known chief, Antonio Maceo, join the insurgent bands, and so great was the number of those who used this means of coming to and going from the island that I do not consider it venturesome to say that at a certain time there was a regular communication

by means of small crafts and open boats between Cuba and the Antilles and the nearest keys."

One of the most frequent irritations manipulated to increase the strain upon the relations of the United States and Spain was the arrest by Spanish authorities of naturalized American citizens. The Senate of the United States, December 21, 1896, directed a report of all naturalized citizens arrested since the breaking out of the insurrection in Cuba February 24, 1895. There were seventy-four such persons. The Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Olney, in sending the list, said:

"Passports, certificates of naturalization, registration in the consulates of this government on the island of Cuba, and service on ships sailing under the flag of the United States, having been alike accepted by our consular officers and the Spanish authorities as prima facie evidence of citizenship, establishing the rights of the claimants to the treatment secured to our citizens under our treaties and protocols with Spain, it has been deemed advisable to include in the subjoined list all persons of the classes referred to who have been arrested.

"Of the 74 persons arrested, 7 have been tried, namely: Nos. 1, 36, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74. In the cases of 2 of these (Nos. 1 and 36) appeals have been taken, and in the cases of the other 5, the Competitor prisoners, a new trial has been ordered.

"Thirty-six persons arrested have been released after the charges against them had been investigated and found to be baseless.

"Eighteen have been expelled from the island, after periods of confinement lasting from a few days to nearly a year in the case of José Aguirre (No. 2); while 17 cases are still pending. The charges against 14 of the 17 are as follows:

"Nos. 31 and 35, sedition and rebellion.

"No. 38, rebellion.

"Nos. 37, 40, 61, and 62, rebellion with arms in hand.

"No. 43, purchase and concealment of arms and ammunition.

"No. 53, disorderly conduct and insults to Spain.

"Nos. 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74, landing arms from Competitor for insurgents.

"In the remaining three cases (Nos. 35, 47, and 52), the nature of the charges having not yet been ascertained, demand has been made both at Habana and Madrid that they be at once formulated and communicated, or that prisoners be released."

We present in full the list of American citizens, native and naturalized, arrested and imprisoned in Cuba since February 24, 1895, to date, stating also cause of arrest, charges, place of confinement, whether tried, released, deported, or cases pending:

1. Julio Sanguily, 49 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1878; arrested February 24, 1895; charge of rebellion; tried November 28, 1895; found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment; case appealed to supreme court, Madrid. Was also tried on charge of participation in the kidnapping of the sugar planter Fernandez de Castro, in 1894, by the late bandit, Manuel Garcia, and acquitted. Tried for the second time December 21, 1896, for rebellion, the case remanded from Spain, and again sentenced December 28 to life imprisonment; an appeal taken. Has been imprisoned in the Cabana fort.

2. José Marie Timoteo Aguirre, 52 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1881; arrested February 24, 1895; charge of rebellion; confined in Cabana fort; acquitted and deported September 6, 1895; went to the United States.

3. Francisco Peraza, arrested at Sagua, March 2, 1895; charge of participation in the robbery of some cattle; released March 4, 1895.

4. Francisco Carrillo, 45 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1891; arrested at Remedios on February 24, 1895, upon a gubernative order for not having inscribed himself in the register of foreigners in any province of the island; confined in Cabana fort; released and deported to United States May 29, 1895.

5. Juan Roderiguez Valdez, native of Cuba; naturalized 1876; arrested at Puerto Principe April 5, 1895; released April 6.

6. Justo Gener, 68 years; native of Cuba; naturalized; arrested at Matanzas April 6; released April 9, 1895.

7. José Maria Caraballo, 42 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1877; arrested at Matanzas April 6; released April 9, 1885.

8. Manuel Fuentes, 33 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1889; correspondent New York World; arrested at Caimanera April 30, 1895; released May 4, 1895, on condition that he return to United States.

9. Manuel Vargas, arrested at Remedios July 3, 1895; released and expelled July 13, 1895; charged with being an agent of the insurgents, etc.; naturalized.

10. Domingo Gonzalez y Alfonso, 42 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1876; arrested at Quivican July 3, 1895; expelled September 3, 1895, for the



GENERAL BLANCO, WHO COMMANDED SPANISH FORCES IN CUBA.



LA PERLA THEATRE IN PONCE, PORTO RICO.

reason that his presence in the island is a source of danger to the government.

11. Victoriano Bulit Perez, 33 years, native of Cuba, of American parents; arrested at Sagua July 12, 1895; accused of "proposing treasonable acts"; released November 8, 1895.

12. Joseph Ansley, 56 years; born in Habana, of American parents; arrested at Sagua August 26, 1895; charge, "presence prejudicial to peace of island"; deported to United States September 21, 1895.

13. Aurelio Ansley, 34 years; son of Joseph Ansley. Same as above.

14. Luis Ansley, 30 years; son of Joseph Ansley. Same as above.

15. John A Sowers, 65 years; native of Virginia. Same as above.

16. Carlos M. Garcia y Ruiz, 28 years; born in the United States; arrested at Sagua September 7, 1895; accused of attempting to join the insurrectionists; released October 7, 1895.

17. Jose Martinez Gonzalez, 45 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1873; arrested at Sagua September 12, 1895; charge of riding on railroad without paying fare; no evidence against him; released September 19, 1895.

18. Mariano Rodriguez Zayas, native of Cuba; arrested Habana September 17; released September 19, 1895; naturalized; no charges.

19. José Martinez Mesa, 41 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1878; arrested at Habana September 17, 1895; released September 19, 1895; no charges.

20. Eugene Pelletier, 42 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1877; arrested at Cienfuegos December 5, 1895; charged with recruiting for the insurrection; released, under surveillance, May 17, 1896.

21. Joseph J. Trelles, native of Cuba; naturalized; arrested at Matanzas December 24, 1895; released December 26, 1895; no charges.

22. Manuel M. (or W.) Amieva, 39 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1878; arrested at Matanzas December 24, 1895, as a suspect; released December 31, 1895; no charges.

23. Solomon, Chas. S., native of the United States, arrested and released.

24. Marcos E. Rodriguez, 57 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1875; arrested January 17, 1896, on board American steamship Olivette; charge, aiding the rebellion, sedition, etc.; released April 1, 1896.

25. Louis Someillan, Sr., 58 years; born in Cuba; naturalized Key

West, 1878; arrested January 17, 1896, at Habana; released April 1, 1896; charge, aiding rebellion, sedition, etc.

26. Louis Someillan, Jr., 36 years; born in Habana, son of above; arrested January 17 at Habana; released April 1, 1896; charge, aiding rebellion, sedition, etc.

27. Ladislao Quintero, born in Key West; made a prisoner of war February 22, 1896, at Guatao, where he had been wounded by Spanish troops; released April 11, 1896.

28. Walter Grant Dygert, 25 years; born in the United States; arrested February 23, 1896; imprisoned at Guines; supposed to be insurgent leader El Inglesito; finally released and sent to United States April 24, 1896.

29. Rev. Albert J. Diaz, native of Cuba; naturalized; arrested at Habana April 16, 1896, charged with forwarding rebel correspondence; confined at police headquarters; expelled April 16, 1896; accused of abetting insurrection.

30. Alfred Diaz; brother of above; arrested, same charge; both of the Diazes were released April 22, 1896, on condition of leaving the country; went to Key West.

31. Joseph L. Cepero, native of Cuba; naturalized 1881; arrested prior to January 20, 1896, on board steamer from Cienfuegos to Batabano; case now pending before civil court Santa Clara; confined in Santa Clara prison; charge, sedition, rebellion, etc.

32. Luis Martinez, arrested about March 1, 1896; charged with treasonable correspondence; released April 13, 1896, on \$400 bail; naturalized 1873.

33. William A. Glean, native of Cuba, of American parents; arrested at Sagua April, 1896; charge, rebellion; military jurisdiction inhibited in favor of civil July 28, 1896; released and returned to the United States.

34. Louis M. Glean, brother of the above; same as above.

35. Frank J. Larrieu, native of Cuba; naturalized; arrested at Cardenas May 15, 1896; case pending; charges not made known.

36. Louis Someillan, 58 years; native of Cuba; naturalized; arrested July 7, 1896, for second time; charge, aiding rebellion; turned over to civil courts, is confined in city prison; trial held January 8, 1897; sentenced January 13 to imprisonment in chains for life; appeal taken.

37. Manuel Fernandez Chaqueilo, 19 years; native of Key West; captured July 9, 1896; was the companion of Charles Govin; is in Cabana fort;

case pending, under military jurisdiction; charge, "rebellion with arms in hand."

38. George W. Aguirre, 25 years; born in the United States; captured by a Spanish gunboat July 10, 1896; case pending before civil court of Jaruco; confined in Cabana fort; charge of rebellion.

39. Samuel T. Tolon, 45 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1878; arrested on board American steamer Seneca September 3, 1896; incommunicado twenty-two days; charged with being a delegate to the Cuban Junta; released and deported September 30, 1896; went to New York.

40. Oscar Cespedes, 20 years; native of Key West; captured without arms in insurgent hospital near Zapata swamp about September 5, 1896; imprisoned at San Severino fort, Matanzas; question of competency between military and civil jurisdiction decided in favor of military; case pending.

41. Francisco E. Cazanias, arrested as suspect at Matanzas October 14, 1896; released October 16, 1896.

42. Alfredo Hernandez, 44 years; native of Matanzas; naturalized 1876; arrested at his house at Habana September 6, 1896; suspicion of being concerned in the insurrection; expelled September 23, 1896; went to Key West.

43. Antonio Saurez Del Villar, native of Cuba; naturalized; arrested at Cienfuegos September 5, 1896; charged with purchase and concealing of arms and ammunition; case sent to civil jurisdiction December 23, 1896; in prison at Cienfuegos; case pending.

44. José Curbino, native of Cuba; naturalized; arrested at Rincon, September 18, 1896; surrendered to military authorities without arms; released and is residing at Santiago de las Vegas.

45. Joseph Austin Munoz, native of New Orleans; arrested at Matanzas September 18, 1896; released September 19; claimed that arrest was by mistake.

46. Ramon Rodriguez, native of Cuba; naturalized; arrested September 20, 1896, upon requisition from governor of Matanzas; had been in insurrection; surrendered and failed to report regularly; sent to Cardena and released.

47. Esteben Venero, 22 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1895; arrested at Los Palos (Habana province) about September 22, 1896; charges not stated; Captain-General asked for evidence of American citizenship on December 9, which was sent him; case pending cognizance of military or civil jurisdiction.

48. Adolfo Torres, native of Cuba; naturalized; arrested October 4, at Sagua; charges not stated; release ordered November 23, 1896, question of competency not established; released November 26, officer remarking, "We have no charges against you."

49. Esteben Cespedes (colored), born in Cuba; naturalized Key West, 1891; arrested October 13, 1896, charged with naniguismo (voodoo); expelled November 7, and went to Key West.

50. Ramon Cruet, 48 years; born in Cuba; naturalized 1873; arrested in Colon November 1, 1896; charges, public censure of acts of Spanish government; released December 18, 1896; no grounds of complaint.

51. Louis Lay, 18 years; native of Cuba, of American parents; arrested November 9, 1896, during a raid upon a social club in Regla; confined in Cabana fort; case ordered to be transferred to civil court at Guanabacoa, December 23; charges, aiding rebellion. Released January 15, 1897.

52. José Gonzalez, 63 years; native of Bejucal, Cuba; naturalized 1882; arrested at Las Mangas November 10, 1896, taken to prison at Pinar del Rio; charges not yet made known to consulate-general, Habana.

53. Theodore L. Vives, native of Cienfuegos; naturalized 1891; arrested November 19, 1896; charges, first disorderly conduct and then insults to Spain; case pending cognizance of military or civil jurisdiction; is confined in jail.

54. Henry J. Delgado, native of the United States; captured about December 10, 1896, at an insurgent hospital in Pinar del Rio province, after having been ten weeks in a hut sick; sent to Havana to Cabana fort; removed to hospital December 28, 1896, where, our consul-general reports, he received best medical attention; died in hospital January 19, 1897.

55. Gaspar A. Betancourt, 63 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1877; arrested December 26, 1896, confined at police headquarters incommunicado, charged with sedition.

56. Fernando Pino Hernandez, 19 years (colored); native of Key West, charged with naniguismo (voodoo); ordered to be expelled December 30, 1896; will be sent to Key West.

57. Amado Pino Hernandez, 21 years; brother of the above; same as above.

58. José Antonio Iznaga, native of Cuba; naturalized; expelled in August, 1896; no report.

59. August Bolton, naturalized 1893.



A PICKET SQUAD OF CUBAN SOLDIERS.



GENERAL CASTELLIO AND STAFF.



PLAZA IN SANTIAGO, CUBA.



GROUP OF NATIVE WOMEN IN PONCE, PORTO RICO.

60. Gustave Richelieu, naturalized 1870; taken in a boat near Santiago de Cuba about February 23, 1896; released from prison about March 1, 1896; subsequently rearrested and recommitted for leaving Guantanamo without permission; consul considers second arrest an excuse for detention; release granted shortly after.

61. Frank Agramont, and 62, Thos. Julio Sainz, arrested with arms in their hands, May, 1895; charge, rebellion; to be tried for armed insurrection against the government; Santiago de Cuba.

63. John D. Ferrer, no evidence against him; released March 23, 1896; naturalized at New York, 1878.

64. Pedro Duarte; 65, Jorge Calvar, and 66, Ramon Romagosa, arrested at Manzanillo for alleged conspiracy in insurrection; expelled August 11, 1896.

It will be noted that there was a strong tendency displayed by naturalized citizens, whose names did not themselves declare American ancestry, to participate in the contested affairs of Cuba. In the case of the men who crossed from Haiti to Cuba in a fishing boat, they obtained able counsel, and we find it stated respecting the Spaniards, by this gentleman in a letter to the State Department:

“The euphuistic palaver and the circumambient correspondence of the Spanish authorities thinly veils a deliberate purpose to advisedly disregard these obligations.”

This language of the counsel of naturalized citizens, it may be observed, while possibly circumambient, is not cast in the circumlocution molds of the curved palaver of stately diplomacy.

The claims stacked in the State Department, brought before the Senate in January, 1897, were in the order following:

August Bolten, arrest and imprisonment	\$ 10,000.00
John D. Ferrer, arrest and imprisonment	25,000.00
Mrs. C. J. Diaz de Clarke, property losses	116,335.00
John F. Java, property losses	90,585.00
José Ignacio Toscano, property losses	15,000.00
Pedro Plutarco Ortiz, property losses	84,000.00
F. J. Cazanás, property losses	39,843.00
José G. and José M. Delgado, property losses	178,534.00
José Antonio Iznaga, property losses	156,500.00
Ricardo Machado, property losses	64,900.00

Francisco Seiglie, property losses	\$778,510.00
José Rafael de les Reyes y Garcia and wife, property losses	729,161.00
Frederick P. Montes, property losses	160,000.00
George L. Lay, property losses	value of horse
Andres L. Terry, property losses	334,905.00
John A. Sowers, arrest, imprisonment, and expulsion	200,000.00
Perfecto Lacosti, property losses	652,900.00
Wm. A. and Louis M. Glean, imprisonment	150,000.00
Wm. A. Glean, property losses	4,668.00
Louis M. Glean, property losses	7,547.00
Whiting & Co., property losses	60,240.00
Mrs. A. L. Whiting, property losses	17,000.00
J. B. Carillo de Albornoz, property losses	36,000.00
Ignacio Larrondo, property losses	129,472.38
Cristobal N. Madan, property losses and personal injuries	88,000.00
Antonio A. Martinez, property losses	35,000.00
Joaquin P. Cruz and wife, property losses	70,000.00
George W. Hyatt, property losses	285,490.54
Manuel A. R. Morales, property losses	275,000.00
Peter Dominguez, expulsion	10,000.00
Teresa Joerg, property losses	2,500.00
James A. Glean, property losses	28,425.00
Peter S. Rodriguez, property losses	40,796.00
Antonio M. Jimenez, property losses	19,158.45
Pedro C. Casanova, property losses	40,400.00
Pedro C. Casanova, personal injuries	40,000.00
Walter G. Dygert, arrest and imprisonment	100,000.00
Frederick A. Libbey, property losses	23,166.00
José M. Caraballo, property losses	90,470.00
José M. Caraballo, arrest, imprisonment, etc.	60,000.00
Angel Gronlier, property losses	34,779.00
Albert V. de Goicouria, property losses	130,000.00
Rosa A. Maragliano, property losses	30,000.00
Juana M. C. de Maragliano	25,000.00
J. de Armas y Armas, property losses	69,525.00
Maximo M. Diaz, property losses	10,000.00

Wm. W. Gay, expulsion	\$ 25,000.00
Thomas R. Dawley, arrest, imprisonment, etc.	100,000.00
George Fortier, property losses	32,450.00
L. F. Marejon y Marquez, property losses	15,000.00
Wm. G. Thorne, property losses	25,000.00
M. D. J. Garcia y Pino, executrix, etc., property losses	200,000.00
Manuel Prieto, property losses	58,850.00
Gustave Richelieu, imprisonment	a fair indemnity
Miguel de la Vega y Gener, property losses	71,683.00
J. Sanchez y Coba, property losses	16,290.00
F. J. Terry y Dorticas, property losses	202,952.50
J. C. de Albornoz O'Farrill, property losses	106,105.49
A. C. de Albornoz O'Farrill, property losses	130,703.12
Heine Safety Boiler Co., property losses	27,316.80
R. M. y de la Cruz, property losses	not stated
Francisco Rionda (Central Tuinucu Sugar Cane Manufacturing Co.), property losses	527,480.20
Charles Rosa, property losses	882,840.00
Rabel & Co., property losses	75,785.00
Joseph M. Duenos, property losses	15,000.00
P. P. de Leon, property losses	379,000.00
J. F. de Cossio, property losses	20,000.00
Peter E. Rivery, personal injuries	suitable indemnity
Samuel T. Tolon, personal injuries	50,000.00
Samuel T. Tolon, property losses	100,000.00
Adolphus Torres, imprisonment	25,000.00
A. L. Terry y Dorticos and A. E. Terry, property losses	81,888.00
A. E. Terry, property losses	110,500.00
Frederick L. Craycraft, personal injuries	25,000.00
Thomas E. Rodriguez, property losses, banishment, etc.	61,000.00
Oscar Giguel, property losses	100,000.00
José Tur, property losses	251,500.00
Adolfo Santa Maria, property losses	120,803.32
Enrequita Santa Maria, property losses	94,953.32
Joseph M. Fernandez, property losses	61,115.61
George Becket, property losses	75,000.00

Manuel F. Lopez, killing of son, S. N. Lopez	\$100,000.00
Adolfo Torres, arrest and imprisonment	25,000.00

There was a great deal of Cuban investigation by committees of Congress, the object of which seemed to be to persuade the American people that American captives were subjected to indignities that must be compensated, and to celebrate the glories of the armies of the rebellion. In truth, there were several kinds of American citizens, and a large assortment of insurgents; and any resinous wood that could be thrown where it would flame for war was welcome and pitched on the fire. The American people need first of all for their own sake, to sift the truth about the Cuban people, and see how many of those who were so rapid to be naturalized citizens before the war are faithful Americans after the war; and to what extent the Cuban Republic, as it was magnified by the mysteries around it in the war, may claim that they have acquired title to the country, for which they speak with and of authority. As to the number of troops in the field for Cuba, Mr. Frederick W. Lawrence, May 20, 1896, said: "Generals Gomez and Maceo have now under their command in the neighborhood of 100,000 men, whose numbers would be very largely increased if the men who desire to form them could pass through the Spanish lines." The imagination of Mr. Lawrence must have been profoundly affected. He said: "General Gomez, with nearly 30,000 men, is marching westward, and has reached a point in Matanzas close enough to the city of Havana to cause great trepidation." This was a dream. Gomez never had one-half of 30,000 men, and at this time was not marching westward, and there was no trepidation at Havana about him. Mr. Lawrence thought Havana could be taken easily, and added: "In the opinion of military men whom I have seen, defenses of Habana are totally inadequate to protect the city from an invasion on the land side." The only protection the capital has from an attack by land are a few insignificant stockade forts erected around the outskirts and garrisoned by poorly equipped, undrilled, half starved volunteers, who, during the hours when they are off duty, may be seen in the streets of Habana asking alms of citizens, like ordinary beggars. It seems incredible that such men would succeed in holding Habana against an attack by such fighters as the Cubans under General Gomez have on more than one occasion proven themselves to be." It seems strange that an intelligent man could believe these assertions, that would be ridiculous if they had not been a part of the war whoopery that was for a time a leading feature

with our public men who wanted war in a few minutes. If Gomez had 30,000 men, what happened to them when our 18,000 all told landed and lost 1,500 men, killed, wounded and missing, in carrying Spanish positions near Santiago? Mr. Lawrence was deceived. The 30,000 troops of Gomez, the nearly 100,000 thundering at the gates of Havana, were an array of impostures, the object of which was to subordinate the United States to Cuba, and play second fiddle to Gomez with the army of the United States. We fortunately escaped from the consequences of the conspiracy of falsification, and we are indebted to the solid sense of the President for the escape. There was good fighting done with slender forces in Pinar del Rio by Maceo, but Gomez "Oriented" himself and was hors de combat. Where did he bury his 100,000 heroes, or what otherwise became of them? Mr. Lawrence was good enough to add:

"Up in the mountains the leaders of the army of the Republic have established ranches, where men are engaged in breeding and raising cattle for food purposes. The raising of vegetables is also encouraged by the Cuban commanders, and in addition to this means of subsistence they have the native food plants that grow in wild profusion all over the island.

"From this it will be readily understood that no matter how long the war should last, or how much privation they might suffer in other directions, the Republican army will never suffer dangerously from lack of food."

They did not seem to be flush of provisions when they first struck our troops in Santiago. We quote again from Mr. Lawrence:

"The Cubans have been accused of incendiarism in a criminal sense because they have destroyed sugar cane, tobacco, mills, and plantations. They insist that they should not be regarded as criminals, but that the orders which the commanders issued for the destruction of the island were justifiable war measures.

"I have personal knowledge that in a great many cases the plantations have been destroyed with the consent of the owners. In fact, a great number of owners of plantations that have been destroyed informed me personally that they had invited the Cubans to do so because they did not want to grind their cane, and thereby supply revenues to the Spanish government."

The cane-burning was barbarian, inflicting immense losses upon the Cubans, destroying the only chance they had of really providing a government.

The Rev. A. J. Diaz saw the armies of Maceo and Gomez—great crowds of men, Maceo seven or eight thousand, Gomez ten thousand, and Mr. Aguirre had an army.

“Q. Now, what class of people did that army consist of?—A. The best class of young men in Habana, generally.

“Q. Do you mean the Province of Habana?—A. No; the city.

“Q. Aguirre's command consists mostly of city boys, does it?—A. Yes, sir.

“Q. How many were there?—A. He had at that time about 2,000; that was his escort.

“Q. He had others?—A. Oh, yes. He had in the province 10,000 or 15,000 men, scattered all over the Province of Habana in different camps.

“Q. Now, what kind of people did the army of Maceo appear to be?—A. Very fine people, too; white people; doctors, lawyers, druggists.

“Q. Intelligent people?—A. Intelligent people.

By Senator Davis:

“Q. What kind of people were the private soldiers in Maceo's army?—A. Well, they have some colored people, too—many—and they have some of these intelligent people as private soldiers, a great many of them people who do not want any rank; just wanted to be soldiers, just to do that in the democratic line to encourage others.”

There are fifteen thousand city boys from Havana, eh! What happened to them? What were they doing when Blanco was fortifying the city?

Senator Morgan wanted to know how many Spanish troops were in Cuba in the May before we attacked Spain, and Dr. Diaz said:

“A. I think they have in Cuba only about 70,000 or 80,000 soldiers. I do not think they have more than that.

“Q. How many have come there since this war broke out?—A. Nearly 150,000 to 180,000.

“Q. What has become of the balance of them?—A. Well, a great many of them have been killed, and many of them have joined the rebels.

“Q. Joined the rebels?—A. A great many of them; yes, sir.”

Dr. Diaz was hard at it to make up a rebel army of about 100,000 men, but having mustered them in he has never been able to find ten per cent of them. The mighty Cuban armies had arms! We quote again from the examination of Dr. Diaz:

"Q. Do the Cubans get any arms and ammunition from the villages or people?—A. Yes; they get them from Habana.

"Q. How do they get them?—A. Exactly, I do not know the way they manage it, but I know they get all they need."

Mr. William D. Smith was once a soldier in the United States army. He was examined by Senator Morgan June 3, 1897. He joined Gomez, he says, in the midst of a battle. The Cubans lost 68 killed and 110 wounded. The Cubans dug up 180 dead Spaniards by order of Gomez, and reburied them at once. He wanted to count the dead. Mr. Smith was a gushing talker. He said:

"There were 242 engagements I have been in with General Gomez, besides little skirmishes I did not count. It is a dash and a few shots, and get out of the way where they outnumber you. There were 242 engagements where he stood his ground and camped on the ground of the Spaniards, the last engagement just a few days before I left, when General Gomez and General Weyler met for the first time.

"Q. Where was that?—A. At La Reforma.

"Q. A sugar estate?—A. No, sir; not a sugar estate; it is a cattle range; the most beautiful place, I think, in La Villias. It is General Gomez's favorite camping ground, because his son was born there.

"Q. How did the last battle wind up?—A. General Weyler withdrew the troops and went to Puerto Principe, and Gomez camped on the ground.

"Q. How many troops were engaged?—A. Gomez had 1,500, or possibly 2,000—I am trying to get this as near right as possible—I do not want to overestimate. The Spanish had 20,000 men—General Weyler had 20,000 troops with him.

"Q. 20,000 in bodies within reach of each other?—A. No, sir; 20,000 men right in the fight at one time; not in a mass, in any one body, but he had 20,000 in columns. The fighting down there requires explanation. It seems ridiculous that 1,500 men would stand and fight 20,000, but the Spaniards always march in a column of 1,000 men and one piece of artillery—one cannon. They came into Reforma in twenty different directions. The trap was being laid by General Weyler to capture General Gomez. The General was cognizant of it for two weeks, and waited for them to come. The way he fought those 20,000, he would have 100 men fight one column, and 50 men fight another column, and 100 men fight another, and 75 still another column, and so on, and he stood them off like that. I have known 10 Cubans to hold a

Spanish column of 1,000 men until General Gomez could get together his impedimenta and get out—hold them at a dead standstill. I account for it by the reason that the Spaniards thought that there was a trap, an ambushade, and they would not run into it. That is General Gomez's tactics; he has done it several times.

“Q. What is the area of that estate?—A. Between ten and twelve thousand acres.

“Q. What were the losses in the battle of La Reforma?—A. The last one?

“Q. Yes, sir.—A. The Cuban losses were 26, I think, killed, during the two days' fighting.

“Q. How many days?—A. Two days.

“Q. How many wounded?—A. The wounded it is hard to estimate. We never know the exact number wounded, because so many are wounded who do not pay any attention to it. I saw one man wounded who was shot with a Mauser bullet, which passed right through him, and we never knew anything about it for two days. That seems almost miraculous, but it is true. I suppose you have seen that Mauser bullet. The lead is covered by some metal. I can show you a wound that you would have said, if it had happened with any other cartridge, that I would have had to have an amputation. One went right through my ankle, and I was only in the hospital two hours—long enough to have it done up. The bullet does not make any fracture. I have never seen a case of amputation since I have been on the island, and it does not cause septicæmia. There is the wound [exhibiting]. The bullet entered here [pointing to his ankle], and came out there. I was never laid up a minute. The doctor in camp simply dressed it with iodoform and a little antiseptic. That is why I say it is almost impossible to give an exact account of the wounded.

“Q. About how many?—A. I should say 50 or 75.

“Q. What was the loss to the Spaniards?—A. Their loss was 180 or 185 killed, and the wounded we never know, although in getting here after leaving camp I ran across a practico—that is, a guide—and he told us he had guided General Weyler's forces across the Rio Sassa, and he got it from the soldiers that they had 300 or 400 wounded.

“Q. Weyler was in personal command on the one side and Gomez on the other at that time?—A. Yes, sir; the first time they had ever met. The New York Sun gave an account of it.




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
A DWELLING IN SANTIAGO.



EFFECT OF TORPEDO EXPLOSION IN "VIZCAYA."



5.5-INCH GUN AND CARTRIDGE ON "VIZCAYA."



THE MAJOR, HIS ADJUTANT, ORDERLY, AND WIFE.



PARTIAL VIEW OF THE ARSENAL, FACING THE BACoor, IN CAVITE.

“Q. Where did Gomez’s troops camp after that battle?—A. At Reforma, on the battlefield. He has always marched over the battlefield since I have been with him.

“Q. General Gomez is commander in chief of the Cuban army?—A. He calls himself the general in chief. The commander in chief is Cisneros Betancourt.

“Q. Under whom does he hold his commission?—A. Under the Cuban government. He has a diploma, the same as I have—I have seen it—only, of course, with different names and grades.

“Q. Do all the officers hold their commissions from the civil government?—A. Everything above a captain.

“Q. Does Gomez make report to the civil government?—A. Daily. They may not get them daily, but there is a daily report made by Gomez to the civil government. He makes them up, and every two or three days they are sent by couriers. Of course, there may be a jump of a day or two.

“Q. Does he report for his own command or entire army?—A. For the entire army.

“Q. The army, then, is divided into——?—A. Into six army corps.”

This old soldier should have been at the head of the literary bureau at Key West. Examined by Senator Morgan, he said:

“Every Cuban on the island of Cuba, unless he has run away and got under the protection of the Spanish government, is supposed to have a gun in his hand or be working for those who have a gun; and they do it with a royal good will. These men work ten hours a day; the pacificos go to the mountains and till the soil. I saw in Trinidad, where there were 15 or 20 acres on the slope of the mountains where they have cut the timber down and planted sweet potatoes, and you can kick out sweet potatoes as large as that cuspidor. I have not eaten a meal on the island without having all I wanted, and the finest honey and beef and sweet potatoes. Gomez is husbanding the beef, and I think he has enough to last time immemorial. They are only allowed to kill what is actually consumed. The same can be said of the horses; all under the control of the Cubans are in depositos. He does not allow a soldier to ride a mare, only geldings; that is in case the war is prolonged, so that they may have their horses. They systematically propagate horses, mules, and cattle.

“Q. From your knowledge of resources of Cuba and its power to produce

animal life, how long do you think that the Cuban government could sustain an army of fifty or sixty thousand men?—A. Under the plan or system they are working now, I do not know why they should not support it for ages. I know that the cattle are apparently just as many as when I went there a year ago, and more vegetables, because they have been accumulating them all the time. The civil government works at that all the time, and there are more of them than a year ago.

“Q. How are the women and children provided for?—A. Those in the interior—their husbands, the *pacificos*—the rule is: The civil government allows one man to provide food for every five women and children. These can be five women, or one woman and four children, but it allows one man to stay away from the army—or a portion of the time—one man for five women and children. That is the civil law. And they have their houses in these mountains, and they raise their pork and vegetables, and a great many of the women work in the shops where they are making clothes for the soldiers. In one portion of this shop there was a great number—I never counted them—daughters of the Cubans in the field and their wives, in there making clothes. I have seen 10,000 suits of clothes at one time, piled out there. That includes a pair of pants, a coat, and shoes.

“Q. Is the Cuban army well fed?—A. The best I ever saw in any army. I have not had a meal—and that applies to the army, when I say myself I mean all—I have not had five meals on the island—

“Q. What?—A. There have not been five meals on the island when I have not had my coffee and sugar. I say sugar; sometimes we had honey in place of the sugar—

“Q. Where is the coffee raised?—A. Certain kinds of coffee grow wild in this province of Santa Clara. In these Trinidad hills there is one vast forest of coffee, where I have seen coffee on the ground two inches thick—on the ground rotting.

“Q. Is it good coffee?—A. It is fair coffee. It is not the best coffee. Their best coffee is not the very best grade of coffee—

“Q. It makes a good, wholesome beverage?—A. Yes, sir; it is good enough, so that when the soldiers don't get it they growl considerably.

“Q. You would say the army is well fed?—A. Yes, sir; I hardly think that expresses it; they have luxuries.

“Q. Take the body of the Cuban army, the white people in it, are they

as intelligent as the average of people in the rural districts here—what we call backwoods of the United States?—A. Yes, sir.

“Q. Are they patriotic?—A. As much so as any class of people I ever saw. So much so that I not only heard General Gomez and the government and the officers, but I have heard private soldiers talk. I will say that there is not a man in the escort or in the Victoria regiment that I have not heard an expression from similar to this: That before they would lay down their arms they would let every Spaniard in Spain walk over their dead bodies, and they would not accept anything but absolute independence. If you want to make them angry, talk autonomy to them. They say they have been caught once, but they will never be the fish to be caught again with the same bait. And I have heard Gomez say that they should be glad to have the United States recognize them, but that they will keep up the war until they secure independence if it takes twenty years to do it.

“Q. Is there any considerable proportion of native Americans in the Cuban army?—A. I do not think there is over 20 in the army.”

Mr. Smith, once upon a time of Ohio, with a record of over two hundred battles alongside General Gomez—in one of which 20,000 Spaniards under Weyler were defeated by 1,500 Cubans—gave this account under pressure of cross-examination of the escort of the famous Dominican chieftain:

“I was appointed a captain in Gomez’s escort, where they are all officers, appointed over the heads of old Cubans who have been in the service for years—some of them with him in the ten-year war—appointed second in command, jumping over all the others, and there is no jealousy of me.

“Q. About what is the strength of that escort?—A. From 70 to 90.

“Q. All officers?—A. Yes, sir. With the exception of myself, there is no man in it who has got in except through some special act of bravery. They are General Gomez’s body-guard. He goes into an engagement, and they are first into the fight and the last to leave, and, by reason of that, I know they have from 10 to 15 or 20 in the hospital, and they have nearly all been wounded more than once. I have never been wounded except the once.

“Q. What is the strength of this Victoria regiment?—A. When it came into Las Vegas it was 142; when I left there, the other day, they were all, with the exception of 38, in the hospital, wounded.”

Mr. Smith went so far as to describe Cubitos. The Cuban President, he said, had headquarters at Nahassa—and proceeded:

"Q. The same place you call Cubitos?—A. It is in the vicinity. Nahassa is a very level piece of country, a beautiful river running through it, and fine grass for the horses. Cubitos is a little back of it."

It will be observed that Cubitos was the only place Mr. Smith did not know all about, and Cubitos is the capital of this land of milk and honey, fat cattle and sweet potatoes as big as cuspidors. But it is a "little back."

Did the Cubans have a coast-guard? Oh, yes—to be sure they had—and Smith told all about it, though he thought his talk might hurt. He said:

"There is a continuous guard of armed men around that island, called the coast-guard. They are fully armed, with plenty of ammunition.

"Q. About how many men?—A. I presume in that coast-guard about 5,000 men. They fight if necessary, but it is a complete chain of guards. Now, there are several reasons for that guard. The Cuban government has a perfect line of communication, as I say, all through the island. They also have a perfect line of communication with the United States."

Mr. George Bronson Rea, of Brooklyn, was examined June 11, 1897. He was an electrical engineer and newspaper correspondent, and before the war had charge of an electrical light plant. January 18, 1896, he took the field with Gomez in Pinar del Rio. After being with Gomez for a month he joined Maceo, was with him six months, and then slipped through the Spanish lines, visited New York, and returned in January, 1897, to Cuba, and was with Gomez until the middle of April. Asked how great an army Gomez had, Mr. Rea said: "About 150 under his personal command—the escort and the Victoria regiment—each about 80 men." The grand army of Gomez in the province of Santa Clara was in "two divisions and various regiments." Mr. Rea proceeded to give an intelligible story of Gomez's forces, at the time the oratory of senators was seeking to subordinate the United States to this military pastmaster. "I can in one minute," said Mr. Rea, "give the total accurately." This was a frightful menace, but it had to go! Mr. Rea said:

"This recent campaign of Gomez in the eastern part of La Villas has been carried out by the first division of what they call the fourth army corps, divided into three brigades: The brigade of Remedios, about 800 men; the brigade of Sancti Spiritus, about 600 men; and the brigade of Trinidad, about 400 men. There are three more brigades, composing the second division: That of Cienfuegos, about 500 men; the brigade of Sagua, about 400 men; and the brigade of Villa Clara, probably 500 more. That is all in that



CUADRILLEROS, OR RURALGUARDS, IN THE PHILIPPINES.



THE PRINCESS PROMENADE, SAN JUAN, PORTO RICO. (Copyrighted, 1898, by J. M. Jordan.)

province. In the province of Matanzas there are very few insurgents; indeed, I think they could be safely estimated at about 400 or 500 men in the whole province. In the province of Havana, probably at the present time there are 2,000 insurgents. Last November—or October, I meant to say—I was down in the province of Havana about one month or a month and a half, and then there were about that number, and the force has not augmented. Contrary to all stories as to their number, the force has not increased. I left Maceo in Pinar del Rio with 6,000 men. The number of men in the eastern part of the island is—what I have said already in regard to the western part can be relied on, but in the eastern part of the island I would not like to give any testimony to be depended upon as accurate—as to my opinion as to the number of men, there are, I should judge, probably about 4,000 or 5,000 men in the two eastern provinces.

“Q. What provinces?—A. Santiago de Cuba and Camaguey. The total I have not figured, but in my estimation they do not exceed 25,000 armed men on the island.”

Of this 25,000 armed Cubans, four thousand were of Maceo's forces, and they dwindled after his death.

An effort was made by the examiners to show Mr. Rea was not the friend of the Cubans, but he had simply been telling the truth, and put down the land army of the Cuban commander-in-chief at one hundred and fifty men in hand, the rest scattered so as to scare the Spaniards a little everywhere. We quote the report:

“Q. As far as the Spanish were concerned, you were watched?—A. Yes, sir; I suppose, if caught, I should have suffered the fate of Govin.

“Q. What did they do with him?—A. They chopped him up.

“Q. Have you any knowledge of that?—A. Yes, sir; no personal knowledge.

“Q. Whence is your information derived?—A. From two persons who were with him; one Lieutenant-Colonel Mirabal and the other Colonel Gordon—both dead now. They were in a fight between Major Valencia, who had 60 or 80 men, and the Spaniards under General Ochoa from Jaruco. It took place near the sugar estate of Jiquiabo, and, as generally the case in a little fight, the Cubans, after firing a few volleys, got out of the way, and Govin, never having been in a fight before, found himself alone and the Spaniards very close to him. They told me that Govin, when he saw he was to be cap-

tured, walked forward to meet the Spanish column to surrender, hoping his American citizenship would help him in this case; but it seems that his papers—parties told me who said they were watching and saw it done (but I do not attach much importance to the statement myself, because I never saw a Cuban that would stay near a Spanish column long enough to watch much)—but they said the papers were torn up and thrown in his face, and he was tied to another man and taken to San Mateo and kept there all night, and the next morning as they were led out to march to Jaruco he was untied from the other prisoner and fastened to a tree and chopped up with machetes."

Govin was killed, Rea said, because he was an American. Rea added that he did not carry a revolver, for he could get out of the way when the Spaniards came "by keeping up with the Cubans." He once engaged in hostilities to this effect, though a man of peace:

"I directed Gomez once how to burn out a locomotive, and that is all. I took no actual hand in it; I told the old man how they could do it, and men—Cubans—went to work and did it. That is as far as my experience in helping the insurgents has ever gone.

"Q. What do you mean by burning out a locomotive—destroying it?—A. Yes, sir. If the water gets low and the fire is kept going, it will burn out the tubes and then it will not stand the pressure.

"Q. He had captured the locomotive, and wanted to destroy it?—A. Yes, sir. He asked me how to do it—he knew I was an electrical engineer—and I gave him the benefit of my experience.

"Q. Did you give him the benefit of your experience in firing dynamite shells?—A. No, sir.

"Q. You knew how to do it?—A. Yes, sir.

"Q. Did he ever ask for your assistance?—A. Maceo intimated as much to me once or twice, but I thought I was not there to do that; I was there as a neutral, and it was not my business. They have had a few foreigners come there to show them how to blow up railroad trains and use dynamite cartridges, and they have treated them badly, in such a way as to disgust them and drive them away. A Frenchman came along and was to show the Cubans how to make dynamite—and there was also a powder maker. Two bombs were prepared, but the Cubans were jealous, as the bomb-maker was going to get some glory, and so only eighteen men were sent to help him. The bombs were exploded, and when the engine went off the track they had a

couple of hand bombs which they were to throw into the train, but when the engine was derailed and the Spanish soldiers poured out of the cars the Cubans got scared and ran away and left the Frenchman alone. He got away safe, but was disgusted, and left them.'

Evidently the way Mr. Rea talked was not what the investigators wanted, but the cross-examination helped the story of the witness.

By Mr. Morgan:

"Q. How many fights have you been in, did you say?—A. More or less, about 80; not counting little shooting scrapes.

"Q. How many?—A. About 80, not counting shooting scrapes.

"Q. In how many battles have the Cubans held the ground?—A. I have only seen the Cubans advance twice.

"Q. I only speak of holding the ground.—A. They may hold the ground temporarily—for one minute or ten minutes or fifteen.

"Q. I mean after the battle is over.—A. They generally come back after the Spaniards give up the pursuit.

"Q. After the pursuit?—A. Yes, sir. I was with Antonio Maceo in those fights around Tapia, and we had about a dozen of them, hot and heavy. He would wait until the Spaniards came up, and from one hilltop he would hold them back until they grew too strong for him and then retreat to the next hilltop, going back and back until the Spaniards would give it up after a while and retire, getting tired of the conflict.

"Q. When they got tired, Maceo would come back?—A. Yes, sir.

"Q. Who would win the battle?—A. I would call it a draw. There is one strange thing about it; I rarely saw a Cuban killed."

These distasteful accounts of Cubans are like those that came out of the conversation of the private American soldiers who met both Spaniards and Cubans at Santiago.

Mr. Rea was asked why the rebels ought to be in the open, as he had said they were hiding themselves too much in Matanzas province, and he answered, "To subsist," for they had to go to the cultivated zones for vegetables. Asked whether it was not in those zones where people were starving, the witness contumaciously said, "The starvation business has been exaggerated"; and he proceeded to tell how the sweet potato—the boniato—would grow by itself:

"Q. Suppose the worst for the Cubans, can not they plant boniatos; and when not assailed by the Spaniards can not they live?—A. Yes, sir; they can,

and to a certain extent they do, but in the province of La Villas they have shown a wasteful spirit by eating all they have to-day, and never giving a thought of to-morrow.

“Q. Maybe they want to prevent Weyler from getting it?—A. The Cubans recognize, too, that they must have enough to eat if they want to wait until the United States intervenes and recognizes them.”

Senator Morgan does not seem to have made much headway with this young man. The examination proceeded:

“Q. Pinar del Rio—how did you subsist there with 6,000 men [Rea's estimate of Maceo's forces]?—A. I left Pinar del Rio last year, last October. The northern part of the province, from Mariel to a point called La Mulata, cattle had about disappeared. There were a few corralled in the hills by the Cubans. Vegetables had completely disappeared, except those planted around the Spanish forts. The cane fields had been burnt; there was not a stalk of cane standing. It was a devastated country in every sense of the word. This was not done by the Cubans, but by the Spaniards, to take away the fodder for the Cuban cavalry, and the fire spread in all directions; to the thickets, and palm groves, and everywhere else. Antonio Maceo sent every three nights an armed force of men with the impedimenta (two or three hundred unarmed men) down near Cabanas to bring the boniatos out, or, in lieu of that, they went to the zones of cultivation near the large fortified sugar factories La Linza and Bramales, between Cabanas and Bahia Honda, where there were also a few vegetables. In through the hills, at that time, Antonio Maceo had quite a large number of vegetables planted. He was a very practical man, who saw ahead more than any of the rest, and he took all the impedimenta, probably 1,500 men, and he set them to work planting sweet potatoes, so he must have had quite a sufficient supply to last him that campaign in the hills. Along the southern coast, or the part of Pinar del Rio lying south of the Cordillera, there was quite a supply of cattle, and, in fact, all south of the railway was grazing ground, and large cattle ranches were scattered throughout the country, but I should not think there was many cattle left at the present time, because the policy of Weyler, when he found that he could not corner the Cubans, was to destroy their means of subsistence; and all cattle found in the hills and on the plains have been killed.

“Q. About how many troops had Weyler?—A. About 40,000.

“Q. And Maceo about 6,000?—A. Yes, sir.

“Q. It appears the Spaniards, then, were engaged in raising potatoes to feed Maceo's command, principally?—A. Yes, sir; in this case.

“Q. Whenever they got out of potatoes they sent out and got them from under the fort?—A. That is right.

“Q. If I understood you correctly, there was never a battle-ground that Maceo's command did not return to after the battle was over?—A. No, sir; there were several occasions where he came back, especially in that country of Pinar del Rio, where the hills are. In the open country he never came back. I was with Antonio Maceo when he returned after the first invasion of Pinar del Rio and had so many big fights in Havana province. There was where I joined him, and during the month or more I was with him in this section, there was a constant succession of fights, one after the other, and we could not come back and camp where we were the day before. It was simply one continuous skirmish, day after day, moving from place to place.”

One thing Mr. Rea did not approve. The insurgents in Matanzas hid themselves in the swamps too much—“could not establish prefectos in Havana or Matanzas provinces.”

“Q. Why?—A. Because the country is very open. They have a few in the swamps, but in the provinces of Havana and Matanzas it is practically impossible to hold a prefectora.

“Q. You say it is open?—A. It is the open country of that island.

“Q. Because the Spaniards hold the towns?—A. Because the towns are close together and the Spanish columns are continually on the move, and there are no hills and nooks where they can hide themselves in any force, except along the southern coast in these swamps, which are terrible places to live in. The insurgents cannot hold out in the province of Matanzas a day.

“Q. Is it not a fact that they are holding out?—A. Well, if you want to immerse yourself in the swamp and stay there you are holding out, but you are not doing anything.

“Q. But they are still there?—A. Yes, sir.

“Q. The Spanish have not driven them out?—They have driven them off the open country where they ought to be.”

The judicial examiners stood up for the patriots immersed in the swamps, and would not consent that those fighting by immersion were not conquering heroes, though in hiding until they wanted beef they hooked it from the Spaniards. Maceo was the real great fighting man of the rebellion. Rea

spoke of the concentration of the Cubans—of their forcing the Spaniards into the towns at first. Asked to explain, he said:

“When the invasion reached the provinces of Havana and Pinar del Rio (I was in the island from the time the revolution broke out), when the Cubans reached these provinces, they found a large majority of the people living there were Spanish storekeepers, clerks, etc., many belonging to the volunteer corps. (All Spaniards coming to Cuba have to belong to the volunteer corps.) If they have not served in Spain, they join the volunteers to free themselves from the enforced military service which all have to suffer in Spain. Also in Pinar del Rio the large bulk of the population are Canary Islanders, not Cubans, and all staunch supporters of the Crown, and belong to the volunteer corps. A large majority of the tobacco planters are also Canary Islanders, as are also many of the sugar planters in Havana and Matanzas. The Cubans commenced their career of—well, they really commenced the atrocities themselves then. The Spaniards of the volunteer corps were taken and hung, and the trail of Bermudez could be followed by the bodies of those who were hung on the trees.

“Q. Did you ever see an instance of that kind?—A. Yes, sir; two of them—three of them.

“Q. Where?—A. The first was on the sugar estate of Santa Teresa, in the province of Havana. The second—hold on, he was not a Spaniard, he was a Cuban—I believe, near Rio Bayamos, also in the province of Havana. In the province of Pinar del Rio, while I did not see them, I know of the case where Bermudez hung 21—everybody spoke of it—21 to one tree, of these Spanish volunteers.

“Q. Who was Bermudez?—A. Bermudez led the vanguard of Maceo's army during the invasion. Bermudez was a bandit before the war, and is called, among the people who lived in the fields, the Weyler of the Cubans.

“Q. What has become of him?—A. He is still there, if he did not die of his wound, received just before Maceo crossed the trocha. I do not mean to say that this was approved by Maceo, for when Maceo found that so many people had been killed, he deprived Bermudez of his command.

“Q. It was done by a bandit?—A. An ex-bandit; but he was a colonel in the Cuban army.

“Q. He was deprived of his command by Maceo?—A. Yes, sir.

“Q. Because of these outrages?—A. Yes, sir. Antonio Maceo and all the

rest of these Cuban chiefs, when they got this invasion finished, or had carried their revolution to the far western part of the province, started to organize their various zones and appointed local chiefs. One of the first steps of these local chiefs was to eliminate from the country people all those who had Spanish tendencies. All who lived in the country who were in any way suspected of Spanish sympathy and all who belonged to the volunteer corps, were ordered to the towns and their houses were burned over their heads. That started the concentration business. When Weyler began his concentration, there was not a man living in the open fields who was not at least morally, if not openly, a Cuban insurgent. A man to live in the fields has to work for the Cuban government, and plant vegetables for them, and he is, technically, an insurgent, living under the laws of the Cuban prefecto, and he has to acknowledge their authority or go to the town. They give no choice.

“Q. They do not kill him, but send him to town?—A. They do not kill them. They have hung several for various little offenses.

“Q. What kind of offenses?—A. One fellow in the province of Havana, a Cuban colonel—Col. Raul Arango—invited me once to a double hanging. One man he had ordered to town, and had been seen outside afterwards, and he was going to catch him and hang him—

“Q. Treat him as a spy?—A. I suppose so. The other man was to be hung because he had taken cattle into town without permission.

“Q. Treated him as a spy also?—A. The cattle were his own. If they catch any one who is giving help to the Spaniards they string him up.

“Q. The Cubans treat those who are not with them as the enemies of the Republic?—A. Yes, sir. It was only recently, in the province of Villa Clara, that I called Gomez's attention to it, and asked him what he meant, and if it was his policy. Around the small town of Fomento the Spaniards had not operated for a long time. It was about the beginning of Weyler's campaign, in the month of January or February. There were probably 100 families, or 800 individuals, living within a radius of, say, 3 leagues of this town—all little farmers, most of them Cubans and insurgent sympathizers working for the cause. Many were families of the insurgents where the men were out fighting. To show that Gomez is bound to force this concentration business himself, these people were ordered several times to vacate their homes and either go to the towns or to the hills. They did not obey. I believe the order was given twice, and still they did not notice it. Major Herrera—a Cuban major

—was given orders by Brigadier Bravo, of Trinidad, to burn the houses of every one and thus force them to move. The orders were carried out, and the houses of these people were looted and burned, and their money and valuables taken away by their own countrymen. These people left destitute, and a great many, enraged at the treatment they received, went to the town and joined the local guerrillas. I reported it to Gomez, and asked if that was his policy, as he was always decrying the Spaniards for employing these methods. He said: 'Those people would not get out of there, and I did it as a humane measure. The humanity consists in forcing them to go away, because if they stay there the Spaniards will come along and kill them.' The idea is to get the people out of the country. It is just as much to Gomez's ends as to those of the Spaniards not to have too many people around. It is only because he is at present in a country where there are no people, or where there are no pacificos living, that he is able to elude the vigilance of the Spaniards. This policy was not started recently, but long ago, and Weyler has taken the same precaution as Gomez had done previously.

"Q. Around what town was this?—A. Fomento.

"Q. After they had their houses burnt, they joined the guerrillas?—A. A great many, as they were enraged at the treatment they received at the hands of those they thought their friends.

"Q. Do you know—you have had good opportunity for observing—have you known any case where Gomez or Maceo, or any other Cuban general, has caused prisoners captured either in battle or out of battle to be shot?—A. I once had occasion to write about the conduct of Lieut. Col. Frederico Nunez, in the province of Pinar del Rio. He captured five Spanish soldiers on the estate Susi, near Cayajabos, and strung them up.

"Q. Did Maceo know of that?—A. No; he was very indignant about it when he heard of it.

"Q. What did he do about it?—A. Reprimanded him, I guess.

"Q. What was the excuse for doing it?—A. I forget the excuse. There was quite a little talk about it. He had some trouble with General Arolas at the time, and there was something behind it; I could not explain.

"Q. Did he do it as an act of retaliation upon some Spanish general?—A. No.

"Q. Because they were spies?—A. No.

"Q. Well?—A. He might have done it because they were spies. He

captured them near the trocha, as Cayajabos was the first town outside the trocha.

"Q. How did Maceo know about them?—A. Nunez made the report himself.

"Q. Made the report that he captured them and hung them?—A. Yes, sir. You asked me did I know anything. I have a copy of an official document of one of these executions, committed by a Cuban sub-chief without the knowledge of his superiors. Here is a letter from Juan Ducasse, commanding the southern brigade of the province of Pinar del Rio.

"Q. No, sir.—A. 'I have notice that you have verified some executions in the district under my command without my previous knowledge—'

"Q. Who was that from?—A. Ducasse to his subordinate. 'I direct this present letter to you so that in the future you will abstain from doing this without filling all the legal requirements that are necessary in such cases. Please acknowledge the receipt of the present letter.' This was, as I say, sent by Ducasse to one of his subalterns (Maj. Thomas Murgado) who had caused a couple of pacificos to be executed.

"Q. In every case the act, when it came to the knowledge of the commander, was disapproved and rebuked—the man sometimes deprived of his rank?—A. Yes, sir. In another case I had the confession of a man who did it. Dr. Rojas Sanchez was a commander in Zayas's force. He boasted of having been given eight prisoners to deliver to the Spanish authorities, and openly bragged that only four got there.

"Q. Did he say he reported that fact to his commanding officer?—A. No, sir.

"Q. He kept that concealed?—A. Yes, sir; to show that Zayas was acting in good faith, when he made a big raid into the town of Esperanza, near Santa Clara city, this same major openly boasted that he refused to go into the town unless given permission to use his machete on all pacificos, and Zayas would not allow him to go in, but ordered him to stay outside the town. A story comes to my mind—

"Q. A story I don't care about.—A. It is not a story; it was told to me by two soldiers—

"Q. I don't care about putting in this record the stories—

"A. I am perfectly convinced of it."

It was a great point that the investigating senators did not care about stories.

“Q. How do you know any orders were given by any Cuban officer to loot and burn, to machete the men, but respect the women? Do you know that order was ever given?—A. I have heard it at La Palma. I have been at attacks on towns, and I have heard the order to loot and burn the town, but to respect women and children. The reason Maceo suffered such a defeat at Palma was because he put in all his unarmed men to assist in looting, they were so anxious to get clothing. His men were nearly naked.

“Q. You went as an electrical engineer when you first went to Cuba?—A. Yes, sir.

“Q. How long did you work at that?—A. Until the year after the war began.

“Q. Establishing telegraph lines?—A. No, sir; putting up electric light plants.”

There was much anxiety about Mr. Rea's occupation, but his answers were clear and to the point, and the more he was examined, the greater amount of truth, as in this case:

By Mr. Davis:

“Q. Do you not understand that those concentrados are mostly women and children and old men?—A. I do not understand that at all.

“Q. Have you ever witnessed one of those places?—A. I saw just as many young men as there were old men.

“Q. When?—A. Just before I came home—a few months ago.

“Q. Men that have come in from the country—Cubans?—A. I saw just as many young men as old men. The Cuban who has his country at heart—who was a patriot—went out during the first year. Those who have joined during the last year have been forced out by various circumstances—by lack of food, by persecutions of the Spaniards, etc. All the Cubans who had money when this war broke out came to the United States, and are carrying on the war from here. Leaving out those who rose up against Spain during the first year of the outbreak, the men carrying on this war in the island are those who could not help themselves or had no money to get away. This insurrection was going on for a year in the provinces of Camaguey and Santa Clara, and those in the west did not have the nerve to take up arms.

“Q. Did you ever have any difficulty with Gomez?—A. Yes, sir.

“Q. What was it?—A. It is quite a long story. General Gomez and I were very good friends until—I do not say he is a bad friend of mine now, but

he treated me very badly. He did not treat me as he had others. He treated Scovil much better. He offered him twenty men to help him get through, and did not offer me any.

“Q. What do you mean by impartial manner?—A. He showed partiality to the others.

“Q. In what month or in what year did this partiality begin?—A. When I first met the old man.

“Q. What other correspondents were in the camp?—A. Sylvester Scovil, correspondent of the World.

“Q. He treated him better than you?—A. Yes, sir.

“Q. That continued until you ceased all relations with him?—A. Yes, sir.

“Q. Now you can go on and make any statement you want to.—A. I had been away from him to Trinidad. I saw things that astonished me—that ought not to have taken place in the Cuban government. I saw many things that would work against them if printed and prove detrimental to their character. Among other things Smith and I witnessed—not exactly witnessed, but we were within half a mile of the town of Paredes. At 1 o'clock at night the Cubans attacked the town. There were 16 Spanish soldiers in the garrison—in one fort 5, in another 9, in another 2. They attacked the town and captured two forts, and there were but 5 Spaniards to deal with, when some one raised the cry, 'Here comes the Spaniards,' and they ran out of the town, leaving their dead and wounded. The Cuban commander made a report to Gomez, saying he had gained a big victory, while exactly the opposite was the case. He left his dead and wounded in the streets and ran away. Also, Smith and I had experience with the 'majas' or unarmed men, who live in the hills and steal the food from the pacificos and respect no one's authority. We also had seen several cases on the part of the government prefectos, who would not attend to their business. When I got to Gomez's camp, the old man asked me, very honestly, 'How about your trip?' I said, 'I have not enjoyed it very much;' and I went on to explain what I had seen. I told the old man, for his benefit, what I had seen, and Smith did also, and the old man was quite interested until finally he got mad and walked away; and I talked some with the other officers and made some criticisms on what had passed and that they did not know anything about. Gomez came to me after supper when I was passing through the camp, and said, 'What do you mean, Mr. Rea, by telling me all these things that you saw on that trip?' In the after-

noon before that he came to me and said, 'You have told me these things, I suppose, because you sympathize with me and want them corrected.' Afterwards he called to me and asked what I meant by it, and I told him again what I had said before. He said it was not true, and I told him it was not my habit to lie.

"Q. Was Smith in the camp?—A. Yes, sir.

"Q. Did you call on him to corroborate you?—A. No, sir; Smith is afraid of the old man. Gomez said, 'What did you mean by saying my brigadier made a false report?' and I said that he did make a false report if he had said that he won a victory, after he had run away and left his dead and wounded. He said, 'What do you think of it, and what are you going to write about it?' I said, 'I am to write the truth,' and he said that I had no business to write the truth.

"Q. Did he make any point that you had made the same statements that you made to him to the various men in his command?—A. No, sir; the various men in his command have made these statements to him. He got very mad about it, and said that if I wrote these stories he would shoot me. I looked at him in surprise. I thought perhaps the old man might take it into his head to do it then. I said that it was a pretty serious thing to shoot a man, especially an American, and he answered that as the United States or nobody else had recognized him as a belligerent, and his status was that of a bandit, he would shoot me, and that he could not be held responsible. After awhile he calmed down, and we parted very comfortably. In the morning Gomez, in the front of all his forces, started again on the American Congress, the New York Herald, the American public, Grover Cleveland, and everybody else, and I told him I could not stand it any longer. He said all we cared about it was what we could get out of it or the money we might make.

"Q. What did you say about that?—A. I said he was way off—that is not exactly what I said.

"Q. Give us exactly.—A. I said, 'General Gomez, you are very unjust. You very well know that if the United States should set its foot down, and cut off your chance of getting arms and ammunition, your revolution could not last.'

"Q. Was that between you and Gomez alone?—A. No, sir; the whole army was there—that is, the whole of the army he had, 150 men and staff.

"Q. They heard it all?—A. Yes, sir. After it was all over they came to

me and tried to smooth it over. I said they could not smooth it over until the old man apologized. Smith was there, and was very mad. He went up to Gomez and told him that he must stop abusing Americans or he would resign.

"Q. Did he give a reason for this?—A. Because he had insulted the nation and Americans.

"Q. Smith did not show he was very much afraid of the old man, then?—A. No, sir.

"Q. He didn't like it?—A. Yes, sir.

"Q. Did you leave Gomez after this incident?—A. About an hour afterwards.

"Q. Did you leave his camp then?—A. About an hour afterwards.


"Q. Did you report these facts to your paper?—A. To the paper, yes, sir; I did not publish them. I did not know whether I was right in publishing them or not. The old man made these remarks to me, and raised the dickens for no cause whatever. He was quite put out because, I suppose, the old fellow thought we ought to have been arrested and put in prison by the Spanish government, so as to raise an issue between that government and our own.

"Q. Did you say anything about the partiality he had shown to other correspondents?—A. No, sir; I never said a word about it. He was comparing me with the other correspondents. He said that it would be a very good thing if Scovil or I were arrested, and then the United States government would get into trouble with Spain in regard to it, and he made the same remark that morning, and he made a comparison between Scovil and myself, and I said: 'General, the day I get arrested by the Spaniards, I don't think it will cause a war that will redound to your benefit.'

"Having read and corrected the above statement, I hereby sign the same.

GEO. BRONSON REA,

"355 Sixth Avenue, Brooklyn, N. Y."





CHAPTER VI.

The Two Sorts of Spaniards in Cuba.

The Food Supplies in Cuba—Introduction of the Torch by the Insurgents—Garcia's Fine Army with an Engineer Corps—The Double Tax on Sugar Making—Spanish Methods of Making War—The Policy of Annihilation—A Government in Light Marching Order.

The importance of Mr. Rea's testimony is in the fact that it has been substantially confirmed by the revelations made in the American conquest of Cuba. The insurgents have been found generally as Mr. Rea represented, with the exception, perhaps, that he was occasionally excited by his sense of humor, and as the cue of the Commission was to deal with the Cubans as saints and martyrs, this exuberance was discouraged. However, the effulgency of Mr. Smith may be accepted, as compensation. The Spaniards and the Cubans made war upon the same general principles, with the exception of the treatment of prisoners and wounded. The cruelty of the Spaniards in dealing with those combatants was systematic and rarely allowed an instance of mercy. The Cubans as a rule did not torture helpless enemies, and they seldom "chopped up" prisoners, but the humane purposes of the leaders were often evaded. It was plain policy on the part of the Cubans to deal tenderly with the disabled and spare those who had surrendered, for they hoped to have their hospitals respected. Dr. Diaz states as within his personal knowledge that Martinez Campos favored the ministrations of the Red Cross, but Weyler held charitable attention was due Spaniards only. Cubans, however, used the torch without hesitation, and at last were mad with the illusion that when property was destroyed the Spaniards were the exclusive sufferers. The Cuban zeal for everlasting war faded perceptibly during the last year of the struggle. Mr. Rea estimated that when Maceo's western army gradually disappeared after the fall of their one magnetic leader, there were not more than twenty thousand Cubans in the army, while the whole force of the Spaniards was not less than 135,000 men. Mr. Rea was asked the question:

"Q. Have you any way of accounting for the fact that the Cubans—according to your estimate being only 25,000 strong—have been able to prevent the 135,000 Spaniards from running over and destroying them?—A. You cannot lick a man if he will not let you, or if he runs away from you all the time.

"Q. Cuba is bounded by the sea on every side, and is patrolled by the navy of Spain?—A. There are a great many hills and woods, etc. A body of 1,000 men does not take up much space. That is the reason Gomez has divided his men into bodies of about 150 men, so he can get into the woods.

"Q. If his force does not shrink considerably, how long can he protract this struggle?—A. As long as he has anything to eat.

"Q. What are his resources for feeding his forces?—A. When I left the province of La Villas, two months ago, the eastern part, where Gomez is, had quite a large number of cattle, owing to the reason that it is a grazing country, quite the reverse to the western provinces, which are devoted to the culture of cane and tobacco. The eastern provinces of La Villas and Camaguey are devoted to cattle and grazing, the eastern part of La Villas especially. While he had plenty of cattle to last him, economically, for about a year, he had no potatoes, no vegetables, of any account."

In Matanzas there were practically no insurgents. The few existing took refuge in the swamps, and subsisted chiefly on a species of jutia or racoon and crocodile steaks—no vegetables and no cattle, except as they could forage on the Spaniards. There were wild dispatches, however, day by day, about the wonderful war going on in Matanzas.

The most unreserved of the admirers of General Gomez is Capt. W. D. Smith, who was also an admirer of Garcia, and gave in his sworn testimony the account of the army of the "Oriente":

"Garcia has the finest equipped army on the island. His chief of staff is General Menocal, a very good engineer, who speaks very good English. He has organized an engineer corps; he has got a signal corps; he has got his cavalry and his artillery, and his engineer corps is pretty fine, too. It is right up to date. Any one who ever told me before I went down there that the Cubans had a good engineer corps I would have laughed at him, but it is true."

The insurgent troops that came out of the woods at Santiago were therefore the very flower of the Cuban army. Smith bestowed upon the Cubans,

finding what was wanted, more than 60,000 men, saying, "They can put in the field a little over 60,000 men." As for Gomez personally:

"General Gomez called me the morning I left there, and said: 'I want to speak to you. There have been false reports, and some may say to you that I have been sick.' Gomez is a man over 70 years old. He put his hand on the pommel of his saddle and vaulted right over, and put his other hand on and vaulted right back again. He said to me, 'You do that,' and I told him that I had business elsewhere. 'A sick man cannot do that,' he said."

The way Gomez harassed the Spaniards is thus, according to Captain Smith:

"Just the moment Gomez gets news that a column has left Sancti Spiritus or any other fort he marches toward that column and they meet. I have never known Gomez to lie idle when there was a Spanish column out; when they meet there is a fight right off. At night the Spaniards halt, and Gomez retires a mile or so. The Spaniards dare not put out a picket at night; their only guard is in their camps. Just as quick as dark comes, Gomez details an officer with 15 or 20 men to keep that camp awake, firing into them all night, and then at daybreak Gomez attacks the camp, and so on, and they are fighting all day and night, and so on. Whenever they go into camp there are 15 or 20 men more keeping them awake all night, and the result is that the Spanish troops are exhausted, and obliged to return to the town for rations or from fatigue.

"Q. The Spanish commanders are obliged to go back for provisions?—A. Yes, sir.

"Q. Is the island of Cuba, in the places which were not cultivated, heavily timbered?—A. Yes, sir.

"Q. Forests dense?—A. Yes, sir; some of the finest forests the eye ever saw; thousands upon thousands of acres of the finest mahogany, stretching as far as the eye can see."

Mr. Stephen Bonsal, journalist, described the policy of the concentration of the peasantry. The orders were issued October, 1896, and, "Every peasant and every person living in the four western provinces outside the garrison towns were driven into stations of concentration, their houses were all burnt, their crops and the palm trees destroyed, all the roots that grew—yams, etc.—were dug up, with the idea, many of the officers told me, to rob insurgent bands in these so-called 'pacified' provinces of the means of subsistence."



CITY OF SAN JUAN, PORTO RICO. (Copyrighted, 1898, by J. M. Jordan.)



STREET OF THE CROSS, SAN JUAN, PORTO RICO. (Copyrighted, 1898, by J. M. Jordan.)

In the four western provinces there were twenty sugar estates protected, by regular and irregular Spanish troops, paid by the sugar men. Where there were twenty sugar estates, there had been 200, and: "You go along through the western provinces and you can see the standing chimneys"—all the great machinery burned! There is a close relationship that should be in mind between the sugar estate burning and the concentration abomination. No matter how much the Spaniards were paid to protect the sugar estates, they were burned unless the rebels were paid also. That is, there had to be "two taxes paid to the two governments." Mr. Bonsal says sometimes a man who paid a thousand soldiers would refuse to pay the Gomez tax, and "the crop was always burned." This happened to an American named Stillman. "He was somewhat sluggish and his crop was burned." This was the bottom of the policy of the insurgent commander in chief. He would allow the Spanish to make sugar if the cause of liberty got a share of the blackmail that was impartial as it was infamous.

Mr. Bonsal was asked whether the payment of sugar protection was an open bargain, and he said:

"It was a bargain. It was arranged at the palace in Havana, and they had to pay extra there. It was a written contract. They had to pay extra to keep the comandante sweet. It cost them a pretty penny to have this garrison. Every man had to—the way they did this, they would have these places declared strategic points. That was the way the Spaniards would excuse the fact that they were having large bodies of troops in places where they were absolutely of no use. So Mr. Atkins or the sugar planters would go to Havana and have breakfast with the Marquis Palmerola, and have a talk, and have their places declared a strategic point, and the Captain General would order a certain number of troops there until further orders, with the understanding that the proprietor would pay so much bounty. I visited one estate where there were a thousand men.

By Mr. Davis:

"Q. What estate?—A. Azpeztequia, on the southern coast, belonging to the Marquis, now in Madrid, and who belongs to the constitutional or tory party in Cuba. It had eighty forts defending it.

"Q. Eighty forts?—A. Fortines. They look like forts in Sebastopol, a game we used to play when I was a boy—

"By Mr. Morgan:

"Q. Did you learn whether this destruction of sugar plantations was the work of one side exclusively or both?—A. I think it was both sides. It is a rather difficult question, because they have each changed their policy. The Spanish idea the first year of the war, the last campaign, as announced over his own signature by Mr. Dupuy de Lome, was to make the sugar crop. That was to show that the revolution was merely local and of little importance. This letter was published in the New York Herald, being the ideas of the representative of the Spanish government in the United States, and at that time they took steps to protect the sugar estates to the best of their ability. Azpeztequia was the first man to fortify his estate. As soon as they found out, as they did a year and a half ago, while the first sugar crop was making, that even the most loyal Spaniard, being a business man, was perfectly willing to pay 50 cents a bag for the sugar he made to the insurgents, or to the Cuban prefecto—when they found out that the people they were protecting were paying taxes into the patriot treasury they concluded it would be a good thing to destroy all the sugar.

"By Mr. Davis:

"Q. By 'them' you mean the Spanish?—A. Yes, sir. This year they have done nothing for the sugar people, because they knew all the sugar people, whether American, French, German, or the most loyal Spaniard, were paying tribute on their prospective crop to the insurgent local representatives. It is so easy to burn cane. One man can burn cane, and 4,000 can not stop it. So the policy of the Spanish government in Cuba on the sugar question changed entirely. Last year it was to make the crop; this year they think to hurt the Cubans more by destroying it."

It should be carefully observed that the cane conflagrations became so fashionable that the Spaniards participated like the others, but few people have reflected that in this war with the torch, the incendiary San Domingo method of destroying all that fire would burn, the worst of the atrocities of the war had their origin—and Weyler and Gomez will be held participants in the crime as far as history enlightens men. Mr. Bonsal said in his evidence about the perishing people crowded around the Spanish garrisons—a horrible example being at Matanzas:

"Judge Day asked me two or three days ago, I do not suppose confidentially, what would happen if the Spanish government should change its policy and drive these people back to the places whence they came. I said

that many would die on the way; that many more would die of starvation after they arrived.

“Q. And very few would survive?—A. Yes, sir.

“Q. So it is death to stay, and death to go back to their homes?—

A. Yes, sir.”

It does not occur to everybody, as it certainly should, that this horrible system of warfare never was known in Cuba until General Gomez led his columns five hundred miles through the island, burning plantations; the Cuba Libre journals in New York setting forth in glowing terms that the ruddy skies were the token of the triumphant progress of the liberating army. There was no devastation like this in the ten years' war from 1868 to 1878! That was comparatively civilized. The firebrand was thrown in 1896 in the name of freedom, and the end was blackmail, famine, pestilence, and death. The leaders in this were not the Spanish, but the Cuban officers. The Spaniards did not at first throw fire, but they followed the San Domingo example and became destroyers, as the insurgents were. The very Cubans who began this desperado work, complaining bitterly because their own fashion was imitated, are the foremost and most venomous of the enemies of the United States, insisting that their government of shadows and army of false pretenses must be consoled with money for the horrors they themselves so largely originated. The Spaniards are said to have avowed that they had a policy of extermination. This is in Mr. Bonsal's testimony:

“The Spaniards say that the policy of what they call 'kindness' has failed, and that now they have quite made up their minds that the only thing is extermination; that there will never be peace on the island as long as there are any of these Cubans left, or any considerable number of them.

“Q. The policy is then to exterminate?—A. Yes, sir; and they are not at all squeamish about admitting it.

“Q. They propose to destroy the peasant population?—A. Yes, sir.

“Q. And then to repopulate with Spanish?—A. Yes, sir. They have already exterminated one race, and Las Casas tells how they did it. They will probably follow the same methods with the Creole race.

“Q. None of the Indians are living?—A. No, sir; within forty years of taking possession by the Spaniards, the Caribbean or Giboney race quite disappeared, although they had numbered 400,000 or 500,000, in a generation and a half.”

But why did the Cubans introduce into this war the lurid features of barbarism, the firebrand with which the meanest savage can lay in ashes the proudest monuments of civilization—the greater achievements of art, the grandest realizations of the creative forces of industry? "The Cuban Republic" has this question to answer before the people of the United States, who have now to deal not with the peninsular Spaniards, but with Spaniards of the island who are not an improvement on the old stock. We know well how freely the Spaniard has shed blood, how he has for a century stained his colonies with red rivers, how cruel, haughty, revengeful he has been, but what we want to ascertain absolutely now is whether he has precedence as an incendiary and freedom reached by sacrifice of fire? By whom was laid waste the production of one million tons of sugar per annum in Cuban plantations? The peninsular Spaniards did not do that savagery. Mr. Bonsal said:

"General Weyler is not unpopular among what you might call the most powerful section of the Spaniards in the island of Cuba. On the contrary, he is quite popular. He is just the man they want. They believe with him in command this policy of extermination will be carried out to its logical conclusion. I remember, in Santa Clara, in the Club of Merchants, in the town of Santa Clara—it was at the time when it was proposed that Gen. Martinez Campos should come to Cuba—they said to me, these men of influence, unanimously, that 'if Martinez Campos comes to the island of Cuba and makes any proposition of compromise, as he had before, we will shoot him in the streets of Havana. We do not want General Weyler removed, because he is our man. He is bloodthirsty, and he is the man we want.' "

Certainly! The tale of bloodthirstiness is the old, old Spanish story, and Weyler was a man of blood. But was he the first of the firebugs in this war? Why deny Gomez the credit of the premier firebrand policy? Dr. F. B. Winn said there were 4,700 insurgent troops at his time in Havana province, and the concentrados numbered about 80,000 "pisonos—farmers."

"Q. What class of people constitute these concentrados?—A. Small farmers, renters, what we would call in this country, I suppose, tenant farmers; a good many storekeepers. Out there they have these small stores scattered all over the country. It is a very old country, and near the sugar plantations or in the thickly settled community they would have five or six of these small grocery stores to sell groceries, small articles, and drinks, etc.—to sell everything; and those people have been scattered and their stores burned.



MARKET WOMEN OF PORTO RICO. (Copyrighted, 1898, by J. M. Jordan.)



A PORTO RICO COUNTRY HOUSE. (Copyrighted, 1898, by J. M. Jordan.)

They are loyal; but the greater part of the concentrados are little farmers who were unable to get out of the island, and did not care to join the insurgents, and wanted to get to town; lived in bad houses, which the Spaniards burned. The Spaniards burned all these houses, all the wooden houses.

"Q. Was that generally through the province of Havana, the burning of houses of the common people?—A. Complete; all burnt; none left standing.

"Q. None at all?—A. None at all; not a house left standing outside of the fortification."

This was the first of the Spanish answers to the sugar plantation firebug crusade. The famine followed.

"Q. Are these little palm leaf huts furnished with any furniture or conveniences for living?—A. No, sir. Some have a chair—you can get a chair pretty near any place in the island. I could camp any place in the province and have a chair to sit down on in five minutes. The whole island is strewn with chairs, sewing machines, tables, and household articles, etc.

"Q. Broken out of the houses?—A. Yes, sir. These concentrados can not come out for them, and they make their chairs and provide the houses pretty well.

"Q. By whom has this wreck of the houses been conducted and carried on?—A. The large stone houses, of which there were a good many in that province—the wealthy people's houses—were destroyed by the insurgents, as they regarded them as possible fortifications for the Spanish army. The little wooden houses, the small houses, were destroyed by the Spaniards."

Dr. Winn gave a most interesting and important account of the "surrendered people," saying:

"They are people who came to America, ran away from Cuba to America, and came to the Junta and were a charge on the Junta, and to get them off their hands they sent them back to the insurgent lines. For the most part they were young men who lived in Havana; dudes, as we would call them here; some bachelors, with a diploma from a college. They would come back to Cuba with their diplomas and call themselves captains, majors, and colonels, and they would come up and represent themselves to the men who have been fighting in the field for two years, and they would say: 'We come from the Junta, and you get us a horse and a negro and we want commands in the army,' and the officers would say: 'You get yourself a horse and a negro, if you want them, and get to fighting,' and they would fight for a day or two,

and then slip into the brush and wait their chance to come into the Spanish lines. There is another class of presentados called maja, who are in the woods. They took to the woods when the orders of concentration came. They are supposed to be there to fight when arms are sent to them. When arms are furnished them, they are ordered to the force to fight. About 40 per cent of them sneak into the first town and surrender. They will not surrender until they have a gun, but when they have a gun it is a sort of guaranty for them. That is another kind of presentados."

The doctor gave this unquestionable statement of the way a Spanish column searches a thick wood for Cuban hospitals, that they may chop up the wounded with machetes:

"I at one time got out of the woods before the soldiers got in, and sat on a hill 300 or 400 yards away and watched them go into the woods. The chief stopped about 300 yards from where they entered the brush, and the infantry marched up and all the officers stood back, and the sergeant or lieutenant or small officers ordered the men in. The men marched up to the brush, and then they would hesitate, and these officers would draw their canes—they nearly all carry canes—or some of them machetes, and they would whip them in. They would grab a man by the arm and strike him with a cane and drag and push him in. By the time a man got a little ways in he would cry 'Viva Espagnol,' and then the others would follow, and they would all rush in and set the houses afire, and yell and raise the mischief generally, and those on the outside would run up and try to set the brush afire, try to set the whole army afire, as it looked to me. If it had been dry brush, like American undergrowth, they would have burnt the entire army up.

"Q. By brush do you mean trees and bushes that have been cut down?
—A. No, sir; it is short growth that has not been cut down."

Dr. Danforth, of Milwaukee, for a year physician to Cisneros, President of Cuba, was examined June, 1897, and when asked the favorite question about the mysterious Cuban capital, he said:

"They have had no capital until about the 1st of February of this year, and then they put up a number of houses at Aguirra, about three leagues to west of the city of Wymero, in Puerto Principe, and they established that as the seat of government.

"Q. Were they not at Cubitos?—A. No, sir.

"Q. Have they ever been driven out of their seat of government by the

Spaniards?—A. Not up to the time I left; but I will tell you in candor that all the Spaniards have to do, if they want to, is to march 100 men down there and drive the Cubans out. I was there on the 29th of April, and they had but 8 men in the capital.

“Q. Is there any regular postal service?—A. Yes, sir.

“Q. In what manner is it conducted?—A. On this plan: They have the prefects of these districts, and they act as distributing officers in the postal service, I believe.

“Q. They are from 3 to 6 leagues apart?—A. Yes, sir. All the people in their districts are coming and going to and from their place. They usually visit the prefects at least once every week or two to get mail.”

“Once every week or two” was the regular mail service of this country with a capital city containing eight men and located for several months where it was the greater part of the time visible only by the all-searching eye of Omnipotence.

Dr. Danforth is a gentleman of large figures. He estimated the Spanish forces in Cuba at 300,000 men—the Cubans about one in ten. As to food:

“In Camaguey, where I was, they have boniato, or sweet potatoes. Sometimes they will have yucca, sometimes plantains, sometimes cochanchilla, a mixture of honey and hot water. Sometimes they will have coffee, sometimes they will not have anything except, perhaps, meat.

“Q. How about their supply of meat?—A. It is ample.

“Q. Where is that obtained?—A. Everywhere, anywhere. By the laws of the Cubans, by the law of the land, it is a fact that the Cuban rulers declared, when this war first started, that all horses and all cattle in the island, wherever found, were to be regarded as public property. The result is you can find cattle everywhere in Camaguey. I do not believe I have ever ridden three miles without seeing more or less cattle. The yucca grows without any care at all. They have also a great many bananas, or plantains, as they are termed, growing at Cubitos at the present time. They have a great many of those, and they send over from the rest of the province every once in a while to secure several mule loads of the yucca and plantain, or boniato—the sweet potato.

“Q. I do not understand about that plant yucca. Is that a plant which grows in moist soil, like a radish?—A. No, sir; it belongs to the family of

tubers, I believe. It is the root, and the root will increase in size, and will weigh anywhere from 5 to 100 pounds. They are very large.

"Q. Is it palatable and nutritious?—A. Indeed, it is. It is just about like our Irish potato; just about the same thing.

"Q. Do they cook it in the same way as Irish potatoes?—A. Yes, sir; they cut it up and put it in water and allow it to boil just about as with Irish potatoes.

"Q. It comes out mealy?—A. No, sir; it comes out in the original pieces, very nicely done—mealy and nice to the taste.

"Q. They eat it with salt, just as you would an Irish potato?—A. Yes, sir.

"Q. That food does not require cultivation?—A. No, sir.

"Q. Grows indigenous?—A. Yes, sir; wherever you chance to put it.

"Q. I have been interested, too, in another thing, and that is, what is the production of hogs in the island of Cuba?—A. They have an immense number. Contrary to the custom in the United States, they allow them to run wild, and they eat whatever they find. I do not know exactly what they do live on, but they live very well. They have what they call hog dogs, and if you want a hog you call the dogs, and they will take after the hogs, and after chasing them around, the dogs will seize them by the ears and maintain their hold until the man comes up, and then they tie their legs together and sling him across the saddle and take him to the house and kill him.

"Q. They are in good condition?—A. Always.

"Q. Have the Spanish ever attempted to drive them out of there?—A. Never as yet, up to the time I left Cuba, although one day there was word sent that a Spanish column of 4,000 men was only a league and a half off, and we had orders to get our horses up and saddled, and everything on them, ready to start at a moment's notice. However, it proved to be a false rumor.

"Q. And where is the treasury of the government kept?—A. That is somewhat complex. The treasurer of the government is Mr. Pina, and he receives and disburses all moneys, and as fast as he will get on hand any considerable store of money that money is sent, I believe, to New York, in some way or another, to the Junta, and there is used for the purposes that are best calculated to help the revolutionists.

"Q. In the meantime, where does he keep his money; where does he have it for safe-keeping?—A. In the chests.

"Q. Carried with the government?—A. Yes, sir; with the President's escort.

"Q. Carried along with the archives?—A. Yes, sir.

"Q. About what proportion of the Cuban army is negroes?—A. Well, I should say less than 50 per cent. I do not know how much less, but less than 50 per cent.

"Q. As a rule, are the negroes under white officers, white Cuban officers?—A. Yes, sir.

"Q. Are they good soldiers?—A. Yes, sir; very good, indeed; and splendid fighters, too."

It is agreeable to hear that the money, gathered, we presume, chiefly through what we may call the supplementary sugar tax, was shipped to the New York Junta. The wars of independence of Spanish colonies were always a competition of Juntas, the original Spaniards holding that they were the divinely appointed ruling class. It was in Cuba only that the insurgents got ahead of the regulars in the use of fire—and this was ominously under lead of the military chieftain from the east end of Haiti.

We have followed the testimony taken by the Senate committee of investigation sufficiently to show the character of the war in Cuba, and have endeavored to apportion judicially the measures of the degrees of the respective responsibilities for the peculiar horrors of the conflict between the antagonists. There was an awful accumulation of evidence of unparalleled atrocities. We have to so far acknowledge the rights of the belligerents as to admit the consanguinity of the combatants. We shall quote in addition to the passages that truly set forth the situation of the woeful island during the last year before the American intervention and participation in war, only a few lines from the statement of Mr. C. F. Koop, of Boston, who described fearful brutalities on the cars by Spanish officers:

"Q. You can state some of the instances which impressed you as being characteristic of the situation.—A. One of the saddest, if not the saddest sight I saw was the case of a woman who stood in front of a hotel in Santa Clara, and who dropped dead when I handed her a piece of bread. That was the saddest sight I saw on the whole trip.

"Q. Did she undertake to eat it?—A. She dropped the baby which she had in her arms, grabbed the piece of bread which I handed her, drove her teeth into it and fell over dead. She had a baby in her arms and two little children hanging on to her skirts.

"Q. What became of the baby she let drop?—A. The baby died that night or the next morning. I found out in the morning that it had died; and the other two children died a day or two afterwards.

"Q. Died of starvation?—A. Yes; starvation."

Mr. Koop was a man traveling in the tobacco business, and he expressed the opinion that the true purpose of the Spaniards in herding the farmers in the "Zones" of cultivation was to cause them to perish of fevers and starvation. We quote:

"Q. Do the Spanish treat the Cubans with repugnance?—A. They feel that a Cuban is worse than a dog.

"Q. You think, then, that the purpose of the regulation was really to starve these people to death?—A. Yes; the sole purpose. It is well known that 900,000 of those natives were forced in from their homes, and out of that number 500,000 have died already. Therefore, the results have proved the motive.

"Q. What was the apparent relation between the soldiers and these reconcentrados, or did the soldiers seem to have any sort of human regard for them?—A. Many of the soldiers are low spirited and absolutely incapable of having such resentment, because, in the majority of cases, they were mere boys and in such a condition as to be hardly able to take care of themselves. The repugnance was largely among the officers and the Spanish guards, which is the flower of the army. They are in better condition than the common soldiers. The Home Guard, picked men, are also in better condition.

"Q. What is the feeling of this class that are in better condition—what is their feeling towards these poor reconcentrados, as you saw it?—A. There is a sort of a feeling between them that they would eat at one another's table, if they could. If one had anything, they would give it to the other. There was no animosity among the ordinary soldiery of the Spanish army."

During the examination of witnesses by Senators to ascertain accurately the state of the island, much attention was given any one who had ever been in or about the Cuban capital, and anything that supported the view that the Cubans had a civil government somewhere in the woods was dwelt upon and made impressive as possible. This was with a view of putting the Cubans to the front as constituting a Republic. There was found, to the satisfaction of the pro-Cuban party, that there was an organization camped in a secluded spot, in light marching order, with a President, and a cabinet and all the

formal appurtenances. As the Cubans could not maintain themselves at any particular port, they were given to magnifying the formalities and celebrating the functional equipments of their government and to claiming for it a "complete" postal system, and also an all-encircling coast guard, but this machine lacked a great deal of perfection, and indeed the uses to which it was applicable were rather in anticipation than performance—like the Cuban army in the later months before the United States declared war. The far-sighted organizers remote from the scenes, seeing that they had ready a government to claim the sovereignty to be wrested by our arms from the Spaniards, set up an official ring as the people of Cuba, with power to mortgage the bloody ashes of the island, and assume to rule when their turn came as the Spaniards had done. The history of the island in the future must depend in a comprehensive way upon the dealing with the professors of official Cubanism, by the government of the United States, whose specific promise to the people of Cuba and the United States and all civilized men, was and remains to establish a "stable government." The immediate necessity is that the possessions with which Spain has parted are to be subordinated to our military forces, under the inviolable guaranties of "the faith and honor of the army of the United States."





CHAPTER VII.

General Lee's Consul-Generalship in Cuba.

The Conservative Administrations of Grant, Cleveland and McKinley—A Variety of "American Citizens" in Havana—Judicious Discrimination of Consulate Authorities—A Young Man who Gave Himself Away—The Brave Stand of the President against Bulling the Market for Bonds Issued on a Basis of Bloody Ashes.

The consul-generalship of General Fitzhugh Lee, at Havana, lapping the national administrations of President Cleveland and President McKinley, was an important incident in the development of the public opinion and official policy of the United States in the affairs of Cuba. The lines pursued by President Cleveland and the State papers of Secretary Olney did not depart widely from those of the concluding administration of President Grant and the grave and powerful but reserved communications from Secretary Fish, whose correspondence from Ministers Daniel Sickles and Caleb Cushing at Madrid was marked by individual distinctions so strong that their letters are a most valuable source of interior intelligence, indispensable to a correct understanding of the course of events from the Ostend manifesto to the declaration by the United States of war against Spain. There is to be marked the consistent straightforwardness of the administrations of General Grant, Grover Cleveland and William McKinley, in the performance, under circumstances of constant difficulty, of our duty toward Spain as a friendly power in the maintenance of our international obligations. Though this was a subject of a great deal of polite writing and speaking by the diplomatic representatives of Spain, it was a fact perfectly within the scope of the intelligence of the American people that the popular feeling in Spain was that we encouraged filibusters and were considerably accountable for the Cuban insurrections that were so disastrous to the credit of the Spaniards. Our people did, of course, sympathize with the Cubans, and entertained no doubt that Spain would and should lose the island, as Mexico, Peru, and the rest of



MAJOR-GENERAL FITZHUGH LEE, CONSUL AT HAVANA WHEN WAR WAS DECLARED.



THE SEA WALL OF SAN JUAN, PORTO RICO. (Copyrighted, 1898, by J. M. Jordan.)

the continental Spanish-American States were lost. The interests the United States had in Cuba were presented with extraordinary force in the course of the later of the ten years' war, by Secretary Fish, whose pen had the potentiality of representing his own great ability and the Presidency of Grant.

There was a deep impression made upon Spain, in the course of this correspondence, but it was not, on the whole, conciliatory, for it clearly was a warning that the time could not be far distant when the United States would intervene in Cuba. The Spaniards had two hopes—one that they might overcome the rebellion, and the other that Europe would support their Cuban sovereignty against that which would naturally seem to the monarchies American aggression. President Grant, while pressing Spain to take decisive action, was not fortunate in opportunity, because his period of executive power was coincident with a series of Spanish revolutions, but he urged that it was the duty of other nations to sustain our tentative advances, and associated with this appeal to the powers was necessarily the strict observance of the conventionalities of the usages of the strong governments with respect to declarations of independence and the recognition of belligerent rights. Mr. Cleveland's conservatism on this subject remained unshaken, and the assaults of the literary laborers in the filibuster cause were disregarded without indications of uneasiness, while the anxious urgency of the Cuban agents that they should be considered the representatives of a Republican form of government found no countenance in the White House or the State Department. The Cuban desire was for right of belligerency, and it was supported by exaggerations of all shams of Cuban organization, the general and particular purpose being to gain recognition of rights as combatants, and to manage that condition so as to drive the United States to make war with Spain. The State Department, in the closing months of Cleveland's administration, was in doubt as to the condition of Cuba, holding that there was no reliable information from that quarter, positively nothing that called for action by the nation. The naturalized citizens of the United States in Cuba had, to a distinct degree, been actuated in declaring their intentions by the hope of protection in time of political trouble, and many of them were disposed to interpret as among their privileges as American citizens, exemption from punishment when they interfered with Spanish rule. The more persistent they were in getting into dangerous places, the more intense their appreciation of the duties toward them as Americans, of the representatives of the government of

the United States. They laid special claim to the protection of the Consulate of the United States at Havana, and were there very frequently with grievances. It was not, as a rule, in proportion to the dimensions of their actual wrongs that they were insistent in presenting them; and if their affair was insignificant they were apt to become exasperating. The office of the Consulate was well provided for matters of business, but it was not redolent of the flavor most pleasing to the Cubans who were sympathetic with the insurrection. Consul-General Ramon O. Williams had long been a man of affairs in Havana, and had an extensive acquaintance and many friendly relations with Spaniards. He was an expert in the obligations of his office, and knew every point of the law. The Spanish language was familiar to him, and he had for some time contemplated resigning his official place, in which case Vice Consul Joseph A. Springer was the best equipped man for the succession in case the ordinary promotion for long and effective service was considered. Mr. Springer was thoroughly informed, had facile command of the Spanish language, was learned in the laws, and familiar with the customs of the people. As Cuba became the center of news-interest in the United States, the Havana hotels were thronged with correspondents of the newspapers of America and Europe, with their interpreters and secretaries, and the office of the Consul-General was a much favored rendezvous. It became manifest to the young gentlemen in the service of the press that all "American citizens" were not alike welcome; and that a naturalized Cuban, who had never been out of the island, and had shown a talent for the intrigues indigenous in an insurgent atmosphere, was not promptly waited upon when he desired United States officials to find his valuable mule confiscated as a bearer of burdens of smuggled goods—struck a chilling frost when making known his claim upon the great Republic that should have felt much complimented when the citizenship of the sufferer was for the fortieth time vociferated. Omissions on the part of Williams or Springer to find a lost mule, or something of that nature, were liable to be celebrated in some of the most famous journals that ever put forth their leaves for the help of the human race. One young man, whose passage had been paid to Havana by the Spanish Consul in New York, to write the stories to please Spain, and whose appetite for gold increased with indulgence, caused him presently to hate Spanish, and then to offer his services as a spy, to report on other correspondents, and give away their confidence—this versatile youth took it upon himself to lecture Consul-General


Williams as to the use he made of law books, and instruct him in the detail of official duty. He also denounced Williams to his face, and encountered no incivility. Some time later the young man was disturbed to find out that Mr. Williams had in his desk a few scraps of paper that proved the Spanish relations of his assailant, but scorned to strike him down with his own letters. President Cleveland concluded some months later to accept the resignation of Mr. Williams, which he had on file to be used when convenient, and to appoint to fill the vacancy General Lee. Undoubtedly this was a judicious selection. Fitzhugh Lee was, in the first place, a man of good nerve, and of military experience. He was a Southern man, and the Spaniards would not be able to deceive him with their perpetual protestation that they were engaged in putting down a negro insurrection; and he was a man of such home distinction that he could not be easily turned from his purposes by that which was said of him pro or con. President McKinley had made known before his inauguration that he would call an extra session of Congress. He had no personal desire to avoid the presence of Congress, but was sincerely of the judgment that the members were of incomparable utility as the Senators of the several States, and direct representatives of the people. The course of the Cleveland administration, in doing things and refraining to do other things, so as to leave unembarrassed by action the successors upon whom must fall the weight of responsible decisions, was well considered and in excellent form, and General Lee had shown so cleverly and with such serious deportment his sense of the high duties committed to him that he was continued in office, and gained more and more the confidence of his countrymen. He supported forcibly the first movement of the government in the McKinley administration demanding the speedy trial or release of the American citizens under arrest, and the resolute tone with which this policy was presented had an immediate influence. At the same time, there was less of the friction of frivolous manifestations that were expressly intended to aggravate contentions. There was a change in Captain-Generals in Cuba; General Weyler, having been identified with so much that was oppressive and exasperating, was withdrawn and General Blanco, a more gracious character, with a better military reputation, substituted; and Blanco's policy presently was shaped so as to placate, if practicable, the rising indignation of the people of the United States. These things were believed to make for the preservation of peace, rather than to cause war between the United States and Spain; and hence the fierce agitation

of the Cuban war party, whose hopes and struggles were to fight, and they became ferocious at the thought of peace. They were soon in a super-heated state, and as incessant as Red Indians rubbing sticks of wood together to kindle a fire, to communicate their incandescence to Congress. The President's message December 6, 1897, was a State paper of excellent temper, and of the profoundest logic, legal and historical, and yet it did not favorably impress our public men and papers who insisted the time had come for war, and inconsiderate of our unprepared situation in a military sense, chafed against all restraints of composure.

President McKinley's message to the Fifty-fifth Congress, assembled in regular session, stated the most important problem with which the government was called upon to deal in its foreign relations concerned its "duty toward Spain and the Cuban insurrection." The President referred to the disquieting prospect that Spain's weak hold upon the island might lead to the transfer of Cuba to a continental power, and the declarations of policy that any change must be in the direction of "independence or acquisition by or through purchase." The ten years' war was outlined in a few sentences, with the Peace of Zanjón, and the "present insurrection in February, 1895"—its "remarkable increase" and "tenacious resistance against the enormous forces" that Spain massed against it. The offer of friendly offices in 1876 had failed. No mediation on our part had been accepted. The answers were: "There is no effectual way to pacify Cuba unless it begins with the actual submission of the rebels to the mother country." The President denounced the cruel policy of concentration initiated in February, 1896, that depopulated the districts commanded by the Spanish armies. He proceeded, after characterizing this policy as cruel, to say of it: "The agricultural inhabitants were herded in and about the garrison towns, their lands laid waste, and their dwellings destroyed. This policy the late Cabinet of Spain justified as a necessary measure of war and as a means of cutting off supplies from the insurgents. It has utterly failed as a war measure. It was not civilized warfare. It was extermination." The part of the Cuban leaders in burning out the civilization of the island to cut off Spanish resources was not mentioned, for it was the President's basis of operations that there was no responsible Cuban government to deal with. The persecution of American citizens had especially aroused the President, and he did not feel it incumbent upon him to investigate naturalization papers. His first duty was "to make instant demand for



HORSES LADEN WITH MALOJA, IN MATANZAS, CUBA.



THE YUMURI RIVER AT MATANZAS, CUBA.

the release or speedy trial of all American citizens under arrest, and before the change of the Spanish Cabinet in October last twenty-two prisoners, citizens of the United States, had been given their freedom." Then came the work of charity. The message of the President very seriously recited the developments of the situation leading up to the most grave utterance that ever came from a chief magistrate of this country, touching our international obligations as Americans, and the conservative propriety of our interest in the peace of communities of the neighborhood.

The culmination of the message was in this paragraph: "Sure of the right, keeping free from all offense ourselves, actuated only by upright and patriotic considerations, moved neither by passion nor selfishness, the government will continue its watchful care over the rights and property of American citizens, and will abate none of its efforts to bring about by peaceful agencies a peace which shall be honorable and enduring. If it shall hereafter appear to be a duty imposed by our obligations to ourselves, to civilization and humanity, to intervene with force, it shall be without fault on our part and only because the necessity for such action will be so clear as to command the support and approval of the civilized world."

The remarkable words were "to intervene with force." Spain well knew what the four words signified, but those engaged in shouting war cries in Cuba and this country were not satisfied. They had been screaming for years against General Grant and Grover Cleveland, because they did not accept the New York Junta as a nation, entitled to use the arms of the United States for the faction in Cuba that sought with our aid to supersede the Spaniards. President McKinley offended the filibusters when he declared: "The wise utterances of President Grant in his memorable message of December 7, 1875, are signally relevant to the present situation in Cuba, and it may be wholesome now to recall them." This, of course, was simple treason to the Republic of Cuba. President Grant said, and President McKinley quoted with approbation, these words: "A recognition of the independence of Cuba being, in my opinion, impracticable, and indefensible, the question which next presents itself is that of the recognition of belligerent rights in the parties to the contest." More than this, President McKinley said: "In a former message to Congress I had occasion to consider this question, and reached the conclusion that the conflict in Cuba, dreadful and devastating as were its incidents, did not rise to the fearful dignity of war." In a word, the President

did not propose to use the United States for the pretended Cuban Republic, and that was the very pith of the Cuban war party's position. The President, instead of floundering into war headlong for the Cuban incendiaries, who prepared at once to destroy property and issue certificates of bonded indebtedness, made a last sincere and pressing effort to defer war, and so far as was possible interpreted events as helpful for the preservation of peace. He said he regarded the recognition of belligerency of the Cuban insurgents as "now unwise and therefore inadmissible"—and he held that "a hopeful change has supervened in the policy of Spain toward Cuba. A new government has taken office in the mother country. It is pledged in advance to the declaration that all the effort in the world cannot suffice to maintain peace in Cuba by the bayonet; that vague promises of reform after subjugation afford no solution of the insular problem; that with a substitution of commanders must come a change of the past system of warfare for one in harmony with a new policy."

These were the promptings and teachings of a generous heart, and there was behind them the wisdom of expediency, for if we were drifting to war, we would be great gainers by the time occupied. All the American citizen prisoners in Cuba were released. There could be nothing lost save as to the Cuban Republic, and bonds based on the naked chimneys, monumental of ancient and prosperous industry! The President was in position to say: "Not a single American citizen is now in arrest or confinement in Cuba of whom this government has any knowledge. The near future will demonstrate whether the indispensable condition of a righteous peace, just alike to the Cubans and to Spain, as well as equitable to all our interests so intimately involved in the welfare of Cuba, is likely to be attained. If not, the exigency of further and other action by the United States will remain to be taken. When that time comes that action will be determined in the line of indisputable right and duty. It will be faced, without misgiving or hesitancy, in the light of the obligation this government owes to itself, to the people who have confided to it the protection of their interests and honor, and to humanity."

There was behind the President all the powers of the people, and all the dignities of decency and civilization; and the grim necessity of which he had knowledge exceeding others—for, if war was just ahead, we should not make haste to get into it without preparation.

There was an ignorant and inflammatory public opinion—part vanity and part malice—fed by the falsehoods of Spanish Cubans through the convenient

wires, and it was foolishly and wantonly and insolently wrong, as regards the conditions under which we were moving to encounter in Cuba—first, the rainy season; second, the sweltering venom of the yellow fever; third, insufficient water supplies and inadequate facilities for the water transportation even of our regular army and the articles requisite to its higher efficiency. Last, but not least, there was not abroad in our country understanding of the fighting abilities of the Spaniards on the defensive, or the fruitfulness of the soil that made starvation outside prisons a tedious task—for we could only blockade the ports. The marvels of the soil and sky of Cuba in providing food remained, and not until the full story of the war is read will the people at large be truly informed of the endowments of the island, golden in all but the yellow metal. The Cuban Spaniards and American filibusters were rank with violence that would have been ludicrous if it had not closely approached criminality, because the President held open to the last hour it was practicable the door that led to the paths of peace. It was Cuban influence that burnt the sugar plantations that did not yield the Republic a special tax, that branded the insurrection with the San Domingo mark, and redoubled outcries for recognizing independence, on preposterous grounds, granting belligerency, and putting firebrands wherever there was fuel for war.





CHAPTER VIII.

The Actual Experience and Sentiments of the People of Cuba.

Two Parties of Malignants—The Firm Stand of the President at the Beginning of the War—A Study of the Historical Truth of the Situation—The President's Language Contrasted with that of the Fire Bugs—Extreme Views of Senators Davis, Daniel, Foraker, and Others—The Fury of the War Party—Cuban and Spanish Desperadoes—The Massacre of the *Maine*—The Findings of the Courts—List of the Lost on the Ship.

The public sentiment in Havana did not easily appear to strangers. It was of vital consequence to those who were owners of real estate or engaged in business, surrounded with families, to assume an attitude as far as permissible from partyism—to be moderate in all things, cultivate good will, put out, as a form of consenting to the conditions, the Spanish colors, wear dress suits on occasions of ceremony, welcoming General Weyler, for example. There were those who took the risks of avowed sympathy with the insurgents, but they had reasons for refraining from active service. One of the ways of preventing persecutions was in the susceptibility of many holding Spanish commissions to the acceptance of concessions in cash or its equivalent.

The processes of protection in the city were like those that prevented the burning of a few cane fields and mills, and the dispersion of the carts and horses that were an important part of the equipment of plantations—that is, the payment of a double tax. There were those who communicated with the avowed rebels in Key West, New York, and elsewhere, and the Spanish officials were complacent about that. The price of taking a small package of "private" letters to the United States post office was a five dollar Spanish gold piece. Often Spanish or insurgent officers were transported to and fro from Havana—visiting the United States—at regular rates, according to the rank of the travelers. Under this system it was not difficult to account for adventures that were touched up with superficial mystery. What was the need of daring when bribery was so facile? Heroism was as marketable as Mauser cartridges

at Morro Castle! The men of sincerities ascertained that there were deplorable disadvantages in persistent integrity. There were two besetting dangers for an honest man. One was to give mortal offense to the important Spaniards by telling the truth of them—and the other was to insult the civilian insurgents by truthfulness respecting them, the capital crime being to doubt the ability of the government in the woods to issue bonds, command armies, and exercise all the supreme functions of a national sovereignty. Those who absorbed this fictitious officialism held that it was treason to question their regularity, and they were sure as possible of everything and in a state of infallibility all the time. It was highly criminal to fail in faith in any falsehood invented in and telegraphed from the Florida bureaus. It was the most wicked way of being treasonable to Cuba Libre to hesitate to believe that the New York Junta and the literary manufactures, carried on outside Cuba with the making of Havana cigars, were not the veritable and the only people of Cuba. One development of scoundrelism in Cuba fostered another. The canker of corruption in the Spanish service was not unknown among the Cubans. There were pecuniary reasons for the protraction of the war. There is a real people of Cuba behind all this. There is also a real Spanish manhood that is not revealed in this outrageous distemper of dishonesty. If one got the unreserved confidence of true Cubans—those who in spite of misgovernment had made the island prosper—the truth would break out about in this way: "We have been taxed regularly and irregularly, by the Spaniards and the rebels—double taxed in custom houses—forced to pay for things done and undone—compelled to pay all sorts of soldiers and loafers to care for us, openly and secretly—have everything offered now as always for money—and are refused justice in any case without it. Now we are exhausted. Our money is gone. We are not politicians. This is a rich country. There is no end of money to be made here. We only want order—no matter whether under a monarchy or a republic—anything so that we can do business. We know that if the Spanish conquer the island and rule it again we shall be ruined utterly. We are almost in a condition of beggary now. It will be very little, if any, better for us if these fellows who claim to have a Cuban government should become the masters of the island. They will ruin us just the same as the Spaniards. In either case we are reduced to poverty, and shall be without hope. We have one chance—that we shall sometime soon—very soon, before it is too late for us and our children—become a part of the

United States." Notwithstanding the terrible indictment of the Spanish colonial system, of which the last and worst development was in Cuba, by the President in his message of December, 1897, it would have been impossible to have framed a paper more disturbing and alarming to the managers of the Cuban policy than the whole document as it appeared with its plain use of the plain words "intervention with force." The Cuban holders of commissions or diplomas, as they say, wanted intervention with force, to be sure, but for them, in their way. The programme was for the United States to make the war and finish it and turn over the island to the Cuban republic. There was a huge speculation in this contrived to be at the expense of the United States, and President McKinley's straightforward course was an interference. One of the Cuban outcries had been stifled. It was that crowds of "American citizens" were imprisoned and not tried. That was at an end. Weyler was gone like a gory scapegoat, and Blanco had arrived, dressed in regimentals that he gave assurance were white robes. He made an impression that there was a real meaning behind his good words. He seemed to be taking himself in earnest. The Spanish language was not exhausted. The President appeared to have hopes that his policy of peace could prevail.

It was necessary that there should be something done in Havana to change the current. There was always under Spanish rule a chance for a panic there. The vindictive volunteers were ever ready for the indulgence of resentments. They hated the Blanco style, and opposed it with the same malignity that their extreme opposites—the firebug patriots—denounced the pacific President of the United States. They discovered that the American citizens in Havana were in peril, that they needed ships of war to protect them! That was one of the cultivated alarms always ready for an emergency. The incendiaries had failed to impress General Lee. There was a solidity about his composition that gave them sore grief. Lee was fearless and positive as against Spanish misconduct toward American citizens, no matter how defective their title might be. He acted on the face of the papers—but the incandescent Cuban officialism did not appeal to him strongly. He did not submit himself to those people or take them into his confidence. He was an American, not a Cuban, but he could not see, as the United States and Spain were in friendly relations, officially, why there should not be one of our ships of war in the Havana harbor—on the like terms of those of the favored nations. The Cuban theory that our war ships were wanted in the harbor to

protect Americans was unsound. The real want was to use and display our ships of war so as to promote the war conspiracy! It was certain that if we sent ships to Havana waters to rest there as fixtures we would sacrifice many lives to the pestilential influences of that spot where centuries of filthiness have made provision for plagues of fever. It was clear also to any observer that if there were Americans in personal danger, a ship of war more or less could not save them, for the ships would necessarily be out of the way of the resorts of the city, and under the German guns with which the old forts and the new fortifications were armed. It was provided that there should be arranged an exchange of courtesies between Spanish and American ships of war, and two ill-fated cruisers were appointed, the *Maine* to visit Havana and the *Vizcaya* to call at New York.

The malignants on both sides in Cuba, the extreme peninsular Spaniards, and the extreme Cuban Spaniards, the filibusters and adventurers, were joyful over the massacre of the *Maine*, and used the awful story to fan the smoldering embers of war into a conflagration. They were aided by the Cuban war party in the United States, and a great, irresistible wave of emotion that was deeper than anger, and of indignation that rises like the ocean uplifted by an earthquake and rolls mighty billows upon distant shores. It was the President's duty, and he performed it, to be clear headed for the country, to hold the balances of judgment serenely higher than the sphere of the tempests. It is not often in the annals of mankind that a man has had a loftier and broader responsibility to discharge, and the President, awed by the overmastering sense of the destiny upon him, was not disquieted and depressed, but calmed and elevated by the magnitude of events, as became a President of the people, and there were those who would have belittled the days as they passed with sound and fury, and cheapened themselves with hatefulness and fancies that haste and clamor would be thought identical with the expression of serious duties,—and the sensationalists displayed themselves on fire lines and illuminated the distortions of their own insignificance. In proportion as the people of the United States knew war and were of general intelligence, they sustained with their moral sympathy and political force the equipoise of the Executive Department; they commended the request of Captain Sigsbee of the *Maine* for a suspension of public opinion as to that catastrophe, and the deliberate reserve of the President, accepting the tenders of courtesies of Spanish military and naval civil authorities in the way of regrets and condo-

lences for the victims of the Havana harbor explosion. In the message of the President May 11th, after quoting state papers of Cleveland and Jackson, and reciting once more the hideous situation in Cuba and the elements of danger and disorder, he said these had been "strikingly illustrated by a tragic event which has deeply and justly moved the American people. I have already transmitted to Congress the report of the naval court of inquiry on the destruction of the battleship Maine in the harbor of Havana during the night of the 15th of February. The destruction of that noble vessel has filled the national heart with inexpressible horror. Two hundred and fifty-eight brave sailors and marines and two officers of our navy, reposing in the fancied security of a friendly harbor, have been hurled to death, grief and want brought to their homes, and sorrow to the nation.

"The naval court of inquiry, which, it is needless to say, commands the unqualified confidence of the government, was unanimous in its conclusion that the destruction of the Maine was caused by an exterior explosion, that of a submarine mine. It did not assume to place the responsibility. That remains to be fixed.

"In any event, the destruction of the Maine, by whatever exterior cause, is a patent and impressive proof of a state of things in Cuba that is intolerable. That condition is thus shown to be such that the Spanish government cannot assure safety and security to a vessel of the American navy in the harbor of Havana on a mission of peace, and rightfully there."

Further, dwelling in this connection on recent diplomatic correspondence, "A dispatch from our Minister to Spain, of the 26th ultimo, contained the statement that the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs assured him positively that Spain will do all that the highest honor and justice require in the matter of the Maine. The reply above referred to of the 31st ultimo also contained an expression of the readiness of Spain to submit to an arbitration all the differences which can arise in this matter, which is subsequently explained by the note of the Spanish Minister at Washington of the 10th instant, as follows:

"'As to the question of fact which springs from the diversity of views between the reports of the American and Spanish boards, Spain proposes that the facts be ascertained by an impartial investigation by experts, whose decision Spain accepts in advance.'

"To this I have made no reply." Nothing was wanted of Spain's experts.

The date of this message was within ten days of the declaration of war, and the President closed in these words, that will ever reflect honor upon him:

"I ask the Congress to authorize and empower the President to take measures to secure a full and final termination of hostilities between the government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to secure in the island the establishment of a stable government, capable of maintaining order and observing its international obligations, insuring peace and tranquillity and the security of its citizens as well as our own, and to use the military and naval forces of the United States as may be necessary for these purposes.

"And in the interest of humanity and to aid in preserving the lives of the starving people of the island I recommend that the distribution of food and supplies be continued, and that an appropriation be made out of the public Treasury to supplement the charity of our citizens.

"The issue is now with the Congress. It is a solemn responsibility. I have exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs which is at our doors. Prepared to execute every obligation imposed upon me by the Constitution and the law, I await your action.

"Yesterday, and since the preparation of the foregoing message, official information was received by me that the latest decree of the Queen Regent of Spain directs General Blanco, in order to prepare and facilitate peace, to proclaim a suspension of hostilities, the duration and details of which have not yet been communicated to me.

"This fact, with every other pertinent consideration, will, I am sure, have your just and careful attention in the solemn deliberations upon which you are about to enter. If this measure attains a successful result, then our aspirations as a Christian, peace-loving people will be realized. If it fails, it will be only another justification for our contemplated action."

It does not seem, now that the war is over, fairly and swiftly won, that there was lacking in this measured language anything becoming the dignity of the United States, the spirit of resolve and sacrifice of the people at large, or any sign of negligence in the discharge of the tremendous functions of the Presidential office. The words "contemplated action" were of deep meaning.

There was something of injustice, for a time, in the criticisms of the course of the President, of the steadfast, imperturbable demeanor with which he met the extraordinarily exacting demands upon him, but the people presently knew, not from spoken words or through the poms of complacency, but

the deeds that were wrought from day to day, that their Chief Magistrate, the Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy, was at the front and never flinched under fire. There appeared in the message, April 11, this passage of solemn caution—then justified—now amply vindicated:

“I said in my message of December last, ‘It is to be seriously considered whether the Cuban insurrection possesses beyond dispute the attributes of statehood which alone can demand the recognition of belligerency in its favor. The same requirement must certainly be no less seriously considered when the graver issue of recognizing independence is in question; for no less positive test can be applied to the greater act than to the lesser; while, on the other hand, the influences and consequences of the struggle upon the internal policy of the recognizing State, which form important factors when the recognition of belligerency is concerned, are secondary, if not rightly eliminable, factors when the real question is whether the community claiming recognition is or is not independent beyond peradventure.

“Nor from the standpoint of expediency do I think it would be wise or prudent for this government to recognize at the present time the independence of the so-called Cuban Republic. Such recognition is not necessary in order to enable the United States to intervene and pacify the island. To commit this country now to the recognition of any particular government in Cuba might subject us to embarrassing conditions of international obligation toward the organization so recognized. In case of intervention our conduct would be subject to the approval or disapproval of such government. We would be required to submit to its direction and to assume to it the mere relation of a friendly ally.

“When it shall appear hereafter that there is within the island a government capable of performing the duties and discharging the functions of a separate nation, and having, as a matter of fact, the proper forms and attributes of nationality, such government can be promptly and readily recognized and the relations and interests of the United States with such nation adjusted.”

This excellent medicine was a bitter dose in the bellies of the Cubans who were doing their fighting out of the island whose soil was contested. Among the forces the President was obliged to restrain from misadventure was the report of Mr. Davis, of the Committee on Foreign Relations, who paraded several resolutions of Congress. Mr. Davis said one-third of the people of

Cuba in the eastern end of the island were subordinate to the insurgent government and "that third of population pays taxes to them, serves in their armies, and in every way supports and is loyal to them. This situation has existed ever since the first few months of the war. The armies of Spain under Campos, Weyler, and Blanco, successively have been repelled in every invasion that they have attempted of the eastern half of the island. The cause of Spain has continually grown weaker, and that of the insurgents has grown stronger."

This was not warranted. It was the acceptance of the exaggerations of the Spanish Cubans, and it was the temporary misfortune of the country that this falsified current history could not be, as conclusively exposed as it has been by the accounts of the army and navy of the United States. Throughout the able and ingenious report of Mr. Davis, the injudicial element cropped out, and the absence of the impartial spirit, that gives due weight to all facts, is evident in the omission of the truth that the insurgent forces were the first to use the torch and originated the savage policy of desolation.

The President was equal to the firm presentation of the truth: "As I said in my message of last December, it was not civilized warfare; it was extermination. The only peace it could beget was that of the wilderness and the grave. Meanwhile, the military situation in the island had undergone a noticeable change. The extraordinary activity that characterized the second year of the war, when the insurgents invaded even the hitherto unharmed fields of Pinar del Rio and carried havoc and destruction up to the walls of the city of Havana itself, had relapsed into a dogged struggle in the central and eastern provinces. The Spanish arms regained a measure of control in Pinar del Rio and parts of Havana, but, under the existing conditions of the rural country, without immediate improvement of their productive situation. Even thus partially restricted, the revolutionists held their own, and their conquest and submission, put forward by Spain as the essential and sole basis of peace, seemed as far distant as at the outset."

Here is the exercise of the judicial faculty. Mr. Davis reported: "It is the opinion of this committee that the time to interpose has arrived; that intervention which will stop the war and secure the national independence of Cuba should at once take place."

Even this was not going far enough. The annexed document is an essential part of the record:

"VIEWS OF MINORITY.

"The undersigned members of said committee cordially concur in the report made upon the Cuban resolutions, but we favor the immediate recognition of the Republic of Cuba, as organized in that island, as a free, independent, and sovereign power among the nations of the world.

"DAVID TURPIE.

"R. Q. MILLS.

"JNO. W. DANIEL.

"J. B. FORAKER."

There was for a time a formidable following of this doctrine, which was an effusion of passion and an apotheosis of imposture, and it will claim a fixed place in the popular recollection, to mark the danger escaped, showing that when the Senate tottered on the edge of a precipice, the quality of public safety was found in the House. Far beyond all other investigating committees, the army of the United States discovered the whole truth, and there are clouds of witnesses that our recognition of the Cuban "Republic" as an established government would have been a degradation of ourselves. This does not imply that the Cuban insurgent forces are not largely composed of brave and honest men, and that there is not capacity in them to participate in good government, but all that concerned them was subjected to competitive deceptions from the peninsular and insular people who had the same habits of both misapprehending and misrepresenting themselves and prevaricating, whether as friends or foemen. The Cuban cause would have been greatly benefited if it had been truthfully served, though nothing could have excused or even considerably extenuated the confirmation of the Spanish accusation of following the precedent of San Domingo, a cause that produced heroes and yet bequeathed to the world a startling lesson of the crimes that may be committed in the name of liberty, the barbarism of which license is productive.

However, the greater crimes in the Indies have had their origin in the wrongs inflicted upon labor paid with the lash, and the greed of the strong in consuming the earnings of the weak.

The events immediately preceding the blowing up of the *Maine* are presented in the dispatches passing between Consul-General Lec and Secretary of State Day. January 12, 1898, mobs, led by Spanish officers, attacked the

offices of three newspapers advocating autonomy. The autonomists were rhetoricians, who thought reform could be founded in fine words. Mobs, on the 13th, shouted against Blanco and for Weyler; the palace and consulate were guarded. General Lee thought if Blanco could not control the situation, "or if Americans and their interests are in danger, ships must be sent;" and it was added they must be ready to move promptly. Quiet prevailed for a few days. January 24th Mr. Day telegraphed Mr. Lee:

"It is the purpose of this government to resume friendly naval visits at Cuban ports. In that view the *Maine* will call at the port of Havana in a day or two. Please arrange for a friendly interchange of calls with authorities."

Lee telegraphed at once:

"Advise visit be postponed six or seven days, to give last excitement more time to disappear. Will see authorities and let you know result. Governor-General away for two weeks. I should know day and hour visit."

Mr. Day responded, 24th:

"*Maine* has been ordered. Will probably arrive at Havana sometime to-morrow. Cannot tell hour; possibly early. Coöperate with authorities for her friendly visit. Keep us advised by frequent telegrams."

The next dispatch from Lee was on January 25th, that the "authorities profess to think United States has ulterior purpose in sending ship—would obstruct autonomy, produce excitement, probably demonstration;" and they asked that the *Maine* should not be sent until instructions could be received from Madrid, and the closing words of the dispatch were that the authorities said, "If for friendly motives, as claimed, delay unimportant." On the same day, "Ship quietly arrived" at eleven in the morning. There was no demonstration. Spanish commanders called on the commander of the *Maine*, and salutes were exchanged. It will be observed that the first feeling of the Spaniards was unfriendly to the *Maine*, and this was succeeded by civility. General Lee, with Captain Sigsbee, and two officers, called on the acting Captain-General January 27th, and the following day Lee telegraphed:

"Acting Governor-General Parrado and staff went with me this morning to return visit of Sigsbee. Inspected the *Maine*, were entertained and given the appropriate salute. Expressed pleasure at their reception and admiration for the splendid battleship."

On the 4th of February the Secretary of the Navy thought it "not prudent for sanitary reasons" to remain long in Havana. If there was another vessel

than the Maine sent, what kind of a ship should it be? Lee replied same day:

"Do not think slightest sanitary danger to officers or crew until April or even May. Ship or ships should be kept here all the time now. We should not relinquish position of peaceful control of situation, or conditions would be worse than if vessel had never been sent. Americans would depart with their families in haste if no vessel in harbor, on account of distrust of preservation of order by authorities. If another riot occurs, will be against Governor-General and autonomy, but might include anti-American demonstration also. First-class battleship should replace present one if relieved, as object lesson and to counteract Spanish opinion of our Navy, and should have torpedo boat with it to preserve communication with Admiral."

February 11th Lee telegraphed: "Sigsbee attended General Blanco's reception with me last night. This morning paid him and others of government officials visit." The next telegram in order was:

(General Lee to Mr. Day.)

"Havana, February 16, 1898, 12:30 p. m.—Maine blown up and destroyed to-night at 9:40 p. m. Explosion occurred well forward under quarters of crew; consequence many were lost. It is believed all officers saved, but Jenkins and Merritt not yet accounted for. Cause of explosion yet to be investigated. Captain-General and Spanish army and navy officers have rendered every assistance. Sigsbee and most of his officers on Ward steamer City of Washington. Others on Spanish man-of-war and in city. Am with Sigsbee now, who has telegraphed Navy Department."

On the 8th of January General Lee wrote Secretary Day:

"I estimate that probably 200,000 of the rural population in the provinces of Pinar del Rio, Havana, Matanzas, and Santa Clara have died of starvation or from resultant causes, and the deaths of whole families almost simultaneously or within a few days of each other, and of mothers praying for their children to be relieved of their horrible sufferings by death, are not the least of the many pitiable scenes which were ever present. In the provinces of Puerto Principe and Santiago de Cuba, where the 'reconcentrado order' could not be enforced, the great mass of the people are self-sustaining."

The following is one of General Lee's inclosures:

"Statistics of death rate in Santa Clara (a town of 14,000 inhabitants):

1890	578	1896 (epidemic of yellow fever among army and Cubans)	<u>1,417</u>
1891	720		
1892	596		
1893	619		
1894	687		
1895	872	1897 (no epidemic)	6,981

(1,492 more than in seven previous years.)”

After the funeral civilities over the victims of the *Maine*, the Spanish officials found, through a Naval Board of inquiry, March 22d:

“That the character of the proceedings undertaken and respect for the law which establishes the absolute extra territoriality of a foreign war vessel have prevented the determination, even by conjecture, of the said internal origin of the disaster, to which also the impossibility of establishing the necessary communication either with the crew of the wrecked vessel or the officials of their government commissioned to investigate the causes of the said event, or with those subsequently intrusted with the issue, has contributed.

“Sixth. That the interior and exterior examination of the bottom of the *Maine*, whenever it is possible, unless the bottom of the ship and that of the place in the bay where it is sunk are altered by the work which is being carried on for the total or partial recovery of the vessel, will prove the correctness of all that is said in this report; but this must not be understood to mean that the accuracy of these present conclusions requires such proof.”

The United States naval court of inquiry, convened by Rear-Admiral Montgomery Sicard, in pursuance of orders of the Department, found that:

“The destruction of the *Maine* occurred at 9:40 p. m., on the 15th day of February, 1898, in the harbor of Havana, Cuba, she being at the time moored to the same buoy to which she had been taken upon her arrival. There were two explosions of a distinctly different character, with a very short but distinct interval between them, and the forward part of the ship was lifted to a marked degree at the time of the first explosion. The first explosion was more in the nature of a report like that of a gun, while the second explosion was more open, prolonged, and of greater volume. This second explosion was, in the opinion of the court, caused by the partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines of the *Maine*.

"At frame 17 the outer shell of the ship, from a point 11½ feet from the middle line of the ship, and 6 feet above the keel when in its normal position, has been forced up so as to be now about 4 feet above the surface of the water, therefore about 34 feet above where it would be had the ship sunk uninjured.

"The outside bottom plating is bent into a reversed V-shape (Δ), the after wing of which, about 15 feet broad and 32 feet in length (from frame 17 to frame 25), is doubled back upon itself against the continuation of the same plating, extending forward.

"At frame 18 the vertical keel is broken in two, and the flat keel bent into an angle similar to the angle formed by the outside bottom plating. This break is now about 6 feet below the surface of the water, and about 30 feet above its normal position.

"In the opinion of the court this effect could have been produced only by the explosion of a mine situated under the bottom of the ship at about frame 18 and somewhat on the port side of the ship.


"The court finds that the loss of the *Maine* on the occasion named was not in any respect due to fault or negligence on the part of any of the officers or members of the crew of said vessel.

"In the opinion of the court the *Maine* was destroyed by the explosion of a submarine mine, which caused the partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines.


"The court has been unable to obtain evidence fixing the responsibility for the destruction of the *Maine* upon any person or persons."

There is no rational question that the condition of the wreck of the *Maine* demonstrates the first explosion was exterior, and that exempting the higher Spanish officers from the charge of guilty knowledge, there must have been some concerned who had official information and responsibility. We give the official casualty list on the *Maine*. It far exceeds in extent of fatalities all the losses of the American navy in all the service of our squadrons in the annihilation of the fleets of Montijo and Cervera at Manila and Santiago, and all the combats with the shore batteries of Cuba and Porto Rico:

"U. S. S. *Maine*, 1st rate, blown up in Havana harbor, February 15, 1898. List of officers, sailors, and marines on board of the U. S. S. *Maine*, who were killed or drowned when that vessel was wrecked in the harbor of Havana, February 15, 1898, or who subsequently died of their injuries."



THE UNITED STATES BATTLESHIP "MAINE."



CAPTAIN SIGSBEE, WHO COMMANDED THE ILL-FATED "MAINE."

(The men marked with an asterisk (*) died subsequently of injuries received when the U. S. S. Maine was destroyed.)

OFFICERS.

Jenkins, Frederick W., lieutenant.
Merritt, Darwin R., assistant engineer.

SAILORS.

Adams, John T., coal passer.	Butler, Frederick F., machinist, second class.
Aitken, James P., boatswain's mate, first class.	Boyle, James, quartermaster, first class.
Anderson, John, boatswain's mate, second class.	Clarke, James C., shipwright.
Andersen, Holm A., coal passer.	Caine, Thomas, blacksmith.
Anderson, Charles, landsman.	Cameron, Walter, seaman.
Anderson, Gustav A., seaman.	Carr, Herbert M., gunner's mate, second class.
Anderson, John, seaman.	Caulfield, William R. B., landsman.
Anderson, Axel C., seaman.	Chingi, Suke, mess attendant.
Andrews, Frank, ordinary seaman.	Christiansen, Charles A., fireman, first class.
Anfindsen, Abraham, cockswain.	Clark, Thomas, coal passer.
Anglund, Bernhard, blacksmith.	Cochrane, Michael, fireman, first class.
Auchenbach, Harry, fireman, second class.	Cole, Thomas M., bayman.
Barry, John P., apprentice, first class.	Coleman, William, ordinary seaman.
Barry, Lewis L., coal passer.	Coleman, William, fireman, second class.
Baum, Henry S., landsman.	Conroy, Anthony, coal passer.
Becker, Jakob, chief machinist.	Cosgrove, William, fireman, second class.
Bell, John R., cabin steward.	Curran, Charles, cockswain.
Blomberg, Fred, landsman.	Dahlman, Berger, seaman.
Bookbinder, John, apprentice, second class.	Dennig, Charles, seaman.
Boll, Fritz, bayman.	Donoughy, William, ordinary sea- man.
Bonner, Leon, seaman.	Drury, James, fireman, first class.
Brinkman, Heinrich, seaman.	Edler, George, seaman.
Brofeldt, Arthur, chief gunner's mate.	Eiermann, Charles F. W., gunner's mate, first class.
Bruns, Adolph C., quartermaster, third class.	*Erikson, Andrew V., seaman.
Burns, Edward, coal passer.	
Burkhardt, Robert, quartermaster, second class.	

SAILORS—CONTINUED.

- Etts, John P., seaman.
 Evensen, Karl, seaman.
 Fadde, Charles F. J., apprentice, first class.
 Falk, Rudolph, oiler.
 Faubel, George D., chief machinist.
 Fewer, William J., boatswain's mate, second class.
 Finch, Trubie, apprentice, first class.
 *Fisher, Frank, ordinary seaman.
 Fisher, Alfred J., oiler.
 Flaherty, Michael, fireman, first class.
 Fleishman, Lewis M., seaman.
 Flynn, Patrick, fireman, second class.
 Fougere, John, coal passer.
 Fountain, Bartley, boatswain's mate, first class.
 Frank, Charles, apprentice, first class.
 Furlong, James F., coal passer.
 Gaffney, Patrick, fireman, first class.
 Gardner, Frank, coal passer.
 Gardner, Thomas J., chief yeoman.
 Gorman, William H., ordinary seaman.
 Gordon, Joseph F., fireman, first class.
 Graham, James A., chief yeoman.
 Graham, Edward P., coal passer.
 Grady, Patrick, coal passer.
 Greer, William A., apprentice, first class.
 Griffin, Michael, fireman, second class.
 Gross, Henry, landsman.
 Grupp, Reinhardt, coal passer.
 Hallberg, John A., oiler.
 Hamburger, William, landsman.
 Hamilton, Charles A., apprentice, first class.
 Hamilton, John, chief carpenter's mate.
 Hanrahan, William C., cockswain.
 Harris, Edward, water tender.
 Harris, Millard F., quartermaster, third class.
 Harley, Daniel O'C. fireman, second class.
 Harty, Thomas J., coal passer.
 Hassell, Charles F., gunner's mate, third class.
 Hauck, Charles, landsman.
 Hawkins, Howard B., ordinary seaman.
 Hennekes, Albert B., gunner's mate, second class.
 Herriman, Benjamin H., apprentice, first class.
 *Holzer, Frederick C., ordinary seaman.
 Holm, Gustav, boatswain's mate, second class.
 *Holland, Alfred J., cockswain.
 Horn, William J., fireman, first class.
 Hough, William L., landsman.
 Hughes, Patrick, fireman, first class.
 Ishida, Otogiro, steerage cook.
 Johansen, Peter C., seaman.
 Johnson, Charles, ordinary seaman.
 Johnson, John W., landsman.
 Johnsson, Peter, oiler.
 Johnson, George, coal passer.
 Jones, Thomas J., coal passer.
 *Jectson, Harry, seaman.
 Jencks, Carlton, gunner's mate, third class.
 Jernee, Fred, coal passer.
 Just, Charles F., apprentice, first class.
 Kane, Michael, coal passer.
 Kay, John A., machinist, first class.
 Kelly, Hugh, coal passer.

SAILORS—CONTINUED.

- Kelly, John, coal passer.
 Keskull, Alexander, seaman.
 Keys, Harry J., ordinary seaman.
 Kihlstrom, Fritz, ordinary seaman.
 Kinsey, Frederick E., machinist, second class.
 Kinsella, Thomas F., machinist, second class.
 Kitagata, Yukichi, warrant officers' cook.
 Kniese, Frederick H., machinist, first class.
 *Koebler, George W., apprentice, first class.
 Kranyak, Charles, apprentice, first class.
 Kruse, Hugo, painter.
 Laird, Charles, master-at-arms, third class.
 Lambert, William, Fireman, second class.
 Lancaster, Luther, boatswain's mate, second class.
 Lapierre, George, apprentice, first class.
 Lawler, Edward, coal passer.
 League, James M., chief yeoman.
 Lee, William J., apprentice, first class.
 Leene, Daniel, coal passer.
 Lees, Samucl, ordinary seaman.
 Leupold, Gustav, fireman, second class.
 Lewis, John B., water tender.
 Lewis, Daniel, oiler.
 Lieber, George, apprentice, first class.
 Lorenzen, Jorgen J., oiler.
 Louden, James W., apprentice, second class.
 Lowell, Clarence E., ordinary seaman.
 Lund, William, cockswain.
 Lydon, John T., ordinary seaman.
 Lynch, Matthew, coal passer.
 Lynch, Bernard, fireman, first class.
 Malone, Michael, fireman, second class.
 Marshall, John E., landsman.
 Marsden, Benjamin L., apprentice, first class.
 Martensson, Johan, gunner's mate, third class.
 Mason, James H., landsman.
 Matiasen, Carl, seaman.
 Matza, John, coal passer.
 Meilstrup, Elmer M., ordinary seaman.
 Merz, John, landsman.
 Mero, Eldon H., chief machinist.
 Miller, George, seaman.
 Miller, William S., apprentice, second class.
 Mobles, George, cockswain.
 Moore, Edward H., coal passer.
 Monfort, William, landsman.
 Moss, Gerhard C., machinist, first class.
 Moss, John H., landsman.
 Mudd, Noble T., seaman.
 Murphy, Cornelius, oiler.
 McGonigle, Hugh, fireman, second class.
 McManus, John J., fireman, second class.
 McNiece, Francis J., coal passer.
 Nielsen, Sophus, cockswain.
 Nielsen, John C., seaman.
 Nolan, Charles M., gunner's mate, third class.
 Noble, William, fireman, second class.
 Nagamine, Tomekichi, mess attendant.

SAILORS—CONTINUED.

- Ohye, Mas, mess attendant.
 Ording, Gustav C., carpenter's mate, third class.
 O'Connor, James, chief boatswain's mate.
 O'Hagan, Thomas J., apprentice, first class.
 O'Neill, Patrick, fireman, second class.
 O'Regan, Henry H., water tender.
 Paige, Frederick, landsman.
 Palmgren, John, seaman.
 Perry, Robert, mess attendant.
 Phillips, Francis C., apprentice, first class.
 Pinkney, James, mess attendant.
 Porter, John, coal passer.
 Powers, John, oiler.
 Price, Daniel, fireman, first class.
 Quigley, Thomas J., plumber and fitter.
 Quinn, Charles P., oiler.
 Reilly, Joseph, fireman, first class.
 Reiger, William A., gunner's mate, first class.
 Rising, Newell, coal passer.
 Robinson, William, landsman.
 Roos, Peter, sailmaker.
 Rushworth, William, chief machinist.
 Safford, Clarence E., gunner's mate, first class.
 Salmin, Michael E., ordinary seaman.
 Schroeder, August, ordinary seaman.
 Scott, Charles A., carpenter's mate, second class.
 Scully, Joseph, boiler maker.
 Seery, Joseph, fireman, first class.
 Sellers, Walter S., apothecary.
 Shea, Patrick J., fireman, first class.
 Shea, Thomas, landsman.
 Shea, John J., coal passer.
 Sheridan, Owen, fireman, second class.
 Shillington, John H., yeoman, third class.
 Simmons, Alfred, coal passer.
 *Smith, Carl A., seaman.
 Smith, Nicholas J., apprentice, first class.
 Stevenson, Nicholas, seaman.
 Sugisaki, Isa, wardroom steward.
 Sutton, Frank, fireman, second class.
 Suzuki, Kashitara, mess attendant.
 Talbot, Frank C., landsman.
 Tehan, Daniel J., coal passer.
 Thompson, George, landsman.
 Tigges, Frank B., coppersmith.
 Tinsman, William H., landsman.
 Todoresco, Constantin, fireman, first class.
 Troy, Thomas, coal passer.
 Tuohey, Martin, coal passer.
 Walsh, Joseph F., cockswain.
 Wallace, John, ordinary seaman.
 Warren, John, fireman, second class.
 White, Charles O., chief master-at-arms.
 Whiten, George, seaman.
 White, Robert, mess attendant.
 Wickstrom, Johan E., seaman.
 Wilson, Albert, seaman.
 Wilson, Robert, chief quartermaster.
 Wilbur, George W., apprentice, first class.
 Ziegler, John H., coal passer.



FUNERAL OF THE VICTIMS OF THE "MAINE" DISASTER.



THE COURT OF INQUIRY INTO THE FATE OF THE "MAINE" IN SESSION.

MARINES.

Wagner, Henry, first sergeant.	Monahan, Joseph P., private.
Bennet, John, private.	McDermott, John, private.
Botting, Vincent H., private.	Newton, C. H., fifer.
Brosnan, George, private.	Newman, F. J., private.
Burns, James R., private.	Richter, A. H., corporal.
Brown, James T., sergeant.	Roberts, James H., private.
Dierking, John H., drummer.	Schoen, Joseph, corporal.
Downing, Michael J., private.	Stock, H. E., private.
Johnson, Charles E., private.	Strongman, James, private.
Jordan, William J., private.	Suman, E. B., private.
Kean, Edward F., private.	Timpany, E. B., private.
Kelly, Frank, private.	Van Horn, H. A., private.
Lauriette, George M., private.	Warren, Asa V., private.
Losko, Peter A., private.	Wills, A. O., private.

LIST OF OFFICERS, SAILORS, AND MARINES ON BOARD
OF THE U. S. S. MAINE WHO WERE SAVED.

Capt. Charles D. Sigsbee, commanding.
 Lieut. Commander Richard Wainwright.
 Lieuts. George F. W. Holman, John Hood, and Carl W. Jungen.
 Lieuts. (Junior Grade) George P. Blow, John J. Blandin.
 Naval Cadets Jonas H. Holden, Watt T. Cluverius, Amon Bronson, and
 David F. Boyd, Jr.
 Surg. Lucien G. Heneberger.
 Paymaster Charles M. Ray.
 Chief Engineer Charles P. Howell.
 Passed Assistant Engineer Frederic C. Bowers.
 Assistant Engineer John R. Morris.
 Naval Cadets (engineer division) Pope Washington and Arthur Crenshaw.
 Chaplain John P. Chidwick.
 First Lieut. of Marines Albertus W. Catlin.
 Boatswain Francis E. Larkin.
 Gunner Joseph Hill.
 Carpenter George Helms.
 Pay Clerk B. McCarty.

SAILORS.

Allen, James W., mess attendant.	Bergman, Charles, boatswain's mate, first class.
Anderson, Oskar, cockswain.	Bloomer, John H., landsman.
Awo, Firsanion, steerage cook.	

SAILORS—CONTINUED.

Bullock, Charles H., gunner's mate, second class.	Lohman, Charles A., coal passer.
Cahill, Francis D., landsman.	Mack, Thomas, landsman.
Christiansen, Karl, fireman, first class.	Matsen, Edward, ordinary seaman.
Cronin, Daniel, landsman.	Mattisen, William, ordinary seaman.
David, George, ordinary seaman.	Melville, Thomas, coal passer.
Dolan, John, seaman.	Mikkelsen, Peter, seaman.
Dressler, Gustav J., apprentice, first class.	Moriniere, Louis, seaman.
Durckin, Thomas J., ordinary seaman.	McCann, Harry, seaman.
Flynn, Michael, seaman.	McNair, William, ordinary seaman.
Foley, Patrick J., apprentice, first class.	Panck, John H., fireman, first class.
Fox, George, landsman.	Pilcher, Charles F., ordinary seaman.
Gartrell, William M., fireman, first class.	Rau, Arthur, seaman.
Hallberg, Alfred, cockswain.	Reden, Martin, seaman.
Ham, Ambrose, apprentice, first class.	Richards, Walter E., apprentice, second class.
Harris, Westmore, mess attendant.	Rowe, James, ship's cook, fourth class.
Heffron, John, ordinary seaman.	Rusch, Frank, ordinary seaman.
Herbert, John, landsman.	Schwartz, George, ship's cook, first class.
Herness, Alfred B., gunner's mate, third class.	Shea, Jeremiah, coal passer.
Hutchings, Robert, landsman.	Teackle, Harry, seaman.
Johnson, Alfred, seaman.	Thompson, William H., landsman.
Kane, Joseph H., landsman.	Toppin, Daniel G., wardroom cook.
Kushida, Katusaburo, warrant of- ficers' steward.	Turpin, John H., mess attendant.
Lanahan, Michael, landsman.	Waters, Thomas J., landsman.
Larsen, Peder, seaman.	Webber, Martin V., landsman.
Larsen, Martin, seaman.	White, John E., landsman.
Load, John B., master-at-arms, third class.	Williams, James, gunner's mate, third class.
	Williams, Henry, cabin cook.
	Willis, Alonzo, apprentice, second class.
	Wilbur, Benjamin R., cockswain.

MARINES.

Anthony, William, private.	Loftus, Paul, private.
Coffey, John, private.	McDevitt, William, private.
Galpin, C. P., private.	McGuinness, William, private.
Germond, C. V., private.	McKay, Edward, private.
Lutz, Joseph, private.	Meehan, Michael, sergeant.
	Thompson, T. G., corporal.



CHAPTER IX.

The San Domingo Torch in Aid of the Cuban Rebellion.

The Policy of Maximo Gomez, and the Famine in Cuba—The Reports of American Consuls in Cuba on the Cane Burning and its Relation to the Starvation of the People—The Agent of the Cubans in Arms Justified Barbarism—The Testimony of Our Consuls that the Gomez Policy was the Cause of the Death of Thousands—Direct Evidence of Black Mail Taxes and the Anxiety of Cuban People to be Annexed to the United States.—The Desperado Orders by Gomez Before Weyler Came to Cuba.

One of the well remembered circumstances of the agitations that preceded the declaration of war with Spain a few days was the intensity with which the champions of the freedom and independence of the Republic of Cuba demanded the reports that the American-Cuban consuls had furnished the State Department, respecting the Spanish policy of the malicious extermination of the Cuban people, and there was a clamor because it was held to be prudent to revise those papers, or withhold them for a few days, in order that the Spaniards might not find, in the official statements of the consuls, reasons that would seem to demand the slaughter of writers of truth about the island.

There were two or three days' waiting, when the consuls were withdrawn from their posts, and preserved, events following so fast that what they had to say about Cuban affairs has never received very much attention. The real character of the documentary evidence will, as a rule, be in the nature of news to those who read this volume. The newspapers having the country in charge and having undertaken the management of the war, had not much space to give Cuban outrages when once there was assurance that we were going to war with the Spaniards.

On the day the *Maine* was blown up, February 15, 1898, General Lee wrote to President McKinley, enclosing a letter from the insurgent General Maximo Gomez, without date, in which the general said:

"The revolution, as absolute master of the country, has never prohibited any citizen, whatever his nationality, from earning his living, and it has hap-

pened that as soon as the barbarous concentration decree was promulgated innumerable families have left and still leave the city for the field, impelled by hunger to wrest from the fruitful Cuban vegetation the means of relieving the most pressing needs of life. Those unhappy beings ignore the fact that if the Spaniards, by steel and privation, have shrouded their hearths in mourning, so also it might be said that the flora of Cuba was in mourning, devastated by the bullet and torch."

It must, of course, have been a solemn occasion when General Gomez referred to the "torch," at the same time claiming that he had done nothing to prevent the gaining of a livelihood by any man. When the Hon. T. Estrada Palma, in 1895, December 7th, wrote to the Secretary of State Richard Olney, he made a statement of points upon which he asked "that the rights of belligerency be accorded them by your government;" and he stated many propositions and elucidated many principles, but gave the greater part of his interesting narrative to the achievements of Gomez, especially the celebration of his campaign against Captain-General Martinez Campos, who was as a fact pretty roughly handled. The strategy of fire by the military Commander-in-Chief was given a good deal of space; and as far east as Santa Clara Mr. Palma mentions that "a most important work of the forces" under Gomez, "which occupied considerable time and caused many encounters with the enemy, was the destruction of telegraph and telephone communications and railroads, of which there are many lines or branches in this district." Of course, this was just preparing the island to enter upon a superior course of internal improvements, but Gomez had everything his own way, the Spanish not interfering, and we quote Mr. Palma's report: "Early in July he issued the first of the now famous orders relative to the sugar crop, and announced his intention of marching through Santa Clara and into Matanzas in the winter in order to superintend the carrying out of his decrees." This is an official avowal to the Secretary of State of the United States by the authorized agent of the Cubans in arms, of the beginning of the destruction of the greatest industry in the richest island in the world—and as Gomez marched westward the skies over Cuba were flushed with fire, so that the red glow was visible at once from the Atlantic Ocean and the Caribbean Sea. We continue to quote from Mr. Palma—page 8, following the demand of the U. S. Senate committee, that Cuba should at once take her place as a sovereign sister among the nations of the earth.

"It was not the intention of General Gomez when he planned his winter campaign to march on and lay siege to the capital, his only object being to prevent the grinding and export of the sugar crop and the consequent flow of treasure into the Spanish coffers, and to demonstrate to the world that he could control the provinces and enforce his orders.

"While this march of the main bodies of troops westward has been carried on, the Cuban forces of the other army corps have also succeeded in carrying out the orders concerning sugar cane and preventing the establishment of Spanish lines of communication."

We suppose that it must have been simply the modesty of Gomez that he did not "lay siege" to Havana. That was undoubtedly the way to fire Cuba—or it would have been if it had not been for the regulation of the sugar business with "the torch." But Gomez wrote to President McKinley on the day of the Maine massacre that he never interfered with a day's work that was to get a living.

Mr. Palma describes in his letter to Mr. Olney that the Cuban army consisted of five army corps, and says: "The first two corps consist of 26,000 men, mostly infantry; the third, of about 4,000 men, mostly cavalry; the Fourth and Fifth Corps consisted before the late invasion of Gomez of over 20,000 men, both infantry and cavalry, which force has been considerably increased in these last days."

Now, here was a magnificent army of liberation of 50,000 men, with more coming, and arms and ammunition pouring in, and a good supply, as Mr. Palma mentions, of artillery. What had become of them when Maximo Gomez was thundering at the gates of Havana two hundred and fifty miles away, with his body-guard and the Victoria regiment, eighty men in each of the august regiments? And where were the first, and second, fourth and fifth army corps of ten thousand men, at least, in each, with 4,000 cavalry to boot, and field pieces galore? Where were those glittering hosts when our small army of 17,000 men landed near Santiago to coöperate with the Cuban cavaliers and legionaries? Why did not Gomez take his swelling ranks, already victorious in setting on fire hundreds of plantations, and set up a republic sure enough?

The particular object in gathering the Cuban consuls' reports was to kindle a blaze with them like that of a flaming cane field, so as to fan high the blasts of war with the intelligence, indisputable because official, of the horrors of the camps where the small farmers were passing away with fevers and

starvation, the grim results of the desolation of the plantations of sugar and tobacco. Now, General Lee believed in the sincerity of Captain-General Blanco, and his chief of staff, Pando—believed they honestly sought to make an end of the famine, and in a letter from Lee to the Secretary of State, Day, November 23, 1897, we find the perfectly frank and true story of the situation:

“First. The insurgents will not accept autonomy.

“Second. A large majority of the Spanish subjects who have commercial and business interests and own property here, will not accept autonomy, but prefer annexation to the United States rather than an independent republic or genuine autonomy under the Spanish flag.

“Third. The Spanish authorities are sincere in doing all in their power to encourage, protect, and promote the grinding of sugar. The grinding season commences in December.

“Fourth. The insurgents’ leaders have given instructions to prevent grinding wherever it can be done, because by diminishing the export of sugar the Spanish government revenues are decreased. It will be very difficult for the Spanish authorities to prevent cane burning, because one man at night can start a fire which will burn hundreds of acres, just as a single individual could ignite a prairie by throwing a match into the dry grass.”

Precisely, and just as a fool or a fiend can burn a house or a city. Notice the reference to Spanish subjects wanting to be citizens of the United States.

Mr. A. C. Brice was the consul at Matanzas, and wrote, January 17, 1898:

“The scenes of misery and distress daily observed are beyond belief. Here is one out of hundreds. In a family of seventeen living in an old lime-kiln, upper part of city limits, all were found dead except three, and they barely alive. . . . A few of the strongest of these people have been sent out to sugar plantations, which expect to grind. They get 30 cents per day and board themselves.

“A few plantations are grinding cane. In every case they are heavily guarded by Spanish troops, and have paid insurgents for so doing. Was shown a letter from insurgent chief to owner of a large plantation, in which the price demanded for grinding was 2,000 centones (\$10,600 United States gold). It was paid. To make crop of sugar this season money, oxen, and laborers must be had. I am, etc.,

A. C. BRICE,

“United States Consul.”

Here we see what was the great principle of "the torch" to which Gomez refers in such a dainty way in his letter through Lee to the President. He was an insurgent chief who wanted \$10,000 United States gold for a permit to make sugar on one plantation; and the perishing Cubans of the famine camps could have had work if this blackmail tax had been paid to the Republic of Cuba. The torch of liberty was to light the flames of total destruction in a great cane mill that offered employment to the starving—if the machinery moved without a rebel permit; and yet Gomez would not allow restraint upon working for a livelihood—except in a case where \$10,000 American gold was wanted to send to New York for patriotic purposes. Some of our great Statesmen have discovered in Gomez a second George Washington, but closely studied there is to be found some difference between the two men.

Mr. Hyatt, U. S. Consul at Santiago de Cuba, writing November 20, 1897, said:

"The Spanish residents of the island are becoming very outspoken in favor of closing the war and annexation to the United States. There are numerous inquiries among them of how they can become citizens of our Government. There are also quite a number of Spanish soldiers making the same inquiry. The business Spaniards here declare that they are tired of doing business at a loss, and that peace and prosperity can only come by annexation. Many are greatly disappointed that the United States consul cannot make American citizens of them at once.

"With highest, etc.,

PULASKI F. HYATT,

"United States Consul."

December 5, 1897, Mr. Hyatt wrote: "Mr. Rigney, an American sugar planter near Manzanilla, was preparing to grind during the coming season. A few nights since the insurgents fired seven cannon shots among his buildings, one ball passing through the roof of his house. Americans were hopeful that they would be allowed to make their crop, and several are making ready to do so; but the action of the insurgents toward Mr. Rigney gives the problem a doubtful aspect. It may have been a personal matter against Mr. Rigney. The number of destitute Americans fed by this consulate decreased from 89 to 64, but is again on the increase."

It is to be taken into consideration that here is another consular report of Spanish residents wanting to become Americans, through "annexation to the United States." We think it entirely probable that these people may soon

know enough to help govern themselves. Spanish soldiers are making the same inquiry. Here it is mentioned as a matter of business that as insurgent cannon balls were fired to stop sugar making, the destitution of American citizens was on the increase. The connection between fire and famine is distinctly made.

American Consul McGarr, writing from Cienfuegos, January 10, 1898:

"Consulate of the United States, Cienfuegos, January 10, 1898.—Sir: All the sugar mills in this consular jurisdiction, 23 in number, have been grinding since the first of the month, and at the busy centrales the various industries incident to the gathering of the crop and the manufacture of sugar are in full and steady operation.

"Several of the principal estates are owned by American citizens and corporations, and most of their skilled employés are brought from the United States.

"The demand for labor on the sugar estates has drawn from the towns a great portion of the unemployed laborers and given employment to the male 'concentrados,' many of whom were in a state of enforced idleness and destitution. As a consequence, few of them are now seen here, and the labor 'congestion' has been relieved.

"Small predatory parties of insurgents make frequent attempts to fire the cane fields, and it requires constant and active vigilance to prevent their destruction. The dry weather and the high winds prevailing at this season render it a simple matter for one person (who can easily conceal himself in the tall cane) to start a conflagration that will, unless promptly extinguished, destroy hundreds of acres in a few hours.

"Hence the almost impossibility, with the utmost watchfulness and using every practicable safeguard, to prevent some loss of cane by the fires started, often under cover of darkness, by the stealthy incendiaries familiar with the locality and always on the alert for an opportunity to apply the torch.


"The sugar crop is the support of all classes, and especially of the laboring class, and should it be in large part destroyed a famine in reality would be inevitable.

"I am, etc.,

OWEN MCGARR,

"United States Consul."

This does not seem to have been exactly what was expected in the consular reports, but it is extremely pertinent and valuable, and it could never



QUARTER-DECK OF THE U. S. S. "BROOKLYN."



FIRE ROOM OF THE U. S. S. "BROOKLYN."

have had a greater opening for usefulness than just now, as the flag of the United States is raised over Cuba.

The Consul, Mr. Hyatt, at Santiago de Cuba, writing December 21, 1897, said:

"As yet planters are all at sea as to whether they will grind cane or not. It is no secret that they will have to make terms with the insurgents if they do, and I understand that an agreement by which 50 cents per bag, or about 15 cents per 100, will be paid for Cuban hands off. Planters say this will leave them no profit, but leave their plantations in better order for future operations.

"The three Rivery brothers, American citizens and owners of coffee, cocoa, and orange groves, are about to return to their places. They are absolutely penniless, and say they would have surely starved but for the food issued from this consulate. I shall continue to supply them with food, and issue a month's rations of such food as rice, beans, codfish, crackers, etc., as their homes are over 30 miles away."

The letter following, from a historic place, is of historical importance:

(Mr. Hyatt to Mr. Day.)

"Consulate of the United States, Santiago de Cuba, January 12, 1898.— Sir: I deem it a duty to lay before the honorable Department of State the situation here as affecting American interests, and to inclose herewith an order issued by command of General Maximo Gomez, and a translation of the same, forbidding the grinding of the sugar crop for the years 1897 and 1898.

"In this part of Cuba, so far as I can learn, all idea of making a sugar crop is entirely abandoned.

"I regret to say that the stoppage of industries, from present appearances, will not halt at the sugar crop, but coffee and other agricultural crops fall under the same ban.

"I had hoped that, after the reconcentration order was revoked, through the energetic action of the present administration, we would find no trouble in reinstating American industries; but it appears that all of the benefits that should have accrued to our citizens are thwarted by the action of the insurgents, who refuse to allow them to return to their sugar, coffee and other estates. The Pompo Manganese mines, owned by Americans, which would

at the present time be a very profitable investment if allowed to operate, are also being held up by the same power.

"The three Rivery brothers, whom I informed you recently I was about to assist in returning to their coffee and fruit estates, got there only to find they could not go to work until permission was obtained from the insurgent commander, which permission seems doubtful, I myself, as I understand my duty, being inhibited from rendering them any assistance at this point.

"These, with several sugar estates within my consular district, are held up and becoming more worthless than before.

"It is beyond the power of my pen to describe the situation in eastern Cuba. Squalidity, starvation, sickness, and death meet one in all places. Beggars throng our doors and stop us on the streets. The dead in large numbers remain over from day to day in the cemeteries unburied.

"Very respectfully,

PULASKI F. HYATT,

"United States Consul."

The connection between the blackmail, sugar burning policy of the insurgents reaffirmed by Gomez, and the "squalidity, starvation, sickness and death" is absolutely established.

Mr. Walter B. Barker, writing November 20, 1897:

"As to grinding the present crop, I have interviewed most of the largest planters in this consular district, who stated that unless assured of immunity from the insurgent chief—Gomez—they would not jeopardize their property by attempting to grind."

"Consulate of the United States, Sagua la Grande, December 15, 1897.—
Sir: Thinking it may interest the Department, I have the honor to transmit herewith clippings from a leading Spanish journal published in Havana, . . . calling attention to the inability of the mills to grind in the Province of Santiago de Cuba, which is one of the obstacles to grinding in this (Santa Clara) province, where the planters are not able to pay tribute required by the insurgents.

"The grinding season being at hand without preparations having been made dissipates all hope of a beginning.

"Not to grind the present crop, small as it must be, will bring distress far greater than can be imagined.

"I am, etc.,

WALTER B. BARKER,

"Consul."

(Mr. Barker to Mr. Day.)

"Consulate of the United States, Sagua la Grande, December 28, 1897.—The suffering and destitution among the concentrados . . . is fearful, and must continue to grow worse.

"How could the situation be otherwise, since the island is producing absolutely nothing, save some growing cane, and at the same time completely exhausted of all food. Relief alone can be obtained from the outer world in the way of charitable contributions.

"This—Santa Clara—province is capable at this season of producing, perhaps, two-thirds of whatever cane might be made in the entire island.

"To grind this cane without interruption would be the means of saving the lives of thousands who, without this or outside aid within the next thirty to fifty days, must die of actual hunger. Over a month since, the planters were officially advised of Spain's inability to provide protection in order to operate their mills. This leaves the sugar growers entirely in the hands of the Cubans in revolt, as to whether they will be allowed to grind without hindrance or fear of total destruction of their property. I know that strict orders have been given to subordinate commanders under no circumstances must mills be permitted to grind, under penalty of violation of the order forth destruction of property.

"Without contributions of food and medicine from the outer world, and at once, a sacrifice of lives will ensue, the responsibility for which no Christian people can face.

"I am, etc., WALTER B. BARKER, Consul."

Here is the proof in consular reports that were expected to fill the United States with horror toward the Spaniards, furnishing the proof that the insurgents, carrying on their blackmail war upon industry, refused to save thousands of lives by permitting sugar making.

"Consulate of the United States, Sagua la Grande, January 31, 1898.—At my suggestion several families returned to the American-owned 'Central Santa Anna,' the owner having been forced to abandon the property in order to prevent further spoliation of the mill machinery. Although a government guard is stationed on the place, they (former tenants) were ordered to leave.

"One sugar mill is running, not without interruption, with chances of making one-fourth of a crop. Another—just started up—was attacked yester-

day by a band of insurgents, killing 14 and wounding 5 of the guerrillas paid by the estate to protect the operatives. Seven laborers were killed, the insurgents leaving two of their dead.

"An adjoining estate, the property of the British consul, was also attacked, the growing cane burned. This precludes further attempts to grind, as men cannot be induced to work while the insurgents roam at will over the country.

"I am, etc.,

WALTER B. BARKER, Consul."

We do not say that Maximo Gomez meant to inflict famine upon Cuba, for he probably had the barbarian instinct that led him to think that to fling firebrands was a way of announcing liberty. He issued a proclamation dated at Sancti Spiritus, November 11, 1895, placing the responsibility, as he said, for the great ruin he was about to inflict, upon "passive" people. He added:

"This people cannot hesitate between the wealth of Spain and the liberty of Cuba. Its greatest crime would be to stain the land with blood without effecting its purposes because of puerile scruples and fears which do not concur with the character of the men who are in the field."


July 1, 1895, at Najasa Camaguay, Gomez issued an address to the planters and cattle ranchers:

"Whereas, all exploitations of any product whatsoever are aids and resources to the Government that we are fighting, it is resolved by the General-in-Chief to issue this general order throughout the island that the introduction of articles of commerce, as well as beef and cattle, into the towns occupied by the enemy, is absolutely prohibited. The sugar plantations will stop their labors, and whosoever shall attempt to grind the crop notwithstanding this order, will have their cane burned and their buildings demolished."


Any one disobeying this order was to be considered an enemy and "treated as a traitor." Gomez also issued a peremptory order as follows:

"Headquarters of the Army of Liberation, Territory of Sancti Spiritus, November 6, 1895.—Animated by the spirit of unchangeable resolution in defense of the rights of the revolution of redemption of this country of colonists, humiliated and despised by Spain, and in harmony with what has been decreed concerning the subject in the circular dated the 1st of July, I have ordered the following:

"Article I. That all plantations shall be totally destroyed, their cane and outbuildings burned, and railroad connections destroyed.



A FRUIT VENDOR IN HAVANA.



12-INCH BREECH-LOADING MORTARS. WEIGHT, 28,980 POUNDS EACH.

"Art. II. All laborers who shall aid the sugar factories—these sources of supplies that we must deprive the enemy of—shall be considered as traitors to their country.

"Art. III. All who are caught in the act, or whose violation of Article II. shall be proven, shall be shot. Let all chiefs of operations of the army of liberty comply with this order, determined to unfurl triumphantly, even over ruin and ashes, the flag of the Republic of Cuba.

"In regard to the manner of waging the war, follow the private instructions that I have already given.

"For the sake of the honor of our arms and your well-known courage and patriotism, it is expected that you will strictly comply with the above orders.

"M. GOMEZ, General-in-Chief.

"To the chiefs of operations: Circulate this."

Here we have the official announcement of the policy of firebugs, as that of liberation, and it is the confirmation of this firebug policy that is now thrust like a torch in the face of the United States, in the name of freedom and independence.





CHAPTER X.

The Way the War Business was Handled.

The Declaration of War—The President's Call upon Congress to Take Action—Fit and Few Words—The Constant Scramble in Congress for the Cuban Ghost Dance Government—The Official Text of the President's War Proclamations—The Navy had First to Take Command of the Seas—The Timely Dispatches from the Navy Department, Making Ready for War—Major General Miles and his 50,000 Cubans.

A considerable number of members of Congress were slow in appreciating the excellence of the attitude of the President in holding fast the last chances of peace and at the same time urging forward as part of the same policy works of charity and preparations for war. He was better understood and held in higher esteem during a few days of agitation, abroad than at home, and the general consent of civilized nations that the international position of our country was unassailable, that contributed to our success, was in a great measure due to the propriety of the course of the President, which presently consolidated public sentiment in all the States, and appealed with dignity to the Powers, whose interest became as intelligible as it was indisputable. Especially was the far-sighted thoughtfulness of the President comprehended and respected in England, and through all the months of exciting trial and straining tests we felt the firm grasp of her friendly hand, and the growth of mutual regard stronger than treaties, because it was the genuine self-evidence of the kindred blood of the nations, and that their joint influence would be without conventions one of the mightiest in the betterment of the world.

The weight of the President's message of April 11th was felt to be overwhelming in gravity and import. He said, "I ask Congress to authorize and empower the President to take measures to secure a full and final termination of hostilities between the government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to insure in the island the establishment of a stable government." The words had been picked for their places, and were "stable." There was wanted,

the President added, a government in Cuba "capable of maintaining order and of observing its international obligations—insuring peace and tranquillity, and the security of its citizens as well as its own." This was just as plain as a proclamation could have been written, that the ghost dance of the Cuban Republic was not what was wanted—that their government was a gang not to be put in possession by our arms of the island they had devastated with the torch. The next words were that the President wanted the authority of Congress "to use the military and naval forces of the United States"—and this as might be "necessary for those purposes." The next four sentences were clear as shafts of white light, keen as steel, and terminal, "The issue is now with the Congress. It is a solemn responsibility. I have exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs which is at our doors. Prepared to execute every obligation imposed upon me by the Constitution and the law, I await some action." These were the words of truth and sobriety. The country was the stronger for this soberness, and knew it. There was no need to quote Grant and Jackson, but it was done, and well done. There was no question as to the commander and pilot of the Ship of State. On the 13th of April the House resolved for immediate intervention, 334 to 19. The terms of the resolution were tinged with the preliminary temper, but the business was in the words: "The President is hereby authorized and directed to intervene at once, to stop the war in Cuba." The President's words were not, in the part of the resolution that was definite and certain, far departed from. The purpose of the intervention was defined to be "permanent peace and order," and "establishing by the free action of the people" a "stable and independent government of their own," and the President was empowered to use the army and navy for that purpose. But the filibuster war party strove to twist into the texture of the proceedings an advertisement of the intended Republic, and a quit claim deed to its professional managers; the scramble was for this perversity. There was a joint resolution that "the United States government hereby recognizes the independence of the Republic of Cuba." This was defeated, 191 to 150. The Senate, with a whereas about the Maine, resolved, "That the people of the island of Cuba are and of right ought to be free and independent." It was amended to read, "That the people of the island of Cuba of right ought to be free and independent." The House voted, yeas 178, nays 156. The next day the President wrote on the joint resolution engrossed on parchment,

"Approved, William McKinley, April 20, 1898." The passports of the Spanish Minister were dated the same day, and the next day the American Minister left Madrid, handing the interests of the American citizens and affairs to the Minister of England. The President's blockade message was of the date of April 25th. The call for volunteers, in the aggregate 125,000, was on the 23d of April, and it was certified as done by the President, by John Sherman, Secretary of State.

"MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

"Transmitting Copies of Correspondence Recently Had with the Representative of Spain in the United States, with the United States Minister at Madrid, and through the Latter with the Government of Spain, Showing the Action Taken under the Joint Resolution Approved April 20, 1898.—April 25, 1898.—Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and ordered to be printed.

"To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America:—I transmit to the Congress, for its consideration and appropriate action, copies of correspondence recently had with the representative of Spain in the United States, with the United States Minister at Madrid, and through the latter with the government of Spain, showing the action taken under the joint resolution approved April 20, 1898, 'for the recognition of the independence of the people of Cuba, demanding that the government of Spain relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the President of the United States to use the land and naval forces of the United States to carry these resolutions into effect.'

"Upon communicating to the Spanish Minister in Washington the demand which it became the duty of the Executive to address to the government of Spain in obedience to said resolution, the Minister asked for his passports and withdrew. The United States Minister at Madrid was in turn notified by the Spanish Minister for foreign affairs that the withdrawal of the Spanish representative from the United States had terminated diplomatic relations between the two countries, and that all official communications between their respective representatives ceased therewith.

"I commend to your especial attention the note addressed to the United States Minister at Madrid by the Spanish Minister for foreign affairs on the

21st instant, whereby the foregoing notification was conveyed. It will be perceived therefrom that the government of Spain, having cognizance of the joint resolution of the United States Congress, and in view of the things which the President is thereby required and authorized to do, responds by treating the reasonable demands of this government as measures of hostility, following with that instant and complete severance of relations by its action, which by the usage of nations accompanies an existent state of war between sovereign powers.

"The position of Spain being thus made known and the demands of the United States being denied with a complete rupture of intercourse by the act of Spain, I have been constrained, in exercise of the power and authority conferred upon me by the joint resolution aforesaid, to proclaim, under date of April 22, 1898, a blockade of certain ports of the north coast of Cuba, lying between Cardenas and Bahia Honda, and of the port of Cienfuegos on the south coast of Cuba; and further, in exercise of my constitutional powers and using the authority conferred upon me by the act of Congress approved April 22, 1898, to issue my proclamation, dated April 23, 1898, calling forth volunteers in order to carry into effect the said resolution of April 20, 1898. Copies of these proclamations are hereto appended.

"In view of the measures so taken, and with a view to the adoption of such other measures as may be necessary to enable me to carry out the expressed will of the Congress of the United States in the premises, I now recommend to your honorable body the adoption of a joint resolution declaring that a state of war exists between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain, and I urge speedy action thereon, to the end that the definition of the international status of the United States as a belligerent power may be made known, and the assertion of all its rights and the maintenance of all its duties in the conduct of public war may be assured.

"WILLIAM McKINLEY.

"Executive Mansion, Washington, April 25, 1898."

No. 1.

Mr. Sherman to Mr. Woodford.

(Telegram in Cipher.)

"Department of State, Washington, April 14, 1898—Tuesday noon.—House of Representatives, 324 to 19, passed yesterday afternoon resolution authorizing and directing the President to intervene at once to stop the war

in Cuba, with the purpose of securing peace and order there and establishing by the free action of the people thereof, a stable and independent government of their own, and empowering him to use the land and naval forces to execute that purpose. Senate committee on Foreign affairs reported yesterday resolution declaring that the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent, demanding that Spain relinquish authority and government in Cuba and withdraw land and naval forces therefrom, and empowering the President to use Army and Navy and militia to carry resolutions into effect. It will probably be decisively voted to-day. Ultimate resolution in conference can not now be forecast, but will doubtless direct intervention by force, if need be, to secure free Cuba. The situation is most critical.

JOHN SHERMAN."

No. 2.

Mr. Day to Mr. Woodford.

(Telegram, in part cipher.)

"Department of State, Washington, April 17, 1898.—The Senate, Saturday evening, by 67 votes to 21, passed a resolution amending all of the House resolution after the enacting clause. It declares as follows:

"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled:

"First. That the people of the Island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent, and that the government of the United States hereby recognizes the Republic of Cuba as the true and lawful government of that island.

"Second. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the government of the United States does hereby demand, that the government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

"Third. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States to such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.

"Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island,

except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its people.'

"The House has taken a recess until 10 Monday morning, when vote will be taken on concurring in the Senate amendments. If the House non-concurs, conference follows. Ultimate form of resolution cannot yet be foreseen.

"Sunday morning, 1 o'clock. DAY, Acting."

No. 3.

Mr. Day to Mr. Woodford.

(Telegram, in cipher.)

"Department of State, Washington, April 19, 1898.—At 3 this morning, after prolonged conferences, the Senate and the House of Representatives adopted the joint resolution the text of which was telegraphed to you Saturday night, omitting from the first section the words 'and that the government of the United States hereby recognizes the Republic of Cuba as the true and lawful government of that island.' Vote in Senate, 42 to 35; in House, 310 against 6.

"An instruction will be telegraphed you later, immediately on the President signing the joint resolution. In the meantime you will prepare for withdrawal from Spain, and notify consuls to be ready for the signal to leave. If any consul is in danger, he may quietly leave at his discretion.

"DAY."

No. 4.

Mr. Woodford to Mr. Day.

(Telegram, in cipher.)

"Madrid, April 20, 1898.—Have received telegram of Tuesday morning; am prepared to withdraw; have notified consuls to be ready.

"WOODFORD."

No. 5.

Mr. Sherman to Mr. Woodford.

(Telegram, plain.)

"Department of State, Washington, April 20, 1898.—You have been furnished with the text of a joint resolution voted by the Congress of the United States on the 19th instant (approved to-day) in relation to the pacifica-

tion of the island of Cuba. In obedience to that act the President directs you to immediately communicate to the government of Spain said resolution, with the formal demand of the government of the United States that the government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters. In taking this step the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its people under such free and independent government as they may establish.

"If by the hour of noon on Saturday next, the 23d day of April, instant, there be not communicated to this government by that of Spain a full and satisfactory response to this demand and resolution whereby the ends of peace in Cuba shall be assured, the President will proceed without further notice to use the power and authority enjoined and conferred upon him by the said joint resolution to such extent as may be necessary to carry the same into effect.

SHERMAN."

No. 6.

Mr. Sherman to the Spanish Minister.

"Department of State, Washington, April 20, 1898.—Sir: I have the honor to communicate to you a copy of an instruction sent this day to the United States Minister at Madrid, by telegraph, in obedience to a joint resolution of the Congress of the United States of America in relation to the pacification of the island of Cuba, approved this day, of which a copy is hereto annexed.

"I avail myself of this opportunity to repeat to you the assurances of my highest consideration.

JOHN SHERMAN."

"Joint Resolution for the recognition of the independence of the people of Cuba, demanding that the government of Spain relinquish its authority and government in the Island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the President of the United States to use the land and naval forces of the United States to carry these resolutions into effect.

"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United

States of America in Congress assembled, First. That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent.

"Second. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the government of the United States does hereby demand, that the government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

"Third. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States, to such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.

"Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people.

"Approved, April 20, 1898."

No. 7.

Spanish Minister to Mr. Sherman.

(Translation.)

"Legation of Spain, Washington, April 20, 1898. (Received 11:35 a. m.)—Mr. Secretary: The resolution adopted by the Congress of the United States of America and approved to-day by the President is of such a nature that my continuance in Washington becomes impossible and obliges me to request of you the delivery of my passports.

"The protection of Spanish interests will be intrusted to the French Ambassador and to the Austrian-Hungarian Minister.

"On this occasion, very painful to me, I have the honor to renew to you the assurances of my highest consideration.

"LUIS POLO DE BERNABÉ."

No. 8.

Mr. Sherman to the Spanish Minister.

"Department of State, Washington, April 20, 1898.—Mr. Minister: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of this day's date, in

which you state that the resolution adopted by the Congress of the United States of America, and to-day approved by the President, is of such a nature as to make your continuance in Washington impossible and constrains you to request that your passports be given you. You add that the protection of Spanish interests is intrusted to the Ambassador of France and the Minister of Austria-Hungary.

"In response to your request I have the honor to hand you a passport for yourself, your family, and your suite. I beg also to inform you that arrangements have been made for a guard to attend you during your presence in the territory of the United States.

"Sincerely regretting the step that you have felt constrained to take, I avail myself of this opportunity to again tender you the assurances of my highest consideration.

JOHN SHERMAN."

Copy of passport handed to Minister Polo de Bernabé.

No.—.) United States of America.

"To all to whom these presents shall come greeting: Know ye that the bearer hereof, Señor Don Luis Polo de Bernabé, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Spain to the United States, is about to travel abroad, accompanied by his family and suite.

"These are therefore to request all officers of the United States, or of any State thereof, whom it may concern, to permit them to pass freely, without let or molestation, and to extend to them friendly aid and protection in case of need.

"In testimony whereof, I, John Sherman, Secretary of State of the United States of America, have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Department of State to be affixed at Washington, this 20th day of April, A. D. 1898, and of the independence of the United States of America the one hundred and twenty-second.

"(Seal.)

SHERMAN."

No. 9.

Mr. Sherman to Mr. Woodford.

(Telegram, in part cipher.)

"Department of State, April 20, 1898.—Señor Polo de Bernabé, Spanish Minister to the United States, upon being informed, shortly before noon

to-day, of the action of this government taken in pursuance of the resolutions of Congress of April 19, 1898, has asked for his passports. In compliance with his request passports for himself, his family, and suite have been handed him, with assurances of safety while within the territory of the United States.

“Unless previously handed your passports, you will be expected to remain near the Court of Spain till Saturday noon of this week, and unless by that day and hour some communication is received from the government of Spain which you deem will be satisfactory to this government, you will ask for your passports and safe conduct. SHERMAN.”

No. 10.

Mr. Woodford to Mr. Sherman.

(Telegram, received in cipher.)

“Madrid, April 21, 1898. (Received 9:02 a. m.)—Early this (Thursday) morning, immediately after the receipt of your open telegram and before I had communicated same to Spanish government, Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs notified me that diplomatic relations are broken between the two countries, and that all official communication between their respective representatives has ceased. I accordingly asked for safe passport. Turn legation over to British embassy and leave for Paris this afternoon. Have notified consuls.”

No. 11.

Mr. Woodford to Mr. Sherman.

(Telegram.)

“United States Legation, Madrid, April 21, 1898.—Following is text of official note received this morning at 7:30 o'clock from Spanish Minister of State:

“In compliance with a painful duty, I have the honor to inform your excellency that, the President having approved a resolution of both Chambers of the United States which, in denying the legitimate sovereignty of Spain and in threatening armed intervention in Cuba, is equivalent to an evident declaration of war, the government of His Majesty has ordered its Minister in Washington to withdraw without loss of time from the North American territory with all the personnel of the legation. By this act the diplomatic relations which previously existed between the two countries are broken off, all

official communication between their respective representatives ceasing, and I hasten to communicate this to your excellency in order that on your part you may make such dispositions as seem suitable.

“I beg of your excellency to kindly acknowledge the receipt of this note, and I avail myself, etc.’

WOODFORD.”

No. 12.

Mr. Woodford to Mr. Sherman.

(Telegram.)

“Madrid, April 21, 1898. (Received 3:01 p. m.)—Following is text of my reply to official note received this morning at 7:30 o'clock from Spanish Minister of State:

“I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt this morning of your note of this date informing me that the Spanish Minister at Washington has been ordered to withdraw with all his legation and without loss of time from North American territory. You also informed me that by this act diplomatic relations between the two countries are broken off, that all official communication between their respective representatives ceases. I have accordingly this day telegraphed the American Consul-General at Barcelona to instruct all the consular representatives of the United States in Spain to turn their respective consulates over to the British consuls and to leave Spain at once. I have myself turned this legation over to Her Britannic Majesty's embassy at Madrid. That embassy will from this time have the care of all American interests in Spain. I now request passports and safe conduct to the French frontier for myself and the personnel of this legation. I intend leaving this afternoon at 4 o'clock for Paris. I avail myself, etc.’

“WOODFORD.”

No. 13.

(Blockade of Cuban Ports.)

By the President of the United States of America.

“A PROCLAMATION.

“Whereas, by a joint resolution passed by the Congress and approved April 20, 1898, and communicated to the government of Spain, it was

demanding that said government at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters; and the President of the United States was directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States to such extent as might be necessary to carry said resolution into effect; and

“Whereas, in carrying into effect said resolution, the President of the United States deems it necessary to set on foot and maintain a blockade of the north coast of Cuba, including all ports on said coast, between Cardenas and Bahia Honda, and the port of Cienfuegos on the south coast of Cuba:

“Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United States, in order to enforce the said resolution do hereby declare and proclaim that the United States of America have instituted and will maintain a blockade of the north coast of Cuba, including ports on said coast between Cardenas and Bahia Honda, and the port of Cienfuegos on the south coast of Cuba, aforesaid, in pursuance of the laws of the United States and the law of nations applicable to such cases. An efficient force will be posted so as to prevent the entrance and exit of vessels from the ports aforesaid. Any neutral vessel approaching any of said ports, or attempting to leave the same, without notice or knowledge of the establishment of such blockade, will be duly warned by the commander of the blockading forces, who will indorse on her register the fact, and the date, of such warning, where such indorsement was made; and if the same vessel shall again attempt to enter any blockaded port, she will be captured and sent to the nearest convenient port for such proceedings against her and her cargo as prize as may be deemed advisable.

“Neutral vessels lying in any of said ports at the time of the establishment of such blockade will be allowed thirty days to issue therefrom.

“In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

“Done at the city of Washington, this 22d day of April, A. D. 1898, and of the independence of the United States the one hundred and twenty-second.

“(Seal.)

WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

“By the President:

“JOHN SHERMAN, Secretary of State.”

No. 14.

(Call for Volunteers—Spain.)

By the President of the United States.

“A PROCLAMATION.

“Whereas a joint resolution of Congress was approved on the twentieth day of April, 1898, entitled ‘Joint resolution for the recognition of the independence of the people of Cuba, demanding that the government of Spain relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the President of the United States to use the land and naval forces of the United States to carry these resolutions into effect;’ and

“Whereas, by an act of Congress entitled ‘An act to provide for temporarily increasing the military establishment of the United States in time of war, and for other purposes,’ approved April 22, 1898; the President is authorized, in order to raise a volunteer army, to issue his proclamation calling for volunteers to serve in the Army of the United States:

“Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United States, by virtue of the power vested in me by the Constitution and the laws, and deeming sufficient occasion to exist, have thought fit to call forth and hereby do call forth, volunteers to the aggregate number of 125,000, in order to carry into effect the purpose of the said resolution; the same to be apportioned, as far as practicable, among the several States and Territories, and the District of Columbia, according to population, and to serve for two years, unless sooner discharged. The details for this object will be immediately communicated to the proper authorities through the War Department.

“In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

“Done at the city of Washington, this twenty-third day of April, A. D. 1898, and of the independence of the United States the one hundred and twenty-second.

“(Seal.)

WILLIAM McKINLEY.

“By the President:

JOHN SHERMAN, Secretary of State.”

PROCLAMATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT RELATING TO THE
WAR WITH SPAIN.

(Blockade of Cuban Ports.)

By the President of the United States of America.

“A PROCLAMATION.

“Whereas, by a joint resolution passed by the Congress and approved April 20, 1898, and communicated to the government of Spain, it was demanded that said government at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters; and the President of the United States was directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States to such extent as might be necessary to carry said resolution into effect; and

“Whereas, in carrying into effect said resolution, the President of the United States deems it necessary to set on foot and maintain a blockade of the north coast of Cuba, including all ports on said coast between Cardenas and Bahia Honda and the port of Cienfuegos on the south coast of Cuba:

“Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United States, in order to enforce the said resolution, do hereby declare and proclaim that the United States of America have instituted, and will maintain a blockade of the North coast of Cuba, including ports on said coast between Cardenas and Bahia Honda, and the port of Cienfuegos on the south coast of Cuba, aforesaid, in pursuance of the laws of the United States and the law of nations applicable to such cases. An efficient force will be posted so as to prevent the entrance and exit of vessels from the ports aforesaid. Any neutral vessel approaching any of said ports, or attempting to leave the same, without notice or knowledge of the establishment of such blockade, will be duly warned by the commander of the blockading forces, who will indorse on her register the fact, and the date, of such warning, where such indorsement was made; and if the same vessel shall again attempt to enter any blockaded port, she will be captured and sent to the nearest convenient port for such proceedings against her and her cargo as prize, as may be deemed advisable.

“Neutral vessels lying in any of said ports at the time of the establishment of such blockade will be allowed thirty days to issue therefrom.

“In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

“Done at the city of Washington, this 22d day of April, A. D. 1898, and of the independence of the United States, the one hundred and twenty-second.

“(Seal.)

WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

“By the President.

“JOHN SHERMAN, Secretary of State.”

(Call for Volunteers—Spain.)


By the President of the United States.

“A PROCLAMATION.

“Whereas, a joint resolution of Congress was approved on the twentieth day of April, 1898, entitled ‘Joint resolution for the recognition of the independence of the people of Cuba, demanding that the government of Spain relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the President of the United States to use the land and naval forces of the United States to carry these resolutions into effect,’ and

“Whereas, by an act of Congress entitled ‘An act to provide for temporarily increasing the military establishment of the United States in time of war and for other purposes,’ approved April 22, 1898; the President is authorized, in order to raise a volunteer army, to issue his proclamation calling for volunteers to serve in the Army of the United States:

“Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United States, by virtue of the power vested in me by the Constitution and the laws, and deeming sufficient occasion to exist, have thought fit to call forth and hereby do call forth, volunteers to the aggregate number of 125,000, in order to carry into effect the purpose of the said resolution; the same to be apportioned, as far as practicable, among the several States and Territories and the District



THE FLYING SQUADRON.



ADMIRAL DEWEY AS CHIEF OF BUREAU OF EQUIPMENT, UNITED STATES NAVY.

of Columbia, according to population, and to serve for two years, unless sooner discharged. The details for this object will be immediately communicated to the proper authorities through the War Department.

"In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

"Done at the city of Washington, this twenty-third day of April, A. D. 1898, and of the independence of the United States the one-hundred and twenty-second.

"(Seal.)

WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

"By the President:

"JOHN SHERMAN, Secretary of State."

(War with Spain—Maritime Law.)

By the President of the United States of America.

"A PROCLAMATION.

"Whereas, by an act of Congress, approved April 25, 1898, it is declared that war exists and that war has existed since the 21st day of April, A. D. 1898, including said day, between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain; and

"Whereas, it being desirable that such war should be conducted upon principles in harmony with the present views of nations and sanctioned by their recent practice, it has already been announced that the policy of this government will be not to resort to privateering, but to adhere to the rules of the Declaration of Paris:

"Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the power vested in me by the Constitution and the laws, do hereby declare and proclaim:

"1. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war.

"2. Neutral goods, not contraband of war, are not liable to confiscation under the enemy's flag.

"3. Blockades in order to be binding must be effective.

"4. Spanish merchant vessels, in any ports or places within the United States, shall be allowed till May 21, 1898, inclusive, for loading their cargoes

and departing from such ports or places; and such Spanish merchant vessels, if met at sea by any United States ship, shall be permitted to continue their voyage, if, on examination of their papers, it shall appear that their cargoes were taken on board before the expiration of the above term; Provided, that nothing herein contained shall apply to Spanish vessels having on board any officer in the military or naval service of the enemy, or any coal (except such as may be necessary for their voyage), or any other article prohibited or contraband of war, or any dispatch of or to the Spanish government.

"5. Any Spanish merchant vessel which, prior to April 21, 1898, shall have sailed from any foreign port bound for any port or place in the United States, shall be permitted to enter such port or place, and to discharge her cargo, and afterward forthwith to depart without molestation; and any such vessel, if met at sea by any United States ship, shall be permitted to continue her voyage to any port not blockaded.

"6. The right of search is to be exercised with strict regard for the rights of neutrals, and the voyages of mail steamers are not to be interfered with except on the clearest grounds of suspicion of a violation of law in respect of contraband or blockade.

"In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

"Done at the city of Washington, on the twenty-sixth day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight, and of the independence of the United States the one hundred and twenty-second.

"(Seal.)

WILLIAM McKINLEY.

"By the President:

"ALVEY A. ADEE, Acting Secretary of State."

(Second call for Volunteers—Spain.)

By the President of the United States.

"A PROCLAMATION.

"Whereas, an act of Congress was approved on the twenty-fifth day of April, 1898, entitled 'An act declaring that war exists between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain,' and

"Whereas, by an act of Congress entitled 'An act to provide for temporarily increasing the military establishment of the United States in

time of war and for other purposes, approved April 22, 1898; the President is authorized, in order to raise a volunteer army, to issue his proclamation for calling for volunteers to serve in the army of the United States:

"Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United States, by virtue of the power vested in me by the Constitution and the laws, and deeming sufficient occasion to exist, have thought fit to call forth and hereby do call forth, volunteers to the aggregate number of 75,000 in addition to the volunteers called forth by my proclamation of the twenty-third day of April, in the present year; the same to be apportioned, as far as practicable, among the several States and Territories and the District of Columbia, according to population, and to serve for two years, unless sooner discharged. The proportion of each arm and the details of enlistment and organization will be made known through the War Department.

"In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

"Done at the city of Washington, this twenty-fifth day of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight, and of the independence of the United States the one hundred and twenty-second.

"(Seal.)

WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

"By the President:

"WILLIAM R. DAY, Secretary of State."

(Blockade—Southern Cuba and San Juan, Puerto Rico.)

By the President of the United States.

"A PROCLAMATION.

"Whereas, for the reasons set forth in my Proclamation of April 22, 1898, a blockade of the ports on the northern coast of Cuba, from Cardenas to Bahia Honda, inclusive, and of the port of Cienfuegos, on the south coast of Cuba, was declared to have been instituted; and

"Whereas, it has become desirable to extend the blockade to other Spanish ports:

"Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United States, do hereby declare and proclaim that, in addition to the blockade of the ports specified in my Proclamation of April 22, 1898, the United States of America

has instituted and will maintain an effective blockade of all the ports on the south coast of Cuba from Cape Frances to Cape Cruz, inclusive, and also of the port of San Juan, in the Island of Porto Rico.

“Neutral vessels lying in any of the ports to which the blockade is by the present Proclamation extended, will be allowed thirty days to issue therefrom, with cargo.

“In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the Seal of the United States to be affixed.

“Done at the city of Washington, this twenty-seventh day of June, A. D. 1898, and of the independence of the United States the one hundred and twenty-second.

“(Seal.)

WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

“By the President:

“J. B. MOORE, Acting Secretary of State.”


The various departments of the government of the United States have performed the part of a government by the people, of and for the people, in giving full information of the conduct of the war with Spain. The policy of candor has prevailed. Since nations lifted the sword against each other there has been no war more obstinately and weakly, though vindictively, provoked than that which Spain insisted upon with the United States. Notwithstanding a remarkable lack of preparation in military matters, owing to the unthinking habit as to the possible occurrence of speedy and costly war measures forced upon us—a habit in the indulgence of which as a political luxury Congress fairly represented and competed with the people—the war was a wonderful success. The Spaniards had in their colonies that we assailed ten regular soldiers to every man of our regular army, and they were thoroughly supplied with rifles, almost equal in range, and better supplied with fixed ammunition than ours, and field artillery up to date. They had for many years been of the opinion that they would sometime in this generation have to fight us for the West India Islands, and so had in their calculations pitted their navy against that of the United States, with results in their minds flattering to themselves. As long ago as during the second administration of General Grant, it was Spanish public opinion, with which there was general concurrence in Europe, with the possible exception of England, that we were not a match for Spain at sea. This idea was based upon the estimation in which Europe held the lighter class of vessels for war purposes—the smaller cruisers, the gunboats,



GUNS USED BY UNITED STATES INFANTRY. BREECH CLOSED.



GUNS USED BY UNITED STATES INFANTRY. BREECH OPEN.



UNITED STATES LIGHT ARTILLERY AT PORT TAMPA.



ARTILLERY TARGET PRACTICE AT PORT TAMPA.

torpedo boats and torpedo destroyers. In these Spain certainly outnumbered us. But our naval men had not lost time in their studies of the squadrons of the greater sea powers, and fortunately they had early reached the conclusion that the battleship able to cross the great oceans was the old reliable style of combatant, and that comparatively a few guns of very high power, supported by rapid-fire guns, stood many chances of proving the most effective combination that could be devised. It seems to be established by our experience that two battleships—say the Oregon and the Iowa—could have sunk, without receiving a serious scratch, all the torpedo and destroyer and light cruiser boats in the Spanish navy. There were twelve gunboats in the squadron of the Spaniards in the Philippines that did not in the war period show sign of existence, though they were invited to adventure by our transports on the Pacific, bearing practically unarmed regiments. It is characteristic of modern wars that they are practically short, owing to the rapidity with which orders are sent by telegraph and troops by railways and steamers; and the concentrated destructiveness of monster war ships, and rapidly mobilized armies, are such enormous consumers of men and money that expenses in active operations cannot long be endured.

However, our war with Spain was fought to a finish in a fortnight and a hundred days, and we had a procession of triumphs from start to end. It may have been a fault that victory became too monotonous for some of our men, prepared as they presumed to draw prizes, and for the journalism of fragmentary distortion that covers all countries wrapped up in newspapers and yet is adapted only to sea serpents, earthquakes and the land where earthquakes abide and typhoon and the cyclone are at play, and no music is tolerated that is gentler than the calliope. There never was as much that was difficult accomplished in warfare in the same time as by this country, with so small a loss of life, or more gratifying acts of good conduct in which heroes came from all ranks in the service, and yet there is a literature of criticism of the conduct of the war. It is the ordinary fortune of war that the exposures, fatigues and privations of camp life and the march cost more lives than are lost on battlefields, but for these things our country seemed to be least prepared, and feeling sure abundant provision was made for the soldiers, there have been disappointments demanding victims, and we have volumes of testimony taken by the commission appointed by the President to investigate the business of the War Department in the war with Spain.

The report of the Major-General commanding the army, Nelson A. Miles, contains this passage:

"At the commencement of the war the problem was largely a naval one, and until the question of superiority between our navy and the Spanish navy, or such naval forces as might be furnished by any other European power or combination of powers supporting the Spanish government, was determined, military operations had to be determined by the success or failure of our naval forces. I was fully convinced that should our navy prove superior the position of the Spanish army in Cuba would be rendered untenable with a minimum loss of life and treasure to the United States."

It was the first certainty of the war that the command of the sea must be settled before military operations took place outside our own lines. The navy Department had its work cut out for it—knew what was on hand, the possibilities, where the ships were and how manned and equipped, and three months in advance of the declaration, precautionary orders were issued. Many of them are presented in the Appendix Report of the Bureau of Navigation, and these are described as "only part of the more important precautionary orders issued by the Department," and as "orders not elsewhere included." This further preface is given:

"No attempt has been made to indicate the vast amount of work done by the bureaus and offices of the Department in putting ships and yards in the highest state of efficiency and in purchasing and manufacturing war material. Arrangements for purchases abroad began in February, but the correspondence in relation thereto is so voluminous that it is not published."

Washington, January 16, 1898.

Selfridge, Villefranche-sur-Mer:

Retain men on this enlistment. Detailed instructions by mail.

LONG.

Washington, January 11, 1898.

Helena, Funchal, Madeira:

Secret and confidential. In view of recent events, it is considered advisable to delay departure from Funchal. Can you obtain good berth behind breakwater for a considerable time?

LONG.

Washington, January 17, 1898.

Chester, Cincinnati, Montevideo, Uruguay:

Secret and confidential. Affairs are very disturbed at Cuba. It is considered advisable to change the disposition of ships. Announce unofficially your intention to proceed with the Cincinnati and Castine (on) cruise to northward for exercise and drill, and to visit the most northern part of the South Atlantic Station. As soon after as possible, without thereby causing comment, proceed to Para, Brazil, at discretion, and there await further orders.

LONG.

Washington, January 17, 1898.

Helena, Funchal, Madeira:

Proceed to Lisbon, Portugal, at discretion, and there await further orders.

LONG.

Washington, January 17, 1898.

Wilmington, Basseterre, Guadeloupe:

Delay execution of orders of December 9 for the present. Cruise in Windward Islands, not touching at Spanish ports. Will keep in telegraphic communication. About February 14 proceed to La Guayra, and there await further orders. Do not detach Ensigns Bretherton and Dayton.

LONG.

(The orders of December 9 directed the Wilmington to proceed to the South Atlantic Station.)

Washington, January 26, 1898.

Selfridge, Villefranche:

Orders were sent by steamer of January 19 naval force on European Station, proceed to Lisbon after February 2. Orders have been issued to Commander of Helena. Will remain until further orders at Lisbon.

LONG.

Washington, January 27, 1898.

Dewey, Olympia, Yokohama, Japan:

Retain until further orders the crew of the squadron whose terms of enlistment have expired.

CROWNINSHIELD.

Washington, February 17, 1898.

Cincinnati, Para, Brazil:

The Cincinnati and Castine proceed to such ports as you think best to the north of Para, Brazil. Keep in telegraphic communication with Washington.

LONG.

Washington, February 24, 1898.

Bunce, Navy Yard, New York:

Keep closest watch on submarine boat. Inform captain of Vizcaya about her. If in your judgment circumstances warrant it, seize her. Learn, if possible, from Nixon or otherwise where she has gone and what interest controls her.

LONG.

Washington, February 25, 1898.

Howell, Lisbon:

Secret and confidential. Keep the squadron at such port as it may be in (Lisbon) until further orders. Keep filled with coal. ROOSEVELT.

Washington, February 25, 1898.

Dewey, Hongkong:

Secret and confidential. Order the squadron, except Monocacy, to Hongkong. Keep full of coal. In the event of declaration of war, Spain, your duty will be to see that the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive operations in Philippine Islands. Keep Olympia until further orders.

ROOSEVELT.

Washington, February 26, 1898.

Wilmington, La Guaira:

Proceed to Barbados and report for duty to the Commander in Chief United States Naval Force on South Atlantic Station.

LONG.

Washington, February 26, 1898.

Chester, Barbados:

Keep full of coal, the best that can be had. When Castine has been docked, order her to Barbados. Wilmington has been ordered to Barbados.

LONG.

And on this February 26th—two months before the war was on, Miller, Honolulu; Howell, Lisbon; Dewey, Hongkong; Sicard, Key West, were telegraphed by the Secretary of the Navy, "Keep full of coal, the best that can be had." There was no stinting about that. Uncle Sam's ships were not to be caught without coal. From January 27th to April 7th, there were four cables for the Navy Department to Dewey, Hongkong: First, hold enlisted men whose terms were expired, for further orders; second, go to Hongkong; third, in case of war see that the Spanish fleet does not get away; fourth, keep full of coal, then offensive operations in Philippine islands. Keep Olympia! All this five weeks before the war was declared. Keep full of coal, was reiterated. April 7th, Dewey, Hongkong, was told in plain terms to "prepare for action."

Washington, March 3, 1898.

Navy Yard, League Island:

Enlist seamen, firemen, and petty officers for general service for crews of Columbia and Minneapolis. Direct commanding officers of those vessels to get them in readiness for service at sea. CROWNINSHIELD.

(Note.—Enlistments under this and following order exceeded quota established by law.)

Washington, March 3, 1898.

Navy Yards, Brooklyn, Boston:

Enlist seamen, firemen, and petty officers for general service for crews of Columbia and Minneapolis. CROWNINSHIELD.

Washington, March 3, 1898.

Navy Yard, Mare Island, Cal.:

Order Mohican, navy yard, Mare Island, to receive on board ammunition now there for the naval force on Asiatic Station; then proceed at once to Honolulu and transfer to the Baltimore. As soon as Mohican arrives Baltimore will leave for Hongkong. Orders by mail. When will Mohican be ready? LONG.

Navy Department, Washington, March 4, 1898.

Sir: The Department has this date directed, by telegraph, that the ammunition now at the navy yard, Mare Island, intended for the Asiatic Station and for the U. S. F. S. Baltimore, shall be shipped to that vessel by the Mohican. You will please prepare the Mohican to receive this ammunition, and have her proceed to Honolulu at the earliest practicable date.

Very respectfully,
Commandant Navy Yard, Mare Island, Cal.

Washington, March 7, 1898.

Brooklyn, La Guayra:

The situation is getting worse. Proceed without delay to Hampton Roads.

LONG.

(Note.—The above order was in contemplation of the formation of the Flying Squadron.)

Washington, March 9, 1898.

Sicard, Key West:

Not to expend ammunition, target practice or as a test, until further orders.

LONG.

Washington, March 12, 1898.

Howell, Lisbon:

Direct Bancroft to proceed at once to Norfolk. Direct Helena to proceed at once to Key West.

LONG.

Washington, March 14, 1898.

Howell, Lisbon, Portugal:

Proceed at once to Newcastle-upon-the-Tyne. Upon arrival communicate immediately with the United States naval attaché at London. Hoist United States flag upon Amazonas and Abreu. Appoint to the command of former Lieut. Commander A. P. Nazro and sufficient officers and crew of the San Francisco. Proceed to New York. San Francisco to convoy. Utilize your staff watch duty.

LONG.

Washington, March 15, 1898.

Chester, Barbados:

Order the squadron to proceed to Port Antonio. The Annapolis left yesterday from Curacao (for a) cruise to the northward, to arrive not later than March 31 at Key West. I could not communicate by telegraph, and he does not know the altered situation. Try to intercept and direct to proceed to Hampton Roads, Va. LONG.

(The Annapolis had left on a practice cruise with apprentices on board, and was to remain at sea for seventeen days.)

Washington, March 17, 1898.

Sicard, Key West, Fla.:

Send Texas and Massachusetts to Hampton Roads, Va., without delay.

LONG.

(Note.—The above order was issued to carry on the formation of the Flying Squadron.)

Washington, April 4, 1898.

Sampson, Key West, Fla.:

Be ready on receipt of order to take possession of Key West cable and telegraph office, and to place an officer in charge. He will not permit the transmission to Cuba of any telegram relating to the action of the President or Congress. Will be further instructed. The business of the company not to be interfered with any more it is necessary. The officer assigned upon this duty must be one discreet and judicious. LONG.

Washington, April 7, 1898.

Dewey, Hongkong:

Land all woodwork, stores, etc., it is not considered necessary to have for operations. LONG.

Washington, April 19, 1898.

Navy Pay Office, San Francisco, Cal.:

Send the following cipher message to Admiral Miller by first steamer: Proceed with your personal staff to San Francisco immediately by steamer. Order Mohican to San Francisco. Keep Bennington at Honolulu. Bring squadron records. LONG.

Washington, April 21, 1898.

Navy Yard, Boston, New York, Norfolk, Mare Island:

The naval force on the North Atlantic Station are blockading Cuba. War has not been declared. War may be declared at any moment.

LONG.

Washington, April 23, 1898.

Schley, Fort Monroe:

Send Minneapolis immediately to Eastport, Me., skirting coast above Cape Ann; Columbia to Newport, R. I. Both will receive, upon arrival, further orders.

LONG.

Fort Monroe, April 24, 1898.


Secretary of the Navy, Washington:

Minneapolis and Columbia left at 11 p. m. Saturday night, having proceeded in obedience to orders.


SCHLEY.

It should be remembered that while the wires were worked in this way the world around, a part of the intellectual force of Congress was spent in getting up time tables and holding stop watches to hurry the President into war, and the disregard of yellow fever and rainy weather and passion to run our ships against forts, and land a few of our small force of regulars to aid the standing army, 50,000 strong, of the free and independent Republic of Cuba. The Major General commanding, however, refers to "an auxiliary force of 50,000 natives." As we did not before the battles put ashore twenty thousand regulars and volunteers, it is our army that would have been the "auxiliary force." The natives, we infer, were already in the island, for General Miles mentions the landing at "the harbor of Banes, on the north coast of Cuba, which has been held during the war by the Cubans." This harbor should have been discovered earlier, for it would have been a great help to the sister Republic. There was landed, "for the 10,000 Cubans under General Garcia," 7,500 rifles, 1,000,000 cartridges, 5,000 uniforms and other material." We presume it was these new and fresh Cuban uniforms that so much impressed our comparatively small force at Santiago.






DECK VIEW OF THE U. S. S. "INDIANA."



REGIMENT IN HEAVY MARCHING ORDER AT CAMP ALGER.



CHAPTER XI.

The Story of Dewey's Splendid Victory Told by Those Who Won It.

The Battle of Manila Bay—Confidential Information From Madrid, Showing Spanish Confidence in Their Navy—Rapid Exchange of Cables between Dewey and Long—Energetic Inquiry in the Navy Department—Everything Rushed from the Start—Dewey's Masterly Movements and Immortal Victory—The Official Reports Full of Stories of the Battle That Will be News to the People—Details of Uncommon Value—Spanish Official Report Exceedingly Interesting—Admiral Montijo was not Surprised but Fired First—The Celebrated Breakfast Caused by a False Alarm.

The Bureau of Navigation publishes a communication dated Madrid, the 16th of April, 1898, five days before the war opened—the name of the writer not given. He was evidently a deeply interested and well instructed observer. Attention is called to an article April 6th, in the *Heraldo* of Madrid, that caused much comment. We quote:

“We had an opportunity to-day to talk for a long time with General Beranger, the last secretary of the navy under the Conservative Cabinet. To the questions which we directed to him concerning the conflict pending with the United States he was kind enough to inform us that he confided absolutely in the triumph of our naval forces. The attack on our island ports is not to be feared, he said, by an enemy taking advantage of the darkness of night. The reason of this is that Havana, as well as Cienfuegos, Nuevitas, and Santiago, are defended by electrical and automobile torpedoes, which can work at a great distance (have a large radius of action). Señor Canovas del Castillo, who did not neglect these things, arranged for, in agreement with me, the shipping to Cuba of 190 torpedoes, which are surely located in these ports at present. The transportation and installation of these war machines was in the charge of the distinguished torpedoist, Señor Chacon. I have already said that we shall conquer on the sea, and I am now going to give you my reasons. The first of these is the remarkable discipline that prevails on our war ships, and the second, as soon as fire is opened the crews of the American

ships will commence to desert, since we all know that among them are people of all nationalities. Ship against ship, therefore, a failure is not to be feared. I believe that the squadron detained at Cape de Verdes, and particularly the destroyers, should have and could have continued the voyage to Cuba, since they have nothing to fear from the American fleet. In this class of ships we are on a much higher level than the United States."

This Heraldo was the most important of the Madrid journals, and the statement about torpedoes, coming at the juncture it did, is quite striking. The Madrid correspondent who furnished the Heraldo translation wrote on that "the press has fed the people with all sorts of nonsense about the superior bravery of the Spanish sailor, the superior discipline on board the Spanish ships, and the greater fighting power of the navy. The belief in this superiority of the Spanish navy over that of the United States accounts, in a large measure, in my opinion, for the determination to fight us. This opinion is shared also by many intelligent persons, in fact, I believe, by all Spaniards. They say they have nothing to lose, they could not be worse off with the war than without it, as they are about to lose Cuba anyhow; but they can do incalculable damage to our commerce; seriously injure, if not destroy, our navy, and, although they would probably be beaten in the end, they will have taught us a salutary lesson in the meantime. One of the most intelligent, best-informed Spaniards I have met here, a man who has traveled much, and claims to have a great admiration for the United States, and who knows much about our history and resources, a senator from the Kingdom, told me yesterday that the thing that he dreaded most was the long period that the hostilities would last. He was sure that three years would be the very least that the struggle would continue."

At this time the Spaniards thought they were rapidly getting their navy in order, and were in course of preparing Cervera's fleet, which sailed from the Cape Verdes thirteen days later. The correspondent gave the Spanish vessels that were believed to be approaching an efficient state. "The torpedo squadron, consisting of three destroyers, three torpedo boats, and the converted cruiser Ciudad de Cadiz, with the Colon and Maria Teresa, are at the Cape de Verdes awaiting instructions. It is said that the Colon and Teresa left Cadiz in such a hurry that they were not properly provisioned. Provisions and coal have been sent to them. I have no reason to believe that they have not a full supply of ammunition. The Oquendo and Vizcaya from Porto Rico

should arrive at Cape de Verdes to-day. Although I have no definite information, I believe the Pelayo arrived at Cadiz yesterday, coming from Cartagena. It was intended that she should go, after a few days' necessary delay in Cartagena, and it is reported that she was sighted in the Straits of Gibraltar day before yesterday. The Proserpina, Osado, Destructor, Barcelo, Retamosa, Habana, Halcon, torpedo boats and destroyers, and the Vitoria, are now practically ready in Cadiz, awaiting the arrival of the Carlos V. and the Pelayo. The Alfonso XIII. is also about ready in Cartagena. The installation for moving the guns by electricity in the Carlos V. is not completed, and I am unable to get at the estimate of the date when she will be entirely ready for service. It is said on good authority, however, that in an emergency she could be used at once, working such parts as have not power applied by hand. Work is being pushed, also, as rapidly as possible on the Cisneros, but she can hardly be ready for many weeks. The trans-Atlantic steamers Mexico, Panama, Santo Domingo, San Augustin, and Villaverde, now in Cuban waters, are being armed as auxiliary cruisers. Nine trans-Atlantic steamers in Spanish ports at present are also being armed as cruisers. To this number should be added the Columbia and Normannia, recently purchased in Germany, and the Giralda, now being converted in Barcelona. This makes twenty-one auxiliary cruisers concerning which I have quite definite information. The two steamers bought in Germany were strengthened there, and are in condition to receive their artillery and crew when they arrive at Cadiz, which is expected to-day."

Other ships were to be taken by the government, and there were extraordinary precautions to prevent the getting out of news about the ships, upon the assumption that Cervera would do the unexpected. This publication gives in better form than it has been found elsewhere, the basis of fact upon which the Spanish rested their anticipations of successfully disputing our supremacy at sea.

The cable was in April kept busy between the Navy Department at Washington, and Admiral George Dewey at Hongkong. The dispatches run:

Washington, April 1, 1898.

Dewey, Hongkong:

Fill up with provisions purchased on station; then how many days' provisions have you on hand? How much soap and tobacco shall I ship?

LONG.

Washington, April 4, 1898.

Dewey, Hongkong:

Can you purchase immediately supply steamer? What will be the cost of?
LONG.

Hongkong, April 4, 1898. Secretary of the Navy, Washington:

I have chartered the British steamer Nanshan, having over 3,000 tons of coal now on board. Before the outbreak of hostilities can and would purchase this steamer. I request the earliest information in order to conclude arrangements. Cannot be made after the outbreak of hostilities. DEWEY.

Washington, April 6, 1898.

Dewey, Hongkong:

Purchase immediately Nanshan and one more vessel for supplies. Charge special appropriation. Send the receipts to the Department. Enlist for special service, if possible, one year, unless sooner discharged, the crew of. Detach and order assume command of each an officer. Arm if possible. War may be declared. Condition very critical. LONG.

Washington, April 6, 1898.

Dewey, Hongkong:

The receipt of telegram of April 4 is acknowledged. I approve action. Expedite delivery. April 6 may be last opportunity. LONG.

Hongkong, April 6, 1898.

Secretary of Navy, Washington, D. C.:

I have purchased Nanshan, and I have engaged her crew. Will detail an officer for command. I have ordered three officers, 50 men from Monocacy to fill vacancies here. I hope to get another steamer. . . . The receipt of telegram April 6 acknowledged, to expedite delivery. DEWEY.


It was April 7th that Dewey was cabled by Long, "Land all woodwork." There was but little more time to lose or use before action. Long's cable was the equivalent of "Clear for action!"

Hongkong, April 9, 1898.

Secretary of Navy, Washington:

I have purchased the British steamer Zafiro, for supplies, for £18,000 sterling. I will arm, equip, and man vessel immediately. DEWEY.

ADMIRAL DREWRY'S FLEET THAT WON THE MAY-DAY VICTORY IN MANILA BAY





ADMIRAL DEWEY, HERO OF MANILA BAY.

Washington, April 21, 1898.

Dewey, Hongkong:

The naval force on the North Atlantic Station are blockading Cuba. War has not yet been declared, but may be declared at any moment. I will inform you. Await orders. LONG.

Washington, April 24, 1898.

Dewey, Hongkong:

War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once, particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavors. LONG.

Hongkong, April 25, 1898.

Secretary of Navy, Washington:

The squadron will leave for Manila, Philippine Islands, immediately upon the arrival of the United States consul from Manila. DEWEY.

Hongkong, April 25, 1898.

Secretary of Navy, Washington:

In accordance with the request of the governor of Hongkong, the squadron leaves to-day for Mirs Bay, China, to await telegraphic instructions. Address, Hongkong. I will communicate by tug. DEWEY.

Hongkong, April 27, 1898.

Secretary of Navy, Washington:

Williams, the United States consul from Manila, has arrived. The squadron will sail immediately for the Philippine Islands. DEWEY.

Hongkong, May 7, 1898. (Manila, May 1.)

Secretary of the Navy, Washington:

The squadron arrived at Manila at daybreak this morning. Immediately engaged enemy and destroyed the following Spanish vessels: Reina Christina, Castillia, Don Antonio de Biloa, Don Juan de Austria, Isla de Luzon, Isla de Cuba, General Lezo, Marquis del Duaro, El Curreo, Velasco, one transport, Isla de Mandano, water battery at Cavite. I shall destroy Cavite arsenal dispensatory. The squadron is uninjured. Few men were slightly wounded. I

request Department will send immediately from San Francisco fast steamer with ammunition. The only means of telegraphing is to the American consul at Hongkong. DEWEY.

Washington, May 3, 1898.

Dewey (care American consul), Hongkong:

I send hearty congratulations to yourself and your officers and men. The President highly appreciates your achievement. I await report from you, on receipt of which further action will be taken and any supplies that you wish will be forwarded. LONG.

Hongkong, May 7, 1898. (Cavite, May 4.)

Secretary of the Navy, Washington:

I have taken possession of the naval station at Cavite, Philippine Islands, and destroyed its fortifications. Have destroyed fortifications bay entrance, paroling garrison. Have cut cable to mainland. I control bay completely, and can take city at any time, but I have not sufficient men to hold. The squadron excellent health and spirits. The Spanish loss not fully known; very heavy; 150 killed, including captain, on Reina Christina alone. I am assisting and protecting Spanish sick and wounded, 250 in number, in this hospital, within our lines. Will ammunition be sent? I request answer without delay. I can supply squadron coal and provisions for a long period. Much excitement at Manila. Scarcity of provisions on account of not having economized stores. Will protect foreign residents. DEWEY.

Washington, May 7, 1898.

Dewey (care American consul), Hongkong:

The President, in the name of the American people, thanks you and your officers and men for your splendid achievement and overwhelming victory. In recognition he has appointed you acting rear-admiral, and will recommend a vote of thanks to you by Congress as a foundation for further promotion. The Charleston will leave at once with what ammunition she can carry. Pacific Mail Steamship Company's steamer Pekin will follow with ammunition and supplies. Will take troops unless you telegraph otherwise. How many will you require? LONG.

Washington, May 7, 1898.

Sir: Under the authority of section 1434 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, you have been assigned to the command of the United States naval force on the Asiatic Station, with the rank of rear-admiral.

You will hoist the flag of a rear-admiral, will wear the uniform, and will affix that title to your official signature.

Respectfully.

JOHN D. LONG, Secretary.

Commodore George Dewey, U. S. N.,
Commander-in-Chief U. S. Naval Force, Asiatic Station,
U. S. Flagship Olympia.

Hongkong, June 17, 1898. (Cavite, June 12.)

Secretary of Navy, Washington:

The following is correct list Spanish vessels destroyed May 1: Two protected cruisers, Isla de Cuba, Isla de Luzon; five unprotected cruisers, Reina Christina, Castilla, Don Antonio de Ulloa, Don Juan de Austria, Velasco; two gunboats, General Lezo, Marquis del Duero; one transport, Isla de Mindano; one surveying vessel, Argos, both armed. The following have been captured: One transport, Manila; one gunboat, Callao.

DEWEY.

Manila, November 26, 1898.

Secretary Navy, Washington:

Isla de Luzon, Isla de Cuba, and Don Juan de Austria have been raised and docked. My anticipations as to their value fully realized. Will leave shortly for Hongkong under their own steam. Constructor Capps deserving highest commendation.

DEWEY.

(Report of engagement of squadron with Spanish forces at Manila Bay.)

“(No. 240 D.) U. S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station, Flagship Olympia, Cavite, Philippine Islands, May 4, 1898.—Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the squadron under my command:

“The squadron left Mirs Bay on April 27, immediately on the arrival of Mr. O. F. Williams, United States consul at Manila, who brought important information and who accompanies the squadron.

“Arrived off Bolinao on the morning of April 30, and, finding no vessels

there, proceeded down the coast and arrived off the entrance to Manila Bay on the same afternoon.

"The Boston and Concord were sent to reconnoiter Port Subic, I having been informed that the enemy intended to take position there. A thorough search of the port was made by the Boston and Concord, but the Spanish fleet was not found, although, from a letter afterwards found in the arsenal (inclosed with translation), it appears that it had been their intention to go there.

"Entered the Boca Grande, or south channel, at 11:30 p. m., steaming in column at distance at 8 knots. After half the squadron had passed, a battery on the south side of the channel opened fire, none of the shots taking effect. The Boston and McCulloch returned the fire.

"The squadron proceeded across the bay at slow speed, and arrived off Manila at daybreak, and was fired upon at 5:15 a. m., by three batteries at Manila and two at Cavite and by the Spanish fleet anchored in an approximately east and west line across the mouth of Bakor Bay, with their left in shoal water in Zanacao Bay.

"The squadron then proceeded to the attack, the flagship Olympia, under my personal direction, leading, followed at distance by the Baltimore, Raleigh, Petrel, Concord, and Boston, in the order named, which formation was maintained throughout the action. The squadron opened fire at 5:41 a. m. While advancing to the attack, two mines were exploded ahead of the flagship, too far to be effective.

"The squadron maintained a continuous and precise fire at ranges varying from 5,000 to 2,000 square yards, countermarching in a line approximately parallel to that of the Spanish fleet. The enemy's fire was vigorous, but generally ineffective.

"Early in the engagement two launches put out toward the Olympia with the apparent intention of using torpedoes. One was sunk and the other disabled by our fire and beached before an opportunity occurred to fire torpedoes. At 7 a. m. the Spanish flagship Reina Christina made a desperate attempt to leave the line and come out to engage at short range, but was received with such galling fire, the entire battery of the Olympia being concentrated upon her, that she was barely able to return to the shelter of the point. The fires started in her by our shell at this time were not extinguished until she sank.

"At 7:35 a. m., it having been erroneously reported to me that only 15 rounds per gun remained for the 5-inch rapid fire battery, I ceased firing and withdrew the squadron for consultation and a redistribution of ammunition, if necessary.

"The three batteries at Manila had kept up a continuous fire from the beginning of the engagement, which fire was not returned by this squadron. The first of these batteries was situated on the south mole head, at the entrance to the Passig river, the second on the south bastion of the walled city of Manila, and the third at Malate, about one-half mile farther south. At this point I sent a message to the Governor-General to the effect that if the batteries did not cease firing the city would be shelled. This had the effect of silencing them.

"At 11:16 a. m., finding that the report of scarcity of ammunition was incorrect, I returned with the squadron to the attack. By this time the flagship and almost the entire Spanish fleet were in flames, and at 12:30 p. m. the squadron ceased firing, the batteries being silenced and the ships sunk, burnt and deserted.

"At 12:40 p. m. the squadron returned and anchored off Manila, the Petrel being left behind to complete the destruction of the smaller gunboats, which were behind the point of Cavite. This duty was performed by Commander E. P. Wood in the most expeditious and complete manner possible.

"The Spanish lost the following vessels:

"Sunk—Reina Christina, Castilla, Don Antonio de Ulloa.

"Burnt—Don Juan de Austria, Isla de Luzon, Isla de Cuba, General Lezo, Marques del Duero, El Correo, Velasco, and Isla de Mindanao (transport).

"Captured—Rapido and Hercules (tugs), and several small launches.

"I am unable to obtain complete accounts of the enemy's killed and wounded, but believe their loss to be very heavy. The Reina Christina alone had 150 killed, including the captain, and 90 wounded.

"I am happy to report that the damage done to the squadron under my command was inconsiderable. There were none killed, and only 7 men in the squadron very slightly wounded. As will be seen by the reports of the commanding officers which are herewith inclosed, several of the vessels were struck and even penetrated, but the damage was of the slightest, and the squadron is in as good condition now as before the battle.

"I beg to state to the Department that I doubt if any commander-in-chief, under similar circumstances, was ever served by more loyal, efficient, and gallant captains than those of the squadron now under my command. Capt. Frank Wildes, commanding the Boston, volunteered to remain in command of his vessel, although his relief arrived before leaving Hongkong.

"Asst. Surg. C. P. Kindleberger, of the Olympia, and Gunner J. C. Evans, of the Boston, also volunteered to remain after orders detaching them had arrived.

"The conduct of my personal staff was excellent. Commander B. P. Lamberton, chief of staff, was a volunteer for that position, and gave me most efficient aid. Lieut. T. M. Brumby, flag lieutenant, and Ensign W. P. Scott, aid, performed their duties as signal officers in a highly creditable manner. The Olympia being short of officers for the battery, Ensign H. H. Caldwell, flag secretary, volunteered for and was assigned to a subdivision of the 5-inch battery.

"Mr. J. L. Stickney, formerly an officer in the United States Navy, and now correspondent for the New York Herald, volunteered for duty as my aid, and rendered valuable service.

"While leaving to the commanding officers to comment on the conduct of the officers and men under their commands, I desire especially to mention the coolness of Lieut. C. G. Calkins, the navigator of the Olympia, who came under my personal observation, being on the bridge with me throughout the entire action, and giving the ranges to the guns with an accuracy that was proven by the excellence of the firing.

"On May 2, the day following the engagement, the squadron again went to Cavite, where it remains. A landing party was sent to destroy the guns and magazines of the batteries there. The first battery, near the end of Sangley Point, was composed of two modern Trubia B. L. rifles of 15 centimeters caliber. The second was one mile farther down the beach, and consisted of a modern Canet 12-centimeter B. L. rifle behind improvised earthworks.

"On the 3d, the military forces evacuated the Cavite arsenal, which was taken possession of by a landing party. On the same day the Raleigh and Baltimore secured the surrender of the batteries on Corregidor Island, paroling the garrison and destroying the guns.

“On the morning of May 4 the transport Manila, which had been aground in Bakor Bay, was towed off and made a prize.

“Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

“GEORGE DEWEY,

“Commodore, U. S. N.,

“Commanding U. S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station.

“The Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.”

“U. S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station, Flagship Olympia, Cavite, Philippine Islands, July 9, 1898.—Sir: Referring to section 46355 of the Revised Statutes, I have the honor to forward the following list of the complements of the vessels of the enemy destroyed by the squadron under my command in the battle of Manila Bay on May 1, 1898, taken from the official list of the Spanish Navy:

Ship.	Officers, etc.	Total complement.
Reina Christina	57	352
Castilla	52	349
Don Juan de Austria	28	179
Don Antonio de Ulloa	31	159
Isla de Cuba	31	156
Isla de Luzon	31	156
Marques del Duero	18	96
General Lezo	20	115
Argos	21	87
Velasco	28	147
		1,796

“The trans-Atlantic Company's steamer Isla de Mindanao was armed and took part in the battle, and was also destroyed. Her complement is not known, but it is estimated at 120.

“From the above it appears that the enemy had more men in this engagement than the United States squadron. In this connection I beg to invite the attention of the Department to a letter from the commanding officer of the Petrel, dated June 26, 1898, which has already been forwarded and which

gives a statement by one of the crew of the *Reina Christina*, showing that the crews of the Spanish vessels were largely in excess of the complements given here.

"I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

"GEORGE DEWEY,

"Rear-Admiral, U. S. N.,

"Commanding U. S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station.

"The Secretary of the Navy,

"Navy Department, Washington, D. C."

The lamented Captain Gridley's report of working the *Olympia* in the famous action demands a place in history, and is a most realistic picture of the resources and vicissitudes, the mishaps and the stern work of the flagship:

"(No. 6-C.) U. S. Flagship *Olympia*, Off Manila, Philippine Islands, May 3, 1898.—Sir: I have the honor to make the following report of this ship's engagement with the enemy on May 1:

"On April 30 we stood down for the entrance to Manila Bay. At 9:42 p. m. the crew were called to general quarters (the ship having been previously cleared for action), and remained by their guns, ready to return the fire of the batteries if called upon.

"About 11:30 p. m. we passed through Boca Grande entrance of Manila Bay. The lights on Corrigidor and Caballo islands and on San Nicolas Banks were extinguished.

"After this ship had passed in, the battery on the southern shore of entrance opened fire at the ships astern, and the McCulloch and the Boston returned the fire.

"At 4 a. m. of May 1 coffee was served out to officers and men. At day-break sighted shipping at Manila. Shifted course to southward and stood for Cavite. At 5:06 two submarine mines were exploded near Cavite bearing south-southeast, distant 4 miles. At 5:15 battery on Sangley Point opened fire, but the shell fell short. Other shells passed over us, ranging 7 miles. At 5:41 a. m. we opened fire on Spanish ships with forward 8-inch guns, which were soon followed by the 5-inch battery. A rapid fire was kept up until the close of the action.

"The range varied from 5,600 to 2,000 yards.

"A torpedo boat ran out and headed for this ship, but was finally driven

back by our secondary battery. She came out a second time and was again repulsed. This time she had to be beached, as several shot had hit her.

“Batteries from Manila fired occasional shots at the ships during the action, but did no damage.

“At 6:20 turned to starboard and headed back in front of the Spanish line. The Olympia led the column three times to the westward and twice to the eastward in front of the Spanish ships and shore batteries. On one occasion the Spanish flagship Reina Christina was hit by an 8-inch shell from our forward turret and raked fore and aft. At 7:35 ceased firing and stood out into Manila Bay.

“The men went to breakfast.

“Many of the Spanish ships were seen to be on fire, and when we returned at 11:16 to complete the destruction of the Spanish fleet, only one, the Don Antonio de Ulloa, and the shore batteries returned our fire. The former was sunk and the latter was silenced.

“At 12:40 p. m. stood back to Manila Bay and anchored.

“Besides making the ordinary preparations of clearing ship for action, the heavy sheet chains were faked up and down over a buffer of awnings against the sides in wake of the 5-inch ammunition hoists, and afforded a staunch protection, while iron and canvas barricades were placed in various places to cover guns' crews and strengthen moderate defenses.

“The vessel was struck or slightly hulled as follows:

“1. Plate indented 1½ inches starboard side of superstructure just forward of second 5-inch sponson.

“2. Three planks torn up slightly in wake of forward turret on starboard side of fore-castle.

“3. Port after shrouds of fore and main rigging.

“4. Strongback of gig's davits hit and slightly damaged.

“5. Hole in frame of ship between frames 65 and 66 on starboard side below main deck rail; made by a 6-pounder.

“6. Lashing of port whaleboat davit carried away by shot.

“7. One of the rail stanchions carried away outside of port gangway.

“8. Hull of ship indented on starboard side 1 foot below main-deck rail and 3 feet abaft No 4 coal port.

“The forward 8-inch guns fired 23 shells. The ammunition hoist was temporarily out of commission on account of the blowing of the fuse. The

right gun worked well with the electrical batteries. Battery of left gun failed to explode the primer after the first shot; also resistance lamp in dynamo circuit broken. Used percussion primers in this gun with good results after the first shot.

“The after turret fired 13 shells. Had three misfires with battery of right gun and two with dynamo circuit, as fuses blew out. In renewing fuses they were immediately blown out; so shifted to percussion primers with good results. In left gun 1 shell jammed, after which used half-full and half-reduced charge, which fired it. Battery of this gun gave good results. One primer failed to check gas.

“The smoke from the 5-inch battery and from the forward 8-inch guns gave considerable trouble, and in both turrets the object glass of the telescopic sights became covered with a deposit from the powder and had to be wiped off frequently. These are, nevertheless, considered good sights for heavy guns; but it is recommended that bar sights be installed in case of emergency, as there is no provision for sighting other than with the telescopes.

“The batteries for the 5-inch guns found to be unreliable. Used dynamo circuit on 3 guns with good results. Ammunition poor. Many shell became detached from the cases on loading and had to be rammed out from the muzzle. Several cases jammed in loading and in extracting. Guns and gun mounts worked well. Fired about 281 5-inch shell.

“The 6-pounder battery worked to perfection, firing 1,000 rounds. Fired 360 rounds of 1-pounder and 1,000 rounds of small-arm ammunition.

“From 9:42 p. m. of April 30 till 12:40 p. m. May 1, two divisions of the engineer's force worked the boilers and engines, keeping up steam and working well, notwithstanding the heat of the fire and engine rooms. The third division worked at their stations in the powder division.

“The ship needs no immediate repairs, and is in excellent condition to engage the enemy at any time.

“There were no casualties nor wounded on this ship.

“Where every officer and man did his whole duty there is only room for general praise. Pay Inspector D. A. Smith, Fleet Pay Clerk Wm. J. Rightmire, and Pay Clerk W. M. Long all volunteered for and performed active service not required by their stations. Ensign H. H. Caldwell, secretary to the commander-in-chief, volunteered for fighting duty and was assigned to the command of a subdivision of the 5-inch battery. Mr. J. L. Stickney, corre-

spondent of the New York Herald (and formerly a naval officer of exceptional ability), served as a volunteer aid to the commander-in-chief and rendered valuable assistance in carrying messages and in keeping an accurate account of the battle. One 6-pounder was manned by a crew of marines, and two relief crews for the 5-inch guns and two for the 6-pounders acted as sharpshooters under Capt. W. Biddle, U. S. M. C.

"The range was obtained by cross bearings from the standard compass, and the distance taken from the chart.

"I am, sir, very respectfully, CH. V. GRIDLEY,
"Captain U. S. N., Commanding U. S. Flagship Olympia.

"The Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Station."

Captain J. B. Coghlan, of the Raleigh, says that at 12:10 a. m., May 1st, there was a flash as a signal, and five minutes later a shot was fired from El Saile Island and returned without effect. At 5 a. m., nearly five hours later, "when the squadron was nearly abreast the city of Manila and the flagship was turning to pass down toward Cavite, the Lunetta Battery, of apparently heavy guns, at Manila, opened fire and continued so long as the squadron was in action." This was a dangerous battery of Krupp guns, with a large supply of ammunition. The captain says his vessel was struck but once, "and then by a 6-pounder shell, which passed through both sides of the whaleboat (above her water line), and then glanced along the chase of the starboard 6-pounder on our poop. The gun was not injured, and the whaleboat but slightly, and she is again ready for service."

In conclusion the captain says to the admiral: "Permit me to congratulate you upon the very brilliant victory you achieved over a naval force nearly equal to your own, and backed by extensive shore batteries of very heavy guns, and this without the loss of a single life. History points to no greater achievement."

Captain Asa Walker, of the Concord, says: "In passing the city a big gun opened on the fleet, to which I replied with two shots. The Concord held her position in the line until your order to withdraw from action. The Concord was not hit. The following is a list of the ammunition expended: One hundred and fifteen 6-inch full charges, sixty-seven 6-inch reduced charges, six shrapnel, one hundred and seventy-six 6-inch common shell, two hundred and twenty 6-pounder cartridges, one hundred and twenty 3-pounder cartridges,

and sixty 1-pounder cartridges," or seven hundred and sixty-four shots fired. The executive officer of the Concord reports:

"Three complete turns were made by our squadron in front of the enemy's line, the ships firing whenever the guns would bear.

"At 7:40 a. m. we ceased firing, in obedience to signal from the commander-in-chief, and at 8:10 a. m. the crews went to breakfast. At this time several of the enemy's ships were in flames and explosions took place on board one of them; some were sinking and others withdrawing for protection behind Cañacao and Cavite.

"At 12:25 not a Spanish flag was flying in the harbor except from the staff of the sunken cruiser Don Antonio de Ulloa, submerged behind Sangley Point; the Reina Christina was a mass of flames, and sunk near the bastion at Cavite, and the Castilla was burning rapidly in Cañacao Bay.

"At 1:45 we started to rejoin the squadron, but were ordered to go to the Petrel at Cavite, where she had been sent to destroy the vessels at the arsenal. She signaled as we anchored, 'Have destroyed eight vessels here.' White flags were flying at various points on shore, and there was no longer any resistance."

Captain Dyer, of the Baltimore, makes a most interesting report, saying:

"At early daylight the fleet had reached a point close up to the shipping off the city of Manila, when the signal was made, 'Prepare for general action.' Spanish batteries near Old Manila opened fire at long range at about the same time. Flagship leading, with port helm, bore down on the right of Spanish line of vessels, formed in a somewhat irregular crescent at anchor.

"Our column passed down the enemy's line, turning with port helm as their left was reached, engaging them with starboard battery on the return. This maneuver was performed three times at distances from the enemy's ships varying from 2,600 to 5,000 yards, when you signaled to 'withdraw from action' at 7:35.

"Upon reaching a convenient distance in the bay, you signaled, 'Let the people go to breakfast'; and at 8:40, 'Commanding officers repair on board the flagship.'

"While on board the flagship I received an order to intercept a steamer coming up the bay, reported to be flying Spanish colors.

"Soon after starting on this duty I discovered the colors of the stranger

to be British, and so reported by signal, you having in the meantime made general signal to get under way and follow your motions, this ship being at the time some 2 miles to the south-southwest of the flagship on her way to intercept the supposed Spanish steamer.

"At 10:55 you made general signal, 'Designated vessel will lead,' with Baltimore's distinguishing pennant, and in a few minutes signal to 'Attack the enemy's batteries or earthworks' and for fleet to 'close up'; in obedience to which order this ship led in, with starboard helm, to a position off the Cañacoa and Sangley Point batteries and opened fire with starboard battery at a distance of about 2,800 yards, closing in to 2,200, between which and 2,700 yards our best work was done, slowing the ship dead slow, stopping the engines as range was obtained, delivering a rapid and accurate fire upon the shore batteries and a gunboat just inside of Sangley Point. You signaled, at 11:20, to 'Prepare to anchor,' and at 11:30, 'Anchor at discretion.'

"The victory was complete."

The executive officer of the Baltimore reports:

"The Baltimore was struck five times, with small projectiles, all of which, with one exception, exploded or broke up. The most serious hit, happily attended with no serious injury to any officer or man, came from a 4.7-inch steel projectile, which entered the ship's side forward of the starboard gangway, about a foot above the line of the main deck. It passed through the hammock netting, downward through the deck planks and steel deck, bending and cracking deck beam in wardroom stateroom No. 5, then glanced upward through the after engine room coaming, over against the after cylinder of No. 3 6-inch gun (port), carrying away lug and starting several shield bolts and putting the gun out of commission; deflected over to the starboard side, striking a ventilator ladder and dropping on deck. In its passage it struck a box of 3-pounder ammunition of the fourth division, exploding several charges, and wounded Lieutenant Kellogg, Ensign Irwin, and 6 men of the gun's crew—none very seriously. A second shot came in about a foot above the berth deck, just forward of the blowers, passed through the 'thwartship alleyway, hitting the exhaust pipe of the starboard blower, causing a slight leak. A third shot struck about 2 feet above the water line on the port side, abreast bunker B-110, passed into the bunker, cutting blower drain and main air duct, and exploding in bunker. A fourth shot came in about 6 feet above the berth deck, starboard side, abreast the forward end of the forward

wash room, and broke up in a clothes locker. A fifth struck the starboard forward ventilator, slightly bending it.

"The upper cabin skylight, the after range finder, and the two whaleboats hanging at the davits were all destroyed by the shock of discharge from the 8-inch guns of the second division."

Commander E. P. Wood, of the Petrel, reports: "Just as day was breaking, about 5 o'clock, the shore batteries below Manila began firing. It was scarcely light enough to distinguish signals from this vessel when flagship made signal to 'Prepare for action,' so signal was repeated from the Baltimore. During time column was forming and closing up, the batteries from below Manila were firing. As flagship stood to southward the ships and batteries at Cavite began their firing, and gradually, as we approached, we could make out ships under way in harbor and three guns on shore firing."

The Petrel expended in three turns before breakfast: "Ninety-two 6-inch common shells, eighty-two 6-inch full charges, ten reduced charges, and two hundred and fifty-three 3-pounders. Several times during rounds had to cease firing on account of smoke and in order to economize ammunition.

"The action of ammunition was exceedingly good. There was expended during action, one hundred and thirteen 6-inch common shells, three 6-inch armor-piercing shells, eighty-two 6-inch full charges, thirty-four 6-inch reduced charges, and three hundred and thirteen 3-pounder ammunition. Owing to the heat due to firing, the pads swelled and made it very difficult to lock the breech plug. Nothing would remedy this save shifting plugs, replacing hot plug by the one from the other gun which was cool. The wedge of firing lock jammed frequently, due to hot parts. This was remedied by shifting locks.

"The percussion primers worked very unsatisfactorily; sometimes four primers would be expended before one would act. Primers leaked badly, causing excessive deposit in primer seat, hard extraction, and delay in priming of gun and requiring frequent boring of vent."

Lieutenant Hughes reports: "The ship was gradually cleared for action, this work having been begun in Hongkong, when the fore and foretopsails yards, fore trysail gaff, ladders, diving outfit, part of the running rigging, etc., were placed on board the transport Nanshan, and completed the day before the squadron entered Manila Bay. In the operation of preparing the ship for action certain articles and material in the equipment and construction

departments were necessarily thrown overboard. Among these may be mentioned all of the varnishes, inflammable paints and oils, tar, turpentine, etc., lumber, two boats' strong backs, one turpentine chest, one ice chest, one large hammock box, the carpenter's bench."

Captain Wilder, of the Boston, brought up the rear, and makes a model report for brevity and prose. He remarks:

"Several shots were fired by the batteries in Manila, and two shots were given in reply. At 5:35 (a. m.) action with the enemy commenced, and was continued at varying distances, steaming in a circle, until 7:35 a. m., firing with a fair degree of deliberation and accuracy. At times the smoke was dense, interfering very materially with maneuvering and firing.

"The Spanish fleet and shore batteries replied vigorously, and an attempt was made with an improvised torpedo boat, but our fire was overpowering and the enemy received heavy damage and loss.

"In obedience to signal, I withdrew from action at 7:35, and gave the crew breakfast and rest.

"At 11:10 the action was renewed, and continued until the enemy ceased firing and his ships were all burned, sunk, or withdrawn behind the arsenal of Cavite.

"It gives me pleasure to bear witness to the courage and resolution of the Spanish fleet, and to say that they defended themselves creditably."

This report of the working of the guns is interesting:

"There being no quick and accurate method of finding the range, it was found that a considerable number of the shots apparently fell short. Had the ship been provided with a range finder the effectiveness of the firing would have been somewhat increased; as it was, the result was generally good. After passing the enemy, a countermarch was made, and fire was opened with the starboard battery. This maneuver was repeated several times, until the enemy seemed to be silenced. During this part of the engagement full charges with common shell were used in all guns of the main battery. The guns generally worked well, but after an hour's fighting it was found that most of the breech plugs of the 6 and 8 inch guns were expanded by the heat, so as to make it a somewhat difficult operation to close the breech. After firing the forward 8-inch for half an hour it was found necessary to put in a new gas-check pad, and the firing was then continued. The wire breechings of No. 2 6-inch gun (starboard) were carried away near the end of the firing.

The lock of No. 3 6-inch (port) was disabled, and a spare one substituted. The action was resumed at 11:10 a. m., the starboard battery being first engaged. The reply was principally from the forts, but these were soon silenced. Advantage had been taken of the interval to put the battery in order again. The breechings on No. 2 6-inch were replaced by the gunner's mate of the division. The guns were still very hot, and the breech plugs became still harder to work. The forward 8-inch gun was put out of commission for about twenty minutes from this cause. At 12:20 the ship was turned around and the port battery brought into play. At 12:40 p. m. 'Cease firing' was sounded, a white flag having been raised at Cavite."

The executive officer, J. A. Howe, says of the officers and men: "Very few, if any of them, had ever been under fire before, but their coolness was remarkable. They were full of zeal, energy, and enthusiasm, and were untiring. Where the conduct of all was so commendable it would be impossible to single out any individual for special praise. One noteworthy feature was the conduct of the Chinese messmen, who were stationed in the after powder division. While they are usually considered entirely alien in their ideas, and are not regarded as good fighters, yet in this case they displayed as much zeal, bravery, and energy as any other person. The uninterrupted ammunition supply in the after part of the ship was largely due to their efforts."


In the Spanish official report, Admiral Montijo mentions that he left the Bay of Manila for Subic with his squadron April 25, at 11 p. m., and had one wooden cruiser disabled on the way through leaks and disabled machinery. The admiral found, "with much disgust," of the defense of the western entrance to Subic, that "the guns which should have been mounted on that island were delayed a month and a half. This surprised me, as the shore batteries that the navy had installed (with very little difficulty) at the entrance of the bay of Manila, under the intelligent direction of colonel of naval artillery, Señor Garces, and Lieutenant Benevente, were ready to fight twenty-four days after the commencement of the work.

"I was also no less disgusted that they confided in the efficacy of the few torpedoes which they had found feasible to put there.

"The entrance was not defended by torpedoes nor by the batteries of the island, so that the squadron would have had to bear the attack of the Americans with its own resources, in 40 meters of water, and with little security.



ADMIRAL MONTIJO, COMMANDER OF THE FLEET THAT ADMIRAL DEWEY SUNK.



VIEWS OF THE NAVY YARD AT CAVITE, PHILIPPINES.

Our vessels could not only be destroyed, but they could not save their crews. I still held a hope that the Americans would not go to Subic, and give us time for more preparations, but the following day I received from the Spanish consul at Hongkong a telegram which said: 'Enemy's squadron sailed at 2 p. m. from the bay of Mira, and according to reliable accounts they sailed for Subic to destroy our squadron, and then will go to Manila.'

"This telegram demonstrated that the enemy knew where they could find my squadron, and that the port of Subic had no defenses."

There was held a council of war, and returned to fight "under less insupportable conditions" in the bay of Manila, but "not near the City, because far from defending it, this would provoke the enemy to bombard the plaza, which doubtless would have been demolished on account of its few defenses. It was unanimously decided that we should take position in the bay of Cañacao, in the least water possible, in order to combine our fire with that of the batteries of Point Sangley and Ulloa.

"I immediately ordered Del Rio to concentrate his forces in the most strategic point of the arsenal, taking every disposition to burn the coal and stores before allowing them to fall into the power of the enemy. I sent the Don Juan de Austria to Manila to get a large number of lighters filled with sand to defend the water line of the Castilla (which could not move) against the enemy's shells and torpedoes. At 10 a. m. on the 29th I left Subic with the vessels of my squadron, towing the Castilla by the transport Manila.

"In the afternoon of the same day we anchored in the Gulf of Cañacao in 8 meters of water. On the following morning we anchored in line of battle, the Christina, Castilla, Don Juan de Austria, Don Juan de Ulloa, Luzon, Cuba, and Marques del Duero, while the transport Manila was sent to the Roads of Bacoor, where the Velasco and Lezo were undergoing repairs.

"At 7 p. m. I received a telegram from Subic announcing that the enemy's squadron had entered the port at 3, reconnoitering, doubtless seeking our ships, and from there they had sailed with course for Manila.

"The mail steamer Isla Mindanao arrived in the bay. I advised her captain to save his vessel by going to Singapore, as the enemy could not get into the entrance probably before midnight. As he was not authorized from the trans-Atlantic, he did not do so, and then I told him that he could anchor in shallow water as near as possible to Bacoor.

"At midnight gun fire was heard off Corregidor, and at 2 on the morning

of the 1st of May I received telegraphic advices that the American vessels were throwing their search lights at the batteries of the entrance, with which they had exchanged several shots. I notified the commanding general of the arsenal, Señor Sostoa, and the general-governor of the plaza, Capt. Señor Garcia Pana, that they should prepare themselves. I directed all the artillery to be loaded, and all the sailors and soldiers to go to their stations for battle."

Montijo details the tonnage of vessels and the character of guns, to show the odds in favor of the Americans, adding all his vessels had been painted dark gray color, had taken down their masts and yards; and the boats, to avoid the effects of projectiles and the splinters, had their anchors buoyed and cables ready to slip instantly. At 5:15 the signal to open the fire of the Spanish fleet was made, and the American answer came promptly. Montijo says:

"The Americans fired most rapidly. There came upon us numberless projectiles, as the three cruisers at the head of the line devoted themselves almost entirely to fight the Christina, my flagship. A short time after the action commenced one shell exploded in the fore-castle and put out of action all those who served the four rapid-fire cannon, making splinters of the forward mast, which wounded the helmsman on the bridge, when Lieut. José Nunez took the wheel with a coolness worthy of the greatest commendation, steering until the end of the fight. In the meanwhile, another shell exploded in the orlop, setting fire to the crews' bags, which they were fortunately able to control.

"The enemy shortened the distance between us, and, rectifying his aim, covered us with a rain of rapid-fire projectiles. At 7:30 one shell destroyed completely the steering gear. I ordered to steer by hand while the rudder was out of action. In the meanwhile, another shell exploded on the poop, and put out of action 9 men. Another destroyed the mizzen masthead, bringing down the flag and my ensign, which were replaced immediately. A fresh shell exploded in the officers' cabin, covering the hospital with blood, destroying the wounded who were being treated there. Another exploded in the ammunition room astern, filling the quarters with smoke and preventing the working of the hand steering gear. As it was impossible to control the fire, I had to flood the magazine when the cartridges were beginning to explode.

"Amidships several shells of smaller caliber went through the smokestack, and one of the large ones penetrated the fire room, putting out of action 1

master gunner and 12 men serving the guns. Another rendered useless the starboard bow gun; while the fire astern increased, fire was started forward by another shell, which went through the hull and exploded on the deck.

"The broadside guns, being undamaged, continued firing until there were only one gunner and one seaman remaining unhurt for firing them, as the guns' crews had been frequently called upon to substitute those charged with steering, all of whom were out of action.

"The ship being out of control, the hull, smoke pipe, and mast riddled with shot, or confused with the cries of the wounded; half of her crew out of action, among whom were 7 officers, I gave the order to sink and abandon the ship before the magazines should explode, making signal at the same time to the Cuba and Luzon to assist in saving the rest of the crew, which they did, aided by others from the Duero and the arsenal.

"I abandoned the Christina, directing beforehand to secure her flag, and accompanied by my staff, and with great sorrow, I hoisted my flag on the cruiser Isla de Cuba.

"After having saved many men from the unfortunate vessel, one shell destroying her heroic commander, Don Luis Cadarso, who was directing the rescue.

"The Ulloa, which also defended herself firmly, using the only two guns which were available, was sunk by a shell which entered the water line, putting out of action her commander and half of her remaining crew, those which were only remaining for the service of the two guns stated.

"The Castilla, which fought heroically, remained with her artillery useless, except one stern gun, with which they fought spiritedly, was riddled with shot and set on fire by the enemy's shells, then sunk, and was abandoned by her crew in good order, which was directed by her commander, Don Alonzo Algado. The casualties on this ship were 23 killed and 80 wounded.

"The Austria, very much damaged and on fire, went to the aid of the Castilla. The Luzon had three guns dismantled, and was slightly damaged in the hull. The Duero remained with one of her engines useless, the bow gun of 12 centimeters and one of the redoubts.

"At 8 o'clock in the morning, the enemy's squadron having suspended its fire, I ordered the ships that remained to us to take positions in the bottom of the Roads at Bacoor, and there to resist to the last moment, and that they should be sunk before they surrendered.

"At 10:30 the enemy returned, forming a circle to destroy the arsenal and the ships which remained to me, opening upon them a horrible fire, which we answered as far as we could with the few cannon which we still had mounted.

"There remained the last recourse, to sink our vessels, and we accomplished this operation, taking care to save the flag, the distinguishing pennant, the money in the safe, the portable arms, the breech plugs of the guns, and the signal codes.


"After which I went with my staff to the Convent of Santo Domingo de Cavite, to be cured of a wound received in the left leg, and to telegraph a brief report of the action, with preliminaries and results.

"It remains only to say that all the chiefs, officers, engineers, quartermasters, gunners, sailors, and soldiers rivaled one another in sustaining with honor the good name of the navy on this sad day.


"The inefficiency of the vessels which composed my little squadron, the lack of all classes of the personnel, especially master gunners and seamen gunners; the inaptitude of some of the provisional machinists, the scarcity of rapid-fire cannon, the strong crews of the enemy, and the unprotected character of the greater part of our vessels, all contributed to make more decided the sacrifice which we made for our country and to prevent the possibility of the horrors of the bombardment of the city of Manila, with the conviction that with the scarcity of our force against the superior enemy we were going to certain death and could expect a loss of all our ships.

"Our casualties, including those of the arsenal, amounted to 381 men killed and wounded."

There is a surprising amount of information in the official reports of Admiral Dewey's famous victory that will be of the nature of novelty to people at large. The fact becomes prominent that a great deal of credit is due the Navy Department for its foresight, vigilance, incessant industry in supplying to the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic fleet the news of the day, cautioning him not to spare expense where there was anything in reach or sight to aid the fighting ships when the decisive hours came. The conversation between the Navy Department and the Asiatic command was right to the point. Nothing seemed to escape, or to be misunderstood. The movements on behalf of the United States were characterized by confidence, certainty of purpose, promptitude and precision of execution. The Spaniards were hesi-



THE ARENA, CONSTRUCTED OF BAMBOO, IN WHICH THE BULL FIGHTS ARE GIVEN AT MANILA.



41. Street in the Suburb of La Ermita. 42. Rosario Street in La Ermita. 43. Luneta Square in Manila. 44. Hospital of San Juan de Dios. 45. Manila Cathedral. 46. Royal Street in Malate. 47. Royal Street in Santa Ana. 48. Monument of Don Simon de Anda y Salazar in the Malecon Square.

VIEW IN AND AROUND MANILA.

tant, uncertain, confused, and the doom that was upon them was announced plainly—the one redeeming feature for them being in the personal bravery of the officers and men. The rottenness of the government of Spain provided the elements of defeat. The preparations by the Spaniards for the battle contrast effectively with those of the Americans. Admiral Montijo was “disgusted” to find nothing done at the vital point for the defense of Subic, and warned that the Americans were on the way, made haste to Manila Bay, where he planned his line of defense so as to be flanked by shore batteries, and yet to spare the city—a strategy afterward sharply resented by Admiral Dewey when he sent his compliments to the authorities in Manila with the message that another gun fired at an American ship and the city would be destroyed. The flanking batteries were of powerful German guns, several of them firing heavier metal than any in the American squadron, and they were well located to do hurt to our ships. Montijo’s line had been formed with reference to them, and he had contrived to be in part protected by shallows. He had towed a ship that he calls a floating battery, from Subig, and sought to protect this machine with other vessels. The Americans stripped for the battle, their ships and themselves, throwing overboard all that was inflammable, sparing nothing that would splinter or burn. The Spaniards were much encumbered with fuel, and the fires kindled by our shells were inextinguishable. There have been doubts whether the Spaniards were surprised by the American visit. They certainly were not. Admiral Montijo had two days’ warning, heard the guns at the mouth of the harbor at midnight, and made full preparation for the shock that he knew was approaching. He gave the signal for the firing to commence, and the Americans were received by two shore batteries and a floating one and the entire Spanish squadron. The American reply was immediate, and the hour was that of daybreak. The victory of our ships was so thorough, and the loss on our side so insignificant, that our countrymen have hardly ascertained how many things there were to think about, and with what efficacy the hard work was done, or through what strife with tribulations it was accomplished. The gunners found out in battle much they had not been familiar with, in handling their tools. The dreadful and beautiful machines they used were fashioned delicately as telescopes, and might in several particulars be mistaken for instruments of science of refined construction and nice adjustments. One of the words of caution to the men that the Commander-in-Chief made

impressive was that ammunition was not to be wasted. They were far from home, and in a protracted engagement might disarm themselves. It was an erroneous report that only fifteen rounds remained of the ammunition for the four-inch rapid fire battery that caused the remarkable intermission in the battle—and the celebrated recess. The boys, it will be remembered, wanted to finish the job before they had coffee, but the Commander-in-Chief insisted on breakfast all around, and not a minute was lost. First the smoke of the firing and the burning ships covered the scene of action, though the American ships were kept in motion. Second, the guns were so hot it was hard to work them. Third, the heat was excessive—May is the hottest month of the year at Manila. The rest was refreshing and reassuring to the Americans. They saw their victory, and poured in what Admiral Montijo calls "a horrible fire" that soon closed the conflict with the annihilation of the Asiatic squadron of Spain.

At 12:40 the flagship signaled "Cease firing." The resistance of the Spaniards had ended. There were only the slain and wounded, the wrecks and ships on fire, the swarms of prisoners and fugitives, the burning houses at Cavite, the silenced batteries—a battle won whose proud story shall never fade, the American arms with freshly-wrought splendors on the seas, the flag of the Great Republic with brightened stars and stripes, the sound of American guns ringing around the globe, great news on the streets of the capitals of all nations, another radiant chapter in our inheritance of glory.



CHAPTER XII.

After the May Day Battle in Manila Bay.

Dewey's Cables during the Time He Held the Harbor with the City of Manila under His Guns—Dispatches Full of History and Rich in Personal Characteristics—Authentic Information from the Inside—The Official Story—Dewey's Unfavorable Opinion of Cubans—Capture of the City—Trouble with Aguinaldo—Our Ships and Crews.

During the days Admiral Dewey was on the way from Mirs Bay to that of Manila, the news got into circulation that something was to be expected from our Asiatic squadron. Our ships of war in time of war could not remain in neutral ports, and those on the coast of China had been ordered to assume the offensive in the Philippines, especially, it was the early public understanding, to "remove" the Spanish fleet, so that our commerce on the seas of Asia might not be assailed or obstructed. We had a very vigilant consul at Hongkong, who had been at pains to inform himself as to affairs in the Spanish archipelago, and was favorably impressed by the Filipino insurgents, and when Admiral Dewey departed on his important errand, his line of communications was "by tug" through the consulate. The first account of the action in Manila Bay was from the defeated Spaniards, and in the course of explaining their misfortunes they confessed to disaster that at length included all the ships in that part of the world flying the flag of Spain, with the exception of a few gunboats scattered so far among the islands that they disappeared from all scenes of action. The immediate impression made by the loss of cable connection with Manila while it was relating the story that the navy of Spain had vanished in the Orient, so valiantly defended that the Americans were "compelled to maneuver repeatedly," was that the Spaniards had cut the wires so as to keep the extent of their broken fortunes to themselves. The cable was cut by order of Admiral Dewey, who selected a suitable place, took out a section of the cable, coiled it away and buoyed both ends. He first proposed to preserve the line for the use of both parties, but the offer was

quickly rejected. After a few hours the minds of the authorities of Spain were changed, and they sent an acceptance of the conservation of the privilege of talking to Madrid in exchange for admitting the American Admiral to equal rights, but it was too late. There was a weary wait for news from Dewey, and the full orb'd intelligence had to travel by dispatch boat to Hongkong. When the city of Manila fell into our possession the cable was soon spliced, and money poured into the company at the rate of four dollars a word. The dispatches by Admiral Dewey through the combination of tugs and cables, during the intermission in through wire service, and his cablegrams afterward, are so many thunderbolts of history, and the journals generally have been so busily magnifying current matters that this treasury of solid knowledge has not been attractively displayed, until, thanks to the Navy Department, it appears in these pages: .

Hongkong, May 12, 1898.

Secretary of Navy, Washington:

There is little change in the situation since my last telegram. I am transferring to transports steel breech-loading rifles from sunken Spanish men-of-war; also stores from arsenal in my possession. I am maintaining strict blockade. Add Argos to the list of destroyed vessels. El Correo probably El Cano. I send this telegram to Hongkong. . . . It has been reported at Manila that Pelayo and another vessel are en route to Philippine Islands.

DEWEY.

Hongkong, May 15, 1898. (Cavite, May 12.)

Secretary of the Navy, Washington:

I thank the President for my promotion. Forcibly recommend that Commander Lamberton, chief of staff; Captains Wildes, the commander of the Boston; Coghlan, the commander of the Raleigh; Gridley, the commander of the Olympia; Dyer, the commander of the Baltimore; Walker, the commander of the Concord; Wood, the commander of the Petrel—without whose aid I could have done nothing, each to be advanced ten numbers.

DEWEY.

Hongkong, May 15, 1898. (Cavite, May 13.)

Secretary of the Navy, Washington:

The squadron thanks the President for his message in your telegram of May 7. I am maintaining strict blockade of Manila by sea, and believe rebels

are hemming in by land, although they are inactive and making no demonstrations. Great scarcity of provisions in the city. I believe the Spanish Governor-General will be obliged to surrender soon. I can take Manila at any moment. To retain possession and thus control Philippine Islands would require, in my best judgment, well-equipped force of 5,000 men, although United States troops sent by Pekin will be very useful to relieve the Olympia of guarding Cavite. United States troops should make provision for extremely hot, moist climate. Spanish force is estimated 10,000 men. The rebels are reported 30,000 men. I should suggest the Charleston or Pekin bring a few officers and about 100 men, partly Engineers' Department, to man transport Manila and captured vessels. I am loading Manila with ordnance from the Spanish man-of-war. I propose to assign Lieutenant-Commander Singer to command. Captured on May 12 the Spanish gun vessel Callao attempting to run blockade; released on parole officers and men. I have plenty of coal for the present and can purchase more in Chinese ports. Will hold frequent communication with Hongkong. One British, one French, two German, one Japanese men-of-war here observing. Baltimore requires immediately one Mark IV mount for one 6-inch B. L. R., a supply of extractors for Hotchkiss 3-pounders and for Hotchkiss 6-pounders; also locks most recent design for main battery.

DEWEY.

Hongkong, May 24, 1898. (Cavite, May 20.)

Secretary of Navy, Washington:

Situation unchanged. Strict blockade is continued. Great scarcity prevails at Manila. Foreign subjects fear an outbreak of the Spanish soldiers. Arrangements have been made for them to be transferred to Cavite by the foreign men-of-war, if necessary. Aguinaldo, the rebel commander-in-chief, was brought down by the McCulloch. Organizing forces near Cavite, and may render assistance that will be valuable. I do not consider submarine mines practicable here, on account of great depth and width of bay and entrance. If attacked by superior force, the squadron will endeavor to give good account of itself. The American bark Saranac was captured off Iloilo, Philippine Islands. Upon the arrival of the Charleston with ammunition, I propose to recapture and to clear the island of small Spanish gun vessels. When is Charleston expected to arrive? I request you will send to the Asiatic Station the Bennington and the Yorktown, if possible. Will be more useful

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than the Philadelphia. How many troops coming here Pekin? When expected to arrive? I request send provisions for the squadron—2,000 men for three months. Also small stores. DEWEY.

Hongkong, May 27, 1898. (Cavite, May 29.)

Secretary of Navy, Washington:

No change in the situation of the blockade. Is effective. It is impossible for the people in Manila to buy provisions, except rice. The French men-of-war must go to Saigon for provisions. It is important that I should know as early as possible whereabouts and strength of the possible Spanish expedition to the Philippines, and, if possible, that the squadron should be reinforced with a battleship or armored cruiser. The captain of the Olympia (Gridley) condemned by medical survey; is ordered home; leave by Occidental and Oriental Steamship Company's steamer from Hongkong on May 28. Commander Lamberton has been appointed to the command of the Olympia. Steamer has just arrived from Amoy with 3,000 Mauser rifles and great amount ammunition for Aguinaldo, whose force is increasing constantly. . . . Bark Saranac is sailing under the British flag; is loading with sugar at Iloilo for New York. DEWEY.

Hongkong, May 30, 1898.

Secretary of Navy, Washington:

Aguinaldo, revolutionary leader, visited the Olympia yesterday. He expects to make general attack on May 31. Doubt ability to succeed. Situation remains unchanged. DEWEY.

Hongkong, June 6, 1898.

Secretary of Navy, Washington:

The following telegram has been received, addressed United States consul, Hongkong:

"Direct Captain Hodgson, McCulloch, turn over command Foley; return home. CRIDLER."

I request to be informed is this official? DEWEY.

(The reply, through Allen, Acting Secretary, was "official.")

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U. S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station,
Flagship Olympia, Cavite, Philippine Islands, June 12, 1898.

Sir: I take pleasure in bringing to the attention of the Department the zeal and efficiency of Capt. Daniel B. Hodgson, R. C. S., commanding the McCulloch, while serving in the squadron under my command.

The McCulloch steamed from Hongkong to Manila Bay in the squadron formation, and ran the batteries at the entrance with the squadron, and while not in the line of battle at the battle of Manila Bay, was kept near by and in readiness to assist any vessel that might be disabled.

Since joining my command, and up to the time of his detachment, Captain Hodgson has kept the McCulloch in a high state of efficiency, and ready to move at a moment's notice, and has made her a valuable auxiliary to the squadron.

I request that the Department will communicate this report to the honorable Secretary of the Treasury.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

GEORGE DEWEY,

Rear-Admiral, U. S. N.,

Commanding U. S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station.

The Secretary of the Navy Washington, D. C.

Hongkong, June 6, 1898. (Cavite, June 3.)

Secretary of Navy, Washington:

Receipt of telegram of May 26 is acknowledged, and I thank the Department for the expression of confidence. Have acted according to the spirit of Department's instructions therein from the beginning, and I have entered into no alliance with the insurgents or with any faction. This squadron can reduce the defenses of Manila at any moment, but it is considered useless until the arrival of sufficient United States forces to retain possession.

DEWEY.

Hongkong, June 6, 1898.

Secretary of Navy, Washington:

There are no guns of recent design available to mount upon shore, being without breech mechanism, mounts, or ammunition. There is no telegraphic communication Bolinao to Hongkong. Have just received 4,500 tons of coal; I have sufficient coal for two months. Insurgents have been engaged

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actively within the province of Cavite during last week; they have won several small victories, taking prisoners about 1,800 men, 50 officers; Spanish troops, not native. I am preparing arsenal and Cavite for the occupation United States troops, and will have vessel of Cape Engano to meet United States transports.

DEWEY.

Hongkong, June 27, 1898.

Secretary of Navy, Washington:

Receipt of telegram of June 14 is acknowledged. Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, with thirteen of his staff, arrived May 19, by permission, on Nanshan. Established self Cavite, outside arsenal, under the protection of our guns, and organized his army. I have had several conferences with him, generally of a personal nature. Consistently I have refrained from assisting him in any way with the force under my command, and on several occasions I have declined requests that I should do so, telling him the squadron could not act until the arrival of the United States troops. At the same time I have given him to understand that I consider insurgents as friends, being opposed to a common enemy. He has gone to attend a meeting of insurgent leaders for the purpose of forming a civil government. Aguinaldo has acted independently of the squadron, but has kept me advised of his progress, which has been wonderful. I have allowed to pass by water recruits, arms, and ammunition, and to take such Spanish arms and ammunition from the arsenal as he needed. Have advised frequently to conduct the war humanely, which he has done invariably. My relations with him are cordial, but I am not in his confidence. The United States has not been bound in any way to assist insurgents by any act or promises, and he is not, to my knowledge, committed to assist us. I believe he expects to capture Manila without my assistance, but doubt ability, they not yet having many guns. In my opinion, these people are far superior in their intelligence and more capable of self-government than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both races.

DEWEY.

Hongkong, June 17, 1898. (Cavite, June 12.)


Secretary of Navy, Washington:

Insurgents continue hostilities and have practically surrounded Manila. They have taken 2,500 Spanish prisoners, whom they treat most humanely. They do not intend to attack city proper until the arrival of United States troops thither; I have advised. Twelve merchant vessels are anchored in the



33. In the Valleys of Carabao. 34. Street in the District of Paco, Manila. 35. Aristocratic Residences in the Suburbs of San Juan del Monte. 36. Square of Santa Ana in the District of San Sebastian, Manila. 37. View of the Royal Highway of La Concepcion. 38. The King's Wharf, Manila. 39. The Aguilar Barrier in Tondo, Manila. 40. The Cathedral of Jaro in Ilo-Ilo.

VIEWES IN THE PHILIPPINES, MOSTLY IN AND AROUND MANILA.



17. Royal Street in Lipa, Batangas Province. 18. School of Arts and Commerce in Ilo-Ilo. 19. Molo Church in Ilo-Ilo. 20. A Filipino Funeral Party in Ilo-Ilo, Grouped Around the Tomb. 21. A View of the San Sebastian Highway, Manila. 22. Rombion—Capital of the Island of Su Nombre. 23. View of the Paseo de Aguadas, Manila. 24. Filipino Carpenters of Ilo-Ilo at Work.

VIEWS FROM THE PHILIPPINES

AFTER THE MAY DAY BATTLE IN MANILA BAY. 317

bay with refugees on board under guard of neutral men-of-war; this with my permission. Health of the squadron continues excellent. The German commander-in-chief arrived to-day. Three German, two British, one French, one Japanese men-of-war now in port; another German man-of-war is expected. I request the departure of the Monadnock and the Monterey be expedited.

DEWEY.

Hongkong, June 17, 1898. (Cavite, June 13.)

Secretary of Navy, Washington:

I request the Department will send six months' supplies in all departments, including medical, for the squadron, including McCulloch, Zafiro, Nanshan, Manila, complement about 50 men, and Callao, complement about 25 men. It is practically impossible to obtain further supplies within the limits of the station during the war.

DEWEY.

Hongkong, June 17, 1898. (Cavite, June 12.)

Secretary of Navy, Washington:

I request the Department send 350 men and 20 marines to fill vacancies existing to replace men whose terms of enlistment have expired or will expire before October 1.

DEWEY.

Cavite, June 17, 1898.

Secretary of Navy, Washington:

No change since my telegram of June 12. Have sent the Baltimore, Cape Engano, Luzon Island, to meet American transports. The health of the squadron continues excellent. Another French man-of-war has arrived.

DEWEY.

Cavite, June 17, 1898.

Secretary of Navy, Washington:

Commanding officers have no recommendation to make under Revised Statutes, sections 1407 and 491. All officers and men did their whole duty nobly, but the nature of the action did not admit of any individual display of personal heroism.

DEWEY.

Hongkong. (Received June 27, 1898.)

Secretary of Navy, Washington:

No change in the situation since my telegram of June 17. Five German, 3 British, 1 French, 1 Japanese men-of-war in port. Insurgents constantly

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closing in on city. The United States transports and the Charleston have not yet arrived. The Baltimore is at Cape Engano awaiting them. Have received information Cadiz squadron passed Gibraltar Friday morning, June 17, bound eastward. Shall the Monadnock and the Monterey arrive in time? In my judgment, if the coast of Spain was threatened, the squadron of the enemy would have to return. One hundred and twenty-one officers, United States Navy, 6 paymaster's clerks, and 1,709 men were engaged battle of Manila Bay. DEWEY.

Hongkong, July 1, 1898.

Secretary of Navy, Washington:

Referring to your telegram of June 21, the crew now on board is more efficient than new men would be. I consider, however, that in justice to them, and to prevent discontent, if not dissatisfaction in the squadron, men whose terms of enlistment have expired should be relieved from duty in this hot and unhealthy climate as soon as possible. DEWEY.

Hongkong, July 1, 1898. (Cavite, June 26.)

Secretary of Navy, Washington:

I shall have vessel at Hongkong on or about July 1. The Charleston and transports have not yet arrived. DEWEY.

Hongkong, July 1, 1898.

Secretary of Navy, Washington:

The British bark Austria has gone to Hongkong without cargo. In my opinion allowing to return to load might give cause for complaint to other neutral nations whose ships have been warned off. DEWEY.

Hongkong, July 7, 1898. (Cavite, July 4.)

Secretary of Navy, Washington:

The receipt of telegram is acknowledged. The United States troops have landed and have been comfortably housed at Cavite, Luzon Island. Insurgents are still active. The Chinese subjects have been permitted to leave freely. Cold-storage steamer has not yet arrived. Aguinaldo proclaimed himself president of the revolutionary republic on July 1. DEWEY.

Hongkong, July 13, 1898.

Secretary of Navy, Washington:

Aguinaldo informed me his troops had taken all of Subic Bay except Isla Grande, which they were prevented from taking by the German man-of-war Irene. On July 7 sent the Raleigh and the Concord there; they took the island and about 1,300 men, with arms and ammunition; no resistance. The Irene retired from the bay on their arrival. I shall send the Boston Cape Engano about July 16, to meet second army detachment. It is not practicable to send Guam. No chartered vessel available. DEWEY.

Hongkong, July 20, 1898. (Cavite, July 17.)

Secretary of Navy, Washington:

Situation unchanged. Second army detachment arrived to-day. All well on board. The health of the squadron continues good. No sickness whatever. I have taken the coal of the British ship Honolulu and I am retaining her until the port is opened. Have provisions for six months. The receipt of telegram of July 7 is acknowledged; in view of the information therein shall retain Pekin and China as auxiliaries. I do not expect the Monterey before August 5, and the Monadnock ten days later. If necessary, shall proceed with the squadron to meet the Monadnock to the east Cape Engano, Luzon. Shall return other transports to the United States as soon as possible. DEWEY.

Hongkong, July 30, 1898. (Cavite, July 26.)

Secretary of Navy, Washington:

Merritt arrived yesterday in the Newport. The remainder of the expedition is expected within the next few days. Situation is most critical at Manila. The Spanish may surrender at any moment. Merritt's most difficult problem will be how to deal with insurgents under Aguinaldo, who has become aggressive, and even threatening toward our army. The Monadnock was at Honolulu on July 8; expected to leave four days later. DEWEY.

Hongkong, August 1, 1898. (Cavite, July 29.)

Secretary of Navy, Washington:

Referring to your telegram July 20, strict blockade continues. The neutral vessels are not allowed to enter. From information, which I consider

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reliable, Spanish Governor-General would surrender to United States forces at once, if it was not for insurgent complication. In any event, they must capitulate very soon. Merritt and I are working together to this end. The remainder of Merritt's forces has not yet arrived. Pekin will leave to-morrow for San Francisco, Cal. DEWEY.

Hongkong, August 9, 1898. (Cavite, August 4.)

Secretary of Navy, Washington:

The receipt of telegram of July 26 acknowledged. Have provisions for three months, fresh; also plenty of coal. Do not need provisions from Australia. The Monterey and Brutus arrived to-day. DEWEY.

Washington, August 12, 1898.

Dewey, Hongkong:

Peace protocol signed by President. Suspend all hostilities and blockade. ALLEN.

Washington, August 12, 1898.

Dewey, Hongkong:

The protocol, signed by the President to-day, provides that the United States will occupy and hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines. This is most important.


ALLEN, Acting.

The dispatches from Admiral Dewey are at once characteristic and historical—strikingly so.

His career during the lonesome months, before Anderson, McArthur, Greene and Merritt came, was full of dramatic situation, and there is a cutting sparkle in his cabled words that scintillates intelligence. May 12th he was "transferring to transports steel breech-loading rifles from sunken Spanish men-of-war." There is a picture in a sentence. The Admiral "forcibly recommends" promotions of officers "without whose aid I could have done nothing." "The squadron thanks the President for his message." In reply as to whether he "would desire submarine mines," "in case of attack by a



NATIVE METHOD OF PLOWING. SCENE IN THE PROVINCE OF BATANGAS, PHILIPPINES.



A COUNTRY MARRIAGE, PHILIPPINES. MARRIAGE MAKER AND BRIDAL COUPLE IN CARRIAGE,
FOLLOWED BY BAND, ON WAY TO CHURCH.

superior force," the answer eight days later was the squadron would "endeavor to give good account of itself."

Aguinaldo had visited the Olympia and overrated his ability. The insurgent general had stated he would make a general attack on Manila. Captain Hodgson, "up to the time of his detachment," had kept his ship "in a high state of efficiency," and made her "a valuable auxiliary."

The Admiral had entered into no alliance with the insurgents or any faction. He declined to cooperate with the fleet in aid of the insurgents. Aguinaldo had been allowed to help himself at the Spanish arsenal. As the insurgents were opposed to a common enemy, they were "friends." Aguinaldo "expected" to take Manila, but had not the force to do it, and never could have taken it if he had had twenty thousand men at his back. Indeed, the Spaniards, if they had not been afraid of the American fleet, could have marched out and raised the siege. The most striking of the sayings of the Admiral was that he knew familiarly both the Filipinos and Cubans, and "these people (Filipino) are far superior in their intelligence and more capable of self-government than the natives of Cuba." The movement of the Cadiz fleet was a subject of great interest; and the Admiral, July 17th, said he would, "if necessary, proceed with the squadron to meet the Monadnock to the east of Cape Engano"—the northeast corner of Luzon. The necessity was in case of the arrival of the Cadiz fleet with battleships, the Monadnock still lingering on the Pacific. Dewey's idea was that with the two monitors he would be master of the situation, and prove it by sinking a second Spanish fleet. Fortune did not favor him to that extent. In a dispatch to Admiral Dewey, Secretary Long stated, May 20th, mentioning a rumor of Spaniards sending troops and battleships to the Philippines, that "our means of receiving intelligence from Spain are very untrustworthy." May 29th, Long cabled Dewey, "There is no Spanish force en route to Philippines." Long telegraphed, August 1st, report that monks and other prisoners in the hands of insurgents at Cavite were in danger of being "unjustly put to death," and "this should not be permitted" if the Admiral was "in a position to prevent it." June 6th Navy Department cabled Dewey, "Cold-storage steamer from Australia is due about June 20 at Manila, with fresh provisions for the squadron." And July 26th this comprehensive inquiry was made:

Do you want another fresh provision ship or anything else from Australia?

LONG.

The following cable is a model of compliment and caution:

Washington, May 26, 1898.

Dewey (care American consul), Hongkong:

You must exercise discretion most fully in all matters, and be governed according to circumstance which you know and we cannot know. You have our confidence entirely. It is desirable, as far as possible, and consistent for your success and safety, not to have political alliances with the insurgents or any faction in the islands that would incur liability to maintain their cause in the future.

LONG.

July 27th the Admiral desired the British foreign office should be informed of his "deep appreciation" of the services of the British Consul Walker, who had "performed the trying duties of acting United States consul during the last three months in a most able and painstaking manner, and has been of invaluable assistance to me, being my only means of communication with the Spanish authorities, and the chief agent in the protection of foreign residents."

The Admiral's account of the fall of Manila was that the city surrendered "to our land and naval forces after a combined attack"—a "division of the squadron shelled the forts and intrenchments at Malate, on the south side of the city, driving back enemy, our army advancing on that side at the same time."

On the day of the surrender of Manila:

Washington, August 13, 1898.

Dewey (care American Consul), Hongkong:

The President desires to receive from you any important information you may have of the Philippines; the desirability of the several islands; the character of their population; coal and other mineral deposits; their harbor and commercial advantages, and in a naval and commercial sense which would be the most advantageous. If you have other information which may be of value to the government in their negotiations, the President may desire your presence here. If he should request you to come, take the quickest route of travel.

ALLEN, Acting Secretary of Navy.

Manila, August 20, 1898.

Secretary of the Navy, Washington:

Referring to the Department's telegram of August 13, important islands are: Colon, Luzon, Panay, Cebu, Negros, Leyte. Others, owing to the

nature of the inhabitants, have a small amount of civilization, want of cultivation. They may be neglected, especially isles of southern group. Luzon is in all respects the most desirable to retain. Contains most important commercial ports. Manila is farthest north. Produces all of the good tobacco. Friendly natives. Civilization somewhat advanced. Not yet developed. Possible rich minerals. Population, 825,000. Subic Bay best harbor for coaling purposes and military. Water deep; landlocked; easily defended. Strategically, command of bay and city of Manila, with arsenal at Cavite, most valuable. Panay, Cebu, Negros thickly populated, most civilized, and well cultivated. Iloilo second commercial port; center of sugar trade; a good harbor strategically; in view of the situation, good for defense. Cebu third commercial port; a good harbor, very desirable. No coal of good quality can be procured in Philippine Islands. Some has been mined on Cebu, English company. I trust it may not be necessary to order me to Washington. Should regret very much to leave here while matters remain in present critical condition.

DEWEY.

Washington, August 27, 1898.

Dewey, Manila:

The President received your telegram, and will respect your wishes and not direct you to leave your present duty. He desires you to communicate to General Merritt your views upon the general question of the Philippines, with such information as you have, and to transmit to the President in writing by the quickest method (possibly by hand of Merritt) the substance of your suggestions to Merritt.

ALLEN.

There had been no account of the Philippine Islands in which there was as much said in a few words as Dewey's dispatch of August 20th. The President was well pleased because the Admiral evidently understood the critical importance of the situation and wanted to stay at his post. When the American army entered Manila—and it is to be remembered the action of the navy prevented heavy loss of life—the insurgents were "dusted out of the way," driven out of the city while the Spaniards were forced into the walled portion. There were 8,500 Americans in the army. The Spaniards surrendered 13,180, and the insurgents mustered about 14,000. As early as July 26th, the Admiral, who had been judicious in friendliness to Aguinaldo, stated

This was sent to the Admiral asking for the President what he thought, and Dewey's reply was:

"Am advised that in addition to Spanish civil authorities there are about 750 priests, who are anxious to leave the country. Strongly advise that they be given passage to Hongkong, as they are heartily disliked by the insurgents, and their departure would tend to appease latter and to promote harmony."

Information was asked August 29, at the instance of the French Ambassador in Washington, as to the treatment of Spanish prisoners; and Dewey replies:

"From my observation and that of my officers, the Spanish prisoners are not treated cruelly by the insurgents, but they are neglected, not from design, but owing to want of proper food supply, medical outfit, and attendance."

The President directed that Dewey should, during the suspension of hostilities, exert his influence "to restrain insurgent hostilities toward Spaniards, and while maintaining a position of rightful supremacy as to the insurgents, to pursue, so far as possible, a conciliatory course to all."

It was a few days before this that General Aguinaldo became careful to refer matters of account to his "Council." He put off the part of dictator, and found it a necessary ceremony to confer a great deal. He took advice as to the Spanish priests he had captured and imprisoned, concluding to hold them as hostages. The Belgian Consul at Manila established himself in the confidence of Admiral Dewey, who wrote that Mr. Audie, knowing the fall of Manila certain, was "most assiduous in his endeavors to bring about its surrender without loss of life or property." There was a new Governor-General appointed, because he was for fighting to the end, and the Belgian Consul, "much to his credit," the Admiral says, overcame the resistance of the new man, and also "acted as intermediary between the two Governor-Generals on the one hand and General Merritt and myself on the other, carrying several important communications, among them a message from me to the Governor-General to the effect that if the numerous batteries on the water front of the walled city kept silent the city would not be shelled. The effect of this was the capture of this rich and populous city without loss of life to the squadron or to non-combatants and with little or none to our army."

If the cable had been in working order from Manila to Hongkong and beyond during the early days of August, the signing of the protocol would in

all probability have been delayed until the surrender of the city, but the fact that the capitulation was signed a day later than the protocol, Washington and Madrid time, did not materially change the situation.

The crushing defeat of the Spanish fleet by Admiral Dewey had a terrorizing influence, and the fact that the City would be destroyed as well as the fleet, influenced all proceedings, and as the Admiral describes, saved the effusion of blood when the American advance took place. It is curious to note in the business report by the Admiral of our Asiatic squadron that there are a good many things the matter with the vessels—"the boiler tubes of the Boston give out frequently, the Raleigh's engines and boiler are under constant repair, and the construction of her fire rooms faulty; the boilers of the Baltimore are only fair." The squadron has, under Dewey, burned 36,815 tons of coal. The price of 4,000 tons not reported. The 32,813 tons cost \$330,060.71—of this \$96,802.04 was consumed by the Olympia and tenders.

The Admiral grimly says: "Regular target practice was held according to prescribed methods during the first half of the fiscal year, after which it was discontinued, the ammunition being needed for war purposes. Especial attention has been paid to subcaliber practice. The marksmanship in action was excellent, and during four months in Manila Bay there has been almost no sickness."

Vessel.	Sick, per cent.	Deaths.	Hospital.	Home.
Olympia	1.25	4	36	6
Baltimore	1.24	0	18	2
Boston	2.16	2	9	4
Charleston	2.88	0	12	0
Concord	2.58	0	3	0
McCulloch	8.80	2	7	4
Monadnock	1.16	0	22	2
Monocacy	2.17	1	19	1
Monterey	1.19	0	18	1
Petrel	2.48	1	0	2
Raleigh	5.77	2	15	2
Total		12	159	24



CHAPTER XIII.

The Object Lesson of the Voyage of the Oregon.

The People Instructed for the Army by the Experience of the Navy—The Run from Washington State to Florida—Splendid Spirit of the Men—The Fearful Storm in the Straits of Magellan—The Threat of Destroying a Spanish Torpedo Boat at Rio—The Finish Alone and in Good Form, and Famous the World Over.

The lesson of the War with Spain that will prove most profitable to the people of the United States, if they accept the teachings of a costly experience, is the comfort, economy and self-respect of strengthening the army, providing for it ungrudgingly the arms most approved by the nations in arms, and making the posts schools of military science and marksmanship with the firearms of precision great and small. It will not be the part of wisdom to go on scolding Congress for its neglect of duty to the army. All demagogy aside, and we find the army has been immensely improved since the close of the war of the States and sections, and the gradual decline almost to departure of the Indian question, as an army problem. This is the condition of enlisted men, and their character. Now thousands of young men go into the army as an occupation, and take pride in being soldiers. More than that, they are often inspired to educate themselves—and they find the zeal of competition and the flush of accomplishment in target practice, as our pioneer backwoodsmen rejoiced to excel in "shooting at a mark." There is an art in handling the modern rifle, that requires training, as certainly as there is skill and dexterity in perfecting musical gifts. There is a tradition that in the second of our wars with Great Britain a Kentucky soldier killed an Indian at the measured distance of a mile. The feat was one of celebrity, and there was much said for years of the calculations required to give the long-barreled, old-fashioned gun the correct elevation, how necessary it was that the rifle grooves should be cut with a care equal to the finest workmanship on a watch, that the ball should be perfectly round, and equally solid in every part, and the "patch"

that fitted it so that it should be so guided in the initiatory whirl, as not to have a thread amiss, or too thick or thin, just so that the full force of the powder would be applied, and the missile sent on its long flight with all possible mechanical aids—all these details demanded that the firm nerve, the cool intelligence, the keen eye, the alert executive will, the steady hand, should answer to the impulse of the brain of the man. It is not a feat held to be remarkable now to shoot accurately more than a mile. There are many of our soldiers who could pick an enemy out of a tree top at that distance, and there ought to be more of them. The improvement of the gun gives a wider scope and surer chances for the faculties of the man—the thing indispensable. The advance of the army has been rapid, in quality, in bulk, and in the favor of the people, who remember that the sword as an emblem, and the rifle as a fact, should be the weapons of liberty, that despotism with its tools may not have conceded, through the carelessness or the over-confidence of popular government, advantages that may be fatal, and are sure to be costly, in contests with freedom. If republicanism is to win in the world, it must be stronger in the hands and that which they hold, than empire—even for the reason that the people should show the capacity for greater realization from stated resources, when they control and levy upon themselves, than governments of inheritance in which the potency of manhood for the enterprise of man is classified away. It was well said when the war of the States was over that the war had legislated.

It has been ascertained that the momentous enactments of war were not always placed in forms of law, constitutional or other—were not invariably reduced to writing, and that so far had we advanced in governing by the will of the people that there was jurisprudence in the instincts of man, efficacy in traditions and public opinion that will not await the solemnities of deliberate representative bodies or pause to be valid, until the church or the courts have given them consecration. The great Republic has recognized that the army may be of and for the people, and yet not be irregular, spasmodic, undisciplined—that it is a mathematical establishment and an instrument scientific as astronomy—just as a modern piece of artillery is wrought to resemble a telescope, and is aimed at an enemy in the blue distances on land or sea as stars are found and defined in the abyss in which they are as motes of dust incandescent in the light of the sun. Much as our army was advanced and elevated in and by the generation that has just passed between wars, it did

not gain comparatively as the navy did at the same time in the things that are the essentials, when the great trials by battle, the Supreme Courts of the last resort, came to pass like bolts from the blue, in the hours of destiny when the unexpected happens and is not the more anticipated because it has occurred a thousand times.

A great American writer of the English language, Captain Mahan, taught England the significance of the words "Sea Power"—how nations had been rising to greatness through the ages, with increased velocity and augmented certainty, as they gained respect and held dominion on the seas, commanding from stormy waters the fertile shores. It was not inapt that one of our countrymen made this reassuring revelation to England, for it was in American waters, after both France and England had lost their fairest colonies on the North American continent, that the centuries of conflict between the greater nations of Western Europe, for supremacy on the central oceans and over all the world-wide waters, was in the West Indies—the archipelago—at the broad gates of the American Mediterranean—closed in favor of Great Britain as the mistress of the seas, not to be again contested until we ourselves are the contestants. It auspiciously transpired, when England's consciousness was quickened by Captain Mahan to comprehend her own greatness, that events were in the air that would bring the English speaking people nearer each other in sympathy, with broader common interests, than ever before, and that the greater sea power warmly congratulated us upon our accession of victories, honors and trophies.

There could have been no more acceptable evidence of the timeliness of our triumphs than the British cheers that greeted them. We were fortunate in the high education of our naval officers and in the good will that came down to us from days of glory long ago for the navy, and developed in a degree of Congressional enlightenment that seconded the studies of our men of science as navigators and constructors, the result being that unprepared for war on land as we were, when we were swept by currents surveyed long ago, made wild by recent storms, into the Spanish war, we had the consummate fighting ships whose names have been added in letters of light to the old rolls of the records of renown.

Even when we got the navy we did not get the docks and arsenals, that are the homes of fleets, where they clothe their necks with thunder, and make ready for glorious enterprise. However, having gotten so much, we

should go on and remove the factional restraints of conservatism. Suppose we, the people of the United States, had done as well for the army as for the navy—that is, suppose we had just doubled our regiments, troops and batteries—and then had added a reserve for the field, say 96 guns (Blanco, the last Spanish defender of Cuba, had 183 pieces of field artillery). Suppose we had fixed up one port on our southern coast where there was an inexhaustible supply of good water—a dockyard where our battleships could have been scraped, and we had ascertained the elementary principles of putting an army on ships, and at the same time arranged for getting them off again—we would have saved time and expenses, and escaped the friction about small matters that has distracted the measure of attention due the events that, after all embarrassments and obstructions, have uplifted our countrymen with the heroic sentiment that is the charm of history and the vital glow that gives color to the memory of nations; imparts a lofty spirit of patriotism, and fills the atmosphere with the illumination of great and shining deeds that will be the footsteps of light on the hills of the hereafter of the land, that has almost hesitated to accept the gifts the gods have provided in the South seas, east and west, and that came to us with the endowment of the tropics, the affluence of achievement and the opulence of the beautiful.

The army had to wait on the shore of Florida for the navy to clear the seas, and it was a superb dramatic scene, for which all the world was a stage, that while the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic squadron was warned at Hongkong to clear for action in the Philippines, the battleship Oregon, built at San Francisco, was called from the North Pacific to make haste around South America to reinforce the Atlantic fleet, to ward off the stroke which Spain seemed to be delivering to defend the last of her American possessions. There was an early and forcible call for the Oregon in this brief but sufficient telegram:

Washington, March 7, 1898.

Oregon, Bremerton, Wash. :

The situation is getting worse. You should go to San Francisco as soon as possible and get ammunition.

LONG.

(Oregon arrived at San Francisco March 9, 1898.)

Washington, March 12, 1898.

Sir: When in all respects ready for sea, proceed, with the vessel under your command, to Callao, Peru, and await further orders.

In view of the present critical condition of affairs, the Oregon should leave San Francisco at the earliest possible date, and arrive at Callao as soon as practicable.

The crew is to be constantly drilled, the passage of the ship not to be delayed thereby.

Very respectfully,

JOHN D. LONG, Secretary.

Commanding Officer, U. S. S. Oregon.

(Through Commandant, Mare Island, Cal.)

Washington, March 12, 1898.

Navy Yard, Mare Island, Cal.:

Prepare Oregon for sea with all possible dispatch. Long cruise. Fill with coal. When will she be ready to sail? LONG.

(On March 17 Capt. C. E. Clark assumed command of Oregon, relieving Capt. B. J. McCormick, condemned by medical survey.)

On March 19 the Oregon left San Francisco for Callao, arriving at the latter port April 4, 1898, having made an average speed of 10.7 knots.)

Washington, March 22, 1898.

Marietta, Panama, Colombia:

Proceed to Callao, Peru, and make arrangements to coal Oregon upon arrival. Left March 19 from San Francisco for Callao. LONG.

Washington, March 29, 1898.

Marietta, Callao, Peru:

Contract for best coal to be delivered on board Oregon immediately upon arrival. Oregon to coal utmost dispatch. You proceed at once to Valparaiso. It is possible you may take possession of Chilean armored cruiser.

LONG.

U. S. S. Marietta, 3d Rate, Callao, Peru, March 31, 1898.

Sir: I respectfully acknowledge the receipt this day of the Department's cipher dispatch dated the 29th instant.

In compliance therewith I have made necessary contract for coal for the

Oregon, and have 750 tons in lighters for her now, which will be placed alongside the moment she arrives.

This vessel leaves to-night for Valparaiso, Chile.

Respectfully,

F. M. SYMONDS,

Commander, U. S. N., Commanding, and Senior Officer Present.
The Secretary of the Navy,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Callao, Peru, April 5, 1898.

Secretary of the Navy, Washington:

Will complete work necessary boilers and engines. Will be ready to sail Thursday night (7th). I can make Montevideo, perhaps Rio Janeiro, not stopping at Valparaiso, and if coal may be obtained at Sandy Point, Patagonia, I could make Bahia.

CLARK.

Callao, April 6, 1898.

Secretary of Navy, Washington, D. C.:

On account of navigation of Magellan Strait, and reported movements Spanish torpedo vessel near Montevideo, I should recommend Marietta to accompany this vessel. If required, I could touch Talcahuana, Chile, for orders six days after my sailing.

CLARK.

Washington, April 6, 1898.

Oregon, Callao, Peru:

Proceed at once to Montevideo or Rio Janeiro. The Spanish torpedo boat Temerario is in Montevideo. Marietta has been ordered to proceed to Sandy Point, Patagonia, to arrange for coal. How many tons of coal will you require? The Marietta and Oregon to proceed together. Keep secret your destination. Keep secret this message.

LONG.

(Oregon sailed from Callao April 7 for Sandy Point.)

Washington, April 7, 1898.

Marietta, Valparaiso:

Oregon leaves to-day from Callao for Sandy Point, Patagonia. Go ahead and secure 600 tons of coal for her and accompany to the north. The United States consulates in Cuba have closed. United States Consul-General is coming home.

LONG.

The authorities at Valparaiso were very cautious and careful in their treatment of American ships on the way to the Atlantic at this time. There had been threats by Spanish residents that the *Marietta* should be destroyed in the harbor of the capital of Chile. The commander of the *Marietta* reported:

"Although we had a patrol boat about the vessel, and made necessary preparations on board for a night attack, still it was unnecessary, as by orders of the civil authorities shore boats were not permitted under any pretext to approach the vessel within 300 meters during the night, and I learned that a government detective force on shore closely watched suspected localities and persons."

Captain Clark, of the *Oregon*, writing at Rio Janeiro April 30th, of his run from Callao, states he left that port April 7th, one boiler under repairs, taking 1,100 tons coal in eighty hours, 100 tons in bags on deck, and reached the Straits in comparatively good weather, "though a heavy swell, increased by fresh southerly winds, made the ship pitch heavily, the jack staff sometimes disappearing under the solid seas that swept all but the superstructure deck. The vibrations and the racing of the propellers were very marked at times, but the condition of affairs and the Department's instructions warranted a high rate of speed.

"Entered the straits at about 3:30 p. m. on the 16th, and that evening anchored outside Port Tamar. One of the severest gales of the season broke before an anchorage could be reached, and as the wind and rain became so dense that the abrupt shores could not be seen, while no soundings could be obtained, the *Oregon* was for a time awkwardly placed. Just before dark the anchors were let go on a rocky shelf, fringed by islets and reefs, in 38 and 52 fathoms of water, and they fortunately held through some of the most violent gusts I have ever experienced."

The *Oregon* made $11\frac{3}{4}$ knots an hour, but was, after meeting the *Marietta*, detained by her low rate of speed during the run to Rio. "Owing to the chance that the Spanish torpedo vessel, the *Temerario*, might, if war existed, sight us before dark and get near enough to dispatch a torpedo during the night, only the leading vessels showed any lights, and these were screened at the sides. The 8-inch and 6-inch guns were loaded with shell, and ammunition for the rapid-fire guns was kept on deck, four crews in each watch being stationed at the guns. Orders for the maneuvering of the two ships in the event of falling in with a suspicious-looking vessel were issued."

The crews were in high spirits, the engineer officers, for instance, "voluntarily doubling their watches when high speed was to be made, and the attempts of men to return to the fire room after being carried out of it insensible; and most of the crew, who were working by watches day and night at Sandy Point, preferred to leave their hammocks in the netting until they could get the ship coaled."

At Rio was a cable from Long stating war was declared, nine days before, and to await orders—the Spanish torpedo boat probably on the way from Montevideo for Rio. On Dewey's great day this dispatch from the Navy Department showed a sense of apprehension:

"Washington, May 1, 1898.—Oregon, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Four Spanish armored cruisers, heavy and fast, three torpedo boat destroyers, sailed April 29 from Cape de Verde to the west, destination unknown. Beware of and study carefully the situation. Must be left to your discretion entirely to avoid this fleet and to reach the United States by West Indies. You can go when and where you desire. Nictheroy and the Marietta subject to the orders of yourself."

Next day Captain Clark was ordered to await orders, and the next that order was countermanded, and then came the news of the annihilation of the Spanish Asiatic fleet.

Captain Clark telegraphed May 4th: "Keeping near the Brazilian coast, as the Navy Department considers the Spanish fleet from Cape de Verde Islands superior, will be unsuitable. I can coal from the Nictheroy, if necessity compels it, to reach the United States. If the Nictheroy delays too much I shall hasten passage, leaving her with the Marietta. Every department of the Oregon in fine condition."

Clark was impatient, and telegraphed from Bahia May 9th:

"Much delayed by the Marietta and the Nictheroy. Left them near Cape Frio, with orders to come home or beach, if necessity compels it, to avoid capture. The Oregon could steam 14 knots for hours, and in a running fight might beat off and even cripple the Spanish fleet. With present amount of coal on board will be in good fighting trim, and could reach West Indies. If more should be taken here I could reach Key West; but, in that case, belt armor, cellulose belt, and protective deck would be below water line. Whereabouts of Spanish fleet requested. CLARK."

The next word from the Navy Department was to push on, avoiding the

Spaniards, but the belief of the Board was that the Oregon would defeat the Spanish fleet. It was determined not to send ships to assist the Oregon. Writing on the Oregon at sea, May 18th, Captain Clark said, being advised the night after his arrival at Rio of the Spanish torpedo boat going to that port, he sent an officer to the captain in command of the Brazilian flagship and explained to him, "that the Oregon, a \$5,000,000 battleship, might be disabled or even destroyed by the torpedo vessel of the nation that had blown up the Maine, and that I relied upon the Brazilian naval forces to prevent any such act of hostility in their waters, but that if the *Temerario* entered the harbor and approached the Oregon with a hostile purpose I must destroy her."

Captain Clark moved further up the bay after delivering this message, and instructed the commander of the *Marietta* "to send her steam launch to the *Temerario* if she appeared, and inform the commander that if he approached within half a mile of the Oregon he would be sunk." The *Marietta* was ordered to keep her search light on the vessel all the time.

The Brazilians upon this became extremely vigilant and courteous. The torpedo boat did not appear, and Captain Clark grew weary of waiting for his two companions—one slow and one crippled—and the night of May 5th, "believing that the Department needed the Oregon at the seat of war, and knowing that if we fell in with a Spanish fleet of superior force, with torpedo vessels, I must make a running fight of it at full speed, which meant leaving the *Marietta* and *Nichteroy* to escape the best way they could, as even the former could not be counted a factor in such an encounter," the Oregon moved on at high speed, and arrived at Jupiter Inlet, Florida, May 24th, having made a straight run north from the Brazilian coast beyond the islands, and then a run west. This congratulatory correspondence followed:

Washington, May 26, 1898.

Oregon (through Naval Base, Key West, Fla.):

The Department congratulates you, your officers, and crew on the completion of your long and remarkably successful voyage. LONG.

U. S. S. Oregon, 1st Rate, Key West, Fla., May 27, 1898.

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the Department's telegram of yesterday, which was received and read to all hands at muster the same evening, causing great enthusiasm and spontaneous cheers. That the officers, who have labored so faithfully and intelligently to bring the ship around in

our efficient condition for fighting and steaming, and especially that the crew, who individually and collectively have made real sacrifices and who for two months have asked for nothing but the privilege of doing extra work that might hasten the progress of the ship, should be mentioned and congratulated, affords me, as the commanding officer, especial gratification.

Very respectfully,

C. E. CLARK,

Captain, U. S. N., Commanding.

The Secretary of the Navy.


There could be no happier illustration than that furnished by the Oregon, in the long voyage and subsequent history, of the perfection attained in the building of our battleships, the superior excellence of their armament, the high spirit of the crews and the admirable tone and distinction of the officers equal as always found to all occasions.

It is plain that the confidence of the Navy Department and of Captain Clark was increased as the voyage of the Oregon progressed. The Captain was not in luck that he did not meet Cervera's fleet. As instructed by the experiences of the war—of what the Oregon did, and the fate of the fugitive ships at Santiago—only a series of accidents that there is no occasion to think probable would have prevented that ship, single handed, from destroying the entire squadron reserved for the doom that overtook the fated ships July 3d on the Coast of Cuba west of Santiago.





CAPTAIN CLARK, OF THE "OREGON," IN HIS OFFICE.



THE "OREGON," THE BULL-DOG OF THE NAVY. (Copyrighted, 1898, by J. S. Johnston, New York.)



CHAPTER XIV.

The Report of the Secretary of War.

Putting the Army into the Combat—The Plans of Campaign—The Proposed Waiting and Equipping Policy of the Major General Commanding—His Strange Confidence in the Cuban Story of an Army of 50,000 Rebels to Help Us—Reasons Why We Could not Wait Six Months after Declaring War before Striking Decisively with the Army.

The report of the Secretary of War for the year of the war with Spain and the peace also, is a document necessarily memorable and that has other than adventitious distinctions. It is remarkable for its fullness and the absolute fair play given those who have found fault with the administration of the War Department, and the sweeping frankness with which the true inwardness has been told, by the insertion of the original dispatches, that tell the bottom facts. As the war was over when the report was prepared, though the treaty had not then been signed, there was an unusually early opportunity to take the public into complete confidence by spreading in plain print the documentary truth—the whole truth, too—in the official history of the war. The story is told now and forever, and if it could be gathered into volumes unabridged, and each of the millions of the American people had them to read, without note or comment, there would be no special occasion, though abundant room, for this book.

The annual report of the Secretary of War for the year 1898 is in a large sense the original papers of the history of the Spanish war, which freed the possessions of Spain from centuries of misrule and from all oppression, except the things for which all peoples are brought to judgment, aside from disabilities that are the fault of misgovernment, inflicted upon the character of the people themselves. It is impossible that in the flash of a sword, however mightier it may be than the wand of a magician, the wrongs that are the growth of centuries shall be dissipated. We may give masses of mankind equalities of opportunity and they themselves must be responsible for the

results. We have cast down the tyrant, and the people are free to rise. We have possessed lands, and that are resources for the future generations—the assurances that there is subsistence in the soil, the skies, the waters, and the sunlight, for the children of God—the toilers that are to be.

The Secretary thus gives the history of the war in a few words:

“An army of about 250,000 volunteers and recruits for the regulars was called into existence from civil life, which, with the regular army, made a total force of 274,717 men. It was organized, armed, and equipped (no supplies being on hand other than those for the regulars, save Springfield muskets), and 50,000 men of this force were transported by land and sea to battlefields in the tropics 12,000 miles apart, where they won their victories without a single defeat, and all within the period of one hundred and thirteen days from the declaration of war to signing the protocol.” •

The report crowds two hundred and thirty-one pages. The report of the Major General commanding the army, with the accompanying reports of the commanders of independent expeditions, are given in full by the Secretary. Major General Miles, in the course of a few of the first weeks of the war, produced a series of orders or recommendations, for the preparations of ideal campaigns, and that which he directed and suggested was persuasive as well as peremptory, but not in actual business affairs so precise as to be convincing that the lines were drawn upon which the work could be done smoothly. It was not possible to be sure of the detail of a campaign on an island with a large army of regulars as defenders, before all disputes were settled as to the command of the surrounding waters. The plans of the general commanding were of course constructed of material in which theories played a great part—and it was lost time to be elaborate, before the disappearance of the elementary uncertainties. In the proposals of General Miles there are the marks of vigorous industry and the professional and technical points of the military business. On the 13th of April, the General issued a careful expression of his judgment, of which we give this paragraph:

“The history of the expedition to the Crimea and to Egypt indicate the necessity of complete and perfect equipment of each military organization, and the army should be thoroughly and effectively organized in every department—infantry, artillery, cavalry, engineer corps, signal corps, construction train for building wharves, piers, etc., and repairing railway tracks and

bridges, corduroying roads, etc., pontoon trains and appliances for depot and reserve trains—in order that upon landing on foreign soil every company, battery, regiment, brigade, and division shall be in perfect condition, fully supplied and equipped to render effective service. Hence the regiments of infantry, cavalry, and light batteries of artillery should be fully supplied with tentage, camp equipage, arms, ammunition, intrenching tools, and transportation, with medical supplies, and rations and food for men and animals for at least six months. The command should also be supplied with field artillery, siege guns, howitzers, and mortars for offensive work against any field-works or fortifications of the enemy, or for the protection of camps and depots that might be established.”

All this is well stated, but it is in the nature of general conversation, and does not bear the positive edge and point of military direction, but no doubt it had its value in impressing the people that there was much to do in preparing for war. The plans of operation of the Major General commanding will long be read with the deepest interest, but they had a common fault, requiring too much time for execution. April 9th the Major General in command made various recommendations, one of which was, “that at least 22 regiments of infantry, 5 regiments of cavalry, and the light artillery be mobilized, and placed in one large camp where they can be carefully and thoroughly inspected, fully equipped, drilled, disciplined, and instructed in brigades and divisions, and prepared for war service. This will give approximately a force of 30,000 men.” This was in addition to other recommendations, and followed by one “that the President call for a volunteer force from the different States and Territories of at least 50,000 men, in addition to the above force, to constitute one army for any offensive movements against the Spanish army in Cuba, estimated at 150,000 men, of which number 80,000 are reported as effective for military service. The entire force should be fully equipped with mountain, field, and siege artillery, and all the appliances and equipments required for actual war service.”

Also there were to be available for any emergency that might arise, “State troops along the Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific coasts,” and in addition to “any emergency” there might be “threatened attacks upon the towns, villages or cities that are exposed,” and “for the concentration of the large force that may be required in the future.” It was apparent to all that the first thing was to know whether the sea was to be our basis of offensive operations. If

it was, we did not require a diffusion of strength with a view of defending ourselves. If we invaded Cuba we were not to be invaded or even assaulted in turn. The one sure thing in the situation was that we had first to dispose of the Spanish fleets. If Spain was going to fight for Cuba, she had to do it with her navy, for her available army was there. The Major General wanted "at least" 30,000 men for one large camp where they should be "carefully and thoroughly inspected," and another "at least" 50,000, "to constitute our army for any offensive movements against the Spanish army in Cuba," estimated at 150,000. This would, of course, mean logically the land army that was in due time to be under the command of the Major General commanding, and engaged in the reduction of Havana. Certainly this ambition of the Commanding General was the logical outlook of his position, the natural consequence of the impending war, but it was qualified with severe and repeated warnings that the real work was, with the view of saving the lives of our soldiers, to be postponed for a considerable time. The contemplation of the Major General commanding is stated in his official report, with reference to letters to the Secretary of War, that the real "plan" was "harassing the Spanish forces and doing the enemy the largest amount of injury during the time necessary for our Navy to demonstrate its superiority—the rainy or sickly season, and the time actually required to equip and instruct the volunteer forces with the least possible loss to ourselves." In that letter he also asserted the belief as entertained from the first, that "we could secure the surrender of the Spanish army in the island of Cuba without any great sacrifice of life." In the letter here referred to, the General said:

"In my opinion it is extremely hazardous, and I think it would be injudicious, to put an army on that island at this season of the year, as it would undoubtedly be decimated by the deadly disease, to say nothing of having to cope with some 80,000 troops, the remnant of 214,000, that have become acclimated, and that are equipped with 183 guns. And still another element of extreme danger would be to place an army there with the possibility of our own navy not being able to keep the waters between our own territory and that island clear of hostile ships or fleets.

"By mobilizing our force and putting it in healthful camps and using such force as might be necessary to harass the enemy and doing them the greatest injury with the least possible loss to ourselves, if our navy is superior to theirs, in my judgment, we can compel the surrender of the army on the



**TRANSPORT "NEWPORT" OF THE PHILIPPINE EXPEDITION LEAVING SAN FRANCISCO.
GENERAL MERRITT ON THE BRIDGE.**



REGIMENT BREAKING CAMP AT CAMP ALGER.

island of Cuba with very little loss of life, and possibly avoid the spread of yellow fever over our own country.

“There is still time, if this is favorably considered, to put a small force of regular troops, number approximately 18,000 men, in healthful camps until such time as they can be used on the island of Cuba with safety.”

This was planning, on the 18th of April, to allow all summer for the navy of the United States to demonstrate its superiority to the Spaniards, and to put off the aggressive opening of the war six months at least, our troops being instructed in those healthful camps that were so numerous in the general understanding in April and so scarce a little later.

After the rainy and sickly seasons were over in Cuba, there was to be one masterly effort by a grand army perfected in every respect—to consist of 50,000 men at least, to overpower Blanco's 80,000 effectives and 183 guns; our ships harassing the Spaniards with their target practice at old forts, we presume. But the Major General commanding had several reserves to bring up—the 50,000 men who were to be the one specifically great and authoritatively conducted army—and one of them was “an auxiliary force of 50,000 natives.” Here the Major General commanding (page 20 of the report of the Secretary of War) apologizes for the small force comparatively that was to be ready to move six months later. He says he “deemed it of the first importance to well equip such force rather than to partly equip a much larger number.” With all possible respect for General Miles, there is evidence here of unsound calculations. Any expedition beginning with the anticipation that invaders of Cuba could be reinforced by 50,000 natives would have been founded on a rotten romance. Our soldiers did not find forces of natives reliable for the fire lines, when they got ashore at Santiago. There is a certain reserve on the subject, as a more uncertain enthusiasm that has been countenanced by some of the generals, but the private soldiers tell a different story. The list of Cuban casualties was 2 killed and 4 wounded, when we lost 1,500 men.

There is quoted a dispatch from Admiral Sampson to the Secretary of the Navy and repeated to Miles at Tampa, as follows:

“Mole St. Nicholas, Haiti.—General Miles's letter received through Colonel Hernandez on June 6. Garcia regards his wishes and suggestions as orders, and immediately will take measures to concentrate forces at the points indicated, but he is unable to do so as early as desired on account of his

expedition to Banes Port, Cuba, but he will march without delay. All of his subordinates are ordered to assist to disembark the United States troops, and to place themselves under orders. Santiago de Cuba well fortified, with advanced intrenchments, but he believes position for artillery can be taken as Miles desires. (Approximate) twelve thousand (12,000) regulars and three thousand (3,000) militia between Santiago and Guantanamo. He has sent force in order to prevent aid going to Santiago from Holguin. Repeats every assurance of good will, and desires to second plans. SAMPSON."

The General comments: "It will be observed that General Garcia regarded my requests as his orders, and promptly took steps to execute the plan of operations. He sent 3,000 men to check any movement of the 12,000 Spaniards stationed at Holguin. A portion of this latter force started to the relief of the garrison at Santiago, but was successfully checked and turned back by the Cuban forces under General Feria. General Garcia also sent 2,000 men, under Perez, to oppose the 6,000 Spaniards at Guantanamo, and they were successful in their object. He also sent 1,000 men, under General Rios, against the 6,000 men at Manzanillo. Of this garrison, 3,500 started to reinforce the garrison at Santiago, and were engaged in no less than thirty combats with the Cubans on their way before reaching Santiago, and would have been stopped had General Garcia's request of June 27 been granted. With an additional force of 5,000 men General Garcia besieged the garrison of Santiago, taking up a strong position on the west side and in close proximity to the harbor, and he afterwards received General Shafter and Admiral Sampson at his camp near that place. He had troops in the rear, as well as on both sides, of the garrison at Santiago before the arrival of our troops."

The Major General commanding accepted Cuban stories as facts so far as to say that Garcia was besieging Santiago, and proceeded to give Garcia one force of 3,000 men, another of 2,000, another of 1,000 men, and then "with an additional force of 5,000 men besieged the garrison of Santiago." Here we have four Cuban armies, in round numbers 11,000 men in all. We know what 15,000 men who were with Shafter have to say about these besiegers of the garrison of Santiago. They saw only a few scattering bands. Major-General-Commanding Miles was incorrectly informed. He did not see and count the troops, and he did not have reliable intelligence about the thirty combats. As Garcia obeyed the wishes of General Miles as orders, why did not the

American General commanding wish to have the 11,000 men brought in to crowd the Spaniards somewhat? General Garcia had such Cuban troops as there were anywhere in sight, excepting the grand army of 160 men under Gomez, who were constantly encamped for their health in a salubrious part of the country mountainous in its character. The romantic 50,000 Cuban army had existed so long in the Key West Bureau, and Gomez was so constantly thundering at the gates of Havana, from his elevated point of observations in the mountains of the Cuban Orient, that delusions were propagated and still find believers. According to the report of the Commanding General of the United States, as reproduced in the report of the Secretary of War, the plan of campaign with which he opened was to do the best we could to harass the Cubans until the rainy season and the sickly season were over, about the middle of December, four months after the surrender of Spain in consenting to the terms of the protocol. Then everything was to be perfectly prepared for a movement with 50,000 men, when the fighting was to be hot and heavy. Of course, the rainy season and the yellow fever were most serious reasons for not rushing the war. The President did not want to invade Cuba in the midst of the yellow fever season, and to subject the troops to the torrential rains when it was death to sleep on the ground—he wanted to use some time in preparation, and thought peace might be preserved after all if the people would consider the actual facts, and be patient, but all that had been overruled by Congress. Honorable members wanted to know who was afraid of the rain. The yellow fever was not a subject of jesting, but there was evidence in abundance that the yellow journals were immune. The Major General commanding had a wholesome sensibility as to the fatality it would be to attack Havana as the English did in 1762 in the midsummer—that season being selected owing to the dread of the hurricanes to be expected in October and almost always on hand in that month except when Columbus discovered America. At the same time the Major General commanding held the opinions expressed in these words from his official report:

“Congregating tens of thousands of men, many of whom were not uniformed, and scarcely any properly equipped, in great camps away from their States, rendered it difficult for them to be properly supplied with food, cooking utensils, camp equipage, blankets, tentage, medical supplies, transportation, etc., and was to a great extent the cause, in my judgment, of the debilitating effect upon the health and strength of the men, who were other-

wise in good physical condition. The material necessary to clothe and equip large armies was not even manufactured at that time, and the consequent condition of the troops for weeks and months was injurious to the commands in many ways."


What better could have been done under the "plan" of the Major General commanding does not appear. The analysis and comparison of various plans of campaigns that were not tried cannot fail to be unprofitable, and it is desirable to avoid the contentious exercise, for there is a drift in it away from higher considerations. Many of the suggestions by Major-General-Commanding Miles were excellent. His orders as a rule were judicious. If they seem sometimes too vague now, it is to be remembered that the very subjects to which they related were at the moment foggy. But the plan of waiting as long to prepare a force to conquer Cuba as the Army of the Potomac was held for the movement on Richmond, was inadmissible, first because public opinion would not have permitted it; second, as the event proved, because it was not necessary. If there was any doubt of our command of the seas as against Spain, after Dewey's victory at Manila, it was not in existence after the Oregon from the North Pacific joined the North Atlantic squadron. The President's plan was more specific than that of the military head of the army, and as he was the Commander-in-Chief of the army and the navy, he tried it and it had the merit of simplicity, proving efficacious. It was to mobilize the regular army, which was wonderfully well done, and with the most available volunteer regiments, strike a blow, not at Havana, but at some other vital point possibly, in Porto Rico, more probably in southern or eastern Cuba. Major General Miles, among others, had two harbors on the north shore in his mind. The run of Cervera's fleet into the harbor of Santiago decided the spot to deliver the blow, and the delivery proved to be the decisive event.

The President of the United States had more to study than the necessity of the inspection and instruction of the troops who were called out for a war of invasion. It required no prophet, civil or military, to tell him that there were two things apparently much in the mind of Congress that must be avoided. Our navy, while conclusions with the navy of Spain were untried on the Atlantic waters, was not to be thrust against the fortresses and stone walls of Havana. That was not the way to prepare to meet the Spanish fleet, which was obliged to appear in all available force for the protection of Cuba

and Porto Rico, or abandon at the outset the assertion of the competency of the kingdom to care for itself. The declaration about the bombardment of Havana was not worthy to be considered. It was also of common understanding, aside from the consecutive production of the current literature of practical politics, that the way to open the war was not, while the West India waters were in controversy, to scrape together all the transports that could be found, and land the mass of our soldiers, regular and volunteer—irrespective of the condition of the latter—in the province of Havana, to enter speedily as forced marches would carry our columns, into the yellow fever territory, where there were floods falling from the skies, and the supply of wholesome water very short indeed. The foremost and most fantastic ideas of campaigning in Cuba had therefore to be returned marked officially, "Not approved," to the journals that were happy to believe they were the authors of the war, and about to finish it after a few days' flurry.

Secretary Seward, in the tentative days between the secession of the extreme southern States, and the red deluge that swept over the land, assisted public confidence by coldly studied, airy declarations that the disorder would be ended in ninety days. The people on both sides of the line about to burst into fire would have been appalled and shaken if they could have foreseen one battlefield, where, years later in the struggle, many thousands perished. Mr. Seward's ninety days will be a byword for centuries, to measure great mistakes with, but it is questionable whether that acute statesman was ever mistaken for a minute. It was his duty to be confident, and especially his calling for the period of initiation, as he was the representative of his country in affairs international. The parallel case in Cuba was the feeling of some who possessed dual reputations as soldiers and statesmen, that a three weeks' blockade of Havana, with an occasional thirteen-inch shell, would turn over the great city to the United States. In the beginning there was impatience because our will-power did not seem equal to the immediate conquest of Cuba, but very soon the immense common sense of the people asserted itself, upon the proposition that we could afford to wait, and there was a vivid recollection that we had not been developing the army along with the navy, and that one of the penalties for the public fault of procrastination was that we had to encounter the expenses and endure the disappointments of delay. The Major General commanding had the hard-earned reputation of a gallant soldier. Scarred with wounds, an officer who had led

his men, sword in hand, on the bloody hillsides sloping north to the Rappahamock, and he was firm in the general estimate as a man of bravery, decision of character, and experience. His various orders, prognostications and plans excited interest as they became known, and their influence was in the correct direction of giving the people intelligence to the effect that the war was a very serious business, that must be pressed with comprehensive energy, and that the first lesson was to "learn to labor and to wait." Plans, as plans, though accompanied with statistics, did not seize the people. What they wanted was to get at the Spaniards. The first utterance of the Major General commanding was not believed to be a happy one, for it had a chill in it, and did not appear to be demanded. It was that we did not want to begin this war with a Bull Run. Still, this was meant to assist in forming public opinion to sustain the authorities in the works of preparation. And yet it would have been a colossal blunder to have held the troops assembled, with our enormous railroad facilities, in camps all summer. If we couldn't command the sea, an offensive war was impossible. Clearly we had the sea power. The prodigious victory of Dewey was the thing needed, to tell the world the true story, and it satisfied our self-esteem while it demanded action, if not all along the line, at least wherever the enemy obtruded a mark. It would be ruinous to linger. We were spending a million dollars a day, and every dollar must be accounted for. Our regular army could and would shoot a Spanish force in pieces, as our Asiatic squadron had smashed the fleet of Spain at Manila. The thing to do was to disregard the maneuvers of the Cape Verde fleet, and in the east end of Cuba, where the only insurgent forces of any value were held to be, or Porto Rico, a healthful island abounding in good roads, water, supplies, and provisions in the fields and woods, strike quick and hard, leaving the pen and pool, and pestilence, and famine, of Havana to the Spaniards. It was so ordered in time and place befitting.





CHAPTER XV.

The Early Correspondence of the Department of War.

Activity in the War Department before the Declaration of War—The Precautionary Policy of the Major General Commanding—Differences of Opinion in High Places about an Early Invasion of Cuba—Importance of Healthful Camp—The Dangers of Water Supplies—The Inside History of a Troubled Time—Shafter's Sagacity as to the Importance of a First Engagement—The Demand for a Competent Army Enforced.

"The telegraphic and other correspondence relating to the war," is the unpretending headline that follows the official reports of the generals having dependent commands and engaged in actions of importance; and a remarkable collection of dispatches and communications appear. The utter candor of this official publication is displayed in these few introductory words, in the type that declares the remarks of the Secretary:

"Early in May a movement upon Havana was contemplated, as it was believed that the city could be assaulted and captured before the rainy season set in, but the plan was subsequently abandoned on account of the reported movements of the enemy's fleet.

"It was proposed to send a portion of the army of invasion from Tampa, and to gather another part of it at Key West, on account of the close proximity of the latter place to Mariel, Cuba (a point about 26 miles west of Havana)."

This, the Secretary says, "will be shown by the following dispatches." There is a great deal more than this shown in that which is given, and the first thing one is reminded of in reading the lines that it was believed Havana "could be assaulted and captured before the rainy season," is that the war Secretary was warlike from the first day of the war and an opponent of delays, holding that to strike promptly was the way to do business.

The Spanish fleet had the advantage of associating itself with mysteries. The Cape Verde squadron appeared in the West Indies and disappeared, and the Spaniards were able to hide their purposes and the deficiencies of their ships, by the suppression of intelligence. The presence of a squadron of half

a dozen heavily armed cruisers and some torpedo boats that had a reputation for ability to be destructive far beyond their performance, was a menace, and caused a suspension of the invasion of Cuba. If Cervera's fleet had returned to Spain, and there had been a show of mustering the naval force of that nation for a rush upon the Philippines or into the harbor of Havana, the course of war events would have been largely changed, though there is no reason to be persuaded that changed results would have been reached. Still, the commitment of our army to the siege of Havana would have been a dangerous first move, for from what we know of the army and armament of Blanco, his force in the field and the formidableness of his fortifications, it would have been beyond our strength to take the capital city of Cuba before the rainy season, and we should have been constrained to fight it out with the Spaniards in the place where they were most thoroughly prepared, and could have concentrated their whole army, while our troops would have been sufferers from insufficient or impure water supplies, and victimized by the yellow fever. Once occupied in besieging Havana, we could not have abandoned it, and our ill-prepared regiments must have taken the lines of the enemy by assault as the way that would save the soldiers from fevers by shedding their blood. That is to say, the Santiago policy must have been introduced at an earlier day and on a larger scale; and while the victory at Havana the valor and numbers of our soldiers should have won, might have been more conclusive than that of Santiago, it must have been more costly. It is not surprising that the Secretary of War and the Major General commanding did not come to an agreement on plans of campaign, for it is according to the weight of the facts in the scales, that in theory of war the General wanted too much professional elaboration, and the Secretary had a hazardous confidence the war could be suddenly finished by rushing it and delivering blows with the utmost celerity, assuming the enemy to lack in preparation for defense, as much as we were wanting in equipage for offense. It was Cervera's fitful fleet that put an end to the proposed assault upon Havana, that it might be captured before the rains and the fevers came to destroy the tens of thousands while the sword devoured its thousands.

The first telegram of the long series is this:


"Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C., May 9, 1898.—The Major General commanding directs that the following orders be sent by telegraph to General Wade, at Tampa:



UNITED STATES VOLUNTEER IN FULL MARCHING ORDER.



MODEL OF GUNS USED ON AFT DECKS.



10-INCH DISAPPEARING GUN CARRIAGE. MODEL. 1896.

“Direct Major-General Shafter to move his command, under protection of Navy, and seize and hold Mariel, or most important point on north coast of Cuba, and where territory is ample to land and deploy army. Follow up his command with all the forces sent to you. Troops will be sent you as rapidly as possible from Chickamauga and other points. Have troops fully equipped; send abundance of ammunition and ship with them food for men and animals for sixty days, to be followed by four months’ supplies.

“J. C. GILMORE, Assistant Adjutant-General.”

There is a certain uncertainty about this, not removed by the words “ample,” to describe “territory,” or “rapidly as possible,” “fully equipped,” “abundance of ammunition.” There is more cadence than command in this. It is a flourish of phrases rather than an order. But the Secretary of War and the Commanding General appear to have started together. Adjutant General Corbin forwarded the order that the Major-General commanding, with the approval of the Secretary, directed. Of course this meant the execution of the Havana plan. The first difficulty was the lack of fresh water at Key West. This interfered with the concentration of a large force there.

The Commanding General, April 15th, had sent orders to all departments. The generals in the field were designated as follows: Maj. Gen. John R. Brooke, Chickamauga Park; Brig. Gen. William R. Shafter, New Orleans, La.; Brig. Gen. J. J. Coppinger, Mobile, Ala.; Brig. Gen. J. F. Wade, Tampa, Fla.

The war telegrams from the war office began to fly April 15th. The first in order after the preparatory dispatches to the army posts, were these:

Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, April 15, 1898.

Brig. Gen. J. F. Wade,

Commanding Department Dakota, St. Paul, Minn. :

With approval of Secretary of War, the Major General commanding army directs, as necessary for the public service, that you, accompanied by your adjutant-general, proceed with least practicable delay to Tampa, Fla., to assume command of troops ordered to rendezvous there. Please designate officer to perform duties of adjutant-general at department headquarters and submit names of other staff officers whom you desire to take with you.

H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, April 15, 1898.

Brig. Gen. J. F. Wade,

Commanding Department Dakota, St. Paul, Minn.:

Referring to previous telegrams on the same subject, the Major-General commanding army, with approval of Secretary of War, directs, as necessary for the public service, that you order your chief quartermaster to proceed immediately and in advance of your own departure to Tampa, Fla., for the purpose of selecting suitable ground as a camp for the troops ordered to rendezvous there for your action on arrival. SCHWAN, A. A. G.

This was a week before the declaration of war. Three days before the declaration, April 18th, in full view of the impending crisis, the Major-General commanding put in the strongest terms his admonitions that the troops should be located in healthful camps, and his opinion that it would be "extremely hazardous" and injudicious to put an army in Cuba, considering the season of the year, "as it would undoubtedly be decimated by the deadly disease, to say nothing of having to cope with some 80,000 troops, the remnant of 214,000, that have become acclimated, and that are equipped with 183 guns. And still another element of extreme danger would be to place an army there with the possibility of our own navy not being able to keep the waters between our own territory and that island clear of hostile ships or fleets." The feeling of the Commanding General that the navy might not be able to afford perfect protection to the army in course of transportation, or after disembarkation on a hostile shore, was not shared seriously by naval officers whose confidence in victory over the Spanish was never clouded, but no intelligent persons could escape the presence of peril in placing the army in Cuba before the question of commanding the surrounding seas was settled by actual combat or the retirement of the Spaniards from the scenes of activity. The Major-General commanding shared in the ordinary expressions of well-informed public opinion, among which was the spread of the yellow fever in our own country as an incident of our military expeditions, and he thought it possible to "compel the surrender of the army on the island of Cuba with very little loss of life." There was manifestly a reliance in the military mind upon the blockade which was in the thoughts of all men—and indeed distorted by the popular imagination. The food productiveness of Cuba had not been realized. It had, surprisingly, survived the torch, the machete, and the "zones of cultivation," of the desolation of which so much was said.

There was "still time," the Commanding General said, "to put a small force of regular troops, numbering approximately 18,000 men, in healthful camps until such time as they can be used on the island of Cuba with safety." Here was the first development of disagreement. The experienced officers understood the meaning of "healthful camps," but Congress and the country basked in a state of enthusiasm, and were slow of comprehension of the most sinister feature of the conditions—the inability of new troops to make use of their rations and take care of themselves in camps. In the presence of a combination of the inexperience both of officers and privates, and impracticability of providing the articles demanded for nearly a quarter of a million men turned suddenly into the fields from their habitations, there was no avoidance of discomfort, and the carelessness of the men in exposing themselves, so as to be partially disqualified for instruction, was as certain as the rains and the changing temperature by day, and night, of the winds. It was much easier to talk of healthful camps than to find them, and still harder to preserve the wholesomeness of grounds selected.

The American people in the hurries of their labors in expanding the cultivation of the continent, building cities and mills, clearing away forests, establishing the drainage of thickly settled communities, have fallen into methods of improvement that unfortunately have promoted the washing away of the fertile properties of the soil—this to a great extent by the inconsiderate waste of forests—the diminution in volume of the brooks that once turned grist mills, beautified the country, and were full of food fishes, and the pollution of living streams from villages, towns, cities, and, above all, manufactories, wherein the conversion of raw materials into articles involved chemical and mechanical changes. At the same time, the water supplies for the centers of concentrated population have been found in dangerous association with the drainage of impurities.

There were imperative reasons for camps in Florida, that peninsula being the closest approximation of our land to that of the Spaniards—Cuba being within a day's run of Tampa. This was fair striking distance. It permitted the close prognostication of the weather, an exceedingly important advantage in the transfer of an army by ships to make a landing that would be in all probability disputed by heavy masses of infantry and artillery. It was held that the sojourn of our young men in Florida would in a degree be an advanced step of acclimatization, a half-way resting place between the fields

and shops of America, and the trials of the threatening Cuban climate, famous for its deadly influences upon invading armies, as both Spanish and English history gave expositions. This memorandum for the Adjutant-General, and the response of that officer, gave the official history of the direction to General Shafter to take command of the regular army that was to be the head of the spear to penetrate Cuba:

Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C., April 29, 1898.

The Major-General commanding desires that, by letter, Brig. Gen. William R. Shafter be directed, upon his arrival at Tampa, Fla., to assume command of all troops now assembled there.

J. C. GILMORE, Assistant Adjutant-General.

War Department, Adjutant-General's Office,
Washington, April 29, 1898.

Brig. Gen. William R. Shafter, Washington, D. C.:

Sir: Under instructions from the President, the Secretary of War directs that upon your arrival at Tampa, Fla., you assume command of all the troops assembled there. Very respectfully,

H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

The water supply deficiency was the first embarrassment encountered. This was known to be an awaiting woe at Key West, but was not expected to lurk at Tampa also. General Shafter's first dispatches disclosed that his plunge into the task assigned him had located a rising tide of troubles:

Tampa Bay Hotel, Tampa, Fla., May 7, 1898—3:44 p. m.

Adjutant-General United States Army, Washington, D. C.:

Am crowding work of watering and coal transport, and put in pen and stall for sortie (stock?). Will have it completed Wednesday sure. Many obstacles to—

SHAFTER, Brigadier-General.

(Note.—Telegram apparently not completed.)

Tampa Bay Hotel, Tampa, Fla., May 7, 1898—6:50 p. m.


Adjutant-General, United States Army,

War Department, Washington, D. C.:

Colonel Lawton just returned from Key West. Brings message from Commodore Watson that water is absolutely necessary; that supply on all ships is very short, and that if can assist him in getting supply it will be a great favor to him. A barge, capacity one hundred thousand gallons, can



DAIQUIRI, WHERE OUR TROOPS LANDED IN CUBA.



THE BEACH AT DAIQUIRI.



THE PIER AT DAIQUIRI.



A PART OF DAIQUIRA, CUBA.



THE WAY MILK IS SOLD AND DELIVERED IN HAVANA.

start in morning for Key West, towed by one of ships under charter. Cost of water two cents per gallon. No tug here for hire. Shall I send it?

SHAFTER, Brigadier-General.

The footnote that the telegram of Shafter appeared to be unfinished is an example of the thoroughness with which the telegraphic correspondence has been given to the public. The dispatch had a word evidently of erroneous writing, and the unbroken termination tells that a work of "watering" was in progress, and between the words is the easy reading that the work watering ships was slow, and that the least of the evil consequences was loss of time. The news from Key West was that those who got further along were faring worse.

Adjutant-General Corbin's reply to Shafter's dispatch of May 7th, dated 6:50 p. m., about the short water supply at Key West, was rushed the following morning:

Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, May 8, 1898.

General Shafter, Tampa Bay Hotel, Tampa, Fla.:

Your telegram concerning water supply for Commodore Watson received, and Secretary of War directs you to make every possible effort to furnish anything and everything to help him along. In this and other cases Secretary of War approves any action you take, but desires every such order of yours reported for his information. H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

May 10th, by direction of the Major-General commanding, the invasion of Cuba was postponed for a week:

Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C., May 10, 1898.

The Major-General commanding directs that the following orders be telegraphed General Wade, Tampa, Fla.: That the movement of troops to Cuba is delayed until Monday, May 16, 1898. In the meantime, he will send the infantry in the ships, with an abundant supply of water and whatever else is required with them, to Key West, there to disembark. The ships are to return to Tampa to carry more infantry to Key West, until there are about 12,000 men there. These will move from Key West, to Dry Tortugas and Cuba, on ships coming from New York. Also, that General Brooke has been directed to send to Tampa from Chickamauga the Second, Seventh, Eighth, Twelfth, and Sixteenth Infantry. These can be forwarded to Key West by any means available.

J. C. GILMORE, Assistant Adjutant-General.

The next day after the order of 12,000 troops to Key West, came to hand this jarring information about the water supply:

Tampa Bay Hotel, Tampa, Fla., May 11, 1898.

(Received Washington, 8:12 p. m.)

Adjutant-General United States Army, for Commanding General,
War Department, Washington, D. C.:

Water for large body of troops at Key West is serious question. Absolutely no water there. Only water barge from this port, capacity 130,000 gallons, should reach Key West to-morrow with water for navy, and be back Friday. Transports carry considerable water, but have no way of distillation. Is imperative that water be placed in Key West before troops begin to arrive. Quartermaster-General has been asked to charter, clean, loan, and start 1,000,000 gallons tank steamer with light draft barge for unloading. Dry Tortugas reported to have brackish water in cisterns. Am now trying to ascertain quantity and quality. Expect information.

J. F. WADE, Brigadier-General.

On the same day the Major-General commanding directed the troops at Tampa to be in readiness to ship to Dry Tortugas (ominous name!) to be there on the morning of the 16th.

Here is an example of a way a rumor appears in an official telegram:

(Telegram.—Rush.—Confidential.)

Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, May 13, 1898.

Col. A. S. Kimball, Army Building, New York City:

Report at once any information you have about Spanish war boats on our coast. Give full information. Hold transports until further orders. Acknowledge.

NELSON A. MILES,

Major-General Commanding Army.

It has often been remarked that as a rule a dispatch is more important at the delivery than at the receiving end of the wire over which it passes, and that the magnifying power of a wire is in proportion to its length. A "head-quarters" will be more stirred up by a telegram than the personal report of a scout. An official dispatch increases the phenomenon of long-distance telegraphy.

The dispatches from Major-General Shafter were at this period thoughtful, and straight shots. He recommended legislation to enable soldiers on the field "to exercise the franking privilege as was done during the War of the

Rebellion," urged that recruits should join their regiments when they could be under the control of the officers who would command them, stopped part of the volunteer regiments at Jacksonville owing to "difficulty of finding suitable camping ground with abundant water supply."

On this last dispatch Corbin telegraphed that the Secretary of War wanted "further recommendation on this line as to distribution of troops, with view to their comfort and their ultimate transport from Tampa."

The Seventy-first New York regiment attracted the attention of Shafter, who telegraphed:

Tampa Bay Hotel, Tampa, Fla., May 22, 1898.

(Received, Washington, 6:33 p. m.)

Adjutant-General U. S. A., Washington, D. C.:

Upon personal report to me by colonel of the Seventy-first New York that 300 of his men have never fired a gun, I have ordered 15,000 rounds of ammunition be given that regiment for target practice. Will do same with other volunteer regiments that I find uninstructed.

SHAFTER, Major-General.

General Corbin telegraphed Shafter asking him to take up and solve the question of organization of the Fifth and Seventh corps and "do a very great service." The dispatch from Shafter, one of the important papers, is as follows:

Tampa Bay Hotel, Tampa, Fla., May 24, 1898.

(Received, Washington, 2:45 p. m.)

The Adjutant-General U. S. A., Washington, D. C.:

Recommend brigades to consist of three regiments of infantry, three brigades to a division. Regular regiments to be brigaded together, adding two volunteer regiments to the sixteen regular regiments already here to form first and second divisions of Fifth Army Corps, the other corps to be formed in like manner from volunteer regiments. General officers in order of rank of respective corps to command divisions as fast as organized; others to command brigades. Staff officers recently appointed to be assigned as far as practicable with the volunteers, in order to give brigade commanders the benefit of their experience. The five cavalry regiments here now to be formed into two brigades of three and two regiments respectively. Should cavalry volunteer regiments be assigned here, brigades then to be formed with two regiments each. The number of regiments for each brigade as I

have indicated is approved by General Wheeler. Other general officers whom I have consulted agree with me as to the number of regiments to constitute a brigade. Recommend placing all the regular regiments in one corps, so that they may be taken first for service in Cuba. If this is not satisfactory, half of the regulars can be assigned to each corps, and in event of an advance on Cuba the regulars in each corps formed for the advance. I think, however, that it would be better to have all regulars in one corps. The light artillery should (remain), as at present, all together under charge of Colonel Randolph. They should accompany the advance, and then be assigned one battery to each division and one to cavalry corps, the remainder to constitute the reserve. If this project is approved, I request early order, and I will immediately proceed to complete the organization. I have been led to make the recommendations in view of an early advance, and from the fact that I believe the first battle will be the decisive one and that the best troops should bear the brunt, supported as strongly as possible by the volunteers.

SHAFTER, Major-General, Commanding.


This dispatch is a model of executive statement and the last sentence not only contains the outlines of the Santiago campaign, but is marked by the sagacity that solved the situation—"the first battle will be the decisive one, and the best troops should bear the brunt." It was sound military sense in Shafter to discern six weeks ahead of the fact that the decisive battle would be the first one, and he wanted no mistake about that. General Shafter thus emerged from the moonshine of distant speculation, and put himself in the place of the critical command and mapped the event, without knowing where on the island the fateful field was located.

In the wars that may hereafter come upon us, this is an example to be quoted. It is a line of sunlight to be distinguished in the morning, followed to the noon of victory. The importance of the increase of the regular army is tremendously increased by the truth, plain now and to be more and more made known to the comprehensive assimilation of the intelligence gathered by prescient observation, that the decisive battles will be the first ones, or at least that the losers of the opening engagements will find the cost of the restoration of fallen fortunes intolerably augmented by the education of sufficient armies, after the wars are on. In the campaigns of modern warfare there is no instance but that in our war of States in the United States in which the winners of the first serious combat were not those who gained the

closing triumph; and it was a terrible road to travel from Manassas to Appomattox. In the Crimean war the allies held the field of battle of Alma. In the Franco-Austrian war Marshal McMahon was the victor at Magenta, and it was followed by Solferino. The Prussians won the first events in the advance into Silesia in the combat with Austria, and Sadowa was the finish. In the Franco-German war the French lost the skirmishes on the frontier, the battles of Woerth and Saarbrück, and the end was Gravelotte, Sedan, and the capitulation of Paris. The same fatality was visible in the English invasion of Egypt, the Chilean assault upon Peru, the Japanese advance into China, the Turkish humiliation of the Greeks.

These object lessons all tell the same story. They mean the necessity that is imposed upon a nation of great resources—a fine place for looting, as Blucher said of London—to have a competent army; first for the insurance of peace with dignity and honor, second to guard against the misfortune of insufficiency at the start when the red flame of war bursts through the roofs and the walls of the world, and one disaster makes way for another—following fast and following faster—all modern improvements hastening and extending the original impulse to ruin. Every decent sentiment of national duty demands of the people of the United States that they shall be an armed nation. It turned out at Santiago as Shafter said it would somewhere, that the decision would be made where the armies of the belligerents first met in battle array. It was the foresight that put the regulars to the front where the swords crossed, that enabled us to close the campaign with a clap of thunder and a blaze of glory.





CHAPTER XVI.

The Phantom Fleets of Spain in Cuban Waters.

Admiral Cervera Sailed into the Unknown and Became a Mystery and a Menace—He Appeared and Disappeared and Was at Last Found at Santiago by Commodore Schley—Imperative Demands for Information Answered—The Orders of General Shafter and Plans of General Miles—Dramatic Scenes at Tampa—Just as the Great Fleet was Sailing Another Spanish Hoodoo Fleet was Announced—After All a Prosperous Voyage, and Easy Landing.

The fleet of Admiral Cervera sailed from the Cape Verde Islands April 29th, four armored cruisers, and three torpedo gunboats. The destination could only be conjectured. The surface indications were that the Spaniards had done the best they could, but the Cadiz squadron was not in form for fighting. The Cervera fleet was obviously unequal to raising the blockade of Cuba, and must have for its objective an appearance on our North Atlantic coast, with the view of exciting an alarm that would be a diversion, or to maneuver in the West Indies, to disturb the disposition of those destined to invade Cuba.

The Spanish cruisers had a high reputation for speed, and were undoubtedly swifter than the fleet of Admiral Sampson, which was limited in movement to the rate at which the monitors could be towed, and for a time it was held by those who gave time to conjecture that the real object of the Spaniards was to capture the Oregon, whose voyage from the Pacific to the Atlantic was of universal knowledge, and the interest in it constant and keen. There was a hawk in the sky, and it might strike anywhere. May 7th Admiral Sampson was informed at Cape Haitien that the Spanish squadron was reported at St. Thomas. May 14th the roving cruisers of Spain were off Curacoa. The bombardment of San Juan, Porto Rico, by Admiral Sampson's fleet, took place on the 10th of May. On the 22d was received a dispatch from Key West that Cervera's fleet was in the Santiago harbor. The Naval Department had information that—we quote the Secretary of the Navy—the

"Spanish fleet had munitions of war destined for the defense of Havana, and was under imperative orders to reach Havana, Cienfuegos, or a port connected with Havana by rail; and that as Cienfuegos appeared to be the only port fulfilling the conditions, the Flying Squadron would be instructed upon arrival at Key West to proceed to Cienfuegos. Instructions were at the same time given to Admiral Sampson to increase the Flying Squadron by such armored ships as he might deem desirable."

It turned out that for a time Cervera's fleet, which had taken refuge at Santiago, because short of coal and provisions, occupied the attention of both our superior squadrons, and detained the army that was going to Cuba. May 27th, the Secretary of the Navy wrote the Secretary of War: "If the Spanish fleet is in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, I expect absolute information to that effect from our naval commanding officer at any moment. On receipt of that information, the movement to Santiago should be made without a moment's delay, day or night," and of this he had advised Admiral Sampson and Commodore Schley. The Secretary telegraphed Sampson:

"If Cervera's division is proved to be in Santiago, it is intended to make immediately a descent upon that port with 10,000 troops, landing about eight miles east of port. You will be expected to convoy the transports, probably fifteen or twenty, going in person and taking with you New York, Indiana, Oregon, and as many smaller vessels with good batteries as can possibly be gathered."

This was partly in apprehension of the torpedo vessels. The blockade of Havana was to be provided for by the monitors and gunboats.

The Secretary's telegram to Commodore Schley was:

"The most absolutely urgent thing now is to know positively whether Cervera's division is in Santiago harbor, as, if so, an immediate movement against him and the town will be made by the navy and a division of about 10,000 of our troops, which are all ready to embark. Your difficulties regarding coaling must be surmounted by your own ingenuity and perseverance. This is a crucial time, and the Department relies upon you to give quickly information as to Cervera's presence, and to be all ready for concerted action with the army. Two colliers have been ordered to St. Nicolas Mole."

The coast line of Cuba is almost as long as that of our country on the Atlantic. The island is nearly eighteen hundred miles from east to west, and there are many islands and reefs. Blockading vessels looking for a hostile

fleet are surprising consumers of coal, and battleships are, as a rule, hard to coal unless in comfortable quarters. Commodore Schley was not convinced as quickly as others that the Cape Verde fleet was at Santiago, and hesitated whether to go to Key West for coal. He knew that if Cervera was to give relief to the city of Havana, he must do it from Cienfuegos, within easy reach of the capital by rail, and that if he was aggressive. But Cervera, instead of seeking enemies, was striving to elude them, and secure coal and provisions for his men, do what was possible in the way of clearing his ships to restore their much declined speed. The Commodore, however, concluded after he had sent out dispatches that he was going to Key West, that his first duty was to find certainly that Cervera was or was not at Santiago, and wisely turned his ships about and drove them east. May 28th he cabled from Kingston:

"Have been unable absolutely to coal the Texas, Marblehead, Vixen, Brooklyn from collier, all owing to very rough sea. Bad weather since leaving Key West. The Brooklyn alone has more than sufficient coal to proceed to Key West; cannot remain off Santiago present state squadron coal account. Impossible to coal leeward Cape Cruz in the summer, all owing to south-westerly winds. Harvard reports coal sufficient for Jamaica; leaves to-day for Kingston; reports only small vessels could coal at Gonaives or Mole. Minneapolis only coaled for Key West; also Yale, which tows Merrimac. Much to be regretted, can not obey orders of Department. Have striven earnestly; forced to proceed for coal to Key West by way of Yucatan passage. Cannot ascertain anything respecting enemy positive. Obligated to send Eagle—admitted no delay—to Port Antonio, Jamaica; had only 25 tons of coal. Will leave St. Paul off Santiago de Cuba. Will require 10,000 tons of coal at Key West. Very difficult to tow collier to get cable to hold."

On the same day Long telegraphed:

Washington, May 28, 1898.

Harvard, care American Consul, Kingston, Jamaica:

Following must be delivered to Schley as soon as possible; utmost urgency. Unless it is unsafe, your squadron Department wishes you to remain off Santiago, so can not you take possession of Guantanamo, occupy as a coaling station? If you must leave, are authorized to sink collier in the mouth of harbor if you can obstruct thereby, but if not so used and not necessary to you, it would be desirable to leave her Nicholas Mole or vicinity.

You must not leave the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba unless it is unsafe your squadron, or unless Spanish division is not there. LONG.

Sampson to Long, Key West, May 28:

"He has sufficient coal aboard, undoubtedly, to keep sea for some time, as all except Iowa left here full. The importance of absolutely preventing departure of Spanish squadron of paramount importance, and demands the most prompt and efficient use of every means."

May 29, Sampson to Long:

"The failure of Schley to continue blockade must be remedied at once if possible. There can be no doubt of presence of Spanish division at Santiago."

Long to Schley, May 29:

"Schley, Mole Haiti. (Also sent to Port Antonio and to Kingston, Jamaica).—It is your duty to ascertain immediately if the Spanish fleet is in Santiago and report. Would be discreditable to the navy if that fact were not ascertained immediately. All military and naval movements depend upon that point."

Schley to Long:

"Off Santiago de Cuba, May 29, 10 a. m.—Enemy in port. Recognized Cristobal Colon, Infanta Maria Teresa, and two torpedo-boat destroyers moored inside Morro, behind point. Doubtless the others are here. I have not sufficient coal."

Long to Sampson, 29:

"Schley has seen the Spanish fleet at Santiago."

Washington, May 29, 1898.

Cotton, U. S. S. Harvard, Kingston, Jamaica:

Return to Schley with this message. Hold on at all hazards. New York, Oregon, and New Orleans are on the way. St. Louis and Yankee just leaving New York for Santiago, via Nicholas Mole. Two more colliers en route.

LONG.

Harvard, Kingston, Jamaica:

Washington, May 30, 1898.

Deliver Schley following: Where are the other two armored cruisers, Spanish fleet? When discovered, please report promptly. Commander-in-Chief North Atlantic Station has started to join you.

LONG.

Commodore Schley made for Santiago in good time. The tone of the Sampson and the Long dispatches was not that of approval of the Commodore's disability from lack of coal. The Secretary asked, on the 30th of May,

where the two armored cruisers of Spain Schley had not seen were. Schley had seen two of the four cruisers, and the two torpedo boats—and reporting them by name, added, “Doubtless the others are here.” Of course, that was according to the probabilities, but it was necessary to be sure of all the Spaniards,—and so the energetic Secretary cautioned:

Washington, May 31, 1898.

Sampson, care Cable Office, Mole St. Nicholas, Haiti:

It is essential to know if all of four Spanish armored cruisers in Santiago, as our military expedition must wait for this information. Report as soon as possible.

LONG.

Schley's answer, May 31st, mentioned that he needed more picket boats very badly, and he added: “Have seen one more vessel of the Vizcaya class in port.” The Commodore would not, however, swear it was the Vizcaya.

On the 29th Sampson had come around to this:

“Telegram just received from Schley shows that he is to-day blockading Santiago de Cuba, and will continue to do so until coal supply has been reduced to safe limit for large ships.”

Two days later Schley was telegraphing from in front of Santiago. “Smooth sea here now.” The waves were not running so high, but Schley had not seen all the Spanish cruisers, and it would not do to let any of them get out when our transports were on the wing.

The Secretary of the Navy had a slight attack of Cuban stories delivered in this official form:

Washington, May 30, 1898.

Harvard, Kingston, Jamaica:

Deliver following to Schley: Sagua, 25 miles east of Santiago, is reported a good place for landing, and that the insurgents have entire possession of this vicinity, and some horses of their cavalry are kept about a mile inland. From thence it has been reported easy to reach the heights in the rear of Santiago, commanding view of the whole harbor, without any probability of meeting with the Spanish forces. For miles the road is mountainous, and after this very fair.

LONG.

The subsequent proceedings at Santiago did not show that the reports to the Secretary that he sent on to Schley were strictly accurate. The Cuban cavalry of the coast guard did not muster in force when wanted, and the heights in the rear of Santiago were not “easy to reach” without meeting

several Spaniards, and right in the neighborhood the Cubans to sacrifice their lives for their Republic were not reported as numerous, and never were found by burial parties. But Admiral Sampson proceeded to Santiago waters, on this dispatch from Long dated May 29th: "Department thinks it very desirable that you carry out recommendation to go yourself with two ships to Santiago de Cuba;" and the Commander-in-Chief of the North Atlantic squadron certified to "a reliable Cuban" as follows:

Mole Haiti, June 4, 1898.

Secretary of the Navy, Washington:

Off Santiago, June 3.—Some observations made to-day by a reliable Cuban, in accordance with my instructions, made four armored vessels and two torpedo destroyers at Santiago. At that time repairs and more coal needed by them. SAMPSON.

This made up the full list of the Spanish fleet seen in the harbor of Santiago.

The Secretary of the Navy, on May 31st, wanted to know from the War Department, as there seemed to be a movement of the army at hand, "what means are to be employed by the War Department for landing the troops, artillery, horses, siege guns, mortars, and other heavy objects, when the pending military expedition arrives on the Cuban coast near Santiago."

It was pointed out that the crews of the armored ships "ought not to be fatigued by the work incident to landing troops, stores, etc." They were going to have to remove Spanish mines and to meet the Spanish fleet in action, and so must not be overworked. The boys were eventually able to help themselves ashore, but the transfer from the ships to the land was not accompanied with facilities of the most modern sort. We were a shade deficient in that line, but the men were shifty and glad to swim ashore when boats were scarce, but they left their supplies.

It seemed that the time for action had arrived, and that the personal telegrams of General Corbin and the cipher dispatch to General Shafter following made the start of the embarked army definite and certain:

Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, May 30, 1898—11:30 p. m.

Major-General Shafter, Tampa, Fla.:

My telegram just now said important telegram would reach you in a few minutes. It may be an hour before I can have it ready, but no more.

H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

War Department, Washington, May 30, 1898.

(Sent in cipher May 31, 1898, 2:30 a. m.)

Maj. Gen. William R. Shafter, Tampa, Fla. :

With the approval of the Secretary of War, you are directed to take your command on transports, proceed under convoy of the Navy to the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba, land your force at such place east or west of that point as your judgment may dictate, under the protection of the Navy, and move it onto the high ground and bluffs, overlooking the harbor, or into the interior, as shall best enable you to capture or destroy the garrison there; and cover the navy as it sends its men in small boats to remove torpedoes, or with the aid of the navy capture or destroy the Spanish fleet now reported to be in Santiago Harbor. You will use the utmost energy to accomplish this enterprise, and the government relies upon your good judgment as to the most judicious use of your command, but desires to impress upon you the importance of accomplishing this object with the least possible delay. You can call to your assistance any of the insurgent forces in that vicinity, and make use of such of them as you think advisable to assist you, especially as scouts, guides, etc. You are cautioned against putting too much confidence in any persons outside of your troops. You will take every precaution against ambushes or surprises or positions that may have been mined or are commanded by the Spanish forces. You will cooperate most earnestly with the naval forces in every way, agreeing beforehand upon a code of signals. Communicate your instructions to Admiral Sampson and Commodore Schley. On completion of this enterprise, unless you receive other orders or deem it advisable to remain in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, reëmbark your troops and proceed to the harbor of Port de Banos, reporting by the most favorable means for further orders and future important service. This with the understanding that your command has not sustained serious loss and that the above harbor is safe for your transports and convoy. When will you sail?

By command of Major-General Miles:

H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

Tampa Bay Hotel, Tampa, Fla., May 31, 1898—11:58 a. m.

Gen. H. C. Corbin, Washington, D. C. :

Telegram received 3:45 this morning now being deciphered. Your boy will go with me, and I shall take same care of him I would my own. Much love.

SHAFTER, Major-General, Commanding.

On the 27th of May General Miles had addressed a letter to the Secretary of War, saying he thought it would be advisable to "land transports with a strong force," and so on, and with army and navy together capture the harbor, garrison and fleet at Santiago. If this happened prematurely, the General argued, "We will be able to land a superior force, and I believe that a combined effort will result in capturing the island, with its garrison, provided it is done before it can be reinforced from Spain. The distance from Key West to Porto Rico is 1,040 miles, and from Cadiz, Spain, to Porto Rico, it is about 4,000 miles. The possession of Porto Rico would be of very great advantage to the military, as it would cripple the forces of Spain, giving us several thousand prisoners. It could be well fortified, the harbor mined, and would be a most excellent port for our navy, which could be speedily relieved from any responsibility in the charge of that port, as we could leave a sufficient garrison to hold it against any force that might be sent against it."

After this there was to be "a movement toward the west," and a base found at Nuevitas along the Puerto Principe railroad—insurgents to be supplied with the usual "abundance of arms and munitions of war," our people acting in conjunction "with the forces of Lieutenant-General Garcia, and General Gomez"—and the general gave this cheerful reassurance:

"These movements, in my judgment, can all be accomplished during the rainy season, through a country comparatively free from yellow fever, well stocked with cattle, and having grass sufficient for our animals. While this is being accomplished our volunteer army will be prepared to land in the vicinity of Mariel, Havana, or Matanzas in sufficient force to complete the capture or destruction of the Spanish forces upon the island of Cuba. The advantage of this movement will be that the army and navy will act in concert and close unison."

Another recommendation was that this would not divide the navy, and the General adds: "I believe that the entrance to the port of Cienfuegos can be obstructed or blockaded by one or two monitors to better advantage than to send the army there, where it would have to meet a strong garrison, which is already there."

The only detail neglected is as to the two monitors. The General does not say whether they should be allowed to float—if they may be said to float—or sunk altogether; and the General does not say whether the "close unison"

of the army and navy could be best secured by himself or Admiral Sampson becoming Commander-in-Chief of both Army and Navy. Of course, the only real objection to this happy adjustment would be that the Constitution of the United States is an instrument that reserves the command in chief of the sailors and soldiers, afloat and ashore, to the President alone. In the instructions sent by General Miles to General Shafter from Washington, May 31, 2:30 a. m., Shafter was told to move his army as his judgment might dictate, "onto the high ground and bluffs overlooking the harbor or into the interior."

Shafter being thus instructed, the Major-General left for Tampa at once, arriving June 1st.

The first bulletin from the Major-General commanding, General Miles, after his arrival at Tampa was that men were working night and day, and there was an important and gratifying telegram to the effect that "Dorst, Captain," had at Port Banes, northern coast, directly opposite Santiago, "landed over 400 armed and equipped Cubans; 1,300,000 rounds ammunition, Springfield and Remington; 7,500 Springfield rifles; 20,000 rations, besides large quantities equipment and clothing; 24 horses; 74 mules."

As for Spanish troops there were 40,000 in the province of Santiago, and "nearly 1,000 insurgent troops" had arrived at Banes, a favorite resort, no doubt, of the Cuban navy! General Miles reported favorably June 2d as to work going on, saying: "The working force at Tampa has been divided into three reliefs, each working eight hours during the twenty-four, nine ships being loaded at one time."

Rear Admiral Sicard recommended that to secure secrecy as to army movements, "the commanding officer of the army in Tampa and of the navy at Key West be directed to seize and detain all press boats, of whatever character, in those ports, and to prevent their following the expedition, placing, if necessary, a file of soldiers or marines on board to enforce obedience; and likewise that the commanding naval officer of the convoy be directed, in case a press boat joins the fleet, to take charge of her and compel her to remain until he reaches the Commander-in-Chief, who shall also detain her so long as he thinks expedient to do so."

Orders were issued accordingly. Shafter telegraphed that the difficulties in loading could not be appreciated. General Miles illustrated the embarrassments: "Fifteen cars loaded with uniforms were sidetracked 25 miles away from Tampa, and remained there for weeks while the troops were suffering

for clothing. Five thousand rifles, which were discovered yesterday, were needed by several regiments. Also, the different parts of the siege train and ammunition for same, which will be required immediately on landing."

It was the next day that Admiral Sampson cabled that the Merrimac was in the channel, and Cervera "safely bottled up." The Secretary of the Navy says in his report that when Sampson arrived off Santiago he found "Schley's squadron in column to the westward of the mouth of the harbor," and "on June 3rd an attempt was made to close the harbor by sinking across its entrance the collier Merrimac. This attempt, though unsuccessful in its object, was daringly executed. It is now one of the well-known historic marvels of naval adventure and enterprise, in which Naval Constructor Hobson and his men won undying fame."

The President became impatient and wanted to know why there was so much delay in getting off. Shafter replied, June 5th, 6:32 a. m., that "delays occur that cannot be prevented or foreseen"—and, "Siege guns have only been assembled late this evening. They will be loaded on cars to-night and sent to transports early in the morning, and the loading rushed. Will begin putting men on to-morrow p. m., if possible, and be ready to start Monday night or Tuesday morning. The last of the troops from Chickamauga are expected to-night. Officers engaged in loading transports have worked night and day. The main cause for delay has been the fact that great quantities of stores have been rushed in promiscuously, and with no facilities to handle or store them. The last 10 miles before reaching the wharf is a single track, and very narrow place in which to work. The capacity of this place has been greatly exceeded. Could have put the troops on and rushed them off, but not properly equipped as I know the President wishes them. I will not delay a minute longer than is absolutely necessary to get my command in condition and start the earliest moment possible."

June 5th General Miles telegraphed that the delay had been caused "through no fault of any one connected with it," and contained the principal part of the army, "which for intelligence and efficiency was exceeded by no body of troops on earth." The General requested "ample protection" for this command from the navy while at sea—and he added: "This enterprise is so important that I desire to go with this army corps, or to immediately organize another and go with it to join this, and capture position No. 2."

General Miles telegraphed the day following that there should be "a few regiments well equipped at Camp Alger." The words "few" and "well" here are not of military precision—but the general proposition stands good.

Admiral Sampson had, on June 7th, "silenced works quickly without injury of any kind." The general opinion is after the war that this sentence should have read, "without injury of any kind to the works." The Admiral also remarked: "If 10,000 men were here, city and fleet would be ours within forty-eight hours. Every consideration demands immediate army movement. If delayed, city will be defended more strongly by guns taken from the fleet."

This observation was not confirmed by Shafter's experience with 18,000 men. Santiago was a hard, hot nut to crack.

The night of June 7th the Secretary of War telegraphed Shafter: "The President directs you to sail at once with what force you have ready," and Shafter's reply was worthy the occasion:

Tampa, Fla., June 7, 1898—9 p. m.

Secretary of War, Washington:

I will sail to-morrow morning. Steam cannot be gotten up earlier. There is loaded to-night one division of infantry (9 regiments), 16 companies of dismounted cavalry, 4 light batteries, 2 siege batteries artillery, 2 companies of engineers, and the troops from Mobile. I will try and get on the rest of the cavalry and another division of regular infantry by morning. I will sail then with whatever I have on board. SHAFTER, Major-General.

Executive Mansion, Washington, June 7, 1898.

General Shafter, Tampa, Fla.:

About how many men will you have ready by morning?

CORBIN, Adjutant-General


Port Tampa, Fla. (direct), June 7, 1898—10:15 p. m.

Adjutant-General Corbin:

I expect to have 834 officers, 16,154 men on transports by daylight, and will sail at that hour. SHAFTER.

General Miles telegraphed that the last of the troops from Chickamauga "arrived this morning and hurried to the steamers."

North Atlantic Fleet
 Flying Squadron
 Spanish Squadron



The positions shown are those of the flagship in each case except that the Spanish positions are those taken from the Log of the Cristóbal Colon



CHART SHOWING DAILY POSITIONS OF FLEET IN CAMPAIGN AGAINST SPANISH SQUADRON UNDER ADMIRAL CERVERA, FROM MAY 15, 1898, TO JULY 3, 1898. REDUCED FROM MAP PREPARED BY NAVY DEPARTMENT.



DAILY POSITIONS OF SPANISH SQUADRON UNDER ADMIRAL CERVERA, FROM APRIL 9, 1898, TO JULY 3, 1898. REDUCED FROM MAP PREPARED BY NAVY DEPARTMENT FROM LOG OF "CRISTOBAL COLON."

This was a remarkable situation, and the next thing was a startling shift of scenery:

War Department, Washington, D. C., June 8, 1898.

Major-General Shafter, Tampa, Fla.:

Wait until you get further orders before you sail. Answer quick.

R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War.

Port Tampa, Fla., June 8, 1898—4:06 p. m.

R. A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.:

Message received. Vessels are in the stream, but will be able to stop them before reaching the Gulf. SHAFTER, Major-General.

War Department, Washington, June 8, 1898.

Major-General Miles, Tampa, Fla.:

The reason for countermanding order you will find in the following. The order was given at the request of the Navy Department by direction of the President:

“Key West, June 8.—Spanish armor cruiser, second class, and Spanish torpedo-boat destroyer seen by Eagle, Nicholas Channel, Cuba.—Remey.”

“Key West, June 8.—Last cipher just came by Resolute, just arrived; was pursued by two vessels, Nicholas Channel, Cuba, last night. Shall I order Indiana and all available cruisers to coast of Cuba? More detail to follow.—Remey.”

Tampa, Fla., June 8, 1898—11:42 p. m.

Hon. Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.:

If that report is true, those Spanish vessels could be within six hours of the loaded transports now, and there to-morrow. Have ample measures been taken by the navy to insure their safety? MILES, Commanding.

General Miles took advantage of the interval to submit several questions, suggestions and plans of campaign. He rattled the Secretary of War.

June 9th, 6:50 p. m.: “Think it would be well to announce that the army got on board transports and started, as they did yesterday. Say nothing about its being recalled, but let our naval vessels go over the course that our transports would have gone over, with the hope of finding those Spanish ships.”

Now, the General wanted to know whether the presence of Spanish war

vessels didn't render it extremely hazardous to send troops on transports until the Spaniards were "captured, destroyed or driven away." The General wanted to know whether he should go on with the organization of Expedition No. 2.

The reply of the President was:

War Department, June 9, 1898.

Major-General Miles, Tampa, Fla.:

The President directs me to say that no change of plan will be made; that Expedition No. 2 must be organized as rapidly as possible. We are looking for transports, and are satisfied the navy will take care of that problem. Give nothing out.

R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War.

General Miles at once had another plan—not a change in the plan, but a new one, right from the mint. It took hold heartily of the navy, and awakened its drowsy consciousness thus:

Tampa, Fla., June 9, 1898—2:45 p. m.

Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.:

It seems that it is a naval problem yet unsolved, and it might be advisable for the command now on board transports to have the protection of the entire navy to convoy it to number 1, number 2, or Nuevitas, or, if this is considered too hazardous, then keep the troops in healthful camps, as they are now, and assist the navy to destroy the Spanish fleet. There are here 25 good steamers that could be used to carry water, coal, and supplies, guns, revolving cannon, and mortars, etc., and they could be added to the force of the navy. It seems strange to be suggesting that the army assist the navy in this way, but I am sure we would receive most loyal support when the waters are safe for crossing with the army.

MILES, Major-General, Commanding Army.

There was talk of disembarking the troops, but Shafter said it was not practicable. They could not be encamped comfortably, but were taken off in detachments to exercise. June 17th it was stated that the expedition should get under way and meet convoy at Rebecca Shoal.

Port Tampa, Fla., June 10, 1898—9:30 p. m.

Adjutant-General of the Army, Washington, D. C.:

Practically all the transports have been in canal, where men have had free access to shore, and they have been off the greater part of two days. This afternoon all but eleven of the transports have been drawn a short dis-

tance into the stream, where the men are much more comfortable than in the canal, with excellent facilities for swimming and keeping clean. The command is being increased only by recruits, of which there are several hundred, the exact number of which will be telegraphed you in the morning, and by one troop of cavalry mounts. The transports now here are practically filled, though it might be possible to get one more regiment of volunteer infantry on. Will be able to tell to-morrow, when a rearrangement of some of the troops will be made. If I find it possible to take another regiment I prefer the Thirty-second Michigan.

SHAFTER,

Major-General, United States Volunteers, Commanding.

June 12th, 7:18 p. m., Shafter telegraphed Corbin:

"Have consulted with senior naval officer present, who says we must have daylight to get down to lower bay. Will start the transports at daylight to-morrow, and with good luck will meet convoy from Key West before Wednesday noon."

Port Tampa, Fla., June 13, 1898—1:10 p. m.

Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.:

Steamers are moving out to sea and should be away by 1 o'clock.

MILES, Major-General.

Playa del Este, via Haiti.

(Received at Washington June 22, 1898, 6:22 p. m.)

Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.:

Off Daiquiri, Cuba, June 22, 1898.—Landing at Daiquiri this morning successful. Very little, if any, resistance.

SHAFTER.





CHAPTER XVII.

The Sharp Strain of the Struggle at Santiago.

General Miles as a Loyal Soldier—Shafter's Fine Voyage and Safe Landing—The First Blood in Battle—Rush of Supplies and Reënforcements to the Army—Alger Wants Shafter to "Get a Good Ready"—Why Siege Guns were not Unloaded—Work Cut Out for the Regulars—Parallel with the British Siege of Havana—The Sword Had to be Swift to Save from the Pestilence.

The credit is due General Miles of pulling steadily in the harness. When one of his suggestions did not take root, he was soon ready with another. If one of his campaigns on paper was blown away in the morning, he was as fertile as ever in the evening. He saw, after the Santiago expedition was under way, that it was the primary enterprise, and would in all ways take precedence, and he was ready and willing to go on with number two. If he was not to command in Cuba, he was persevering for Porto Rico. His plans might be subjected to all trials except that of being tried, but his loyalty as a soldier was never impeachable. In all aspects of his versatility he was facing to the front. If he thought it wise to wait, he said so at large and in particular, but when the word was to go, he was up and doing at the tap of the drum, buttoned and buckled, alert and stepping out to the music. In his contentions with the critics he can always say that his faults were in words, and the facility with which they are flashed about the world, but his feet were rather jubilant than laggard, and the toes of his boots pointed to the enemy. When Shafter's fleet sailed down the bay, General Miles telegraphed the War Department the hour and the minute—June 14, 1898, 10:30 a. m.—when "the last one was out of sight," and he mentioned an auxiliary cruiser, that would go in six hours, and for a wonder the Major-General commanding did not know the destination of the boat. This was signed simply, "Miles, Commanding," but his command at the moment was "out of sight" so far as the regular army was concerned. Major-General



THIRD LIGHT ARTILLERY GOING INTO CAMP, ON THE WAY TO THE FRONT, SIX MILES FROM SIBONEY.



GENL. HAWKINS WHO LED THE FAMOUS CHARGE OF THE 1ST BRIGADE AT SAN JUAN,
JULY 1ST, 1898.

Brooke telegraphed the Adjutant-General of the army July 14th that he was "directed to fully equip 15,000 men for duty elsewhere," and he wanted to know whether "the ordnance equipment for 23 regiments" was on the way to the Chickamauga Park, or likely to arrive soon. This was to the point. Miles, commanding, telegraphed the Secretary of War June 14th, 9:50 p. m., that he thought their "telegrams crossed in transit," not at all an improbable conjecture—though what happened when they collided has not yet been the subject of an investigation. But the fact Miles wanted to get through was that one-half the "troops for No. 2"—the army for Porto Rico—were at Tampa, "fully equipped and drilling every day as artillery. Siege trains, balloons, heavy ammunition, commissary and quartermaster's stores" were also there.

Balloons and everything all ready, Shafter was sailing on the blue sea under the indigo sky of the subtropics. There had been a change at Tampa, —there were 21 feet of water, and nine ships could load at a time. Just at this hour Inspector-General Breckenridge made a call for officers in these terms, addressing himself to the Secretary of War:

"Regular officers are sadly needed among volunteers, but regular organizations are also already suffering from paucity of officers. Regular organizations furnish a remarkably fine training school for officers and all that can be so trained are already needed. Can not regular service be immediately supplied with all the junior officers the law allows, especially as the good of the service evidently demands it? Then additional second lieutenants can increase the numbers now so greatly needed. It must be evident to all now that we need a larger perfectly trained and equipped force, especially officers, and the best place for quick training is among the regulars. It would be well if we had several hundred more regular officers immediately."

On the 15th of June the Secretary of War concluded he must see Major-General-Commanding Miles speedily and telegraphed "Important business requires your presence here; report at once," and at 5:23 p. m. General Miles was able to say over the wire, "I leave by the first train, 7:20 this evening," and the telegrams, which are of the kinoscope order, show that he was in three days transacting business from the Washington army headquarters in the usual way. Telegrams show vigorous work in the camps preparing the volunteer troops. General Coppinger, June 26th, telegraphed that cars were being as rapidly unloaded as delivered by railroads. Some days 70 were

unloaded, then only 13, because they could not be placed. There were in corals 1,811 unassigned mules, and there were 1,791 assigned draft mule and 15 Red Cross ambulances.

Shafter, Major-General Volunteers, commanding, telegraphed:

"Playa del Este, via Haiti, June 25th, 2:45 p. m.—Daiquiri, 23.—Had very fine voyage, lost less than 50 animals, 6 or 8 to-day; lost more putting them through the surf to land than on transports. Command as healthy as when we left. Eighty men sick. Only deaths 2 men drowned in landing. Landings difficult. Coast quite similar to that in vicinity of San Francisco, and covered with dense growth of bushes. Landing at Daiquiri unopposed. All points occupied by Spanish troops; heavily bombarded by navy to clear them out. Sent troops toward Santiago and occupied Juragua City, a naturally strong place, this morning. Spanish troops retreating as soon as our advance was known. Had not mounted troops or could have captured them—about 600 all told. Railroad from there in. Have cars and engine in possession. With assistance of navy disembarked 6,000 men yesterday and as many more to-day. Will get all troops off to-morrow, including light artillery and greater portion of pack train, probably all of it, with some of the wagons; animals have to be jumped to the water and towed ashore. Had consultations with Generals Garcia, Rader, and Castillo, 1 p. m. of 20th, 20 miles west of Santiago. These officers were unanimously of the opinion that landing should be made east of Santiago. I had come to the same conclusion. General Garcia promises to join me at Juragua City to-morrow with between 3,000 and 4,000 men, who will be brought from west of Santiago by ships of the navy to Juragua City and there disembarked; this will give me between 4,000 and 5,000 Cubans, and leave 1,000 under General Rabi to threaten Santiago from the west. General Kent's division is being disembarked this afternoon at Juragua City, and will be continued during the night. The assistance of the navy has been of the greatest benefit, and enthusiastically given. Without them I could not have landed in ten days, and perhaps not at all, as I believe I should have lost so many boats in the surf. At present want nothing. Weather has been good. No rain on land, and prospects for fair weather."

There is not a sentence lost in this dispatch. It is not long, and tells all. If General Garcia came with between three and four thousand Cubans, he would have between four and five thousand of them. So there must have been

about 1,000 already in the neighborhood ready for rations. A few of the Cubans had a skirmish with the Spaniards—no casualties reported. The first fighting was when General Young, with 964 officers and men, one squadron of the First cavalry, one of the Tenth cavalry and two of the First U. S. Volunteer cavalry, on the morning of the 24th, became engaged with Spaniards entrenched in a strong position at La Guasimo, three miles from Siboney on the Santiago road. General Shafter says in his official report:

“The enemy made an obstinate resistance, but were driven from the field with considerable loss. Our own loss was 1 officer and 15 men killed; 6 officers and 46 men wounded. The reported losses of the Spaniards were 9 killed and 27 wounded. The engagement had an inspiring effect upon our men, and doubtless correspondingly depressed the enemy, as it was now plainly demonstrated to them that they had a foe to meet who would advance upon them under a heavy fire delivered from entrenchments. General Wheeler, division commander, was present during the engagement, and reports our troops, officers and men, fought with the greatest gallantry. This engagement gave us a well-watered country farther to the front, on which to encamp our troops.”

In his telegram to the Adjutant-General about this affair, General Shafter said: “The Spaniards occupied a very strong, intrenched position on a high hill. The firing lasted about an hour, and the enemy was driven from his position, which is now occupied by our troops, about a mile and a half from Sevilla. The enemy has retired toward Santiago.”

One sees in the telegrams following the opening fight that there was intense interest and exertion in the War Department. The army was committed irrevocably to the Santiago stroke, and it was seen that there was to be the fight of the war. Coppinger wires, June 25th, 6:35 p. m., in answer to inquiries as to what could be done to reinforce Shafter: “If transports and ammunition are provided, I can ship 629 officers and 12,860 men from Tampa. No transports have reported to me. I understand there are five transports and two ocean tramps at Port Tampa.”

Corbin telegraphs Coppinger to know “whether in the transports at Port Tampa there are two or three lighters that can be sent at once to General Shafter. Having lost one going over, the tug he has is not sufficient to meet demands of the service. Time is essence of situation, and an immediate answer is desired.”

There is evidence here that the War Department was alive to the fact that Shafter might need help. As to the ships at Tampa, there were seven, "capacity about 5,000 men, if loaded and shipped at once. This will, however, be increased when the boats are fitted up. At present there are but two boats which are in proper condition to load and ship and get maximum results.'

The Secretary of War made a memorandum June 25th, that 15,000 men were to be taken from Chickamauga, and 12,000, if so many were fit, from Coppinger's command, Snyder's division to embark at once to go as soon as convoy could be had, to reinforce Shafter at Santiago. Orders were issued to establish telegraphic communication between Shafter's headquarters and cable stations. Corbin telegraphed Shafter, June 28th:

"From Mobile the large steam tug Nimrod and light draft lighters Ben, Ora, and Tourat, have been ordered to get out of Mobile just as soon to-day as possible, going with all dispatch, taking into consideration the safety of the lighters. The depot quartermaster at Tampa has been ordered to send the Bessie to report to you. The Bessie is a steam lighter, and sister to the Laura. General Duffield will arrive on the Yale to-morrow morning with 1,300 men. Balance of his brigade left Fort Monroe this morning. Orders have been given to have a division sent you from Tampa this week. The wagon transportation will leave to-morrow."

There were anxious inquiries already about the remains of our dead and questions raised whether bodies could be embalmed, which was not possible. The Secretary of War telegraphed that the parents of Hamilton Fish and others were "very desirous of recovering the bodies of their boys." June 27th Alger telegraphed Shafter: "Have you landed the siege guns?" and the order on this telegram was "rush." Two light batteries, Lemly's and Macomb's of the Seventh Artillery, at Fort Mayer, Va., were ordered to Tampa—and the six light batteries at Tampa were ordered on fastest steamers immediately, but this was subject to "when convoy arrives"—as there might be Spanish gunboats hiding in the many shady places looking for an unarmed transport. Alger had telegraphed Shafter that he hoped he would "take time to get a good ready." Shafter's reply was from Siboney, June 27th: "Will not act hastily, though I believe I can take the place within forty-eight hours, but I fear at considerable loss of life. There is no necessity for haste, as we are growing stronger and they weaker every day. The health of the command is reported to me by the surgeon as remarkable. Outside of the wounded there

are to-day less than 150 men sick. So far no wounded have died, and but two men of disease since leaving Tampa. Am very glad to know that tugs and lighters are on the way. Hospital steamer Relief is all that we need at present."

The roads were dusty, and a position was taken within three miles of Santiago, and in plain view of the town! June 28th the convoy was ready at Key West, and Corbin asked Coppinger what he had ready to go next day, and the answer was, "Six batteries, 800 recruits for Shafter's infantry, and the First Illinois." Incidentally these telegrams passed:

Playa del Este, June 28, 1898—4:15 p. m.

Adjutant-General U. S. A., Washington:

Daiquiri, Cuba, June 27. I have just been shown a telegram from Greely to Major Greene, of my staff, requesting daily confidential reports of operations of my command. I have ordered him never to send any report relating to my command that is not first submitted to me. I do not understand by what authority General Greely presumes to ask confidential information from a member of my staff. SHAFTER, Major-General.

Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, June 28, 1898.

Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba:

Your telegram of this date concerning giving of information by staff officers has been read by the Secretary of War, and your action therein is approved by him, without any reservation whatever.

H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

The inference is that General Greely, who was censor of the press dispatches, wanted points to make his duties of suppression clear, and was not guarded as to the form of stating the desire. The rush and urgent telegrams were now flying day and night. The form of "Acknowledge receipt and report execution" appears frequently.

Shafter wanted, June 28th, "Thirty-six sides Lutigo leather; 36 sides harness leather; 50 pounds copper rivets, one-half inch; 5,000 pounds mule shoes, Nos. 2 and 3; 500 pounds nails, horseshoe No. 6; 6 shoeing hammers; 24 rasps, farriers'; 12 coils five-sixths rope; 12 coils three-eighths rope; 12 hand punches, saddlers'; 1,200 yards canvas, 72-inch, heavy; 1,200 yards canvas, 22-inch; 2 small field forges for pack train; 2 small anvils for pack

train; 35 dozen snaps, $1\frac{1}{4}$ -inch, with guard. The 22-inch canvas is to make oversacks for carrying forage."

Here is one of the Commanding General's telegrams:

"Siboney, Cuba, June 28, 5 p. m. Have just learned 8,000 Spaniards are en route here from Manzanillo with pack train and beef cattle on the hoof; probably 54 miles from here to-day; advancing at the rate of 12 miles per day."

This was probably from a "reliable Cuban" who wanted reinforcements and rations. Corbin telegraphed June 29th from Washington:

"Six transports will leave Port Tampa this evening for Santiago. Specialist and Unionist carrying artillery horses and artillery guard. The Comanche will carry artillerymen, the Hudson infantry recruits for your command. The City of Macon and Gate City will take First Illinois and such cavalry recruits and signal corps as can be loaded."

Coppinger telegraphed the Adjutant-General June 29th, 12:15, replying to telegram that deducting troops about leaving on transports there were at Tampa—"infantry, 12,661; cavalry, 4,693; cavalry horses, 5,000; heavy artillery, 917; horses, 378; signal corps, 147; also about 160 men awaiting discharge and unequipped recruits belonging to General Shafter's command, and about 150 tons of regimental and company property, and tentage left by General Shafter with the cavalry, being about 1,000 tons of property of all kinds. Quartermasters estimate 4,300 mules, 840 cavalry and artillery horses, 921 Cuban horses, 1,000 tons hay, 500 tons oats, and 12,000 tons coal; about 1,000 tons miscellaneous quartermaster's property, ordnance material, and forage with siege train; 1,200 tons commissary stores and property; about 4,000 tons ordnance."

There was great inquiry as to Shafter's slowness in getting the siege artillery to the front, and he cabled the Secretary of War:

"I have not yet unloaded the siege guns, but will do so as soon as I can. I do not intend to take them to the front until we are stopped or need them. It is going to be a very difficult undertaking to get them up, and if attempted now would block the road. I have four light batteries at the front, and they are heavy enough to overcome anything the Spaniards have. If we have to besiege the town I will get the guns up. The advance picket is now within $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles of Santiago. Officers making reconnoissances were within $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles to-day, and met with no opposition."

There was a necessity as imperious as can arise in the affairs of a great nation in days of destiny, that the blow the United States had to strike Spain when declaring war upon her, must be delivered as soon after the declaration as was mechanically practicable. Owing to national inattention and the conservatism of Congress, the army in hand that was efficient was small. Under the circumstances, it was a success that in the end proved to be the assurance of speedy and complete victory and honorable and triumphant peace, to get together and embark in time, when the actual beginning of the war was in May, so considerable an army as that which sailed and made a prosperous voyage under Shafter.

The mobilization of this force and its embarkation and disembarkation would have been wholly impracticable if it had not been for the construction just in time of our battleships that gave us the unequivocal superiority over Spain at sea, and the improved character of the regular army. Thorough as the confidence of the country has been in our volunteer military system, the people are educated by the Spanish war as never before, not to depend upon it to the exclusion of an army prepared to meet emergencies that may strike us by cablegrams, through orders flying in the twinkling of an eye by telegraph. We had not the force to attack Havana at the time the Santiago army scrambled through the Cuban surf to remove Spain from the Americas. If we had landed in the west instead of the east end of the island, as was at first proposed, we could undoubtedly have made the landing and held the ground, though there would have been hard fighting to do that, and our regular army could not have marched straight to Havana. The Santiago campaign demonstrates that. Blanco would have opposed us with from fifty to sixty thousand men, and 150 guns, and on several fortified lines. It would have been necessary to hasten the embarkation of all the volunteers, fairly armed, in all the Southern camps, to aid the regulars in advance, and we would have had seventy thousand men attacking Havana in the rain and the yellow fever. We could have produced in and about the city of Havana the horrors of the besieged Jerusalem as described by Josephus, and repeated in our camps the awful experiences of the English, the New Englanders, and the New Yorkers and New Jersey men who conquered Cuba by taking Havana in August, 1762. The change of the point of attack from Havana to Santiago saved tens of thousands of our fellow citizens from Cuban graves, but it was the cost of the war and not its eventual substantial fortunes, changed by the determination

that hung upon the will of the President, who had the genius of good sense to choose the better way. The change made the sea voyage 1,000 miles instead of 200, and a fearful augmentation of difficulties that forced delays, forcing upon Shafter's army the deadly demand of storming the lines of the enemy instead of crushing them with siege artillery.

To those who have not ascertained this vital point the story of the campaign is a nightmare dream of bloody blundering. Given the understanding that interprets the circumstances, the conquest of Santiago, while an enterprise that was hazardous, was a deed of the highest military accomplishment. The exertions of the government through its respective departments to provide for the army of the invasion of Cuba were something gigantic. To go from Tampa to the west end of Cuba was like a voyage from New York to Norfolk, but from Tampa to Santiago, the excursion was equal to the journey from Philadelphia to Havana. Aware of the certainty of wounds and sickness, the steamer John Englist was purchased for \$450,000, and fitted up as a hospital ship at a cost of \$136,851.11, and named the Relief. She was provided with every appliance, as the Quartermaster-General comprehensively as well as particularly states, "for the ease, comfort and treatment of the sick and wounded. The interior was remodeled; electric plant for light and purifying, sterilizing and laundry plants, and two steam launches were provided." The launches were like cradles, to carry the helpless men from the shore to the ship.

After the first of July there were chartered on the Atlantic coast the steamers Wanderer, La Grande Duchesse, Tarpan and Ute, for the transportation of troops and supplies to Cuba and Porto Rico, and with these the tonnage was 111,000 tons, the carrying capacity 250,000 men.


The Quartermaster-General reports:

"The carrying capacity of the chartered steamships employed in connection with General Shafter's army for the invasion of Cuba was not found adequate to promptly transport the number of troops, in addition to that army, required for Cuba and Porto Rico, and it therefore became necessary to increase the number of transport vessels with larger carrying capacity for men and animals, with bilge keels to prevent rolling, and thus make the ships more comfortable for stock.

"Congress being averse to admitting foreign ships to American registry, the Secretary of War decided to direct the purchase of vessels, and have them



CAPRON'S BATTERY IN ACTION IN THEIR POSITION IN GENERAL LAWTON'S DIVISION.



WOUNDED ON THEIR WAY TO DRESSING PLACE AT BATTLE OF SAN JUAN.

fitted up to meet the needs of the army for the safe and comfortable transportation of men and animals and the transportation of army supplies. Fourteen large steamships were purchased and fitted up for carrying men, animals, freight, etc. The following is a list of these vessels:

Name of Vessel	Tonnage	Cost	Class	Carrying Capacity		
				Officers	Men	Animals
Panama No. 1.....	2,085	\$ 41,000	Freighter	10	400	
Port Victor, No. 2.....	2,792	175,000	do.	25	400	
Rita, No. 3.....	2,194	125,000	do.	15	700	
Mohawk, No. 20.....	5,658	660,000	Combination	80	1,000	1,000
Mobile, No. 21.....	5,780	660,000	do.	80	1,000	1,000
Massachusetts, No. 22.....	5,673	660,000	do.	80	1,000	1,000
Manitoba, No. 23.....	5,673	660,000	do.	80	1,000	1,000
Minnewaska, No. 24.....	5,796	660,000	do.	100	1,200	1,000
Mississippi, No. 25.....	3,732	350,000	do.	40	800	800
Michigan, No. 26.....	3,722	350,000	do.	40	800	800
Romanian, No. 27.....	4,126	240,000	do.	45	1,100	50
Oblam, No. 30.....	3,656	250,000	Troop ship	50	1,300	100
Berlin, No. 31.....	5,641	400,000	do.	75	2,000	
Chester, No. 32.....	4,770	290,000	do.			
Total.....	61,295	5,431,000		720	12,700	6,750

"Eight of these vessels were provided with refrigerators for the transportation of fresh meat, seven of them having a capacity of 1,000 tons each. Two, the Panama and the Rita, were captured by the navy, and were purchased by this Department after having been condemned as prizes by the proper courts and offered for sale.

"All of these were merchant vessels and were temporarily fitted up as army transports to meet the urgent demands of the service for which purpose an expenditure of \$178,018.37 was made.

"The fleet of transport ships which was concentrated at Port Tampa, Fla., in June last for the transportation of the army of General Shafter to Cuba, consisting of 38 vessels, including 2 water boats, 3 steam lighters, 1 collier, and 1 tug, had been fitted out for a voyage to the vicinity of Havana, distant about 400 miles; 2 decked barges were also provided by the Engineer Department. One of the steam lighters, the tug, and a decked barge failed to reach Cuba.

"Upon embarkation of the troops it was found that the vessels would not safely and comfortably carry more than about 16,000 men with their 2,295 animals, equipments, ammunition, subsistence, and medical supplies, on a voyage of 1,000 miles."

To relieve the fighting soldiers and the seamen from the heavy task of landing supplies—the very line of labor that exhausted and sickened the British when they were besieging Havana—the Quartermaster's Department entered "into contract with the firm of D. Van Aken & Co., of New York City, to fit out an expedition with a large force of mechanics of various trades, and laborers, with machinery, such as pile drivers, implements for construction of docks and railways, with the necessary materials—iron and lumber—for building docks, lighters, repairing railroads and engines. The company was furnished the steamship Panama and two fine ocean tugs, the Gladisfen, which was chartered, and the Gypsum King, which was purchased." This outfit afforded great aid and relief.

The English expedition which assailed and captured Havana in 1762 was not as large as Shafter's army. The force of Lord Albemarle was only 11,351 men. The vessels of the squadron numbered 203, including "six ships with the baggage of general officers," 93 transports and 43 ships of the line; and 1,000 negroes were purchased to relieve the troops of drudgery, and with the provincials and the sailors saved the enterprise from failure.

Colonel Humphrey, Chief Quartermaster, worked hard at Tampa and Santiago, and says of the transports that began to arrive early in May at Tampa, that they were as fast as reported, "fully coaled and watered and policed, and later fitted with bunks and stalls for the comfort of men and animals. The loading of the transports began at once, and was carried on speedily and systematically. This was, at best, difficult, owing to the limited wharf facilities. The place affords, in all particulars, most insufficient facilities for fitting out the many ships and embarking so large a force. The loading of all classes of stores was completed at 11 a. m. of June 6th, and by 9 p. m., June 8th, the troops were all on board and the expedition was fully embarked. The departure, however, was delayed until June 14th, by reason of a report made by the naval authorities that the Spanish war vessels were seen in Nicholas Channel. The transports when sailing were in good order, but not in so prime condition as when the troops and animals were embarked."

No effort was spared, no cost counted in any department, or nook, or corner of the government of the United States, to assist the plain purpose of the Shafter expedition. The General recited the facts of the bitter fight of the 24th, in which out of 964 our loss was 16 killed and 52 wounded in an hour. The loss of the enemy reported 9 killed and 27 wounded; that the engagement

had "inspired the men." They were hardy men who believed that they had tried the tether of the enemy under circumstances that were and would be characteristic of the campaign, and that they could win out, but the effect at Washington—and it is well that it was so—was to hurry telegrams that all get ready instantly to reinforce the army at Santiago. That the fighting right at hand would be of the severest nature, with the fearful climate and the dreadful ambuscades to contend with, was already clear. Moreover, the certainties were that the few Cubans who had emerged from their mysteries could not be relied upon for hot work, and that the Spaniards were well armed and abundantly supplied with ammunition, that their Mauser rifles and smokeless powder were haunting as a superstition, and that they would in shelter do things to truly save the military character of their country from contempt. There was also a deep conviction of danger that Shafter needed more men, and that the quicker they could reach him the surer the result for us, and the smaller the expenditure of the blood of the heroic few. The United States is a mighty nation, and there was that in the air more fiery than "the rocket's red glare" in the song of the banner, but while the people waited with anxiety and the trains rumbled, and there were busy scenes at the ports, and the volunteers were massed and rushed to the rescue, while steamers blackened the sky and whitened the waters, as they throbbed through the waves to the scene of the conflict, the brunt of the battle was to be borne by the thin lines already in the sultry forests and on the steep hillsides where the boys stood in disciplined devotion, the siege guns not ashore, incredible toil the only way to get forward to those ready to furnish the necessaries of life. Then arose the specter of the ghastliest fever that blights the strong, and so the breasts of the boys and the steel they bore must be driven home by stormy rushes, that the sword might win the salvation it was vain to hope for when the pestilence surely on the wing would swoop down upon the bivouacs of the brave.





CHAPTER XVIII.

The Field Fighting for Santiago.

The Supreme Test of American Valor—The Thin but Steady Regular Line, and the Essential Assistance by the Foremost Volunteers—The Whole Story from the First Skirmish to the Last Assault Told in War Office Dispatches Far More Interesting than the Formal Reports of the Officers and More Sensational than the Lurid Chapters in the Journals—Their Publication an Admirable Example of the Candor of the Authorities—An All-Night Watch for News at the White House—Shafter's Memorable Third and Fourth of July.

The President sent thanks to General Shafter and his army for "the gallant action" of the 24th June. On the 26th the Secretary of War communicated to General Miles that with the least possible delay an expedition would be organized under the immediate command of Major-General Brooke, "composed of three divisions taken from the troops best equipped in the First and Third Army Corps, and two divisions from the Fourth Army Corps, for movement and operation against the enemy in Cuba and Porto Rico. The command under Major-General Shafter, or such part thereof as can be spared from the work now in hand, will join the foregoing expedition," and the whole was to be commanded in person by General Miles, who was to place himself "in close touch with the senior officers of the navy in those waters, with the view to harmonious and forceful action." This telegram was sent on the day of the assignment of General Miles to the Porto Rico occupation:

Washington, June 26, 1898.

Maj.-Gen. W. R. Shafter, Commanding United States forces in Cuba:


In burying the dead, be sure and detail a competent officer to have a map made giving resting place of each, so that friends can find the remains of their loved ones.

R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War.

There have been serious perplexities about the graves. It is true that they were sometimes shallow, because the men detailed to dig them were so weak from the heat and affected by exposure to the sun and rain that they



ARTILLERY MEN TRYING TO LOCATE THE ENEMY'S BATTERIES WHILE UNDER FIRE.



GENERAL WHEELER AND GENERAL SUMNER IN THE LATTER'S HEADQUARTERS BEFORE SANTIAGO.

could not wield the grave-digger's tools more than a very few minutes at a time. Another reason exists for some of the lost graves, which were identified by bottles tightly corked, containing the name, organization and home of the deceased, and buried close by the remains. There was also an external identification—strong stakes driven at the head of the graves and marked so as to be intelligible. Some of the stakes were removed by Santiago refugees and Cubans who professed to be soldiers, because it was convenient to make use of them to cook coffee. This was resented by our soldiers to the point of shooting several of the miscreants informally, but the mischief was done.

On the 29th the advance pickets were within a mile and a half of Santiago, and Shafter was expecting to put a division on the Caney road between that place and Santiago on the 1st of July, also "advance on the Sevilla road to the San Juan road, and possibly beyond," and Garcia with 3,000 men was to "take the railroad north of Santiago and prevent Pando reaching the city." The figures of Garcia's force show that the "scatterment" he reported of his followers when the time came to show them up had not been reformed altogether. Still his army greatly outnumbered that of the Commander-in-Chief Gomez, who for strategic reasons kept only 150 men about his person, holding the others in reserve in the recesses of the wilderness, where no human eye beheld them when the cane burning orgies were over. June 30th the First Illinois, 1,200 men, sailed from Tampa, also Shafter's regular recruits, some hundreds, and two hundred thousand rations. Certainly the government was doing all that could be done.

The advance of the 1st of July developed the enemy and Shafter telegraphed 9:34 a. m: "Action going on, but firing only light and desultory—began on the right near Caney—Lawton's division." The movement was on the northeast of Santiago. But the light firing deepened, and then its desultory character changed. July 1st was a bloody day. The first dispatch from the field to the War Office was:

Siboney.—Had a very heavy engagement to-day, which lasted from 8 a. m. till sundown. We have carried their outer works and are now in possession of them. There is now about three-quarters of a mile of open country between my lines and city. By morning troops will be intrenched and considerable augmentation of forces will be there. General Lawton's division and General Bates's brigade, which have been engaged all day in carrying El Caney, which was accomplished at 4 p. m., will be in line and in front of

Santiago during the night. I regret to say that our casualties will be above 400. Of these not many are killed. W. R. SHAFTER, Major-General.

The second dispatch added significance to the story of the fight "from 8 a. m. till sundown":

Playa del Este, via Haiti.

(Received at Washington July 2, 1898—1:12 a. m.)

Adjutant-General, Washington:

Headquarters near Santiago de Cuba, 1.—I fear I have underestimated to-day's casualties. A large and thoroughly equipped hospital ship should be sent here at once. Chief surgeon says he has use for 40 more medical officers. Ship must bring launch and boat for conveying wounded.

W. R. SHAFTER, Major-General, Fifth Corps.

The response from Washington was that the hospital ship and medical officers would be sent "as soon as possible," and was confident of "ultimate complete success." The Secretary of War suggested the navy could "help" in the care of the wounded.

July 1st, the President disapproved of a "plan" by General Miles to at once capture the Isle of Pines. The Major-General commanding had thought that subject all over, and concluded that it would be the very thing to take the celebrated retreat of the pirates in the Pines, as:

"It is said to have the most delightful climate in the West Indies, being entirely free from yellow fever. It can be made extremely useful for the establishment of a hospital and a camp of prisoners, and, also, eventually, as a base for supplying the Cubans, and possibly for the cavalry operations on the main island of Cuba.

"I think the one steamer now at Tampa can, with a battery of artillery, and one regiment of infantry, take the island, land from two to six months' supplies, and return to Tampa inside of ten days, when the steamer would be ready to be used for any future military purpose."

This was one episode of the day. Another was, Brooke telegraphed from Chickamauga he was "pressing the whole corps for movement." The return of as many transports as possible from Santiago was ordered "at once." July 3d, at 5:25 p. m., there was a telegram from Tampa to the Adjutant-General:

"General Randolph and six light batteries on the Comanche and two English 9-knot transports, and the First District of Columbia infantry, on the Catania, have sailed for Key West to-day."

At 7:55 p. m., Coppinger telegraphed from U. S. Camp, Florida:

"Specialist, with 225 horses, and Unionist, with 300 horses and 2 mules, both carrying artillery material and 75 men each, sailed at 8:35 this morning. The Comanche, with General Randolph and balance of men of the six light batteries and 50 horses, left at 11:40. The first two are 9-knot freighters; the Comanche is a 16-knot boat. The Catania, with the First District Volunteers, less Captain Looker's company, remaining here as provisional engineers, left at 12:30 p. m."

The Adjutant-General was advised: "Depot quartermaster has conferred with us as to movement Tampa to Savannah. Both Florida railroads have sent to Chickamauga their passenger equipment, which is being held in readiness for movement from there. We can get together equipment for the rough riders, but it would simplify matters if you could order Chickamauga movement to begin at once, and we could use that equipment to carry the 5,000 troops to Savannah."

The first of July, 1898, was Friday. On Sunday morning the Secretary of War sent a telegram to the general commanding the army assailing Santiago that shows as distinctly as a tremor of the earth is recorded by a seismometer, the strain of the critical hours:

"Executive Mansion, Washington, July 3, 1898—1:56 a. m.

Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este:

(To be forwarded at once to headquarters in the field.)

The following is just received—midnight—from sources unofficial: "Cervera has been ordered to shell the town (Santiago) when Americans get possession. All foreign consuls have been notified to retire at that time to places of safety outside of city." This information may or may not be correct, but is sent for your consideration. We are awaiting with intense anxiety tidings of to-day.

R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War.

The President was up all night. There was no news, and it was hard to have faith that it was good to hear nothing.

This is the Secretary's telegram, of the up-all-night-after-the-battle vigil at the White House:

War Department, July 3, 1898.

Major-General Shafter, Commanding United States Forces, Cuba:

I waited with the President until 4 o'clock this morning for news from you relative to Saturday's battle. Not a word was received, nor has there been

up to this hour, 11 a. m., except an account of the battle of Friday, upon which I congratulate you most heartily. I wish hereafter that you would interrupt all messages that are being sent to the Associated Press and others, and make report at the close of each day, or during the day if there is anything of special importance, at once. The Relief left New York yesterday. She has 17 surgeons aboard, and will come to you as quickly as possible.

R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War.

The Relief was the scientifically provided hospital ship, purchased and fitted out in anticipation for such an emergency, but too late to go with the expedition.

Playa del Este, via Haiti.

(Received Washington, July 4, 1898—12:15 a. m.)

General Alger, Washington:

Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, Cuba, 3.—Did not telegraph, as I was too busy looking after things that had to be attended to at once, and did not wish to send any news that was not fully confirmed; besides, I was too much excited myself. The Spanish fleet left the harbor this morning and is reported practically destroyed. I demanded surrender of the city at 10 o'clock to-day. At this hour, 4:30 p. m., no reply has been received; perfect quiet along the line; situation has been precarious on account of difficulties of supplying command with food, and tremendous fighting capabilities shown by the enemy from his almost impregnable position.


SHAFTER, Major-General.

This dispatch tells the story that Shafter had been sorely tried. The forceful candor of his way of putting things is well illustrated here, but he had suffered from illness and despondency, and in the darkest hour he sent this dispatch, which is a remarkable contribution to the full story of historical events:

Playa del Este, July 3, 1898. (Received Washington, 11:44 a. m.)

The Secretary of War, Washington:

Camp near Sevilla, Cuba, 3. We have the town well invested on the north and east, but with a very thin line. Upon approaching it we find it of such a character and the defenses so strong it will be impossible to carry it by storm with my present force, and I am seriously considering withdrawing about 5 miles and taking up a new position on the high ground between the San Juan River and Siboney, with our left at Sardinero, so as to get our sup-



REDUCED FROM OFFICIAL PLAN PREPARED BY WAR DEPARTMENT.

plies, to a large extent, by means of the railroad, which we can use, having engines and cars at Siboney. Our losses up to date will aggregate 1,000, but list has not yet been made. But little sickness outside of exhaustion from intense heat and exertion of the battle of the day before yesterday and the almost constant fire which is kept up on the trenches. Wagon road to the rear is kept up with some difficulty on account of rains, but I will be able to use it for the present. General Wheeler is seriously ill, and will probably have to go to the rear to-day. General Young also very ill; confined to his bed. General Hawkins slightly wounded in foot during sortie enemy made last night, which was handsomely repulsed. The behavior of the regular troops was magnificent. I am urging Admiral Sampson to attempt to force the entrance of the harbor, and will have consultation with him this morning. He is coming to the front to see me. I have been unable to be out during the heat of the day for four days, but am retaining the command. General Garcia reported he holds the railroad from Santiago to San Luis, and has burned a bridge and removed some rails; also that General Pando has arrived at Palma, and that the French consul with about 400 French citizens came into his lines yesterday from Santiago. Have directed him to treat them with every courtesy possible.

SHAFTER, Major-General.

The dismal lines in this telegram are relating to the serious consideration of retirement—"withdrawing about five miles." A five mile retreat could not have changed American destiny, but it would have smashed a great deal of highly wrought red, white and blue china. The Secretary of War struck the right keynote when he finally got the news in his dispatch—firm, quiet, strong words that will be long held in honorable remembrance:

War Department, Washington, July 3, 1898—12:10 p. m.

Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba:

Your first dispatch received. Of course, you can judge the situation better than we can at this end of the line. If, however, you could hold your present position, especially San Juan heights, the effect upon the country would be much better than falling back. However, we leave all that matter to you. This is only a suggestion. We shall send you reinforcements at once.

R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War.

On this memorable July 3d, Alger requested that the transports returned should be ordered by the commander of the fleet, "directing that the fastest vessels sail with all possible speed to Port Tampa, in order that they may get

a supply of coal and water, and commence loading before the others arrive, thus saving time." This was "pushing things"—to use two of Phil. Sheridan's words as he put them. At two o'clock in the afternoon of July 3d, Shafter telegraphed:

"Camp near Santiago, 3.—Large quantities of underclothing and shoes, enough for entire army, are badly needed."

The response the next day was:

St. Paul leaves New York Wednesday direct for Santiago with Eighth Ohio, and underclothing, shoes, stockings, and duck suits for your whole army. How are you, Wheeler, Young, and others?

R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War.

But to go back a day:

Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 3, 1898—5 p. m.

Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba:

You can have whatever reinforcements you want. Wire what additional troops you desire, and they will be sent as rapidly as transports can be secured. In addition to the 2,700 troops now en route from Tampa, the St. Paul and Duchess will leave Newport News not later than Wednesday, with 3,000 troops of Garretson's brigade; the St. Louis, Yale, and Columbia will sail probably from Charleston, carrying 4,000 more, and others will be sent from Tampa as you may request.

H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

War Department, Washington, July 3, 1898.

General Shafter, Commanding United States Forces, Cuba:

We are forwarding reinforcements to you this week. How is your health? Do you think that some one should come to relieve you? Are you going to be able to stand through? What do you think? Be very careful of yourself.

R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War.

This was a delicate but decided suggestion that Shafter's resignation was the thought of the War Department and the country.

Early in the morning of the 4th of July there was this good news in the war office, in reply to the "suggestion" of Alger to Shafter that he had better not yield any ground, but hold what he had got:

Playa del Este, via Haiti.

(Received Washington, July 4, 1898—1:16 a. m.)

The Honorable Secretary of War, Washington:

Headquarters Fifth Corps, 3.—I shall hold my present position.

SHAFTER, Major-General.

Holding his present position meant two things. A little later Shafter felt better, as this witnesses:

Playa, July 4, 1898.

(Received Washington July 4, 1898—9:30 a. m.)

The Adjutant-General's Office, U. S. Army, Washington:

Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, near Santiago.—Your telegram inquiring about my health just received. I am still very much exhausted. Eating a little this p. m. for the first time in four days. The good news has inspired everybody. When the news of the disaster of the Spanish fleet reached the front, which was during the period of truce, a regimental band that had managed to keep its instruments on the line, played "The Star-Spangled Banner" and "There will be a hot time in the old town to-night," men cheering from one end of the line to the other. Officers and men, without even shelter tents, have been soaking for five days in the afternoon rains, but all are happy.

SHAFTER, Major-General, U. S. A.

The American eagle has a fashion of flying high on the 4th of July, and this was no exception. There are two dispatches from General Shafter that should be printed together—the following:

Playa del Este, via Haiti.

(Received Washington July 3, 1898—7 p. m.)

Secretary War, Washington:

Camp near Santiago, 3.—Lieutenant Allen, Second Cavalry, is just in from my extreme right, which is on the railroad running north from Santiago and which overlooks the entire bay. Lieutenant Allen states that Cervera's fleet was in full view until nearly 10 o'clock this morning, when it proceeded down the bay, and shortly afterwards heavy firing was heard. Duffield, at Siboney, has just telephoned me that Captain Cotton, of the Harvard, just sent him word that Admiral Sampson had signaled Cervera had come out and had escaped, and that he was in pursuit. The Harvard immediately left. The French consul informed General Garcia, into whose lines he went yesterday, that Admiral Cervera had stated that he would run out at 10 o'clock this

a. m., and that was the hour Allen witnessed his departure. Cervera told such consul it was better to die fighting than blow up ships in harbor.

SHAFTER, Commanding.

Playa del Este, via Haiti.

(Received Washington July 3, 1898—7:31 p. m.)

Adjutant-General United States Army, Washington:

Camp near Santiago, Cuba 3.—Early this morning I sent in a demand for immediate surrender of Santiago, threatening bombardment to-morrow. Perfect quiet on lines for one hour. From news just received of escape of fleet am satisfied place will be surrendered. SHAFTER, Commanding.

It was very good of the French consul to inform General Garcia when Cervera was to go out, and Shafter was quick and hair-triggered in his rebound, demanding the surrender of Santiago within the same day that he had considered a fall-back of five miles. The following is the text of the demand:

Headquarters United States Forces,

Near San Juan River, Cuba, July 3, 1898—8:30 a. m.

To the Commanding General of the Spanish Forces, Santiago de Cuba:

Sir: I shall be obliged unless you surrender to shell Santiago de Cuba.

Please inform the citizens of foreign countries and all women and children that they should leave the city before 10 o'clock to-morrow morning.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. R. SHAFTER, Major-General, U. S. Army.

The reply of José Toral, the Spanish commander at Santiago, was:

"I advise the foreigners and women and children that they must leave the city before 10 o'clock to-morrow morning. It is my duty to say to you that this city will not surrender, and that I will inform the foreign consuls and inhabitants of the contents of your message."

The British, Portuguese, Chinese, and Norwegian consuls came to General Shafter's lines and asked if non-combatants could occupy the town of Caney and railroad points, and wanted until 10 o'clock of the 5th instant before the city was fired on. "They claim"—we quote Shafter—"that there are between 15,000 and 20,000 people, many of them old, who will leave. They ask if I can supply them with food, which I cannot do for want of transportation to Caney, which is 15 miles from my landing."

Shafter concluded that solely in the interest of the poor women and children he would delay the bombardment until noon of the 5th, if in the interval no demonstration was made on the American lines, and added in communicating this to the Secretary of War:

"I do not know that these extreme measures which I had threatened be justifiable under the circumstances, and I submit the matter for the action of the President. The little town of Caney will not hold one thousand people, and great suffering will be occasioned to our friends, as we must regard the people referred to; and it is now filled with dead and wounded, the dead still unburied. The consuls tell Dorst that there are not to exceed 5,000 troops in the city. I can hold my present line and starve them out, letting the non-combatants come out leisurely as they run out of food, and will probably be able to give such as are forced out by hunger food to keep them alive. I await your orders."

The Secretary of War responded, early in the morning of the 4th:

"While you would be justified in beginning to shell Santiago at expiration of time limit set by you, still under the conditions named in your dispatch and for humanity's sake the postponement of the bombardment to noon of July 5th is approved."

And later the Secretary continued to Shafter:

"You are the best judge of the situation, and all the country has every faith in your wisdom. How are you physically, anyway?"

The dispatch from Shafter, showing depression so deep he was considering retirement to a line abandoning five miles of lands and territory, continued to disturb, if not dismay, the War Office, as this telegram perfectly expresses:

Adjutant-General's Office; Washington, July 4, 1898.

Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba:

After conference with the President and the Secretary of War, I am directed to say your continued illness brings sorrow and anxiety. In case you are disabled, General Wheeler would, of course, succeed to command. His illness, which we also regret, is feared to be so serious as to prevent his assuming command. You must determine whether your condition is such as to require you to relinquish command. If so, and General Wheeler is disabled, you will order the next general officer in rank for duty to succeed you and to take up the work in hand. It is not expected that our forces will make assault until they are ready.

H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

The reply was not thoroughly reassuring, but raised the pressure of severe anxiety that might take the form of duty to order the resignation of the officer who was ill.

Playa del Este, via Haiti.

(Received Washington, July 6, 1898—5:40 a. m.)

Adjutant-General, Washington:

Camp near Santiago, Cuba, 5.—I am not at present so much ill as exhausted from the intense strain that has been on me for last two months. I am also suffering from an attack of gout, which prevents me from moving about. I have, however, the whole business in my hand, and am managing it through able staff officers. When I do have to give up I will of course follow your order, but I hope to be better soon. SHAFTER.

This day, July 6th, the Commanding General at Santiago was notified that "Hobson and men" were to be exchanged, and the next day Shafter had the pleasure of telegraphing:

"Lieutenant Hobson and all his men have just been received safely in exchange for Spanish officer and prisoners taken by us. All are in good health except two seamen, convalescent from remittent fever."

The apprehensions of General Shafter as to the safety of his position when he considered falling back were in some degree accountable by the state of his health. He was seriously sick. He is a man of uncommon bulk, and the climate was to him unexpectedly trying. He could not endure the full power of the sun, and suffering from an attack of gout was an additional burden.

The line the American troops occupied on the Friday night when there was such an oppression in the atmosphere was, as General Shafter described it, "very thin." So exhausting had been the experiences of the day, so many men had been killed and wounded, and so many had been overcome by heat, or fatigued into disability, and the carrying of the wounded to the rear had been a grievous labor, demanding many bearers, that in the judgment of most competent officers not more than three thousand of our men were in a defensive position. The question was whether the Spaniards would advance, and there was concern on that subject. General Joseph Wheeler, instead of yielding to his illness, managed to shake it off, and was on the thin line encouraging the men, and expanding his conviction to them that they were safe from an attack by the Spaniards they had driven before them; that the Spaniards would not dare to fling themselves against our position, and must

get the worst of it if they did. But the line, considering its great extent, was thin, but good as the "thin red line" the British held against the solid Russian masses, good stuff as they were, at Balaklava and Inkerman. The four dispatches following display the exact lines of the conditions:

Playa del Este, via Haiti.

(Received at Washington July 5, 1898—7 a. m.)

Adjutant-General U. S. Army, Washington:

1:07 p. m. Headquarters United States forces near San Juan River, Cuba, 4.—I regard as necessary that the navy force an entrance into the harbor Santiago not later than 6th instant, and assist in the capture of the place. If they do, I believe the place will surrender without further sacrifice of life.

SHAFTER, Major-General, U. S. Volunteers.

Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 5, 1898—11:20 a. m.

Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba:

Secretary of War instructs me to say that the President directs that you confer with Admiral Sampson at once for coöperation in taking Santiago. After the fullest exchange of views, you will agree upon the time and manner of attack.

By command Major-General Miles:

H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 5, 1898—3:10 p. m.

Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba:

Your telegram this date has been submitted to the President. After consideration, the Secretary of War directs me to say that it is evident from your several reports that you do not consider your force strong enough to make a successful assault upon the Spanish army entrenched in Santiago. This being the case, it is the part of wisdom to await reinforcements, the embarkation of which you have already been advised. As you have already been advised, you must be judge of the time and manner of assault. The President has directed that you and Admiral Sampson have a conference and determine a course of coöperation best calculated to secure desired results with least sacrifice.

By command Major-General Miles:

H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 6, 1898—2:30 p. m.
Maj. Gen. W. R. Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba:

The Secretary of War is anxious to know what prospect there is of breaking through the mines. He would be very glad, even with a delay, to have coöperation of the navy, thus saving many lives. The *St. Paul*, sailing from New York to-day, has nearly everything you asked for. The lighters, sent a long time since, ought to be with you by this time. We are trying to make arrangements for light-draft steam vessels for carrying orders, etc., to be sent you as quickly as possible. Can you not procure from the navy steam launches to aid you in landing supplies and carrying dispatches while we are getting crafts of our own for that object. It is expected you will communicate freely, setting forth any assistance that can be given you in the way of supplies of any kind.

By command Major-General Miles:

H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

General Shafter, when his Santiago Fouth of July was but fifteen minutes old—12:15 a. m.—had accounted for being too busy to telegraph the current intelligence to the President and Secretary of War, who waited in vain until four in the morning, that he did not want to be sending what might not be confirmed, and there was a further embarrassment in "the tremendous fighting capabilities shown by the enemy." The words that followed—"from his almost impregnable position"—did not take away the great compliment which ought to be useful to Spain in her home rule, for the good positions, though they may be defended by fighting men instinctively, are not found marked out and made almost impregnable accidentally.





CHAPTER XIX.

The Strange Story of the Secret Official Cipher of Spain.

The Cables that Passed Between Sagasta, Blanco, Cervera, Correa and Linares During the Crisis of the Spanish War in Cuba—A Diary Telegraphed from Santiago to Havana, Giving the Inside of Spanish Affairs from the Attack to the Surrender—Cervera not Well Fitted out, Forced to Flight, Protesting that he was Going to Destruction—The Cables Are a Gallery of Paintings of Spanish Character.

In association with the official history of the war between the United States and Spain, as recorded in our departments of War and the Navy, and published officially for the information of all nations and people, we are indebted to the journalistic investments in the news of the day—the liberal purchase of intelligence in the market—for the unquestionably authentic cable and wire dispatches of the Spanish Cabinet, the Premier and Ministers of War and Navy; General Blanco, Admiral Cervera, the military commander of the defenders of Santiago, the spies of Spain in Canada, and others, communicating with each other, privately and confidentially, in the crisis of the struggle between the several storm centers of the Spaniards—Madrid, Santiago and Havana—stating without reservation the "true inwardness" of their most important trusts, exposing their own shams, expressing facts, exchanging opinions, giving orders, embodying the secrets of State, camp, field, fleet and city. These cablegrams and telegrams are simply the Spanish war secrets revealing, presenting nakedly their fears and hopes, jealousies and sentiments, public and personal. The grim privacies of many wars have been revealed, after the lapse of many years, in the examination of musty papers from personal collections, and the disturbance in pigeon holes of reserved documents, too momentous to trust to the world until the generation of their production was gone and the freshness of their significance made dull by the


passage of time, but this ancient history was stunted, not merely by public and personal policy, but on account of the limitations of the methods in old times of exchanging facts and ideas, and of the preservation in permanent form of the precise words of conversations, and therefore the inexactness of all ways of conveying messages. The introduction of telegraphy, the almost universal use of the wire, and the reduction of messages to writing, changes many conditions and contributes mechanically to the veracity of the wonderfully complete material of history, never so strikingly illustrated as in this volume, the purpose of whose author is to tell the story of the war in the words of those whose deeds are celebrated; not the elaborated after-thoughts of the actors, but their hot words in action. Here are thousands of snap shots, true as the Kodak, picturing the thoughts of men responsible for decisions in masterful minutes, setting forth strongly as if painted in colors the strokes of will power that were materialized in events. It seems almost incredible that we have already in print the records of Spain's unhappy war, as written by those who were the chieftains entrusted with the fleets and armies of the kingdom, in the capitals of Spain and Cuba, and in Santiago, the city made memorable in bombardments, by modern ships of old style fortresses, and desperate battles afloat and ashore, in which both sides had blood on their hands and breasts.

The dispatches that we give were the discovery of the New York Journal, and of course made their first appearance in the pages of that paper. There are two facts that account for this publication, and the first in order may be mentioned now that the flag of the United States floats over Cuba.

The telegraphic operators on the island did not, as a class, regard the Spanish cause or officers with favor, and they and other young men having the handling of instruments for the transmission and the transfiguration of intelligence were like minded. Many a Spanish secret was clicked away according to the Morse alphabet, or conveyed by the soundless signals with forefingers that experts give and take. An operator says to a reporter, both telegraphers, at a way-station on a railroad, for instance, as a message with pith in it is on the wire: "Here, listen to this!" and the sounds are translated into characters that are imperishable, if that which they contain has the indestructible vitality of truth. Then the Spanish official is apt to be corrupted by the large latitude with which he interprets the word concessions. There was a time when, as a matter of business, cartridges sold to the insurgents were carried out of Morro Castle in market baskets. A golden key



THE CHURCH AT EL CANEY.



SCENE IN A FIELD HOSPITAL DURING THE BATTLE OF SAN JUAN.

unlocks more secrets in Spain than in countries where officialism is less firmly commissioned and strictly classified.

The Journal was able to say:

"Very interesting are the almost daily bulletins of movements of the American army and navy from the Spanish spies at Montreal. The originals of these documents have been kept in the Captain-General's safe in Havana, and were copied from the original Spanish by a Journal representative, and were then carefully translated into English. The Journal has in its possession full copies in the original Spanish."

We give preference in the order of presentation of the dispatches to the story of Santiago as cabled from Captain Dedemonte, the commander of the naval station at Santiago, to Admiral Ventura Manterola, at the Navy Yard, Havana:

April 12, 1898.—Molins and Galicia will probably leave on Saturday. Both went to-day to arrange the defense at the mouth of the harbor, which the Mercedes had been guarding. They planted the first group of torpedoes this morning, and began work on the second group.

April 14.—Ship arrived to-day with 6,000 tons of coal.

April 24.—I have requested permission to extinguish the lights at the mouth of the harbor.

April 21.—The first line of electric torpedoes is ready.

April 28.—The Mercedes has sent ashore her 16-centimeter Hontoria guns. The huts in which are stationed the men who guard the torpedoes are defended with a Nordenfeldt and four machine guns, all served by sailors from the Mercedes.

May 1.—Two lines of electric torpedoes are now fully installed.

May 9.—Two 16-centimeter Hontoria guns have been added to the Zocapa fortifications. German steamer Polaria has arrived with a case of explosives.

May 5.—Since one o'clock this morning two ships, believed to be American, have been standing off the mouth of the harbor. One of them, with all her lights shaded, approached within a pistol shot of Morro. As soon as she was discovered by the tug on guard there she turned and fled, and was later seen to exchange signals with the other. I think they were trying to cut the cable. It is not probable that they were endeavoring to destroy the submarine torpedoes. At dawn neither of them could be seen.

May 18.—A small vessel, which looked like the one that tried to cut the

cable, and a large transatlantic steamer, converted into a war ship, have exchanged shots with the forts at the mouth of the harbor. No damage was done on either side. At 4 o'clock this afternoon both ships sailed away. The light at Morro Castle has been extinguished.

May 19.—Maria Teresa, Oquendo, Colon, Vizcaya, and Pluton have just entered Port.

May 23.—Four ships of the enemy are reported.

May 25.—At dawn this morning two of the enemy's ships captured an English steamer.

May 26.—Six of the enemy's ships reported. Although the squadron has taken on 1,300 tons of coal, yet it has not enough.

May 31.—Blockading fleet has just finished firing on the batteries at the mouth of the harbor. The enemy kept up the firing for an hour and a half. Not one of our men even wounded, and no damage whatever done. It is believed that Iowa and another ironclad were badly injured, and another of the ships set on fire. All of their big ships engaged in the fight. Our Colon enfiladed the entrance to the canal with a disastrous fire, as did the guns of the Mercedes, which had been mounted on land. Our ships in the harbor also took part, throwing a number of projectiles at a high elevation. Grand enthusiasm; excellent feeling.

June 1.—Crew of the Mercedes thanks you most sincerely for your congratulation. I recommend very highly for promotion the brave Ensign Venancia Nardiz, who commands the land battery; his companion, Ricardo Bruguedas, and Artillerist Antonio Raga.

June 3.—The enemy's ship Merrimac tried to force the entrance at half-past three this morning. She was discovered in her attempt, and Morro immediately opened fire upon her, followed in lively fashion by the inner fortress of the fort, and by the battery manned by the sailors from the Mercedes. The Mercedes and the two torpedo boat destroyers later joined the combat. Our disastrous fire sunk the ship in the channel. It does not wholly block the entrance. No damage whatever was done to us. We captured a lieutenant and seven sailors.

June 4.—The squadron has exhausted the stock of powdered coal.

June 5.—The squadron needs at least seventeen hundred tons of coal to refill its bunkers.

June 6.—Announcement of the landing of the enemy at Aguadores was

an error of Morro. Firing was exceedingly lively by the squadron for three hours. No damage done to ships of our squadron, but six were killed on the Reina Mercedes; among them was Lieutenant-Commander Don Emilio Acosta. Three were seriously wounded, and a large number only slightly. Among the latter were Ensign Alexandro Bolino, temporarily on the Reina Mercedes, and the boatswain.

June 7.—In battle yesterday Reina Mercedes was badly injured. She was twice set on fire by shells of the enemy. Lieutenant-Commander dead.

June 9.—Nineteen ships reported.

June 11.—Seventeen ships reported.

June 12.—Seventeen ships reported.

June 13.—Thirteen ships reported.

June 14.—Early this morning enemy's ships opened fire on the batteries at the mouth of the harbor. Three ships took part. R. Bruquetas and two marines slightly wounded. At midnight the batteries fired at random at the enemy's ships. Fourteen ships now on the blockading stations.

June 16.—During the bombardment to-day one sailor was seriously wounded and three others slightly so, while one marine and one sailor, both stationed on the Mercedes, were killed. Fourteen ships on the blockading station. According to Morro, the dynamite cruiser Vesuvius here since yesterday.

June 17.—The ship Sumefido (?) has been sunk in the middle of the canal, near Zocapa Point. It does not obstruct the passage of large ships. She was sunk in twelve fathoms of water.

June 18.—The form of the blockading line is that of an arch, whose points rest on Punta Cabrera, on the west, and Aguadores on the east. The ships of the enemy are all the time appearing and disappearing toward the east. An night they flood the coast and the entrance of the harbor incessantly with light from the electric searchlights, and when they are on blockading duty they never station themselves farther than eight miles from Morro, while at Cabrera and Aguadores they stand in as close as three. There are fourteen ships now on the line. Our wounded are doing well. It is exactly a month to-day since they fired the first shot against us. Since that time they have discharged over four thousand projectiles, causing us no material damage whatever, and only insignificant injuries.

June 21.—The Admiral of our squadron has had more Bustamente tor-

pedoes planted in the harbor. Since last night four were placed between Cayo Smith and the ship Sumerfido (?), and three between that ship and Punta Solado. At 3:50 o'clock this afternoon thirty-nine ships of the enemy returned unexpectedly. They had sailed early this morning, going eastward. There are sixty now in sight from Morro. The thirty-nine that left early this morning had large bodies of troops on board of them. I have reason to believe that they expect to land at once at Guantanamo.

(Several other dispatches sent during later hours of the afternoon and night of this date, June 21st, indicate that the lookout man at El Morro was kept busy tallying our ships by the frequent departures of transports.)

June 22.—According to information received from El Morro, the enemy began embarking troops early this morning at Berracos, while their ships kept up a furious bombardment of the coast, El Morro and the battery at the mouth of the harbor.

June 23.—In front of the mouth of the harbor are eight iron-clads, two torpedo boats, and the Vesuvius and eight transports, the remainder up to 71 having gone down the coast. We believe that the landing of troops is continuing.

June 24.—Twenty-two ships blockading the port. The remainder up to 63 are at Baiquiri. Others are bombarding the coast.

The Admiral has caused the Mercedes to be anchored within the harbor. He says he now has provisions for sixty days.

June 25.—Alvarado has provisions for forty-five days.

I learn from the Military Governor that the troops of the enemy must have suffered very severely from the fire of our men, who compelled them to abandon their position.

June 26.—In one storehouse alone there are 4,800 rations at the disposal of Admiral's squadron. Forty-two ships in sight on station. El Morro says that last night Vesuvius fired two dynamite shells, which completely destroyed the house of the torpedo officer and caused great injury in the fortress, resulting in three sailors of the Reina Mercedes being wounded.

June 27.—Morro says that Vesuvius fired three more dynamite shells last night, but they did no damage, for they fell in the water.

July 1.—Since early this morning a battle has been in progress with more or less vigor between our troops and the enemy, lasting until 2 o'clock this afternoon. A few shells fell in the city, causing great commotion. A few of



BOMBPROOFS THROWN UP BY ROUGH RIDERS TO PROTECT THEM FROM SPANISH SHELL AND SHRAPNEL.



COL. ROOSEVELT'S MEN COOKING THEIR FIRST DINNER AT DAIQUIRI. FRIED BACON AND HARD TACK THE MENU.

the ships fired at an elevation with the object of hitting the ships of our squadron, but failed to do so. I have not yet learned of the result of the battle on land. Captain Bustamente, of the navy, is seriously wounded. It is said that General Vara del Reye was killed, together with many other officers, and that many officers have also been wounded. Killed and wounded among the troops will reach a high figure. General Linares was also wounded. Day before yesterday squadron of the enemy captured steamer which was endeavoring to enter this port. A captive balloon was sent up from the camp of the enemy and inspected our advance positions and probably harbor also.

July 2.—The battles on land and sea were renewed this morning, the squadron of the enemy firing on the batteries of the fort, and our ships. The firing is spirited. At 8 o'clock the firing ceased. Our losses were three killed and three wounded—at the Reina Mercedes battery at Punta Gorda. Among the wounded are Ensign Peina and a sailor from the Mercedes. The Zocapa battery has been silenced.

July 3.—Our squadron has left. It was met outside by a very sharp fire from the enemy's ships. It has apparently succeeded in running the blockade, going out of sight of land in a westerly direction.

June 4.—One hundred and eight members of the crews of the Pluton, Terror and Infanta Maria Teresa have arrived here. Not a single officer among them. Nobody has any definite news of the Admiral. Military Governor has sent a cablegram for the General-in-Chief, instructing me to sink at the mouth of the harbor the Reina Mercedes. This will be done to-night.

Enemy bombarded again to-day. Enemy apparently intends to force the port. I have confidence in the first line of electric torpedoes, but there are only four in the second line, the rest having been raised to enable our squadron to pass out. I have proposed to the Military Governor to sink the Reina Mercedes across the channel in eight fathoms of water. He is now consulting with the General-in-Chief. Reina Mercedes is without armament, crew or officers, her batteries having been sent to the mouth of the harbor. Her boilers are worthless. I consider our situation as grave.

July 5.—There are twenty-four ships of the enemy in sight at dusk. Reina Mercedes was sunk at the mouth of the harbor by the guns of the enemy.

July 10.—At 9 o'clock this morning there were twenty-four ships of the enemy on blockading station, and an abundance of American troops on land. Rebels on every side of us also. Although the bombardment has ceased, it seems that there is a suspension of hostilities, but for what purpose I do not know. From half-past 4 to half-past 6 the firing between our troops and the enemy has been exceedingly lively. A few projectiles fell among the ships of the squadron and the land batteries. We drove the enemy from the first line of trenches. Our loss not heavy. Our men behaved with rare courage. If we had had an abundance of ammunition we would have inflicted a severe blow on the enemy.

July 11.—Random firing between the advanced lines of both sides. Two ironclads at the mouth of the harbor, two in Baiquiri and fifteen at different points toward the east. From 9 to 2 the enemy's ships have been firing on the city, using projectiles of large caliber, but a majority of them fell short of their mark and exploded in the bay. Several buildings were damaged.

July 12.—Situation the same, but firing has ceased for the sake of a parley.

July 13.—Both sides have agreed to cease firing till 12 o'clock to-morrow.

July 16.—Suspension of hostilities continued, General Toral holding conferences with American General. I believe that the capitulation, in the event of that being the result of the conferences, will be on the basis of the repatriation of our men and those of the squadron and the Reina Mercedes. Number of people dying from hunger and the like is increasing. Military Governor has issued a decree against pillage, robbery and incendiarism. There are in Cuba to-day 50,000 Americans, sixty cannon, the squadron and the rebels.

July 17.—The city has capitulated, and over it and the Alvarado the American flag has been raised. Thus ends my authority, as well as that of my associates on this naval station.

This diary is only remarkable because it was written day by day in Santiago and sent to Havana, and shows the shifting shades of the situation. We reproduce, according to their dates, the Spanish cipher cables that the Journal certifies are accurate and careful translations from the original Spanish copies of the cipher dispatches, as they were received or sent by Captain General Blanco:

Admiral Cervera reports his arrival at Santiago:

Santiago, May 19, 1898.

Captain-General Blanco, Havana:

Arrived to-day in this port, where the entire squadron, desirous of coöperating in defense of the country, has the pleasure of saluting you.

CERVERA.

Linares, at Santiago, reports Cervera's squadron:

May 19, 1898.

Captain-General Blanco, Havana:

Cervera's squadron arrived here at 7 o'clock this morning, the Maria Teresa flying the flag of the Admiral. The Colon brings neither her forward nor stern guns, not having been able to mount them. The squadron is composed of the cruisers Teresa, Oquendo, Vizcaya and Colon, the torpedo boat destroyers Pluton and Furor, and two steamers of the Transatlantic Line. The Terror remained in Martinique, repairing the damages sustained on the voyage. The Alicante is with the Terror. They both need coal and provisions. By reason of the increase in consumption caused by the arrival of the squadron, the provisions of this place will only hold out until the end of June.

LINARES.

Blanco cables Cervera can't fight:

Havana, May 20, 1898.

General Correa, Minister of War, Madrid:

Cervera's squadron has arrived at Santiago de Cuba, without the Terror, which remained at Martinique with the Alicante, both blockaded by the ships of the enemy. The squadron comes without provisions or coal, which it will take on there, but it will not be able to remain a long time, since it would expose itself to be blockaded, thus shutting itself off completely and limiting itself to the scant resources of the city. If it had brought the Pelayo and the Carlos Quinto and a flotilla of torpedo boats, it would be able to attempt something important and to contribute powerfully to the defense of the island. Reduced as it is, however, it will be obliged to avoid a combat as much as possible, limiting itself to maneuvers which will not expose it to dangers, but which, on the other hand, cannot produce great results. The squadron has not brought with it any transport, either with coal or provisions, which would have been as advantageous for us as arms and ammunition. The question of

provisions threatens to be very serious, for hardly enough remains for one month. The efforts which I have been making to obtain supplies have thus far been without success. The only thing that can be done is to arm some fast transatlantic steamers and send them to run the blockade, advising me of the probable date of their arrival, so that we may distract the attention of the enemy. I have to-day issued a decree suppressing all the duties on merchandise and making every port of the island free. I consider it indispensable that the squadron of Cervera be reinforced as much as possible, and that the torpedo boat destroyers be sent here to increase our strength. I am assured on good authority that the enemy plans invasion with 28,000 men next week.

BLANCO.

Linares's impressions of Cervera's fleet:

Santiago, May 20, 1898.

Captain-General Blanco, Havana:

Yesterday, when I gave an account of the number of ships and their classes composing the squadron, I did not send you my impressions, expecting to confer with the Admiral, because I supposed that you were fully informed. Neither here nor in the Peninsula is there available a better squadron than that of Cervera, who says that he can only be reinforced with the Carlos Quinto, but no cruiser, nor the Pelayo. If they have continued mounting their old armament they could not be expected to strengthen the other vessels, since they would lack the facilities for coping with vessels enjoying modern equipments. As it now stands, Cervera's squadron cannot go out and search a battle. It will have to limit itself to maneuvering cleverly in order not to compromise any portion of our naval power. If it remains here long enough it will be blockaded, and thus completely shut off from communication, and reduced to the scant resources of this place. It is my duty to lay before you clearly the situation and to assure you that I will meet all the dangers of the situation with all energy. However, the government should know the real state of affairs, so that if the naval forces and the army should be unable to accomplish anything, the failure will not be attributed to lack of skill and bungling. I have furnished to the squadron 2,400 tons of coal, 600 from the San Luis Railroad Company's storehouse, and 1,800 from the Yuruago and Baiquiri mines.

LINARES.

Spanish government's understanding of Cervera's position:

Madrid, May 21, 1898.

Captain-General Blanco, Havana:

In the name of the government I thank you for your congratulation in regard to the safe arrival of Cervera's squadron. The Admiral says that he expects to provision it in as short a time as possible, because it is his opinion that that place (Santiago) will shortly be in a very difficult position. He, however, asks that reinforcements be sent to him. Assure him that the government appreciates the gravity of affairs, and is fully alive to the situation.

CORREA.

Spanish Consul at Montreal tells of Schley's departure:

Montreal, May 22, 1898.

Captain-General Blanco, Madrid:

Schley's squadron has sailed for the south of Cuba. It is composed of four monitors and a coast defense vessel.

BONILLA.

Blanco reports a British collier:

Havana, May 22, 1898.

General Linares, Santiago:

I have information that the American battleship Iowa and the American cruiser Brooklyn and two other large ships and three small ones are off Cienfuegos. I have also to inform you that an English ship loaded with coal has sailed from Curacoa for Santiago.

BLANCO.

Spying on our fleets:

Santiago, May 23, 1898.

Captain-General Blanco, Havana:

The two ships of the enemy which withdrew yesterday, going westward, returned this morning with another cruiser.

LINARES.

Havana, May 23, 1898.

General Linares, Santiago:

The Indiana, the New York, Montgomery, Dolphin, Wilmington, and three other cruisers, left the blockading station off Havana to-day.

BLANCO.

Santiago, May 23, 1898.

Captain-General Blanco, Havana:

The squadron will leave to-morrow morning. I do not know what direction it will take. It is said it will abandon the coasts of Cuba.

LINARES.

Montreal, May 23, 1898.

Captain-General Blanco, Havana:

Four powerful war ships sailed on the 21st, with instructions to find and destroy Cervera's squadron. The Cincinnati and Vesuvius have been sent to patrol the Yucatan Channel.

BONILLA

Havana May 24, 1898

General Linares, Santiago:

Be sure and notify me of departure of squadron. Am eager to learn of its departure.

BLANCO.

Cervera decides to stay at Santiago:

Santiago, May 24, 1898.

Captain-General Blanco, Havana:

Cervera, after having consulted with the commanders of his various ships, has been to see me. He has decided to remain here until assured that he will not be pursued by the Americans when he endeavors to leave the port. He will wait until they make a move on Porto Rico. He thinks it will be best to go to Curacoa. Unless the future movements of the enemy should change the situation he does not think it would be well to go to Cienfuegos, a point which is connected with Havana and other places with resources and provisions. A few ships could close the narrow mouth of this port and render difficult for an indefinite time a departure from it. Thus the American forces would be permitted to resume without embarrassment the attack on Havana, with the moral advantage of having rendered our squadron useless.

LINARES.

Blanco's wishes for success:

Havana, May 24, 1898.

General Linares, Santiago:

Your observations regarding the squadron very acceptable. If it had gone to Cienfuegos it would certainly have entered that port without incident. Your situation is certainly difficult to-day, for the reasons which you indicate,

but it is to be hoped that the ingenuity and valor of your Admiral and other chiefs will enable a departure from there to be made with success, for which I offer you again my sincerest wishes. BLANCO.

Cervera warned against being "bottled up":

Havana, May 24 1898.

General Linares, Santiago:

Oregon arrived to-day at Key West. The flying squadron will move upon Santiago to-day, and Sampson expects to arrive to-morrow. Report to Cervera that he may take steps to prevent himself from being shut up in the harbor. BLANCO.

Blanco encourages Madrid:

Havana, May 27, 1898.

General Corea, Minister of War, Madrid:

Cervera's squadron has made a great impression on the Americans. They have dispatched seven ships to Santiago. BLANCO.

Spanish Consul sends word of Hobson's plan:

Montreal, May 27, 1898.

Captain-General Blanco, Havana:

Believing that our squadron is in Santiago, the government of the United States is thinking of sinking large hulks at the entrance of the bay after the destruction of the fortifications. I advise that notice of this be sent to our squadron. The American government announces an agreement with Maximo Gomez. It is said that a steamer will touch at Key West very soon to take on an expedition, which will disembark at various points. BONILLA.

Correa, Minister of War, much pleased:

Madrid, May 30, 1898.

Captain-General Blanco, Havana:

The belief that General Linares is not in cable communication with you and the interruption of the telegraphic land line cause us to notify you that we will expect you to send us information of the Eastern Department and of Cervera as you may receive it. The last paragraph of your dispatch has created a very favorable impression on the government. CORREA.

Plot to smash Dewey:

Madrid, June 3, 1898.

Captain-General Blanco, Havana:

The very serious situation in the Philippines compels us to send there ships and reinforcements of troops as soon as possible. In order to be able to cope with the squadron of the enemy in Manila, it will be indispensable to send there a squadron that is not inferior. Now there are only two ships of war there, and one of them, I think, cannot pass the canal. The only thing that we can do is to send such ships of Cervera's squadron as may be able to leave Santiago, but before adopting a resolution to that effect the government desires to know your opinion as to the effect that would be produced in the people of Cuba by the withdrawal of Cervera's squadron. This move would be only temporary, and, once the object was obtained in the Philippines, the squadron would return to Cuba without loss of time and strongly reinforced.

CORREA.

Blanco says withdrawal of Cervera's fleet would mean the loss of Cuba:

Havana, June 3, 1898.

General Correa, Minister of War, Madrid:

I would be lacking in my duty if I should conceal from you the fact that the departure from these waters of Cervera's squadron would produce here such a dismal effect that I doubt if I would be able to cope even with force with the situation that it would provoke. The volunteers at present, primed to their utmost by reason of the smallness of Cervera's squadron and sustained in their exaltation by the hope of the arrival of reinforcements from one moment to another, would arise in a body on learning that instead of reinforcements the ships that are here would leave. It would necessitate the shedding of considerable blood, even if the army would agree to fire upon the volunteers, which I doubt. In that case the loss of the island by reason of the terrible uprising which would thus be caused would follow. That is my opinion, and I express it without any exaggeration. So my conscience directs—and permit me to add that in my judgment the salvation of Spain and of the dynasty is here in Cuba, and here, therefore, you ought to send as many ships as you possibly can. If the Indians of the Philippine Islands are loyal, they ought to be sufficient to save that country. If they are not loyal there is no means of saving the Philippines.


BLANCO.



GRAVE OF CAPTAIN WETHERILL WHO FELL IN THE FAMOUS CHARGE OF SAN JUAN HILL.



"OQUENDO," STARBOARD SIDE, SHOWING EXIT OF 13-INCH SHELL.



"OQUENDO," STARBOARD SIDE, AS ABANDONED.

Cervera's Marines ordered to land:

Havana, June 13, 1898.

General Linares, Santiago:

In order to resist the attack on Santiago, either by sea or by land, the marines of Cervera's squadron should be landed and the rapid fire guns, and they, it seems, could be also used to good effect.

BLANCO.

Blanco asks authority over Cervera:

Havana, June 21, 1898.

General Correa, Minister of War, Madrid:

I have regretted very much that the independence enjoyed by Cervera's squadron has prevented me from intervening in the matter of its operation notwithstanding the fact that on me will fall whatever the consequences may be, especially as since the arrival of the squadron in Santiago and its prolonged stay there I have had to change the campaign. If at least he had endeavored to put himself in communication with me, with Linares, or Admiral Manterola, chief of the navy yard in Havana, it is probable that between us all we would have found a more advantageous solution of the problem than that which is offered to-day, namely, either an unequal combat within the harbor or a dash through the enemy's line for either Haiti or Jamaica, where, in turn, they would be again shut up. It would be preferable, perhaps, to come to Cienfuegos or Havana, which is possible at the present time, or to go back to Spain if there is no possibility of being reinforced. It is better to take all these risks rather than to remain shut up in Cuba and to be compelled to surrender because of hunger. The situation is very grave, and I do not doubt that the government will order in these critical times that which will be best for the country and the throne. Permit me, however, to suggest, with all respect, the advisability of combining all military action in the present war, decreeing that in me shall reside all authority as commanding chief of all the forces, both land and water, operating in these parts.

BLANCO.

Cervera told of a good time to escape:

Havana, June 24, 1898.

General Linares, Santiago:

Tell Admiral Cervera that I desire to know his opinion of the situation and his plans. Tell him I think that he ought to leave as soon as possible for whatever port he may think most advisable, because his position in that

harbor, in my opinion, is as dangerous as it can possibly be. Last night alone there were seven ships there, while in Cienfuegos there were only three, and here there were nine, in spite of which the Santo Domingo and Montevideo, which left at 2 o'clock in the morning, were able to run the blockade with ease.

BLANCO

Madrid, June 24, 1898.

Captain-General Blanco, Havana:

The squadron of blockading ships being reduced to seven at Santiago, the government thinks this would be an excellent occasion for our squadron to endeavor to make its escape.

CORREA.

Cervera's view of the situation:

Santiago, June 25, 1898.

Captain-General Blanco,

(Through Admiral Manterola, Chief of the Navy Yard), Havana:

Since my last dispatch to you, I have received a letter from General Linares, transmitting to me a dispatch from you, in which you say you desire to know my opinion on the situation. In my former letter I indicated what it was, and on the present occasion I shall go into details. It is not true that the blockading squadron has even been reduced to only seven ships. Even the six principal ones represent a force three times greater than mine. The lack of long-range guns in the fortifications at the mouth of the harbor prevents us from keeping the American ships at a great distance. It therefore happens that they are always near to the mouth of the harbor, and with their strong searchlights they make it impossible for me to escape, except by giving them battle and overpowering them. In my judgment, an attempt to leave this port would surely involve the loss of the squadron, the death of a majority of the crews of all the ships, a course which I would never take upon myself, but if you order it I will execute it. In my opinion, the loss of the squadron was settled when I was ordered to come here, so that the present grievous situation is not a surprise to me. You will command whether or not we shall go forward to this sacrifice, which I think will be useless.

CERVERA.

Admiral Cervera a subordinate:

Santiago, June 25, 1898.

Captain-General Blanco, Havana:

The government orders me to place myself under your orders, in accord-

ance with the decree of November 13, 1872, which I do with the greatest of pleasure, believing it to be my duty, and I shall explain to you the condition of the squadron.

Of three thousand shells for the Hontoria guns of fourteen centimeters, only six hundred and twenty are available, the others being absolutely useless, not having been replaced by good ones because of the lack of facilities at the time of our departure from Spain. Two Hontoria guns of fourteen centimeters on the Oquendo are not good, and I have ordered them changed for others. The greater number of the quick matches are useless, as they lack their caps. The Colon is without her main batteries. The Vizcaya's bottom is foul, and the ship has therefore lost her speed. The Maria Teresa has no guns for landing parties, and those of the Vizcaya and Oquendo are worthless. Moreover, we have very little coal and provisions for the month of July. The blockading squadron is four times superior. Therefore, our attempt to leave this port would mean our immediate, absolutely sure destruction. A great part of my crews are on land, reinforcing the garrison there. On the 23d I considered it to be my duty to place before the government the information contained in the following telegram: "The enemy is at sea. He has captured Baiquiri. To-day he will surely capture Siboney, in spite of the brilliant defense which will be offered. Yesterday five battalions left Manzanillo. They will arrive in time to prolong the agony, for I very much doubt if they will be able to save the city. As it is absolutely impossible for the squadron to escape under these circumstances, I expect to offer all the resistance in my power in the event of necessity, and to destroy the ships as a last resort." This is the expression of my opinion, which agrees with the opinion of the commanders of all my ships. I await your instructions.

CERVERA.

General Blanco orders Cervera out (copyright, 1898, by W. R. Hearst):

Havana, June 26, 1898.

Admiral Cervera, Santiago:

Your two telegrams received. I reciprocate highly the satisfaction which you express at being placed under my orders, and I consider myself highly honored, and I desire that you shall regard me more as a companion than as a chief. It appears to me that you exaggerate somewhat the difficulties of leaving Santiago. There is no necessity of fighting. All that you are asked

to do is to escape from that prison in which the squadron now finds itself, and I do not think it is impossible, if you take advantage of opportune circumstances, such as a dark night, stormy weather, etc. Thus you might be able to mock the vigilance of the enemy and to take whatever course you might deem best. Moreover, in the case of your being detected, remember that the aim at night is uncertain, and although you may sustain some damage, yet they would be trivial when the saving of the ships is taken into consideration. You tell me that the loss of Santiago is assured, in which case you would destroy the ships—and this is all the more reason why you should endeavor to escape, since it is always preferable for a soldier to succumb in a battle where he would have many chances of success. For my part, I repeat that I think it would be very difficult, indeed, even admitting the strength of the enemy's ships, that leaving the port on a dark night and taking advantage of a good opportunity, the departure or temporary reduction of the enemy's squadron for any purpose, they would cause much damage. A proof of this is the departure of the Montevideo and Santo Domingo from this port, with nine ships on the blockading station, the departure of the Purisima Concepcion from Casilda, with three, and the arrival of the Regina Christina in Cienfuegos, with three also. If your ships should be captured in any way whatever in a Cuban port, the effect in all the world would be disastrous and the war would then be held to be ended in favor of the enemy. To-day all the nations of the earth have their eyes fixed on your squadron, and in it is wrapt up the honor of the nation, as I am sure you understand. The government is of the same opinion. The situation offers no doubt to my mind, for indeed, I have great confidence in the success of it. I shall leave completely to your discretion the course which you will have to take, even though some ships will have to be sacrificed. As a favorable sign I will say to you that the captain of the German cruiser Geier has expressed the opinion that the squadron can effect its departure from Santiago without exposing itself to great risks.

BLANCO.

• Admiral Cervera's reply to Blanco:

Santiago, June 27, 1898.

Captain-General Blanco, Havana:

Your cable of yesterday received. Many thanks for your very kind words. I ought to bow to your judgment without discussing it, the more so, having already given you my full opinion after mature reflection. I have always



MOAT OF MORRO CASTLE.



INSIDE OF MORRO.



TOP PARAPET, MORRO CASTLE.


MORRO CASTLE.



MORTAR BATTERY, MORRO CASTLE.

INTERIOR WALLS OF MORRO CASTLE.

VIEWS OF THE NOTORIOUS PRISON AT SANTIAGO.



CAST IRON PROJECTILES USED IN THE NAVY



PETTY OFFICERS OF THE U. S. S. "NEW YORK."

believed that there were more competent sailors than I, and I am very sorry that none of them can come to take command of the squadron, making me his subordinate. I consider your telegram as an order to leave the port, and in consequence I shall ask General Linares to re-embark the forces which were landed from my ships in conformity with your orders. I beg you to confirm the order to leave the port, because it is not stated in explicit terms, and I should be very sorry not to interpret your orders correctly.

CERVERA.

Santiago, June 28, 1898.

Captain-General Blanco, Havana:

Impossible to reëmbark troops from Cervera's ships until the arrival of reinforcements.

LINARES.

Madrid presses Cervera to escape:

Madrid, June 26, 1898.

Captain-General Blanco, Havana:

The government believes that on the first opportunity offering all the ships of the squadron, or those whose condition would lead to the hope that they may be able to save themselves, should leave the port, and that the Admiral should be given full liberty to take whichever direction he pleases.

CORREA.

Blanco orders a postponement of the fleet's "departure":

Havana, June 28.

Admiral Cervera, Santiago:

I desire to improve as much as possible the situation in Santiago. I am doing all I can to send you rations, and if I can get them I will send you more reinforcements, thus prolonging the defense and perhaps raising the siege, with the result of saving the squadron. In the event of not securing reinforcements for you, you will have to leave the port in spite of the difficulties, which I recognize. My decision is that the squadron remain there quietly until the rations are received, watching a favorable opportunity to depart, going wherever you may think convenient, but in the event of affairs becoming grave, even to the point of your believing the fall of Santiago to be imminent, the squadron must leave immediately as best it can, its destination

to be determined by you and the distinguished officers who command the ships, and undoubtedly they will confirm with their acts the reputation which they enjoy. BLANCO.

Cervera accepts his doom:

Santiago, June 28, 1898.

Captain-General Blanco, Havana:

Your telegram received. Please repeat it from the word "grave" to the end of the sentence, as I do not understand it perfectly at that point. All the rest will be complied with as well as possible, notwithstanding the fact that the scarcity of coal will make it difficult. These ships require twelve hours of firing up, and if the fires are ready to enable them to take advantage of any opportunity which may offer, they will each burn up fifteen tons a day; but I believe I understand the purport of your order, which is that if I can get a favorable opportunity we shall make the best of it, and if not, at the last hour it is to be done even though the loss of the squadron will be inevitable.

CERVERA.

Blanco orders Cervera to leave:

Havana, July 1, 1898.

Admiral Cervera, Santiago:

I have learned of the advance made by the enemy in spite of the heroic defense of the troops at Santiago, and in accordance with the opinion of the government you must reembark those of your crew who were landed, and you must take advantage of the earliest possible opportunity to leave the port with all your ships. You are to follow whatever course you may consider opportune, and you are authorized to leave there any of your ships which, because of its slowness or for other reasons, would have no chance of saving itself. I must inform you that in Cienfuegos there are only three blockading ships and at Havana nine, none of them of any importance.

BLANCO.

Cervera seeks delay:

Santiago, July 1, 1898.

Captain-General Blanco, Havana:

As a continuation of my cable of yesterday, I have to inform you that General Linares has answered me that he cannot return the sailors because they occupy positions on the firing line and in the trenches, and that if they are removed the Americans would be able to advance through the places thus

vacated. Without these men the squadron cannot leave the port. I request further instructions from you. CERVERA.

Santiago, July 1, 1898.

Captain-General Blanco, Havana:

From General Toral you know of the battle of to-day. General Toral thinks that the withdrawal of my sailors would result in the loss of Santiago, and without them I cannot attempt to escape. My opinion is the same as that of Toral, and our departure would in that event be like a flight. My captains also think so. Send instructions for which I have asked.

CERVERA.

Squadron given twelve hours to leave:

Havana, July 2, 1898.

Admiral Cervera, Santiago:

Ship with the greatest haste all your sailors and leave immediately with the squadron. BLANCO.

(In his own handwriting Blanco added the following words to this dispatch, writing them on the back of the telegram: "Twelve hours only are necessary for Cervera to get ready.")

Madrid approves:

Madrid, July 3, 1898.

Captain-General Blanco, Havana:

Instructions given to Cervera are approved. CORREA.

General Toral, of Santiago, reports Cervera's flight:

Santiago, July 3, 1898.

Captain-General Blanco, Havana:

At half-past nine this morning Cervera's squadron departed in perfect formation, firing like the devil on the ships of the enemy, including the Indiana, Massachusetts, Iowa, Texas, Brooklyn, New York, and a number of converted yachts, which were near the mouth of the harbor. After an hour of sharp firing our squadron disappeared from sight, going toward the west, having maneuvered with the greatest celerity and without losing a single minute. The enemy's squadron was thrown into confusion and was not able to approach our ships, notwithstanding their superiority, and it was only after our squadron had run the blockade that the enemy's ships followed in pursuit. I regret to have to report the loss of the two torpedo boat destroyers.

One of them ran on the rocks near Punta Cabrera, and the other received such injuries, including the loss of its rudder, that it was in vain that it endeavored to return to port. Attacked by a ship of the enemy, it sustained the battle and then was compelled to ship its crew in two boats. One of them was captured, while the other reached the shore. A short time afterward the destroyer blew up. From Morro it was impossible to see whether the crew of the one that was stranded at Punta Cabrera was able to save themselves. As this battle, which was distinguished by heroic conduct on the part of all our sailors, much to the glory of our navy, may awaken in the Admiral commanding the enemy's squadron a desire to force the entrance to the harbor and bombard the city, which I think would be easy, I have decided to block the mouth of the harbor.

TORAL.

Cienfuegos ordered to congratulate Cervera:

Havana, July 3, 1898.

General Aguirre, Military Commander, Cienfuegos:

Make preparations for the reception of the squadron commanded by Admiral Cervera, which left Santiago this morning, and which may arrive at any moment at Cienfuegos. Facilitate the Admiral with whatever he may need, and congratulate him for me for the distinguished victory over the enemy.

BLANCO.

First news of the squadron's destruction:

Santiago, July 3, 1898.

Captain-General Blanco, Havana:

A number of shipwrecked sailors from the destroyers and one from the Maria Teresa presented themselves this evening in Zocapa Castle. The sailor from the Maria Teresa said that when far from Santiago that cruiser was lost, and that the Oquendo was on fire at the time. A number of other sailors from the Maria Teresa have made their way here. It is not known what has been the fate of the Admiral.

TORAL.

Santiago, July 4, 1898.

Captain-General Blanco, Havana:

The American General tells me that our squadron has been destroyed and that Cervera is a prisoner.

TORAL.

Madrid hears of the squadron's fate:

Havana, July 4, 1898.

General Correa, Minister of War, Madrid:

According to advices received from the military commander of Santiago de Cuba, a number of sailors from the Maria Teresa have arrived here, and they say that their ship, the Oquendo, the Pluton and the Furor were beached with fire on board, and that the Colon and Vizcaya were lost to sight with the enemy in full pursuit.

BLANCO.

Cervera reports his capture:

Playa del Este, July 5, 1898.

Captain General Blanco, Havana:

I left Santiago de Cuba yesterday morning with all the squadron, and, after an unequal combat and against forces more than three times greater than my own, my entire squadron was destroyed, I having given orders to run them on the rocks. The Maria Teresa, the Oquendo and the Vizcaya blew up, and the Colon, according to information given me by the Americans, beached and turned over, and the destroyers were sunk. I am not yet aware of the number of lives lost, but it will undoubtedly exceed six hundred dead and many wounded, although not in such a great proportion. We, the survivors, are all prisoners of the Americans. My men behaved with the greatest courage, and they won the plaudits even of the enemy. The commander of the Vizcaya was permitted to retain his sword. I am highly pleased with the generosity with which they treated us. Villamil is among the dead, and I believe that Lagaza was also killed. And among the wounded is Eulate. We have lost everything, and need funds.

CERVERA (a prisoner at that time).

Blanco tries to shift blame:

Havana, July 5, 1898.

Admiral Cervera, Playa del Este:

I have read your telegram with great sorrow, and I admire the bearing of the chief officers and crew. Perhaps if you had selected some other hour to leave port the result would have been different. Sampson says in his telegram that he has not suffered more than three killed and wounded. Is that possible? Tell me what funds you need, and where and how I can remit to

you. I beg you, as well as all the chiefs and officers and men under your command, to receive the expression of my lively interest and desire to alleviate your situation to the full extent of my ability.

BLANCO.

Madrid cables "great joy":

Madrid, July 6, 1898.

Captain-General Blanco, Havana:

The departure of the squadron has caused great joy here.

CORREA.

Blanco advises holding out:

Havana, July 8, 1898.

General Correa, Minister of War, Madrid:

The army, always ready for any sacrifice for the sake of the nation, remains intact up to the present time, and is still full of spirit, for it is maintaining itself in Santiago de Cuba with vigor. After many brilliant battles, in which, although some ground has been lost, every inch of territory was disputed with great valor, severe losses have been inflicted upon the enemy. It is my opinion that the majority of the military classes would listen with little patience to any peace proposition, much less to any proposition for the abandonment of territory which the army has been defending so valorously. With provisions and ammunition we could maintain our position for many months, and still render very dear the victory to our enemies, although the absolute possession of the sea, which the Americans enjoy, will make life painful for the lack of food, battles extremely difficult by reason of the scarcity of ammunition, and hamper the government considerably, because of the frequent disturbances of public order, which will result from a famishing condition on the part of the people. To sum up, then, permit me to say that the army in general desires war for the honor of arms as well as for its own honor, and that it would be exceedingly sorrowful to them to abandon to the enemy without fighting a land which it has been preserving for so many long years at the cost of its own blood. That is the opinion I also hold, and that I have always held.

BLANCO.

Blanco's tribute of admiration to Cervera:

Havana, July 9, 1898.

Admiral Cervera, Care French Consul, New York:

Insisting on my desire to alleviate the condition of those brave defenders of the nation who so valorously succumbed in unequal combat, and to whom,

as to you, I offer a tribute of admiration, I beg you to let me know what sum of money you need, and where I can send it to you, which end and to save time I am directing this telegram to the care of the French Consul in New York.

BLANCO.

Madrid, July 14, 1898.

General Blanco, Havana:

Your telegram received.

CORREA.

Prime Minister Sagasta's appeal:

Madrid, July 12, 1898.

Blanco, Governor-General, Havana:

Absolute masters of the siege, the Americans, knowing by experience how costly it has been to them to engage our brave soldiers in battle, will limit themselves in the future to extending and strengthening the blockade and to bombarding ports, at the same time detaching ships to attack Porto Rico, the Canaries, the Balearic Islands, and even cities on the coast of the Peninsula, expecting that, aided by the Indians, they will secure possession of the Philippines, and surely also disturb public order in the nation. The unmistakable duty of any government is to avoid such great and such irremediable evil by seeking by all means the end of such an unequal and disastrous combat. Peace could be obtained to-day on conditions that would be accepted and honorable to the army. But once Cuba has been reduced by starvation, Manila lost, a part, if not all, of Porto Rico occupied and the most important cities on our coast bombarded, it will not be possible to think of peace. The discomposure and ruin of this calamitous country would be the result. I trust that in view of these reasons you and the generals under your orders, to whom our institutions and, above all, our country, are so dear, will know how to respond to the discipline of the ever valorous army, and to render obedience to the resolutions of the government regarding peace. I await with anxiety your reply which I beg you to send me with all possible haste.

SAGASTA.

Correa explains Madrid's position:

Madrid, July 12, 1898.

Captain-General Blanco, Havana:

Your telegram No. 202 received. I am surprised that the honor of your indomitable army being already saved, as undoubtedly and to the admiration

of the whole world, as well as to the great glory of the nation, it has been, that the forces at Santiago persist in continuing a war in which they surely can gain no more laurels nor arrive at any other result than that of being compelled to surrender in a short time for lack of provisions and ammunition. It is not to be believed that the enemy, being fully aware of the lamentable conditions existing among the troops at Santiago, will be in any hurry to suffer or risk new losses, especially since being able, by means of the blockade, to prevent any help being sent from here, they can possess themselves of the island without new sacrifices of blood on their part.

Neither can I explain to myself your tenacity in maintaining a position in an ungrateful land which repels us and makes itself odious to us by its desire to separate itself from the mother country. I should think that the army would prefer the grief of abandoning it to the ruin and desolation which such a disastrous persistency would bring to this unfortunate country, which, in view of the future which awaits it, is clamoring for peace with honor, the present being the time when it could be secured.

But let it be whatever it will, and without ceasing to feel in the bottom of my heart the real pride of a Spaniard and a soldier in the exalted sentiments of your unrivaled army, I conceive and deduce that it will not permit its noble aims to interfere with discipline, and that the soldiers will never forget their duties of obedience and submission to the decrees of the government, giving such attention to them as will be sure to preserve the honor of the army.

I therefore believe that whatever may be the decrees of the government the army will execute them, and that it will not pretend to constitute itself a danger to the nation, thus bringing upon itself the great misfortune of having to surrender for lack of provisions and other means of sustaining itself.

I nevertheless desire to have an absolute assurance of this, and this you alone can give me. Be so kind as to let me have it as soon as possible, for these are critical moments.

CORREA.

Havana, July 13, 1898.

General Correa, Minister of War, Madrid:

The matters you discuss in your confidential telegram No. 107, addressed to me, being of supreme gravity and importance, and as the majority of the generals are absent at the front from their commands, it will not be possible

for me to answer you before to-morrow. Please excuse this short delay, which I trust will be for the better. BLANCO.

Blanco demands a continuation of the war:

Havana, July 14, 1898.

Señor Sagasta, Prime Minister, Madrid:

The ruling opinion in the army in Cuba, in which we the generals all share, demands a continuation of the war. We believe that the honor of the army demands several more sacrifices, but the army will never present itself an obstacle to the fulfillment of the orders of the government, which it will obey, as it is its duty to do. Profoundly grateful on my part for the very flattering phrases which you direct to me in your telegram of the 12th, it is exceedingly painful for me to inform you that I can no longer continue at the head of this army in the event of the government deciding to sue for peace. BLANCO.

Havana, July 14, 1898.

General Correa, Minister of War, Madrid:

The ruling opinion of the army, which we the generals all share, is for the continuation of the war, believing that enough has not yet been done for the preservation of its honor. It would therefore view with shame the abandonment of the island which it is occupying and defending with such bravery, but you may be sure that it will respect the orders of the government, and will not oppose its decisions. This much the generals promise you. In these most difficult circumstances I beg to assure you of my best wishes. BLANCO.

BLANCO.

Blanco reports Santiago's fall:

Havana, July 17, 1898.

General Correa, Minister of War, Madrid:

The surrender of Santiago was effected this morning without any intervention whatever of my authority, according to information which I have transmitted to you. In spite of this dismemberment of the island, the army continues spirited and the war can be continued if you will only send us provisions, which would be advisable under ships flying a neutral flag, seeking the means of sending us ammunition. The fall of Santiago has no true

military importance, and it can be said that the war has not in reality begun yet. Several days ago I issued orders for the concentration of the divisions of Holguin and Puerto Principe to maneuver according to the movements of the enemy. The decisive campaign will have to be fought out on this side of the trocha, and the enemy will have to suffer very severe losses in order to penetrate this section.

BLANCO.

These dispatches are confessions of the incompetency of the Spaniards for peace or war. The colonial system that stimulated their arrogance disturbed their balances, and they became profligates in public business. The fatal loss was that of the honesty of the servants of the government in dealing with the people, and the immediate natural consequence was the people became false to their government—hence disorderly revolution.

The character of Spain was impaired by her injustice to her colonies. The degradation that she imposed upon them reacted on herself. It has appeared in weakness for the preservation of domestic order, as well as in asserting her ancient authority beyond the lines of the peninsula; and it has been still more signally displayed in fighting a foreign foe. The dispatches of Sagasta, Blanco, Cervera, Correa and Linares, telegrams written in the cipher code of Spain, are in every sense official. They betray, as hardly anything else could, the decadence of the country, not only in the facts they reveal, but in the fact of publicity. There is no doubt that it was public opinion in Spain, for years before the war with us came, that the Spanish navy was more powerful than that of the United States—that they had battleships superior to ours in armor and arms, cruisers that were swifter and equally staunch, and torpedo boats and destroyers that greatly overmatched our gunboats. It was the policy of the Government to misinform the people.

It appears in the plain English of the secret Spanish cipher that the fleets of Spain were largely shams. They failed in the equipments essential in modern warfare. They had but one thing left. On the defensive—not asked to brave the terrors of bushwhacking, the honor of the Spanish infantry, once equal to any in Europe, was sustained, and the crews of the doomed ships at Manila and Santiago, beaten and crushed, burning and sinking, behaved with intrepidity to the last. Spain was not able to send east or west a squadron that could cope with ours, and the only advantage they got from their navy was that they had so deceived themselves as to persuade others that their

illusions were real, and we were for a time embarrassed by apprehensions. We made the safe mistake of over-valuing the ability of our enemy, and yet we had so neglected our army that the fate of the day at Santiago depended upon a thin and strained line. The Spaniards dealt with themselves badly when they believed the fancies that were the foolishness of their pride, and as their last step before collapse was taken, their condition was incomprehensible by them. When Cervera was ordered from Madrid and Havana to flee from Santiago, there was no real plan that had a promise in it, of more than a few days' respite from ruin, for the utmost success expected was that some of the fugitives might get into the harbor of Cienfuegos.





CHAPTER XX.

The Santiago Situation After the Spanish Fleet was Gone.

Cipher Dispatches—Too Much Publicity—Shafter Demands the Help of the Navy, and is Supported by the War Department—He Heard Firing at Midnight and Hoped it was Sampson—Garcia's Men who were Always Going to do Something To-morrow—"Terrible Fight" July 1st—Reinforcements, Lighters and Tugs Wanted—An Energetic Rush to Aid Shafter, but not by the Navy—Cable Direct to Corbin—The Yellow Fever Appears—Preliminaries to the Capitulation—The President Sticks to It that Spaniards Must Unconditionally Surrender—Fortunate Arrival of Miles in the Blue Rains.

The anxieties of the War Office to receive the very latest news from General Shafter's headquarters during the fighting at Santiago, and at the same time to so far control the publications about the battles as to interfere with recklessly panicky communications, caused repeated "hurry" suggestions from Washington and orders to send that which was important in cipher.

The following dispatches have the effect of a searchlight:

Playa del Este, July 4, 1898—1:13 a. m.

Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington:

Camp near Santiago, 3.—I will send important dispatches hereafter in cipher, when possible, but you must understand that we have no time to spare, no facilities for the work. Messages sent you this afternoon would require until to-morrow to work out. Captain Alger is 10 miles from here; also my staff officer in charge of cipher is absent, on duty.

SHAFTER, Major-General.

Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 4, 1898—1:45 a. m.

Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba:

Secretary War directs me to say for you to exercise your own judgment about using cipher and not inconvenience yourself in any way, as it is fully understood how you are occupied. H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

Captain Alger, the son of the Secretary, was an expert in ciphers, but

there was no time for the exercise of his skill, and there was a good deal of circulation of intelligence.

The extreme activity enforced upon the army headquarters in the field may perhaps account for this paragraph in the report of Admiral Sampson, explaining that he did not refuse to endeavor to force his way into the Santiago Harbor. The Admiral was aroused to remark: "I here, moreover, would animadvert upon the apparently extraordinary openness with which every detail of hope, effort, or suggestion on the part of the army has been published. The unwisdom of such procedure is too manifest for discussion."

When Cervera's fleet was smashed, burned, wrecked on the rocks, and Shafter was demanding the surrender of the Spanish garrison, the wires were tingling with hotly rushed telegrams driving the officers in charge of transportation by rail and steamers to hasten reinforcements and supplies to sustain the boys who had been in the thick of the fight, and were waiting through the long days of a truce, subject to the vicissitudes of calculations whether they should be thrown in storming columns upon the Spanish lines, to save them from the fearful blight of the yellow fever. July 5th, Shafter said if Sampson would force an entrance to the harbor, which did not seem to ordinary observation utterly beyond reason after the annihilation of Cervera's fleet, the city would be taken "in a few hours." If the army was to take it, 15,000 troops were "wanted speedily," and it was not certain about the landing, "as it is getting stormy." The "sure and speedy" way, the General said, was "through the bay"—and Shafter wired he was "now in position" to do his part. The President wanted coöperation between the army and navy, and telegraphed accordingly.

July 5th, Shafter wired: "Navy should go Santiago Harbor at any cost. If they do, I believe they will take the city and all the troops that are there. If they do not, the country should be prepared for heavy losses among our troops."

Meantime, Shafter had talked with the French Consul and others, and concluded to "keep up fire on the trenches," but not on the town, for "if it was simply a going out of the women, and to outside places where they could be cared for, it would not matter much, but now it means their going out to starve to death or be furnished with food by us, and the latter is not possible now."

The General wanted the Secretary's views very much, and the President interposed—if that may be said of one whose hand was all the time visible and busy and nigh—that “it was the part of wisdom to await reinforcements, the embarkation of which you have already been advised,” and Shafter and Sampson were directed to “have a conference and determine a course of coöperation,” that there might be secured “desirable results with the least sacrifice.”

As an example of the promotion of movement in spite of difficulties, we quote General Wilson at Chickamauga, July 5th, 3:45 p. m.:

“Just leaving for Charleston. No signal officers or men. No engineers' supplies. No intrenching tools, and no funds for any of the supply departments, except commissary. Please arrange at Charleston to meet these requirements. Place to my credit at Charleston at least \$5,000 for each department, total, \$30,000, with check books.”

Here is a stirring suggestion from the Adjutant-General's office that the army might get along without the navy:

Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 5, 1898—4:30 p. m.

Maj. Gen. W. R. Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba:

Your telegram concerning the navy entering Santiago Harbor is received, and your action thoroughly approved. The Secretary of War suggests that if the navy will not undertake to break through, take a transport, cover the pilot house in most exposed points with baled hay, attach an anchor to a towline, and, if possible, grapple the torpedo cables, and call for volunteers from the army—not a large number—to run into the harbor, thus making a way for the navy. Before acting, telegraph what you think of it. One thing is certain; that is, the navy must get into the harbor, and must save the lives of our brave men that will be sacrificed if we assault the enemy in his intrenchments without aid. This is strictly confidential to you.

H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

Shafter's dispatch to the Adjutant-General on the same day mentioned the large number of women and children coming out of Santiago, and touched the harp again as to Sampson:

“Heavy firing about midnight, which continued an hour, at entrance to bay. Don't know cause. Hope it was Sampson clearing the entrance of torpedoes. Appearance of fleet in harbor will settle Santiago.”

Admiral Sampson goes into an exhaustive explanation of his relations with General Shafter at Santiago, and it is of exceeding interest. The General commanding the expedition testified in terms of enthusiastic appreciation, that the landing of the troops was handsomely supported by the fleet. The disagreements developed after the battles of the 1st and 2d of July, and became intensified when the fleet of Spain ceased to be a factor in the war. The Admiral had met General Garcia, who thought he had "4,000 men back in the country," and he "left behind him 3,000 men." The Admiral seemed to think that these forces made 7,000 men, but the surface show is that 3,000 men were counted twice in order to make up the 7,000. The 4,000 men were about forty-five miles away, and as General Miles would say, perfectly "equipped in every respect," the Florida expedition that landed at Banés having supplied all deficiencies. The Admiral paid this compliment to the insurgent chieftain in a letter to the Secretary of War:

"My impressions of General Garcia are of the most pleasant character. He is a large, handsome man, of most frank and engaging manners, and of most soldierly appearance. He remained some time on board, though, unfortunately, so seasick that he was obliged to lie down during the whole of his visit."

There is no opportunity lost in paying compliments to the Cubans, but the 50,000 auxiliary forces General Miles put down in his first plan of campaign did not materialize. The few that came were "amply provided" with food and enjoyed the change—eating abundantly and leaving fighting to the Americans.

June 26th the Admiral dispatched to the Secretary of War:

"Channel was not obstructed by the Merrimac, and we must be prepared to meet the Spanish fleet if they attempt to escape. I am preparing torpedo attack in order to hasten their destruction. Regret to resort to this method because of its difficulties and small chance of success, torpedo boats being subject to small arms and rapid-fire guns from the shore for a long distance. I should not do this were present force to be kept here, as it now insures a capture which I believe will terminate the war."

The explanation of the last line is that it was proposed to send some of the heavy ships to attack Spain.

June 30th Shafter sent Sampson a communication dated Camp near San Juan River, as follows:

"Sir: I expect to attack Santiago to-morrow morning. I wish you would bombard the forts at Aguadores in support of a regiment of infantry which I shall send there early to-morrow, and also make such demonstration as you think proper at the mouth of the harbor, so as to keep as many of the enemy there as possible."

July 1st Shafter sent his compliments to Sampson, saying:

"General Shafter's compliments to Admiral Sampson. Wishes him to keep up his fire on Santiago on the water front. Enemy has 6-inch guns there, annoying us very much in our moves. Our troops watching within a hundred yards of city on the east side. Will assault at daylight to-morrow morning."

On this day Sampson's official report states: "The New York and Oregon took up position and fired a number of 8-inch shell over the hills in the direction of Santiago and the ships in the bay, using a range of from $3\frac{1}{2}$ to 4 miles."

Shafter recognized the shooting in these uncertain terms: "A few shells of large size fell some distance behind our lines to-day. It is hardly possible that they come from your ships, but I cannot account for them unless they come from the enemy's navy."

Shafter's report to Sampson of the battle of July 1st is brief but forcible:

"July 2.—Terrible fight yesterday, but my line is now strongly intrenched about three-fourths of a mile from town. I urge that you make effort immediately to force the entrance to avoid future losses among my men, which are already very heavy. You can now operate with less loss of life than I can. Please telephone answer."

Lieutenant Staunton telephoned Shafter: "Admiral Sampson has this morning bombarded forts at entrance of Santiago, and also Punta Gorda Battery inside, silencing their fire. Do you wish further firing on his part? He began at 5:30, finished at 7:30. Your message to him here. Impossible to force entrance until we can clear channel of mines—a work of some time after forts are taken possession of by your troops. Nothing in this direction accomplished yesterday by the advance on Aguadores."

Shafter telephoned in return: "It is impossible for me to say when I can take batteries at entrance to harbor. If they are as difficult to take as those which we have been pitted against, it will be some time and a great loss of life. I am at a loss to see why the navy cannot work under a destructive fire



STONE FORT AT EL CANEY. EFFECT OF CANNONADING.



SNAP SHOT OF GENERAL SHAFTER IN THE FIELD.

as well as the army. My loss yesterday was over 500 men. By all means keep up fire on everything in sight of you until demolished. I expect, however, in time and with sufficient men, to capture the forts along the bay."

Sampson reports that he wrote General Shafter and "began making preparations to countermine, and, with the object of arranging an attack upon the batteries at the entrance, a visit was arranged to General Shafter, so that the matter might be thoroughly discussed, and combined action take place. I had in view the employment of the marines for an assault on either the Morro or Socapa battery, while at the same time assaulting the defenses at the entrance with the fleet."

In his letter to Shafter at this time Sampson said: "Our trouble from the first has been that the channel to the harbor is well strewn with observation mines, which would certainly result in the sinking of one or more of our ships if we attempted to enter the harbor, and by the sinking of a ship the object of the attempt to enter the harbor would be defeated by the preventing of further progress on our part.

"It was my hope that an attack on your part of these shore batteries, from the rear, would leave us at liberty to drag the channel for torpedoes.

"If it is your earnest desire that we should force our entrance, I will at once prepare to undertake it. I think, however, that our position and yours would be made more difficult if, as is possible, we fail in our attempt.

"We have in our outfit at Guantanamo 40 countermining mines, which I will bring here with as little delay as possible, and if we can succeed in freeing the entrance of mines by their use, I will enter the harbor.

"This work, which is unfamiliar to us, will require considerable time.

"It is not so much the loss of men as it is the loss of ships which has until now deterred me from making a direct attack upon the ships within the port."

This was written on the day before the incident of the departure and removal of Cervera's fleet. The distance Admiral Sampson was from the scene of action is accounted for in his official statement in these quiet terms suppressing sensibility:

"I started the morning of the 3d July, by prearrangement, to confer with the General as to a plan of combined attack, but this conference was prevented by the battle with the Spanish fleet."

Later the Admiral made a more particular statement as follows:

"In consequence of General Shafter's request for assistance, a consultation

was arranged to take place the morning of July 3, and horses were sent to Siboney for that purpose. I started for Siboney about 9 o'clock, but the sortie of Admiral Cervera's fleet, of course prevented my carrying out the arrangement.

"The plans which I had proposed laying before General Shafter, and which had been very thoroughly discussed on board by myself and staff, included the countermining of the harbor entrance, the immediate entrance of the fleet, and the carrying of the Morro by assault with a thousand marines landed in Estrella Cove; or, using the marines for carrying the western battery, the Morro to be attacked by a detachment of the army, the advance being from the direction of Aguadores. Orders had been sent to Guantanamo June 28th ordering up the Resolute, with a view of using the mines stored on board of her.

"These facts are given to show how early the matter of forcing the harbor entrance was taken in hand with a view to assisting the army. My own views had always been that the first effort of the army should have been toward the carrying of the batteries at the harbor entrance to enable us to enter and countermine without a loss of ships, and this was, in fact, the view of General Shafter when he first arrived, as expressed to my chief of staff when he first went on board the headquarters ship, and also stated by General Shafter on consultation with General Garcia and myself at Acerraderos the same day. The reasons for change on his part I do not know."

General Shafter's Fourth of July greeting to Admiral Sampson must appear with all the tassels on it:

Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, July 4

Admiral Sampson, Commanding United States Navy Forces:

Through negligence of our Cuban allies, Pando, with 5,000 men, entered the city of Santiago last night. This nearly doubles their forces. I have demanded their surrender, which they refuse, but I am giving them some wounded prisoners and delaying operations to let foreign citizens get out, and there will be no action before the 6th and perhaps the 7th. Now, if you will force your way into that harbor the town will surrender without any further sacrifice of life. My present position has cost me 1,000 men, and I do not wish to lose any more. With my forces on one side and yours on the other—and they have a great terror of the navy, for they know they cannot hurt you—we shall have them. I ask for an early reply. Very respectfully,

WM. R. SHAFTER, Major-General, U. S. V.

On this the annotation of the Admiral is:

"This dispatch shows a complete misapprehension of the circumstances which had to be met.

"On the night of July 4, the *Reina Mercedes* was sunk by the Spaniards in a manner which would certainly obstruct the larger ships and possibly the smaller ones. Extensive shore batteries were known to exist, and if our smaller vessels were sent in and were sunk, either by the mines or by the fire of the batteries, the harbor would be effectually closed to us. It was essential to the new scheme of attack of this mine field that the positions occupied by the eastern and western batteries should be carried, and this was the scheme of action first proposed by General Shafter in his discussion with my chief of staff, who was sent by me to meet General Shafter the day of his arrival. The chief of staff carried with him a chart of the harbor and explained the situation, stating that it was regarded by us as a movement of primal importance that these points should be carried before any attention was paid to the city. The possession of these points insured the destruction of the mines by us, the entrance of our heavy ships in the harbor, and the assault on Admiral Cervera's squadron inside. To this General Shafter gave most cordial assent, and stated that he had no intention of attacking the city proper, that here (pointing to the entrance) was the key to the situation, and that when we had this we had all. This was repeated in his interview with General Garcia at Acerraderos."

Shafter's few days before Santiago were full of troubles—for instance:

Playa, July 7, 1898—2:05 p. m.

Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington:

The failure to have tugs and lighters for use in handling the fleet is of so serious a nature that I must again refer to it. Transports go off miles from shore and there is no way of reaching them or compelling them to come in. It is a constant struggle to keep them in hand. Had it not been for the lighter *Laura*, the army could not have moved. It is with the greatest difficulty that one day's food can be issued at a time.

SHAFTER, Major-General, Commanding.

Two more dispatches of the 7th show it was a bad day:

Playa, July 7, 1898—4:50 p. m.

Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington:

Had consultation with Sampson. Navy disinclined to force entrance

except as a last resource. They will bombard the city, which is within easy range of their big guns, beginning at noon of the 9th, and if that is not effective, after twenty-four hours, will then force entrance with some of the smallest ships. I still have hopes they will surrender. Made a second demand on them yesterday, calling attention to the changed conditions because of the loss of the Spanish fleet, and offering to give them time to consult their home government, which General Toral has accepted, asking that the British consul return to the city with employés of the cable company to permit him to do so. Meanwhile, I hope my reinforcements will arrive. Not one in sight yet except the 200 recruits for the Second Infantry, who came a week ago. As a last resource I will try running in transports. I do not consider my force sufficient to warrant an assault on the city, though I believe it would be successful, but at a fearful loss. Of course, it would be criminal to hope for the end to be gained, which is merely the capture of a few thousand men, and when we see we are getting them by siege. Nothing has yet been seen of tugs, lighters, and launches promised ten days ago.

SHAFTER, Major-General, Commanding.

Playa, July 7, 1898—4:55 p. m.

Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington:

When ought I to expect reinforcements? They sadly needed. Nothing in sight to-day.

SHAFTER, Major-General.

War Department, July 7, 1898—5:30 p. m.

Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba:

The President directs that you order transports to stand in by the shore and enforce demand, so that they may be able to get supplies more easily. We are distressed about the tugs and lighters, which were ordered long since and ought to have reached you before now. Your long dispatch concerning second demand on city received and approved. We will be very glad if you can finish up that work without another assault.

By order Secretary of War:

H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 7, 1898.

Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba:

One tug should reach you to-day. A large, powerful one leaves New



AMERICAN TROOPS IN SANTIAGO. RELIEF OF THE GUARD.



SCENE ON THE WHARF AT SANTIAGO, CUBA.

Orleans to-night. Fifty laborers went on the St. Paul, leaving New York to-day, and stevedores are on boats going to you.

H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

Playa del Este, via Haiti, July 7, 1898—7:42 p. m.

Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington:

Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, Camp near Santiago, Cuba, 7.—Please send some fast ship from nearest point with 100 stevedores, 100 drivers, and as many medicines and dressings as can be obtained. It is reported to me medicines are very scarce. Two steam launches should be bought. Too much trouble to get things from navy, and we have but partial control of them when we do get them. This is not a matter to be put off. Sent 90,000 rations ashore to-day.

SHAFTER, Major-General.

Playa del Este, July 7, 1898—8:35 p. m.

Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington:

Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, near Santiago, Cuba.—The hospital ship Relief just arrived with a large amount of medical stores. Want the teamsters, stevedores, and steam lighters as wired you, and the sooner they can be gotten here the better.

W. R. SHAFTER.

General Miles left Washington at 10:40 the night of July 7th on the way to Santiago and Porto Rico, with instructions not to supersede Shafter if he was able for duty. At Rockhill, South Carolina, he telegraphed the Secretary of War request "20,000 .30 caliber rifles, using government ammunition, be sent at once, to be used at Santiago or other places, with strong canvas web belts and ammunition, and that all troops sent to Cuba be supplied with smokeless powder rifles. The Winchester and Remington companies furnish arms and ammunition. The Lee rifle does good service for the navy. Horstman's, military dealers, Philadelphia, has 12,000 Mauser rifles and ammunition for sale. Modern rifles can be obtained from other parties."

Corbin telegraphed Miles: "There are 12,000 Krag-Jorgensen rifles at Tampa available, with 1,800,000 rounds of ammunition, with larger amount in hands of General Shafter at Santiago. The output of new ammunition of this caliber is 250,000 rounds per day."

July 8th Corbin telegraphed Shafter: "Do you recommend the arming of

Henry's division, or any other volunteers of your command, with Krag-Jorgensen rifles? We have 1,800,000 rounds of ammunition at Tampa, and manufacture 250,000 per day, so you may know what the supply will be. What are your wishes?"

Shafter replied: "By all means arm in field Henry's division and the volunteer regiments now here with Krag-Jorgensen rifle. The use of black powder instantly brought volleys against regiments using Springfield, and was very demoralizing on those regiments."

The President's telegram to Shafter on the battle of July 1st got lost on the wires, and was repeated on the 8th as follows:

"The President directs me to say you have the gratitude and thanks of the Nation for the brilliant and effective work of your noble army on Friday, July 1. The steady valor and heroism of officers and men thrill the American people with pride. The country mourns the brave men who fell in battle. They have added new names to our roll of heroes."

The fact is not obscure in the official dispatches, that General Shafter was exceedingly anxious to have the Spaniards in Santiago surrender to him. Indeed, when he made the demand he was sick and despondent, and his correspondence with Admiral Sampson shows that he was not in high spirits. July 9 at 1 p. m., he got a proposition from the commandant in Santiago to march out of the city with arms and baggage, not to be molested until he reached Holguin, surrendering the territory to the Americans. This, Shafter remarked, was, as the Spaniards stated it, to save the city and avoid useless bloodshed. Shafter closed his communication: "This will give me another day to get up troops from Siboney, the first transports of reinforcements having just arrived. In my opinion, they will have to surrender unconditionally very soon after I open fire on them."

The General received this conclusive dispatch:

Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 9, 1898—1:50 p. m.

Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba:

Your telegram setting forth terms on which the enemy will evacuate Santiago has been submitted to the President by the Secretary of War, who instructs me to say that you will accept nothing but an unconditional surrender, and should take extra precautions to prevent the enemy's escape.

By order Secretary of War:

H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

Playa del Este, via Haiti, July 9, 1898—9 p. m.

Secretary of War, Washington:

Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, near Santiago.—I forwarded General Toral's proposition to evacuate the town this morning without consulting any one. Since then I have seen the general officers commanding divisions, who agree with me that it should be accepted. First, it releases at once the harbor; second, it permits the return of thousands of women, children, and old men, who have left the town fearing bombardment, and who are now suffering where they are, though I am doing my best to supply them with food; third, it saves the great destruction of property which a bombardment would entail, most of which belongs to Cubans and foreign residents; fourth, it at once relieves the command, while it is in good health, for operations elsewhere. There are now three cases of yellow fever at Siboney, in Michigan regiment; and if it gets started, no one knows where it will stop. We lose by this simply some prisoners we do not want and the arms they carry. I believe many of them will desert and return to our lines. I was told by sentinel, who deserted last night, that 200 men want to come, but were afraid our men would fire upon them.

W. R. SHAFTER, General.

Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 9, 1898—11:15 p. m.

Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba:

In reply to your telegram recommending terms of evacuation as proposed by the Spanish commander, after careful consideration by the President and Secretary of War, I am directed to say that you have repeatedly been advised that you would not be expected to make an assault upon the enemy at Santiago until you were prepared to do the work thoroughly. When you are ready, this will be done. Your telegram of this morning said your position was impregnable, and that you believed the enemy would yet surrender unconditionally. You have also assured us that you could force their surrender by cutting off the supplies. Under these circumstances your message recommending that Spanish troops be permitted to evacuate and proceed without molestation to Holguin is a great surprise and is not approved. The responsibility of destruction and distress to the inhabitants rests entirely with the Spanish Commander. The Secretary of War orders that when you are strong enough to destroy the enemy and take Santiago that you do it. If you have not force enough, it will be dispatched to you at the earliest moment practi-

cable. Reinforcements are on the way, of which you have already been advised. In the meantime, nothing is lost by holding the position you now have and which you regard as impregnable. Acknowledge receipt.

By order of the Secretary of War:

H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

The annexed telegram is of no little significance:

Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 9, 1898—11:20 p. m.

Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba:

It is suggested that all official telegrams, particularly those requiring action, be addressed to the Adjutant-General. This will insure more prompt action, as the office is kept open twenty-four hours a day.

H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

General Corbin has been likened to the engineer of a locomotive, or the fireman. He certainly fed the fires and pulled the lever day and night, and did a grand work, being on duty about two-thirds of the twenty-four hours per day.

July 10th Shafter telegraphed Corbin, 1:30 a. m.: "If two lighters and tugs have arrived, navy must have them. They have not, up to sundown, reported at Siboney or Daiquiri."

The tug and lighters had stuck at Guantanamo, and the Quartermaster-General asked the naval authorities to send them to Shafter, who "needs them badly." Shafter telegraphed July 10th, 2:50 p. m., that his position was impregnable against attack, but he had not troops enough to surround the town, adding, "The Cuban troops are not to be depended upon for severe fighting." General Wilson telegraphed from Charleston, as he was about sailing for the seat of war, that if they had to go out of sight of transports there would be a paralysis by the absence of Miles.* Corbin caught this on the first bounce, and replied: "The transports that will take the First Brigade of your division will carry, in addition to the men, 800 mules, without interfering with the comfort of soldiers. General Brooke has been directed to send you your wagon transportation."

July 11th Shafter telegraphed: "Navy fired few shots from the sea near Aguadores. Effect not perceptible." Major General Miles commanding arrived off Santiago July 12th. On the next day Corbin telegraphed him:

"Contracting party, with steamship, two powerful sea tugs, steam sea-

* Not the Commanding General.

going barges, and fleet of lighters, supplied with timber, iron, bolts, blacksmith's outfit, pile-drivers, derrick, etc., for dock building, also 100 mechanics and skilled laborers and 250 common laborers, will sail from New York late to-morrow afternoon or early Thursday morning direct for Santiago."

General Miles never knew heavier rains. Shafter telegraphed, if rains continued roads would be impassable. There had been "no attempt to enter the harbor by the navy. They should be required to make a determined effort at once." If roads stopped rations, the town would have to be assaulted. José Toral, commander of the forces in Santiago, July 12th wanted a solution that would leave the honor of his troops intact, and Shafter asked the Adjutant-General:

"Will any modification of the recent order be permitted? I have been perfectly satisfied that he can be taken, but if he fights, as we have reason to believe he may, it will be at fearful cost of life; and to stay here with disease threatening may be as great loss from that cause. The suffering of the people who left the town is intense. I can only supply food enough to keep them from starvation, and if blue rains continue I do not know how long I can do that."

The reply was there could be no modification of former orders. General Miles telegraphed July 13th, the Spanish General "offers to surrender Santiago province, force, batteries, munitions of war., etc., all except the men and small arms. Under ordinary circumstances would not advise acceptance, but this is a great concession, and would avoid assaulting intrenching lines with every device for protecting his men and inflicting heavy loss on assaulting lines. The siege may last many weeks, and they have the provisions for two months. There are 20,000 starving people who have fled the city and were not allowed to take any food."

Behind this urgency were 100 cases of yellow fever in the army and the certainty of its rapid increase. The Secretary of War wrote to the Secretary of the Navy requesting him to order the fleet off Santiago to force its way into the bay. The reasons for immediate action were these: "First, the very heavy rains that are falling almost constantly have made the roads nearly impassable and threaten to cut off our supply of provisions for the army in the trenches altogether; second, the rains are making the holding of our lines almost impossible, as the trenches are filled with water; third, the lives of our men are in great danger from yellow fever, which has broken out among our

troops and is spreading rapidly, and, fourth, the character of the works of the enemy is such that to take them by assault would be a terrible sacrifice of life."

General Shafter's position before Santiago after the Spanish fleet was extinguished was dangerous. There can be no doubt of it. The strain upon our small army in fighting through tropical jungles, with insufficient artillery, under the frightful fire from Mauser rifles of range almost equal to field guns, using smokeless powder, so that the messenger of wounds and death seemed to be a killing storm from clear air, had been almost unbearable. The killing and wounding of more than 1,500 men was unexpected, and for that reason made the greater impression, though the percentage of loss was but a fraction of that often suffered on both sides when our national and confederate armies confronted each other. Shafter's illness was distressing, and, his dispatches show, affected his moral as well as physical condition. He hung on with fierce resolution to his job, but gave the impression in the War Office of an uncertain quantity, so that he was admonished daily by inquiries as to his health, that there was the gravest personal solicitude about him, and several times he was pressed as to what should be done if he had to give up. It could not well be told at a distance what percentage of a sick man's petulance and fanciful confidence there was in his asserted betterments in health. His proposal at the close of the hardest fighting to yield five miles of ground seemed like the retreat across the Rappahannock after Chancellorsville, and there was a crispness in the calm phrase in which the Secretary of War cabled that it would be much better to stay where he was. He thought so himself on the Fourth of July. Though George Washington was a paroled prisoner on that date at Fort Necessity, it was when he was a young man, before the consecration of the day. That the navy was not doing what it might to help the siege, when there was no more blockading to do, was an opinion Shafter shared with the country. The slender army had lost in killed, wounded, missing, sick and exhausted, 2,000 men, and the navy two killed and six wounded. The evidence was not easily made to appear of a full performance of duty, though the entrance to the harbor of Santiago was very narrow and strongly fortified, and a Spanish ship had been sunk July 4th to block the way against our battleships. Farragut and Dewey disregarded torpedoes, but the former lost a ship with its crew at Mobile, and the latter had a broad entrance to Manila Bay. The conditions were certainly not the same at New

Orleans, Mobile and Manila, but in those cases the navy was foremost in the fray, and gloriously cleared the path for the army; so it was not unreasonable to feel that the spirit of aggression at Santiago in handling our ships was not according to the most illustrious precedents. General Shafter, however, had been painfully willing to allow the Spanish troops to get away, without insisting upon the "U. S." preliminary insisted upon at Fort Donaldson by U. S. Grant, that of "unconditional surrender," but the President supplied the deficiency, and used the very words, as there were none suitable or stronger. Shafter had been keenly disappointed by the Cubans, who became at last more numerous than valuable when they were fed, armed, clothed, and treated with much consideration, but they were still deficient in every military service but that of scouting, and managed to be in at the coffee and out of the fight. They were not adapted, as Shafter said, to severe fighting. They let Spaniards into Santiago, and did not help to put them out. The fifty thousand Cubans General Miles had regarded as one wing of his grand army when he planned a great campaign, dissolved, except in a small way, when their bodies needed nourishment. However, as General Miles arrived late at Santiago, and did not take command, for he found Shafter able to ride, he managed to retain his early kindness for the Cubans as soldiers. The last and worst blow to Shafter was the dreadful presence and rapid development of the yellow fever, with the "blue rains," the torrents from the skies that threatened the pork and cracker line. It cannot be denied that there was a combination of discouraging circumstances. General Miles, according to his soldierly way, supported the views of Shafter, and gave him wholesome encouragement. Indeed, the arrival of the General at Santiago was as timely as it had been carefully and wisely planned. The presence of the military head of the army of the United States meant to the Santiago Spaniards that while they were utterly forsaken, all the forces that seventy million people could array were centering there. The arrival of the head of the army was an appeal to the imagination, and the watchmen of the beleaguered city at the signal stations by the sea reported fifty-seven ships, many of them swarming with troops. General José Toral had to say in his explanation that, in his opinion, the garrison could have held the reserve lines against Shafter's army, but there was no hope as against the fresh forces pouring in. And so Santiago surrendered. "All is well that ends well."





CHAPTER XXI.

The Lesson for the Country of the Hills of Santiago.

Value of the Reports of the Inspector-General—His Keen Suggestions and Brilliant Sketches with Expert Information—Tribute of Breckenridge to Shafter—The Volunteers in Camps—Chickamauga as an Illustration—The Location of the Wrongs that the Soldiers Suffered Unduly—We Must Build Regiments as We do Battleships—The Fault of Poor Preparation not Personal—Let Congress for the Country Mend it.

There is extraordinary value, professional and literary, in the official papers of Major General of Volunteers, Inspector General J. C. Breckenridge. His military intelligence is constantly manifested in what he says, and his vigor of expression presents information clear-cut and in a strong light, the outlines sharp, the color vivid. He said of the earliest military expedition out of this country, that to Santiago, that it was composed of "the flower of the American army"—and writing as it was getting under way, he said:

"Despite the newspaper freedom of assertion, its purpose is said to be definitely known to but few, but it is doubtless worthy of its high quality. America has no fighting force of equal size, worthy to represent her, if this is not. Every general and line officer has come up through the different grades in her military service, and is as ripe as any we have for their respective commands; and many of the staff officers have had broad experience perhaps even in their present particular positions. The adaptability of Americans is illustrated by the admirable work being done by many officers outside their own legitimate field. Officers of the line are doing every kind of staff duty in a manner it is impossible to too highly appreciate. The elasticity and adventurousness of youthful vigor may occasionally be somewhat lacking, and the siege artillery material may lack preliminary adjustment and practice in expeditions seaward, or even in the ordinary experience in the practical maneuvers of large bodies of men, and under a questionable policy is particularly deficient in military transportations. An immobile army is ridiculous.



CRUSHING MILL, ON A SUGAR PLANTATION IN CUBA.



VALLEY OF THE YUMURI RIVER, CUBA.

"Many foreign countries are also studying every detail and the varying phases of this expedition with most critical care, for few are exempt from similar possibilities. The Fifth Corps is not alone in need of all the benefits that can be gleaned from such experience; the whole army should derive full advantage from it. The difficulties have been immense, and have been overcome with remarkable energy. Only the ultimate result can fully approve how well or how ill every possible contingency has been provided for and met. The careful, painstaking preparation and study of every detail of the problem to be met, and the persistent exertion to fully meet it to the utmost limit of the powers of a great department of the government, and with the combined provision and united effort of every bureau, which was so admirably illustrated in the naval expedition to the Philippines, is, of course, also to be expected in this."

One of the lessons of the war of the sections and states was sharply applied by General Breckenridge to this:

"It is believed that special attention should be called to the general absence of intrenching tools as a regular part of the equipment of the troops. Hardly any intrenching tools, save the usual small number of picks and shovels for public purposes, accompany this expedition; though this nation, in the war of the rebellion, brought the use of hasty intrenchments into such prominence as to materially affect the tactics and strategy of its armies. If the use of the bayonet or other makeshifts for this purpose was formerly inadequate, it is no longer so. The modern shelter trench for skirmishers is normally $2\frac{1}{2}$ feet in thickness, for protection against the penetration of modern small arms, and this would seem to require the use of a tool specially adapted for the purpose required. So patent has this need become that one young company commander is said to have purchased masons' trowels at Tampa, for the use of his company in Cuba."

In regard to the volunteers, General Breckenridge refers to their "zeal, rare intelligence and adaptability and the having of many of them in some of the more excellent schools of the National Guard," and remarks that these qualities are evident all along the line, and that "every advantage should be taken of all the military instruction which our military system affords, and perhaps full use is not being made of the graduates of our hundred of military colleges, nor of the army itself as a training school for young officers. Doubtless we could promptly commission several hundred bright young citi-

zens in our regular regiments, and put them into thorough training immediately, and so release and utilize more of the superbly trained regular officers, and have them serve with, and perhaps command, volunteer regiments and brigades—men of the age of Sheridan and Custer when they won their fame—and we could attract many more graduates of our military colleges into places of command; so the whole situation might be benefited and much less discomfort be felt and quicker efficiency for battle be attained. Already there is progress everywhere. The work is devolving upon the better officers, and a general insight as to how and when it is to be done and the best way to do it is spreading rapidly.”

This was especially applicable to the first stage of preparation in the camps, and meant for the encouragement of those bearing the burdens of those preliminaries. The General struck a common experience in this state of things at Chickamauga Park in May: “The worst from some States are better equipped than the best from others, and they are apt to know how to continue to get things. The struggle and delay in supplies is still apparent, and the more inexperienced suffer.” In one division were two regiments without arms, and “some other regiments have none for 30 to 40 per cent of men, and guards walk posts with wands. Many rifles, especially older models, even if not already unserviceable, can hardly be expected to last through a campaign. An issuing arsenal and repair shop seem needed.”

On the way to Tampa the General wrote that “brigade and division commanders, rather under than over 45 (alert, vigorous, and experienced, but not stale), are especially needed for instruction and leading an improvised army to promptly and successfully meet the requirements of the modern battle lines, and well-instructed staff officers for these subordinate commands, even if not so young, are also needed. There are almost none with the brigades.”

General Breckenridge urged striking Spain a blow at home in order to make an impression on her where she lives, “and if possible the solar plexus blow, now that the pace is set.” July 25th the General wrote: “Daiquiri having been selected, the landing could not have been effected with less loss, and the movements of the troops thereafter were merely limited by the speed with which supplies could be gotten from the vessels, even with the advantage of Siboney also, both of which were little more than indentations on an open coast without landing facilities. And it was seldom, indeed, that the supplies were brought up to the fighting lines in any great excess of their

immediate needs, and the entire absence of the usual comforts and conveniences of even the simplest army life during the whole of this expedition, and sometimes medical essentials, even in the hour of utmost need, was one of the most marked features of the landing."

In a few sentences the General gives the story of the fighting on land for Santiago:

"The remarkable marksmanship of our trained soldiers was hardly more exploited than the gross ignorance of our recruits. The books say that it ought not to be possible to successfully assault in front unshaken, still more, well-fortified infantry, under modern conditions. But in this instance dismounted cavalry, as well as its confrere of the infantry arm, did, without bayonets, successfully assault infantry posted on commanding ground, behind water, well intrenched, valiant and unshaken, and the severity of the task is indicated by the list of casualties, as compared with the actual numbers the immediately opposing trenches will hold. And when the fight was over, though successful everywhere, we had no reserves.

"Doubtless, through telegrams and otherwise, there have been sufficient indications of the intense strain in the whole military situation on the field of operations which led to the consultation at the El Poso house on the night of July 2d, and to some of the general officers favoring a retrograde movement during the day or two prior to our intrenchments taking shape and the armistice being agreed upon, which latter remained almost unbroken until the surrender. Probably it is now evident to all that it was far better to stand steadfast, and perhaps quite possible to advance rather than retreat, so near the 4th of July; and certainly we have demonstrated our ability to hold our own. Indeed, the fighting of this army came up to the highest expectations, and accomplished results beyond what it is usual to expect of a force so constituted."

General Breckenridge has been quoted without authority as having given personal encouragement to General Shafter in moments of doubt as to the demands of the hour, and to have been steadily urgent to stand firm until the word could be given to advance, and some of the language quoted above may be taken to refer to his exertions and confirm in part the general statement of his timely tenacity. His accounts of the fighting days contain this reference to the action of Las Guasimas:

"The First and Tenth regiments of regular cavalry (dismounted)

deployed, and charged up the hill in front; the First Volunteer Cavalry deployed upon the other or ridge road from Siboney, which forks at this point with the valley road, and charged in flank on the left, driving the enemy from his position, but not until we had sustained severe losses in both killed and wounded. Our forces pushed on, and at nightfall occupied a line a mile or more in advance of the position occupied by the enemy in the morning. The conduct of the troops, both white and colored, regular and volunteer, was most gallant and soldierly, and General Young's dispositions, plan, and execution were skillful, dashing, and successful."

The soil of the portion of Cuba containing the battlefields, he says, "is rich and supports a luxuriant growth of trees, brush, and vines, making a chaparral rather noticeably thorny and poisonous, that is often impossible to penetrate unaided by the machete. The streams in this vicinity are for the most part readily fordable, except for a few hours immediately after heavy and long-continued rains. The roads become then almost impassable, but dry up very quickly."

The movements of the troops were between the fighting days favored by the moon, and many hours of the night were useful for changes that could not have been possible in darkness. In the preliminaries to the battle of El Caney, "General Ludlow's brigade took up a position west of the village, in order to cut off the retreat of the Spaniards when they should be driven out and attempt to retreat to the city of Santiago. But with soldierly instinct and admirable effect, he closed in upon the defenses of the village, and his white sailor hat became a target for the enemy during the hours he hugged the blockhouses on his flank of the well-defended village."

The artillery was on this occasion served with great effect. The division commander, between one and two, directed the battery "to concentrate its fire upon the stone fort, or blockhouses, situated on the highest point in the village on the northern side, and which was the key point to the village. This fort was built of brick, with walls about a foot thick, about 45 by 35 feet, with semicircular bastions diagonally opposite each other. The practice of the artillery against this was very effective, knocking great holes into the fort and rendering it untenable."

At about 6.30, after the El Caney fight, "General Lawton went forward with his staff to find and definitely locate the position which his troops were to occupy, and continued along the road to within about a mile of the city, when



A GROUP OF SPANISH PRISONERS BEFORE SANTIAGO.



COL. JOHN JACOB ASTOR, OF ASTOR BATTERY FAME, NEAR SPANISH TRENCHES.

he was fired into by the Spanish pickets. He then returned and sent forward a strong patrol of Cubans to find out the condition of affairs. He then reported the matter to corps headquarters and waited until about 2:30 a. m., and not receiving any report from the Cubans, or any further direction from headquarters, he started forward again, and was ordered to take a position on the right."

Nothing was heard from the Cubans after they were directed to do something. General Breckenridge says:

"Firing was kept up during the whole of the 2d of July by both sides, our troops having thrown up hasty intrenchments in many positions the night previous. During the 2d of July there were a great many casualties, resulting not entirely from aimed fire, but from bullets clearing the crest of our intrenchments and going far beyond, striking men as they were coming up to gather into position, or as they were going back and forth, bringing water, caring for the wounded, and so on. Many casualties also resulted from the fire of sharpshooters, stationed in trees with such thick foliage that the sharpshooters could not be seen. It seemed incredible that men should be so reckless as to remain within our lines and continue firing, and it was believed by many that what was reported to be fire from sharpshooters was simply spent bullets that came over the crest of our works. But I and the members of my staff can testify to the fact that, in many places along the road leading up to the center of our lines, the sharp crack of the Mauser rifle could be heard very close to the road; and there were all the usual indications of the near and selected aim against individuals. Scouting parties were sent out from time to time to get hold of these fellows, and a number of them were captured or shot. It was not until a day or two afterwards, however, that they were all cleared out.

"On the morning of the 2d, three batteries of artillery went into action near San Juan, right behind the infantry intrenchments, and about 600 yards from the enemy's intrenchments. Firing black powder, instead of smokeless, they, of course, instantly drew all fire in that vicinity, and being unable to work the guns, were obliged to withdraw. The question as to smokeless powder, intrenchments, and batteries of both light and siege artillery, were matters of the highest moment to the men most nearly exposed to the steady fire from the intrenched lines, so admirably laid out and stoutly defended as in this fight. During the night of the 2d our troops

continued intrenching on a crest from 500 to 1,500 yards distant from the crest occupied by the Spanish intrenchments, and in more cases having higher command. The Spaniards made an attack on the night of the 2d upon our lines, which was repulsed with very little loss to ourselves."

These are remarkable accounts of Spaniards, who not only remained within our lines to do sharp-shooting from tree tops, but ventured upon a night attack. General Breckenridge says the bravery of the Spanish soldier fighting on the defensive is beyond doubt, and the Mauser rifle "an excellent and rapid weapon," while the smokeless cartridge adds to its special efficacy. It is loaded with five cartridges at a time, held in a clip "detached from the belt and placed in the rifle in one motion."

The account General Breckenridge gives of the Cubans is discriminating and judicial, and we quote the words herewith:

"In the beginning the Cuban soldiers were largely used as outposts on our front and flanks. There has been a great deal of discussion among officers of this expedition concerning the Cuban soldiers and the aid they have rendered. They seem to have very little organization or discipline, and they do not, of course, fight in the battle line with our troops.

"Yet in every skirmish or fight where they are present they seem to have a fair proportion of killed and wounded. They were of undoubted assistance in our first landing, and in our scouting our front and flanks. It is not safe, however, to rely upon their fully performing any specific duty, according to our expectation and understanding, unless they are under the constant supervision and direction of one of our own officers, as our methods and views are so different, and misunderstanding or failure so easy."

The General says: "We were told when we entered upon this campaign that it was necessary above all things not to sleep on the ground, and hammocks were recommended to secure this end. Some were seen in the original bales on the transports, and it is doubtful whether the soldiers could have carried hammocks in addition to what they already had to carry. Even such heavy intrenching tools as were on hand were felt to be a burden. The Kahki quickly loses its shape and dandy color, and is not strong enough to withstand thorns. There were many lost packs, and apparently the Cubans and the sick found some comfort from the owners' loss. Bayonets were found useless in this war except to dig with.

"It has certainly been clearly demonstrated that smokeless powder is an

absolute necessity for both small arms and field guns. Often we fought for hours against an invisible enemy who was firing fatally upon us all the time. The volunteers, as soon as the Springfields were fired, at once revealed their position and drew the fire of the enemy, besides hiding the enemy from their view. They found it difficult to contend with an invisible enemy, pouring in an effective fire from a position impossible to determine.

“The Spanish blockhouse is ubiquitous and a more elaborate structure than we had been led to expect. It has the air of an evolution during a course of years for dominating an inimical and insurgent country at every high point and crossroad. It is usually placed upon a commanding position and affords a lookout, the lower part built of stones and earth, and two tiers of fire, and the upper part of wood, the top of the parapet being the top of the stone wall, so that up to the height of the breast there is complete protection against small-arms fire.

“Around the blockhouses and connected with it by intrenchments are sometimes several successive lines of field intrenchments. These intrenchments are very narrow in profile, and instead of earth being thrown to the front it is more often thrown to the rear, to one side, so that the protection in front of the trench is natural solid earth. The soil is of such a nature that it will stand almost vertical in its natural condition, so that the slope of the trench is very slight.

“Such a trench as this is extremely difficult to injure, even in artillery fire, and it is extremely difficult to reach men in the intrenchments, as they are thoroughly protected, even from artillery fire, by crouching. The trenches are usually very short, so that there is not much chance of bringing an enfilading fire upon them.

“The old Springfield seemed a begrimed and suicidal blunderbuss upon the battlefield. Of course it can still administer death to enemies, like the obsolete cannon in the enemy’s trenches did to us, as a pitiful makeshift.

“Among the telling features frequently remarked upon by those present were the conspicuous gallantry of the gray-haired officers (General Hawkins at San Juan and Captain Haskell at the Caney blockhouse), when they led their commands to the final assaults, and the courage and conduct of the colored troops and First United States Volunteers seemed always up to the best. The admiration certain other organizations also elicited from their comrades was noticeable where all were such good soldiers.”

The concluding lines of the report of the battles of Santiago by the Inspector General are personal. General Lawton is referred to as in "every exigency of campaign and battle capable of adequately performing more than was ever assigned to him, though some of the severest military tasks and duties were performed by him. This judgment still stands well established, though the command of a division of regulars and the front and swinging right wing of an invading and assaulting army has been intrusted confidently to his command. The reserve force and quiet self-control with which every step in action was conducted equaled his proverbial energy, endurance, courage, and tenacity."

General Shafter is characterized as of phenomenal force and activity, and, "if permitted me, it seems due that I should bear willing testimony to the remarkable energy, decision, and self-reliance which characterized General Shafter's course during this distinguished military adventure throughout its arduous course to its most honorable conclusion. At every stage of this proceeding General Shafter was the dominant spirit at the scene of action.

"Oppressed with sickness and overweighted with responsibilities and care, he carried the fate of his army to a successful and glorious issue. And any precedent is rare where, amidst such natural obstacles and dangers and limited means and opposing defenses, a more numerous, well disciplined, and gallant force capitulated to invaders who had upon their fighting line a smaller force than that surrendered. The glory of this belongs to General Shafter and his army and the administration sustaining it. And whatever influence was felt from this army toward the driving out and destruction of the Spanish fleet may also go to its credit."

That the volunteers who got to the front at Santiago were of the same sort that have established themselves in the public confidence and the favorable opinion of the masters and leaders of armies, goes without saying. They were, as a rule, under the direction of men who knew something of the business of war, but suffered from inexperience. They were hurried from camps that had not been found particularly healthful, because the sorrows of embarrassing troubles that could not be provided against, were encountered everywhere the men were gathered for the instruction of discipline and the accouterments of army life. They in the flush of enthusiasm chose officers who could not draw requisitions or give the convenient tips for the amelioration of hardships or even the preparation of rations for consumption. The

average thought of the average citizen of the United States was, when Chickamauga Park became a camp for volunteers and regulars too, it was an ideal selection for the schooling into soldiership of an army of the people. It was the battle-ground that in a higher degree than any other—all points included—had illustrated the devoted spirit and desperate endurance of American manhood on the fields smitten under the stress of the grim game of war. There were higher percentages of losses of both sides at Chickamauga; on those terrible and glorious September days, that all then and now living in this country remember so well, and that those born since, here and elsewhere, must know all about if they would comprehend the perseverance of valor, and the capacities of sacrifice, that is in the nerve of the men of the nation, and it seemed that our young men assembled there from the States north and south, whose regiments lost most heavily by the stream that the Creeks called "the river of death" (Chickamauga), would find in the atmosphere an inheritance of the inspiration of heroism.

In the order of recommendations was the presence a few miles to the north of the splendid River Tennessee, and on the spot was the Cherokee Spring, pouring forth an unfailling pure broad stream, that managed with knowledge and energy and guarded with vigilance would water an army greater than that of Xerxes. There was also the mountain air of Georgia, and the farmers' fields and the breezy woods, and great spaces where army corps could be mustered and put through their evolutions.

Even into this paradise of soldiers' schools came plagues of flies and other plagues, and with the Chickamauga River and the Crawfish Spring and wells by the score, each yielding inexhaustible supplies of the better beverage of man, there were bitter complaints of the water as well as of the insects. There was, counting all the circumstances of the crisis, no quick and certain help for these things. They must all be considered in the argument for a real army, not necessarily for a monstrous host, but a sufficient force to prevent the awful expensiveness of the profligate system of accepting challenges to war, or galloping into it, as the unthinking horse goes to battle, headlong, and squandering in a few summer weeks, and then with disappointing results, the substance of the people, the gain of laborious and thrifty years and the lives of the youth just grown up into usefulness.

In those profuse outlays that the zeal of patriotism and the pride of manliness and the gracious sympathies of womanliness call for irresistibly

and without stint, there cannot be full compensation found. Lost time is irrecoverable, and we have put off for the mystical to-morrows those provisions for bad weather that must come to us as to all others, and that the story of every age foreshadows.

If we had been as presciently thoughtful for the army as on behalf of the navy we would not have depended in the days big with destiny in July, 1898, upon the thin lines of indomitable sufferers, who stormed and held the hills beyond Santiago and were a great salvation. If we had been really ready for entrance upon such a campaign, as all other nations of thirty per cent of our ability, with the exception of China, are, we would have sent troop ships with lighters and tugs, laborers, and all the well known wants of such an enterprise and the requirements of life in southern Cuba. We would have had shipped a narrow-gauge railroad, rails, cars, locomotives, engineers, all but conductors, with expert railroad builders to put it down, and our soldiers could have been and would have been supplied with full rations and medicines, their packs delivered on the firing lines with all their shelter tents, blankets, tobacco, and all the other little comforts, the sum of which is so great, and along with these full advanced, swiftly placed, and provided long range and rapid fire guns to sweep away the Spanish blockhouses and score and search the ridges, thickets and ditches with an intolerable flight of iron hail.

But such things cannot be extemporized at Tampa, Camp Alger, Chickamauga, or anywhere else. What artillery might have done may be seen in what one battery did at El Caney. It was only with extreme exertion that the fateful battery that prepared the victory was placed where it wiped away the Spaniards with their smokeless Mausers, that scourged our lines as if with swarms of hornets, flying from invisible nests with stings of death. Our shells smashed their blockhouses, killing the defenders, or the decisive charge could not have been made.

Our Congress, and it is another way of saying our public opinion, seeing our ocean and gulf coasts exposed to modern squadrons, and apprised of the nature and power of the armaments of the great powers abroad, made the navy more than the army a non-partisan and non-sectional matter, and appropriations were, after due discussion, given for battleships, a fact that stands out and shines forth in honor of the States that are far from salt water, or the mountains where the rivers run to the great river, the Father of floods and the greater ocean of the globe. The national American spirit was abroad in

them, and they began in time the magnificent machines of steel, that are fit for ocean service, bearing enormous burdens, endowed with prodigious forces, equipped with thunderbolts as volcanoes are—such marvels of mechanism as the Oregon, her voyages no less renowned than her fights, and her speed sends her where her artillery smashes the foe that stands or flees. Gigantic embodiments like this could not be built and sent booming forward and back, around Cape Horn; from Washington to Florida, and New York to Manila, unless for years the furnaces flamed and the hammers rang.

Now, if Congress will come to the realizing sense that it takes as long to make out of our matchless material of men a battle regiment, as it does to delve in the mines for iron and coal and build a battleship, and construct a navy, we shall no more be grieved over the privations of the camps, as well as the perils of those who form the fire line. When the thunders of hostile guns deliver the messengers of death and immortality in the ranks of our heroes, we shall not again mourn that precious lives were lost, that might have been saved by the aggregate will and wisdom of the people at large, whose government we have and whose army is their own—their flesh and blood, as the navy is bone of their bone. Regular regiments must be enlisted, officered, drilled and altogether uplifted to competency, and live to the straight line and the broad precept of faith and glory of the fathers—as the steel broadsides from which the far-flashing guns send their armor-piercing bolts, and the crackling shells that light the stormy gloom of battle.

There was a great wrong in that our army at Santiago was so small and so poorly furnished when they stood between the nation and humiliation, and it is to be hoped the war has educated us so that we have surely located the fault and seriously mean to find and apply the remedy that experience has once more revealed. Was it the negligence, the indifference, the incompetency, the ruthless selfishness, the ambition that would deal destruction, hoping to harvest lucrative reputation and forward private ends, of the Secretary of War, the Major-General who commanded the army of the United States, the Adjutant-General of the army, the Major-General Commanding at Santiago, or the Adjutant-General or some commissary or quartermaster?

Those who answer yes belittle the great and grave facts. It is due the dignity of the country that the tirade of personalities, in and outside journalism, the screeching demagogues, in and out of public life, the chatter of speculators in unwholesome exciting agitations should cease. There are

before us volumes of reports of investigation, all of which must be useful, and yet all could have been spared, but for the fact that there was a popular demand for fair and full information as to the grievances of all who had stepped forward to serve the country whether they reached the fire line or not.

The "clamor for investigation" was one of the forms of the appearance of public opinion that the records of the war demanded "army reform." Unquestionably that is true judgment, and the concrete mass of it, hammered down to a solid proposition, is that the regular army should be enlarged, and that the improvements of recent years having such excellent and admirable results in the army already, shall be extended and continued.

Concerning the innumerable incidents of a disagreeable, distressing and exasperating nature that have aroused indignation, and provoked unseemly differences and recriminations, there is to say that the Santiago expedition was, with the exception of the invasion of Mexico, the first ever undertaken by our military organizations in a tropical country, and that Vera Cruz was not so distant or difficult a point to disembark and meet the enemy as Santiago. More than this, the pressure of time was not so acute in Mexico as in Cuba, nor was the race with the yellow fever so close.

It was not the Spaniards in front that shook the fortitude of General Shafter, but the precarious nature of the landing. He realized the peril of bad weather in the obliteration of inadequate roads, the exhaustion of those who were handling the supplies, the certainty that the army would melt away if a regular siege was attempted; that it was unable to dig trenches, stewed in the heat by day, or soaked by rains and chilled at night. Sleeping on the ground because the hammocks could not be carried, the soldiers knew that they were being saturated with poison. Unable to charge through the sultry air and thorny thickets upon the Spanish intrenchments and entanglements, bearing packs and tools, blankets and tents, for the ways were steep and the heat horrible, our boys stripped for the fighting, and were nearly naked, and yet must sleep in the mud. It was hard to say which was the worst trial—the burning sun or the pouring rain by day, or the chill earth and the heavy dew by night.

It is no wonder the Commanding General, himself ill, viewed with dismay the prospect of the total failure of the wretched roads, and thought seriously of falling back, or letting the Spaniards go on easy terms.

The surroundings justified apprehension, and the wires at Washington

sent only firm words, and spurred fainting resolution, while the country was in a frenzy of wrath that war was a horror and glory so dearly won, that the machinery that made up and moved armies was broken here and there under the stress of unaccustomed emergencies.

The victory was won at last, and the teachings of its costliness will have a value beyond price if there is consent that the truth is true, and the remedy easily in the hands of Congress; and if there is a victim demanded, let the sacrifice be the folly that has found favor with many, that we are not as other people, amenable to the laws of progress and of destiny, and to the domestic and international obligations, to be armed that we may defend ourselves, by taking care that we are ready for war if a foeman seeks us or we have to go beyond the seas to find him, for the field is the world in war for warriors as well as for the preachers of peace. The sword has its missions divine.





CHAPTER XXII.

The Day of Doom for Cervera's Fleet.

The Cape Verde Squadron Smashed, Burned and Sunk and Admiral Sampson Makes a Present of the Wrecks to the Nation—The Reports of the Admiral and Commodore Schley—Their Difference in Opinions, Methods and Manners—Intensely Interesting Extracts from Reports by Captains and Executive Officers—A Series of Startling Pictures—Admiral Cervera's Official Lamentation—Extracts from the Spanish Diary of Uncommon Value—The Story of Fugitives from the Fleet Who Found Their Way to the Spanish Trenches—Admiral Omits to Improve Opportunity of His Life.

Admiral Sampson announced the destruction of Cervera's fleet in the following message:

July 3, 1898.

Secretary of the Navy, Washington:

The fleet under my command offers the nation as a Fourth of July present the whole of Cervera's fleet. It attempted to escape at 9:30 this morning. At 2 the last ship, the Cristobal Colon, had run ashore 75 miles west of Santiago and hauled down her colors. The Infanta Maria Teresa, Oquendo, and Vizcaya were forced ashore, burned, and blown up within 20 miles of Santiago. The Furor and Pluton were destroyed within four miles of the port.

SAMPSON.

The President and Secretary of War responded in these telegrams:


Executive Mansion, Washington, July 4, 1898.

You have the gratitude and congratulation of the whole American people. Convey to noble officers and crews, through whose valor new honors have been added to the American Navy, the grateful thanks and appreciation of the Nation.

WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

Navy Department, Washington, July 4, 1898.

The Secretary of the Navy sends you and every officer and man of your fleet, remembering equally your dead comrade, grateful acknowledgment of




your heroism and skill. All honor to the brave. You have maintained the glory of the American Navy.


JOHN D. LONG.

On the second day of July Admiral Sampson had arranged to meet General Shafter to consult about the coöperation of the army and navy, and was on his flagship New York, four miles east of his usual position, three miles east of the harbor entrance, going on that errand. Commodore Schley, on his flagship Brooklyn, was two miles west of the harbor and the flight of the Spaniards' fleet was his way. Admiral Sampson says the speed of the Spanish vessels was from eight to ten knots as they came out "shrouded in the smoke from their guns," and "turned to the westward in column, increasing their speed to the full power of their engines," firing vigorously upon the blockading vessels. The American crews were at Sunday quarters for inspection and "cheered as they sprang to their guns," those in range opening fire in eight minutes. The Admiral relates that the New York toward the end of the chase made sixteen and one-half knots, but "was not, at any time, within the range of the heavy Spanish ships, and her only part in the firing was to receive the undivided fire from the forts in passing the harbor entrance, and to fire a few shots at one of the destroyers, thought at the moment to be attempting to escape from the Gloucester."

"It was," the Admiral says, "the heavy vessels that speedily overwhelmed and silenced the Spanish fire." The Brooklyn and Texas "had at the start the advantage of position," and "the Brooklyn maintained this lead;" the Oregon, however, "steaming with amazing speed from the commencement of the action, took first place. The skillful handling and gallant fighting of the Gloucester excited the admiration of every one who witnessed it," says Admiral Sampson, and her fire upon the destroyer was "accurate, deadly and of great volume." At 11:15 the Vizcaya was on fire, "turned in shore and was beached at Assenderos, fifteen miles from Santiago, burning fiercely and with her reserves of ammunition on deck already beginning to explode." The Admiral says the rescue of prisoners, including wounded, "from the burning Spanish vessels was the occasion of some of the most daring and gallant conduct of the day. The ships were burning fore and aft, their guns and reserve ammunition were exploding, and it was not known at what moment the fire would reach the main magazines. In addition to this a heavy surf was running just inside of the Spanish ships. But no risk deterred our officers and men until their work of humanity was complete."



REDUCED FROM OFFICIAL DIAGRAM PREPARED BY NAVY DEPARTMENT.



REDUCED FROM OFFICIAL PLAN PREPARED BY NAVY DEPARTMENT.

The Cristobal Colon is called by the Admiral "the best and fastest vessel" of the Spaniards. The Brooklyn and Oregon, overhauling her slowly, opened fire at 12:50 and an Oregon shell struck beyond her, and at 1:20 she, the last survivor of the fleet, hauled down her colors and ran ashore forty-eight miles from Santiago. This fine ship, not injured by shots or fire, was treacherously sunk by the opening and breaking of her sea valves and Sampson says: "When it became evident that she could not be kept afloat, she was pushed by the New York bodily up on the beach, the New York's stem being placed against her for this purpose—the ship being handled by Captain Chadwick with admirable judgment."

It is the opinion of the Admiral that the blockade had been made so "stringent and effective during the night that the enemy was deterred from making the attempt to escape at night, and deliberately elected to make the attempt in daylight. That this was the case I was informed by the commanding officer of the Cristobal Colon."

The special feature of the blockade was the search light, and of it the Admiral says: "To the battleships was assigned the duty, in turn, of lighting the channel. Moving up to the port, at a distance of from one to two miles from the Morro—dependent upon the condition of the atmosphere—they threw a search light beam directly up the channel, and held it steadily there. This lighted up the entire breadth of the channel, for half a mile inside of the entrance, so brilliantly that the movement of small boats could be detected. Why the batteries never opened fire upon the search light ship was always a matter of surprise to me; but they never did. Stationed close to the entrance of the port were three picket launches and, at a little distance farther out, three small picket vessels—usually converted yachts—and, when they were available, one or two of our torpedo boats. With this arrangement there was at least a certainty that nothing could get out of the harbor undetected.

"After the arrival of the army, when the situation forced upon the Spanish admiral a decision, our vigilance increased. The night blockading distance was reduced to two miles for all vessels, and a battleship was placed alongside the search light ship, with her broadside trained upon the channel in readiness to fire the instant a Spanish ship should appear. The commanding officers merit the greatest praise for the perfect manner in which they entered into this plan and put it into execution. The Massachusetts,

which, according to routine, was sent that morning to coal at Guantanamo, like the others had spent weary nights upon this work, and deserved a better fate than to be absent that morning."


On the point of absence that morning the Admiral was naturally sensitive, as he happened to be fated to have placed himself out of the combat on business that was the most important matter on hand until the Spaniards sought to escape. The Admiral only mentions Commodore Schley to say that he did not modify an order that officer issued, giving the Spanish officers their personal effects. Of course it was unpleasant and unfortunate for the Admiral to be out of the combat, but this was not in any sense a fault, and as he had been sharply critical of the Commodore for a miscalculation as to the movements of the Spanish fleet, it would have been handsome to have pleasantly characterized the good fortune of Schley in being so well placed, and as this has been quite visible there has been a strong public feeling that there should be made up to the Commodore anything lacking in the appreciation of his services on the great occasion by his superior in rank—and the frigid temperature of the Admiral toward the officer and ship leading the way in the running fight, is compensated by superheated admiration.

Admiral Sampson's remark on the failure of the fire of the Spanish ships is highly interesting. He says: "Our loss was one man killed and one wounded, both on the Brooklyn. It is difficult to explain this immunity from loss of life or injury to ships in a combat with modern vessels of the best type, but Spanish gunnery is poor at the best, and the superior weight and accuracy of our fire speedily drove the men from their guns and silenced their fire. This is borne out by the statements of prisoners and by observation. The Spanish vessels as they dashed out of the harbor, were covered with the smoke from their own guns, but this speedily diminished in volume and soon almost disappeared. The fire from the rapid-fire batteries of the battleships appears to have been remarkably destructive. An examination of the stranded vessels shows that the Almirante Oquendo especially had suffered terribly from this fire. Her sides are everywhere pierced and her decks were strewn with the charred remains of those who had fallen."


The preparations the Admiral had made for contingencies of the blockade were remarkably thorough. June 7th he ordered: "The weather permitting, three picket launches, detailed from the ships of the squadron each evening,



THE NAVAL HEROES OF SANTIAGO.



WRECK OF "REINA MERCEDES," AND ESTRELLA BATTERY, SANTIAGO.



Shoving damage done to Chan-Loreto by a Spanish shell on July 3, 1898.

FROM OFFICIAL PLAN PREPARED BY NAVY DEPARTMENT.

SCOTT PETERS CO. PHOTO-LITHO., WASHINGTON, D. C.

will occupy positions one mile from the Morro, one to the eastward, one to the westward, and one to the south of the harbor entrance. On a circle drawn with a radius of two miles from the Morro will be stationed three vessels—the Vixen to the westward, from one-half to one mile from the shore, the Suwanee south of Morro, and the Dolphin to the eastward, between one-half mile and one mile from the shore. The remaining vessels will retain the positions already occupied; but they will take especial care to keep within a four-mile circle.

“All vessels may turn their engines whenever desirable, to keep them in readiness for immediate use, and while so doing may turn in a small circle, but without losing proper bearing or distance.

“The signal for an enemy will be two red Very lights fired in rapid succession. If the enemy is a torpedo boat, these two red lights will be followed by a green light.”

In this connection attention was called in the strongest terms to the impatience of the service—closing: “The end to be obtained justifies the risk of torpedo attack, and that risk must be taken. The escape of the Spanish vessels at this juncture would be a serious blow to our prestige and to a speedy end of the war.”

The duties of each ship were minutely defined. Three battleships took turns of two hours each during the dark hours in keeping one search light directly on the harbor entrance. The order of June 8th closes with this admonition:


“Attention is called to bad and careless handling of search lights. Last night some of the lights were kept high in the air, and were again swept rapidly from side to side. Under such circumstances a search light is worse than useless.

“The beams must be directed to the horizon, and must be moved very steadily and slowly. Not less than three minutes should be employed in sweeping through an arc of 90 degrees.

“The best way to discover a torpedo boat is by its smoke, and even this will not be seen unless the light is very well handled.”

Commodore Schley reports: “The concentration of fire of the squadron upon the ships coming out was most furious and terrific, and great damage was done them.”

As to the close of the combat he says: “The Oregon having proved



OFFICIAL PLANS SHOWING APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF HITS AND PROBABLE SIZE OF PROJECTILES.


vastly faster than the other battleships, she and the Brooklyn, together with the Texas and another vessel which proved to be your flagship, continued westward in pursuit of the Colon. This pursuit continued with increasing speed in the Brooklyn, Oregon and other ships, and soon the Brooklyn and Oregon were within long range of the Colon, when the Oregon opened fire with her 13-inch guns, landing a shell close to the Colon. A moment afterwards the Brooklyn opened fire with her 8-inch guns, landing a shell just ahead of her. Several other shells were fired at the Colon, now in range of the Brooklyn's and Oregon's guns. Her commander, seeing all chances of escape cut off, and destruction awaiting his ship, fired a lee gun and struck her flag at 1:15 p. m., and ran ashore at a point some 50 miles west of Santiago harbor. Your flagship was coming up rapidly at the time. I would mention, for your consideration, that the Brooklyn occupied the most westward blockading position, with the Vixen, and, being more directly in the route taken by the Spanish squadron, was exposed for some minutes, possibly ten, to the gun fire of three of the Spanish ships and the west battery, at a range of 1,500 yards from the ships and about 3,000 yards from the batteries, but the vessels of the entire squadron, closing in rapidly, soon diverted this fire and did magnificent work at close range.

"I have never before witnessed such deadly and fatally accurate shooting as was done by the ships of your command as they closed in on the Spanish squadron, and I deem it a high privilege to commend to you, for such action as you may deem proper, the gallantry and dashing courage, the prompt decision, and the skillful handling of their respective vessels of Captain Philip, Captain Evans, Captain Clark, and especially of my chief of staff, Captain Cook, who was directly under my personal observation and whose coolness, promptness, and courage were of the highest order. The dense smoke of the combat shut out from my view the Indiana and the Gloucester, but, as these vessels were closer to your flagship, no doubt their part in the conflict was under your immediate observation. The torpedo boats were destroyed early in the action, but the smoke was so dense in their direction that I cannot say to which vessel or vessels the credit belongs. This, doubtless, was better seen from your flagship."


The one American killed, G. H. Ellis, Chief Yeoman, and the one wounded, J. Burns, fireman, in the engagement, were on the Brooklyn, and the Commodore says: "The marks and scars show that the ship was struck



ADMIRAL CERVERA, WHO COMMANDED THE ILL-FATED SPANISH FLEET AT SANTIAGO.



SIDE OF THE "CRISTOBAL COLON." AFTER THE BATTLE.



about twenty-five times, and she bears in all forty-one scars as the result of her participation in the great victory of your force on July 3, 1898. The speed-cone halyards were shot away, and nearly all the signal halyards. The ensign at the main was so shattered that in hauling it down at the close of the action it fell in pieces.

"I congratulate you most sincerely upon this great victory to the squadron under your command, and I am glad that I had an opportunity to contribute in the least to a victory that seems big enough for all of us."

There is a strong contrast between the reports of the Admiral and the Commodore, that appears most positively in the references the distinguished officers make to each other. There is something that approaches neglect in the observations of Sampson and it is difficult to say whether the repetitions in Schley's remarks as to the excellent views the Admiral had at various times of the combat, have a tone of courteous attention or patronage rather too highly flavored to be pleasant to the taste. The Commodore says that in conversation with Captain Eulate of the *Vizcaya* and Commodore Canheras of the *Colon* he learned the Spanish Admiral's scheme was to concentrate all fire for awhile on the *Brooklyn* and the *Vizcaya* to ram her, in hopes that if they could destroy her the chance of escape would be increased, as it was supposed she was the swiftest ship of our squadron. This explains the heavy fire mentioned and the *Vizcaya's* action in the earlier moments of the engagement. The execution of this purpose was promptly defeated by the fact that all the ships of the squadron advanced into close range and opened an irresistibly furious and terrific fire upon the enemy's squadron as it was coming out of the harbor.

Captain Cook of the *Brooklyn*, adds: "The *Brooklyn* was engaged with the three leading ships of the enemy, which were forging ahead, the *Texas*, *Iowa* and *Indiana* keeping up a heavy fire, but steadily dropping astern. The *Oregon* was keeping up a steady fire and was coming up in the most glorious and gallant style, outstripping all others. It was an inspiring sight to see this battleship, with a large white wave before her, and her smokestacks belching forth continued puffs from her forced draft. We were making fourteen knots at the time, and the *Oregon* came up off our starboard quarter at about 600 yards and maintained her position, though we soon after increased our speed to fifteen knots, and just before the *Colon* surrendered were making nearly sixteen."

Captain Cook adds: "The 8-inch guns worked satisfactorily; some trouble and delay was caused by jamming of locks. The turrets worked well. The 5-inch battery gave great trouble with the elevating gear. At the end several were rendered useless for battle. Two are bulged at the muzzle. This ship should have new elevating gear for 5-inch as soon as practicable. We fired 100 rounds of 8-inch, 473 of 5-inch, 1,200 of 6-pounder, and 200 of 1-pounder ammunition."

Captain Clark of the Oregon says of the firing of the ship: "We soon passed all of our ships except the Brooklyn, bearing the broad pennant of Commodore Schley. At first we only used our main battery, but when it was discovered that the enemy's torpedo boats were following their ships we used our rapid-fire guns, as well as the 6-inch, upon them with telling effect. As we ranged up near the sternmost of their ships she headed for the beach, evidently on fire. We raked her as we passed, pushing on for the next ahead, using our starboard guns as they were brought to bear, and before we had her fairly abeam, she too was making for the beach. The two remaining vessels were now some distance ahead, but our speed had increased to sixteen knots and our fire, added to that of the Brooklyn, soon sent another, the Vizcaya, to the shore in flames. The Brooklyn signaled, 'Oregon, well done.' Only the Cristobal Colon was left, and for a time it seemed as if she might escape; but when we opened with our forward turret guns and the Brooklyn followed she began to edge in toward the coast and her capture or destruction was assured. As she struck the beach her flag came down and the Brooklyn signaled, 'Cease firing,' following it with 'Congratulations for the grand victory, thanks for your splendid assistance.'"

The effect of a shot on the Texas is thus stated by an executive officer:

"A shell of about 6 inches in diameter entered the starboard side above the main deck near top of hammock berthing immediately forward of ash-hoist, angle of entrance being about 20 degrees forward of the beam; shell apparently exploded immediately after passing through the outer plating of hammock berthing, passing into the forward air shaft to forced draft blower, destroying doors of both air shafts and the adjacent bulkheads. Several pieces passed through the doorway of after shaft and penetrated the after bulkhead of the shaft. The mass of shell pieces passed on through bulkhead and casing of starboard smoke box, producing an aperture

therein, irregular in form, measuring about 3 feet vertically, 2 feet fore and aft. The ash hoist machinery was badly damaged."

The effect upon the Texas of her own guns this officer relates: "The steel deck has in several places become separated from the beams through the stretching or breaking of rivets, and there are now leaks in several places.

"The rivets securing the head of midship stanchions to the web of beams of frames 55 and 56 have been sheared off.

"The condition of starboard side of the main deck is attributed partly to the firing of the 12-inch turret guns over the deck during the engagement, as mentioned in my report of June 6, but mainly by similar causes during the battle of yesterday.

"The marked increase in the injuries to the deck may be attributed not only to the repetition of great strains over a surface whose support was already weakened, but to an increase in the charge of powder; i. e., reduced charge previously used to full charge used during this battle.

"I am of opinion that the framing of the deck in this ship is too light to permit the further firing of the 12-inch guns over the decks without serious injury."

The reason given by Admiral Sampson for ordering the Indiana to turn back when the Brooklyn had the Colon well in hand is: "There were still some armed vessels remaining in the harbor of Santiago—at least two, and we did not know then how many more—which could have come out in the absence of the fleet and produced great havoc among the troopships, which were defenseless in the absence of an armed vessel."

Commodore Eaton of the Resolute says of the fire of the Indiana, which he had an excellent opportunity to observe: "As the Vizcaya came out, I distinctly saw one of the Indiana's heaviest shells strike her abaft the funnels, and the explosion of this shell was followed by a burst of flame, which, for the moment, obscured the after part of the Vizcaya.

"The Cristobal Colon, as soon as she was clear of Morro Point, fired her first broadside at the Indiana.

"The Oquendo, in coming out, also fired her first broadside at the Indiana, and I could see some of the Indiana's shells strike the Oquendo as she steamed south.

"Following close astern of the Colon and the Oquendo came the destroyer

Furor, and I distinctly saw her struck by an 8-inch or 13-inch shell from the Indiana, which was followed by an explosion and flames on board of the Furor.

"The Spanish officers who were prisoners from the Colon and the Vizcaya have since told me that the fire from the Indiana and the Oregon as they passed from the harbor was deadly in its destructiveness, and that although the Colon escaped with small injury, due to her greater speed and being in a measure covered by other ships, the Vizcaya was hopelessly crippled before she had gone a mile from the Morro."

The way the Iowa dealt destruction to the Maria Teresa—Admiral Cervera's flagship—is thus related by Captain Evans: "When it was certain that the Maria Teresa would pass ahead of us, the helm was put to starboard, and the starboard broadside delivered at a range of 2,500 yards. The helm was then put to port and the ship headed across the bow of the second ship, and as she drew ahead the helm was again put to starboard and she received in turn the full weight of our starboard broadside at a range of about 1,800 yards. The Iowa was again headed off with the port helm for the third ship, and as she approached the helm was put to starboard until our course was approximately that of the Spanish ship. In this position at a range of 1,400 yards the fire of the entire battery, including rapid-fire guns, was poured into the enemy's ship.

"The fire of the main battery of this ship when the range was below 2,500 yards was most effective and destructive, and after a continuance of this fire for perhaps twenty minutes it was noticed that the Maria Teresa and Oquendo were in flames and headed for the beach."

The ammunition expended by the Iowa was: 12-inch semi-armor-piercing shell, with full charges, 31; 8-inch common shell, with full charges, 35.4-inch cartridges, common shell, 251; 6-pounder cartridges, common shell, 1,056; 1-pounder cartridges, common shell, 100.

Captain Evans says of his crew that they were "magnificent" and "so long as the enemy showed his flag they fought like American seamen; but when the flag came down they were as gentle and tender as American women."

The Gloucester had a special combat with the Spanish torpedo destroyers and the executive officer reports an exchange of fire between automatic guns: "The monotonous reports of an automatic gun could be heard after the 2,500

yard range was passed and the zone of fire could be distinctly traced by a line of splashes describing accurately the length of the ship and gradually approaching it. But at a distance, variously estimated from 10 to 50 yards, the automatic firing suddenly ceased. It was afterwards found to be from a 1-pounder Maxim, and the execution aboard would have been terrible during the few minutes that must have elapsed before the ship was sunk had the fire reached us. Meanwhile the service of our own guns was excellent, and at range of 1,200 yards, the two 6-millimeter automatic Colt rifles opened on the enemy."

When the fight was over there was found "a horrible state of affairs" on the *Furor*. "The vessel was a perfect shambles. As she was on fire and burning rapidly, they took off the living and then rescued all they could find in the water and on the beach. The *Pluton* was among the rocks in the surf and could not be boarded, but her crew had made their way ashore or were adrift on life buoys and wreckage. These were all taken on board. I have since learned that the *New York* passed a number of men in the water who had doubtless jumped overboard from the destroyers to escape our fire. All these were probably drowned.

"While this work was going on several explosions took place on the *Furor*, and presently—at about 11:30—she threw her bows in the air, and turning to port slowly sank in deep water."

The Spanish lieutenants Cabellero and Bustamente commanded the Spanish destroyers, so summarily destroyed, and escaped. Cabellero of the *Pluton* says that when the *Furor* sank "We were making a great deal of water; we continued close to the shore to reach Punta Cabrera, and when we were close to the headland which it forms, we received a 32-centimeter projectile which exploded the forward group of boilers, blowing up the whole deck and cutting off communication between the two ends. She then veered to starboard and struck on the headland, tearing off a great part of the bow. The shock threw her back some distance; then she struck again. I jumped into the water and reached the shore.

"I climbed up on the headland of Punta Cabrera and lay there for about fifteen minutes, during which the fire continued. When it was at an end I went into the mountains and gathered up such personnel of the ship as I met—about 20 or 25—and with them I went around a small hill for the purpose of hiding from the coast and took the road to Santiago de Cuba, avoiding

the roads and seeking the densest thickets and woods. The pilot, on pretext that the road which I was following was not a good one, left us and did not again put in an appearance! We continued walking in an easterly direction—some clothed, others naked, and the rest half clothed—for two hours, resting now and then, and trying to keep close to the coast."

"This troop of fugitives reached the Spanish trenches that night. Bustamente of the *Furor* reported that one of the American projectiles struck one of the hatches of the boiler ventilators, thereby reducing the pressure and consequently the speed of the ship. By this time the projectiles were falling on board in large numbers. One of the shells struck Boatswain Duenas, cutting him in two; one part fell between the tiller ropes, interrupting them momentarily, and it was necessary to take it out in pieces. Another projectile destroyed the engine and the servo-motor, so that the ship could neither proceed nor maneuver. Another had struck the after shell room, exploding and destroying it.

"Our torpedoes had their war heads on and were ready to be used, but we did not launch them because we were never at a convenient distance from the enemy. Under these circumstances the commander of the destroyers, Captain Fernando Villaamil, gave orders to abandon the ship, and I with part of the crew jumped into the water, about three miles from the coast. In the water, one of the men near me, I believe the first boatswain, was struck by a bullet in the head and buried in the water forever. The ship in the meantime, after a horrible series of explosions, went down. When we reached the land, we went in an easterly direction towards Santiago. Shortly after we met Lieutenant Caballero and with him and his men we reached Santiago."


The *Heraldo* of Madrid, August 22d, published the report of Cervera. He says the *Brooklyn* was "on account of her speed the vessel most dreaded" and when the departure was effected "we steered the prearranged course in view of the disadvantages that existed for us, which became evident as soon as the exit had been accomplished. The enemy's fire produced terrible damages on board the *Infanta Maria Teresa*, destroying the elements of defense—among others the net for protection against fire. In this critical moment the captain of the ship, Señor Concas, fell wounded, and it was necessary to withdraw him, I taking command of the vessel, because it was impossible to find the second commandant of the *Maria Teresa*. Immediately afterwards they reported to me that my cabin was burning

in consequence of an explosion. The fire soon became very great and ignited other parts of the ship. I gave orders to my aid to flood the after magazines, but it was impossible. Dense clouds of smoke impeded walking in the passages and practicing any kind of operations. In this situation I could only think of beaching the ship, and did so, running aground on Punta Cabrera. The contest was impossible on our side, and there was nothing more to be done but to save as much as possible. I thought to lower the flag, but that was not possible on account of the fire, which prevented all operations. In these anxious moments two boats came to the aid of the Maria Teresa, into which a number of us jumped. Those that were not dying were saved with nothing.


"The Teresa lowered a small boat; which sank before it could be of any service. Subsequently they succeeded in launching a steam launch, but this also sank after making one voyage to the beach. I succeeded in saving myself with nothing, two sailors helping me, one named Andres Sequeros and the officer D. Angel Cervera, all of us arriving on board the American ship Gloucester naked. At this time we were all naked.

"It remains to communicate to you that our enemies behaved toward us with great chivalry, providing us with good clothes, and suppressing almost entirely the usual hurrahs, to prevent hurting our self-respect. The 3d day of July has been to us a horrible disaster, as I had foreseen. The number of the dead, nevertheless, is less than what I feared. The country has been defended with honor, and the satisfaction of the duty done leaves our conscience tranquil."

According to the purser of the Oquendo, the history of this ill-fated ship was as follows: "The unequal battle became more so when a hostile projectile entered the forward turret, killing the whole personnel, with the exception of one gunner, who was badly wounded. Of the 14-cm. battery 2 guns only remained in action, and these fought with incomparable energy. The after turret was soon without a commanding officer; he had been killed as he opened the door, being almost asphyxiated inside of the turret. There were two fires on board the Oquendo, one in the orlop deck forward, which was soon gotten under control, and the other in the stern, which could not be suppressed, the pumps failing to give water. From the very beginning of the battle the 14-cm. ammunition hoists failed to work. When our commander, Mr. Lazaga, saw that the fire could not be controlled and that all the guns



BOW OF THE "VIZCAYA." AFTER THE SANTIAGO BATTLE.



FORECASTLE OF "OQUENDO," SHOWING SINKING OF SPAR DECK, AFTER EXPLOSION.

were out of action, he prepared to beach the ship, first giving orders to discharge all the torpedoes in order to prevent the enemy from approaching. Driven to the last extreme, and after consulting with all the officers present, he ordered the flag to be hauled down. The second and third commanders and three lieutenants had already been killed, and while Mr. Lazaga was directing the rescue of the crew he gave his own life for his country. The men of the Oquendo witnessed calmly and without becoming terrified, the constant explosions on board, determined above all things that the enemy should not set foot on the ship."


The secret cipher official telegrams of the Spanish premier, Sagasta, the Captain General of Cuba, Blanco, the Minister of the Navy of Spain, and the military commander of Santiago, given in the chapter of this book relating to them, should be read in connection with the extracts from our own official papers, touching the Santiago expeditions and the battles on land and sea. The two collections of the papers that are of absolute sincerity, verity and inwardness, perfect the accounts of the episode that was demonstrative that the fortunes of the war were all against Spain. This was so certain, that it would have been irrational not to surrender. The secret ciphers of the Spanish officers complete the explanation of the almost incredible inferiority of the ships of Spain as against ours. Admiral Cervera was not duped by vanity on this subject and did not condescend to boastfulness, or conceal the truth from those higher than himself in authority, yet he confessed after the annihilation of his squadron that he would not have believed the ships he commanded could have been knocked in pieces so rapidly. The fire of the American fleet was overwhelming—battleships, protected cruisers, gunboats, heavy and light, participating with equal vigor, efficiency and immunity from harm.

The identification of the Spanish ships of war in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba as Admiral Cervera's fleet was reported by Commodore Schley. The War Department was able to inform General Miles, then at Tampa, of it, on the 2nd of June, one month and one day before the day of the doom of the squadron. The movements of the Spanish cruisers and torpedo boats commanded by Cervera, had been managed with such skill to prevent their precise location that they had an extraordinary degree of the public attention and there was the gravest concern that they might be located and that no pains should be spared to put them out of the possibility of action.

The campaign plans in Cuba were disturbed by the existence of Spanish war ships in West India waters. One swift and heavily armed cruiser could sink an army of unprotected transports. The news that the flitting squadron of Spain had become fugitives and taken refuge in Santiago Bay was of the greatest consequence. The next thing was to assemble off Santiago an overwhelming blockading fleet, and this done, the organization was in two squadrons:

First squadron (under the personal command of Admiral Sampson): New York, Iowa, Oregon, New Orleans, Mayflower, Porter.

Second squadron (Commodore Schley): Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas, Marblehead, Vixen.



The order was: "The vessels will blockade Santiago de Cuba closely, keeping about six miles from the Morro in the daytime, and closing in at night, the lighter vessels well in shore. The first squadron will blockade on the east side of the port, and the second squadron on the west side. If the enemy tries to escape, the ships must close and engage as soon as possible, and endeavor to sink his vessels or force them to run ashore in the channel."

One thing that contributed greatly to the success of the blockade was the use of search lights held steadily on the mouth of the harbor. The diagram

annexed was drawn to accompany the order of battle, dated June 2nd, and shows the method of the formation.

The Spanish Office of Naval Intelligence has published the diary of Lieutenant José Muller y Tejeiro, second in command of Naval forces of the province of Santiago de Cuba. We quote the opening passages:

"On the 18th of May the first hostile ships were sighted from the Morro of Santiago de Cuba and the first gunshots were heard, which since that date, for the space of two months, have hardly ceased for a single day.

"On the following day, the 19th, the Spanish fleet, commanded by Rear Admiral Cervera, entered with very little coal, which it was absolutely necessary to replenish.

"From that time on I have kept an exact diary * * * of everything I saw, or that came to my notice, or that passed through my hands in my official capacity, or that I knew to be accurate and trustworthy."

A part of the entry, under the date of July the 4th, has special significance:

"July 4.—Opposite the mouth of the harbor, the New York, Brooklyn, Indiana, Massachusetts, Minneapolis, Vesuvius, 1 yacht, and 17 merchant vessels. At 8 p. m. the cruiser Reina Mercedes started up.

"As the interior of the harbor did no longer have the safeguard of the fleet, as the Bustamente torpedoes (six of them) had been taken up so that the fleet could go out and had not yet been replaced, and as, finally, the first line of mines no longer existed, the commander of marine decided—General Toral also being of his opinion—to sink the Mercedes (the only ship that was suitable for that purpose) in the narrow part of the channel; consequently the commander of the cruiser received orders to do so. Hurriedly, for time was pressing, the wounded and sick from the lost fleet were transferred to the steamer Mejico, which had been converted into a hospital, and hoisted the flag of the Red Cross. Important papers that had been saved, memoranda, portable arms, beds, and the most necessary things, were taken off the Mercedes, and at 8 p. m., with her commander, Ensign Nardiz, a few engineers, the necessary sailors, and Pilots Apolonio Nunez and Miguel Lopez, started toward the entrance, with her bow anchor and stern spring on the cable ready."


The ship was sunk under a heavy fire by the American fleet, but the Spanish diary we quote says: "Unfortunately, the ship did not come to lie across the channel, because it seems a projectile cut the spring on the cable; the sacrifice was useless and the harbor was not obstructed. Yet it was not

entirely useless, since the enemy could not take possession of her, as she is all riddled by bullets which she received that night, and I do not believe she can ever again be used."


One thing that is of the utmost importance and that has escaped critical notice, is the fact that when Admiral Sampson ordered the *Indiana* to turn back to protect our transports, he missed the opportunity of his life. He was alarmed quite unnecessarily by the fancy that there was danger more Spanish war ships would come out and avenge the loss of Cervera's squadron. That was not, after the experiences of the day, possible. The Admiral was right to turn the *Indiana* back from the pursuit, but wrong in not discontinuing the long chase after the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon*, then steadily overhauling the *Colon*. There was no business demand for the Admiral to be a personal spectator of the surrender of the *Colon*, and to hold a reception for the prisoners.

It is plain now, and ought to have been then, that the *Indiana* should have gone in where the Spaniards came out. There were no torpedoes to fear. The batteries were not alarming—would not have been to Farragut or Dewey or Lord Nelson. The torpedoes had not been replaced, the mines no longer existed. Our fleet was not damaged. The *Indiana* and *New York* should have gone at full speed for the open door, signaling the battleships to follow, and the Fourth of July would have seen the harbor and city in possession of the fleet, and the Spanish army's surrender must have been immediate and unconditional. There was a gate of glory open, unseen.





"VIZCAYA," AFTER THE BATTLE, SHOWING RESULTS OF AMERICAN GUNNERS' MARKSMANSHIP.



THE "CRISTOBAL COLON," AS FINALLY ABANDONED.



CHAPTER XXIII.

The Scenes and Significance of the Surrender of Santiago.

The Appearance of General Miles at Santiago—His Moral as well as Military Force—Spanish Obstinacy in the Negotiation for Capitulation—The Iron Hand at Washington—The Practical Question was, How Much Would Victory Cost Us?—The Spanish Case was Hopeless—They Sought to Save their Military Honor—The Scenes and Terms of the Surrender—An Inspector General's Picturesque Story—Telegrams that are Photographs—The President's Proclamation of Principles and Purpose in Cuban Government—Comparative Proportions of Great Surrenders.

It was July 7th that the Major-General commanding the army of the United States left Washington City for the seat of war in Cuba, and with the aid of a fast train to Columbia, South Carolina, and a "special" for Charleston, took the "Yale," having 1,500 troops aboard, and arrived at Santiago on the morning of the 11th, finding Admiral Sampson bombarding the Spaniards at the mouth of the harbor, but not forcing his way in, as Shafter desired. The General was en route four nights and three days.

There had been a good deal of conjecture whether the real intention of the war office in hastening the transit of the head of the army from the national capital to the scene of action, might not to be to supersede Shafter, who was a sick man, sorely perplexed; and within the horizon of the popular observation there were heavy clouds, though the navy of the Spaniards was no longer considered. The purpose of General Miles—his plan presumably—was to assist in the capture of Santiago and press on to Porto Rico, precisely that which he did. Santiago was to him a spectacular episode.

The General commanding the United States army and the Admiral commanding the North Atlantic squadron soon got together. General Miles desired to land troops west of Santiago, and make a diversion in that quarter, the Cubans not getting up in our fashion of fighting. In his note to Sampson, Miles did not take into view that a force comprising the greater part of fifty or sixty thousand Cubans ought to be, according to his original plan,

somewhere in the neighborhood to storm the Spaniards out of Santiago. Shafter had cabled Miles July 4th: "I am delighted to know that you are coming that you may see for yourself the obstacles which this army had to overcome. My only regret is the great number of gallant souls who have given their lives for our country's cause."

A telegram of congratulation sent by General Miles July 3d was read at the head of each of the regiments that had been engaged. Miles told Sampson that he desired the cooperation of the navy in the west end movement, and Sampson cordially acquiesced, offering every assistance of his fleet to cover the debarkation of the troops and also to enfilade the Spanish position with the guns of the ships.

It will be noted that it was the plan of Miles, and not the plan of Shafter, in which Sampson so cordially acquiesced. There was one thing about which the Admiral held positive opinion, and that was, as the Spaniards had done what the gallant Hobson had not, blockaded the mouth of the harbor, he did not mean to risk the sinking of a battleship in attempting a "no thoroughfare." After meeting Sampson, Miles went on shore and communicated with Shafter, who said he had troops enough to hold his position, and Miles gave the orders for the movement on the west.

The next morning, July 12th, Miles rode to Shafter's headquarters, and the news of the arrival of the Major-General commanding was sent the Spanish General, also the fact that large reinforcements had arrived, and that others were on the way, and that Shafter and Miles desired to meet him between the lines at any time agreeable to him. The Spanish General courteously replied that he would see the American generals at 12 o'clock on the following day. On that day Shafter announced "nervousness" in the army on account of the yellow fever, "which is among us certainly, twenty-nine new cases yesterday and probably one hundred and fifty all told."

General Toral had been seen and "a good impression made on him," and Shafter supplemented that information with these words: "I will open on him at twelve noon to-morrow with every gun I have and the assistance of the navy with thirteen-inch shells." The Spanish General agreed to surrender on the basis of being returned to Spain—the proposal including all eastern Cuba. There were about 12,000 Spanish troops in Santiago, and as many at other points. The Spaniards were eagerly urgent to be allowed to have their arms shipped with them.

July 16th the Spaniards surrendered, the main point with them being that they were to go home with their side arms and that they were to take with their military archives, the arms they had so valiantly defended. General Shafter did not seem to think it an essential matter whether the old Spanish guns went to Spain or not, but Secretary Alger insisted that it was not possible to concede that the arms should go. The letter of General Toral notifying Shafter of Blanco's acceptance of the terms that had been definitely agreed upon, was wired to the Adjutant-General of the United States at Washington by the American General commanding in the field, who added: "I have stood the delay, as I believe it will come out all right, and a fight which we can have at any time will cost a lot of men." The letter was as follows:

Santiago, Cuba, 14.

General in Chief of the American Forces.

Honored Sir: His excellency the general in chief of the army of the island of Cuba telegraphs from Havana yesterday at 7 p. m. the following: "Believing that business of such importance as the capitulation of that place should be known and decided upon by the government of His Majesty, I give you notice that I have sent the conditions of your telegram, asking immediate answer, and enabling you also to show this to the general of the American army to see if he will agree to await the answer of the government, which can not be as soon as the time which he has decided, as communication by way of Bermuda is more slow than Key West. In the meanwhile your honor and the general of the American army may agree upon capitulation on the basis of returning to Spain." I have the honor to transmit this to you that in case you may find the foregoing satisfactory he may designate persons representative of himself, who, with those in my name, may agree to the clauses of capitulation upon the basis of return to Spain, accepted already in the beginning by the general in chief of this army. Awaiting a reply, I am,

Very respectfully, your servant,

JOSÉ TORAL,

Commanding, Chief of the Fourth Army Corps.

July 14th, 3:24 p. m., General Miles telegraphed Toral had formally surrendered on the understanding that his troops should be returned to Spain. The General pronounced that this was "very gratifying"—and "General Shafter and the officers and men of this command are entitled to great credit for their sincerity, fortitude, and in overcoming almost insuperable obstacles

which they encountered. A portion of the army has been infected with yellow fever."

Then came to the Santiago army headquarters this important dispatch from the White House:

Executive Mansion,
Washington, July 15, 1898—12:35 p. m.

Major-General Shafter, Camp before Santiago, Cuba:

Have you received the absolute surrender of the enemy? We are awaiting the conditions with impatience. R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War.

Shafter announced that the discussion as to terms lasted until ten o'clock the night of the 14th, and was to be settled on the evening of the 15th at 9:30, and that the great point of the Spaniards was to have their arms "shipped to them." It was not possible for them to fail to complete arrangements. The following telegrams complete the links of the chain of events:

Adjutant-General's Office,
Washington, July 15, 1898—4:45 p. m.

Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este:

Secretary of War suggests, is it not possible that Toral is gaining time to get reinforcements that may be on the way to assist him?

H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

Playa del Este, via Hayti.

(Received at Washington July 15, 1898—9 p. m.)

Adjutant-General United States Army, Washington:

Headquarters near Santiago, Cuba, 15.—I do not believe that Toral is trying to gain time in hopes of getting reinforcements. Cubans have forces in vicinity of all Spanish troops. Toral asked to-day to send messages to Guantanamo and to Palmas to notify Spanish troops of condition. Wheeler, Lawton, and Miley are thoroughly convinced that they are earnest, and they have been in consultation with the Spaniards twenty-four hours. Am told by reliable persons Santiago the Spanish officers are greatly pleased at the thought of going home, but generals are afraid of the consequences with themselves unless terms of surrender are sanctioned by the Madrid government.

SHAFTER, Major-General.

Executive Mansion, Washington, July 15, 1898—5:59 p. m.

Major-General Shafter, Camp near Santiago, Playa:

Is it not possible that you are entertaining the proposition of permitting the Spanish to carry away their arms? Such a suggestion should be rejected

instantly. You have been instructed the terms of surrender acceptable to the President, and they must be concluded on these lines.

R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War.

Playa del Este, via Hayti.

(Received Washington July 15, 1898—11:20 p. m.)

Adjutant-General U. S. Army, Washington:

Headquarters near Santiago, 15.—I do not entertain the proposition for the Spanish to retain their arms. They are to surrender them absolutely immediately after articles of capitulation are signed, but they beg, as an act of consideration to them, that I will intercede with my government that they be shipped with them to Spain. I regard this as a small matter that in no way binds the government, but is one I would not let stand between clearing 20,000 Spanish soldiers out of Cuba, or leaving them there to be captured later, and probably with much loss to ourselves. SHAFTER, Major-General.

The text of the terms agreed upon is as follows:

Terms of the military convention for the capitulation of the Spanish forces occupying the territory which constitutes the division of Santiago de Cuba, and described as follows: All that portion of the island of Cuba east of a line passing through Aserradero, Dos Palmas, Cauto Abajo, Escondida, Tanamo, and Aguidora, said troops being in command of Gen. José Toral, agreed upon by the undersigned commissioners: Brig.-Gen. Don Federico Escario, lieutenant-colonel of staff; Don Ventura Fontan, and, as interpreter, Mr. Robert Mason, of the city of Santiago de Cuba, appointed by General Toral, commanding the Spanish forces on behalf of the kingdom of Spain, and Maj.-Gen. Joseph Wheeler, U. S. V.; Maj.-Gen. H. W. Lawton, U. S. V.; and First Lieut. J. D. Miley, Second Artillery, A. D. C., appointed by General Shafter, commanding the American forces, on behalf of the United States:

1. That all hostilities between American and Spanish forces in this district absolutely and unequivocally cease.

2. That this capitulation includes all the forces and war material in said territory.

3. That the United States agrees with as little delay as possible to transport all the Spanish troops in said district to the kingdom of Spain, the troops being embarked, as far as possible, at the port nearest the garrisons they now occupy.

4. That the officers of the Spanish army be permitted to retain their side arms and both officers and private soldiers their personal property.

5. That the Spanish authorities agree to remove, or assist the American navy in removing, all mines or other obstructions to navigation now in the harbor of Santiago and its mouth.

6. That the commanders of the Spanish forces deliver, without delay, a complete inventory of all arms and munitions of war of the Spanish forces in above-described district to the commander of the American forces; also a roster of said forces now in said district.

7. That the commander of the Spanish forces, in leaving said district, is authorized to carry with him all military archives and records pertaining to the Spanish army now in said district.

8. That all that portion of the Spanish forces known as volunteers, mobilizados, and guerrillas who wish to remain in the island of Cuba are permitted to do so upon condition of delivering up their arms and taking a parole not to bear arms against the United States during the continuance of the present war between Spain and the United States.

9. That the Spanish forces will march out of Santiago de Cuba with honors of war, depositing their arms thereafter at a point mutually agreed upon, to await their disposition by the United States government, it being understood that the United States commissioners will recommend that the Spanish soldier return to Spain with the arms he so bravely defended.

10. That the provisions of the foregoing instrument become operative immediately upon its being signed.

Entered into this 16th day of July, 1898, by the undersigned commissioners, acting under instructions from their respective commanding generals and with the approbation of their respective governments.

JOSEPH WHEELER,

Major-General, United States Volunteers.

H. W. LAWTON,

Major-General, United States Volunteers.

J. D. MILEY,

First Lieutenant, Second Artillery, A. D. C. to General Shafter.

FEDERICO ESCARIO.

VENTURA FONTAN.

ROBERT MASON.

The President sent this eloquent message of congratulation:

Washington, D. C., July 16, 1898.

General Shafter, Commanding, Front near Santiago, Playa:

The President of the United States sends to you and your brave army the profound thanks of the American people for the brilliant achievements at Santiago, resulting in the surrender of the city and all of the Spanish troops and territory under General Toral. Your splendid command has endured not only the hardships and sacrifices incident to campaign and battle, but in stress of heat and weather has triumphed over obstacles which would have overcome men less brave and determined. One and all have displayed the most conspicuous gallantry and earned the gratitude of the nation. The hearts of the people turn with tender sympathy to the sick and wounded. May the Father of Mercies protect and comfort them.

WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

Adjutant-General's Office,

Washington, July 17, 1898—9:55 a. m.

General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba:

Your telegram saying that our flag would be hoisted in Santiago at 9 this morning was received by the President and Secretary of War and members of the Cabinet with a sense of profound satisfaction. This feeling is general with all the people. I hope you are well.

H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

Shafter telegraphed Corbin:

"Upon coming into the city I discovered a perfect entanglement of defenses. Fighting as the Spaniards did the first day, it would have cost 5,000 lives to have taken it."

Major and Inspector-General Reade reported:

"Fighting famine and fever extorted from even such a man as Col. Theodore Roosevelt the statement: 'Twenty-five per cent of my Rough Riders can't carry a pail of water from the creek to the trenches. No man can decry me or my regiments, but we must accede to the next proposition from the enemy.' One characteristic of our soldiers is their unwillingness to go upon the sick report. The regulars do duty when really not fit to perform it, but they do duty all the same. Regiments have a pride in maintaining on paper a small percentage of sick."

General Reade wrote this most interesting account of the raising of the flag of the United States over the Governor's Palace of the ancient capital of Cuba.

It was 9 o'clock in the morning of July 17th. Within a few feet of Generals Shafter, Wheeler and Kent "were three officers wearing Panama hats, dressed in cotton, having narrow stripes of blue and white; their hats had rosettes on the side, and they wore either top boots of black leather or white canvas slippers," and "a fine looking man with a gray moustache was General Toral, who saluted General Shafter like a graceful, dignified soldier."

"Just then Lieutenant Miley, Fifth Artillery, aid-de-camp to General Shafter, dashed to the rear, shouting to an orderly to 'Bring up the sword.' After some delay, a sword, having the belt and slings twisted around the hilt, was handed to General Shafter. It was then by him turned over to General Toral. Our trumpets then sounded, after which, by Captain Brett's order, the hundred cavalry executed left front into line, forming in single rank, on our left, facing some dismounted Spanish infantry soldiers, armed with Mauser rifles. The lines were not fifty yards apart.

"'Present sabers!' by our cavalry was immediately followed by a like compliment by the Spanish. It was then 9:25 o'clock. General Toral shouted out something in Spanish. The Spanish trumpets then sounded a march. We were then told by Mr. A. C. Nunez that the tune was played only for the King of Spain or the Captain-General of Cuba. We were also told that the soldiers facing our cavalry comprised the bodyguard of General Toral. A little later the Spanish infantry forged down the road, eastward, without their rifles, to the point where the Thirteenth Regiment, United States Infantry, received them as prisoners of war. I counted them. Their number was 330.

"As they filed along I wheeled my horse and noted trifling things. They had to step over the vulture-picked carcass of a horse lying in the road. Across the tall Guinea-Panama grass came the warbling trill of a mocking bird, imitating the 'Plant! plant! chut, chut-a-dee!' so familiar to the New England ears. A few hundred feet to the westward, hiding Campo de Marte from sight, the crest was lined with the now empty trenches, from which thousands of guns had belched torrents of lead at the United States lines, after the First Division had assaulted, captured and held Fort San Juan, the principal Spanish stronghold, during the seventeen days of battle and siege, which had cost us, in killed and wounded, nearly 2,000 officers and men.

"All of the Americans were silent for perhaps two or three minutes. After General Toral's surrendered bodyguard had passed us our generals led the way through a gap that had been made in the wire-fence, and we filed out into the road leading to Santiago. In order to get there, distance about two miles, we had to pass through the outlying military suburb called Campo de Marte. It is made up entirely of barracks, military storehouses, and hospitals.

"These latter are very large buildings, and throughout the siege numerous white flags, each having the red cross, sacred to neutrals, had fluttered prominently from the roof of every hospital. No doubt the charge will be made that during the siege our forces did not respect, but fired upon and into the buildings displaying the Geneva flag.

"Thousands of us can testify to two facts: First, that the most damaging battery of artillery of the enemy, one shell from which put eleven men of the Sixteenth United States Infantry out of action, was so located that our return fire imperiled the hospital buildings; second, that the trenches of the enemy were, in part, directly between these hospital buildings and our own trenches, so that the direct return fire of our infantry brought the hospitals, Geneva flags and all, into line.

"Moreover, in the course of our triumphal entry from the field of surrender to Santiago, through Campo de Marte, we noted that the hospitals had trenches about them, close in, and the street barricades of tierces filled with earth; also the barbed-wire entanglements were constructed with evident defensive purposes by the enemy if driven from their outer intrenchments. The structures were carefully scanned to see if their plastered surfaces showed any bullet marks. Few indications were observable of bullet impact or penetration.

"The cavalcade of army officers passed Spanish refugees who were wending their way back into town. Most were afoot. A few carretas, two-wheeled vehicles, drawn by a single mule or Cuban pony in shafts, were passed. Some had as many as ten children huddled in one; only one four-wheeled carriage, a sort of barouche, hauled by a pair of undersized Cuban ponies, contained one or two adults and eight or ten juveniles. The streets are mostly paved and quite narrow, not wide enough for a field battery of artillery.

"Santiago is built upon a siding. Some of the houses were built of brick, then plastered; some were built of adobe, or sun-dried brick, and then plastered; some were mud-and-stick houses. Many had blue fronts. The front

doors were of double or triple layers of wood studded with nails and of great strength. Many resembled a jail entrance, because supplemented with iron doors. Barred windows were common. Nearly every residence showed both door and window gratings, from behind which many women and children peered at us; a few men also peered. Shops were numerous, but the majority were closed on July 17.

"Here and there floated the flag of a foreign consulate. The Spanish flag was not anywhere seen. Soldiers were numerous. At the principal street corners armed sentinels with Mauser rifles were posted. They appeared to be doing police patrol duty. All of the Spanish privates were what we term undersized men. We passed sad-eyed women, scowling-eyed women, and coquettish-eyed women. Many of these latter smiled at the procession of American officers from second-story balconies. As a rule, the women were thin, uncomely, and slatternly; only a few had their hair neatly arranged; less than five per cent wore mantillas; their faces were more wan than handsome.

"Absolutely naked children stood in doorways, on the balconies, in windows, or in the streets. A general paucity existed of decent clothes or necessities. Numerous starveling cats and kittens were visible. On the ground porch of one house a burro was lariatied to the front door. More negroes, I should call them, than Spaniards were seen. Lines of refugee Cubans, carrying bundles, pails, furniture, even trunks, upon their heads were seen. All appeared to be entering the city, none departing. Perhaps they were of the 15,000 non-combatants who fled from Santiago to avoid the perils of the bombardment. A few, a very few, led or drove poor-looking milch cows.

"We were impressed by the marked physical contrast between the undersized, wiry, cotton-clad Spanish soldiers and our men. Nobody braced up, so far as I noticed. I was surprised to see so many well-stocked stores, although the warehouses of the pawnbrokers were more abundantly filled with furniture and other household belongings than any. Santiago has several stores whose shelves display what good judges say are \$10,000 worth of general merchandise on sale. There is a hardware store in Santiago de Cuba carrying a \$20,000 stock of goods. One warehouse had 500,000 pounds of rice in 200-pound sacks. Great quantities of olive oil, mostly in tin cans, are on hand.

"We had heard such touching tales of the general destitution prevailing in

Santiago, as, for instance, that the Spanish soldiers were subsisting on horse meat to avoid starving, that the evidences of sale goods were especially noted. Capt. E. F. Taggart, commissary of subsistence, United States Volunteers, also called my attention to a kind of parched barley put up in metal-lined cans.

"But to resume. Reaching a plaza, the generals dismounted, we of the staff following suit. All in order of rank entered a large building. For a few minutes we wandered about without let or hindrance. This is what I saw: Tiled floors, marble freshly wet. The floors of the halls and the rooms that I visited were not all alike. Some had black and white tiles alternating. Some of the rooms had planked floors. All of the windows had Venetian shutters. All of the rooms were cool. The windows had lambrequins. There were also portieres, and an abundance of chairs—arm-chairs, cane-seated, and cane-backed.

"In the great reception room was a life-sized oil painting, probably of some Spanish Queen. Quantities of bamboo furniture, iron-barred windows, glass chandeliers, crystal pendants of the old style, something like mother's candelabra, marble-topped tables, green-topped tables, irresistibly suggestive of poker, several cheval glasses six feet high outside the frame, and perhaps four feet six inside, were conspicuous. Strolling back, I passed into bedrooms. There were no closed doors. The beds all had canopies. Decorated china toilet sets, eau de quinine, puff boxes, 'Roger Gallet' French soap.

"Servants were engaged in setting a table for ten. It had a floral centerpiece, cut-glass decanters, three sizes of wine-glasses, and the usual china and cutlery appointments of civilization. Later our ranking generals lunched there. An electric push button hung on the wall of the hall."

This is official, and more, a bit of color, and an admirable pencil painting.

A little before noon the generals and their respective staffs massed in the Plaza facing the governor's palace. On the roof of the palace were three officers—Lieutenant Miley held the halyards attached to our national flag. It was about the size of the recruiting or storm flag, only shorter. General Chambers McKibben was with a military band behind, and gave the command "Present arms," and the command was repeated by General Breet just as twelve o'clock chimed out of the cathedral clock—the flag, our flag, was raised to the top of the staff, the band played "The Star-Spangled Banner." Three cheers called for by a soldier were given General Shafter.

The Inspector-General Reade, from whom we have quoted, writes a shocking account of the sick army after its movement when the city surrendered, to get out of the infected camps:

"The change of camping ground demonstrated sadly the enfeebled condition of our men. They straggled along the roads; some fell out and prostrated themselves anywhere where shade could be obtained. Some of General Ames's men, Thirteenth Infantry, completed the march and then dropped unconscious or went crazy. He has a wall tent as his headquarters and for personal occupancy. In that tent he sheltered and cared for several exhausted or delirious privates. He said that during his entire military experience and command, 1861 and succeeding years, he never saw as heavy a percentage of used-up men. Unless more food and a greater variety of food is furnished these soldiers their condition will become pitiable indeed. They also need to be relieved of the necessity of having to travel a mile and a half for a canteen full of water.

"They have no camp kettles; all were left aboard the transports 25th of last month, and have remained at Siboney, twelve miles from here, ever since. Ditto as to extra clothing. They need better shelter than shelter tents. All canvas beyond what could be carried upon the person was ordered left behind when the army of invasion left the transports. That was June 24th and 25th. The tents are still on the vessels, and it is much to be hoped that they will be landed at Santiago, together with other supplies. Major McLaughlin, commanding Sixteenth United States Infantry, says that his men can no longer stomach canned bacon.

"According to the statement, soldiers vomit at the sight of a label having printed on it the name of Libby or Armour. They lived on it during a sea voyage of eighteen days; have lived on it since, and now want some nourishing food that their stomachs can retain. Major McLaughlin says that he would like vinegar and tobacco for his regiment. Regarding vinegar, Colonel Miner, commanding Sixth United States Infantry, says: 'My men drank what vinegar was issued them like hungry wolves.' The officer last named says that what is issued as canned beef is refuse from which all nourishment has been extracted. Dr. Calhoun says that it is not possible for officers to buy pure lime juice at twenty-seven cents per large bottle. He believes that the article sold by the Subsistence Department as such is injurious.

"Asst.-Surg. W. D. McCaw, Medical Department, on duty with the Sixth United States Infantry, reports that symptoms of scurvy are showing themselves in certain fever cases, and asks that issue be made of vinegar, onions, potatoes, tomatoes, etc. Dr. McCaw states that he has not shelter or canvas enough for his sick. Wants cans of beef extract. He predicts that a startling increase in the sick list will occur, due to lack of the essentials, food and rest, and proper clothing. All of the indications sustain this prediction, and the sooner the sick are placed aboard transports, the better."

Such was the sad state of United States troops after the Spaniards, made hopeless by the loss of their fleet and overawed by the arrival of our reinforcements, surrendered.

The exchange of observations between General Shafter and Admiral Sampson put a strain on their courtesies as the siege of Santiago was about to terminate. The Secretary of the Navy cabled Sampson that the Commanding General of the army and the Secretary of War requested "that navy force harbor." The matter was left to the discretion of the Admiral, "except that the United States armored vessels must not be risked.—Long." Sampson cabled that published telegrams of General Shafter reflected on the navy, and added: "I wish the Department and the President to understand that the first requisite to opening harbor of Santiago de Cuba is the occupation of forts and intrenchments at its entrance guarding mine fields, and that the general has never made a move to do this, although before his army landed he stated that such was the primary object of his operations."

The next thing was the capitulation. Sampson, informed of articles about to be agreed upon, wanted the stipulation added that the Spaniards should remove all torpedoes from the harbor entrance and the harbor itself. Miles had Sampson signal that he should send ashore an officer to represent him "during negotiations for evacuation." The use of the word "evacuation" is an indication that Miles did not think unconditional surrender could be exacted. Sampson wished to know when his representative was wanted and where he could get a horse.

The next signal from shore to flagship was that Santiago had been surrendered, and then Shafter signaled, "Hitch in negotiations. We may have to fight them yet." July 10th Shafter telegraphed "Surrendered," and asked whether a navy representative would be sent, and Miles telegraphed that there was "a little delay," but the Spaniards had surrendered "in a formal,

positive manner." A copy of the agreement was sent Sampson, who, quoting the Commanding General's communication, says: "The foregoing certainly shows clearly the most absolute joint action, and I took for granted that we should be joint signatories of any capitulations, as is customary in all services in such circumstances."

The Admiral's representative, Captain Chadwick, "arrived at the front at the earliest hour it was possible for him to do so, and informed General Shafter of my expectancy in the matter, but General Shafter peremptorily refused. The convention had already been signed, and he stated as one reason that nothing had been said of the army in my report of the fleet action of July 3d. There would have been as much reason for mentioning the navy in the report of the land action of July 1st, when assault was made by our army on the Spanish lines.

"No mention was made of the shipping in the capitulations, and Captain Chadwick informed General Shafter that all Spanish ships would be regarded by us as property to be turned over to the navy. He said he would refer such a matter to the Secretary of War, but that, of course, could have no bearing upon what I considered my duty in the matter, particularly in the view of our late experience of Spanish perfidy in regard to injury of ships, which, in my opinion, made it necessary to look after their safety at once. I thus, after the hauling down of the Spanish flag, sent prize crews on board the gunboat Alvarado and to the five merchant steamers in the harbor. An officer of the army was found on board the Alvarado, who stated he had been sent to take charge of her, whereupon I addressed the following letter to General Shafter:

"U. S. Flagship New York, July 17, 1898.

"Sir: Upon sending in an officer to take charge of the captured Spanish gunboat, the Alvarado, it was found that one of your officers was on board, evidently with the expectation of taking charge of her. It should hardly be necessary to remind you that in all joint operations of the character of those which have resulted in the fall of Santiago all floating material is turned over to the navy, as all forts, etc., go to the army. I have been lying within 500 yards of the Morro, from which the Spanish flag was hauled down at 9 o'clock and upon which the United States flag has not yet, at 2 p. m., been hoisted. Although my forces have frequently engaged these forts and yours have not exchanged a shot with them, I await the arrival of a detachment of your

troops to take possession, as they must eventually occupy them. I expect the same consideration.

"I request that you will relieve Lieutenant Caruthers of the duty given him, as I have directed Lieutenant Marble to assume command of the Alvarado. Very respectfully, etc."

"Early on the morning of the 18th I received from the senior naval officer in the harbor a paper sent him, of which the following is a copy:

"Santiago, July 17, 1898.

"Lieutenant Doyle can keep his men on the ships for the night, and in the morning one of the tugs will get up steam and transfer him with his officers and men to their respective ships. C. MCKIBBINS,

"Brigadier-General, Commanding."

The Admiral quoted this, and remarked:

"I will not enter into any expression of surprise at the reception of such a paper.

"No mention of the shipping was made in the articles of capitulation, though I specially requested that it be included by my message to you of July 13th.

"Our operations leading to the fall of Santiago have been joint, so directed by the President and so confirmed by their character. All propriety and usage surrenders the floating material in such cases to the naval force, and I have taken possession of it.

"I am unable to recognize the authority of the Secretary of War over my actions. I have telegraphed to the Secretary of the Navy and await his instructions.

"In the event of a difference of opinion between the departments, the question will, of course, be decided by the President of the United States; until then my prize crews must remain in charge, and I have so directed.

Very respectfully,

W. T. SAMPSON, Rear Admiral U. S. N.

Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station.

Maj.-Gen. W. R. Shafter, U. S. V.,

Commanding Fifth Army Corps."

Shafter's explanation of his refusal to allow a naval officer's signature on the capitulation agreement is this:

"Santiago, August 1, 1898.

"I do not acknowledge the authority of the Secretary of the Navy in the matter in which you wire me. The surrender of Santiago was made to me by General Toral in person, in surrendering verbally all the prisoners and public property of Spain in the district commanded by him, and I accepting the same in the presence of troops representing all the respective armies. The details for carrying this into effect were arranged by three commissioners on each side. These articles were signed by the respective commissioners in duplicate, one copy of handed to General Toral and the other was sent by me to the Secretary of War. Neither General Toral nor myself signed them. Certainly could not and would not permit these articles to any officer for signature, my own not being affixed, and I shall protest to the Secretary of War against your signature to that document. I respectfully invite your attention to the fact that no claim for any credit for the capture of Cervera and his fleet has been made by the army, although it is a fact the Spanish fleet did not leave the harbor until the investment of the city was practically completed, and Cervera had sufficient losses on land on July 1 and 2, notably among them his chief of staff.

W. R. SHAFTER, Major-General."

The President's proclamation of the 18th of July was of a character that gives it permanent interest. It is the foundation of the policy of the government of the United States with respect to Cuba, which is by the treaty of peace with Spain our military possession. President McKinley's declaration is as follows:

"Adjutant-General's Office,

"Washington, July 18, 1898—6:30 p. m.

"General Shafter, Santiago, Cuba:

"The following is sent you for your information and guidance. It will be published in such manner in both English and Spanish as will give it the widest circulation in the territory under your control:

"To the Secretary of War:

"Sir: The capitulation of the Spanish forces in Santiago de Cuba and in the eastern part of the province of Santiago, and the occupation of the territory by the forces of the United States, render it necessary to instruct the military commander of the United States as to the conduct which he is to observe during the military occupation.

"The first effect of the military occupation of the enemy's territory is



SANTIAGO DE CUBA, NORTH HALF AS SEEN FROM THE BAY.



ENTRANCE TO HARBOR AT SANTIAGO DE CUBA. "MERRIMAC" SHOWN IN THE FOREGROUND.

the severance of the former political relations of the inhabitants and the establishment of a new political power. Under this changed condition of things, the inhabitants, so long as they perform their duties, are entitled to security in their persons and property, and in all their private rights and relations. It is my desire that the inhabitants of Cuba should be acquainted with the purpose of the United States to discharge to the fullest extent its obligations in this regard. It will therefore be the duty of the commander of the army of occupation to announce and proclaim in the most public manner that we come, not to make war upon the inhabitants of Cuba, nor upon any party or faction among them, but to protect them in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights. All persons who, either by active aid or by honest submission, coöperate with the United States in its efforts to give effect to this beneficent purpose will receive the reward of its support and protection. Our occupation should be as free from severity as possible.

“Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of person and property, and provide for the punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and in practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion. The judges and the other officials connected with the administration of justice may, if they accept the supremacy of the United States, continue to administer the ordinary law of the land, as between man and man, under the supervision of the American commander-in-chief. The native constabulary will, so far as may be practicable, be preserved. The freedom of the people to pursue their accustomed occupations will be abridged only when it may be necessary to do so.

“While the rule of conduct of the American commander-in-chief will be such as has just been defined, it will be his duty to adopt measures of a different kind, if, unfortunately, the course of the people should render such measures indispensable to the maintenance of law and order. He will then possess the power to replace or expel the native officials in part or altogether, to substitute new courts of his own constitution for those that now exist, or to

create such new or supplementary tribunals as may be necessary. In the exercise of these high powers the commander must be guided by his judgment and his experience and a high sense of justice.

“One of the most important and most practical problems with which it will be necessary to deal is that of the treatment of property and the collection and administration of the revenues. It is conceded that all public funds and securities belonging to the government of the country in its own right, and all arms and supplies and other movable property of such government, may be seized by the military occupant and converted to his own use. The real property of the State he may hold and administer, at the same time enjoying the revenues thereof, but he is not to destroy it save in the case of military necessity. All public means of transportation, such as telegraph lines, cables, railways, and boats belonging to the State may be appropriated to his use, but unless in case of military necessity they are not to be destroyed. All churches and buildings devoted to religious worship and to the arts and sciences, all school houses, are, as far as possible, to be protected, and all destruction or intentional defacement of such places, of historical monuments, or of archives, or of works of science or art, is prohibited, save when required by urgent military necessity.

“Private property, whether belonging to individuals or corporations, is to be respected, and can be confiscated only for cause. Means of transportation, such as telegraph lines and cables, railways and boats, may, although they belong to private individuals or corporations, be seized by the military occupant, but, unless destroyed under military necessity, are not to be retained.

“While it is held to be the right of the conqueror to levy contributions upon the enemy in their seaports, towns, or provinces which may be in his military possession by conquest, and to apply the proceeds to defray the expense of the war, this right is to be exercised within such limitations that it may not savor of confiscation. As the result of military occupation the taxes and duties payable by the inhabitants to the former government become payable to the military occupant, unless he sees fit to substitute for them other rates or modes of contribution to the expenses of the government. The moneys so collected are to be used for the purpose of paying the expenses of government under the military occupation, such as the salaries of the judges and the police, and for the payment of the expenses of the army.

“Private property taken for the use of the army is to be paid for, when possible, in cash at a fair valuation; and when payment in cash is not possible receipts are to be given.


“All ports and places in Cuba which may be in the actual possession of our land and naval forces will be opened to the commerce of all neutral nations, as well as our own, in articles not contraband of war, upon payment of the prescribed rates of duty which may be in force at the time of importation.

“WILLIAM McKINLEY.”

“By order Secretary of War:

“H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.”

The Spanish soldiers surrendered at Santiago by General Toral with the approval of Captain-General Blanco and the Spanish government outnumbered two to one the combined armies of Burgoyne and Cornwallis surrendered at Saratoga and Yorktown, and were a larger force than was engaged on either side in our two wars with England, and forty per cent greater than the armies of Taylor that crossed the Rio Grande and won at Monterey and Buena Vista; and of Scott, the conqueror of the city of Mexico, who unfurled over the “Halls of the Montezumas” the flag that now floats at Havana.





CHAPTER XXIV.

The Joint Work of the Army and Navy at Manila.

The Reasons Why Admiral Dewey Remained After Destroying the Spanish Fleet—Why there Was Not a Slaughter at Manila Like that at Santiago—The Old Fort that Was the Key of the City—The American Army Drove the Spaniards and Dusted the Insurgents Out of the Way—A Very Neat Job—We Did Not Make War on the Spaniards for the Sake of the Tagalos.

We have seen in the official communications by cable between the Secretary of the Navy of the United States and the Commander of the American fleet on the Asiatic station, that before the declaration of war there were forceful and particular preparations to strike a blow at the Spaniards in the East Indies as soon as the war hurricane broke in the West Indies. The great possessions of Spain in Asian waters seemed almost literally at the end of the world, and were little known. The duty confided to Admiral George Dewey was first the protection of American commerce with China and Japan from the Spanish squadron known to be maintained at Manila, and in the channels and harbors of the Philippines, and it was strongly expressed over the wires from Washington to the squadron of U. S. cruisers at anchor in Hongkong harbor that the way to defend our commerce on the other side of the globe, was to destroy the Spanish war ships.

There was extraordinary energy in the Navy Department. Mr. Long, the Secretary, is a man of high attainments and forecasting intellect. He had for Assistant Secretary, Governor Theodore Roosevelt of New York, who was a grizzly-bear killer before he was a Rough Rider; and indeed the strong, keen and brilliant character that was a dominant factor in the administration of the Navy, itself a high school of heroes.

Admiral Dewey was substantially instructed to clear for action and strike the squadron of Spain before the declaration of war. "Fill up with coal—the best to be had," was the first order issued that had the ring of battle



GENERALS MILES AND SHAFER ON BOARD HEADQUARTERS BOAT "SEGURANCA."



TREE UNDER WHICH SURRENDER OF SPANISH FORCES AT SANTIAGO WAS MADE.

thunder in it. Coal is even more essential in providing a war ship for active service, than gunpowder. There is no more inert mass of matter than a battleship without steam. With coal steam can be raised, and the ponderous structure of iron becomes a thing of life that parts the waters with enormous power, and drives through stormy seas, an engine of wrath and violence, crushing whatever floats in its way, but the utmost accurate range of a rifle is half a dozen miles.

"Fill up with coal—the best to be had" is a good phrase, the very thing for a beginning. It was followed up and the Spanish Asiatic fleet in a few days passed away. It will be a welcome task for Americans to tell the story of the glory of the battle of the Bay of Manila, for the gallant Dewey and his captains bold, and sailors and gunners, and all the officers and crews, the Chinese waiters included, who waited on the boys at the flaming guns with ammunition as cheerfully as they served the tables at one time—but we have to recite another story now.

When Admiral Dewey left Hongkong he had no home for his ships nearer than San Francisco. He had no boarding house, no tavern in which he could take his time and his ease. He found himself on the evening of the first of May destroyer of a fleet, the conqueror of a broad bay with heavy batteries still frowning upon him from the shores, a great city held by an army of thirteen thousand men amply armed under his guns, a litter of wrecks where the fleet of his enemies had been, his own command less numerous than the crews of the ships he had annihilated and his ammunition seriously reduced by hours of rapid firing, it being one of the characteristics of war ships that they consume stores of powder, shells and bolts at a rate never in old times thought possible.

What should he do? Run to Singapore and be permitted to take coal enough to move him to the next port and so on home, getting into American waters in two months, leaving a lot of Spanish gunboats known to be hidden about the islands to go out and prey upon our commerce? Or would it be the better way to hold the Bay of Manila, make it a place of shelter for his fleet and a base of operations, implying as the situation did, that we had gained command of a group of islands extensive as New York, Pennsylvania and New Jersey, one of them more spacious than the State of Ohio, the group rich as our Gulf States? The Admiral of course remained, and announcing that he would lay waste the city if again fired on, established a con-

dition that was satisfactory until the re-enforcements, the ships, provisions, coal and fixed ammunition cabled for after the Spanish fleet was removed, arrived.

The alternative to go away and allow the Spanish gunboats to do us a great mischief was not chosen. The Admiral could have proceeded to Singapore and cabled for further orders, but it was cheaper and stronger to stay, hold Cavite, use the insurgents to employ the Spaniards, protect our interests as a nation, and "possess" what his artillery dominated. The Administration did not order him to sail away from islands equal in soil, climate, minerals, fruits and agricultural productions to all the West Indies. The Admiral saw no departure from duty in the service of a Republican government, in a conquest. As for the government of the people by a majority of the heads or hands shown we cannot profess to do that indiscriminately, and never have done so. We depend upon votes, but it is desirable to mix votes with brains before casting them, and to measure the rights of the people by the American standard, and base the qualifications of statehood in an indissoluble union, upon American manhood.

The Admiral had to stay at Manila, and he was glad to stay. He could not in honor get away, either to leave the Spaniards in possession, or to turn over the civilized communities to the insurgents, whose first idea was to avenge in a few months the wrongs that had been endured for centuries. The United States is like the Admiral. It has a duty to preserve order until there appears a people capable of caring for themselves and governing themselves. Those who have that capacity will not begin the redemption of their race by acts of barbarism—neither of robbery, nor brutal destructiveness. The same class of people who were always distressed by more territory, terrified because they were so much superior to others that the country ought to be small and select for their special use and fashioned according to their personal peculiarities, which were not of generous proportions, grieved over Dewey's protection of his own and the national honor.

We have a territorial system that will serve excellently as a colonial system, for the assimilation of elements from regions remote, and we can govern them through our executive and legislative departments with such measure of military force as may be necessary to preserve peace and promote tendencies to civilization. There is no hurry about more states. Indeed it would be a sound conservation to refuse henceforth to organize

territories into states, unless they are so Americanized as to come into our Union so naturally that opposition would be to antagonize ourselves and assail the precedents that are behind our laws and customs.

The President of the United States has sustained Admiral Dewey and honored him at every step, from the first day of the war when they made their acquaintance intimate over the cable, but he reserved one decision until he was able to consult public opinion. That was what we should do with the Philippines when the time came to make the treaty that must follow the war with Spain. All questions were settled in the Protocol but that of the Spanish East Indies. That was absolutely but not expressly referred to the matured judgment of the citizens of the United States and the result was the decision that we should hold the islands. There are but few against the verdict. If there had been a popular vote on it the majority would have been ten millions to keep the prize so gallantly won. Those opposed to raising the objections are, the survivals of the antique ideas of the delightful symmetry of small countries and the delicious refinement of little things, and in addition there are those who think that they can gain something by the vulgarity of figuring on the twenty millions of indemnity to Spain, the expense of three weeks of war; and there is the soft, flabby demagoguery of suffering for the sake of the people we have relieved from the Spanish yoke.

The line that we draw is that we are quite prepared to consent to the government of Cuba by Cubans and of the Philippines by the Filipinos, but we hold they would improve rapidly in the art of government by the experience of liberty under our guidance. We shall not fight them as against self-government, but they must not fall prey to a class of Spaniards inferior to those who fought for Spain, and of Malay chiefs, whose vanity, inflamed by possible prosperity and modified by material aid, is conspicuous with gilt and titles of distinction. We want to find the real people of the islands of Cuba and Luzon, and others, and we have not evidence that Aguinaldo and Gomez are men of the people. They are powerful in letters and proclamations that have the tropical features of literature, so floridly tintured that it needs, to assume a wholesome aspect, to be tinged with the tones and strengthened with the American air of the North Temperate Zone.

We are content that the islanders in question shall have the government that pleases them, as soon as they show that they have a people whose policy has not been that of firebugs, and ravenous seekers of spoil. There

are people in Cuba and Luzon; let them step to the front. Distinction in superstition or accomplishment in assassination are not sufficient to constrain the United States to set up mutual administration and speculation societies of insurgents as a ruling class who shall govern over us as well as the Cubans and the Filipinos. This insufficiency is not held in favor by those who studied the art of government in swamps and the thorny underbrush of the wilderness. Those both in Cuba and Luzon who are threatening us with guerrilla warfare, if we do not submit to their presumption, appear, as the war manifested, to have voracity for the official privileges the Spaniards enjoyed, and would be willing, in consideration of our war of humanity, to aid us in a zealous and lucrative manner to carry on the government of the United States.

The elementary principles of the policy of expansion, are to improve the opportunities that occur for the appropriation of more land for the people, our people—we the people of the United States. George Dewey held the prize he won and William McKinley has sustained him handsomely for the sake of the people, and the people will stand with them while there is land for labor and power for guns.

Admiral Dewey knew General Merritt was coming. He had helped Aguinaldo against the Spaniards, but had ignored or opposed his fantastic pretensions. Then the insurgent chief was pleased to be, in the language of the Admiral, "threatening" toward Americans. The chief is surrounded by a queer assortment of fanatics, some of whom hold that he has a "charm" that makes him proof against bullets and poison, but he has to obtain the consent of certain persons before he can do anything. The great grievance against the Americans by the insurgents was, after the Spaniards surrendered Manila, that they were not allowed to enter the town in triumph and indulge the passions of revenge and looting.

They had been boasting that they could take Manila, but that was not in their power. It was the fleet of the United States in the bay that allowed the insurgents to blockade the city. It was the fleet too, that by drawing the line between the city and Forte Malate, preserving the former and crushing the latter, broke the Spanish line of defense without such loss of life as occurred at Santiago. We were the master of Manila with a loss small compared with the experience of carrying trenches in Cuba, because the navy forced the mouth of the harbor and made an end of the fleet in the bay with-

out harming the city In storming the Spanish lines after the naval bombardment had cleared the entrance by the shore, the American forces were about one-third the Spaniards and Filipinos counted together. With two divisions of our troops engaged, one drove the Spanish and the other held back the insurgents. It was a divided duty and a double job, and an altogether artistic and effective piece of work. This event took place, it will be remembered, after the Protocol negotiated by the French Minister had been signed, but before knowledge of peace had reached the Oriental seat of war.

One of the dangers in sending an American army across the Pacific was that there were loose Spanish gunboats, that might attack transports that were without convoys or effective batteries and crowded with troops. When the peril was realized, there were in several instances rifled cannon mounted on deck and men trained to handle the guns. General Greene prepared the *China* in her voyage out to Manila with rifles that it was believed would stand off a gunboat, and the same provision was made on the boat that carried Major General Otis, who had an artillery company of regulars on board, but the steamers with the soldiers, while staunch in encountering bad weather, were frail vehicles to be extemporized for ships of war. The voyages were according to orders on lines easily followed. This cable will explain the method:

Washington, June 27, 1898.

Dewey (care American consul), Hongkong:

The *Monadnock* sailed June 25 from San Francisco, accompanied by collier *Nero*. Was ordered to proceed at utmost speed safely possible, and stops as short as possible, and to make the best of way to a point 600 nautical miles east true from Cape Engano, and thence to run to the west true until up to Cape Engano. If then she has not received from you a message to the contrary, she will proceed at once to Manila. This enables you to meet the *Monadnock* or to send a message to her within 600 nautical miles of Cape Engano, if you desire to do so. Furthermore, General Merritt's third division of transports will leave about June 27 from San Francisco with about 4,000 men and not convoyed, but he has been advised to make and to sail the 600 knots east and west line as described for the *Monadnock*.

LONG.

The Spaniards were not enterprising, and there was no danger visibly

threatened. Admiral Dewey was kept well advised of the movement of reënforcements. The Secretary of the Navy cabled him June 18th: "Second division of the army expedition, about 3,500 men, in four steamers, sailed from San Francisco [at] noon on June 15. The army estimates they will make average speed 10 knots per hour, and touch two days at Honolulu. Sustained sea speed seems doubtful."

June 25th the Secretary cabled Dewey via Hongkong: "Second army division, Gen. F. V. Greene commanding, left San Francisco to touch at Honolulu and Guam. Estimated to arrive at Guam July 10 and expects to meet convoying vessel from you at Guam. If practicable, send one. If you cannot do, then charter vessel and send naval officer Guam. Inform commanding officer expedition to come to Engano or Manila without convoy. The War Department states Greene would not touch Guam, but now announces he will touch there."

The Secretary of the Navy cabled:

"The Spanish fleet from Cadiz passed Cape Bon, going to the east, June 22, 3 p. m. Expected to go to Manila. Comprise Pelayo, Emperor Carlos V., three torpedo-boat destroyers, three auxiliary armed steamers, and seven transports. In all 15 sail.

"Monterey and the collier sailed [for] Manila from San Diego on June 11. The Monadnock and the collier will follow June 20 if possible. Could not you have a vessel at Hongkong to receive notice concerning Spanish fleet passing Suez?"

June 29th Long wired to Dewey as follows: "The different re-enforcements sent to you are as follows: First army detachment and the Charleston sailed May 21 from San Francisco via Honolulu and Guam. Estimated sea speed, 10 knots. The Monterey sailed June 11 from San Diego, Cal., via Honolulu and Guam, probably estimated sea speed, 10 knots per hour. The Monadnock sailed June 25 from San Francisco for Honolulu and then direct. Estimated sea speed, 6 knots per hour, perhaps more. Third army detachment sailed June 27 from San Francisco; was recommended to go direct. Squadron under Watson, the Iowa and Oregon, the Yankee and the Dixie, the Newark and the Yosemite, and four colliers preparing with all possible dispatch to start for Spanish coast. The Spaniards know this."

Twenty thousand tons of coal were reported to be aboard supply vessels for the war boats announced to Dewey June 27th in these terms:

"Camara's fleet arrived off Port Said June 26, and is reported by our agent there as follows: Pelayo, Carlos V., Audaz, Osada, Proserpina, Patriota, 12 guns, and three unarmed transports, Colon, Covadonga, and San Francisco. They will coal immediately—to be supplied by Cory Brothers, whose agents are Savon Bazui."

There was according to all appearances a serious line of business in this movement, but it evaporated. Dewey's purpose was to evacuate the harbor at Manila if the Spanish fleet, too strong to fight without getting the worst of it, should pass into the China Sea and reach the Babujan Islands north of Luzon. Long's cable to Dewey July 1st is proof of this.

General Merritt, Commander-in-Chief of the Philippine expedition, sailed from San Francisco June 29th and arrived at Cavite, Manila Bay, July 25th. General Thomas M. Anderson was in command of the United States troops up to that time, his headquarters being in Cavite. General F. V. Greene with his brigade was encamped along the bay near the village of Paranague, "about five miles by water and twenty-five miles by the roads from Cavite, and a strip as described by General Merritt, "of sandy land running parallel to the shore of the bay and not far distant from the beach, but owing to the great difficulties of landing supplies, the greater portion of the force had shelter tents only and were suffering many discomforts, the camp being situated in a low, flat place, without shelter from the heat of the tropical sun or adequate protection during the terrific downpours of rain so frequent at this season."

General Merritt was "at once struck by the exemplary spirit of patient, even cheerful, endurance shown by the officers and men under such circumstances, and this feeling of admiration for the manner in which the American soldiers, volunteer and regular alike, accept the necessary hardships of the work they have undertaken to do, has grown and increased with every phase of the difficult and trying campaign which the troops of the Philippine expedition have brought to such a brilliant and successful conclusion."


The General found that the left or north flank of Greene's command "extended to a point on the 'Calle Real,' about 3,200 yards from the outer line of Spanish defenses of the city of Manila. This Spanish line began at the powder magazine, or old Fort San Antonio, within a hundred yards of the beach and just south of the Malate suburb of Manila, and stretched away to the Spanish left in more or less detached works, eastward, through

swamps and rice fields, covering all the avenues of approach to the town and encircling the city completely."

This fact was the key of the defensive position of the Spaniards and their lines were formidable. There were marshes, rice fields and trenches, and mud barricades, and the advance would have to be over open ground, covered completely by the Spanish rifle fire. The position of the Spaniards was stronger than that of Santiago, for here they were well protected and storming columns could not be sheltered in the least, but the old fort by the seaside was not tenable under the fire of the American fleet. As to General Aguinaldo, whose forces had surrounded the city with irregular skirmish lines, and who was publishing proclamations of independence and belief that he was about to capture Manila, he seems to have thought it was General Merritt's object in coming to place the United States army at the disposition of the insurgent Junta. General Merritt says in his official report that at the time of his arrival "the entire edifice of executive and legislative department and subdivision of territory for administrative purposes had been accomplished at least on paper, and the Filipinos held military possession of many points in the islands other than those in the vicinity of Manila.

"As General Aguinaldo did not visit me on my arrival nor offer his services as subordinate military leader, and as my instructions from the President fully contemplated the occupation of the islands by the American land forces, and state that 'the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants,' I did not consider it wise to hold any direct communication with the insurgent leader until I should be in possession of the city of Manila, especially as I would not until then be in position to issue a proclamation and enforce my authority, in the event that his pretensions should clash with my designs.

"For these reasons the preparations for the attack on the city were pressed and military operations conducted without reference to the situation of the insurgent forces. The wisdom of this course was subsequently fully established by the fact that when the troops of my command carried the Spanish intrenchments, extending from the sea to the Pasay road, on the extreme Spanish right, we were under no obligations, by prearranged plans of mutual attack, to turn to the right and clear the front still held by the insurgents, but were able to move forward at once and occupy the city and suburbs."



MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS M. ANDERSON AND STAFF, IN COMMAND OF 1ST DIVISION 8TH ARMY CORPS AT MANILA.



RIFT IN THE JUNGLES THAT LINE THE COAST OF THE PHILIPPINES.



ROADWAY IN BOTANICAL GARDENS, MANILA.




REDUCED FROM OFFICIAL PLAN PREPARED BY WAR DEPARTMENT.

At the part of the defenses of Manila that must be carried to possess the city, the insurgents were gathered in considerable numbers and had imperfectly intrenched themselves, occupying space that they had not the capability of using offensively. Under General Merritt's instructions General Greene, by finesse and crowding, dispossessed the Filipinos from the grounds they could not use with decisive advantage, and advanced the trenches, coming into sharp conflict with the Spaniards, who used at Santiago the Mauser and Remington rifles, the former especially with smokeless powder, and there were no men so brave as not to admit that when under this fire the tingling whirl of the projectiles was "very disagreeable."

The expenditure of cartridges by the Spaniards was a surprise, but the astonishment cleared up when they finally surrendered 22,000 stand of arms and 10,000,000 cartridges. The usual supposition that the Spaniards were on the point of starvation was contradicted by the presence of large quantities of rice. The fatal flaw of the Spanish position, the one that demoralized them so that they were even intimidated by the insurgents, was, that the city was under the guns of the American fleet. If they opened their batteries for the defense of Manila on our fleet, they knew the shells from our heavy ship-guns would fire the town; and they were also aware that our gunners had the range of objects in the city, the walled city in particular, so that they could, as one of them said, "aim at the batteries on the point and hit the Archbishop's palace every shot."

Nothing had escaped the vigilance and studious observation of our naval officers. The commander of each ship had his orders in case the signal to destroy Manila was made, and knew the spot where he was to go, and the angle at which the guns were to be fired and the direction the shells were to take to sweep the streets and smash buildings. There was apparently nothing out of the sight of Admiral Dewey. The Spaniards were guided in their treatment of him by their experience with him. They judged what he would do by what he had done. He had an understanding with them that as long as the ships were not fired upon he would not shell the city, and this was construed during the siege by American troops, to mean that the fighting ashore was exempt from attention by the Lavetta battery and the fleet. This was no secret. Everybody knew all about it, except some of the reporters who interpreted the old peace basis Dewey had established, to mean there was a bargain between the armies that the fighting was to be a sham, and



REDUCED FROM OFFICIAL PLAN PREPARED BY WAR DEPARTMENT.

therefore the fight a fake. The old convention was not disturbed and that was all. The Spaniards fought all they could.

General Greene had entered actively into the work of opening trenches to drive out the Spaniards and found he was losing men in the long range Mauser fire, and that at the same time the troops were harassed exceedingly by the torrents of rain to which they were exposed, and he became impatient for the action of the navy. General Merritt sympathized with him and officers waited upon Admiral Dewey to urge opening fire upon the enemy by the ships of war. The army and navy are sometimes sensitive as to their relative rights and duties, as there is but one man, the President, whose authority to command both is given in the Constitution of the United States itself, and Admiral Dewey was not approached to invite his immediate coöperation in the manner to which he was accustomed. There was no serious disagreement, but a rub, not of flint and steel, but of two edges of steel, slight but distinct. General Greene, one of the old friends of the Admiral, was able to make an adjustment that was satisfactory to all. The leading feature was that the combined action of the army and navy should be defined for the perfection of a giant plan, and meantime, if the position of our troops was endangered, and General Greene burned a blue light as arranged, the fleet should proceed to bombard the town. The emergency did not arrive.

The surrender of Manila was demanded, that the foreign residents and women and children might find places of safety. The Spanish answer was a refusal to submit, but an admission that the non-combatants had no place to go. This was correctly interpreted, that the Spanish officers were aware of their helplessness, but felt that they must make a show of fight in deference to public and official opinion at home. It was the same notion that had possessed the Spanish officers when they were in the act of surrendering Santiago, to be so pathetic in their insistence that they should have their arms shipped with them.


When General Merritt had 8,500 men in position he thought the time had come to strike and had a meeting with the Admiral. The correspondence followed relative to the capitulation of Manila, and a joint note by Merritt and Dewey opened it. Merritt, when the wording of the letter was discussed, proposed to give time to get the non-combatants out of the way of harm, or the city at a given hour be bombarded. This was changed by the Admiral with the cheerful consent of the General to read that "the defenses" of the city



THE ROAD TO THE CEMETERY IN TASSA, PROVINCE OF ILO-ILO.



LANDSCAPE VIEW SHOWING BEAUTY AND LUXURIANCE OF VEGETATION IN THE PHILIPPINES.



REDUCED FROM OFFICIAL PLAN PREPARED BY WAR DEPARTMENT.

would be bombarded. This kept up the truce as to the pacific attitude of the fleet and the city batteries with respect to each other. General Merritt officially says: "The seacoast batteries in defense of Manila are so situated that it is impossible for ships to engage them without firing into the town, and as the bombardment of a city filled with women and children, sick and wounded, and containing a large amount of neutral property, could only be justified as a last resort, it was agreed between Admiral Dewey and myself that an attempt should be made to carry the extreme right of the Spanish line of intrenchments in front of the positions at that time occupied by our troops, which, with its flank on the seashore, was entirely open to the fire of the navy.

"It was not my intention to press the assault at this point, in case the enemy should hold it in strong force, until the navy had made practicable breaches in the works and shaken the troops holding them, which could not be done by the army alone, owing to the absence of siege guns. This is indicated fully in the orders and memorandum of attack hereto appended. It was believed, however, as most desirable, and in accordance with the principles of civilized warfare, that the attempt should be made to drive the enemy out of his entrenchments before resorting to the bombardment of the city.

'About 9 a. m. on that day our fleet steamed forward from Cavite and before 10 a. m. opened a hot and accurate fire of heavy shells and rapid-fire projectiles on the sea flank of the Spanish intrenchments at the powder magazine fort, and at the same time the Utah batteries, in position in our trenches near the 'Calle Real,' began firing with great accuracy.'

At 10:25 a. m. the fleet had done its work, so that when our troops advanced at that hour the fort, which was the key of the city, was found deserted; also the flanking trenches, but the second line of the Spaniards was defended for a few minutes, and among our men killed was the soldier who pulled down the Spanish colors still flying on the fort and raised our own. General Merritt records his "appreciation of the admirable manner in which the orders for attack and the plan of occupation of the city were carried out by the troops exactly as contemplated. I submit that for troops to enter under fire a town covering a wide area, to rapidly deploy and guard all principal points in the extensive suburbs, to keep out the insurgent forces pressing for admission, to quietly disarm an army of Spaniards more than equal in numbers to the American troops, and finally by all this to prevent entirely all rapine, pillage, and disorder, and gain entire and complete possession of a

city of 300,000 people, filled with natives hostile to European interests, and stirred up by the knowledge that their own people were fighting in the outside trenches, was an act which only the law-abiding, temperate, resolute American soldier, well and skillfully handled by his regimental and brigade commanders, could accomplish."

The insurgents were "dusted out of the way," and there was developed among them a good deal of resentment. Three days after the Spaniards had surrendered, the final article of the capitulation being:

"This city, its inhabitants, its churches, and religious worship, its educational establishments, and its private property of all descriptions, are placed under the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the American army." That is to say, on the 16th the President's proclamation directing a suspension of hostilities was cabled.

The casualties in the Army of the United States during the operations before Manila were seventeen enlisted men killed, ten officers and ninety-six enlisted men wounded. The insurgents were much irritated because they were not permitted to be joint occupants of the city. They have continued their false pretenses of ability to capture Manila, but the only thing to say of that is that it would be extremely discreditable to the military spirit of the Spaniards that they, when equal in numbers to the native assailants, allowed themselves to be driven into Manila, holding only the suburbs, but for the facts the Filipinos had been supplied with arms by the Americans and allowed to help themselves at the arsenals of Cavite to cannon and ammunition, and the Spaniards were aware when their fleet was destroyed and our fleet anchored in the bay and reinforcements had arrived, that the Americans were masters of the situation. The Spaniards were disheartened by the fire of the American fleet on the first of May, which was more rapid, certain and crushing than they imagined possible. It was this special dejected condition of the Spaniards and their general weakness on the offensive that caused them to permit the insurgents to press upon them and at last forced surrender.

It was necessary to suppress the Filipinos in their ardent desire to assume the rôle of conquerors at the expense of the Americans, precisely as it has been required by common sense and decent humanity to chill the tropical temper of the alleged Cuban army, since their bombardment of Havana by Key West reports of fake fights was extinguished by the news of the surrender of the Spanish armies and the obliteration of Spanish

fleets by the American army and navy on the shores of Cuba—the Cubans looking on.

General Merritt's proclamation to the people of the Philippines was a document concerning the construction of which the Filipinos were not consulted. The General used this language assuring "the people" of the islands—not alone the army that was of far more considerable force than appeared to represent the Cuban "Nation," when they were excited to do military work—but all the peaceably disposed people, that "so long as they preserve the peace and perform their duties toward the representatives of the United States they will not be disturbed in their persons and property, except in so far as may be found necessary for the good of the service of the United States and the benefit of the people of the Philippines."

Here are the paragraphs of promise in the proclamation:

"The government established among you by the United States is a government of military occupation and for the present it is ordered that the municipal laws, such as affect private rights of persons and property, regulate local institutions and provide for the punishment of crime, shall be considered as continuing in force so far as is compatible with the purposes of military government, and that they be administered through the ordinary tribunals substantially as before occupation, but by officials appointed by the government of occupation.

"The Port of Manila, and all other ports and places in the Philippines which may be in the actual possession of our land and naval forces, will be open, while our military occupation may continue, to the commerce of all neutral nations as well as our own, in articles not contraband of war, and upon payment of the prescribed rates of duty which may be in force at the time of the importation."

There is a likeness between the disturbance of mind of General Aguinaldo at Manila and that of General Garcia at Santiago, a great difference to note in the men. Both Aguinaldo and Garcia wanted to participate as representatives of an independent power in an American triumph. Also they desired to figure in the procession, to participate in the ceremonies, to put their names into the papers as parties to the transaction.

The insurgents wanted at Manila and Santiago, after an almost imperceptible show of themselves in the fields during the sieges, to have a joint occupation. General Garcia expected to be Governor of Santiago, General

Aguinaldo would be dictator at Manila. In the two cities the military supremacy of the United States tolerated no companionship. The Americans had conquered in Cuba and Luzon, and divided authority and responsibility with no pretenders to statesmanship, given to proclamations as in the Philippines; and not even a character heroic as that of Garcia could be made an exception to an imperative and inviolable rule.





CHAPTER XXV.

The Porto Rico Campaign.

The Preliminary Plans and Movements of General Miles—Sharp but Courteous Correspondence with General Shafter, Closing Cuban Experiences—Place of Landing in Porto Rico Changed at Sea—The Progress of the Campaign Ended by the Peace News—The Constant and Conclusive Success of the American Arms—Some of the Cablegrams that Passed that Remain of Historical Interest.

We have been at pains to trace the plans and the movements of the Major General Commanding from the earliest evolutions of campaigns in his mind to the surrender of Santiago, and we have found that he began with the idea of thoroughly preparing a great army of fifty thousand in a mass, to be supported by a Cuban auxiliary force of equal number and reinforcements as might be required. It was in the General's view absolutely necessary to keep the main body of our troops out of Cuba until the rainy season was over and the virulence of the yellow fever had abated. This meant the commencement of decided operations in the late autumn, and it was proposed to strike blows meantime at the Isle of Pines, Porto Rico and the north shore of the east end of Cuba, and also clear the West India seas of Spanish ships so that all salt water would serve for a secure basis of operations. However, it was held to be essential that we should use our regular army of something over twenty thousand effective soldiers as soon as our sea power was established, and press the organization, equipment and advancement of volunteers, so as to push forward and aid whatever enterprises lingered, owing to the lack of numbers of the regular force.

The country could not have tolerated the course of preparations that the Commanding General recommended, and he was overwhelmed by the Administration and the course of events. It was the visible line and logic of the plan of the Commanding General, that while movements of secondary consideration interested the public and harassed and damaged the Spaniards, the grand army, to be commanded by himself, should be in due time landed in the west

end of Cuba, and move under his personal direction upon Havana, after the pestilence and the floods from the skies had abated. As a military mechanism this plan of the Major-General was perfect, and as the country was not prepared for putting in motion great armies within a few weeks, there was no difficulty in presenting for the course of proceedings contemplated a very fair seeming sort of argument, but science had to yield to a sense of exigency and the war was ended before, as General Miles desired to manage it, the real struggle should be made, and Havana was captured by the destruction of Cervera's fleet, and the surrender of armies of Spain, one thousand and ten thousand miles away from the capital of Cuba.

Just when it had been determined to strike Spain in Porto Rico and the insurrectionary end of Cuba, on the north side of the island by preference, the retreat of the fleet of Cervera to the harbor of Santiago forced the dispatch to that city of our regular army and concentrated there our Atlantic fleet with the exception of the vessels necessary to preserve the legal existence of the blockade of the principal ports of the island. General Miles was present at the embarkation of the troops at Tampa and saw plainly what Shafter had already made out as a tendency, that the most important campaign of the war would be when the land forces of the hostile nations first came in conflict, and the Major-General expressed his liking to take personal charge of the enterprise, but it did not seem according to usage or just to deprive Shafter of his assignment when he had been the first officer of his rank on the ground, and General Miles was recalled to Washington as Shafter was sailing, and took in hand the Porto Rico campaign (No. 2) to overrun that wholesome and beautiful island.

He arrived at Santiago in time to make a perceptible impression on the enemy, whose surrender, as rescue was impossible, could soon be exacted by overwhelming forces. The next thing was to hasten the movement of the victorious soldiers who had sickened under the exposure in the infected villages and the horror-haunted camps upon the soil whose rankness made it poisonous. Then General Miles gathered a competent force and sailed for Porto Rico. Commander C. H. Davis, of the U. S. S. *Dixie*, reported to Admiral Sampson, from Guantanamo, Cuba, August 2d, giving information regarding the island of Porto Rico, "gathered by me on my recent visit to the island, partly through intercourse with natives and residents, and partly through personal observation, as follows:

"There are about 7,000 regular Spanish troops on the island. The number of volunteers and irregular troops is indefinite, but those would not count against our invading force, as popular sentiment in the island is overwhelmingly in favor of the United States. The people struck me as being superior intellectually to the Cubans.

"After the occupation of Guanica and Ponce by our navy and army the Spanish forces began to concentrate on San Juan de Porto Rico, the seat of the colonial government. This will be the last stronghold of Spanish authority on the island. It will be difficult to take San Juan by a land investment unsupported by the fleet.

"General Miles' headquarters are now at Ponce. All transports are being collected there and reinforcements, material, and baggage landed as rapidly as possible. The troops which landed at Guanica will march overland to Ponce to join the main army. I understand that General Miles' plan of campaign is an advance in force across the island from Ponce to San Juan and a regular investment of that place. The distance is about 60 miles in a straight line. It must be much more by the windings of the road. The roads are good.

"The natives assured me that General Miles would meet with very little opposition before reaching the vicinity of San Juan. San Juan is the key to the island. It would be the natural policy of the enemy to concentrate for its defense. The Governor-General of Porto Rico has telegraphed Madrid that he cannot hold the colony for Spain unless strongly reinforced, and San Juan is already beginning to suffer for want of food. The people of the country would rise against the Spanish authority if stimulated. The Spanish official class and Spanish sympathizers will take refuge in San Juan, which may be regarded as a purely Spanish city. General Miles cannot hold the island until he takes the city of San Juan de Porto Rico and compels the surrender of the colonial government.

"I am strongly of the opinion that San Juan de Porto Rico could be taken by the fleet under your command and by a coup de main without the assistance of the army and in advance of its approach from the south and the complete conquest of the island of Porto Rico accomplished by this means. The plan would be to send a flag of truce in advance of the fleet with the usual notice of bombardment. The monitors might occupy the western end of the line and engage the batteries on and to the westward of Morro Point. The battleships and cruisers would continue the line from the position of the monitors

easterly nearly to Necambron Point and bombard the city itself and the land defenses and suburbs, and command the road by which alone egress may be had from the city.

“Two or three light-draft vessels mounting 5-inch guns stationed near El Soquoron could sweep and destroy San Antonio bridge and its approaches and command the San Antonio Channel and Isla Grande. The landing force of marines, convoyed by gunboats, could land a mile to the westward of Paloseco and occupy the shore on the west side of the harbor within easy range of the town for field pieces, automatic guns, and small arms, or the marines could be held in reserve to land and garrison the town on its reduction by the fire from the ships, whose volume would, I believe, insure an immediate surrender of the city and with it the possession of the whole island, or would entirely destroy the place.”

There is something very clever and positive about this, but the Navy was not destined to pick up the golden sheaves in the harvest field of glory. Before getting away from Cuba General Miles had this interesting and instructive correspondence with General Shafter.

Headquarters of the Army, Playa del Este, July 17, 1898—7 p. m.

General Shafter:

What is the condition of your command to-day? Sent you report of medical board, with direction for changing camps, etc. If it is thought more advisable to move troops to fresh camps on the foothills or mountain sides, and surgeons advise, act accordingly.

The St. Paul should be unloaded immediately, and every transport unloaded and returned as soon as possible, as they are needed.

MILES, Major-General Commanding.

Siboney, July 17, 1898—8:48 p. m. (Received July 18, 1898.)

General Miles, On Board Yale:

Letters and orders in reference to movement of camp received and will be carried out. None is more anxious than myself to get away from here. It seems, from your orders given me, that you regard my force as a part of your command. Nothing will give me greater pleasure than serving under you, General, and I shall comply with all your requests and directions, but I was told by the Secretary that you were not to supersede me in command here. I

will furnish the information called for as to condition of command to Gilmore, Adjutant-General, Army Headquarters.

SHAFTER, Major-General.

Headquarters of the Army,
Playa del Este, July 18, 1898. (Sent about 11:30 a. m.)

General Shafter:

Telegram received. Have no desire and have carefully avoided any appearance of superseding you. Your command is a part of the United States Army, which I have the honor to command, having been duly assigned thereto, and directed by the President to go wherever I thought my presence required, and give such general directions as I thought best concerning military matters, and especially directed to go to Santiago for a specific purpose. You will also notice that the order of the Secretary of War of July 13 left the matter to my discretion. I should regret that any event should cause you or any part of your command to cease to be a part of mine.

NELSON A. MILES,
Major-General Commanding.

Half an hour later than the date of the above Miles wrote to the Secretary of War, that he thought it "important to go direct to Pt. Fajardo, Cape de San Juan," and he wanted "a strong, fast, sea-going dispatch boat to be sent to Porto Rico," and he also wanted Keifer's Division, from Miami, Florida, "or troops from Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia and Florida," as "a part of the command of Porto Rico." Before leaving Siboney he said in general field orders No. 1 of the Santiago army: "Under drenching storms, intense and prostrating heat, within a fever-afflicted district, with little comfort or rest, either by day or night, they pursued their purpose of finding and conquering the enemy. Many of them, trained in the severe experience of the great war, and in frequent campaigns on the western plains, officers and men alike exhibited a great skill, fortitude, and tenacity, with results which have added a new chapter of glory to their country's history. Even when their own generals in several cases were temporarily disabled, the troops fought on with the same heroic spirit until success was finally achieved.

"In many instances the officers placed themselves in front of their commands, and under their direct and skillful leadership the trained troops of a brave army were driven from the thickets and jungles of an almost inaccessible

country. In the open field the troops stormed intrenched infantry, and carried and captured fortified works with an unsurpassed daring and disregard of death. By gaining commanding ground they made the harbor of Santiago untenable for the Spanish fleet, and practically drove it out to a speedy destruction by the American navy."

The General proceeded to say: "While enduring the hardships and privations of such a campaign, the troops generously shared their scanty food with the 5,000 Cuban patriots in arms and the suffering people who had fled from the besieged city."

It should be stated that if there were five thousand native troops seen by the American forces, the Spaniards did not get sight of that number of them.

The General continued: "With the twenty-four regiments and four batteries, the flower of the United States army, were also three volunteer regiments. These, though unskilled in warfare, yet, inspired with the same spirit, contributed to the victory, suffered hardships, and made sacrifices with the rest."

Instead of going to Pt. Fajardo, Porto Rico, General Miles concluded to land at Guánica. The reason the General assigned for this change, which was a surprise, he states: "As all cablegrams concerning our landing place had passed over foreign cables, and as it was important to deceive the enemy (who, I afterwards learned, were marching to and intrenching the ground we were expected to occupy, at the very time we were taking possession of the southern coast of Porto Rico)."

While at sea, he wrote to Captain Higginson: "Our objective point has been Pt. Fajardo or Cape San Juan, but so much time has occurred since the movement was decided in that direction and such publicity has been given the enterprise, that the enemy has undoubtedly become apprised of our purpose. While it was advisable to make a demonstration near the harbor of San Juan near Pt. Fajardo, or Pt. Figueroa, I am not decided as to the advisability of landing at either of these places, as we may find them well occupied by strong Spanish forces. If we draw them to that vicinity, we might find it judicious to quickly move to Puerto Guánica, where there is a deep water near the shore—four and one half fathoms—and good facilities for landing."

The correspondence of the General makes clear the completeness of his information. The General says in his report to the Secretary of War that he arrived off Guánica near daylight July 25th, and entered the harbor unopposed.

"The guns of the Gloucester, Commander Wainwright commanding, fired several shots at some Spanish troops on shore. The landing of the marines, sailors, and our troops immediately commenced, and after a short skirmish the Spanish troops were driven from the place, and the flag of the United States was raised on the island.

"In this, and in subsequent movements, I was very ably and cordially assisted by the navy, which rendered invaluable aid in disembarking troops and supplies from the transports, using their steam launches to tow the lighters loaded with men and animals from the transports to the shore. Ten lighters were captured at Guánica and seventy at Ponce."

Major-General Wilson arrived July 27th. Commander Davis of the Dixie entered the Port of Ponce on the same day and found it was not fortified. In order to encourage the dissatisfaction with the Spaniards on the island, General Miles issued a proclamation "To the Inhabitants of Porto Rico," stating that our war against Spain was "in the cause of liberty, justice and humanity," and the United States forces "came bearing the banner of freedom," and he closed with this sounding sentence, equal to the Spanish style in sonorous phrase: "This is not a war of devastation, but one to give to all within the control of its military and naval forces the advantages and blessings of enlightened civilization."

The General seems to have hit his audience squarely. Major-General Brooke arrived July 31st. There were several sharp skirmishes on August 8th, 9th and 10th. In the affair of the 9th the Spanish commanding officer and the second in command were killed and one hundred and sixty-seven prisoners taken. There were six engagements during the campaign when at Asomante, on the 12th of August, the artillery of General Wilson's command began shelling the enemy's position preparatory to an advance in front, while a rear attack was to be made by General Ernst's brigade. This command was under arms and ready to move August 13th, when orders were received suspending hostilities.

July 30th General Miles telegraphed from the Port of Ponce of the progress of the Porto Rico campaign: "We have now landed in a perfectly healthy country, well settled, and where, if necessary, a large amount of beef can be obtained, and also transportation.

"Marching across country, rather than under the guns of the fleet, will have in every way a desirable effect upon the inhabitants of this country. At

least four-fifths of the people will hail with great joy the arrival of United States troops, and requests for our national flag to place over public buildings come in from every direction.

"This is a prosperous and beautiful country. The army will soon be in mountain region; weather delightful; troops in best of health and spirits; anticipate no insurmountable obstacles in future results."

July 31st the General telegraphed: "Volunteers are surrendering themselves with arms and ammunition. Four-fifths of the people are overjoyed at the arrival of the army; 2,000 from one place have volunteered to serve with it. They are bringing in transportation, beef cattle, and other needed supplies. The custom house has already yielded \$14,000."

General Miles remarked by wire August 2d: "Abundance of beef, cattle, coffee, sugar, and supplies of that character can be obtained in the country. Request that no more fresh meat be sent, as it cannot be used more than a day from the coast. I also recommend that the manufacture of Springfield rifles, .45-caliber ammunition, all white canvas tentage and black leather equipments of every description be discontinued, as they are obsolete and should not be part of the army equipment."

August 3d General Alger replied: "As you ought to know, the last caliber .45 Springfield rifle was manufactured in ninety-three. Smokeless powder cartridges are now being manufactured and will be forwarded. I suggest that you get along with what the government has on hand."

August 14th General Miles telegraphed from "near Los Morias; notice on map our troops occupy best part of Porto Rico. They were moving in such strong column in concert that nothing could check their progress. They would have occupied the entire island within four days if they had not been stopped by order to suspend hostilities."

One of the difficulties of the war was the scarcity of supplies of pure water, and the vehement demand for it. At last, as the original difficulties had passed away in great measure, there was a gleam of humor in the four brief dispatches appended:

New York, August 26, 1898—12:51 p. m.

Hon. H. C. Corbin, Adjutant-General U. S. A., Washington, D. C.:

Please see that Troops A and C, New York Volunteer Cavalry, about to embark on return voyage from Ponce, are not overcrowded and are supplied with abundance of water.

T. C. PLATT.

THE PORTO RICO CAMPAIGN.

Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, August 26, 1898—11 p. m.
 Hon. T. C. Platt, Manhattan Beach Hotel, Long Island:

Will give instructions that A and C troops are not crowded on return voyage Pray tell me when they took to water?

H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

New York, August 26, 1898—2:25 p. m.
 Henry C. Corbin, Adjutant-General U. S. A., Washington, D. C.:
 Troops A and C, New York Volunteer Cavalry, are coming home from Ponce. Please do not overcrowd, and give them plenty of water.

GILBERT E. JONES.

Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, August 26, 1898—11 p. m.
 Gilbert E. Jones, 222 Madison Avenue, New York City:

I will see that your darling pets are not crowded, but since when did they take to water? H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

This is in another vein:

New York, August 26, 1898—4:33 p. m.
 Adjutant-General Corbin, War Department, Washington, D. C.:
 Please wire Porto Rico to find when schools will be open.

D. BUTTERFIELD.

Corbin replied, Porto Rico cables "School opened August 15th."

Ponce, August 8, 1898—1:50 p. m.

Adjutant-General, Washington:

Replying to General Butterfield's inquiry concerning public schools in Porto Rico, there are 546 public and 38 private. GILMORE.

The schools opened two days after the Stars and Stripes appeared as the sovereign standard of Porto Rico.

General Butterfield was instrumental in sending a large supply of the Stars and Stripes to Porto Rico, and they were gladly received.

Ponce, via Bermuda, August 21, 1898—7:28 p. m.

Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington:

The arrangements for supplying flags through Butterfield and Bakewell, Lafayette Post, satisfactory. The larger of the sizes sent will be acceptable. Please notify them. NELSON A. MILES, Major-General.

Ponce, via Bermuda, August 14, 1898—9:30 p. m.

Secretary of War, Washington:

Messrs. Potter, Van Renssaller, Vanuxem, and Groff arrived on private yacht *May* with load of supplies, which will greatly contribute to the comfort of the troops, and especially the sick and wounded. They also brought a large number of American flags, which have been sent to the different towns and cities, and soon will be waving over the best part of Porto Rico. The action of these patriotic and philanthropic gentlemen, and the National Relief Commission, which they represent, is highly appreciated by a grateful army, while the display of our national colors will give great joy to the people.

NELSON A. MILES, Major-General Commanding.

Ponce, via Bermuda, August 21, 1898—8:05 p. m.

Secretary of War, Washington:

Everything accomplished that could be desired. Only details to be arranged by commission for evacuation of Spanish troops. Some Spanish troops now marching to San Juan preparatory to embarking for Spain. I have 106 guns, mortars, and howitzers, field and siege. I intended to use at San Juan if Spanish had not been captured outside, which our troops were doing. These available if needed elsewhere. Among number are ten light, very powerful dynamite guns. If desirable, any of above, with ammunition and men, can be shipped, via New Orleans and San Francisco, to Manila. I expect very soon to return to Washington. MILES.


General Miles said in concluding his report: "The success of the enterprise was largely due to the skill and good generalship of the officers in command of the different divisions and brigades. Strategy and skillful tactics accomplished what might have occasioned serious loss to achieve in any other way. The loss of the enemy in killed, wounded and captured was nearly ten times our own, which was only 3 killed and 40 wounded. Thus the island of Puerto Rico became a part of the United States. It embraces nearly 3,700 square miles, and has a population of nearly a million souls.

"It is gratifying to record that during the war not a single defeat has been met, and not a prisoner, color, gun or rifle has been captured by the enemy. In this respect the war has been most remarkable, and, perhaps, unparalleled. Under all circumstances and in spite of many most trying

difficulties the troops have maintained the fortitude of the American character and the honor of their arms."

After planning many campaigns it was not the good fortune of General Miles to conduct the one which he commanded to the surrender of the army of opposition. Suddenly there was peace. The "war drums throbbed no longer." It is conceded that when the intelligence that Porto Rico was ceded to us by Spain reached the Commanding General he had played to the winning point a very handsome game of war chess, and had announced checkmate in three moves, though nearly all the pieces were on the board.





UNITED STATES TRANSPORTS IN THE HARBOR OF PONCE, PORTO RICO.



THE CITADEL, AT PONCE, PORTO RICO.



CHAPTER XXVI.

After the Fighting Was Over in Cuba.

The Casualties at Santiago—Haste to Ship the Spaniards to Spain and the Americans North—The Parting of the Armies that Met in Bloody Strife—Shafter's Opinion of Immunes—A Curious Proclamation from Spanish Soldiers—23,726 Spanish Soldiers Surrendered—American Volunteers Begging to be Hurried to the Front While the War Lasted, and When it was Over They Wanted to Go Home.

The fighting in Cuba with the Spaniards was at an end when the surrender of the Spanish army took place. The report of casualties in the United States army in the actions of July 1, 2, and 3 were: killed, 23 officers and 208 enlisted men; wounded, 80 officers and 1,203 men; missing, 81 men; and there was included in a supplementary return 15 additional names, the grand total being, killed, wounded and missing, 1,610. General Miles, before going to Porto Rico, stated in a telegram:

"There is not a single regiment of regulars or volunteers with General Shafter's command that is not infected with yellow fever, from one case in the Eighth Ohio to thirty-six cases in the Thirty-third Michigan. After consulting with best medical authorities, it is my opinion that the best mode of ridding the troops of the fever will be as I have directed, namely, the troops to go up as high into the mountains as possible, selecting fresh camp every day. If this does not check the spread of the disease, the only way of saving a large portion of the command will be to put them on transports and ship them to New England coast."

The sanitary report August 14th at Santiago, telegraphed the Surgeon-General, was: sick, 2,715; fever cases, 1,506; new cases, 129; number of fever cases returned to duty, 226. August 16th General Shafter wired General Corbin reporting taking customs duties, \$20,000 on the day before, and \$19,000 that day, \$80,000 since occupation.

General Shafter reported on Cuban and immune regiments as follows:

"I have asked no questions whatever whether a man was a Cuban or a Spaniard. Most of the officials are Cuban officers, or Cuban born. I hope that in a short time things will quiet down. The whole trouble here is that there is nothing for men to do in the country. It has absolutely returned to its wild state, and has got to be settled and made anew. The attitude of the pronounced Cubans is hostile. They so far show no disposition to disband and go to work, and until they do there will be trouble, for they have got to live, and they will have to live by robbery—there is no other way. A dual government can't exist here; we have got to have full sway of the Cubans. It is sincerely to be hoped that wise counsels will prevail among the Cubans, and, as war is no longer possible to them except with ourselves, that they will resume their peaceful vocations and without delay, but it is hard for those who have been living by violence and without working to resume their former conditions. The immune regiments that have reached here are, I think, among the worst that I have ever seen, being poor material, without discipline, vicious, and degraded. I think it will be necessary to muster them out as soon as danger from disease is over, and replace them with better men."

At Baracoa and Suquade Tonamo there were surrendered 7,756 officers and men, 2,321 stands of arms, 413,000 rounds of ammunition, and five Krupp guns. The Spaniards had not heard then of the destruction of Cervera's fleet, and thought Dewey had been whipped at Manila.

The telegrams following show exertions made to succor the sick and send home the boys no longer needed at the front:

Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, August 18, 1898.

Commanding Officer Twenty-third Kansas Volunteer Infantry, Topeka, Kans.:

Secretary of War directs that you proceed by rail with your regiment, fully armed and equipped, to New York city, in time to reach there next Wednesday, 24th instant, to embark upon a transport to be provided to take your command to Santiago, where, upon arrival, you will report to the commanding general, Department of Santiago, for duty. Communicate with the chief commissary at Omaha, Neb., concerning your travel rations, and with chief quartermaster at the same point for your transportation. Take every precaution for the comfort and convenience of your men, and sufficient stores of all kinds for the journey. Acknowledge receipt, and communicate to this office from time to time progress in execution.

HEISTAND, Assistant Adjutant-General.

Santiago de Cuba, via Haiti, August 19, 1898—1:15 a. m.

Pierson, War Department, Washington:

Tell Secretary Alger I appreciate to the greatest possible extent his responsive and practical sympathy. His suggestions are better than I had asked, and are promptly adopted. If the Clinton is unloaded in time, I will leave here Saturday morning. Will take 40 mules. Fago here. Need two additional wagons and harness for all my mules. Please give me some horse feed from here.

CLARA BARTON.

Camp Wikoff, Montauk Point, N. Y., August 19, 1898—6:30 p. m.

Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington, D. C.:

Many sick on Mobile. Ship is at pier and sick men being taken to hospital in ambulances. The well men will remain aboard until weather clears. We are providing for them. I specially request that Colonel Weston be ordered to-day to be chief commissary here; if not permanently, until organization is perfected. I have arranged to have full benefit of services of Generals Young, Rand, and Williston. They are active and efficient.

JOSEPH WHEELER, Major-General.

Pennsylvania Depot, Jersey City, N. J., August 20, 1898—9:18 a. m.

Adjutant-General Corbin, Washington, D. C.:

Reported arrival of Mobile with 1,600 on board; 300 sick; 2 died on the way. She ought never to have carried over half the number. This is against positive orders, which were to give men plenty of room and crowd no ship. Have to investigate at once. Cable Shafter. Relief here. Order her to Santiago to-morrow. The hospital ship Missouri will sail Monday.

R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War.

Corbin telegraphed Alger:

"Find the Mobile had carrying capacity of 1,000 men and like number of animals. As there were no animals it is not thought that the ship was overcrowded. Have wired General Shafter your instructions that abundant room be given on every transport. Also informed him of the reported bad condition of the Mobile."

Shafter telegraphed:

"Referring to your telegram about overcrowding the Mobile, her captain reported that, loaded as she was, going to Porto Rico he could carry 3,000

men, and that he could carry 2,000 comfortably, therefore did not consider a few less than 1,700 as too many. Ship was carefully inspected by a board of officers, and Dr. Ives, a member of the board, states it was not overcrowded. Accommodations for officers were, however, somewhat deficient. The large number of deaths can probably be accounted for by the fact that this brigade took nearly all their sick with them. Greatest care has been taken in this respect. Transports have been loaded with from 200 to 300 men less than the same ship brought down."

The total number of Spaniards who surrendered in and about Santiago was 23,726. The following very curious Spanish document from the departing Spaniards seems to show a Spanish preference for United States soldiers over Cubans in arms:

Santiago, via Haiti, August 22, 1898—11:17 p. m.

H. C. Corbin, Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington:


The following letter has just been received from the soldiers who are now embarking for Spain:

"To Major-General Shafter, Commanding the American Army in Cuba.—
Sir: The Spanish soldiers who capitulated in this place on the 16th of July last, recognizing your high and just position, pray that through you all the courageous and noble soldiers under your command may receive our good wishes and farewell, which we send them on embarking for our beloved Spain. For this favor, which we have no doubt you will grant, you will gain the everlasting gratitude and consideration of 11,000 Spanish soldiers, who are your most humble servants.

"PEDRO LOPEZ DE CASTILLO, Private of Infantry."

Also the following letter addressed to the soldiers of the American Army:

"Soldiers of the American Army: We would not be fulfilling our duty as well-born men, in whose breasts there lives gratitude and courtesy, should we embark for our beloved Spain without sending to you our most cordial and sincere good wishes and farewell. We fought you with ardor, with all our strength, endeavoring to gain the victory, but without the slightest rancor or hate toward the American nation. We have been vanquished by you (so our generals and chiefs judged in signing the capitulation), but our surrender and the bloody battles preceding it have left in our souls no place for resentment against the men who fought us nobly and valiantly. You fought and acted in



A CORNER IN THE MARKET, SANTIAGO, CUBA.



HEAD OF PACK TRAIN LEAVING SAN LUIS FOR MANZANILLA.

compliance with the same call of duty as we, for we all but represent the power of our respective States.

"You fought us as men, face to face, and with great courage, as before stated, a quality which we had not met with during the three years we have carried on this war against a people without religion, without morals, without conscience, and of doubtful origin, who could not confront the enemy, but, hidden, spot their noble victims from ambush and then immediately fled. This was the kind of warfare we had to sustain in this unfortunate land. You have complied exactly with all the laws and usages of war as recognized by the armies of the most civilized nations of the world, have given honorable burial to the dead of the vanquished, have cured their wounded with great humanity, have respected and cared for your prisoners and their comfort, and, lastly, to us whose condition was terrible, you have given freely of food, of your stock of medicines, and you have honored us with distinction and courtesy, for after the fighting the two armies mingled with the utmost harmony.

"With this high sentiment of appreciation from us all, there remains but to express our farewell, and with the greatest sincerity we wish you all happiness and health in this land which will no longer belong to our dear Spain, but will be yours, who have conquered it by force and watered it with your blood, as your conscience called for, under the demand of civilization and humanity, but the descendants of the Congo and of Guinea, mingled with the blood of unscrupulous Spaniards and of traitors and adventurers, these people are not able to exercise or enjoy their liberty, for they will find it a burden to comply with the laws which govern civilized communities.

"From 11,000 Spanish soldiers.

"PEDRO LOPEZ DE CASTILLO,

"Soldier of Infantry, Santiago de Cuba, 21st August, 1898."

SHAFTER, Major-General.

Three days later, August 25th, Shafter cabled the War Office: "Command all embarked this morning except Twenty-fourth United States Infantry, detachment of recruits for First Illinois Volunteer Infantry, and a part of the Ninth Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry, all of which will embark to-morrow morning on transport now here," and at noon of August 25th General Shafter sailed for Montauk Point, where he arrived September 1st, and wrote the Secretary of War September 3rd:

"I am very sorry not to be able to come to meet you and the President

on your arrival this morning, but I am still in detention camp, and yesterday for the first time, had considerable fever. I am feeling much better, however, this morning, though rather weak."

The American armies that fought at Santiago hastened away to East Long Island, where there was at least pure air and sand, and the Spaniards were glad to go home. The captive Spaniards far outnumbered the conquering Americans, and the Fifth Corps was disbanded.

(General Orders, No. 50.)

Headquarters Fifth Army Corps,
Camp Wikoff, Long Island, October 3, 1898.

In compliance with instructions of this date from the Secretary of War, the disbandment of the Fifth Army Corps is hereby announced.

The short and successful campaign of this corps before Santiago de Cuba will fill a brilliant page in the history of our country.

By command Major-General Miles.

E. J. McCLERNAND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

The official dispatches are full of evidence of the high spirit of the young men of the country, showing in a special and striking way the eagerness, as the war seemed about to close, to find some fighting to do before the end came. The War Office received a shower of telegrams soliciting the privilege of being in the last events of the war, if peace had to come. The following are specimens of these patriotic messages:

Chickamauga Park, Ga., August 1, 1898—11:05 a. m.
Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.:

In assigning troops and officers to expedition for Porto Rico, won't you allow the State of Texas a representation and give me a command with at least one Texas regiment?

J. R. WATIES, Brigadier-General.

Austin, Tex., August 1, 1898—12:48 p. m.
Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.:

I respectfully indorse the request of Brigadier-General Waties.

C. A. CULBERSON, Governor.

St. Louis, Mo., August 1, 1898—1:25 p. m.
Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

Dear General Alger: If you can, send Fifth Missouri with General Wade. Company H is Sons of Veterans company, and the regiment is first class.

JNO. W. NOBLE.

Indianapolis, Ind., August 1, 1898—2:10 p. m.

Hon. R. A. Alger, Secretary, Washington, D. C. :

The One Hundred and Fifty-eighth Indiana was among the first to reach Chickamauga. Only three regiments have been there longer. Will be obliged if they can go with Wade; they are a splendid lot of men.

CHAS. W. FAIRBANKS.

Rockbridge Alum Springs, Va., August 1, 1898—3:20 p. m.

Secretary Alger, Washington, D. C. :

Please send Fifth Missouri to Porto Rico. My son, Ralph, lieutenant, Company F, that regiment, anxious to join expedition.

JOHN J. INGALLS.

New York, August 1, 1898—8:10 p. m.

Gen. H. C. Corbin, War Department, Washington, D. C. :

Do send the First Missouri, now at Chickamauga, to the front with General Wade. This regiment are nearly all St. Louis boys. There is a tremendous appeal from influential men in St. Louis in their behalf. Why not send them with General Wade?

R. C. KERENS.

Indianapolis, Ind., August 1, 1898—8:45 p. m.

Hon R. A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. :

I earnestly urge acceptance of the One Hundred and Fifty-eighth Indiana regiment, now at Chickamauga, for the Porto Rico expedition.

JESSE OVERSTREET.

Fort Grant, Ariz., August 1, 1898—10:33 p. m.

Gen. H. C. Corbin, Washington, D. C. :

Will the Adjutant-General help in the matter referred to in my official message of to-day? Have written so many letters and made so many efforts in other ways that I venture to address him personally and beg his assistance.

GRESHAM, Captain.

Fort Grant, Ariz., August 1, 1898—10:30 p. m.

Adjutant-General of the Army, Washington, D. C. :

One hundred and thirty-seven men and one officer, constituting L and M troops, Seventh Cavalry, at this post, beg to be part of the 50,000 volun-

teers to occupy Porto Rico, Cuba, and Philippines. They are a fine set of men, fairly drilled, equipped, and most eager to go to the front. Shortage of officers can be supplied if necessary by good non-commissioned officers.

GRESHAM,
Captain, Seventh Cavalry, Commanding L and M troops.

St. Louis, Mo., August 1, 1898—5:05 p. m.

Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.:

The undersigned respectfully urge that the First Regiment Missouri Volunteers be included in General Wade's selection for Porto Rico service.

HENRY ZIEGENHEIN,
Mayor.

CHRIS SHARP,
President Merchants' Exchange.

JNO. C. WILKINSON,
President Business Men's League.

L. D. KINGSLAND,
President Manufacturers' Association.

I. W. MORTON,
President Commercial Club.

French Lick, Ind., August 1, 1898—5:30 p. m.

Hon. R. A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.:

The men and officers of One Hundred and Fifty-eighth Indiana Regiment urgently request that they be detailed for Porto Rico expedition, and I second their request.

DAVID TURPIE.

Van Wert, Ohio, August 2, 1898—1:12 a. m.

Hon. R. A. Alger, Washington, D. C.:

Second Ohio was one of the first regiments mustered. They beg to go to Porto Rico. I earnestly urge their prayer.

G. L. MARBLE.

Minneapolis, Minn., August 2, 1898—11:45 a. m.

Hon. R. A. Alger, Washington, D. C.:

Minnesota boys at Chickamauga impatient to go to front. Can you not befriend them and place them where they may face the foe? Their sires

fought and fell at Gettysburg. If there be more fighting, their sons seek the field of honor and danger. W. H. EUSTIS.

Prescott, Ark., August 2, 1898—11:45 a. m.

Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.:

I sincerely trust you will allow the Arkansas troops to participate in the Porto Rico expedition. THOS. C. McRAE.

Northfield, Minn., August 2, 1898—11:49 a. m.

Hon. R. A. Alger, Secretary, Washington:

Respectfully urge that Fourteenth Minnesota Regiment be sent on Porto Rico expedition. Men anxious to go. Sincerely hope you will.

JOEL P. HEATWOLE,
Member Congress, Third District.

North Tonawanda, N. Y., August 2, 1898—12 m.

Hon. George D. Meiklejohn,

Assistant Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.:

If possible, please have Third Regiment New York Volunteers included in Porto Rico expedition. J. P. LINDSAY.

Little Rock, Ark., August 2, 1898—1:31 p. m.

Hon. G. D. Meiklejohn, Washington, D. C.:

Please do all you can to have Firstst Arkansas, now at Chickamauga, ordered out with next expedition. HENRY M. COOPER.

Little Rock, Ark., August 2, 1898—2:02 p. m.

Hon. Russell A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.:

Second Arkansas, Colonel Cook, anxious to go with General Wade. Will highly appreciate it if you will give Arkansas boys a chance for active service.

A. S. FOWLER.
JOHN McCLURE.

Port Chester, N. Y., August 2, 1898—3:08 p. m.

General Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.:

Eighth New York most anxious for immediate service. Can't you send them to Porto Rico and oblige them and yours?

JOHN MURRAY MITCHELL.

Atlanta, Ga., August 2, 1898—3:18 p. m.

Gen. R. A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.:

Please favor number of your Georgia friends by sending First Georgia to the front.

W. H. JOHNSON.

Eureka Springs, Ark., August 2, 1898—4:03 p. m.

Hon. Russell A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.:

Officers and men of First and Second Arkansas Volunteers, now at Chickamauga, are ready and anxious to go to Porto Rico. Hope you can send them.

J. H. BERRY.

Indianapolis, Ind., August 2, 1898—4:15 p. m.

Hon. R. A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.:

I cordially indorse Colonel Durbin's application to have the One Hundred and Sixty-first Regiment Indiana Volunteer attached to General Wade's expedition to Porto Rico.

JAMES A. MOUNT, Governor.

Indianapolis, Ind., August 2, 1898—4:16 p. m.

Hon. H. C. Corbin, Adjutant-General U. S. A., Washington, D. C.:

I cordially indorse Colonel Durbin's application to have the One Hundred and Sixty-first Indiana Volunteer Infantry attached to General Wade's expedition to Porto Rico.

JAMES A. MOUNT, Governor.

Chattanooga, Tenn., August 2, 1898—7:50 p. m.

Gen. Henry C. Corbin, Washington, D. C.:

Third Brigade, including Second Ohio, want to be sent to Porto Rico. I was transferred on assurance that my brigade would move. Others are working to supersede us. Can't you push us along to join our commander?

ABE S. BICKAM.

Minneapolis, Minn., August 2, 1898—1:05 p. m.

Hon. G. D. Meiklejohn:

The Fourteenth Minnesota, now at Chickamauga, very anxious to go to Porto Rico next expedition. Won't you see that they go?

L. FLETCHER.

New York, August 3, 1898—1 p. m.

Gen H. C. Corbin, Adjutant-General, Washington, D. C. :

If you have the disposition to confer lasting favor upon me and friends of Fourteenth New York, Wilder's regiment, please send same to Porto Rico. The command full, well equipped. Its career in your hands.

HENRY H. ADAMS.

St. Paul, Minn., August 4, 1898.

Hon. R. A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. :

It is thought by our people that one of the Minnesota regiments at Chickamauga ought to be sent to Porto Rico, and I think so, too.

C. K. DAVIS.

Augusta, Me., August 4, 1898—1:37 p. m.

Gen. R. A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. :

I earnestly recommend the sending of General Mattocks and his brigade to Porto Rico, and his appointment to the military and civil governorship.

E. C. BURLEIGH.

Bangor, Me., August 4, 1898—2:06 p. m.

Hon. R. A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. :

General Mattocks earnestly desires his brigade, including Maine regiment, be ordered to Porto Rico. Hope you will send his brigade.

C. A. BOUTELLE.

New York, August 4, 1898—5:56 p. m.

Hon. Russell A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. :

We respectfully request and urge that our well-drilled and able-bodied Fourteenth New York Regiment, commanded by a Regular Army officer, Colonel Wilder, be included in any command to be sent to Porto Rico or into active service. No regiment better fitted or commanded.

C. P. Huntington, F. D. Tappin, Howard Gould, W. L. Strong, Edward E. Poore, H. W. Cannon, Charles A. Moore, R. A. C. Smith, Charles Stewart Smith, J. Edward Simmons, Dumont Clark, and 25 others.

This telegram tells the story about the going home of the sick soldiers from Cuba.

Santiago de Cuba, August 14, 1898—12:41 a. m.

H. C. Corbin, Adjutant-General U. S. A., Washington, D. C.:

Rio Grande, Seneca, and Comanche, with Ninth and Tenth Cavalry, Fourth and Twenty-fifth Infantry all loaded, and will go out this afternoon unless hurricane, of which reports have been had as blowing south of Jamaica, prevents. The Breakwater, City of Macon, and Arkadia will go to-morrow with two light batteries and Twelfth and Seventeenth Infantry. One of the hardest rainstorms we have yet had is raging this afternoon. Am getting the sick left behind in very comfortable condition. Two thousand Spanish troops to be loaded to-morrow, and only other ship that is in as soon as it can coal, probably two days. My own health is excellent; not been better for years. Hope to get troops off so as to be able to start the latter part of the week for the United States. As you see, number taken sick rapidly decreasing for lack of fuel, nearly all of three divisions having left, but we have a large number of sick men. Are doing the very best by them possible. Will ship 400 convalescents on Catania Monday. SHAFTER, Major-General.

It was a great mercy peace was made so soon as to allow those who were ready to perish from Cuban fevers to go where the sanitary conditions were good and hope helped to save. In this telegram is a cheerful tone and happy promise:

Montauk, N. Y., August 14, 1898—2:15 p. m.

Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington, D. C.:

Sailed from Santiago, Cuba, Monday last, 8th instant; arrived this morning. Condition of troops on board (Sixth and Thirteenth Infantry, regulars) much improved by voyage; no new cases of sickness developed; no yellow fever; no deaths.

A. AMES,

Brigadier-General Volunteers, Commanding.

The emergency for moving the troops north, even from Florida, is seen in the telegram of General Rogers, Chief of Artillery, from Tampa, August 7th:

"The Secretary of War having stopped the further shipment of the siege train to General Miles, I now request instructions as to the disposition to be made of the batteries serving with the train, the ordnance material, and quartermaster's transportation. There are about 1,800 men, 1,300 animals, and a large amount of artillery material collected here. A considerable time will



SUGAR MILL. SCENE OF SAN LUIS R'OT, NOV. 4, 18 8.



SOLDIERS IN INSURGENT ARMY OF CUBA.



THE PALACE AT SANTIAGO, CUBA.

be necessary to complete the shipment of the command. After consulting with General Coppinger and the chief surgeon, I report that the condition of health of the men and animals requires their removal at once from the South, and if it is considered advisable to maintain any portion of this siege train for service or future instructions, I am of the opinion that the interests of the service will be subserved by moving it to a point at least as far north as Washington. The chief surgeon, Fourth Army Corps, informs me that the sanitary conditions at Jacksonville, Fernandina, or other points along Gulf or South Atlantic coast would not afford relief from conditions existing here; also that there are many cases of typhoid fever in camp, and although it is the healthiest camp at Tampa, a rapid depletion of the command may be expected from this disease, if not from infection."

There was much of wholesome significance in this brief telegram:

Adjutant-General's Office,

Washington, August 13, 1898—11:30 p. m.

General Shafter, Santiago:—You may discontinue press censorship.

H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

The Surgeon-General issued a circular the wisdom of which has been shown by experience. He said:

"No doubt typhoid fever, camp diarrhœa, and probably yellow fever are frequently communicated to soldiers in camp through the agency of flies, which swarm about fecal matter and filth of all kinds deposited upon the ground or in shallow pits, and directly convey infectious material, attached to their feet or contained in their excreta, to the food which is exposed while being prepared at the company kitchens or while being served in the mess tent. It is for this reason that a strict sanitary police is so important. Also because the water supply may be contaminated in the same way or by surface drainage.

"It is unsafe to eat heartily or drink freely when greatly fatigued or overheated.

"Ripe fruit may be eaten in moderation, but green or over-ripe fruit will give rise to bowel complaints. Food should be thoroughly cooked and free from fermentation or putrefactive changes."

The Surgeon-General said, in accounting for sickness in the army, that the strength of the many men was undermined by dissipation, the temptations of

great cities, and though there was supposed to be inspection, so many men were found in the camps unfit for service, from causes existing prior to enlistment, that special arrangements had to be made for their discharge.

Soon after the newly raised levies were aggregated in large camps sickness began to increase progressively from causes that were so general in their operation that scarcely a regiment escaped. These may largely be referred to ignorance on the part of officers of the principles of camp sanitation, and of their duties and responsibilities as regards the welfare of the enlisted men in their commands. Medical officers, as a rule, were also without experience in the sanitation of camps and the prevention of disease among troops. The few who knew what should be done were insufficient to control the sanitary situation.

Officers and men in these camps were rife for war, and drill, parades, practice marches, and military camp duties occupied the whole of their time and energies. Considerations of domestic economy and sanitation in the companies and regiments were not given proper attention, and men who were being taught to meet the enemy in battle succumbed to the hardships and insanitary conditions of life in their camps of instruction.

The sites of certain of the camps have been instanced in the newspapers as the cause of the sickness which was developed in them; but a review of the whole situation shows that it was not the site, but the manner of its occupation which must be held responsible for the general spread of disease among the troops. The density of the military population on the area of these contracted camps prevented the possibility of a good sanitary condition. Camps of this character may be occupied for a week or two at a time without serious results, as in the case of National Guardsmen out for ten days' field practice during the summer, but their continued occupation will inevitably result in the breaking down of the command by diarrhœa, dysentery, and typhoid fever.

Practically nothing was done to make the men comfortable or to remedy the insanitary conditions until these were brought to the attention of the Secretary of War, by inspectors sent out by special orders from the War Department. Then the camps held for so long were abandoned, but not before the manifestations of typhoid infection were rife in them. New sites were carefully selected, regimental camps were expanded, company tentage increased, and board flooring provided. Then, for the first time, the troops went into camps suitable for continued occupation.

Malarial fevers added to the sick lists of camps in Florida and of Southern regiments in the camps in Georgia and Virginia.

It was typhoid fever which broke down the strength of the commands generally, the outbreak becoming distinctly manifest in July. Sporadic cases appeared in most of the regiments in May and June, these cases having been brought in many instances from the State camps. In fact, some regiments, as the Fifteenth Minnesota, suffered more from this disease at their State rendezvous than any of the regiments in the large Federal camps.

In view of the necessity for the return of the troops of the Fifth Army Corps from Santiago, Cuba, preparations were made for encamping them at Montauk Point, Long Island. These included the establishment of temporary tent hospitals, not only for the treatment of the large number of sick brought by each command, from Cuba, but for the isolation and treatment of those from transports lying under the suspicion of yellow fever infection.

The difficulties in the way of administering the affairs of the detention hospital were very great, owing to the rapidity with which the transports followed each other in their arrival. As many as four reached the Point on some days from August 13 to 31, most of them bringing sick requiring detention for medical observation. But the sick men were as well cared for and as comfortable in their cots here as afterwards when transferred to the general hospital at Montauk Point.

The Secretary of War remarks under this head: "The Red Cross and other relief associations contributed in a very large degree to the care and comfort of our sick soldiers, and should receive the grateful thanks of the nation for the work they so nobly and unselfishly performed."

Thousands of valuable lives were saved by the wonderful intelligence and energy displayed in shifting the fever infected troops from Santiago to East Long Island, and it was one of the rare things in history that so much courage, address and liberality, as well as executive ability, have been displayed in war with such beneficent results in saving, not destroying heroic men.





CHAPTER XXVII.

The Public Opinion That Advanced the Navy.

The Marvelous Improvement of the Artillery on Our Ships of War—The Splendid Equipment of the Several Vessels—Full Particulars of the Armament of All Our Ships—Vigilance of the Ordnance Bureau to Continue Progress—The Thirteen-Inch Guns to be Superseded in the New Navy by Twelve-Inch—Important Recommendations—The Way the Navy Was Prepared to Win—Plans for Continued Progress—The Spanish Side as Seen and Described by One of Her Officers—Hopes and Happenings in Bombarded Santiago—Service of Cervera's Fleet—Mystery of the Merrimac—Earthquake—Throwing Vesuvius—German Opinion—Work of the Marines.


Nations abroad have persistently undervalued our navy, and remembering the great armies with which our sectional and state war was fought, have over-estimated our military resources immediately available. This country has been slow in the construction and equipment of battleships, but there has been thoughtful and highly-educated service in the Navy Department. We have been fortunate in secretaries of the navy, for many years, and the organization of the several bureaus has been exceptionally strong, alert and progressive. The very costly experiments of England, France, Germany, Italy and Russia in armored vessels and high-power guns, have been intelligently followed by our naval experts, and the lessons attainable regarded studiously and developed.

It happened, not by accident, that as we turned out first-class fighting ships, in hull, armor and machinery, there were ready for them guns that were formidable weapons of the finest finish, and in the hands of marksmen capable of being more destructive at greater distances than any of which there were records of the armament for sea-firing of other powers. The traditions of our navy were so brilliant that its history appealed especially to the pride of the people, and to the imagination of all our countrymen.


When the voting tests came it was apparent that the dwellers in the Mississippi valley and the mountains, on the head-waters east and west of the



EFFECT OF 8-INCH SHOT THROUGH PORT HEAD OF "VIZCAYA."



STARBOARD SIDE OF "VIZCAYA." AFTER THE BATTLE.



A CUBAN PLOUGHMAN.

Great River, had idealized the ocean and were fonder of the ships and sailors they never saw than the inhabitants of lands watered by tidal rivers and beside the sea, to whom salt water and the iron leviathans of the great deep were familiar. The grandeurs and mysteries of the oceans are profounder and more fascinating to mountaineers and those whose homes are in the green valleys far from the surf, than to those who have been rocked from infancy on the waves or looked out in all stages of life upon the majestical expanses of mighty waters.

It is not the boy or girl who sees the Atlantic or Pacific every day, or so often that the splendors have faded in fancy, who, looking out toward sunrise or sunset from the shore, thinks of it that the first land over there eastward is Spain, or there westward is Asia. The youth born a thousand miles inland is fired by the first glimpse of the everlasting glory of the ocean, and thinks of the galleys of the Carthaginians and Romans, the galleons of the Spaniards, or the privateers and thundering liners of England. The votes of the mountain states, those of the central valley, will join those from the borders of the Gulf of Mexico and from the "unsalted seas" of the North and from the ocean fronts, to put the nation behind the navy.

Looking over the reports of the Bureaus, to the Congress that adjourned in war to meet in peace, we find much information that re-assures us that the care taking of the navy that has been so superbly justified in the conflict with Spain, is the manifestation of a system that is to be continued, a part of the permanent policy of the people of the United States.

The Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance reports, October 1, 1898, the total guns ordered for the navy were 790. Of these four 10-inch and two 6-inch guns were "lost on the Maine." Of the 790 guns ordered thirty-nine were at the date of the report completed, and 131 forgings were ordered. Of the 13-inch guns there are assigned four each to the Indiana, Massachusetts, Oregon, Kearsarge, Kentucky, Illinois, Alabama and Wisconsin. The number of guns completed, with their calibers, were as follows: 13-inch, 35 caliber, 29; 12-inch, 35 caliber, 14; 10-inch, 30 caliber, 24; 10 inch, 35 caliber, 2; 8-inch, 30 caliber, 9; 8-inch, 35 caliber, 65; 8-inch, 40 caliber, 2; 6-inch, 30 caliber, 123; 6-inch, 35 caliber, 6; 6-inch, 40 caliber, 43; 5-inch, 30 caliber, 2; 5-inch, 40 caliber, 171; 4-inch, 40 caliber, 130; 4-inch, 50 caliber, 0. The total is 620 guns. A "caliber" is the calibers of the length of the gun.

The total guns for the new navy are 564. Of these 133 are 4-inch, 8 are

4.7-inch, 127 are 5-inch, 160 are 6-inch, 74 are 8-inch, 18 are 10-inch, 4 are 12-inch, and 32 are 13-inch. The total number of guns, made, in progress, or ordered, is 790, 237 being 4-inch, 199 are 5-inch, 197 are 6-inch, 83 are 8-inch, 26 are 10-inch, 14 are 12-inch, and 34 are 13-inch. The new navy get 544 guns—old vessels, 18; training ships, 19; available for auxiliary cruisers or reserves, 209. The batteries of the New Orleans and Albany were purchased with those vessels, and are to be considered separately from our own proportion. The full strength of our navy is shown with admirable intelligence in the table following:

**BATTERIES PLACED ON VESSELS PURCHASED, CHARTERED
AND TURNED OVER TO THE NAVY BY
OTHER DEPARTMENTS.**

NAME.	Displacement.	Type.	Main battery.				Secondary battery.					Total.			
			6-inch.	5-inch.	4-inch.	60-pounder.	3-inch.	14-pounder.	9-pounder.	6-pounder.	3-pounder.		1-pounder.	47-millime- ter.	37-millime- ter.
	<i>Tons.</i>														
Aileen.....	289	Yacht								1	2			2	5
Badger.....		Cruiser		6						6					12
Buccaneer.....		Yacht							2	2	2				6
Buffalo.....	7,500	Cruiser		2	4				6					2	14
Dixie.....	7,500	do.	10						6					3	19
Dorothea.....	594	Yacht							4	2	4				10
Eagle.....	492	do.							4					2	6
Elfrida.....	173	do.											2		2
Enquirer.....	136	do.								2					2
Free Lance....	192	do.												2	2
Frolic.....	506	do.								2		2			4
Gloucester....	786	do.							4	4				2	10
Harvard.....	11,550	Cruiser		8					8						16
Hawk.....	545	Yacht							2		2			2	6
Hist.....	494	do.								1	4			1	6
Hornet.....	494	do.							3		2		2	2	9
Huntress.....	185	do.											2		2
Kanawha.....	175	do.								1	3			2	6
Inca.....		do.									1			1	2
Mayflower....	2,600	Cruiser		2					12					4	18
Oneida.....	273	Yacht							1		4			1	6
Panther.....		Cruiser		6	2					6					14
Peoria.....	625	do.								4					7
Prairie.....	7,500	do.	10						6						16
Restless.....	194	Yacht									1			3	4
Scorpion.....	350	do.		4					6					2	12
Shearwater....		do.								3					3
Siren.....	315	do.								1	3				4

Batteries Placed on Vessels Purchased, Chartered and Turned Over to the Navy by Other Departments—CONTINUED.

NAME	Displacement.	Type.	Main battery.				Secondary battery.						Total.				
			6-inch.	5-inch.	4-inch.	60-pounder.	30-pounder.	3-inch.	14-pounder.	8-pounder.	6-pounder.	3-pounder.		1-pounder.	47-millimeter.	37-millimeter.	Machine-guns.
St. Louis.....	16,000	Cruiser		4					8								12
St. Paul.....	16,000	do.		6					6	6							18
Stranger.....	546	Yacht						1	2	2							5
Sylph.....		do.							6	2							8
Sylvia.....	302	do.								3	1				2		6
Topeka.....	1,700	Cruiser		6						4	2				1		13
Viking.....	271	Yacht								1					3		4
Vixen.....	800	do.							4	4							8
Wasp.....	750	do.							4						2		6
Yale.....	11,550	Cruiser		8						8							16
Yankee.....	7,500	do.		10					6						2		18
Yankton.....	879	Yacht		1						6					2		9
Yosemite.....	7,500	Cruiser		10					6						2		18
Accomac.....	187	Tug							1						1		2
Active.....	296	do.					2						2		1		5
Alice.....		do.							2								2
Apache.....	516	do.		2						2					2		6
Cheyenne.....		do.								1							1
Chickasaw.....		do.					1										1
Chocktaw.....	151	do.								1			1				2
Hercules.....	198	do.								1			1				2
Iroquois.....	702	do.					4						2	1			7
Massasoit.....		do.									1						1
Nezinscot.....	156	do.							1						1		2
Osceola.....	571	do.							2			1			1		4
Piscataqua.....	631	do.						2					2				4
Pontiac.....	401	do.							2	1							3
Potomac.....	677	do.							2	1							3
Powhatan.....	194	do.								1			1				2
Seminole.....		do.								1							3
Sioux.....	155	do.							1						1		2
Tacoma.....	196	do.							1								1
Tecumseh.....	214	do.								1					1		2
Uncas.....	441	do.											1				1
Vigilant.....	300	do.					2				2			1			5
Waban.....		do.					1										1
Wompatuck.....	462	do.								3					1		4
Arctic.....					1							2					3
Abarenda.....	6,782	Collier								4							4
Alexander.....	7,492	do.								2							2
Arathusa.....		Water boat								5							5
Brutus.....		Collier								2							2
Cæsar.....	5,834	do.								2	2						4
Cassius.....		do.								1				2			3
City of Pekin.....											2						2
Glacier.....		Supply ship					3										3
East Boston.....		Ferryboat					2				2		2				6
Gov. Russell.....		do.		1			1				4						6
Hannibal.....	4,181	Collier									2						2

606 PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY.

Batteries Placed on Vessels Purchased, Chartered and Turned Over to the Navy by Other Departments—CONTINUED.

NAME.	Displacement.	Type.	Main battery.					Secondary battery.					Total.				
			6-inch.	5-inch.	4-inch.	60-pounder.	30-pounder.	3-inch.	14-pounder.	9-pounder.	6-pounder.	8-pounder.		1-pounder.	47-millimeter.	37-millimeter.	Machine-guns.
Hector	<i>Tons.</i>	do.															
Justin	4,857	do.								2						2	
Lebanon	3,375	do.								4						4	
Leonidas	6,034	do.									2					2	
Marcellus		Steamer								2						2	
Merrimac	7,500	do.								2						2	
Nero	4,925	do.						4								4	
Niagara	4,640	do.								3						3	
Pompey	2,975	Collier								2						2	
Resolute	3,712	Transport								2						2	
Saturn	5,420	Collier								2						2	
Scindia	5,294	do.								2	2					4	
Southery	4,729	do.									2					2	
Sterling	2,549	do.						2		2						4	
Supply		Supply ship						2								2	
Vulcan	3,543	Steamer								2						2	
Calumet	174	Revenue-cutter										1				1	
Hamilton	250	do.			1					1					1	3	
Hudson	174	do.								2					1	3	
Manning	980	do.			3					2	2					7	
McCulloch	1,280	do.									1					1	
Morrill	397	do.			2						2				2	6	
Windom	525	do.			1						3	2				6	
Woodbury	370	do.									6				1	7	
Armeria	1,600	Light-house tender									2					2	
Mangrove	620	do.								2						2	
Maple	700	do.			2						2				1	5	
Suwanee	2,185	do.			2						4				1	7	
Albatross		Fish commission vessel					2						1	2	2	7	
Fish Hawk		do.										6				6	
Total 107 ships			20	67	26	1	2	24	1	2	160	111	62	10	20	70	576

ASSIGNMENT OF SECONDARY BATTERIES—THE SMALLER GUNS FOUND EXCEEDINGLY EFFECTIVE IN THE ACTUAL SERVICE WE HAVE RECENTLY EXPERIENCED.

VESSEL.	14-pound-er.	8-pound-er	3-pound-er.	1-pound-er.	37-mil-limeter	47-mil-limeter	Ma-chine guns.	Field guns.	Total
Chicago.....		7		2			2	1	12
Boston.....		2	2	2	2	2	2	1	13
Atlanta.....		6		4			2	1	13
Dolphin.....	2	2	2				2		8
Newark.....		8		4			4	1	17
Charleston.....		4	2	6			2	1	15
Yorktown.....		2	2	2	2		2	1	11
Petrel.....			2	1	2		2	1	8
Baltimore.....		4	2	2	4		2	1	15
Olympia.....		14		7			2	1	24
Texas.....		12		6	4		2	1	25
Vesuvius.....			5						5
Cushing.....				3					3
Philadelphia.....		4	4	2	3		4	1	18
San Francisco.....		4	4	2	3		4	1	18
Concord.....		2	2		2		2	1	9
Bennington.....		2	2		2		2	1	9
Monterey.....		6		4			2	1	13
Cincinnati.....		8		2			2	1	13
Raleigh.....		8		4			2	1	15
Montgomery.....		6		2			2	1	11
Detroit.....		6		2			2	1	11
Marblehead.....		6		2			2	1	11
Bancroft.....		2	8	1			1		12
New York.....		8		2			2	2	14
Puritan.....		6		2	2			1	11
Miantonomoh.....		2	2	6			2	1	13
Amphitrite.....		2	2	6	2		1	1	14
Monadnock.....		2	2	2	2		2	1	11
Terror.....		2	2	2	2		2	1	11
Machias.....		4		2			1	1	8
Castine.....		4		2			1	1	8
Katahdin.....		4							4
Indiana.....		20		7			2	2	31
Massachusetts.....		20		6			2	2	30
Oregon.....		20		6			2	1	29
Columbia.....		12		2			2	1	17
Ericsson.....				4					4
Minneapolis.....		12		2			2	1	17
Iowa.....		20		4			4	2	30
Brooklyn.....		12		4			4	2	22
Nashville.....		4		2			2	1	9
Wilmington.....		4		4			4	1	13
Helena.....		4		4			2	1	11
Foote.....				3					3
Rodgers.....				3					3
Winslow.....				3					3
Annapolis.....		4		2			1		7
Vicksburg.....		4		2			1	1	8
Newport.....		4		2			1	1	8

Assignment of Secondary Batteries—CONTINUED.

VESSEL.	14-pound- er.	6-pound- er	3-pound- er.	1-pound- er.	37-mil- limeter	47-mil- limeter	Ma- chine guns.	Field guns.	Total.
Princeton		4	2	1	1	8
Wheeling		4	2	1	1	8
Marietta		4	2	1	1	8
Kearsarge		20	6	4	2	32
Kentucky		20	6	4	2	32
Porter	4	4
Du Pont	4	4
Rowan	4	4
Monongahela		2	4	1	1	8
Alert		2	2	2	1	7
Essex		4	2	2	1	9
Alliance		4	2	1	1	8
Lancaster		6	4	2	1	13
Vermont		1	1	1	1	1	5
Hartford		4	2	1	7
Adams		4	2	1	1	8
Michigan		6	2	2	10
Ranger		4	1	1	6
Pensacola		1	1	1	1	1	5
Pinta	3	2	5
Illinois		16	4	4	2	26
Alabama		16	4	4	2	26
Wisconsin		16	4	4	2	26
Marion		6	2	2	1	11
Dahlgren	4	4
Craven	4	4
New Orleans		10	4	4	4	2	24
Topeka	4	2	1	7
Albany		10	4	4	4	2	24
Farragut		4	4
Davis	3	3
Fox	3	3
Morris	3	3
Talbot	1	1
Gwin	1	1
Mackenzie	1	1
McKee	1	1
Fern		3	3
Torpedo boat No. 19		4	4
Torpedo boat No. 20		4	4
Torpedo boat No. 21		4	4
Total	2	472	62	233	39	2	140	73	1,023

The Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, Charles O'Neil, reports:

"Since the date of last report, 112 guns of various calibers from 4 to 13 inch have been completed at the naval gun factory, viz.: Sixteen 4-inch, fifty-four 5-inch, twenty-nine 6-inch, one 12-inch, and twelve 13-inch, and thirty-three 6-inch and two 8-inch guns of ordinary type have been converted into quick-firing guns.

"Thirty-seven 4-inch guns and mounts under contract with private firms

nave also been partly completed. Forgings have been ordered for five 8-inch, twenty 5-inch, twenty-six 4-inch, and one 3-inch (14-pounder) guns.

"While no material change has been made during the year in the general system of construction of guns under manufacture, new designs have been prepared for future guns of all calibers, calculated to insure a much greater muzzle energy than is now obtained from guns of the same caliber at present in service. The first of these new guns will be installed on board the battleships Maine, Ohio, and Missouri, and on board of the four harbor-defense monitors authorized at the last session of Congress.

"The guns and mounts and their appurtenances in service have been severely tested during the recent war, and it is gratifying to be able to report that their performance has been in general thoroughly satisfactory. Some minor defects in the details of some of the mounts for guns of small caliber developed, and were quickly, or are being, corrected.

"Reports have been received from the various vessels as to the performance of their ordnance, and the general tenor of them has been that guns, mounts, turrets, and ammunition worked well. That such should be the case in so complex a structure as is a battleship and its equipment is certainly gratifying. Improvements are constantly being made, and each new vessel is superior to her predecessor in many details of her armament and ordnance outfit."

It is proposed in future to expand the electric plant in our ships. This is owing to the "facility of running cables as compared with steam, pneumatic or hydraulic pipes, the absence of heat, perfection of control and ease of manipulation," of which electricity is susceptible. The electric system is "immeasurably preferable to any other which depends upon long leads of pipes under high pressure with numerous packed pistons, valves and joints."

One great advantage of the use of electricity is because it is in a barely perceptible degree heating. There must, of course, be an auxiliary system to serve when wires are broken. "Guns in turrets," the Chief of Ordnance says, "operated by electric power can be more accurately laid upon and made to follow a moving target than when operated by steam, hydraulic, or pneumatic power. There are no water pipes to freeze, no steam pipes to burst, and no delay in obtaining a full working pressure, and no troublesome or noisy exhaust pipes to deal with. A burnt-out fuse can be quickly

replaced or a broken wire repaired, and as the wires can be led below the armored deck, there is little liability of the latter becoming necessary.

"Guns of over four inches in caliber are fitted with attachments for using either electric or percussion primers, but the Bureau will use only percussion ammunition in guns of and below five inches in caliber." The electric firing is preferable, but the production more elaborate and the faults more difficult to locate. The fuses of shells are to be made more sensitive, as it can be done safely. The Chief of Ordnance reports:

"All new guns of and above four inches in caliber are fitted with telescopic sights, and in addition an auxiliary horizontal bar sight is supplied to ship in place of the telescope in case of accident to the latter.

"As the weakest part of a turret is its sighting hood, in which has hitherto been located the only means of sighting the turret guns, the Bureau has decided to attach to all turret guns a bar sight to be used through a slit in the armor, in addition to the telescope in the sighting hood. A 6-inch projectile at moderate range would probably destroy any sighting hood if fairly struck, and, while the turret and guns might still be intact, the means of sighting would be gone.

"The Bureau has in process of manufacture at the Naval Gun Factory 100 heavy 1-pounder automatic guns, nearly half of which are practically completed. These guns fire at the rate of 250 shots per minute, but are nearly as heavy and as large as a 6-pounder, and have the disadvantage of using their ammunition from belts, which is always a source of more or less trouble."

The 1-pounder guns are regarded as useful for boats but not for ships.

The 6-pounder semi-automatic gun is favorably considered. One was recently fired one thousand rounds without hitch or failure. This class of weapon is especially meant for torpedoes and torpedo boat destroyers. We quote again the report:

"A new high-powered 3-inch gun (14-pounder) has been designed, calculated to have a muzzle velocity of 3,000 foot-seconds, and the forgings for the type gun have been ordered. A new mount is also being made for this gun.

"Several years ago when the Bureau began the manufacture of rapid-firing guns, it had two 6-inch guns made with the ordinary obturator and quick-working breech mechanism operated by a lever, which worked admirably, but as brown powder alone was then in vogue, it was considered necessary to use a brass case to contain the charge to prevent fouling of the powder

chamber, and in order that sponging the gun might be dispensed with; hence the general adoption of the brass cartridge case for all rapid-firing guns. The advent of smokeless powder has changed the conditions, and fouling of the bore and sponging are no longer factors in the case, and the Bureau has recently designed, built, and tested a 6-inch rapid-firing gun that does not require a brass cartridge case; and this will be a feature of all 6-inch rapid-firing guns hereafter. In smaller calibers, where the ammunition is complete and handled as a whole—that is, where the projectile is inserted in the case—the brass cases will be retained to facilitate rapidity of loading. The new type of 6-inch gun is 45 calibers in length and weighs 8 tons, and is designed for a muzzle velocity of 3,000 foot-seconds."

It is evident throughout this remarkable report that the Ordnance Bureau was never more active than now in progressive work, and has made a study with a view to improvements of every pertinent incident in the recent war. Decisive as was the efficiency attained, there is a fine enthusiasm to cultivate advantages and to reach conclusions from experiments. There is made a constant study of experimental battle order indicators and range finders. The nice questions as to the thickness of armor and how it shall be located are under consideration. The merits of turrets are also discussed. "The lessons of the day," the report says, "indicate that the greatest execution (except against the heaviest armor) may be expected from the quick firing guns of small caliber." The larger the gun the greater the sacrifice of space and weight. Heavy guns in turrets are a recognized necessity, but the turret is horribly hot and the field of view from the sighting hood limited, and the 13-inch gun is not popular as it was; and these paragraphs show that an important change has been substantially decided upon after "much thought" has been bestowed.

"Heretofore the 13-inch rifle of 60½ tons weight, 35 calibers in length, having a muzzle velocity of 2,400 foot-seconds, with smokeless powder, and a capacity to penetrate with a capped projectile 19 inches of face-hardened armor at a distance of 2,500 yards, has been regarded as the best type for the heavy turret guns of our first-class battleships, and all heretofore built (excepting the Iowa, which has 12-inch guns), have been equipped with guns of this class.

"The development of the 12-inch gun has been so great and its power so much increased that the Bureau is of the opinion that hereafter it will be the maximum caliber that it will be advisable to install on future battleships,

and that these should be supplemented by an auxiliary battery of 6-inch quick-firing guns in casemates, with a secondary battery of 6-pounders and 12-pounders.

"The reduction in weight of the 12-inch gun alone is not great, being but $7\frac{1}{2}$ tons less than is that of the present 13-inch gun; but the reduction in the size of and consequently in the weight of the turrets, barbettes and ammunition is very great."

There has been a notable exemption from mishaps during the hurry and inexperience of the war, in the handling of fixed ammunition, this notwithstanding "the recent great increase of our naval force, by the introduction of so many new and untrained officers and men, seriously aggravated the danger of mistakes and accidents, and the urgent pressure."

Among the most urgent recommendations by the Bureau is that a uniform caliber and standard small-arm cartridge should be adopted for the army, navy, Marine corps, and militia. The gratifying statement is made that the "resources of the country to supply war material were scarcely touched, and unquestionably there is no limit to the amount that can be procured of all kinds, in case of need, provided time is not too important a factor." And the way to provide that time is not too important a factor is to improve the times of peace to prepare for those of war.

One of the great features has been the old style "columbiads," a generation ago our most powerful shooting iron, and the pyramids of cannon balls. In the report under review this appears:

"While a number of smoothbore guns were prepared for service, none were put in use during the late war except such XV-inch guns as were on board the coast-defense monitors. The Bureau is convinced that it is useless to longer retain the old cast-iron smoothbore guns that are on hand in large numbers at all the navy yards with their mounts and ammunition, and will take steps to have them surveyed with a view to disposing of them, as no contingency is likely to arise which could render them of any use whatever, and it is useless to regard them as a part of the country's naval assets."

Here is the official presentation of the fact that the old smoothbores and their big pot-metal bullets are as obsolete as the monstrous thunderers of the Hellespont and those used in the siege of Constantinople that first illustrated the power of gunpowder; and the huge marble balls that were held to be the most irresistible missiles ever hurled at a ship or wall. The better way to geu

rid of the old smoothbores and spheres made for cannonades that will never come, is to give them away to every town, village and schoolhouse where they would be held to be decorative and markers of the events that testify the progress of the times.

In the annual report of the superintendent of the naval gun factory at the United States navy yard at Washington is this honorable mention of the workingmen:

"The extraordinarily large amount of inspection and other work done in the short time of six months could not have been accomplished except for the prompt and ready compliance of the various mechanics to the instructions received and attention to their work, and taking into account the relative number of hours worked, fully 20 per cent more has been accomplished than ordinarily the case, and the men did more work in the same time under the stimulus of a patriotic object to be gained."

In giving an account of the work turned out in the gun factory at the navy yard, this paragraph, related to the one above, occurs:

"Of the above guns, twenty 6-inch, thirty-three 5-inch, and sixteen 4-inch 40 caliber guns have been built since the declaration of war against Spain, and sixteen ordinary 6-inch guns have been converted into rapid fire. This represents about one year's work on ordinary working hours."

Under the head of "Sights" there is this very interesting statement of work:

"Since March 1, twenty-eight 6-inch pedestal mounts, sixty-seven 5-inch pedestal mounts, and twenty 4-inch recoil slides have had telescope sights adjusted; eight 6-inch recoil mounts, two 5-inch pedestal mounts, three 4-inch pedestal mounts, two 4-inch recoil mounts, and fifteen of the American Ordnance Company's mounts have had their telescope sights readjusted on the mounts; two Mark I 4-inch guns, two Mark I 5-inch guns, six Mark III 6-inch guns have had their bar sights overhauled and readjusted on the guns; six telescope sights were adjusted to the Princeton's 4-inch pedestal mounts, when her mounts were overhauled, and top carriages replaced and all the auxiliary bar sights above mentioned have been made.

"This large amount of work in the sighting line has never before been accomplished in any one year, and it has been done in five months by often working on Sundays, including the twenty-four hour work of week days."

In addition to the showing of the high spirit and effective zeal of the

mechanics, this declares that our workmanship, now so celebrated, is to have all possible facilities for improvement.

Of the class of seamen gunners this is said:

"The men have generally exhibited zeal and intelligence, and fully appreciate the benefits to be derived from making a good record in study and work, much of which has been due to the examples set by the instructors, who have given a great deal of their time out of work hours in explaining and helping in difficult matters. Much of the ambition of the present class seems to be due to the fact that three of the instructors are seamen gunners with warrant rank."

Of the smokeless powder manufactory it is remarked:

"A small-arm powder promising satisfactory results when cut and graphited after twenty hours' drying in the sheet between blotting paper has been made and tested. This powder has a dried grain of 0.011 to 0.012 inch thickness. Experiments are now in progress for the manufacture of this powder on a larger and more economical scale.

"Experimental work on 1-pounder, 6-pounder, and 3-inch powders have included nitration, kind and proportion of metallic nitrates, composition of solvent, proportion of solvent to dry ingredients, dimensions of strips, and methods of manufacture.

"Marked improvements have been made recently in the methods of manufacture of these thin ribbon powders. Pyrocellulose as a base and ether alcohol as a solvent has been used only in experiments. But little data was available as a guide to the regular manufacture of smokeless powder for the various calibers.

"In addition to various experimental work, smokeless powder has been manufactured, October 1, 1898, as follows:

6-pounder	Rounds, 10,351
3-inch	" 13,008
1-pounder	" 2,623

"With the beginning of the hostilities a demand was made for special countermines for use in the operations of the fleet.

"Suitable mine cases, primer cases, etc., were designed, and orders for the construction of the heavy mine cases were placed with two separate establishments.

"Mine cases were sent to the station as fast as they were made. They were quickly loaded, and all other parts and appurtenances of the outfit were assembled rapidly.

"Loading was begun within five days, and within ten days from the receipt of the order forty mines were loaded with guncotton and ready for shipment.

"The countermining outfit sent to the North Atlantic fleet included forty mines (each containing about 530 pounds of gun cotton), with 18,000 feet of insulated electric cable, and all necessary ropes, batteries, buoys, primers, testers, exploders, and instructions for handling them in five separate parts. They were loaded with 21,160 pounds of gun cotton. The total boxed weight of this outfit was 37,186 pounds."

Commander A. B. Condin, Inspector of Ordnance, at the proving ground, Indian Head, Maryland, says:

"The supply of smokeless powder has been small in comparison with the needs of the service, though considerable quantities of 5 and 6 inch powder have been supplied. There seems to be no difficulty in supplying an entirely satisfactory powder. Trials are necessary to determine the size of grain suitable for each caliber, in order to reach a combination of burning all the powder in the charge, high velocity, and moderate pressures.

"Large numbers of armor-piercing projectiles of all calibers have been tested during the year; very few rejections have been necessary. A distinct improvement in the quality of these projectiles is a gratifying evidence that the makers are making every endeavor to carry out the clause of their contract which binds them to supply the best article possible and to incur any expense necessary for this purpose. There is on the ground here a handsome array of projectiles of all main battery calibers which have stood very severe tests and are absolutely unaltered in dimensions."

The Secretary of the Navy gives in his annual report the names of the auxiliary vessels purchased, their names before and after purchase, the date of purchase, the purchase price, and the previous owners. This would seem to the senatorial current historian great news, if pulled out of the pigeon-holes by a committee of investigation, but it is quite commonplace now.

The Hornet was purchased from Henry M. Flagler for \$117,500; the Mampatuck from the Standard Oil Company for \$65,000; the Mayflower from the Ogden Goelet estate for \$430,000; the Nictheroy, El Cid, renamed

Buffalo, from the Brazilian government for \$575,000; the Amazonas, renamed New Orleans, from the Brazilian government for \$1,429,215; the Almirante Abru, renamed the Albany, from the Brazilian government for \$1,205,000; the Merrimac from the Hogan Line for \$342,000. The Gloucester, purchased from Pierpont Morgan, price \$225,000, was in the thick of the fight at Santiago, and a very effective vessel. H. M. Hannah sold the Comanche, which came out the Frolic, for \$115,000.

The number of enlisted men in the navy was raised during the war from 12,500 to 24,123. The maximum fighting force of the navy, classified, was as follows: Battleships (first class), 4; battleships (second class), 1; armored cruisers, 2; coast defense monitors, 6; armored ram, 1; protected cruisers, 12; unprotected cruisers, 3; gunboats, 18; dynamite cruiser, 1; torpedo boats, 11; vessels of old navy (including monitors), 14. Auxiliary navy: auxiliary cruisers, 11; converted yachts, 28; revenue cutters, 15; lighthouse tenders, 4; converted tugs, 27; converted colliers, 19; miscellaneous, 19.

The Secretary's report says that in contemplating the work during the past year "the country as well as the service has cause for congratulation in the results which have followed, and which have been so generally approved, and in the further fact that no personal feeling has arisen to mar the glorious victories and magnificent work of the service."

The casualties of the Navy are shown in the following table:

	Number of casualties.	Killed.	Wounded.
Action of Manila Bay	9	0	9
Action of Cienfuegos	12	1	11
Action off Cardenas	8	5	3
Action off San Juan, Porto Rico	8	1	7
Engagement at Guantanamo, Cuba	22	6	16
Engagement off Santiago (June 22)	10	1	9
Engagement off Santiago (July 3)	11	1	10
Eagle (July 12)	1	0	1
Bancroft (August 2)	1	1	0
Amphitrite (August 6)	1	1	0
Yankee (August 11)	1	0	1
Total	84	17	67

Efforts to improve the signal system are earnestly pressed by the Navy Department, guided by the experiences of the war, and yet this example of

what was done between the fleet and army at Santiago indicates that this important work is pretty well done.

Signal messages received and sent:

July 11, 7:50 a. m. Shore to ship: "General Shafter's compliments to Captain Chadwick, and he wishes fire commenced early this morning. Two maps have been sent to Admiral Sampson which give the distance to the cathedral. . . ."

8:10 a. m. From ship to shore: "We are about to commence firing; will fire very slowly, and wish every shot reported."

8:40 a. m. From flag to shore: "Where did that shot fall?"

8:45 a. m. From shore to flag: "We are waiting report from front."

9 a. m. From flag to shore: "Ask front if fall of shot was observed."

9:15 a. m. From flag to shore: "Next shot will be fired at 9:25; keep sharp look-out."

9:30 a. m. From shore to ship: "Your shot fell 200 yards east of Del Loute Hospital. Shot should be directed half mile farther west."

9:45 a. m. From ship to shore: "Give us the fall as quickly as possible."

9:50 a. m. From shore to ship: "Second shot was well placed. A vigorous bombardment until 12 noon requested."

10:20 a. m. From ship to Vesuvius: "Fire shot every five minutes. Our shot are falling right, using range 8,500 yards, NNW., from our position."

11:25 a. m. From ship to Vesuvius: "Please fire three shots every five minutes."

11:25 a. m. From ship to shore: "How is our firing?"

11:32 a. m. Shore to ship: "Striking city, with no apparent result. I think firing with big guns should begin.—Shafter."

11:40 a. m. Ship to shore: "Shall we cease firing at 12 o'clock?"

11:45 a. m. Vesuvius to flag: "Do you know how shells are falling?"

11:50 a. m. From flag to Vesuvius: "Striking in city."

12 m. Shore to ship: "Please continue firing with heavy guns until one o'clock; then cease firing until further orders."

12:35 p. m. "General Castillo reports that Santa Anna church has been turned into a powder magazine.—Shafter."

12:45 p. m. Shore to ship: "The church is west of Reina Mercedes Barracks. Discontinue at once; am going to put up a flag of truce.—Shafter."

4:45 p. m. Vesuvius to flag: "General Shafter states fire from ships very accurate, shell falling in city. Lines have been advanced. Flag of truce went forward to demand unconditional surrender. Will communicate with you fully directly to Aguadores as to time of firing and result of truce."


The congratulatory paragraphs in the annual report of the Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair are full of the dignities of moderation in the statement of a great and signal success that is conspicuous before the world:

"The behavior of all classes of our naval vessels throughout the various conditions of war under which they served during the past months is a source of gratification to the Bureau, in which the designs of the greater part of them have been developed. The many complicated and inter-dependent considerations involved in the several classes, together with the large amount of petty detail, could not but afford opportunity for criticism from various standpoints, as well as for actual errors of judgment in applying too little or too great weight to any of the many considerations referred to.

"Moreover, the lack of reliable data regarding the behavior of the modern ship of war in action lent a very considerable amount of uncertainty to the expectations regarding the conduct of our own vessels in an engagement with the enemy. Although the results of the encounters in which our fleets have engaged demonstrated their superiority so overwhelmingly as to throw doubt upon the value of any deductions which might be made therefrom, the behavior of all classes of vessels, both in action and in general service on the blockade, appears to have been such as to thoroughly demonstrate their integrity and their suitability for the service for which they were designed."

The work of Lieutenant José Muller, of the Spanish navy, contains much that is of the deepest interest of the conditions within Santiago, and the means and details of her defense. The best artillery the Spanish had was taken from the cruiser, the "Reina Mercedes," and Lieutenant Muller says there was substantially no other artillery, and "we who witnessed and sustained the blockade of Santiago, feel satisfaction and pride in being able to say that we kept the American fleet, notwithstanding its power and the number of its guns, for seventy days, namely, from May 18 to July 17, in front of the mouth of the harbor, on the sea, and at a respectable distance from our batteries, which they were unable to silence, and not daring to force the entrance.

"It is only just to say, and I take pleasure in doing so, that this result is



SWORD ORDERED BY CONGRESS TO BE GIVEN ADMIRAL DEWEY AS A TOKEN OF THE NATION'S GRATITUDE.



BUST OF COLUMBUS, FOUND ON "CRISTOBAL COLON." NOW IN WAR DEPARTMENT AT WASHINGTON.

due, in the first place, to the cruiser *Reina Mercedes*, under the command of Captain Rafael Micón, and in the second place, to our fleet anchored in the bay, and which the enemy would have had to fight after forcing the harbor, provided they had succeeded in doing so, but they do not appear to have thought of it."

Further information will show the gallant Spaniard that it was not for the lack of thinking of it that it was not attempted. The *Mercedes* was detained at Santiago by bad boilers, when on the way to Havana. The Lieutenant remarks of Spanish belief in their fleets before the trial by battle:

"When the war between Spain and the United States became a fact, it is hard to tell how much was said and written about the Spanish fleet, or rather, fleets; everybody knows of the thousands of items which appeared in the newspapers concerning the purchase of ships, to such an extent that, if all could have been believed, our navy would have been vastly superior to that of the United States, in number and quality. And this is so true that the least optimistic, the most reasonable people, those whom we considered best informed as belonging to the profession, and who knew to a certain extent what we could expect, counted on not less than eight battleships leaving the Peninsula."

When Cervera ran into Santiago May 19, famishing for coal, and hoped to get it and get away, it was "one of those beautiful mornings that are so frequent in tropical countries; not the slightest breeze rippled the surface of the water, not the least cloud was to be seen in the deep blue sky, and still, notwithstanding all that the local papers have said, very few were the people who came down to witness the arrival of the ships. With the exception of the official element and a small number of Peninsulars, the arrival of our warships inspired no interest, nor even curiosity."

The Peninsulars alone were enthusiasts. Coaling facilities were such that the fleet was detained until blockaded. The troops required 360,000 rations a month, enough with economy for half a month. This would seem to mean that there were 24,000 troops, but this must be a miscalculation. As to the business men, this example is sufficient:

"The man who had the contract of furnishing water at the bay, relying on the letter of his contract, tried to charge the ships of the fleet for the water which they were getting at Las Cruces pier, this water being the property of the American company of the Juragua mines, for which the

Spanish government could therefore not contract, and was conveyed on board by means of the water pipes, which are there for that purpose, the pump being kept going night and day by the soldiers of Colonel Borry's column. Nearly all the ships took over 500 pipes of water each, which, at 4 pesetas a pipe, amounts to several thousand dollars. The contractor in question, whose name I do not wish to remember, is from the Peninsula, a captain of volunteers, and, as he says himself, 'a better Spaniard than Pelayo.'

Before the siege was over this writer says there was famine in Santiago, and many persons starved to death. He saw a man at the entrance to the Brook House who "died because he had nothing to eat," and "horses, dogs and other animals were dying from hunger in the streets and public places, and the worst thing was that their carcasses were not removed. I also saw—this is significant on account of the fatal consequences that might follow—I saw, I repeat, a dog throw himself upon a smaller one and kill and devour him. The water from the aqueduct had been cut off, and the city was exposed to the danger of the dogs going mad."

The Lieutenant continues: "We who belonged to the captaincy of the port finally dined, breakfasted and slept there—or rather, did not sleep there, for there never was a night when it was not necessary to transmit to the Admiral two or three urgent papers, orders, or other cablegrams, at all hours, and the telephone did not stop a minute and did not give us any rest."

Of what service to Spain was the Spanish fleet in Santiago? This question Lieutenant Muller answers:

"Compelling the enemy to sustain with superior forces the blockade of Santiago de Cuba, with all its difficulties and dangers. While our ships were in port, safe from the ordinary dangers of the sea, using hardly any coal, not exhausting their engines, and waiting for a favorable opportunity to maneuver, when and as best they could, the hostile fleet was obliged to cruise on the coast day and night, using a great deal of coal, constantly doing sea service, which is always laborious, especially in time of war, exhausting their engines, and exposed to the danger of having to abandon the blockade in case of a storm from the south or east, still more if the season of cyclones should come." And, "If it had been possible for us, besides the ships that were at Santiago, to have two at Cienfuegos, for instance, and two more at Nuevitas, which ports are well suited for placing lines of torpedoes, owing to their narrow entrances, there is no doubt but that the Americans, who, outside of the

ships they had in the Philippines, had sent their whole fleet to the island of Cuba, would have had to blockade those three ports with forces superior to ours and to keep watch at Key West if they did not want to expose themselves to a serious disaster, or would have had to force one of the ports, thereby exposing themselves to a hecatomb; and we only need think of the number of their ships to understand that they could not successfully threaten so many points; though they only had to deal with Santiago and had almost all the ships of the fleet in front of it, they would have found it necessary to desist from taking the offensive."

The Americans, the Spaniards thought, never before Santiago lacked secret information, and the sinking of the Merrimac was a mystery to the Spaniards. The Spanish writer visited Hobson to take his deposition, and Hobson wanted to know why the British Consul was not present, as he had charge of the American Consulate, and also, "by whose authority he was being examined; and he stated that, since he had been taken prisoner by Admiral Cervera himself in his own boat (as was true), it was his understanding that he could and should answer only Admiral Cervera, or some one delegated by him. And although all this was said in the very best form and with a thousand protestations of his respect and deference for me, it did not prevent our positions from being reversed, and far from my asking the prisoner questions, it was he, on the contrary, who asked them of me.

"I told him so, asking him through the interpreter to state categorically whether he was disposed to answer. He replied he was ready to answer the questions which he thought he ought to answer, but not those which he deemed untimely. Therefore, and in order not to lose time, I at once asked him one question which I knew beforehand he would refuse to answer, namely, by whose order and for what purpose he entered the harbor; he replied: 'By order of Admiral Sampson; the second part I cannot answer.' I then deemed my mission at an end."

Having finished with Hobson, the Spanish officer stood on the esplanade in front of the Morro and admired the American fleet. It was a beautiful evening, and seventeen American ships were in sight. June 6th the American fleet opened fire, and "it was so intense and the shots followed each other in such quick succession that it might have seemed like a fusillade if the mighty thunder of guns can be compared with the crackling of small arms.

"By 9 o'clock it became somewhat slower, shortly after reaching again the

same intensity, then decreasing once more at 10:15, and again becoming terribly intense.

"At 2 p. m. there arrived at the royal pier a boat from the Reina Mercedes, towed by her steam launch, with Lieutenant Ozamiz, bringing three seriously wounded sailors, who were taken to the military hospital. This officer reported the death of Commander Emilio de Acosta y Eyermann, second in command of the cruiser, and of five sailors; also, that Ensign Molins, one boatswain, and several other sailors had been wounded."

Again, the writer says, "the fire resembled one prolonged thunder," and he "had no idea that any firing could be as terrific as that of those ten ships," and he "does not believe the bombardment of Sebastopol and Alexandria could be as terrible as that suffered at Santiago." It was computed that the Americans fired eight thousand projectiles. The belief of the writer was that the insurgents had located everything, and he was sure when he saw the aim of the Americans, who fired so close to the Maria Teresa and Vizcaya, that it was a miracle they were not hit. The Mercedes, though protected by a hill, was hit thirty-five times.

"Commander Emilio de Acosta y Eyermann was directing the extinguishing of the fire in the forecandle, when a large shell cut off his right leg at the hip and also his right hand, mutilating him horribly. But he lived for half an hour after that, and kept on looking after the fire, as I was told by Mr. Ozamiz, who was close to him in those critical moments. I do not like to think of it; he had been a fellow-student of mine at college, and our old friendship had always remained the same. As there was no safe place in the ship, his body was placed on a cot and taken to the Socapa coast; five soldiers who had been killed the same day were also carried there, and all of them were covered with the flag which they had been defending and for which they had died.

"The large projectiles shot through the space across the bay, causing a tremendous noise which only those who heard it can understand; some fell on the opposite coast (to the westward), raising, as they exploded, clouds of dust and smoke; others could not be seen falling, which proves that they must have dropped in the hills at a great distance. This explains that they did not only reach the city, but went thousands of meters beyond.

"The inhabitants of Cay Smith had to take refuge in the northern part, which is very abrupt, and many were in the water up to the waist; if they had not gone there, most of them would have been killed, for nearly all the

dwellings which were located in the southern part suffered from the effects of the shells. The following day the Cay was abandoned."

June 21st it was found out that forty-two ships had during the day before sailed and proceeded eastward. They were the transports bearing Shafter's army, on June 23.

"Opposite the Morro entrance, and at a distance of about six miles from it, 8 battleships, 2 destroyers, the Vesuvius, and 8 merchant vessels. The rest, as many as 63, continued the landing on the coast, protected by some of the war ships.

"Every night, with great regularity (between 11 and 2), the Vesuvius threw her three dynamite bombs on the batteries at the mouth of the harbor, with the greatest humanity possible, for it will be remembered that such was the pretext of this war. For that purpose she would come close to the coast, accompanied by another ship, usually a battleship—for the mission of the Vesuvius is only the offensive, she has no defensive qualities—and as soon as she was within convenient distance she would discharge three tubes at regular intervals. If the projectiles dropped close to a battery its ruin was certain, for one must see the effects of one of these projectiles to understand them.

"This ship is the only one of her class; her projectiles and the apparatus throwing them are not known, and she has made her *début* here. One of the projectiles which fell on the northern slope of the Socapa tore up trees right and left for a distance of about 20 meters. From a certain distance, as I could see the day I went to the Mercedes, it looked as though a road had been opened across the mountain.

"Another, which fell a short distance from the one just referred to, made an excavation, not very deep, but very wide; I was told that it would hold twenty horses."

The sound of the battle in which Cervera's fleet perished is thus related: "A terrific cannonade commenced, such as I have never heard, nor will probably ever hear again, a cannonade more intense than that of June 6, a thing which I believed impossible, shaking the building, thundering through the air. I could not think coherently. I kept looking at Mr. Bustamente like an imbecile, and he looked at me and didn't say a word. I felt something that commenced at my feet and went up to my head, and my hair must have stood on end. Then suddenly, without taking leave, I went out, got on my horse

and rode down the hill at breakneck speed, and I hardly understand how it was that I did not break my neck. I arrived at the captaincy of the port, where I found them all, from the commander of marine to the last clerk, with emotion painted on every face, and all looking in the direction of the mouth of the harbor. The noise caused by the gunshots, which the mountains and valleys echoed, was truly infernal and comparable to nothing."

The pilot who took out the Spanish flagship tells of his personal experience. His name is Miguel Lopez, and he says:

"I was in the forward tower by the side of Admiral Cervera, who was as calm as though he had been at anchor in his own cabin, and was observing the channel and the hostile ships, and only said these words:

" 'Pilot, when can we shift the helm?' He had reference to turning to starboard, which could only be done after we had passed Diamante Bank. After a few seconds he said:

" Pilot, advise me when we can shift the helm.'

" 'I will advise you, Admiral,' I answered.

"A few moments later I said: 'Admiral, the helm may be shifted now.'

"In a moment the Admiral, without shouting, without becoming excited, as calm as usual, said: 'To starboard,' and the next minute, 'Fire!' At the same moment, simultaneously, the two guns of the turret and those of the port battery fired on a ship which seemed to me to be the *Indiana*. I thought the ship was sinking. I cannot tell you, Don José, all that passed. By this time there were already many dead and wounded in the battery, and I believe that in spite of the water that was in the ship she was already on fire then. The Admiral said to me:

" 'Good-by, pilot; go now; go, and be sure you let them pay you, because you have earned it well.' And he continued to give orders."

It was for eight hours believed in Santiago that Cervera's fleet had escaped. There was at first four great clouds of smoke. The mountains, as the ships passed westward, presented a view of the sea except from a few points, and no ship was burned or disabled within the range of vision. The Spanish officers confirmed the view taken by Admiral Sampson of the value of the incessant use at night of the searchlights.

The effect of the cannonades by the fleet was more serious when we read the Spanish story than in the American accounts. The reason Cervera ran into Santiago harbor was lack of coal, and the reason he did not get out at first

was because he could not fill the bunkers in time. There was scarcity of baskets to handle coal, for one thing. The American fleet came in force to Santiago because the Spanish fleet was there, and our army arrived because the fleets were there. Hence the fame forever of Santiago.

Rear Admiral Pluddeman, of the German navy, has published critical "comments" on the main features of the command in Spain, and we have a translation from the November number of the *Marine Rundschau*. The Admiral opens with the remark that there is nothing in the events of the war which might lead to a radical revolution of present ideas, but while the war has "enriched former experiences," no essentially new appliances have been made use of. The torpedo and ram have not been used, but they have no doubt been found less formidable in fact than in imagination. Torpedoes have been tried and found wanting, and it appears that in the state of efficiency of artillery the use of the ram has become, like cavalry charges upon steady infantry with magazine long-range rifles, impracticable.

The supremacy of the battleship, with a few heavy guns and a greater array of secondary batteries, is hardly disputed. The Oregon would have great chances to destroy all the torpedo boats and torpedo boat destroyers that could be launched against her. There is a general conviction that our thirteen-inch guns are too big, that eight and ten inch guns to the same amount of weight are better, and that the smaller rapid-fire guns are weapons that have a way of doing a greater share of execution than the huge steel tubes that shiver and shatter their own foundations.

It is said by the Admiral that many of our shells did not explode, and our Navy Department is already making provision for more sensitive shells. Our monitors are slightly spoken of, and Admiral Sampson thought he found them a nuisance, holding back his fleet, yet the Monterey and the Monadnock crossed the Pacific Ocean, and Admiral Dewey was extremely glad to add them to his squadron, for they gave him the ability to smash batteries that had caused him uneasiness, and if Camara's fleet had appeared in the waters of Asia, he proposed to wait for the monitors on the way before undertaking the sinking of a second Spanish squadron.

The Colonel Commandant of the United States Marine Corps states:

"During the war 57 vessels had marine guards, varying in strength from 80 down to 6 men, making a total of 2,055 enlisted men at sea. There were 623 in the battalion and 50 at Key West, making a total of 2,728."

A battalion of marines saw very active service at Guantanamo. Landing on the 10th of June at Guantanamo Bay, they were on the 11th attacked by a superior force of Spaniards, and a constant fire was kept up for three days. The bay was important, as it was the only one where the vessels could take shelter in the hurricane season. The necessity for the marines to hold their position is stated in the official report of the commander: "Owing to the dense undergrowth, affording safe shelter to the Spanish sharpshooters, it would have been impossible for the vessels, by shelling the shore, to keep the enemy from harassing those on board the ships with their Mauser rifles to such an extent as to make it dangerous for them to remain there."

Admiral Pluddeman has written critically on the matters of interest in our naval experience, and says of Guantanamo: "In the entrance of Guantanamo Bay the Americans found quite a number of mines. These might have caused considerable damage if they had operated, for the Americans entered the bay without any precautionary measures, and the screws of the Marblehead tore two of the mines loose from their anchorages so that they rose to the surface of the water. Then the whole bay was systematically searched for mines. This was done on June 21 by the boats of the Marblehead and Newark. Four steam launches, under the fire of Spanish infantry hiding on the shore, fished up thirteen mines on the first day with light chains they were towing. The ships, of course, fired on the hostile position, which was soon abandoned.

"During the next few days thirty-five more mines were found and taken ashore. These proved to be charged with 120 pounds of guncotton each. Many of them showed evidences of having been in contact with ships' bottoms or screws, but the firing mechanism was not capable of operating. The fuses showed such grave defects that it was quite evident that the work of constructing them had not been done under the supervision of a superior.

"The mines raised in Santiago Harbor after the surrender of the place proved on the whole to be in better condition. Still, the outer row containing contact mines was of doubtful value. One mine was found, for instance, in which half of the guncotton had been burned, leaving no doubt that it had been in contact with some object—probably the Merrimac—and that the fuse had acted, but that the guncotton charge had become spoiled.

"The second row of mines (electric) was in pretty good condition, and might easily have destroyed one or more ships if an attempt had been made

to force the entrance. These latter mines contained a charge of 200 pounds of guncotton each. All the mines in Guantanamo as well as Santiago Bay were thickly overgrown with barnacles and seaweeds."

This covers a point of some delicacy, owing to the controversy over the management of the fleet off Santiago in confining the assaults at the mouth of the harbor to cannonading. A study of the whole matter of the reports from both sides leads to the conclusion that Admiral Sampson was right in his objection to Shafter's change of plans after arrival, the weak point of the defense being at the mouth of the harbor, which could have been forced easily if troops had been landed to drive the Spaniards from their lower batteries, those of the old guns on the castle not being serious in modern warfare. It appears, however, that the dangers of driving into the mouth of the harbor were not as great as imagined. All experiences with Spanish torpedoes and mines discredit them, and plainly, if after Cervera's fleet had disappeared during the hours the harbor was open, the only grave peril was in the navigation of the difficult channel. However, it was Secretary Long's order that a battleship should not be "risked," but he evidently did not mean a literal interpretation of the caution.

It is ungracious to find fault systematically, and to award praise in stinted measure of either Sampson or Shafter, when the closing scenes were the annihilation of the fleet of Spain and the surrender of her army and of the ancient capital of Cuba; however, the distinguished Admiral and General are responsible for the rather fierce exchange of letters that so grounded and inflamed controversy that the grounds upon which it was established and the temper with which it was conducted cannot be neglected. The abundance of glory is insufficient to establish harmony.





CHAPTER XXVIII.

The Army of the United States.

Its Organization and Numbers Before and During the War—The Strength and Location of the Several Army Corps—The Distribution of the Military Forces and their Numbers—Casualties During the War, in Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines—Deaths in the Camps—The Incidents of Hardship and the Yellow Scandals—Spanish Account of the Valor of their Troops and Story of the Conflict—Scarcity of Provisions—Cruel Battles at El Caney and San Juan—Suffering in Santiago.

The regular army of the United States at the beginning of the war with Spain was composed of 2,143 officers and 26,040 enlisted men. Of general officers and staff corps there were 532, with 2,026 enlisted men; cavalry, 437 officers, 6,047 enlisted men; artillery, 288 officers, 4,486 enlisted men; infantry, 886 officers, enlisted men 12,828.

The army was increased in March and April, 1898. In the four months following the declaration of war with Spain, the enlisted men in the regular army numbered, in May, 41,934; June, 49,513; July, 53,931; August, 56,365. These figures include 5,365 men of the hospital corps. The regular officers were 2,191 in May, and 2,323 in August. The enlistments in the regular army were, in May, 9,569; June, 9,311; July, 6,586; August, 3,400. There were 387 regular officers appointed in the volunteer army. There were 15 major-generals, 45 brigadier-generals, 86 officers of volunteer regiments. The enlisted men in the infantry of the volunteer army were, in May, 118,580; June, 153,355; July, 203,461; August, 188,947.

The searching care taken in filling the ranks of the regular army appears in a strong light in the remarkable figures of this paragraph from the Adjutant-General's report:

Of the 29,521 accepted applicants, 24,490 were native born and 5,031 of foreign birth; 27,140 were white, 2,345 colored, and 36 Indians (scouts). The enlistments numbered 24,248, and the reënlistments, 5,273. Excluding reënlistments, the percentage of native-born applicants for original enlistment was 87, the balance being naturalized citizens. The reports show that the

recruiting officers making the 29,207 enlistments embraced in the first two items of the foregoing list rejected 98,277 applicants—a little over 77 per cent of the number seeking enlistment—as lacking in legal, mental, and moral or physical qualifications; 5,209 of these were rejected as aliens, and 4,788 for illiteracy.

The aggregate strength of the regular and of the volunteer armies for each of the months of May, June, July and August was as follows:

	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Grand total.
May—			
Regular army . . .	2,191	41,934	44,125
Volunteer army . . .	6,224	118,580	124,804
Aggregate . . .	8,415	160,514	168,929
June—			
Regular army . . .	2,198	49,513	51,711
Volunteer army . . .	7,169	153,355	160,524
Aggregate . . .	9,367	202,868	212,235
July—			
Regular army . . .	2,327	53,931	56,258
Volunteer army . . .	8,633	203,461	212,094
Aggregate . . .	10,960	257,392	268,352
August—			
Regular army . . .	2,323	56,365	58,688
Volunteer army . . .	8,785	207,244	216,029
Aggregate . . .	11,108	263,609	274,717

The Adjutant-General's report states that May 31, a month and ten days after the declaration of war, nearly 125,000 volunteers were mustered into service, and "the suspension of hostilities, resulting from the short but brilliant operations of the army against Santiago, Cuba, leading to its capture and of that of the Spanish forces defending the city, the surrender of Spanish troops in Porto Rico, no less than the successful operations of our troops in the Philippines, led to the determination to muster out 100,000 men, nearly one-half of the entire volunteer force, and the first order looking to that end was issued on the 18th of August."

The Adjutant-General speaks of the delicate duty of selecting the organizations to be mustered out, it being impossible "to preserve the absolutely correct arithmetical proportion, in the first instance, to the State quotas, and, in the second, to the actual number of troops from the several states," and he

adds: "Since the signing of the Protocol the officers and men of the volunteer regiments have remained at their posts of duty, in most cases at great personal sacrifice. That they have done this cheerfully and without complaint makes it all the more desirable that a speedy increase of the regular army be provided for in order that the volunteers may be released from further service and be allowed to return to their peaceful vocations."

Relating to staff organization, the Adjutant-General remarks: "If, as recommended, additional officers are given the line of the army, so as to give plenty of trained officers for staff duty in time of war, the main objection will have been met; and it is doubtful if, under all the conditions peculiar to this government, a general reorganization of the staff, or the adoption of new systems, will be found to be desirable; certainly nothing radical should be entered upon.

"Under the present system, Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan conducted great and successful campaigns; it has worked well in our Indian wars, and it is confidently asserted that, when the work of the staff departments in this war is more fully understood, it will receive the approval of military men and of the people generally. That there can be improvements in many ways there is no doubt; that this should be done as the result of experience is also true."

The regiments of the regular army, with few exceptions, got their orders to proceed to southern points April 15th, and considering the situation of the army, the extent of territory over which the posts were scattered in small detachments, the movements of concentration were executed with remarkable swiftness, order and ease. It was an excellent lesson of mobilization, and the complete success of this initial step made practicable the stroke at Santiago which proved fatal to Spanish pretension, preventing a lingering schooling of volunteers in the several camps for a greater enterprise under the Major-General Commanding, to resemble the important instruction imparted when for many months of "masterly inactivity" under McClelland all was "quiet on the Potomac." The infantry regiments' changes were made in the general shifting in this order:

First United States Infantry, California, to New Orleans.

Second United States Infantry, Montana and North Dakota, to Chickamauga Park, Ga.

Third United States Infantry, Minnesota, to Mobile, Ala.

- Fourth United States Infantry, Illinois, to Tampa, Fla.
- Fifth United States Infantry, Georgia, to Tampa, Fla.
- Sixth United States Infantry, Kentucky, to Tampa, Fla.
- Seventh United States Infantry, Colorado, to Chickamauga Park, Ga.
- Eighth United States Infantry, Wyoming, to Chickamauga Park, Ga.
- Ninth United States Infantry, New York, to Tampa, Fla.
- Tenth United States Infantry, Oklahoma, to Tampa, Fla.
- Eleventh United States Infantry, Missouri and Arkansas, Mobile, Ala.
- Twelfth United States Infantry, Nebraska, to Chickamauga Park, Ga.
- Thirteenth United States Infantry, New York, to Tampa, Fla.
- Sixteenth United States Infantry, Idaho and Washington, to Chickamauga Park, Ga.
- Seventeenth United States Infantry, Ohio, to Tampa, Fla.
- Eighteenth United States Infantry, Texas, to New Orleans, La.
- Nineteenth United States Infantry, Michigan, to Mobile, Ala.
- Twentieth United States Infantry, Kansas, to Mobile, Ala.
- Twenty-first United States Infantry, New York, to Tampa, Fla.
- Twenty-second United States Infantry, Nebraska, to Tampa, Fla.
- Twenty-third United States Infantry, Texas, to New Orleans, La.
- Twenty-fourth United States Infantry, Utah, to Chickamauga Park, Ga.
- Twenty-fifth United States Infantry, Montana, to Chickamauga Park, Ga.
- Company E, Engineers, West Point, to Tampa, Fla.

Seven army corps were formed by order of the President, May 7th, combining both regulars and volunteers, and the Philippine expeditionary force was June 21st the Eighth Corps. The First and Third corps were organized at Camp Thomas, Ga., Major-General John R. Brooke commanding the First, and Major-General James F. Wade the Third. The combined strength of these corps, on the last day of the month of April, May, June, July and August, was:

	Officers.	Enlisted men.
April	383	6,328
May	2,191	42,036
June	2,004	56,544
July	1,563	42,260
August	436	12,725

In July the First Division of the First Corps, under General Wilson, was detailed for duty in Porto Rico, and August 22 the Second and Third divisions of that corps were sent to Lexington, Ky., and Knoxville, Tenn., respectively.

The Third Army Corps was transferred early in September to the camp established at Anniston, Ala., and by the end of the month but a small detachment remained at Camp Thomas, Ga.

The Second Corps, Major-General William M. Graham commanding, was organized at Camp Alger, Virginia, and removed when that camp was discontinued in July to Camp Meade, Middletown, Pa. The Strength of the Corps was:

	Officers.	Enlisted men.
May	903	17,406
June	887	22,624
July	802	21,373
August	768	20,686

The headquarters of the Fourth Corps, Major-General John J. Coppinger commanding, were at Mobile, and the strength present was:

	Officers.	Enlisted men.
May	343	7,456
June	763	20,053
July	548	13,485
August	413	9,933

The Fifth Army Corps, Major-General William R. Shafter commanding, was organized June 7th at Tampa, and embarked for Santiago June 14th. The strength of this corps for the months indicated was as follows:

	Officers.	Enlisted men.
May	769	15,657
June	791	14,945
July	840	18,619
August	518	14,347

This corps, seventy days after embarking from Tampa, was returned to the United States, owing to the prevalence of sickness. They had in the meantime received the surrender of nearly double their number of Spaniards at Santiago.

The Sixth Corps was not organized. General Wilson, who was to have commanded it, was assigned to the first division of the first corps.

The Seventh Corps was commanded by Major-General Fitzhugh Lee. Its strength was:

	Officers.	Enlisted men.
May	496	8,847
June	781	18,375
July	909	23,193
August	1,025	27,817

The Eighth (Philippine Corps), Major-General Wesley Merritt commanding, sailed from San Francisco for Manila in seven expeditions, the first, under General Thomas Anderson, 115 officers and 2,386 enlisted men. They

sailed May 25th and arrived June 30th. The second expedition, General F. V. Green, 158 officers and 3,428 men, sailed June 15th and arrived July 17th. The third expedition, General Merritt, 197 officers and 4,650 enlisted men, sailed June 27th and 29th, and arrived July 25th and 31st. The fourth, General E. S. Otis, 42 officers and 1,640 enlisted men, sailed July 15th and arrived August 21st. The fifth expedition, Colonel H. C. Kessler, 54 officers and 1,294 men, sailed July 19th and arrived August 24th.

The sixth expedition, General H. G. Otis, sailed July 23d and arrived August 24th, 50 officers and 846 men. The seventh expedition, Lieutenant-Colonel Lee Stover, 25 officers and 814 enlisted men, sailed July 29th and arrived August 31st. The total of the seven expeditions was 641 officers and 15,058 enlisted men. Since that date, October 19, 27, 28 and 30, the troops that sailed for Manila were 99 officers and 2,565 men. The grand total of United States officers and enlisted men who have made the voyage from San Francisco to Manila is 17,363.

The subjoined table exhibits the strength and distribution of the Army of the United States through the Spanish war:

RÉSUMÉ OF STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION OF TROOPS.

Command.	May.		June.		July.		August.	
	Officers.	Enlisted men.						
Department of California.....	98	2,176	87	1,716	70	1,745	100	2,390
Department of Colorado.....	45	956	39	1,250	41	1,329	40	1,516
Department of Columbia.....	21	431	38	997	41	1,256	43	1,416
Department of Dakota.....	24	662	16	722	67	2,956	32	655
Department of the East.....	530	12,093	586	15,576	577	17,240	864	23,248
Department of the Gulf.....	230	4,921	232	5,792	249	7,228	280	7,262
Department of the Lakes.....	12	221	31	597	28	646	20	185
Department of the Missouri.....	23	757	20	591	20	598	19	522
First and Third Corps.....	2,191	42,036	2,004	56,544	1,563	42,260	438	12,725
Second Corps.....	903	17,406	867	22,624	802	21,378	768	20,688
Fourth Corps.....	342	7,456	763	20,958	548	13,485	413	9,933
Fifth Corps.....	769	15,657	791	14,945	890	18,619	518	14,347
Seventh Corps.....	496	8,847	781	18,375	909	23,193	1,025	27,817
Eighth Corps (Dept. of Pacific)	636	13,179	565	22,124	917	22,536	899	22,046
Porto Rico.....					377	9,084	641	16,332
Department of Santiago.....							299	6,748
At State Camps, en route, at recruiting stations, on furlough, etc.....	2,089	33,716	2,227	20,957	3,861	74,739	4,771	95,479
Grand total.....	8,413	160,514	9,367	202,868	10,960	257,932	11,108	263,609

Casualties.—The following is a statement of the several actions in which United States troops were engaged during the war with Spain, and of the losses sustained by them from April 21 to August 13, 1898:

Operations in Cuba.—May 2: Point Arbolitos, Companies E and G, First Infantry, under Capt. J. H. Dorst, Fourth Cavalry. No casualties.

Siege and Surrender of Santiago, June 22 to July 17. (Maj.-Gen. William R. Shafter, commanding Fifth Army Corps):

June 24.—La Quasina: Cavalry division, Maj.-Gen. Joseph Wheeler, commanding. Second Cavalry Brigade, Brig.-Gen. S. B. M. Young.

Present for duty, June 20, 74 officers and 1,067 enlisted men. Killed, one officer and 15 enlisted men; wounded, 6 officers and 44 enlisted men.

Officers killed and wounded, 7. Killed: Capt. A. K. Capron, First United States Volunteer Cavalry. Wounded: Maj. J. M. Bell, First Cavalry, and A. O. Brodie, First United States Volunteer Cavalry; Capt. T. T. Knox, First Cavalry, and J. H. McClintock, First United States Volunteer Cavalry; First Lieuts. G. L. Byram, First Cavalry, and J. R. Thomas, Jr., First United States Volunteer Cavalry.

July 1-12.—Operations against Santiago, embracing the actions at San Juan, El Caney, and Aguadores, July 1-3, and actions around Santiago, July 10-12. Present for duty, June 30, 858 officers and 17,358 enlisted men.

Killed: 22 officers and 222 enlisted men; wounded, 93 officers and 1,288 enlisted men.

Officers killed and wounded, 122. Killed: Col. C. A. Wikoff, Twenty-second Infantry; Lieut.-Col. J. M. Hamilton, Ninth Cavalry; Maj. A. G. Forse, First Cavalry; Capt. C. W. Rowell, Second Infantry; A. M. Wetherill, Sixth Infantry; John Drum, Tenth Infantry; T. W. Morrison, Sixteenth Infantry, and William O'Neill, First United States Volunteer Cavalry; First Lieuts. W. E. Shipp and W. H. Smith, Tenth Cavalry; J. G. Ord, Sixth Infantry; G. H. Field, Second Massachusetts Infantry; Second Lieuts. J. J. Bernard, Fourth Infantry; E. N. Benchley, Sixth Infantry; T. A. Wansboro, Seventh Infantry; L. H. Lewis, Ninth Infantry; W. A. Sater, Thirteenth Infantry; D. M. Michie, Seventeenth Infantry; J. A. Guerney and J. N. Augustin, Twenty-fourth Infantry; H. L. McCorkle, Twenty-fifth Infantry, and Acting Assistant Surgeon H. W. Danforth, who was on duty with Ninth Cavalry.



DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS OF UNITED STATES ARMY AT SANTIAGO.



GENERAL W. F. RANDOLPH.



BOB WRENN AND BILLY LARNED.



TRAIN OF PACK MULES.



SERGEANT DAN HEWITT.

Wounded: Brig.-Gen. H. S. Hawkins. Lieut.-Cols. Henry Carroll, Ninth Cavalry; H. C. Egbert, Sixth Infantry; W. S. Worth, Thirteenth Infantry; J. T. Haskell, Seventeenth Infantry; E. H. Liscum, Twenty-fourth Infantry; J. H. Patterson, Twenty-second Infantry. Maj. H. W. Wessells, Third Cavalry; T. J. Wint, Tenth Cavalry; J. H. Smith, Second Infantry; A. W. Corliss, Seventh Infantry; S. H. Lincoln and R. I. Eskridge, Tenth Infantry; P. H. Ellis, Thirteenth Infantry, and W. C. Hayes, First Ohio Cavalry. Capt. H. L. Mills, A. A. G. Volunteers (first lieutenant, First Cavalry); G. K. Hunter and G. A. Dodd, Third Cavalry; J. B. Kerr and A. P. Blocksom, Sixth Cavalry; C. W. Taylor, Ninth Cavalry; John Bigelow, Jr., Tenth Cavalry; C. D. Parkhurst, Second Artillery; W. J. Turner, Second Infantry; Z. W. Torrey and G. B. Walker, Sixth Infantry; J. B. Jackson, Seventh Infantry; R. C. Van Vliet, Tenth Infantry; James Fornance, J. B. Guthrie, and H. G. Cavanaugh, Thirteenth Infantry; William Lassiter, W. C. McFarland, and T. C. Woodbury, Sixteenth Infantry; H. B. Moon and J. B. Rodman, Twentieth Infantry; F. B. Jones, J. J. Crittenden, and Theodore Mosher, Twenty-second Infantry; A. C. Ducat and J. J. Brereton, Twenty-fourth Infantry; W. S. Warrenner, Second Massachusetts Infantry, and Capt. M. J. Henry, commissary of subsistence volunteers. First Lieuts. Arthur Thayer, A. C. Merrillat, and O. B. Meyer, Third Cavalry; W. S. Wood, Ninth Cavalry; R. L. Livermore, E. D. Anderson, and M. H. Barnum, Tenth Cavalry; W. C. Neary, Fourth Infantry; J. S. Grissard, Seventh Infantry; J. R. Seyburn, Eighth Infantry; Carl Koops, Tenth Infantry; A. B. Scott, Thirteenth Infantry; S. W. Dunning, Sixteenth Infantry; W. M. Dickinson, Seventeenth Infantry; G. J. Godfrey, Twenty-second Infantry; H. G. Lyon and J. E. Brett, Twenty-fourth Infantry; R. C. Day and J. A. Carr, First United States Volunteer Cavalry. Second Lieuts. W. C. Short, Sixth Cavalry; F. R. McCoy, T. A. Roberts, H. C. Whitehead, and H. O. Williard, Tenth Cavalry; B. H. Wells and W. J. Lutz, Second Infantry; J. H. Hughes, Fourth Infantry; L. H. Gross, C. N. Purdy, John Robertson, R. S. Turman, and W. H. Simons, Sixth Infantry; H. A. Lafferty, Seventh Infantry; M. C. Saville, Tenth Infantry; W. E. Dove and Clark Churchman, Twelfth Infantry; L. S. Sorley and R. E. Spence, Sixteenth Infantry; B. F. Hardaway, Seventeenth Infantry; F. R. Meade, Twenty-first Infantry; W. H. Wassell, Twenty-second Infantry; Albert Laws, Twenty-fourth Infantry; J. S. Murdock and H. L. Kinnison,

Twenty-fifth Infantry; D. J. Moynahan and C. D. Hapgood, Second Massachusetts Infantry; W. E. Trull, Seventy-first New York Infantry; D. J. Leahy and H. K. Devereaux, First United States Volunteer Cavalry, and Acting Second Lieut. (cadet M. A.) Ernest A. Haskell, First United States Volunteer Cavalry.

Operations in Porto Rico, July 25 to August 13 (Maj.-Gen. Nelson A. Miles, commanding):

July 25.—Guanica road: 1 officer and 3 enlisted men wounded.

August 5.—Guayamo: 4 enlisted men wounded.

August 8.—Four miles north of Guayamo: 5 enlisted men wounded.

August 9.—Near Coamo: 6 enlisted men wounded.

August 10.—Hormigueros: 1 enlisted man killed; 1 officer and 15 enlisted men wounded. Officer wounded: First Lieut. J. C. Byron, Eighth Cavalry, A. D. C. to General Schwan.

August 12.—Pass near Arbonito: 2 enlisted men killed; 2 officers and 3 enlisted men wounded. Officers wounded: Capt. F. T. Lee, Third Wisconsin Infantry, and Lieut. J. P. Hains, Third Artillery.

August 13.—At crossing of the Rio Prieto, near Las Marias: No casualties.

The total casualties in Porto Rico were 3 enlisted men killed and 4 officers and 36 enlisted men wounded.

Operations in Manila, Philippines, July 30 to August 13 (Maj.-Gen. Wesley Merritt, commanding):

July 30 - August 5.—In the trenches before Manila: Thirteen enlisted men killed; 7 officers and 57 enlisted men wounded.

Officers wounded: Capts. C. V. Hobbs, Third Artillery, Reinhold Richter, First California Infantry, and J. A. Loar, Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry; First Lieuts. E. F. Davis, First California Infantry, and R. D. Laird, Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry; Second Lieuts. A. J. Buttermore and G. L. Gordon, Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry.

August 13.—Assault on Manila: 4 enlisted men killed; 3 officers and 39 enlisted men wounded.

Officers wounded: Capts. Oscar Seabach, A. W. Bjornstad, and First Lieut. C. G. Bunker, Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry.

The total casualties in Manila were: 17 enlisted men killed, 10 officers and 96 men wounded.

Grand total of casualties in killed and wounded during the war with Spain:

Where—	Killed		Wounded	
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.
Cuba	23	237	99	1,332
Porto Rico	3	4	36
Manila	17	10	96
Total	23	257	113	1,464

The number of deaths from all causes, between May 1 and September 30 inclusive, as reported to the Adjutant-General's office up to October 3, were: Killed, 23 officers and 257 enlisted men; died of wounds, 4 officers and 61 enlisted men; died of disease, 80 officers and 2,485 enlisted men. Total, 107 officers and 2,803 enlisted men, being an aggregate of 2,910 out of a total force of 274,717 officers and men, or a percentage of 1.06%.

Statement showing the embarkation of Spanish prisoners, officers, and enlisted men, and the wives of officers and their children over 5 years of age, priests, monks, and sisters of charity, from Cuba to Spain, as reported to the Quartermaster-General's office by Mr. Solon F. Massey, agent, Quartermaster's Department:

Name of vessel.	Where embarked.	Date of embarkation.	Officers.	Number of persons.						Total.
				Enlisted men.	Total of army.	Women.	Children.	Priests and monks.	Sisters of charity.	
Alicante	Santiago	Aug. 9	38	1,069	1,107	1	5	11	1,124
Isle de Luzon	Santiago	Aug. 14	137	2,056	2,193	16	24	4	2,237
Covadonga	Santiago	Aug. 16	109	2,148	2,257	34	45	2,336
Villaverde	Santiago	Aug. 19	52	565	617	18	16	651
Isla de Panay	Santiago	Aug. 19	99	1,599	1,698	19	7	2	3	1,729
P. de Satrustegui	Santiago	Aug. 22	128	2,359	2,487	31	37	2,555
Montevideo	Santiago	Aug. 25	136	2,108	2,244	53	69	2	2,368
Cheribon	Santiago	Aug. 27	18	905	923	12	25	960
Colon	Santiago	Aug. 28	100	1,316	1,416	36	23	1,475
Colon	Guantanamo	Aug. 30	23	726	749	3	2	754
Leo XIII	Guantanamo	Sept. 1	113	2,209	2,322	51	57	2,430
San Ignacio	Guantanamo	Sept. 3	59	1,408	1,467	10	10	1	11	1,499
Leonora	Guantanamo	Sept. 6	15	1,118	1,133	1,133
Ciudad de Cadiz	Guantanamo	Sept. 12	53	53	14	5	1	13	86
San Augustin	Guantanamo	Sept. 17	65	800	865	24	21	910
San Francisco	Guantanamo	Sept. 17	18	588	606	9	2	617
Total	1,163	20,974	22,137	331	348	21	27	22,864

Principal camps of United States troops, dates of establishment, and number of deaths by disease, accidents, etc., at each to September 30, as reported to the Adjutant-General's Office:

Camps—	Date of establishment.	Deaths.
Camp Thomas, Chickamauga Park, Ga.	Apr. 14	425
Camp Cuba Libre, Jacksonville, Fla.	May 26	246
Tampa, Fla.	May 2	56
Cuba (not including killed or died of wounds)	June 22	427
At sea, en route from Cuba to Montauk Point	Aug. and Sept.	87
Camp Wikoff, Montauk Point, N. Y.	Aug. 7	257
Manila, Philippine Islands	June 30	63
Porto Rico	July 25	137
Camp Alger, near Falls Church and vicinity	May 18	107
Camps in San Francisco	May 7	139
Camp Poland, Knoxville, Tenn.	Aug. 21	23
Camp Shipp, Anniston, Ala.	Sept. 3	12
Camp Meade, near Middletown, Pa.	Aug. 24	64
Camp Hamilton, Lexington, Ky.	Aug. 23	29
Camp Wheeler, Huntsville, Ala.	Aug. 17	35
At posts, minor camps, etc.	378
Total		2,485

The report of the Quartermaster-General, M. J. Ludington, gives an idea of the magnitude of the problem of supplying an army of 275,000 men with the machinery and stores provided for an army of 25,000. The General says:

"This Department set upon this task without a moment's delay; every known expedient was at once resorted to with a view to obtaining the necessary quartermaster supplies. Many difficulties were in the way. Contracts were promptly entered into for all the articles of clothing and camp equipage for which there would be an early demand, great care being taken to prevent the supply of articles of inferior quality. The kerseys and flannels of standard quality used for making army blouses and trousers were not to be had in the market, and it was necessary to have them manufactured. In the meantime, the Department, as far as possible, endeavored to procure articles conforming as nearly as practicable to existing standards, but had to resort, at first, to some extent, to the purchase of dark-blue trousers, so that the men might be quickly supplied."

The peace and war figures of the principal articles purchased or contracted for are instructive when the two periods are contrasted:

	July 1, 1897, to Apr. 30, 1898, 10 months peace period.	May 1, 1898, to Aug. 15, 1898, 3¼ months war period.
Blankets, wool	22,000	546,338
Blouses	274,232
Caps, forage	77,000	230,000
Canvas, fatigue coats	31,601
Canvas fatigue trousers, pairs	31,590
Drawers, canton flannel, pairs	50,000
Drawers, summer, pairs	43,340	1,056,990
Field and summer uniforms	153,169
Hats, campaign	18,040	476,705
Leggins	11,000	588,800
Overcoats	129,000
Ponchos, rubber	32,925	325,385
Shirts, dark blue flannel	548,634
Shoes, barrack, pairs	76,093
Shoes, calfskin, pairs	27,950	782,303
Stockings, cotton, pairs	1,996,699
Stockings, woolen, pairs	40,006	150,942

It is not surprising to learn that "the shoes procured at the outbreak of hostilities, and which were found to be essential for the immediate equipment of the organizations then being rapidly mustered into service, did not conform altogether to the newly adopted army shoe."

This does not look like inattention: "The clothing of part of the troops returning from Cuba was ordered to be destroyed to prevent contagion, and the issue to each of the men, free of charge, of another suit in lieu of the one destroyed was authorized. Similar issue was also made to the men in hospitals whose clothing was destroyed for the same reason."

There is much said in few words in this paragraph:

"Fourteen ships were chartered to June 30, 1898, on the Pacific coast, having a total tonnage of 41,152 and carrying capacity of 629 officers and 13,059 men, with their complete outfit of camp and garrison equipage, arms, ammunition, medical and subsistence stores for a voyage of over 7,000 miles." And this was without a serious accident. The movements of troops up to September 15 was: to Cuba, 28,195; to Porto Rico, 17,460; to Manila, 16,405; to

Honolulu, 629; returned from Cuba, 21,686; returned from Porto Rico, 5,541; civilian employes transported, 2,920; the total being 92,863.

A résumé of the work done by the Quartermaster's Department at Tampa in the short space of four months is as follows: Army corps equipped, 2; freight cars handled (loaded or unloaded), 13,239; officers and men transported, 66,478; horses and mules transported, 15,309; horses and mules received, 11,389; horses and mules issued, 9,919; wagons "set up," 604; teams "broken out" (6 mules), 141; teams "broken out" (4 mules), 520; pack trains equipped, 21; wagons and ambulances repaired, 699; transports fitted out, 33; transports cleared, 78.

The Quartermaster in his general summary observes: "Practically everything needed for the largely increased army had to be purchased or manufactured and then transported to the numerous camps."

During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1898, transportation was furnished for 709,617 persons, 60,632 animals, and 1,529,585 tons of war material.

One of the public complaints, widespread and bitter, of the disadvantages to which our soldiers were exposed when facing the enemy at Santiago and Manila, was that the Spaniards had the advantage of us in smokeless powder, and that their rifle, the Mauser, was an excellent long-range gun. General D. W. Flagler, Chief of Ordnance, gives in his report to the Secretary of War this interesting information:

"The especial advantage of the magazine rifle is its reserve of five cartridges in the magazine, the very important advantage of its flatter trajectory, and the lighter weight of its ammunition, which enables the soldier to carry more cartridges. The most serious defect of the Springfield rifle during the war was the fact that at the origin nothing but charcoal powder could be furnished for it. As rapidly as possible this defect was overcome, and the manufacture of smokeless ammunition for the caliber .45 rifle was carried on extensively. The large reserve of Springfield rifles on hand will be supplied with smokeless-powder cartridges should their use become necessary in the future, a use which is not now anticipated. The arms, however, are being cleaned and repaired and made fit for service as rapidly as turned in.

"Reports of officers who were in the Santiago campaign, as received by a special board which proceeded to Montauk Point to investigate the subject, confirm the excellence of the magazine rifle, caliber .30, in all respects.

Notwithstanding rough usage, unusual exposure in a bad climate, which prevented the exercise of the usual care in preserving the arm, the breech mechanism is reported to have worked smoothly and well."

The American magazine rifle has had fastened upon it the name Krag-Jorgensen. General Flagler says:

"At Springfield Arsenal there were manufactured up to June 30, 1898, some 30,000 magazine rifles, 12,000 magazine carbines, an output of about 11,000 more than during the last fiscal year, but this does not show the large increase incident to the war. The maximum was not reached until August 13, when about 370 per day, or over 100,000 per year, were being manufactured. The average daily output before March 15 was about 120. This output was gradually increased to the maximum by working double shifts of men and putting them on as rapidly as was practicable. The utmost output at Springfield with the present plant would not exceed about 500 per day. In February the manufacturers were given orders to work on smokeless powder to their full capacity. Under these orders, with the charcoal powder obtained, the amount on hand brought the supply up to a reasonably safe point. The first issues of powder for field and siege guns were made from charcoal powder on hand; but before the end of May the supply of smokeless powder was ready, and this was issued thereafter."

The Secretary of War remarks:

"The supply of powder was a most troublesome question at the outbreak of the war. There are only two establishments in this country which manufacture smokeless powder, and they own patents upon the process. These, however, like all other companies called to aid the government, responded with alacrity, ran their works day and night, and produced in a short time an ample supply. The same can be said for all manufacturers of tents, clothing, all kinds of guns, cartridges, and other war material, and but for their most energetic exertions we would have been sadly deficient."

The Secretary recommends that there should be 500,000 magazine rifles in our arsenals. General Greeley, in his report on the Signal Service, says the work of the corps "affords a beautiful example of the rapidity and efficiency with which electrical communications can be established and maintained between military posts and advancing armies when the commanding general of such armies takes proper equipments," and instances: "The peace protocol reached the outposts of Generals Brooke, Wilson, and Henry within

thirty-three minutes of the time it was received at Ponce, and thus prevented battles at two points where the troops were moving out."

One hundred and seventy miles of line were operated in Porto Rico when the end of the war came. General Greeley says:

"Cables had to be manufactured to order, steamer chartered, cable gear obtained, and the Chief Signal Officer opened negotiations with commercial telegraph companies whereby the whole system would be harmonious. As a result of two months' labor, the Signal Corps opened a station at Cainanera, Guantanamo Bay, June 20, a day in advance of the landing of General Shafter's army, and within five minutes telegraphically of the Executive Mansion and War Department."

The pages of this volume given to telegrams prove that this marvelous connection between the President and headquarters in the field did not, as has been the rule in wars, cripple the armies, taking the initiative out of the generals commanding and confronting the enemy, but, on the contrary, energized them, and constantly facilitated rather than retarded the decisive movements.

Next to the belated and scandalous disturbance about fresh meat, there was the most disheartening palaver and clamorous outcry relating to water in the camps, and the spot selected to overwhelm this storm was the camp at Chickamauga Park. And yet twenty-seven wells were drilled through the solid rock underlying the park, though springs abounded. General H. V. Boynton, of the Park Commission, says:

"By casing and surrounding the wells at the surface with masonry set in hydraulic cement, surface contamination was rendered impossible. While this work was in progress an emergency pipe line, designed primarily to provide water for cooking, for the large number of animals, and for washing, was recommended and authorized by the Secretary of War, and constructed by the engineer of the park. The intake was established on Chickamauga Creek at the farthest point of park ownership of the stream, and above any possible wash from the camps, in spite of all that has been asserted to the contrary. This stream is fed entirely from mountain springs, and the valley it flows through is exceptionally clean and wholesome. Ten miles of mains and laterals were expeditiously laid, furnishing abundant water to nearly all the camps, and shower baths for all who cared to arrange them.

"All the springs and wells on the park, and the water of the pipe line, were analyzed by competent chemical authority as soon as any question was

raised as to the purity of the water supply, and all in use by troops pronounced fit for domestic use, except two wells, which at first were regarded as doubtful, and their use stopped, but which were found by more thorough analyses to be good. The pipe-line water was twice analyzed chemically, and once bacteriologically by Dr. C. F. Craig of the army, a recognized authority, and pronounced good. While the water supply of the park was abundant and wholesome, the outcry against it, though not based on analyses, became so general as to lead to much hauling of spring water for considerable distances, to the great inconvenience of the troops and the hospitals, and the unnecessary disturbance of the country."

There is no doubt that a good deal of bad stuff called "beef" was sent to the army, and it has been decorated with the descriptive word "embalmed," while it is asserted that "chemicals" were used, and frightful fluids injected—something different from the common chemistry of salt, we infer. The magnificent energies of the modern journalism were largely bestowed upon this chemical terror, and after a war into which the Administration of the Government was forced when there was a plentiful lack of preparation and through which the Nation passed triumphantly, there was a sensation that rivaled the Dreyfus scandal in France, but fortunately Americans are less excitable and fantastic in expression than Frenchmen.

The motive forces of the emotion seemed to spring from the soil where there was a failure to cultivate the primary opportunities in the season when the seed was sown for the harvest of events. The personalities that figured in the unseemly proceedings need not be noticed. They were embodiments of vanities and other weaknesses of ostentation that lacks substantiality. The pose of passion that was full of tears and has a tendency to tatters may be forgiven sooner than the pride that stooped to folly and fancied cloudy campaigns.

Napoleon and Wellington had tormenting troubles with the providers of provisions, meats in particular, for their armies, and prescribed the shooting of the commissaries; and Patrick Henry heaped an immortality of ridicule upon a contractor who had sold beef to the old Continentals, filling the air with cries of "Beef, beef!" Some of the journals that in their majestic presumption not only conducted the war, but claimed the honor of causing it, and indulged in the tropical luxuriance of their imagination, sounded the brasses, and blowed the wind about their luxuriant theme.

There was enough shown of carelessness, experimental or speculative, or

of a lack of executive intelligence in discrimination, to warrant anger, but the exaggeration of details that offend, distort and magnify until wrath is wasted in weariness, and there is a stage set with strange scenery, reminding one of the poetry of a lunatic describing a wilderness in which his mind was lost:

"Yonder indigenous endogen wave
Banner-like blades from a mystical bole,
And with a vigor perennial, brave
Boreal blasts from the Alien pole."

Fresh meat is hard to manage in hot countries in good form, whatever may be the experimental chemistry of speculation. The ship anchored nearest the flagship of Admiral Dewey in Manila Bay was a Belgian cold-storage iron steamer from Australia, filled with frozen beef and mutton. A boat-load of it was conveyed to the deck of the Olympia every day, placed on and covered by a sail, that it might slowly thaw. If the flesh is released from the ice suddenly, if cooked before the process of thawing is complete, it turns black and cannot be eaten, loses flavor and acts like something "embalmed." Let the thaw occur gradually, and the beef and mutton become—it is the Admiral's word—"delicious."

The fact as to the embalmed beef is that, as it was known the meat of steers became ill-flavored in from twelve to sixteen hours, there was offered an experiment in fresh meat alleged to have been prepared so that it would remain good seventy hours. It was referred to General Young, who reported against the experiment. Then permission was asked to put some of it on two transports for trial. That was granted. The experiment failed, and the stuff was thrown overboard.

Lieutenant José Muller is the Spanish officer who called on Lieutenant Hobson in Morro Castle and insisted upon asking him questions with an air of severity, but was questioned himself, and it finally developed that he had been playing a part of intimidation, he and Hobson separating as good friends in pleasant fellowship. His account of the battles and capitulation of Santiago de Cuba is valuable, and we quote from his work passages of interest to the American army and all students of its history. He says of the situation of the city in the middle of June:

"One of the first articles that gave out was flour, and no bread could be baked. Hardtack (galleta) was used instead, but only a few people could pay for it; there was no milk to be had, indispensable for the sick and for babies

The soldiers commenced to eat bread made of rice and rice boiled in water, which weakened them very much; and though they were not suffering actual hunger, everybody knew that calamity was not far off and was inevitable, for no provisions could be expected, either by land or sea."

It was the scarcity of provisions, Lieutenant Muller says, that "compelled General Linares to defend the line, which, beginning at Ermitaño and passing through El Caney, San Miguel de Lajas, Quintero Hill and the hills of La Caridad and Veguita, would protect the railway to Sabanilla and Morón and the aqueduct. If the troops could have maintained this line, they would not have suffered for lack of water, as they did in some positions, nor would the food, as long as we remained in possession of the cultivated region, have been reduced to rice bread and rice boiled in water, which the soldiers could not stand and which made them unfit for active operations. There was nothing left in Santiago except rice, and only 500,000 extra cartridges outside of the regular supply of the soldiers, namely, 150 each; for although there were many more included in the surrender of the Park, they are of the Remington, Argentine Mauser, and other types, and of calibers differing from those of the Spanish Mauser, which is the weapon carried by almost all of our forces. Of course, 150 cartridges are used up very rapidly.

"If El Caney and the San Juan position had not been taken we should not have lost our communications with the cultivated region, nor would the aqueduct have been cut, and it is easy enough to understand how much these two things had to do with later events.

"The ships would no doubt have reduced the city to ashes and ruin, but there would have been water and more provisions, and the army would have been able to maintain itself and fight, at least until the last cartridge was gone."

Here the lamentation comes in that the insurgent Cubans had held back Escario's column, with which it is assumed that the long line could have been maintained on the 27th of June.

"The Vesuvius had discharged two bombs the preceding night, one completely destroying the house of the lighthouse keeper, the other seriously damaging the fortress, wounding three sailors of the Mercedes, and a soldier of the garrison." And yet the German Admiral who has been writing of the lessons of America for the benefit of our countrymen pronounces the dynamite boat as without value. The Spaniards by watching the transport ships were able to tell approximately the number of the Americans on hand.

This account is given of the numbers and organization of the defenders of Santiago:

"The advance post of Caney (a league and a half—about 6 miles—from the city), in command of General Vara del Rey, was defended by three companies of the battalion 'Constitución' (the 29th), one company of guerrillas on foot, in all 430 men, 40 soldiers of the Santiago regiment, and 50 of the mobilized troops, being a total of 520 men.

"The line of the precinct (9 kilometers), extending from Dos Caminos del Cobre, west of the city, to the fort of Punta Blanca, to the east, on the sea-shore, was defended by the following forces:

Corps of sailors from the fleet (four second companies) . . .	458
Four companies of the Provisional Battalion of Puerto Rico . . .	450
Talavera Battalion, No. 4 (Peninsular)	850
Four companies of the San Fernando Battalion, No. 11 . . .	440
	<hr/>
Total, army	2,198
Three companies of mobilized troops	330
Volunteers	440
	<hr/>
Total	2,968

"Also a small number of gunners, for there was not a sufficient number to serve the guns installed. It may therefore be said that there were, in round numbers, 3,000 men. This was the fighting force." There was also the cavalry, the firemen and 970 men at the mouth of the harbor.

The Spanish story of the battles of El Caney and San Juan is intensely interesting. General Vara del Rey had 520 men, with two Plasencia guns, and the position of San Juan was occupied by 250 men. They claimed that General Wheeler had 12,000 men, a remarkable exaggeration. Another statement is that Wheeler's command was 3,500 men, supported by another brigade, "while Colonel Chaffee, with 2,000 men, attacked the hill and fort of San Juan." Lieutenant Muller says:

"The Americans, it must be acknowledged, fought that day with truly admirable courage and spirit. The houses of El Caney, which General Vara with his 520 men converted into as many fortresses, threw forth a hail of projectiles upon the enemy, while one company after another, without any protection, rushed with veritable fury upon the city. The first company having been decimated, another appeared, then a third, and still another, and those

soldiers resembled moving statues (if I may be permitted that expression for want of a better) rather than men; but they met heroes, and although the houses had been riddled with bullets by the artillery and musketry, and although the streets were obstructed with dead and wounded, El Caney had been converted into a veritable volcano, vomiting forth lava and making it impossible to go near it.

"Both sides being short of forces and out of breath, almost without having stirred from their relative positions, the battle ceased for some time, and General Vara del Rey took advantage of this circumstance to have his soldiers re-form the lines and again get ready for the battle.

'General Linares, who was repulsing the attacks at the position of San Juan, upon learning the result of these assaults, warmly congratulated the handful of lions in these words: 'When the American army attacked El Caney they had not counted on a general of Vara del Rey's stamp and on troops as fiery and inured to warfare as those he had under his command.'

"The fighting commenced once more, and the enemy attacked again and again, being always repulsed, but as we had no reserve forces, and the Americans, on the contrary, had a great many, the battle was no longer possible under these circumstances. The General was wounded almost simultaneously in both legs by two musket balls, and as he was being carried away on a stretcher, the bullets falling around him like hail, he was killed by a third one, at the same moment as two of the men who were carrying him.

"The greater part of the commanders and officers (among them two relatives of the General) were dead or wounded, as also the majority of the soldiers. Finally, at 7 p. m., the commander being dead and those 520 men having been reduced to less than 100, and most of these slightly wounded and bruised, that handful of heroes, for want of forces and a commander, retreated from the site, which for ten hours they had been defending without being able to get any reinforcements, for there were none to be had, and the enemy occupied the position in which he in his turn had made such a bold attack."

Only eighty of the 520 Spaniards who fought at El Caney returned. The Spaniards organized and entrenched at San Juan, and "the Americans attacked about noon with cannon, machine gun and musket fire. The Spanish position became critical," as "one half of the officers had fallen under the action of the lead that was pouring down upon the line. The enemy was advancing in large and compact masses, firmly resolved to take the positions,

but Baquero, the brave soldier who had distinguished himself so highly in the campaign, was there, keeping up by his example the spirit of the troops, almost annihilated by hunger and fatigue, and decimated by the clouds of bullets and grapeshot.

"At this critical moment the cavalry was ordered to advance rapidly in order to protect the retreat of Colonel Baquero's forces and save the artillery if possible. Lieutenant-Colonel Sierra hastened to carry out the order, as Commander Arraiz had done before him at San Juan.

"The line which General Linares commanded personally now formed the vanguard. With his assistance the General's aids and his chief of staff had to organize the remnants of the first line.

"It was necessary to maintain that position at any cost, for its loss would give the enemy free entrance into the city. The brave men of the first line were retreating. Colonel Baquero had disappeared, killed, no doubt, when he led that retreat under the hail of grapeshot and lead. The enemy was advancing in compact masses, and rushing upon what was now the first line. Fortunately, the fire of our infantry, accurately aimed, compelled the Americans to recede, and they retreated behind the positions of San Juan. At that moment General Linares and the brave commander of infantry, Arraiz, fell wounded; the latter officer, who had already shed his blood at Cacarajicara, was one of the most beautiful examples of the army.

"The San Juan forces tried once more to recover themselves. Others came to their assistance, among them the company of marines which had been stationed at the Plaza de Toros with Captain Bustamente; but the enemy was already strongly occupying the position, our forces were scant, and success was impossible."

The Spanish writer speaks of "the cruel battles of El Caney and San Juan." At 3:30, at the Plaza de Dolores, he met General Linares. He was on a stretcher being carried to his house. The battle was at an end, and "many commanders and officers were arriving all tired out and almost dying from thirst." The Spanish hospital was near the trenches, and "musket balls were falling in great quantities in the court and on the roof. Later on shells were flying in all directions." The loss of El Caney was the loss of both provisions and water by the Spaniards, and the writer we are quoting gave up the ghost of a chance in these words:

"We had to confine ourselves to the defense of the precinct, knowing full

well that, though the sad end might be held off for a day or two longer, there was no possibility of avoiding it."

He claims that the Americans were inspired by the fighting of the Spaniards with respectful admiration; and says the Americans did not after the 1st of July expose themselves as on that day, but "entrenched themselves and set up their artillery as fast as they received it, and did not again come out from behind their fortifications." And "it was difficult to convince them that only 520 men had been defending El Caney for ten hours. When doubt was no longer possible, their admiration had no limits. When they entered Santiago de Cuba the American soldiers and ours looked upon each other without any prejudice or jealousy, perhaps because they knew that both had fought like brave men, and whenever the Americans saw one of our men of the Twenty-ninth (the number of the battalion 'Constitución,' which had defended the city, and has been referred to so many times) they would call him, look at him, and treat him with great admiration, wondering, perhaps, how so simple a soldier could do such great things.

"The men of the Twenty-ninth, known to have done something worth doing, were loved and feasted by every one and spent whole hours with the Americans, who did not understand them, but applauded everything they said, on the assumption, perhaps, that he who is brave must also be bright.

"Incidents like these I saw, not once, but a hundred times, and they have made me believe and say what I have stated. I may be mistaken, but I do not believe it, because I have also noticed that the Yankees treat the insurgents, although they are their allies, very differently."

According to their own list, the casualties of the Spaniards were:

Killed: Brigadier-General Joaquin Vara del Rey, 3 commanders, 12 officers, and 78 men.

Missing: Colonel of Infantry José Baquero, 4 officers, and 116 men. The Colonel was probably killed, but this could not be verified.

Prisoners: Two officers.

Wounded: Lieutenant-General Arsenio Linares Pombo, 6 commanders, 30 officers, and 339 men.

(Among the wounded officers was Colonel of Engineers Caula and Colonel of Artillery Ordoñez). Total, 595.

The Spanish story of the siege is that the Americans opened fire by land and sea. "Each hour that elapsed fortified the circle that enclosed us," and

in the night the Americans "kept up most incessantly a violent musket and terrific gun fire," bombarded the city, dismounted one of the two effective guns on the Socapa, and on the 2d of July the companies of the fleet embarked, and "a pilot was sent to each one of the ships, which latter took in their boats and steam launches and loosened the spring on their cables, and the gunboat Alvarado, which had come out of the slip and was afloat, raised at night the six Bustamente torpedoes that were obstructing the channel to the west. Everything indicated, without leaving room for doubt, that the fleet was about to go out; but when and how?" That question was answered the next morning. Even that night the Spaniards believed there was a fleet coming from Spain to the rescue of Santiago. On the next day after the destruction of Cervera's fleet, July 4th, Lieutenant Muller says, the Mercedes was sunk to obstruct the harbor channel.

"As the interior of the harbor did no longer have the safeguard of the fleet, as the Bustamente torpedoes (six of them) had been taken up so that the fleet could go out, and had not yet been replaced, and as, finally, the first line of mines no longer existed, the commander of marine decided—General Toral also being of his opinion—to sink the Mercedes."

This took place about noon, the harbor having been open twenty-four hours for our victorious and unharmed squadron, and one of the two guns that fought our fleet at the mouth of the harbor was dismounted. If advantage had been taken of the situation, the controversy between Shafter and Sampson, representing the army and the navy, might have been avoided.

After the departure of Cervera's fleet from the harbor, and from life, the streets of Santiago were "dark as wolves' dens," and infested by robbers. General Toral issued a decree that, "All soldiers who shall destroy or set on fire buildings or property, or commit any acts of violence on persons, shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary for life, after previous degradation, in conformity with Article 239 of the Code of Military Justice. The penalty of death shall be imposed upon the instigators, or persons employing soldiers for this purpose."

This was dated July 16. On the 10th the Americans opened a lively fire from their trenches, and the fleet also. The Spanish loss was 7 killed and 47 wounded. A single shell from the fleet completely ruined a house in the city. Twenty-three projectiles fell within a small space. On the 12th of July



VIEW INSIDE THE TRENCHES.



CAMP AT PORT TAMPA.



HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD.



VIEW OF THE TRENCHES.



LOADING PACK MULES.



A CUBAN VILLA.



PLACING GUNS INTO POSITION.



MEMBERS OF THE 9TH CAVALRY, COLORED.

General Linares, wounded and in his bed, telegraphed the Commander-in-Chief and Minister of War:

"The situation is fatal; surrender inevitable; we are only prolonging the agony; the sacrifice is useless; the enemy knows it, fully realizing our situation. Their circle being well established, they will exhaust our forces without exposing theirs as they did yesterday, bombarding on land by elevation without our being able to see their batteries, and from the sea by the fleet, which has full advices, and is bombarding the city in sections with mathematical accuracy.

"There is a limit to the honor of arms, and I appeal to the judgment of the government and the whole nation; for these long-suffering troops have saved that honor many times since the 18th day of May, when they sustained the first bombardment.

"If it should be necessary to consummate the sacrifice for reasons which I ignore, or if there is need of some one to assume the responsibility of the dénouement anticipated and announced by me in several cablegrams, I offer myself loyally on the altar of my country for the one purpose or the other, and I will take it upon myself to perform the act of signing the surrender."

The vaunted volunteers fought well in the first battle, but became discouraged, and many of them put away their uniforms and guns and retired. The Spanish historian says of the scenes after the surrender: "When a Yankee officer of artillery and another of engineers took possession of the Morro, they inquired about the defenses and artillery of the fort. 'There they are,' said the governor, pointing to the land batteries and old guns. The American officers did not believe him; personally they went all over the place in search of guns and more important works of fortification. And when they had convinced themselves that they had been told the truth, they exclaimed: 'That fleet' (pointing to Admiral Sampson's) 'has no excuse for not having gained possession of the harbor and defeated the city and its defenses in so many days.' "

It is perfectly apparent by the Spanish accounts that the sufferings, the exposures and privations of the defenders of Santiago were even greater than those of the assailants, and the situation, regarded after the battle of El Caney and the flight of the fleet, as not containing a chance of success. On each side there was surprise and apprehension at the proven fighting qualities of the other.



CHAPTER XXIX.

The Insurgents in Arms of Cuba and the Philippines.

Our Relations with and Responsibilities for Them—The Cuban Soldiers Found on the Pay Roll—A Military Service of Importance and the Only One Performed by Armed Cubans in Our War—The Spanish Account of It—Cubans Kept 3,500 of the Best Troops of Spain Away from El Caney—Testimony Taken at Paris by the American Commission of the True Character of the Philippines—General Merritt, General Greene and Major Bell State the Facts.

All the Spaniards in Cuba during the dreary wars that culminated in the decisive struggle between the United States and Spain, were not engaged in the cause of the Peninsulars. The insular Spaniards were not in many respects unlike their oppressors and antagonists. Though in conflict about government, their idea about systems of governing were kindred. The hope of better days in Cuba is in the people of the island, not in either wing of the Spaniards. The supporters of the Junta closely resemble in views of administration the representatives of the regency. The destroyers of the industries of Cuba, that were prosperous under misgovernment, are themselves the victims of false education, and are incapable of organizing reformation.

Liberty with order, fair play for all, and integrity in official life, is not within the comprehension of those who burned the cane and trampled the tobacco. Those golden productions were transferred from Hayti to Cuba, while the horrors of barbarism ruined the former island, when the abolition of slavery established anarchy; and in the latter and greater island the inheritance of the torch has perished by the torch in the hands of the Dominican chieftain, Maximo Gomez.

It is the repeatedly expressed opinion of Admiral Dewey that the Filipinos are more capable of self-government than the Cubans, and they might be that if we confounded the Cuban name with the Key West and New York syndicates, gotten up in the old Junta form, and employed with the facility of

experience, in the accomplishments of the pomps and vanities of the Spanish language, including the fables of history and the follies of freedom.

Gomez had two objects in firing the fields from which the wealth of the island he invaded from Dominica comes—one was to destroy property, because it was an expression of civilization, and the other to destroy labor, because he wanted men to abandon the productive occupations to become destroyers.

General Miles expected 50,000 Cubans to line up with his grand army for the siege of Havana, but there would not have been as many of them there as appeared at Santiago. They have, however, materialized in regard to the pay-roll, and Gomez and his bodyguard and recruits after the war assume that they are a people and that the object of the United States in conquering the island was to give it up to them to rule after the manner of the Spaniards. The difference between one class of Spaniards and another, in the cultivation of the art of government, does not matter much to the cultivators of the soil and the managers in the ways of enterprise that are conducted according to the methods of civilization and yield fruitful harvests to the labor that gains bread in the sweat of the face.

No doubt it was the judgment of Gomez of Dominica that the way to free fertile land was to burn the crops, and that one savagery must be met by another, one victim of an outrage compensated by another victim. The Cubans burned the fine houses and the Spaniards the cottages, and both sides plied the chopping-knife to massacre domestic animals. This was the broad road of bloody ashes to famine.*

In the Philippines we do not have as many Spaniards of any sort as in Cuba, but the Malay makes up for any lack of the elements of mischief; and the Tagalo rivals the Cuban Spaniard as an adventurer to claim what the sword of America has conquered. He wanted joint occupation of Manila, and tickled himself that he was about to make reprisals in days of the accumulated wrongs of centuries. If he had been logical in action he would have applied the torch to the city instead of firing the country, and the property of English, Germans, and Chinese would have been burned in the name of liberty, after the capacity of the insurgents for booty had been determined by the occurrence of physical exhaustion.

There is a notable difference in the racial questions between the isles of Cuba and Luzon. There is no negro blood in the Philippines. The Spanish monarch for whom they were named did not permit African slavery in his

Indian possession, but Spanish officialism is the same in the East Indies as in the West. Incidents in the cities of Manila and Santiago, under military government, will indicate the likeness.

Some of the men of affairs of Manila were importing goods upon which there were duties, and they were so accustomed to paying their respects to the officers who consented to the importations, in pecuniary compliments, that they did not know any other style of transacting business. They gathered a few hundred new Mexican dollars, and for several days carried it around in bags to find "the right man," to whom was to be confided the little testimonial of their respectful confidence, and they asked many tentative questions, and began to feel at last that their modesty must have become offensive. When, at last, they referred in plain terms to the custom of the country, and their desire to conform to it, and were told they would be forgiven just once but never more, there was amazement. The deputation of gentlemen tottered away bearing bright silver dollars refused, and then they wondered whether they did not make a mistake in not having their silver converted into gold.

In Santiago there was a little dinner party in which the representative of the American Republic was entertained, and his guests had arranged for him a pleasant surprise. They wanted to do certain things in which they judged money was to be made, and they were provided with thousands, when the Manila people had but hundreds, and when the time for talking came, they offered their visible means according to the ancient Cuban custom, and heard the incredible response that the Americans did not do public business in that way, that the request they made was proper and there was no reason why they should pay a dollar for the privilege, for it was already their right, and they must not allow such a mistake to occur again, for if it did they would be held to have committed a misdemeanor.

The Cuban army on the pay-rolls, hearing that money was rolling in at the custom houses, had no notion of going home to work, and of course they held that the Americans were shoveling the cash into their own pockets. They no doubt believed they were entitled to pay for several years' picnics, and would go back to the Ten Years' War rather than have nothing to be so unhappy about, as to take away their appetite for employment. These are examples of Asiatic and African sentimentalities and of the thrift of the mixed races, as developed under Spanish instruction for a dozen generations.

In a Spanish pamphlet translated and issued by the office of Naval Intelligence, Lieut. José Muller y Tejrío, the writer on the battles and capitulations of Santiago de Cuba, there is evidence of the usefulness of the Cubans in the neighborhood of Santiago. It is stated by the Spanish officers that the insurgents firing from ambush on Escario's column, "succeeded in delaying its march long enough so that it could not arrive before the first of July. Fate is not always just." It is important in fairness to the Cuban soldiery to give what the Spanish reinforcements on the way to Santiago have to say of the opposition they met. The Spaniards' column, commanded by Escario, arrived in Santiago July 3d after marching fifty-two leagues; the troops nearly all the way "had to march in single file, opening the way with machetas." Their starting place was Man Janillo, and the column comprised a total of 3,752 men. On the Yara River and camping at dark, the Spanish diary, the one we quote, says: "The column had been harassed all day, especially while preparing to encamp, when the enemy opened a steady, lively fire, which lasted ten minutes, killing one man and wounding three." The next day the column had one man killed and one wounded.

Bayamo, the stronghold of the insurgents, was taken with a rush and without loss, and "we learned afterward that the enemy had ten killed and nine wounded." On the 28th, "the rebels appeared again," and near the town of Baire they "opened a galling musket fire. Colonel Ruiz, the second in command of the column, was wounded and his horse killed under him, four soldiers killed and five wounded." On the 29th the column rested and had three more wounded. On the 30th there was hot skirmishing, the rebels numerous. The Spanish losses during the day were five killed and ten wounded, among the latter the captain. July 1st there was a sharp fight at Aguacate. The Spanish diary says:

"The enemy did not wait to be surprised, but opened fire at once from Aguacate hill, the station of our heliograph, and adjoining hills to the right and left in an extensive intrenched line. Our soldiers maneuvered as though on drill, and advancing steadily, two-thirds of the column entered the battle, and that hail of lead which strewed death in its path was not sufficient to make them retreat or even check them. Calmly, with fearless heroism, they advanced, protected by the frequent and sure fire of the artillery, and skillfully guided by their chiefs, and with the cry, 'Long live Spain!' and charging with bayonets, they simultaneously took those heights which were so difficult

and dangerous to scale, beating the enemy into precipitate retreat, so that they could not gather up their dead and wounded.

"Seventeen dead were left on the field, also ammunition of various modern types. There were moments during that battle when the tenacity of the enemy and the order with which they fought gave the impression that they belonged to our own column. This report spread rapidly and reached Colonel Escario's ears, who, fearing that this might really be the case, gave orders to suspend the fire, and tried to make himself known by bugle signals. But this precaution was useless, and the commander, becoming convinced that he was fighting rebel forces, ordered the attack to be renewed and the hostile positions to be taken.

"To do the enemy justice, it must be stated that they defended these well-chosen positions with persistency and in good order, and that they rose to unusual heights that day, making this the fiercest battle which we sustained on the march from Manzanillo to Santiago, and one of the most remarkable ones of the present campaign. Our casualties consisted of 7 dead, and 1 lieutenant and 42 privates wounded. Large pools of blood on the battlefield showed the severe chastisement the enemy suffered."

The 3d of July the troops started at 2 a. m. and got to Santiago with "slight skirmishes," and "here it was learned that on the same day our fleet had gone out in search of death;" and the column "had arrived at the post of honor after a supreme effort and after victoriously crossing the Alps of Cuba. It is not to be wondered at that, when they came in sight of the city, they took off their hats, and with tears in their eyes opened their lips in a unanimous shout of 'Long live Spain!' which rose spontaneously from those noble hearts.

"The casualties during the whole march were 1 colonel, 2 officers, and 68 privates wounded and 27 killed. Twenty-eight thousand six hundred and seventy Mauser cartridges had been used, and 38 rounds of artillery fired."

The insurgent troops in this case were of Garcia's command, and the Spanish column of less than four thousand men had forced their way through the most rebellious part of the island and arrived just when the fighting was over. Garcia's estimate of his forces opposed to Escario has been counted as five thousand men. There were not so many, but they made a resistance that kept Escario from being on the Spanish lines at El Caney, Santiago.

The Spanish pamphlet says: "When 520 men maintained themselves at

El Caney for ten hours, and 250 at San Juan for four hours, if Escario could have been there that day, so that there had been 3,000 men more in our lines, neither El Caney nor San Juan would have been lost, though attacked by almost the whole hostile army." The detention of Escario was the best work done for us during the war by the Cubans, and indeed the only important diversion they made, and justice demands full credit shall be awarded.

The statements made before the American Commission at Paris may be classed as the most striking presentation of the attitude of the Philippine insurgents that has been given. General Merritt was before the Commission August 4th, and was first asked about General Frank V. Greene, of whom he said:

"He was out on the lines all the time, and took a great deal of interest in investigating with the citizens and soldiers. He knew some of the ranking officers, although he did not know Aguinaldo nor have anything to do with him. It was part of my policy that we should keep ourselves aloof from Aguinaldo as much as possible, because we knew trouble would occur from his wanting to go to Manila at the time of its surrender."

General Merritt said further he would greatly rely on General Greene's judgment, who "wrote the best and most authentic—the best received—book on the Russian-Turkish war published yet. He is a man who reads a great deal, quite a student, a very bright man."

General Greene's memorandum, made August 27th, and handed General Merritt, opened with these trenchant statements:

"If the United States evacuate these islands, anarchy and civil war will immediately ensue and lead to foreign intervention. The insurgents were furnished arms and the moral support of the navy prior to our arrival, and we cannot ignore obligations, either to the insurgents or to foreign nations, which our own acts have imposed upon us. The Spanish government is completely demoralized, and Spanish power is dead beyond possibility of resurrection. Spain would be unable to govern these islands if we surrendered them. Spaniards individually stand in great fear of the insurgents. The Spanish government is disorganized and their treasury bankrupt, with a large floating debt. The loss of property has been great. On the other hand, the Filipinos cannot govern the country without the support of some strong nation. They acknowledge this themselves, and say their desire is for independence under American protection; but they have only vague ideas as to what our relative

positions would be—what part we should take in collecting and expending the revenue and administering the government.

“The hatred between the Spanish and natives is very intense, and cannot be eradicated. The natives are all Roman Catholics and devoted to the church, but have bitter hatred for monastic orders—Dominican, Franciscan, and Recollects. They insist that these be sent out of the country or they will murder them. These friars own the greater part of the land, and have grown rich by oppressing the native husbandmen.”

General Merritt said the Philippines would have to be educated up to self-government, and he added: “They want a protectorate, but they do not exactly understand what that means. Their idea is that they should collect the revenues and keep them in their treasury, and that we should be at the expense of maintaining an army and a navy there for their protection, which is the kind of a protectorate they would like very much.”

Major Frank Barnes stated: “The masses of the people will accept our government as soon as they understand the form of government that we would offer. The people are for the most part easily controlled by proper methods, the essence of which can be expressed in two words—justice and firmness. I have definite information also that at least three or four of the leading men of the provinces to the north and east of Manila are not at all in harmony with those in authority around Manila.”

It was the opinion of the Major that if a few of the ambitious chieftains were disposed of, those who controlled the insurgent army, “the masses of the people could be handled without difficulty. At the present it is my opinion that these chieftains find themselves in a difficult position on account of the promises made to their followers in regard to looting Manila, said promises being so far unfulfilled. Their troops have been serving up to the present time almost without remuneration, promises being made that their reward would come when Manila capitulated. I have availed myself of every opportunity to talk with natives and half-castes, both in the insurgent territory and in Manila. I find that many of them would be perfectly willing to accept an American government, and many of them are very anxious that we should take full possession of the islands. Many others hold to the desire of the insurgent chiefs for a Philippine government under the protection of the United States.”

Major J. F. Bell, of the Bureau of Information, reported to General Mer-

ritt in Manila Bay, that Aguinaldo had about \$200,000, and in Bacoor \$220,000 in public funds. Major Bell catalogues and describes the leaders among Aguinaldo's following in this highly interesting way:

"Aguinaldo.—Honest, sincere, and poor, not well educated, but a natural leader of men, with considerable shrewdness and ability; has the power of creating among the people confidence in himself, and is undoubtedly a very popular man, highly respected by all; but there are many better educated and richer natives who do not think he has sufficient education or experience to be a suitable president. He was a 'little governor' of a small town in one of the provinces. It is also said that he was a school teacher, but I have been unable to verify this assertion.

"There is no Secretary of State, the place being kept open for one Cayetano S. Arellano, a prominent native citizen who is said to be the best lawyer and best man among the native prominent men. He is now in Pagsanjan, and has been repeatedly sent for, but does not return, stating as an excuse that he cannot get through Santa Cruz, which is held by the Spanish. He is an avowed annexationist, and does not believe the Filipino people sufficiently advanced in the arts and laws of civilization to govern themselves.

"Baldomero Aguinaldo, a first cousin of Don Emilio, is Secretary of War, and is a swelled dunce, and was once a schoolmaster.

"Mariano Trias, an educated, honest man, of mediocre capacity, is Secretary of the Treasury. He was the Vice-President of a former revolution, and of all the insurgent leaders, he stands next to Aguinaldo in popularity with the people.

"Leandro Y. Barra, a lawyer and good, honest man, is Secretary of the Interior.

"One Estefan de la Rama, a rich and educated man, who speaks English, is commandante de marina, or commander-in-chief of the navy. He is reported honest and capable.

"Aguinaldo's interpreter and secretary is one Escamilla, a good linguist, speaking Latin, French, Spanish, and English—Spanish fluently and English well, to my personal knowledge. He was a teacher of the piano in Hongkong, and is one of the best interpreters I have ever seen.

"One Malabini, a student of law and notary public, honest, but not especially talented, is one of his councilors. There is a prominent and wealthy citizen of this city who is also a councilor, but I prefer not to mention his

name. He is an avowed annexationist, and sincerely hopes the Americans may remain here.

"Don Felipe Agoncillo is a highly respected lawyer, and has for some time been the Filipino agent in Hongkong. I understand it is he who has been designated by Aguinaldo to go to Paris and America to represent the insurgent cause.

"C. Sandico, a skilled and well-educated machinist, who speaks English quite well, is a prominent man, and coadjutor of Aguinaldo. His present commission is to appear on behalf of political prisoners before the officer charged with investigating such cases. He has been generally useful to Aguinaldo as a delegate and negotiator with Americans.

"Lieut.-Gen. Emiliano Riego De Dios, the military governor of Cavite, is said to be an honest man, but with little education.

"Major-General Ricati, in command of operations along the southern zone of trenches, appears and is said to be a well-meaning, honest man, with a fair education.

"Maj.-Gen. Pantelon Garcia, in command of operations along the northern zone, is not educated very well, but is an able, honest, polite, and agreeable man, who has been a schoolmaster of the primary grade.

"Brig.-Gen. Pio Del Pilar, a vicious, uneducated ignoramus and highway robber.

"General Estrella, commanding the military forces in Cavite, has the credit of being an honest man with little education.

"Brigadier-General Mascardo, fairly educated and honest, but possesses little ability.

"Gen. Gregorio Del Pilar is young, well educated, and honest, but with little experience. He belongs to a wealthy family of Nueva Ecija.

"General Noriel, an honest, fairly educated, well-meaning, reasonable, and agreeable fellow, who has done good service and gained the reputation of a good soldier.

"Colonel Montenegro, a very conciliatory fellow to meet. Young, small, and well educated. Speaks French, English, and Spanish, the latter fluently; the others very well. He is a considerable of a 'talk a heap.' Is 'kinder' honest and was a clerk in Lalla's hotel, where he received his lessons in honesty.

"There are other leaders of lesser grade whom it is hardly necessary to mention here. Aguinaldo has many adjutants, most of whom are young,

smart, and well educated. In fact, nearly all of the adjutants of all the generals belong to the *jeunesse dorée* Filipino, in whom insurrectionary ideas seem to breed spontaneously. They are all bright, ambitious, active, and well educated. Among them is one Captain Arevela, Noriel's adjutant, who is a dentist, having learned his profession from an American, who also taught him very good English. He has always possessed great partiality for Americans."

NOTE.—It appears, however, that Maximo Gomez, the old soldier of fortune, has in the schools of misfortune been taught the lessons of sorrow, and when throwing off his reserve after the war was over he knew the light of reason when he saw it, and was not disposed to join in playing a bunco game upon the people of the United States. He may yet exploit his ambition to found a confederacy of the West Indies, but he has shown great dignity and commands respect by his qualities of statesmanship.





CHAPTER XXX.

The Treaty of Peace.

The Official Terms in Which the Spaniards Sued for Peace and Accepted the Demands of the Peace Protocol of August 12—"The Demand Strips Us of the Very Last Memory of a Glorious Past"—The Treaty Commissioners that Met in Paris—Official Text of the Treaty of Peace of December 10—The Spaniards Contend that the Philippine Insurgents Constantly Change the Status Quo and that Americans Must Stop Them—Contention that the Transfer of Sovereignty Meant Transfer of Debts—Protracted Debate over the Cuban Obligations—Claim the Capture of Manila was not Lawful—Insinuation that General Merritt had Heard of the Protocol Before Storming the Town—Spaniards Able and Adroit—Americans Firm but Courteous—The Official History of the Preparation of the Peace Protocol—The Part Taken by the President—His Strong Hand Felt in Paris.

The government of Spain, on July 22, 1898, submitted through the Ambassador of France a message to the President, saying Spain wished to show again that in this war, as well as in the one she carried on against the Cuban insurgents, she had but one object, "the vindication of her prestige, her honor, and her name." She had desired to "spare the great island from the dangers of premature independence," and her sentiments were rather inspired by ties of blood than by her interests. "Spain," the message continued, "is prepared to spare Cuba from the continuation of the horrors of war if the United States is likewise disposed." This paper was signed by the Spanish Minister of State, the Duke of Almodovar del Rio. In reply Secretary Day wrote, July 30th:

"The President witnessed with profound disappointment the frustration of his peaceful efforts by events which forced upon the people of the United States the unalterable conviction that nothing short of the relinquishment by Spain of a claim of sovereignty over Cuba which she was unable to enforce would relieve a situation that had become unendurable.

"For years the government of the United States, out of regard for the susceptibilities of Spain, had by the exercise of its power and the expenditure of its treasure preserved the obligations of neutrality. But a point was at length reached at which, as Spain had often been forewarned, this attitude

could no longer be maintained. The spectacle at our very doors of a fertile territory wasted by fire and sword, and given over to desolation and famine, was one to which our people could not be indifferent. Yielding, therefore, to the demands of humanity, they determined to remove the causes in the effects of which they had become so deeply involved."

Secretary Day proceeded to state substantially the points of the Protocol that was the basis of the treaty of peace. The reply from Madrid, August 7th, by the Minister of State, was:

"The necessity of withdrawing from the territory of Cuba being imperative, the nation assuming Spain's place must, as long as this territory shall not have fully reached the conditions required to take rank among other sovereign powers, provide for rules which will insure order and protect against all risks the Spanish residents, as well as the Cuban natives still loyal to the mother country.

"In the name of the nation the Spanish government hereby relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over or title to Cuba, and engages to the irremovable evacuation of the island, subject to the approval of the Cortes—a reserve which we likewise make with regard to the other proffered terms—just as these terms will have to be ultimately approved by the Senate of the United States.

"The United States require, as an indemnity for or an equivalent to the sacrifices they have borne during this short war, the cession of Porto Rico and of the other islands now under the sovereignty of Spain in the West Indies, and also the cession of an island in the Ladrões, to be selected by the Federal government.

"This demand strips us of the very last memory of a glorious past, and expels us at once from the prosperous island of Porto Rico and from the Western Hemisphere, which became peopled and civilized through the proud deeds of our ancestors. It might, perhaps, have been possible to compensate by some other cession for the injuries sustained by the United States. However, the inflexibility of the demand obliges us to cede, and we shall cede, the island of Porto Rico and the other islands belonging to the Crown of Spain in the West Indies, together with one of the islands of the archipelago of the Ladrões, to be selected by the American government.

"The terms relating to the Philippines seem, to our understanding, to be quite indefinite."

Secretary Day put the case of the United States in these simple and effective terms to the Spanish Minister of State, before the submission of the terms, referred to with such pathetic dignity in the letter of submission by the Duke of Almodovar del Rio:

"As the result of the patriotic exertions of the people of the United States, the strife has, as your excellency observes, proved unequal, inclines the President to offer a brave adversary generous terms of peace.

"The President, therefore, responding to your excellency's request, will state the terms of peace which will be accepted by him at the present time, subject to the approval of the Senate of the United States hereafter.

"Your excellency in discussing the question of Cuba intimates that Spain has desired to spare the island the dangers of premature independence. The government of the United States has not shared the apprehensions of Spain in this regard, but it recognizes the fact that in the distracted and prostrate condition of the island, aid and guidance will be necessary, and these it is prepared to give."

Secretary Day was precise in drawing the Protocol, and yet the Spaniards persuaded themselves that they could find much in it, especially in the clause about the Philippines, susceptible of construction remote from the purpose of the President. August 12th the French Ambassador addressed these lines to the American Secretary of State:

"Mr. Secretary of State: I have the honor to inform you that I have just received, through the intermediation of the Department of Foreign Affairs at Paris, a telegram, dated Madrid, August 11, in which the Duke of Almodovar del Rio announces to me that, by order of Her Majesty the Queen Regent, the Spanish government confers upon me full powers in order that I may sign, without other formality and without delay, the Protocol whereof the terms have been drawn up by common accord between you and me."

The instrument that made this authorization regular was the following:

DON ALFONSO XIII.,
BY THE GRACE OF GOD AND THE CONSTITUTION, KING OF SPAIN, AND
IN HIS NAME AND DURING HIS MINORITY,
DOÑA MARIA CRISTINA,
QUEEN REGENT OF THE KINGDOM.

Whereas it has become necessary to negotiate and sign at Washington a Protocol in which the preliminaries of peace between Spain and the United

States of America shall be settled, and as it is necessary for me to empower for that purpose a person possessing the requisite qualifications: Therefore, I have decided to select, after procuring the consent of His Excellency the President of the French Republic, you, Don Julio Cambon, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the French Republic in the United States of America, as I do, by these presents, select and appoint you to proceed, invested with the character of my plenipotentiary, to negotiate and sign with the plenipotentiary whom His Excellency the President of the United States of America may designate for that purpose the aforesaid Protocol. And I declare, from the present moment, all that you may agree upon, negotiate, and sign in the execution of this commission acceptable and valid, and I will observe it and execute it, and will cause it to be observed and executed as if it had been done by myself, for which I give you my whole full powers in the most ample form required by law. In witness whereof I have caused these presents to be issued, signed by my hand, duly sealed and countersigned by the undersigned, my Minister of State. Given in the palace at Madrid, August 11, 1898.

(L. S.)

MARIA CRISTINA.

JUAN MANUEL SANCHEZ Y GUTIERREZ DE CASTRO,

Minister of State.

The city of Manila fell into our hands two days after the suspension of hostilities, and during the discussion of the Commissioners at Paris the Spaniards made a plea that as Admiral Dewey cut the cable, the failure to get the news at Manila before the Americans possessed the town was an American fault. The report of the French Ambassador of his interviews with the President was much quoted by the Spanish Commissioners, but the American Commissioners were inflexible from the first for the plain meaning of the treaty.

OFFICIAL TEXT OF THE TREATY OF PEACE WITH SPAIN,
SIGNED DECEMBER 12, 1898:

The United States of America and Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain, in the name of her august son Don Alfonso XIII., desiring to end a state of war now existing between the two countries, have for that purpose appointed as plenipotentiaries:

The President of the United States,

William R. Day, Cushman K. Davis, William P. Frye, George Gray, and Whitelaw Reid, citizens of the United States;

And Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain,

Don Eugenio Montero Rios, President of the Senate; Don Buenaventura de Abarzuza, Senator of the Kingdom and ex-Minister of the Crown; Don José de Garnica, deputy to the Cortes, and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court; Don Wenceslao Ramirez de Villa-Urrutia, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Brussels, and Don Rafael Cerero, General of Division;

Who, having assembled in Paris, and having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in due and proper form, have, after discussion of the matters before them, agreed upon the following articles:

Article I.

Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba.

And as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the United States, the United States will, so long as such occupation shall last, assume and discharge the obligations that may under international law result from the fact of its occupation, for the protection of life and property.


Article II.

Spain cedes to the United States the island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and the island of Guam in the Marianas or Ladrones.


Article III.

Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands, and comprehending the islands lying within the following line:

A line running from west to east along or near the twentieth parallel of north latitude, and through the middle of the navigable channel of Bachi, from the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) to the one hundred and twenty-seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence along the one hundred and twenty-seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the parallel of four degrees and forty-five minutes ($4^{\circ} 45'$) north latitude, thence along the parallel of four degrees and forty-five minutes ($4^{\circ} 45'$) north latitude to its intersection with the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty-five minutes ($119^{\circ} 35'$) east of Greenwich, thence along the meridian of longitude one hundred and



THE BATTLE-FIELD OF SAN JUAN, JULY 2, 1898.



"MARIA TERESA," SHOWING HOLE IN 6 5/8-INCH GUN SHIELD, INNER VIEW.

nineteen degrees and thirty-five minutes ($119^{\circ} 35'$) east of Greenwich to the parallel of latitude seven degrees and forty minutes ($7^{\circ} 40'$) north, thence along the parallel of latitude of seven degrees and forty minutes ($7^{\circ} 40'$) north to its intersection with the one hundred and sixteenth (116th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence by a direct line to the intersection of the tenth (10th) degree parallel of north latitude with the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, and thence along the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the point of beginning.

The United States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars (\$20,000,000) within three months after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty.

Article IV.

The United States will, for the term of ten years from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, admit Spanish ships and merchandise to the ports of the Philippine Islands on the same terms as ships and merchandise of the United States.

Article V.

The United States will, upon the signature of the present treaty, send back to Spain, at its own cost, the Spanish soldiers taken as prisoners of war on the capture of Manila by the American forces. The arms of the soldiers in question shall be restored to them.

Spain will, upon the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, proceed to evacuate the Philippines, as well as the island of Guam, on terms similar to those agreed upon by the Commissioners appointed to arrange for the evacuation of Porto Rico and other islands in the West Indies, under the Protocol of August 12, 1898, which is to continue in force till its provisions are completely executed.

The time within which the evacuation of the Philippine Islands and Guam shall be completed shall be fixed by the two governments. Stands of colors, uncaptured war vessels, small arms, guns of all calibers, with their carriages and accessories, powder, ammunition, livestock, and materials and supplies of all kinds, belonging to the land and naval forces of Spain in the Philippines and Guam, remain the property of Spain. Pieces of heavy ordnance, exclusive of field artillery, in the fortifications and coast defenses, shall remain in their emplacements for the term of six months, to be reckoned from the

exchange of ratifications of the treaty; and the United States may, in the meantime, purchase such material from Spain, if a satisfactory agreement between the two governments on the subject shall be reached.

Article VI.

Spain will, upon the signature of the present treaty, release all prisoners of war, and all persons detained or imprisoned for political offenses, in connection with the insurrections in Cuba and the Philippines and the war with the United States.

Reciprocally, the United States will release all persons made prisoners of war by the American forces, and will undertake to obtain the release of all Spanish prisoners in the hands of the insurgents in Cuba and the Philippines.

The government of the United States will at its own cost return to Spain and the government of Spain will at its own cost return to the United States, Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines, according to the situation of their respective homes, prisoners released or caused to be released by them, respectively, under this article.

Article VII.

The United States and Spain mutually relinquish all claims for indemnity, national and individual, of every kind, of either government, or of its citizens or subjects, against the other government, that may have arisen since the beginning of the late insurrection in Cuba and prior to the exchange of ratifications of the present treaty, including all claims for indemnity for the cost of the war.

The United States will adjudicate and settle the claims of its citizens against Spain relinquished in this article.

Article VIII.

In conformity with the provisions of Articles I, II, and III, of this treaty, Spain relinquishes in Cuba, and cedes in Porto Rico and other islands in the West Indies, in the island of Guam, and in the Philippine Archipelago, all the buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, structures, public highways and other immovable property which, in conformity with law, belong to the public domain, and as such belong to the Crown of Spain.

And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, to which the preceding paragraph refers, cannot in any respect impair the property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession

of property of all kinds, of provinces, municipalities, public or private establishments, ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other associations having legal capacity to acquire and possess property in the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded, or of private individuals, of whatsoever nationality such individuals may be.

The aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, includes all documents exclusively referring to the sovereignty relinquished or ceded that may exist in the archives of the Peninsula. Where any document in such archives only in part relates to said sovereignty, a copy of such part will be furnished whenever it shall be requested. Like rules shall be reciprocally observed in favor of Spain in respect of documents in the archives of the islands above referred to.

In the aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, are also included such rights as the Crown of Spain and its authorities possess in respect of the official archives and records, executive as well as judicial, in the islands above referred to, which relate to said islands or the rights and property of their inhabitants. Such archives and records shall be carefully preserved, and private persons shall without distinction have the right to require, in accordance with law, authenticated copies of the contracts, wills and other instruments forming part of notarial protocols or files, or which may be contained in the executive or judicial archives, be the latter in Spain or in the islands aforesaid.

Article IX.

Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty, relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty, may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to other foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they may reside.

The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress.

Article X.

The inhabitants of the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be secured in the free exercise of their religion.

Article XI.

The Spaniards residing in the territories over which Spain by this treaty cedes or relinquishes her sovereignty shall be subject in matters civil as well as criminal to the jurisdiction of the courts of the country wherein they reside, pursuant to the ordinary laws governing the same; and they shall have the right to appear before such courts, and to pursue the same course as citizens of the country to which the courts belong.

Article XII.

Judicial proceedings pending at the time of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty in the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be determined according to the following rules:

1. Judgments rendered either in civil suits between private individuals, or in criminal matters, before the date mentioned, and with respect to which there is no recourse or right of review under the Spanish law, shall be deemed to be final, and shall be executed in due form by competent authority in the territory within which such judgments should be carried out.
2. Civil suits between private individuals which may on the date mentioned be undetermined shall be prosecuted to judgment before the court in which they may then be pending or in the court that may be substituted therefor.
3. Criminal actions pending on the date mentioned before the Supreme Court of Spain against citizens of the territory which by this treaty ceases to be Spanish shall continue under its jurisdiction until final judgment; but, such judgment having been rendered, the execution thereof shall be committed to the competent authority of the place in which the case arose.

Article XIII.

The rights of property secured by copyrights and patents acquired by Spaniards in the island of Cuba and in Porto Rico, the Philippines and other ceded territories, at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty,

shall continue to be respected. Spanish scientific, literary, and artistic works, not subversive of public order in the territories in question, shall continue to be admitted free of duty into such territories, for the period of ten years, to be reckoned from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty.

Article XIV.

Spain will have the power to establish consular officers in the ports and places of the territories, the sovereignty over which has been either relinquished or ceded by the present treaty.

Article XV.

The government of each country will, for the term of ten years, accord to the merchant vessels of the other country the same treatment in respect of all port charges, including entrance and clearance dues, light dues, and tonnage duties, as it accords to its own merchant vessels, not engaged in the coastwise trade.

This article may at any time be terminated on six months' notice given by either government to the other.

Article XVI.

It is understood that any obligations assumed in this treaty by the United States with respect to Cuba are limited to the time of its occupancy thereof; but it will upon the termination of such occupancy, advise any government established in the island to assume the same obligations.

Article XVII.

The present treaty shall be ratified by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and by Her Majesty the Queen regent of Spain; and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington within six months from the date hereof, or earlier if possible.

In faith whereof, we, the respective Plenipotentiaries, have signed this treaty and have hereunto affixed our seals.

Done in duplicate at Paris, the tenth day of December, in the year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight.

[Seal] WILLIAM R. DAY.	[Seal] EUGENIO MONTERO RÍOS.
[Seal] CUSHMAN K. DAVIS.	[Seal] B. DE ABARZUZA.
[Seal] WILLIAM P. FRYE.	[Seal] J. DE GARNICA.
[Seal] GEO. GRAY.	[Seal] W R DE VILLA URRUTIA.
[Seal] WHITELOW REID.	[Seal] RAFAEL CERERO.

When the conference met at Paris, October 1st, the President of the Spanish Commission stated he was charged by his government to lay before the American Commission a proposition of a pressing nature. It was that the status quo was altered and continued to be with daily increasing gravity "to the prejudice of Spain, by the Tagalo rebels who formed an auxiliary force to the regular American troops, and the Spanish Commission demanded of the American Commissioners that the American forces in the Philippines must proceed fully and absolutely to restore the said status quo, and must abstain from preventing by any means, direct or indirect, the restoration thereof by the Spanish authorities and forces in the territory not occupied by those of the United States." The commissions of American Plenipotentiaries were in these terms:

William McKinley, President of the United States of America, to all who shall see these presents, Greeting: Know ye, that reposing special trust and confidence in the integrity and ability of William R. Day, of Ohio, I do appoint him a Commissioner Plenipotentiary of the United States, under the Protocol signed at Washington of the 12th day of August, 1898, to negotiate and conclude a Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain, and do authorize and empower him to execute and fulfill the duties of this Commission, with all the powers, privileges, and emoluments thereunto of right appertaining, during the pleasure of the President of the United States.

In testimony whereof, I have caused these letters to be made patent, and the seal of the United States to be hereunto affixed.

Given under my hand at the city of Washington the 13th day of September in the year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight, and the 123rd year of the Independence of the United States of America.

Signed: WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

By the President:

Signed: J. B. MOORE, Acting Secretary of State.


The Commissions of the other American Plenipotentiaries were in the same form, their names being as follows:

Cushman K. Davis, of Minnesota.

William P. Frye, of Maine.

George Gray, of Delaware, and

Whitelaw Reid, of New York.



THE TREATY OF PEACE.

Whitelaw Reid.

Mr. Moore, Secretary.
Senator Gray.

Senator Frye.
Wm. Day, President.

Senator Davis.

THE AMERICAN PEACE COMMISSIONERS.

THE TREATY OF PEACE.

FULL POWER OF AMERICAN PLENIPOTENTIARIES.

William McKinley, President of the United States of America, to all who shall see these presents, Greeting:

Know Ye: That, reposing special trust and confidence in the Integrity, and Ability of the Honorable William R. Day, of Ohio, lately Secretary of State of the United States, the Honorable Cushman K. Davis, of Minnesota, a Senator of the United States, the Honorable William P. Frye, of Maine, a Senator of the United States, the Honorable George Gray, of Delaware, a Senator of the United States, and the Honorable Whitelaw Reid, of New York, lately Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States to France, I do appoint them jointly and severally to be Commissioners on the part of the United States under the Protocol signed at Washington on the twelfth day of August, 1898, to negotiate and conclude a Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain, hereby empowering them jointly and severally to meet the Commissioners appointed or to be appointed under said Protocol on behalf of Spain, and with them to negotiate and sign a Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain, subject to the ratification of their government; and the said Commission to hold and exercise during the pleasure of the President of the United States for the time being.

In testimony whereof, I have caused these letters to be made patent and the seal of the United States to be hereunto affixed.

Given under my hand at the city of Washington this 13th day of September, in the year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and twenty-third.

Signed: WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

By the President:

Signed: J. B. MOORE, Acting Secretary of State.

The authorization of the Spanish Commission was in the terms and form following:

DON ALFONSO XIII.,
BY THE GRACE OF GOD AND THE CONSTITUTION, KING OF SPAIN, AND
IN HIS NAME AND DURING HIS MINORITY,
DOÑA MARIA CRISTINA,
QUEEN REGENT OF THE KINGDOM:

Whereas the occasion has arisen for the concluding between Spain and the United States of America a Treaty of Peace, and it being necessary that to such end I should duly confer authority upon persons who shall merit my

royal confidence, and you, Don Eugenio Montero Ríos, Knight of the Worthy Order of the Golden Fleece, decorated with the Collar of the Royal and distinguished Order of Charles III., President of the Senate, ex-Minister of the Crown, ex-President of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, Academician of the Moral and Political Sciences, embody the characteristics which meet the requirements of the case. I have therefore chosen and appointed, and by these presents do choose and appoint you to the end that, pursuant to the stipulations of Article V. of the Protocol signed in Washington on the twelfth day of the month of August last, and invested with the character of my Plenipotentiary, you may in unison with the other Plenipotentiaries I have appointed under this date and those who may be designated by the President of the United States for the same purpose, confer and agree upon what may be best and most advisable. And everything you may so confer and agree upon, negotiate, conclude and sign, I now confirm and ratify, I will observe and execute, will cause to be observed and executed, the same as if I myself had conferred and agreed upon, negotiated, concluded and signed it, for all of which I confer upon you ample authority to the fullest extent required by law. In witness whereof I have caused these presents to issue signed by my hand, duly sealed and attested by the undersigned, my Minister of State.

Given in the Palace of Madrid on the twenty-second day of September of eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.

Signed: MARIA CRISTINA.

Signed: JUAN MANUEL SANCHEZ Y GUTIERREZ DE CASTRO,

Minister of State.

The commissions and full powers of the other Spanish Plenipotentiaries were in the same form; their names and titles fully given. The Crown Minister led the list: Don Buenaventura Abarzuza, Senator of the Kingdom and some time Ambassador and Minister of the Crown. Another Commissioner was: Don José de Garnica y Diaz, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of Justice, Deputy of the Cortes, Member of the General Codification Commission, ex-Vice-President of the Congress of Deputies; and most distinguished by his title was: Don Wenceslao Ramirez de Villa-Urrutia, Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Order of Isabel the Catholic, Knight Commander of the Royal and Distinguished Order of Charles III., decorated with the White Cross of the second class of Naval Merit, Grand Cross of the Dutch Lion of the Netherlands, Oak Crown of Luxemburg, the Majidieh of Turkey,



THE SPANISH PEACE COMMISSIONERS.

Knight Commander of the Legion of Honor of France, of the Concepcion de Villaviciosa of Portugal, decorated with the Cross of the second class of the Bust of Bolivar, Knight of St-Maurice and St-Lazarus of Italy, of the Crown of Prussia, of the Crown of Christ of Portugal, Licentiate in civil and canonical law, and through competitive examination, in administrative law Academician Professor of the Royal Academy of Jurisprudence and Legislation, my Minister Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the King of the Belgians.

John Bassett Moore of New York was appointed Secretary and counsel to the Commissioners of the United States. In his reply to the opening proposition of the Spanish Commission relating to the aggressions of the Tagalo rebels, Mr. Moore said: "The American Commissioners can see nothing but a proposal and demand to divert the conference from the object for which it has met to the consideration of a subject which properly belongs to the two governments, and not to the Commissioners here assembled. The American Commissioners do not intend to intimate that the proposal was made with this design, but they think it evident that this would be the necessary result of its discussion." And "The American Commissioners, with a view to prevent the diversion and failure of the present negotiations, as well as on the ground of a want of power, deem themselves obliged to reply that the questions involved in the present proposals and demands of the Spanish Commissioners having heretofore been presented to the government of the United States and answered in notes of the Department of State, any further demands as to military operations in the Philippines must be addressed by the government of Spain to the government of the United States at Washington, and consequently that they cannot join in the proposed declarations."

To this the Spanish Commissioners replied that they understood it was their "duty to make known to the American Commissioners that if the status quo existing in the Philippines on August 12 last, far from being restored, continues to be disturbed to the prejudice of Spain, the government of Her Catholic Majesty, and in her name its plenipotentiaries in this conference, reserve the right to act as they may deem the rights of Spain shall require, since they cannot conceive how the treaty of peace they are charged with arranging with the American Commissioners upon the immutable basis of the Protocol of Washington of August 12 last, can be concluded if this basis is being constantly altered in one of its parts, and continually to the greater prejudice of Spain."

The first words of the Treaty of Peace of December 10, 1898, are: "Spain relinquishes all claims of sovereignty over and title to Cuba," and the island upon evacuation by Spain was to be occupied by the United States, 'and while the occupation lasted the United States assume and discharge the obligations that under international law resulted from the fact of its occupation for the protection of life and property.'" The second article is simply that "Spain ceded" certain islands, including Porto Rico and Guam.

The Spanish Commission began by claiming that under the Protocol of Peace with the United States it was our duty to see that "the insurgents in the Philippines did not change the situation." This shadowy point was sustained with an elaboration of phrases, and discussed by the American Commission as curtly as the courtesies of peace-making permitted. Of course the Spaniards reserved all rights of protest.

The Spanish Commission proceeded to propose articles as an amendment to the proposals of the American Commissioners on the subject of the relinquishment by Spain of sovereignty over Cuba and the cession of Porto Rico. The first article presented by the Spaniards was that the relinquishment and cession was to be accepted by the United States, "that they may in their turn transfer it at the proper time to the Cuban people upon the conditions established in this treaty"; and the second article was that the relinquishment and transfer embraced:

"First. All the prerogatives, powers, and rights, which, as an integral part of the sovereignty, belong to Her Catholic Majesty both over the island of Cuba and over its inhabitants.

"Second. All charges and obligations of every kind in existence at the time of the ratification of this treaty of peace, which the Crown of Spain and her authorities in the island of Cuba may have contracted lawfully in the exercise of the sovereignty hereby relinquished and transferred, and which as such constitute an integral part thereof."

The English of this was that the United States should pay the debts Spain had charged to Cuba. Article Third of the Spanish propositions detailed the property, immovable and other, to be relinquished, and Article Fourth made the material proposal more definite, saying:

"First: The charges and obligations to be transferred must have been levied and imposed in constitutional form and in the exercise of its legitimate

powers by the Crown of Spain, as the sovereign of the island of Cuba, or by its lawful authorities in the exercise of their respective powers prior to the ratification of this treaty.

"Second: The creation or establishment of such charges or obligations must have been for the service of the island of Cuba, or chargeable to its own individual treasury."

Article Fifth was:

"Pursuant to the provisions of the foregoing Article, there shall be embraced in the said transfer all debts, of whatsoever kind, lawful charges, the salaries or allowances of all employés, civil and ecclesiastical, who shall continue to render services in the island of Cuba, and all pensions in the civil and military services and of widows and orphans; provided that they conform to the requirements prescribed in the foregoing Article."

Therefore the "relinquishment" was interpreted to provide that the pensions and salaries of the priests, among others, should be paid by the United States until turned over to the people of Cuba as a part of their free inheritance. The American Commission rejected (October 11) the Spanish articles, and filed a memorandum reciting the Peace Protocol, saying:

"In the place of the unconditional relinquishment agreed to in the Protocol, it is proposed that the relinquishment now offered shall embrace all charges of every kind which Spain and her authorities in Cuba have lawfully contracted heretofore, and may hereafter contract, prior to the ratification of the treaty of peace; and these 'charges and obligations,' past, present and future, which it is proposed to 'transfer' to the United States, are declared to include debts, civil and ecclesiastical salaries, and civil and military pensions, ostensibly in arrears, as well as yet to accrue.

"To the American Commissioners this appears to be not a proposition to 'relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba,' but in substance a proposition to 'transfer' to the United States and in turn to Cuba a mass of Spanish charges and obligations.

"It is difficult to perceive by what logic an indebtedness contracted for any purpose can be deemed part of the sovereignty of Spain over the island of Cuba. In the Article proposed it is attempted to yoke with the transfer of sovereignty an obligation to assume an indebtedness arising out of the relations of Spain to Cuba. The unconditional relinquishment of sovereignty by Spain stipulated for in the Protocol is to be changed into an engagement by

the United States to accept the sovereignty burdened with a large mass of outstanding indebtedness.

“It is proper to say that if during the negotiations resulting in the conclusion of the Protocol Spain had proposed to add to its stipulations in regard to Cuba such as those now put forward, the proposal, unless abandoned, would have terminated negotiations.

“The American Commissioners, therefore, speaking for their government, must decline to accept the burden which it is now proposed shall be gratuitously assumed.

“The American Commissioners further observe that in Article III. of the draft there is a negative clause, by which property not belonging to the Crown of Spain is excepted from the proposed relinquishment and transfer of sovereignty. In one respect this exception appears to be unnecessary, and in another illogical. So far as it affects the question of legal title it is unnecessary, since such title, if not held by Spain, would not pass to the United States by Spain's transfer of sovereignty. On the other hand, so far as it affects the question of sovereignty, it is illogical, since the sovereignty, which includes the right of eminent domain, would, if excepted from the relinquishment, remain with Spain. We would thus have the singular spectacle of Spain relinquishing her sovereignty over property belonging to the Crown, but retaining it over all other property.

“Thus again we should witness the utter defeat of the explicit engagement in the Protocol that Spain would ‘relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba.’

“In the articles presented by the American Commissioners there were stipulations in relation to archives and official records, which stipulations were intended to secure, and, as the American Commissioners believe, would effectually secure, the object of preserving and of furnishing to those in interest evidence of title to property in the islands in question.

“In the articles submitted by the Spanish Commissioners, it is provided that documents and papers relating to sovereignty to be found in the archives of the Peninsula shall be furnished to the United States; also ‘copies of such portions of other documents and papers relating to other subjects foreign to the island of Cuba and the sovereignty aforesaid as may exist in the said archives.’

“It is difficult for the Americans to understand this latter clause; perhaps

its exact meaning is not conveyed in the English translation of the Spanish text.

"It is to be further observed that in the provisions of the Spanish articles relating to the furnishing of record evidence of titles to lands in Cuba and Porto Rico, it is stipulated that the archives and records shall be at the disposal of the United States 'with the same rights and obligations as now attach to them while at the disposal of the Spanish government and its said (insular) authorities.' This restriction, the object of which is not perceived, would seem to limit the control over archives and official records, after Spain's relinquishment of sovereignty, to the same power, both in kind and in extent, as was formerly possessed by the Spanish government. This appears to be inconsistent with the right of control which every sovereign power should possess over its archives and official records.

"All the conditions and qualifications above referred to are by general reference incorporated in the articles relating to the cession of Porto Rico and other islands in the West Indies, and render these articles equally inadmissible."

It would be troublesome to find a more conclusive "annex" to a "Protocol" than this. The Spanish Commission came back with a memorandum that displayed the resources of their noble language. First they defined the difference between "relinquishment" and "abandonment," saying:

"The government of the American Union never demanded that the Spanish government abandon (abandonar) the sovereignty over Cuba, but that it relinquish (renunciar) the same, so that the island should become independent. It so appears from the diplomatic correspondence in the possession of the government of Her Catholic Majesty relating to the negotiation between the two contracting parties prior to the declaration of war. It was also thus declared by the American Congress in the Joint Resolution of April 19 last, subsequently approved by the President of the United States. The first clause of that resolution reads 'that the people of Cuba are and of right ought to be free and independent.'"

There followed the official text of the Protocol in Spanish, and remarks:

"To undertake to explain the essential difference which according to the elementary principles of public international law and the usage of nations exists between the abandonment (abandono) and the relinquishment (renuncia) of sovereignty, would be to offend the intelligence of the learned American Commissioners.

“Abandoned territories can of right be acquired by the first occupant, while relinquished territories necessarily pass unto him to whom relinquishment is made. And the United States demanded that Spain relinquish in order that the Cuban people might become independent.

“Although it is true that the United States of America demanded this of Spain in the present case, they also demanded that such relinquishment must be made through them. The United States were to receive the island of Cuba and retain the possession thereof, governing it until its pacification was secured, asserting its ‘determination to leave [no one can leave what he does not hold] the government and control of the island to its people, as soon as the said pacification is accomplished.’ So was it solemnly set forth in Section 4 of the Joint Resolution of the American Congress and in the despatch of the Secretary of State to the American Minister at Madrid. And if the United States are not to leave the government and control of the island until the pacification thereof is accomplished it is self-evident that in the meantime the United States are called upon to administer the one and retain the other.”

This was followed by learned observations about the rights of sovereignty and the variance of the ancient world with the modern and Christian world, the maxims observed by cultured nations and the eternal principles of justice, more or less labored, and of vague application, saying:

“The special obligations of the particular territories ceded which were contracted by its legitimate authorities, in no single case, not even in those treaties in which the victor has shown himself most merciless towards the vanquished, have the individual and separate charges and obligations of a ceded territory failed to pass therewith. Thus it may be considered as an absolutely essential condition that the cession of territory carries with it the cession of the departmental, communal, and, generally speaking, individual obligations and debts of the ceded territory.”

The “great conqueror of the century” (Napoleon) never dared to violate this eternal rule of justice and, “The territories discovered by Columbus and other illustrious Spanish explorers who have rendered such great, though not always appreciated, services to civilization being divided into, vice-royalties and captaincies-general, each of these small states collected its own revenues and met its own expenses, or contracted obligations to meet the necessities of its own separate government; and when one of these territories found itself



William McKinley.

President of the United States of America.

TO ALL WHO SHALL SEE THESE PRESENTS.

Greetings:

Know Ye, that upon special *Call and Proclamation* in the Patriotic Valor, Fidelity and Ability and *History* of **George Dewey** I have recommended, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate do appoint him **Admiral in the Navy** from the 2nd day of March 1899 in the service of the **UNITED STATES**. He is therefore respectfully and diligently to discharge the Duties of **Admiral** by doing and performing all manner of things thereto belonging.

And Ye strictly charge and require all Officers, Sailors and Marines, under his Command to be obedient to his Orders as **Admiral** and to observe and follow such Orders as *Directions* from time to time as he shall receive from me, or the future **PRESIDENT** of the United States of America, or his *Successors* who shall succeed him, according to the *Articles and Regulations* **WHICH BEFY.**

This **COMMISSION** is to continue in force during the pleasure of the President of the United States for the term being

To the President


Wm. McKinley

Given under my Hand at Washington, this third day of March in the year of our Lord One thousand Eight Hundred and ninety nine and in the 123rd year of the Independence of the United States.

William McKinley



"TO GEORGE DEWEY, WITH THE COMPLIMENTS OF THE PRESIDENT, CONGRESS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES."



MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS M. ANDERSON, COMMANDER OF 1ST DIVISION 8TH ARMY CORPS AT MANILA.

with a permanent deficit, as was the case in the island of Cuba, the nearest sister-colony came to its rescue. The vice-royalty of Mexico, from 1766 to 1806, annually assisted the island of Cuba with heavy sums for its governmental needs and the development of its natural resources, at the time unexploited, which expenses it could not, at such time, meet from its own revenues. Not less than 108 millions of pesos came into Cuba from Mexico during that period, this assistance being known in the Spanish colonial administration under the name of 'Situado de Mexico.'

The Spanish Commission proceeded to state that grave errors were fallen into "owing to the Spanish colonial system being unknown." The Spanish Commission at this point paid this tribute to the Spanish-American peoples:

"What has been said up to this point regarding the nature of the colonial obligations and those bound thereby, has never been disregarded (to their honor be it said) by the Spanish-American peoples. They achieved their independence through their own efforts, and the majority of them, before Spain had recognized it, had by prior and solemn act of their legislatures, declared as their own and as having preference those debts which the Crown of Spain had contracted during the continuance of its sovereignty for the service of such territories, and which debts were recorded in their respective treasury books.

"Very few of the Spanish-American republics delayed so honorable a declaration until the mother country had recognized their independence, as was said by the Argentine Republic in the treaty concluded with Spain on September 21, 1863, and by Uruguay, in that concluded on July 19, 1870: 'Just as they acquired the rights and privileges belonging to the Crown of Spain, they also assume all its duties and obligations.'

"Note that the Spanish-American republics without exception recognized and assumed as their own these debts of every kind whatsoever, specifying them in the treaty of peace with Bolivia of July 21, 1847, wherein it is stated that they 'include all debts for pensions, salaries, supplies, advances, transportation, forced loans, deposits, contracts, and any other debt incurred during war times or prior thereto, chargeable to said treasuries; provided they were contracted by direct orders of the Spanish government or its constituted authorities in said territories.'

"Spain did not recognize the independence of any American state which had previously been her colony save upon this condition, which those states

spontaneously incorporated in their respective treaties, as of right they should.

“Her right and her dignity will not permit her to recognize—without this condition, which now more than ever if possible is still just and proper—the independence of the Cuban and Porto Rican peoples, which they have not been able to achieve by their own unaided efforts.”

The Spanish Commission desired a modification of the sentence in the American Commissioners' Protocol No. 4, that the Spanish Article was a proposition not to relinquish sovereignty, but to “transfer to the United States a mass of Spanish charges and obligations,” and modification was desired “on the ground that it might be thought to imply that they were not acting in good faith.” Out of deference to the Spanish Commissioners this was changed, though the sentence did not sustain the Spanish construction, to read, “a mass of charges and obligations which, in the opinion of the American Commissioners, properly belong to Spain.” October 14th the American Commission replied to the Spanish Commission as to the distinction between relinquishment and abandonment, the contention being based upon the fact that “in the various documents referred to the United States required Spain to ‘relinquish’ her sovereignty, but did not demand that she ‘abandon’ it.

“A distinction is thus made between a ‘relinquishment’ and an ‘abandonment’; and it is argued that while ‘abandoned territories’ become derelict, so that they may be acquired by the first occupant, ‘relinquished territories’ necessarily pass to him to whom relinquishment is made.

“The American Commissioners are unable to admit that such a distinction between the words in question exists either in law or in common use.

“The word ‘relinquish,’ as defined in the English dictionaries, means ‘to give up the possession or occupancy of; withdraw from; leave; abandon; quit.’ Again: ‘to renounce a claim to; resign; as, to relinquish a debt.’

“On the other hand, we find in that great monument of Spanish learning, the law dictionary of Escriche (*Diccionario de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia*), under the word ‘renunciar,’ which the Spanish memorandum declares to be the equivalent of the French word ‘renoncer’ (used in Spain’s version of the Protocol) and of the English word ‘relinquish,’ the following definition: ‘The voluntary giving up of a right exercised or expected to be exercised, or of a thing held or possessed or expected to be held or possessed.’”

Commenting upon this definition, Escriche says: “The relinquishment

differs from the cession in that the latter requires for its completion the concurrence of the wills of the grantor and the grantee and a just cause for the transfer, while the former is perfect with only the will of the relinquisher. The effect of the relinquishment is confined to the abdication or dropping of the right or thing relinquished. The effect of the cession is the conveyance of the right to the grantee."

The American Commissioners noted the declaration in the Spanish memorandum that there was no purpose now to transfer with the sovereignty of Cuba and Porto Rico a proportional part of the national debt of Spain, but "only the obligations and charges attaching individually to the islands," which obligations and charges it likens to the local debts which pass with ceded territory; but it appears, however, by the explanation given in the memorandum of the origin of these charges and obligations, and of the manner in which they were contracted, that they included the whole of what is commonly called the Cuban debt. And it was shown that this debt did not exist prior to 1861, and the American memorandum concluded with the statement that the government of the United States had at a great sacrifice of life and treasure prosecuted a conflict to cause the relinquishment by Spain of sovereignty over Cuba, and one of the results was the unconditional agreement embodied in the first article of the Peace Protocol that Spain "will relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba," and "upon the simple fulfillment of that stipulation the American Commissioners are obliged to insist."

The formation of the Cuban debt was thus related by the Commissioners:

"The revenues of the island were, as a rule, far more than sufficient to pay the expenses of its government, and produced in each year a surplus. This surplus was not expended for the benefit of the island, but was sent to Madrid. The surpluses thus disposed of amounted, from 1856 to 1861 inclusive, to upwards of \$20,000,000.

"In 1864, in order to meet the national expenses of the attempt to 'reincorporate' San Domingo into the Spanish dominions, and of the 'expedition to Mexico,' the Spanish authorities issued bonds to the amount of \$3,000,000. Subsequently new loans were made, so that the so-called Cuban debt had swollen by 1868 to \$18,000,000.

"In that year the ten years' war for Cuban independence broke out, a war produced by causes so generally conceded to be just as to need no exposition on this occasion. All the expenses of this war were imposed upon Cuba, so

that in 1880, according to a statement made at Madrid in that year by a Spanish Secretary for the Colonies, the so-called Cuban debt amounted to upwards of \$170,000,000.

"Subsequently the Spanish government undertook to consolidate these debts, and to this end created in 1886 the so-called Billetes hipotecarios de la Isla de Cuba, to the amount of 620,000,000 pesetas, or \$124,000,000. The Spanish government undertook to pay these bonds and the interest thereon out of the revenues of Cuba, but the national character of the debt was shown by the fact that, upon the face of the bonds, 'the Spanish nation' (la Nación Española) guarantee their payment. The annual charge for interest and sinking fund on account of this debt amounted to the sum of 39,191,000 pesetas, or \$7,838,200, which was disbursed through a Spanish financial institution, called the Banco Hispano-Colonial, which is said to have collected daily from the custom house at Havana, through an agency there established, the sum of \$33,339.

"In 1890 a new issue of bonds was authorized by the Spanish government to the amount, as it is understood, of 875,000,000 pesetas, or \$175,000,000, with the same guarantee as before, apparently with a view to refund the prior debt, as well as to cover any new debts contracted between 1886 and 1890. It seems, however, that only a small number of these bonds had been disposed of when, in February, 1895, the last insurrection and movement for independence broke out. The government of Spain then proceeded to issue these new bonds for the purpose of raising funds with which to suppress the uprising, so that those outstanding on January 1, 1898, amounted, according to published reports, to 858,550,000 pesetas, or \$171,710,000. In addition to these a further loan, known as the 'Cuban War Emergency Loan,' was, as the American Commissioners are advised, floated to the amount of 800,000,000 pesetas, or \$160,000,000, represented by what are called 'five per cent peseta bonds.'

"Although it does not appear that any mention is made in these bonds of the revenues of Cuba, it is understood that they are regarded in Spain as properly constituting a part of the 'Cuban debt,' together with various unliquidated debts, large in amount, incurred by the Spanish authorities in opposing by arms the independence of Cuba.

"From no point of view can the debts above described be considered as local debts of Cuba or as debts incurred for the benefit of Cuba. In no sense are they obligations properly chargeable to that island. They are debts

created by the government of Spain, for its own purposes and through its own agents, in whose creation Cuba had no voice."

In reply to this the Spanish Commission asserted that, "as a general rule, the island of Cuba has not since its discovery covered its own expenses.

"As long as Spain kept the American colonies the island was sustained by the pecuniary aid of her sisters and specially by that of the Vice-Royalty of Mexico. In this century, for a very few years, she had a surplus, thanks to the development of her natural resources, at last obtained through this assistance, and it is true that this surplus was turned over to the treasury of the Peninsula. But with this exception it is patent that the general accounts of the Spanish state from 1896-1897 show that the treasury of the Peninsula advanced to Cuba, in the years preceding that recent period, a sum amounting to 429,602,013.08 pesetas. There also appears an advance to Porto Rico of 3,220,488.67 pesetas, and to Santo Domingo 1,397,161.69 pesetas.

"The prosperity of Cuba was of short duration; for the greater part of the time from the days of Columbus, by reason either of the scarcity of its inhabitants or of the slavery of the black race, which formed the majority, or lastly because Spaniards preferred to colonize other parts of America, the island was unable to develop its natural resources; and it was nevertheless constantly necessary to expend in the island the large sums which were required for the establishment of reform and the creation of the institutions which are the essential conditions of modern life."

The Spanish Commission protested against an assertion in the American memorandum that the insurrections in Cuba were the outcome of just grievances, and regretted that such an assertion should have been made. The American Commission "would surely, and with good reason, regret that the Spanish Commission should say anything here without an imperative necessity of the justice of the rebellions of the natives of the immense American territory which the United States had so often to suppress with an iron hand, and if it should also say anything of the right by which the Southern States attempted to break the federal bond by the force of arms."

It was "very natural," the Spaniards proceeded, "that the American Commissioners should not have such accurate knowledge as is requisite for precise judgment of the acts of the Spanish administration in the Peninsula or in its colonies.

"And we find a confirmation of this in the facts.

"In regard to the argument against the recognition of a certain part of the Cuban debt, on the ground that the rebellion of a minority of the Cuban people to obtain their independence was just, we have only to make the following remark:

"The insurgent minority, it is true, rose up in arms to secure the independence of the island. The United States erroneously believed that their cause was just, and by force of arms caused it to prevail against Spain. But now the facts have shown that Spain was right, as the United States themselves have had to recognize that the Cuban people are not as yet in such conditions as are necessary to entitle them to the enjoyment of full liberty and sovereignty. It is upon this ground that the United States have decided to withhold from that people the said privileges and to hold them under American control, until they become able to enjoy that liberty prematurely demanded by them."

In order to define the debts the Americans should assume the Spaniards presented an article, providing:

"All pecuniary charges and obligations outstanding upon the ratification of this treaty of peace which, after a minute examination into their origin, purpose and the conditions of their creation, should be held, pursuant to strict law and undeniable equity, to be distinct from such as are properly and peculiarly chargeable to the treasury of the Peninsula, and to have been always properly and peculiarly Cuban.

"To make the strict examination provided for in the foregoing paragraph, the two High Contracting Parties shall name a Commission of competent and impartial persons in the manner to be determined in the proper article of this treaty."

As to the powers of the Commissioners, the Spanish Commission quoted the Secretary of State and the President, as follows:

"After the three conditions which the Secretary of State at Washington, replying on July 30 last to the message of the government of Her Catholic Majesty of the 22d of the said month, proposed to Spain for the termination of the war, he said: 'If the terms hereby offered are accepted in their entirety commissioners will be named by the United States to meet similarly authorized commissioners on the part of Spain for the purpose of settling the details of the treaty of peace and signing and delivering it under the terms above indicated.' These details do not appear to be circumscribed to the archipelago.

“The very President of the American Republic in the conference he held on August 10 with the Ambassador of France, representing Spain for the time being, made an absolute distinction between the Protocol and the treaty of peace, stating that the former should only be a mere preliminary document which should have no object or effect other than to record without any delay the agreement of the two governments upon the principles themselves of the peace, and that, therefore, it would not be necessary to reserve therein either the rights of the Cortes or those of the Federal Senate, who were charged only with the ratification of the final treaty.

“The President, it is true, spoke of the Philippine question to state that it was reserved for the Paris conference; but he never said, or even intimated, that this subject should be the only one to be treated by this conference ”

This was followed up with these interesting observations:

“The American Commission, in order to sustain its inadmissible opinion regarding the abandonment by Spain of the island of Cuba, relies on the difference which appears in the Protocol itself. They say that Spain agreed to cede only Porto Rico to the United States, while she bound herself to relinquish the island of Cuba. From this they deduce that the effects of the obligation of Spain with respect to one are broader than with respect to the other. We have already proved by the very text of the draft of articles presented by the said gentlemen that when they drew it up they did not even perceive this difference in the effects with respect to Spain. The difference, nevertheless, is well understood under another aspect. The United States made a demand on Spain and afterwards declared war on her that Cuba might become free and independent. And it is clear that having conquered they could not demand that the island be ceded to them, ignoring the liberty and independence thereof, as this would give cause to the world to believe that such liberty and independence had not been the true cause of the conflict. They did not make the same demand regarding Porto Rico, and did subsequently claim the sovereignty of the latter island and of the others surrounding Cuba (which will render impossible its independence without the will and gracious consent of the United States, which will always have it at their mercy owing to their control over the islands surrounding it like a band of iron) in the way of indemnity for the expenses of the war and of the damages which they said American citizens had suffered during the colonial insurrection. This is the natural explanation of why in the Protocol the

sovereignty of one island appears as relinquished and that of the others as ceded."

The Spaniards proceeded to state the fact that we had repeatedly paid for land, citing the cases of Louisiana, Texas, New Mexico and Alaska, and now we were demanding from Spain, in the way of war indemnity, not only the cession of islands but additionally that the burdens which encumbered them, "as well as their sister Cuba, be thrown upon the mother country, who with her own hands introduced them into the life of the civilized world."

In concluding their very lengthy and able memorandum the Spanish Commission remarked, with eloquent impressiveness, it is only fair to say:

"It results, in recapitulation, that the only question up to now in existence between the two Commissions and awaiting their decision is a question of money, which as far as one of the High Contracting Parties is concerned is relatively of secondary importance. That question is the one which relates to the colonial debt.

"The Spanish Commissioners understand that a question of such a nature as this cannot fail to be solved satisfactorily between two parties, one of which is the greatest nation of the new world, immensely rich and prosperous, blessed with inexhaustible resources, whether due to nature or to the prodigious activity of its inhabitants, which on the other hand acquires by this treaty territories of great importance, and thereby fulfills an aspiration of its policy in America, while the other party is a great and noble nation of the old world, a cordial friend of her late antagonist in days for her more prosperous, but now impoverished through the misfortunes heaped upon her during the century which is about to terminate; whose treasury is overburdened by obligations, and for whom the present treaty will mean the solemn confirmation of the loss of the last remnants of her American empire, although through her discovery of the new world she was instrumental in the very existence of the Great American Republic, and to the enrichment of the modern nations, perhaps at the expense of her own welfare and to the detriment of the full development of the great elements of wealth accumulated in her own bosom but neglected through her desire preferentially to attend to her colonies, creatures who like others in the order of nature enlist the utmost solicitude on the part of their mother, who feeds and supports them at the sacrifice of her own welfare."

In replying to this remarkable manifesto in a memorandum, which is

marked by the passionate dignity of an uncommon and transcendent sorrow, the American Commission said that in offering the precise stipulations of the Protocol they "sought to put aside the controversy raised by the Spanish proposals as to the relinquishment of sovereignty and the assumption of the Cuban debt, and to afford the Spanish Commissioners an opportunity to meet them on the common ground of what the two governments had unmistakably agreed to. It was and is now apparent that on the composite subject, as the Spanish Commissioners consider it to be, of the relinquishment of sovereignty over Cuba and the assumption of the Cuban debt, the views expressed on the one side and on the other are irreconcilable, and that, unless some common ground is found, the conference is at an end. In this crisis the American Commissioners conceived that both sides might, without any compromise of principle or of opinion, agree that, instead of amplifying the words of the Protocol, or substituting for them argumentative stipulations, they would execute the promise in the words in which it was made. They regret that the Spanish Commissioners rejected this conciliatory proposition.

"The Spanish Commissioners, in the memorandum now under consideration, recur to the distinction which they have sought to make between the words 'abandon' and 'relinquish.' On this verbal question, which was raised by the Spanish Commissioners in their memorandum of the 11th of October, the American Commissioners find no occasion to add anything to what they have already said; but they feel called upon to repel the imputation that they have sought either to leave Cuba in a derelict condition or to evade any responsibility to which their government is by its declarations or its course of conduct committed."

Touching the Spanish claims that they had made recent "advances" to Cuba, the American Commission observed:

"It is to be regretted that details were not given. But, by the very term 'advances' it is evident that the Spanish memorandum does not refer to gifts, but to expenditures for the reimbursement of which Cuba was expected ultimately to provide; and the American Commissioners do not doubt that these expenditures were made for the carrying on of the war, or the payment of war expenses, in Cuba.

"When the American Commissioners, in their memorandum of the 14th instant, referred to the Cuban insurrection of 1868 as the product of just grievances, it was not their intention to offend the sensibilities of the Spanish

Commissioners, but to state a fact which they supposed to be generally admitted. They might, if they saw fit to do so, cite the authority of many eminent Spanish statesmen in the support of their remark.

“The American Commissioners have read without offense the reference in the Spanish memorandum to the Indian rebellions which it has been necessary for the United States to suppress, for they are unable to see any parallel between the uprisings of those barbarous and often savage tribes, which have disappeared before the march of civilization because they were unable to submit to it, and the insurrections against Spanish rule in Cuba, insurrections in which many of the noblest men of Spanish blood in the island have participated.

“Nor are the American Commissioners offended by the reference of the Spanish memorandum to the attempt of the Southern States to secede. The Spanish Commissioners evidently misconceive the nature and the object of that movement. The war of secession was fought and concluded upon a question of constitutional principle, asserted by one party to the conflict and denied by the other. It was a conflict in no respect to be likened to the uprisings against Spanish rule in Cuba.

“The American Commissioners are unaware of the ground on which it is asserted in the Spanish memorandum that the United States has been compelled to admit that the Cuban people are as yet unfit for the enjoyment of full liberty and sovereignty. It is true that an intimation of such unfitness was made in the note of the Spanish government on the 22d of July last. The government of the United States, in its reply of the 30th of July, declared that it did not share the apprehensions of Spain in this regard, but that it recognized that in the present distracted and prostrate condition of the island, brought about by the wars that had waged there, aid and guidance would be necessary.”

The Spaniards had said publicists had declared that the thirteen original colonies of the United States had paid Great Britain £15,000,000. The Americans replied:

“The American Commissioners are not acquainted with the works of the publicists who maintain that the thirteen original United States paid to Great Britain £15,000,000 sterling, presumably for the extinguishment of colonial debts. The American Commissioners, however, feel no interest in the matter, since the statement is entirely erroneous. The preliminary and

definitive treaties of peace between the United States and Great Britain of 1782 and 1783 were published soon after their conclusion, and have since been republished in many forms. They are the only treaties made between the two countries as to American independence, and they contain no stipulation of the kind referred to."

The American memorandum closes with these simple sentences:

"If it could be admitted, as is argued in the memorandum submitted by the Spanish Commissioners, that the United States in this relation stands as the agent of the Cuban people, the duty to resist the assumption of these heavy obligations would be equally imperative. The decrees of the Spanish government itself show that these debts were incurred in the fruitless endeavors of that Government to suppress the aspirations of the Cuban people for greater liberty and freer government."

The next move of the Spaniards was to assume and assert a policy in the cases of the Philippines and the West Indian islands. The reply of the American Commission was:

"The American Commissioners are not disturbed by this charge of inconsistency, since they deem it obviously groundless. They based their demands in regard to Cuba and Porto Rico upon the precise terms of the Protocol, because it was in those very terms that the United States had made its demands and Spain had conceded them, by promising to 'relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba,' and to 'cede' to the United States Porto Rico and certain other islands. The United States, in insisting upon the words of the Protocol on these subjects, merely asked that the precise concessions of Spain be made good.

"In the case of the Philippines, the United States, except as to the bay, city, and harbor of Manila, confined itself to demanding that the subject should be left in the widest and fullest sense for future negotiations. While it did not, with the exception referred to, demand specific concessions, it reserved and secured the right to demand them. Its position, therefore, is, not that its present demands in respect of the Philippines were specifically set out in the Protocol, but that they are justified by and included in the right which it therein expressly reserved and secured to make demands in the future."

The Spanish Commission had been sensitive from the first meeting of the Commissioners about the fate of the Philippines, and protested October 17th against the sending of American reinforcements to Manila, the president of

the Spanish Committee stating "that he had received from his government a telegram referring to reports to the effect that two American men-of-war were about to leave American ports with reinforcements of troops for the garrison at Manila, and that Spanish prisoners in the possession of the Tagalos are ill-treated." But the telegram was not read.

There is a curious passage in one of the memorandums, charging that General Merritt, "after the Protocol was signed, contrary to what had been agreed upon, forcibly took possession of Manila," and in the terms of the capitulation the words occurred "or when the American army evacuates," and the Spanish memorandum goes on to say:

"In the conference held on August 4 last, between Mr. Cambon, Ambassador from France, and President McKinley, in the presence of the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Cambon made some remarks as to the session of Porto Rico in compensation for the expenses of the war, and the President, showing himself inflexible upon that point, repeated his assertion that the Philippine question was the only one not finally settled in his mind. It was then that Mr. Cambon asked for an explanation about the meaning of the above cited phrases in Article III. of the Protocol, relating to the Philippine Archipelago, as the language of said Article might lend itself to inspire fear in Spain in regard to her sovereignty over these islands. President McKinley answered him, verbatim, as follows:

"I do not want any ambiguity to be allowed to remain on this point. The negotiators of both countries are the ones who shall resolve upon the permanent advantages (notice that he said "advantages," and not "rights") which we shall ask in the archipelago, and decide upon the intervention (contrôle), disposition and government of the Philippine Islands.'

"He further said: 'The Madrid government can rest assured that up to now nothing is decided à priori, in my own mind, against Spain, nor do I consider anything decided by it against the United States.'

"Is it therefore doubtful that on the 12th of August, when the Secretary of State of the United States signed the Protocol, the President of the United States had no idea of demanding from Spain the cession to the United States of her sovereignty over the archipelago?"

There was further comment upon the President's open-mindedness as to the Philippines, and this gave rise to the most interesting episode of the arduous and contentious negotiations, which, stated by the American Com-

mission, in constant communication by the cable with the President himself, has every authenticity of authority, and is official history. The Spanish Commission had gone so far as to say that on the 13th of August, "General Merritt, commander of the American forces in Manila, and the Admiral of the fleet in that bay, demanded the surrender of the place, and as its authorities did not agree thereto, the said forces opened fire on the San Antonio Abad powder magazine and on the trenches which defended the city on the land side, unnecessarily causing a considerable number of losses to the Spanish forces, who would have peacefully delivered the city over to the Americans in obedience to the third basis of the Protocol that they might hold it as a guaranty pending the conclusion of the treaty of peace.

"General Merritt entered Manila by force, he made prisoners of war of its garrison made up of eight or nine thousand men, he took possession of the public funds and the collection of taxes, including customs receipts, he named as Intendant General and Administrator of the Public Treasury, and Tax Collector, the officers of his army he saw fit, thereby displacing the Spanish officials. He relieved the Spanish Commander of the civil guard charged with the maintenance of public order; he constituted military courts; he opened the port of Manila and all the other ports of the Philippines in the possession of his land and naval forces to the commerce of his nation and of neutral nations, conditioned on the payment of the dues in force at the time of his arrival, which were collected by his officials. All of this is recorded in the preliminary minute of the capitulation of August 13, in the capitulation of the 14th itself, in the proclamation of General Merritt of like date, in his orders of the 22d and 23d of the same month, and in the others dictated by the American authorities and officials in Manila.

"The Spanish government remonstrated to that of Washington through the French Embassy against everything that occurred there on August 29 and the 3d and 11th of September last, repeating such remonstrances since and down to the present time, signally insisting upon the immediate release of the garrison held prisoners in Manila and upon the return of their arms, since, on the one hand, it could not send reinforcements from the Peninsula to the archipelago, nor would the United States look favorably upon such an action, and, on the other hand, it needed those forces to liberate the thousands of Spanish prisoners of the Tagalo insurgents, victims of their ill-treatment, and to combat and dominate that insurrection of its own subjects. The

remonstrances of the Spanish government have been up to the present fruitless. These acts are daily assuming a worse phase. On September 21 Captain W. P. Moffatt, appointed by the American Provost Marshal in charge of the Bilibid prisons, with authority to regulate the entrance and release of all kinds of prisoners, released two, named Silvestre Lacy and Marcos Alarcon, charged with the offense of highway robbery; two others charged with desertion; six charged with contempt of authority; another charged with assault and robbery, and three others charged with homicide. As is seen, all these prisoners were in jail for common crimes. This unheard-of act was communicated to the government of Her Catholic Majesty by the Commandant General's Office of the station of Manila."

The American Commission says of this: "The American Commissioners are loth to assume that the Spanish 'proposition' employs these words for the purpose of intimating that General Merritt could at the time of the capture of Manila have had knowledge of the Protocol. It is a fact doubtless well known to the Spanish government that on the 16th of August last, four days after the signature of the protocol, and four days before the receipt at Washington of the news of the capture and capitulation of Manila, the Department of State addressed to the French Ambassador a note soliciting the consent of the Spanish government to the restoration of cable communication between Manila and Hongkong, in order that continuous telegraphic connection with the Philippines might be reestablished."

The Spaniards descended from their pose of dignity in this instance. The President of the United States could just as well have forced the cession of the Philippines as of Porto Rico, but deemed it his duty to refer the question of our permanency in the archipelago to the people of the United States. The raid of the Spanish Commission upon the facts as to the Philippines exhibits a weakness that takes away sympathy from the Commissioners when representing the misfortunes of their country; they were from the beginning conscious that however adroit their ability, or vigorous their protests, the inevitable end was Spain's surrender.

There is compensation for the general reader in the narration the American Commissioners give of the part of the President in the preparation of the Peace Protocol.

The President on the 26th of July received a note asking him to name the terms on which peace might be obtained. This note was presented to the

President of the United States on the 26th day of July, 1898, by Mr. Cambon, Ambassador of the French Republic at Washington, authorized to make the application, and represent the Spanish government in the subsequent negotiations which led up to the execution of the Protocol. At that meeting, the President received the note of July 22 from the Spanish government, and advised Mr. Cambon that after consultation with his Cabinet he would prepare an answer which could be transmitted to the Spanish government. On July 30, following, the terms of peace having been carefully considered and agreed upon by the President and his Cabinet, the President received Mr. Cambon at the Executive Mansion in Washington, at which meeting were also present Mr. Thiébauld, Secretary of the French Embassy in Washington, and the then Secretary of State of the United States. The answer of the President to the communication of the Spanish government, dated July 30, 1898, was then read to Mr. Cambon. This note was in the exact form in which it was afterwards signed and delivered to Mr. Cambon to be sent to the Spanish government, with a single exception. After some discussion of the terms of the note as to Cuba, and Porto Rico, and other West Indian islands, Mr. Cambon said he did not know what the Spanish government would desire as to the Philippines, and no matter what the note might say as to the Commission, the Spanish government would regard the purpose of the United States as being fixed to acquire not only Cuba and Porto Rico, but the Philippines as well. The President said that as to the Philippines the note expressed the purposes of this government, and their final disposition would depend upon the treaty to be negotiated by the Commissioners and ratified by the interested governments.

After further discussion, in which the President reiterated that the treaty must determine the fate of the Philippines, and the note of the President on that subject reading then as now with the single exception that the word "possession" was then in Article III., so that it read "control, possession and government of the Philippines," where it now reads "control, disposition and government of the Philippines," Mr. Cambon said that the word "possession" translated into Spanish in such a way as to be regarded as of a severe and threatening nature, and suggested a change in that word. He suggested the word "condition." The President declined to change the word except for a word of similar import or meaning. The word "disposition" being suggested, after considerable talk the President consented that that

word, not changing the meaning, being indeed a broader one and including possession, might be substituted. Thereupon the note at the close of the interview of July 30, in exactly the form it was originally cast with the single change of the word "disposition" for "possession," was delivered to Mr. Cambon to be communicated to the Spanish government.

On Wednesday, August 3, in the afternoon, Mr. Cambon having intimated a desire for a further interview with the President, another meeting between the same persons was held at the Executive Mansion. Mr. Cambon said the Spanish government had received the answer of the President, and that it was regarded by Spain as very severe. After asking a modification as to Porto Rico, to which the President promptly answered that he could not consent, Mr. Cambon said there was a disposition to believe in Spain that the United States intended to take the Philippine group; that the Spanish government appreciated that reforms were necessary in the government; that American privileges should be granted; but that Spanish sovereignty should not be interfered with was a matter which Spain would insist upon. The President answered that the question of Cuba, Porto Rico and other West India islands, and the Ladronez, admitted of no negotiation; that the disposition of the Philippine Islands, as he had already said to Mr. Cambon, must depend upon the treaty, which might be negotiated, and that he could not make any change in the terms theretofore submitted. Mr. Cambon called attention to the wording of the note as to the possession of the city, bay and harbor of Manila to be retained during the pendency of the treaty, and asked what was to be done with them afterwards. The President said that must depend upon the terms of the treaty.

This is the same interview alluded to in the memorandum of the Spanish Commissioners as having occurred on the 4th of August. It in fact occurred on the afternoon of August 3, the difference in date arising from the fact, no doubt, that it was reported on the 4th of August. This could make but little difference, as there was but one interview at that time.

In reporting the conversations, and comparing the memoranda made by Mr. Cambon with those made by the representative of the American government then present, it must be borne in mind that Mr. Cambon did not speak or understand English, but communicated with the President through the medium of an interpreter, his Secretary, and that neither of the American representatives understood or spoke the French language. Making this allow-



Gen. Hughes. Capt. Murray. Gen. Otis. Lieut. Sanders. Lieut.-Col. Barry.
GENERAL E. S. OTIS AND STAFF ON PORCH OF MALACANANG PALACE, MANILA.



MALACANAN PALACE AND PASIG RIVER, MANILA.



GENERAL OTIS AND STAFF. DINING ROOM. MALACANAN PALACE. MANILA.

ance, it is perfectly apparent that the American President, even in the version reported and transcribed in the memorandum of the Spanish Commission, at all times maintained that the treaty of peace should determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines. The President did say that the Philippine question was the only one left open for negotiation and settlement in the treaty. It is undoubtedly true that it was not then fully settled in his own mind as to what disposition should be made of the Philippines. Had it been, there would have been nothing to leave to negotiation and settlement in the treaty. It was the purpose of the President in everything written and spoken of to leave to the negotiators of the treaty the most ample freedom with reference to the Philippines, and to settle, if their negotiations should result in an agreement, the control, disposition and government of those islands in the treaty of peace. When Mr. Cambon spoke of Spain's purpose to retain sovereignty over those islands, the President did say he wanted it clearly understood that no ambiguity should remain upon that point, but that the whole matter should be decided as set forth in the treaty of peace, which should determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippine Islands. He certainly did not use the word "intervention," nor limit the subject of negotiation to "advantages" in the Philippines; nor could it be claimed that any report was made to the Spanish government of the precise English words used by the President. In the same paragraph quoted in the memorandum of the Spanish Commission in which it is said he used the words above quoted, it is added that the President also said the negotiators should decide upon the "intervention" (contrôle), disposition and government of the Philippine Islands. Even this version of the conversation is ample proof that the President showed no uncertainty as to the scope and meaning of the terms used. He did say in substance, in reply to the inquiry of Mr. Cambon as to whether the United States had prejudged the matter of the Philippine Islands and the rights to be acquired therein by the United States, that the case had not been prejudged either as to the United States or as to Spain. The whole matter would be left to the Commission for negotiation, and to be settled by the treaty of peace. In the meantime, the United States would insist upon holding Manila as laid down in the note, and its disposition thereafter would depend upon the terms of the treaty. This is reported in the quotation in the Spanish note as the utterance of the President that "the Madrid government can rest assured that up to now nothing is decided à

priori in my own mind against Spain, nor do I consider anything decided by it against the United States." This may not be an unfair interpretation, though not the exact words used by the President. It shows clearly that he did not regard the United States as limited to 'advantages in the Philippines,' but the whole matter, being undecided in the President's mind, was left open in accordance with the terms of the note. The case was not decided in advance in any of its aspects either for or against either government.

Great stress was laid in the Spanish memorandum upon the allegation that the President had not then determined to take the Philippine group, and indeed did not intend to do so. It is utterly immaterial to inquire as to what either government would then have insisted upon. There was a mutual agreement that the question should not then be decided. Opportunity for full investigation was reserved, the final conclusion to be arrived at as the result of the negotiations then in progress, in the treaty of peace to be concluded.

Further conversation as to the number of Commissioners, the place of meeting, et cetera, terminated the interview.

On the afternoon of August 9, Mr. Cambon, having received the note of August 7 sent by the Duke of Almodovar, called by appointment at the Executive Mansion in Washington, at which interview were present the same parties as at the last meeting. The part of that note which relates to the Philippines, in the exact terms in which it was then presented in English text by the French Ambassador to the President of the United States, is as follows:

"The terms relating to the Philippines seem, to our understanding, to be quite indefinite. On the one hand, the ground on which the United States believe themselves entitled to occupy the bay, the harbor and the city of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, cannot be that of conquest, since in spite of the blockade maintained on sea by the American fleet, in spite of the siege established on land by a native supported and provided for by the American Admiral, Manila still holds its own, and the Spanish standard still waves over the city. On the other hand, the whole Archipelago of the Philippines is in the power and under the sovereignty of Spain. Therefore, the government of Spain thinks that the temporary occupation of Manila should constitute a guaranty. It is stated that the treaty of peace shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines;

but as the intentions of the Federal government by regression remain veiled, therefore the Spanish government must declare that, while accepting the third condition, they do not à priori renounce the sovereignty of Spain over the Archipelago, leaving it to the negotiators to agree as to such reforms as the condition of these possessions and the level of culture of their natives may render desirable.

"The government of Her Majesty accepts the third condition, with the above mentioned declarations.

"Such are the statements and observations which the Spanish government has the honor to submit in reply to your Excellency's communication. They accept the proffered terms, subject to the approval of the Cortes of the Kingdom, as required by their constitutional duties.

"The agreement between the two governments implies the irremovable suspension of hostilities and the designation of Commissioners for the purpose of settling the details of the treaty of peace and of signing it, under the terms above indicated."

It is translated in the memorandum of the Spanish Commissioners in language differing somewhat from the terms of the note as presented to the President. In the translation in the memorandum it is said that the treaty shall determine "the intervention, disposition and government of the Philippine Islands." In the note as presented to the President it reads, "It is stated that the treaty of peace shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines." The word "entire" precedes "sovereignty" in the translation embodied in the Spanish note.

It is true that, taking these words of the Duke of Almodovar either as they were conveyed to the President of the United States, or as they were quoted in the Spanish proposition, it may be argued that they did no more than reserve to Spain the right to maintain that she did not in advance of the negotiations for peace renounce her sovereignty over the Archipelago. She did this, by her own declaration, for the reason that the intentions of the United States were "veiled"; clearly perceiving that by the terms of the demand the United States would have the right, if it saw fit to exercise it, to ask that she yield her sovereignty over the group, and that her sovereignty was thus put in jeopardy, she took the precaution to say that she did not intend, in assuming the chance of such a demand, to concede it in advance.

The American Commissioners did not deny that this might be a fair con-

struction of this particular paragraph of the Duke's note. The representatives of the United States were not willing, however, to leave anything to construction. When, therefore, the Duke's answer was read to the President it was immediately objected to by him and the Secretary of State, in that it was vague and indefinite, purporting to accept the terms laid down in the note of the United States, while requiring some modification. In referring to the Philippines, while in one paragraph it stated the acceptance of the terms, in another it seemed to retain the full right of sovereignty, with such reforms, etc., as that government might see fit to grant. The unsatisfactory character of this answer is more clearly shown when in the subsequent part of the same note, not quoted in the memorandum of the Spanish Commissioners, it was said without qualification that they (the Spanish government) accepted the proffered terms, subject to the approval of the Cortes of the Kingdom, as required by their constitutional duties. In the part of the note referred to above it is said 'the Spanish government must declare that, while accepting the said condition, they do not *à priori* renounce the sovereignty of Spain over the archipelago, leaving it to the negotiators, etc.' These contradictory statements were called to the attention of Mr. Cambon, and made the note, as was said to him, unsatisfactory to the United States.

It is to be observed, as has already in effect been pointed out, that even the terms of this note were inconsistent with the claim later put forward that Spanish sovereignty should not be interfered with, for the length to which the statement went in the note is that the Spanish government does not *à priori* relinquish entire sovereignty over the Philippine Archipelago, thus leaving it clearly to be inferred that the Spanish government recognized that the negotiations resulting in a treaty might require a relinquishment of Spanish sovereignty consequent upon such negotiations.

Mr. Cambon, having heard the objections raised by the American representatives to the note, asserted that allowance must be made for different translations which the note had undergone in course of transmission, and to the desire of the Spanish government to express regret at the loss of its colonies; and he was very confident that it was the intention to accept the terms of the United States. It was then suggested by the American representatives that if this was true, and the note was to be regarded as a full acceptance, the best way to settle the matter was to put the terms in the shape of a definite Protocol, which the President would authorize the Secre

tary of State to sign for the United States, Mr. Cambon to submit to the Spanish government the exact terms of the Protocol, to which an answer Yes or No could be had; and if the Spanish government accepted the Protocol, that would end the controversy. Mr. Cambon concurred in this view, and said if the Protocol was drawn up in proper form he would submit it to the Spanish government, and if authorized would execute it on its part.

On that evening, August 9, the Protocol was prepared in the State Department at Washington, and taken to the Executive Mansion, where it was submitted to the President and members of the Cabinet there present. On the morning of August 10 Mr. Cambon called at the State Department at Washington, a draft of the Protocol was submitted to and approved by him, and put into French by Mr. Thiébauld, Secretary of the French Embassy at Washington, and experts in the State Department. It was carefully compared with the English text, and then telegraphed by Mr. Cambon to the Spanish government. On the same day, August 10, the note of the Secretary of State enclosing the Protocol was sent to Mr. Cambon in Washington. This note, it is said, contained the admission of the Secretary of State of the United States that the note of the Duke of Almodovar of August 7 "contained in its spirit the acceptance by Spain of the conditions proposed by the United States." The best answer to this obvious misconstruction of the terms of the note of the Secretary of State is in the text of the note itself, which is as follows:

"Department of State, Washington, August 10, 1898.

"Excellency: Although it is your understanding that the note of the Duke of Almodovar, which you left with the President on yesterday afternoon, is intended to convey an acceptance by the Spanish government of the terms set forth in my note of the 30th ultimo as the basis on which the President would appoint Commissioners to negotiate and conclude with Commissioners on the part of Spain a treaty of peace, I understand that we concur in the opinion that the Duke's note, doubtless owing to the various transformations which it has undergone in the course of its circuitous transmission by telegraph and in cipher, is not, in the form in which it has reached the hands of the President, entirely explicit.

"Under these circumstances, it is thought that the most direct and certain way of avoiding misunderstanding is to embody in a Protocol to be signed by us as the representatives, respectively, of the United States and Spain, the terms on which the negotiations for peace are to be undertaken.

"I therefore enclose herewith a draft of such a Protocol, in which you will find that I have embodied the precise terms tendered to Spain in my note of the 30th ultimo, together with appropriate stipulations for the appointment of Commissioners to arrange the details of the immediate evacuation of Cuba, Porto Rico, and other islands under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, as well as for the appointment of Commissioners to treat of peace.

"Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

"(Signed) WILLIAM R. DAY.

"His Excellency, M. Jules Cambon, etc."

In this note, so far from saying that the Secretary of State of the United States understood that the note of the Spanish government of August 7 accepted the American terms, it is distinctly said: "Although it is your (Mr. Cambon's) understanding that the note of the Duke of Almodovar is intended to convey the acceptance by the Spanish government of the terms set forth in my note of the 30th ultimo, . . . I understand that we concur in the opinion that the Duke's note, doubtless owing to the various transformations which it has undergone in the course of its circuitous transmission by telegraph and in cipher, is not, in the form in which it reached the hands of the President, entirely explicit."

Here it is distinctly stated that the Secretary of State and Mr. Cambon concurred that the note was not entirely explicit. Was it then to be expected after all this careful negotiation that a note which the American representatives contended did not accept the terms of the United States, and which both negotiators agreed was not explicit, was to be received as a satisfactory answer to the American demand? Not so.

"Under these circumstances it was thought that the most direct and certain way of avoiding misunderstanding was to embody in a Protocol, to be signed by the representatives, respectively, of the United States and Spain, the terms on which the negotiations for peace were to be undertaken."

This is a most emphatic and definite declaration that the note of August 7 was not satisfactory, and that it was the purpose of the United States to leave nothing open to misunderstanding, but to embody, in a contract so plain that dispute would be forever foreclosed, the exact terms upon which negotiations for peace would be undertaken. The note goes on to say: "I therefore enclose herewith a draft of such a Protocol, in which you will find that I have

embodied the precise terms tendered to Spain in my note of the 30th ultimo, together with appropriate stipulations for the appointment of Commissioners, etc." What does this note mean? Does it admit the construction that the proposal was intended to embody the acceptance of August 7, reserving Spanish sovereignty? It is definitely settled, as a perusal of the document will show, that the Protocol embodied, not the uncertain and equivocal terms of the note of August 7, but the precise terms stated in the note of the American government of July 30. This note to Mr. Cambon enclosed the Protocol just as it was written and just as it was signed by the parties. It would seem, if ever an attempt was fairly made to have a clear understanding, if ever all precautions were taken which could leave no room for misunderstanding, such was the course pursued in this case.

It is thus seen how utterly groundless was the declaration in the Spanish "proposition" that, in order to determine the meaning of the Protocol, it is necessary to "bear in mind . . . the negotiations carried on between the two parties which culminated in this agreement, and in which the interpretation of the latter had been given beforehand and officially!" In the correspondence thus invoked by the Spanish Commissioners as an interpretation of the Protocol, the two governments did not contemplate the execution of such an instrument; and if the response of the Spanish government to the American demands had taken the form of a simple acceptance, no Protocol would have been made. The first suggestion of such an instrument was that made in the interview in which the Spanish response was declared to be unsatisfactory. It was because the Spanish response was unacceptable that the United States demanded a Protocol. And it was upon this rejected response that the Spanish argument for the limitation of the clear scope and meaning of the Protocol was built.

If further proof of the soundness of the position of the United States were needed, it would be found in a most convincing form in the telegram sent by Mr. Cambon to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. See the French 'Yellow Book' referred to in the Spanish memorandum, telegram number 9, Mr. Cambon to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs.

"No. 9.—M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador of the French Republic at Washington, to M. Delcassé, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

"Washington, August 10, 1898.

"The Federal government has decided to state precisely (*préciser*), in a

Protocol, the bases upon which the peace negotiations must, in its judgment, be entered upon.

"I send you herewith this document, which I shall thank you to transmit to the Spanish government. (Signed) J. CAMBON."

In this telegram, which was immediately communicated to the Spanish government, and which led to the telegram to Mr. Cambon authorizing him to sign the Protocol, followed by full power from the Queen Regent to Mr. Cambon to that effect, Mr. Cambon distinctly says, not that the American government had accepted the note of August 7, or in any wise agreed to such reservations as were contained therein, but that "the Federal government has decided to state precisely (*préciser*), in a Protocol, the bases upon which the peace negotiations must, in its judgment, be entered upon."

It thus clearly appears that the bases of peace negotiations were to be determined by the instrument which was enclosed, and which it was understood put in definite terms the ultimate agreement of the parties.

It was because the answer made in the note of August 7 was rejected by the United States, and for this reason alone, that hostilities were not upon the receipt of that note declared to be suspended; and it remained for the Spanish Commissioners in their "proposition" to advance for the first time in behalf of their government the suggestion that such a declaration should then have been made. It was not so made because that note was not received as an acceptance of the American demands. Hostilities were declared to be suspended only upon the signature of the Protocol.

The correspondence quoted in the French "Yellow Book," no less than the subsequent communications from Mr. Cambon to the American government, shows distinctly that with the exact terms of this Protocol before it, the Spanish Government, on the 11th instant, and subsequently by full power of the Queen Regent, authorized Mr. Cambon to execute the Protocol in behalf of Spain. Observe the language of the note of Mr. Cambon to the American Secretary of State of August 12, 1898:

"Embassy of the French Republic in the United States,

"Washington, August 12, 1898.

"Mr. Secretary of State: I have the honor to inform you that I have just received, through the intermediation of the Department of Foreign Affairs at Paris, a telegram, dated Madrid, August 11, in which the Duke of Almodovar

del Rio announces to me that, by order of Her Majesty the Queen Regent, the Spanish government confers upon me full powers in order that I may sign, without other formality and without delay, the Protocol whereof the terms have been drawn up by common accord between you and me. The instrument destined to make regular the powers which are thus given to me by telegraph will be subsequently addressed to me by the post.

“His Excellency the Minister of State adds that in accepting this Protocol, and by reason of the suspension of hostilities which will be the immediate consequence of that acceptance, the Spanish government has pleasure in hoping that the government of the United States will take the necessary measures with a view to restrain (*empêcher*) all aggression on the part of the Cuban separatist forces.

“The government of the Republic having, on the other hand, authorized me to accept the powers which are conferred upon me by the Spanish government, I shall hold myself at your disposition to sign the Protocol at the hour you may be pleased to designate.

“Congratulating myself upon thus coöperating with you toward the restoration of peace between the two nations, both friends of France, I beg you to accept, Mr. Secretary of State, the fresh assurances of my very high consideration.
(Signed) JULES CAMBON.”

In the light of these facts, it appears there was absolutely no foundation for the claim that the American government accepted the Spanish reservations so far as they are contained in the note of the Duke of Almodovar of August 7. Had that note been only a distinct and unqualified acceptance of the terms as contained in the American note of August 30, it would have been unnecessary to require that all uncertainty and doubt would be removed by reducing into few and simple terms, which it was believed could never be misunderstood, the final agreement of the parties. So far from remaining unanswered, the note of August 7 was declared unsatisfactory when presented to the President. Thus ended the attempt to come to an agreement by correspondence; and it was decided that a Protocol should embody the ultimate terms.

The Spanish government telegraphed the amplest authority to Mr. Cambon to execute it. We were then remitted to the terms of the Protocol itself.

The American government was at a loss to know how stronger terms could have been used to evidence the purpose of the President to keep open the most full and absolute right to deal with and determine the dominion over the Philippine Islands. This was the purpose of inserting the third article of the Protocol, which embodied the terms of the third demand of the United States, as set forth in the note of July 30 of the American government to the Duke of Almodovar, wherein it is said: "Third. On similar grounds the United States is entitled to occupy and hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines."

What are these similar grounds? They are to be found in the next preceding paragraph of the note of July 30, in which the President says that, though not then making any demand for pecuniary indemnity, nevertheless he could not be insensible to the losses and expenses of the United States incident to the war, or to the claims of our citizens for injuries to their persons and property during the late insurrection in Cuba. He must, therefore, require the cession to the United States, and the immediate evacuation by Spain, of the Island of Porto Rico, etc. On similar grounds, to wit, among others the right of the United States to have indemnity for its losses, the United States would hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, which should determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines.

How could the United States receive indemnity in whole or in part from the control, disposition and government of the Philippines, if Spanish sovereignty was not to be touched? It is difficult to conceive what terms could have been used which would more clearly have evidenced the purpose of the parties to afford the fullest latitude in dealing with the Philippine question. The treaty was to determine not alone the control, disposition and government, but at the same time had full power to determine all that is implied in control, disposition and government. Certainly the word "control" was not used here in the sense of "register" or "inspection," but in its broader sense of "authority or command; authority over; power over; the regulation or rule of."

What word could be broader than "disposition," which has practically the same meaning in both the French and English languages? "The disposal of; distribution of; alienation of; definite settlement of; ultimate destination."

We have in these two words, then, authority over, dominion of, final and ultimate destination of the subject matter. What is "government" but the right of administration, or exercising sovereignty, the direction, the political management of a state? Either of these terms implies power of interfering with sovereignty. Taken together, they give the fullest scope in dealing with all power, governmental, territorial and administrative.

It is not argued in the Spanish "proposition" that these words should have a narrow meaning so far as disposition and government are concerned, but transcribed into the French language it is sought to give a narrower meaning to the word "control." It must be construed in the connection in which it is found in the Protocol, in its broader sense of power or dominion. "Noscitur a sociis" is a legal maxim which applies to the discussion or determination of the meaning of phrases. "Control" associated with disposition and government of territory might have a very different significance when used in another relation in its less familiar meaning of "inspection or register." The word "disposition" used in another association might have an entirely different meaning, and a meaning which, in connection with government and control, would deprive it of all sense.

The American government, then, felt itself amply supported in its right to demand the cession of the Philippines with or without concessions, relying upon either the exact terms of the Protocol, or those terms interpreted in the light of negotiations, oral and written, which led to its execution.

The Commissioners of the United States noticed with regret that an attempt had been made in the memorandum of the Spanish Commissioners to invoke the high authority of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs in the interpretation of the Protocol, so as to exclude therefrom all mention of the right of the treaty to deal with the control, disposition and government of the Philippines. In the French "Yellow Book" cited by the Spanish Commissioners, it is apparent that as early as the 10th of August the French government was in possession of the exact terms of the Protocol, transmitted in the note of that date of its Ambassador, Mr. Cambon. Would anybody believe that in summing up this note the Minister would intentionally omit one of the most essential parts of the Protocol?

The note No. 19, referred to, is no part of the negotiations; its purpose was merely to advise the Ambassadors of the French Republic at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, etc., of the result of the action of the repre-

sentative of France in bringing about a suspension of hostilities, and the preliminary agreement as to peace, between two nations toward which the French government was actuated by feelings of humanity and mutual friendship. In this note it is said that the points upon which both parties had reached an agreement were set forth in a Protocol. In stating the contents of that instrument, doubtless through inadvertence, it was not stated that the treaty should determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines.

The attention of the Minister being called to this matter by the American Ambassador in Paris, he very promptly corrected any misapprehension which might exist as to his despatch. This appears in the following letter from the American Ambassador, which was received by the American Commissioners:

“Ambassade des États-Unis, 18, Avenue Kléber,

“Paris, November 5, 1898.

“Dear Sir: I beg to inform you that I saw the French Minister of Foreign Affairs in regard to that portion of the reply of the Spanish Peace Commissioners in which they refer to a letter sent by him to the French Ambassadors dated August 15, 1898, which appears in the French ‘Yellow Book,’ and attempt to construe the language used therein as an interpretation of the French Minister of the meaning of the Protocol, and speak of the unquestionable moral weight of the testimony therein given by him regarding that instrument. He assured me emphatically and unreservedly that the letter referred to was intended to be simply a brief résumé of the general features of the preliminary peace negotiations carried on between the two belligerents, and that he did not attempt to quote the precise language of the Protocol. He disclaimed any intention of giving any views of his own regarding it, having no authority for so doing, and declared that the brief mention contained in his letter could in no wise be construed as an interpretation by him of the terms or meaning of that instrument. He promised that he would at once send to the French Ambassadors the full text of the Protocol in order that they might be informed of its conditions in extenso, and that there might be no ground for misapprehension as to its terms.

“The Minister repeated what he had said several times before, and which I know to be true, that he and his government had all along observed a strict and impartial neutrality between the two powers which were negotiat-

ing, being equally friendly to both, and that he intended to continue the observance of such neutrality.

Very truly yours,

“(Signed) HORACE PORTER.

“Hon. William R. Day,

“President of the American Peace Commission, Paris.”

It was stated that the occupation of Manila was to be only temporary. The Protocol, so far as it relates to the Philippines, is itself provisional. It expressly provides for the doing of certain things pending the conclusion of a treaty which is in this particular to supersede it. Had it provided for the permanent occupation of Manila by the United States, it would have withdrawn the Philippines to that extent from the sphere of future negotiation.

The most presentable and seemly of the pleas of the Spanish commission for shouldering the Cuban debts upon the United States as an obligation of the transferred sovereignty, to be handed over to the Cubans if they became a nation, was this:

“In the memorandum which we are now answering, the singular affirmation is made that the mortgage created by the two issues above named can be called more properly a subsidiary guarantee, and that the party principally bound to pay is the Spanish nation. Undoubtedly the American Commission in making this affirmation had not before its eyes Article II. of the Royal Decree of May 10, 1886, authorizing the issue of 1,240,000 hypothecary bonds of the Island of Cuba, or the 2d paragraph of Article II. of the Royal Decree of September 27, 1890, authorizing the issue of 1,750,000 hypothecary bonds of the same island. Both texts read literally the same thing, and it will be sufficient for us to transcribe one of them. Their language is as follows: ‘The new bonds shall have the direct (especial) guarantee of the customs revenue, stamp revenue of the island of Cuba, direct and indirect taxes now levied or to be levied there in the future, and the subsidiary (general) guarantee of the Spanish nation. They shall be exempt from all ordinary and extraordinary taxes, etc.’ ”

Unquestionably, from the accustomed foundations for the building of nations, in material facts, it would have been simpler and stronger for the President to have demanded the cession of Cuba as of Porto Rico, but the effusion of Congress when it rushed to war had made difficulty in that direction, and the President had deftly and sturdily resisted the torrent that was driving

him upon the rock of the recognition of the national character of the Cuban faction that had monopolized the functions of the ancient Spanish Junta system, and the notorious Key West bureau of misinformation. The President was greatly wise in this, and in referring the Philippine question to the sober second thought of the people of the United States. He did not exert to the utmost the expression of his tremendous power, for that might have been mistaken for imperialism. He followed the high and holy traditions of our form of republicanism, and has been the faithful embodiment of the will of the people; and more than that, he has sought to know their will.

He had faith in the people of Cuba, taught in schools of sorrow to take their part in a system of self-government, but he has not confounded the Cubans in the United States engaged in finance with credit based upon the ashes of the conflagration kindled by Gomez with the people of Cuba, who would restore the opulent industries of the island. A people of Cuba exist, and they are not entirely or principally those who have appeared in the phantom armies that ambuscaded and terrorized the Spanish columns with agility and mystery.

The people of Cuba are not those who, after applying the torch to the cane fields and the tobacco leaves, that come visible wealth from the red and black soil and the indigo sky of the island, have mustered under the banner of the torch of San Domingo, ready for the American pay-roll, and also to make war for the poor plunder the island affords after the visitation of fire, that impoverished Cuba rather than the Peninsula of Spain. It is true that the deliberation of the President and people of the United States and the characteristic delays associated with the dignities of the Senate, allowed the Tagalos of Luzon to strike for a rule despotic and superstitious dictatorship of their own under a man who may be a soldier but is not a statesman; and this is in harmony with the stated courses of the methods of the people who do govern themselves.

It would have been happy if the Senate had ratified at once the splendid treaty with Spain, the fitting crown of a war of triumphs, but time is needed for obtaining the consensus of a multitude of wills trained in the individualities of free politics under popular dominion. The delay was mischievous, but the recompense is in the greater strength that comes at last, indicating one of the primary and grander truths of republicanism, that it is stronger than the imperialism that rests upon despots and dynasties that are degenerate.

The country is indebted no less to the military energy of General Merritt than to the brilliant ability and tenacity of Admiral Dewey, for the victories in which but little of the blood of the victors was spilled, for our possession of the capital of the Philippine Archipelago. General Merritt forced the fight, and Admiral Dewey smashed the defense by the seaside of Manila so that the storming of the town became a spectacle rather than a combat, and he was just in time. Neither the Spanish nor the American Commission seemed to have been perfectly informed or quite ingenuous in their information and use of the cable, the disability of which at one time caused delay, and at another hastened conclusion.

The cable was cut by Dewey after the Spaniards had refused to neutralize its service, and a piece was taken out of it, the operators were scattered and the instruments gone, so that if both sides had been agreed some time must have elapsed before resumption of business. And things that might readily have happened would have vastly changed the Philippine situation—if Dewey had departed after destroying the Spanish fleet, and if Merritt had not rushed the American army, the smaller of the three forces in and about the city, so that he had the Spanish army captives in the walled city, and the Filipino forces relegated to the country, before the peace Protocol was announced.


The Spanish Commissioners' solemn sentences became grotesque touching this phase of the subject, and the American people took their time and way to find their sovereign will and pleasure, as to the disposition of the Philippines, and their commandments will henceforth be executed both in the East and the West Indies.

CEREMONIES CONCLUDING THE WAR WITH SPAIN.


Actually, the war with Spain that began with the battle of the bay of Manila, May 1, concluded August 13, with the capitulation of the city of Manila, the Protocol of Peace having been signed in Washington two days before, the fact, in the broken condition of the cable, not being known in the Philippines until transmitted in dispatch boat from Hongkong. The declaration of war by the United States was on the 21st of April. The official close of the war was on April 11, the period of a legal state of hostilities lacking ten days of a year. The importance of fixing the date is in the effect the formal end of the war has upon the terms of enlistment of our volunteers. The ceremony of the restoration of a state of peace under the law was the

exchange of ratifications in the reception room of the White House. The exact time was April 11, 3 p. m. Among the witnesses attracted by the historic character of the event were many members of the Cabinet and officials prominent in the Administration gathered at the White House. These included Secretaries Hay, Wilson and Hitchcock; Senator Davis, one of the Peace Commissioners who negotiated the treaty; Assistant Secretaries Hill, Adee and Cridler, of the State Department; Acting-Secretary of War Meikelljohn, Adjutant-General Corbin, Solicitor-General Richards, Hon. Wayne MacVeagh, and Mr. Sidney Smith, Chief of the Bureau of Diplomatic Correspondence, State Department, who had prepared the American copy of the treaty. A few minutes in advance the French Ambassador, M. Cambon, arrived, in company with M. Thiebaut, the First Secretary of the Embassy, the latter bearing the Spanish copy of the peace treaty. Mr. McKinley cordially greeted the Ambassador, and, after a brief exchange of well-wishes, the formal ceremony began. The President stood back of the large desk presented to the government by Queen Victoria, while Secretary Hay and Ambassador Cambon occupied places at the desk. Around this central group were ranged the Cabinet officers and others, and officials of the household. The powers of M. Cambon and Secretary Hay were examined, a protocol concerning the day's ceremony signed, and other formalities concluded. These preliminaries took some time, so that it was nearly 3:30 before the actual exchange began. The signing of the protocol of exchange occurred at 3:28 p. m., Ambassador Cambon signing for Spain, and Secretary Hay for the United States. The protocol was in French, and briefly recited the circumstances leading up to the exchange. This cleared the way for the exchange itself, constituting the final act. The President took from the desk the American copy of the treaty, handsomely engrossed, bound in dark blue morocco, and encased in a black morocco portfolio, and handed it to M. Cambon. At the same time M. Cambon handed to the President the Spanish copy of the treaty, also engrossed, bound in morocco and encased in a maroon-colored morocco box. There were deferential bows as each received from the other this final pledge of peace. This exchange of ratifications occurred at 3:35 p. m. The President was the first to speak. "Mr. Ambassador," said he, "I will issue my proclamation at once."

M. Cambon thanked the President for the promptness with which the proclamation followed. This ended the ceremony, and after brief felicitations



SIGNATURES OF AMERICAN AND SPANISH PEACE COMMISSIONERS TO TREATY OF PEACE.
 Reproduced from Photograph Taken by Signal Service Officers Expressly for This History,
 by Permission of State Department at Washington.



LAST JOINT SESSION AT PARIS OF THE AMERICAN AND SPANISH PEACE COMMISSIONERS, AT WHICH THE TREATY OF PEACE WAS SIGNED.

the Ambassador and other officials withdrew. Secretary Hay took with him the Spanish copy of the treaty and deposited it in the archives of the State Department. M. Cambon cabled the Spanish government of the final restoration of peace, and made known that the American copy of the treaty would be forwarded through the French Foreign Office.

PRESIDENT'S PROCLAMATION.

After the ceremony connected with the exchange of the ratification of the peace treaty, President McKinley issued the following proclamation:

Whereas, A treaty of peace between the United States of America and Her Majesty, the Queen Regent of Spain, in the name of her august son, Don Alfonso XIII, was concluded and signed by their respective plenipotentiaries at Paris on December 10, 1898, the original of which is in the Spanish language, is word for word as follows:

(Here full text of treaty is included.)

And, whereas, The said convention has been duly ratified on both parts, and the ratifications of the two governments were exchanged in the city of Washington on April 11, 1899; now, therefore,

Be it known, That I, William McKinley, President of the United States of America, have caused the said convention to be made public, to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof may be observed and fulfilled with good faith by the United States and the citizens thereof.

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington, April 11, in the year of our Lord 1899, and of the independence of the United States 123.

WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

By the President: JOHN HAY, Secretary of State.

There is something in the documents exchanged that is characteristic of the two countries. The Spanish copy now in our possession is handsomely engrossed on parchment in old English script, with wide double columns, one in Spanish and the other in English. Its binding is of red morocco, heavily embossed in gold, which gives the effect of the yellow and red colors of Spain. The United States copy held by Spain is neat and simple, the text in parallel columns, the left in English and the right in Spanish, surrounded by

a narrow border of the national colors. The document is enclosed in a cover of dark blue morocco, with the great seal of the United States upon the face and a decorative design in gilt.

The Official Gazette of Madrid of April 16 contains a royal decree appointing the Duke de Arcos to be Spanish Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States. The decree also creates consulates at Havana, Manila, Iloilo, San Juan de Porto Rico, and Cienfuegos.

Senor Larrea, now Spanish Consul at Antwerp, is transferred to Havana; Senor Bouila, now at Shanghai, is appointed to Manila, and Senor Uriarte goes to Antwerp. The Hon. Bellamy Storer, Minister of the United States, has been chosen to represent the United States at the Spanish court.

General orders of the date of April 12 look to the disbandment of the volunteer forces. The War Department makes this announcement:

"To be continued in service or appointed under Section 13 of the Act of March 2, 1899, which authorizes the President to appoint or continue in service Brigadier-Generals not exceeding one for every 4,000 enlisted men actually in service and Major-Generals not exceeding one for every 12,000 enlisted men:

"General officers of Volunteers—Maj.-Gen. William R. Shafter, Maj.-Gen. Elwell S. Otis.

"Brigadier Generals—James H. Wilson, Fitzhugh Lee, Joseph Wheeler, John C. Bates, Samuel B. M. Young, H. W. Lawton, Adna R. Chaffee, William Ludlow, Leonard Wood, George W. Davis, Theodore Schwan, Robert H. Hall, Loyd Wheaton, Frederick D. Grant.

"To be continued in service under the clause of Section 15 of the act of March 2, 1899, which authorizes the President to enlist temporarily in service for absolutely necessary purposes in the Philippine Islands volunteers, officers and men, individually or by organizations, now in those islands:

"General Officers of Volunteers—Maj.-Gen. H. W. Lawton, Maj.-Gen. Arthur MacArthur, Brig.-Gen. Charles King, Brig.-Gen. Robert P. Hughes, Brig.-Gen. Samuel Ovenshine, Brig.-Gen. Irving Hale."

It would be, now that peace is declared, a great saving to the government and relieve the Department of the necessity of sending more troops to the Philippines if the volunteers there could be largely retained. Under the law the service of the volunteer organization terminated with the declaration of peace, but the act of Congress provided that volunteer organizations might

remain in the volunteer service six months thereafter if they so desired. At the end of that time, however, they were to be mustered out whether they so desired or not. The volunteers now in the Philippines have gained so much experience in the field and have become so well adapted to the service required against the insurgents that it has been thought important to induce them to reënlist in the regular service, either at the present time by demanding their discharge from the volunteer army, or to do so at the expiration of the six months after the declaration of peace.

Volunteer organizations enlisted in the regular army as organizations would therefore bring with them their officers as now assigned. As an inducement to the volunteers to reënter the service of the government, it has been proposed to pay to all reënlisting their full travel allowance for land and sea travel from place of discharge to place of previous enlistment.

The adjournment of Congress by limitation on the 4th of March prevented the accomplishment of an adequate establishment of the army. If it had not been for this incompetency there would have been no anxiety to extend the terms of volunteer enlistments. Fighting men enough, however, will be found to take care of the property and the honor of the country, naval and military.





CHAPTER XXXI.

Review of the War and the Commission on the Conduct of the War Department.

Importance of a Day Lost or Gained—The Protocol Was the Treaty—Military Commissions to Arrange the Spanish Evacuation of Cuba and Porto Rico—Appearance of the Cuban Army—Narrow Margins on Which the War Was Ended so Speedily—Inspiration of Dewey's Victory—Energy in Following It Up—Outbreak of Criticism on the Conduct of the War as Soon as it Was Over—The Commission of Investigation Appointed by the President—Extraordinary Interest in the Action of the Commission and Its Authoritative Report—Weaknesses in Systems and Persons not Spared—Origin and Extent of the Canned Meat Controversy—Fault Found in High Places—The Army, Regular or Volunteer, of and for the People.

One loses a day on the way from Washington City to Manila. The line on which going westward we must correct the almanac, by dropping a day, is the 180th meridian. When it is midnight in London it is noon of the same day on longitude 180 degrees west, or half-way around the world. Whatever time the magic 180th degree is struck going west, the next day is sponged off. If you get there Tuesday, there is no Wednesday that week. And going east there are two of the days on which the mysterious meridian is encountered. The point of this in association with the war is that if we count time to China as we find it coming east, the order of Admiral Dewey to destroy the Spanish fleet was just a little too sharp on time for the actual declaration of war, but if we count on the westward course, the declaration was in time to fairly cover the direction to sink the Spaniards. Either way we go, there was no time lost. It was 103 days from the naval battle before Manila to the signing of the Protocol August 12. Our war with Spain was for 100 days, with a margin of two days, counted as the sun keeps time. It was hard to realize for a while that the Protocol was truly the Treaty of Peace—that the rest was debate on details, and painstaking to weigh and measure and adjust points of difference and formulate the settlement. When Santiago surrendered, Spain was vanquished. Her fate was declared the day it was determined that she could not

contest with us the command of the sea. It was impossible to defend Porto Rico and Cuba if the Spanish armies in those islands were isolated, for the power to overcome them was in the United States, and would be employed. As to the signing of the treaty at Paris, or its ratification at Washington and Madrid, those formalities were needful to legalize action taken. The Protocol was actual peace, but there was a legal continuation of a state of war; and in the first hundred and ten days of this situation there had been mustered out and discharged from the military service an average of one thousand men per day. The order to muster out one hundred thousand men was issued on the 18th of August, less than a week after the proclamation announcing the protocol and suspending hostilities. The administration was as prompt to take advantage of peace, when the war was over, as it had been swift to execute the mandate of war at the beginning. Military committees to superintend the evacuation of Cuba, Porto Rico and the adjacent islands were forthwith appointed; for Cuba, Major-General James F. Wade, Rear-Admiral William T. Sampson, Major-General Matthew C. Butler; for Porto Rico, Major-General John C. Brooke, Rear-Admiral Winfield S. Schley, Brigadier-General W. Gordon—who soon afterwards met the Spanish commissioners at Havana and San Juan respectively. Porto Rico was evacuated and the American flag was up on August 18th. The task of evacuating Cuba proceeded slowly. The American flag was raised on Morro Castle and the Governor General's palace, January 1st, at which time twenty-two thousand Spanish troops remained in the vicinity of Cienfuegos.

While the war was on there was general solicitude that the freedom of speech and facility of the press should not be abused to harm the cause of the country. There was a great deal of eccentricity in the press, but it consisted in excessive military energy, with the accustomed "instructions" to the commanders of the active fleets and armies. There was a steady flight of accusations of favoritism, those whose chosen ones were not favored opening fire on the others who were at the front, as a personal favor, it was said. The harm done was not considerable. The journal that might have reported the presence of Cervera's fleet in Santiago Harbor, when he could only go there to be bottled up, would have been forgiven, even by admirals on the look-out, for audacity of pushing in and pointing to the enemy. The usually seasonable vehemence of partisans skirmishing for position in future civil campaigns was reduced to inoffensiveness while the fighting was going on, and the Presi-

dent's cares were lessened by the loyal moderation of the great mass of his countrymen who had not lined up with him in national affairs until the bugles called for the blue and the gray to put on the uniform of the country and keep step to the national music. The naval victories without loss of life, and the undervaluation of Spanish soldiers as fighting men, on a defensive line, caused the casualty lists of our troops engaged in the Santiago battles to be a surprise that shocked the country, and the illness of General Shafter was charged to his stoutness, and the frank statements he made of his depressions and misgivings were so distressing to the people that the great results attained were not regarded as compensation for loss, though the extraordinary success gained will have a permanent place in the records of decisive battles. The sweeping naval victories of the Americans from Cavite to Santiago, ninety-five days, were so uniform in character, there was a feeling that the Spaniards were unworthy to be considered steady enough to furnish a test of our high quality, and soon there was much said by the perverse about the feebleness of the foe. It is, however, the established truth that the Americans were well commanded, fought in the highest form on all occasions, and in addition to good conduct were attended by good fortune. If the regular army had not been massed at Tampa to strike the southern coast of Cuba, in spite of the rainy and fever seasons, the volunteers must have been held in camps of instruction until there was frost on the cotton fields, or suffered from the Cuban soil and climate immense losses; and military operations against Havana on a very large scale would have been frightfully costly. When, however, the volunteers were engaged, they would have been so prepared and disciplined that they could have closed the campaign quickly. One of the reasons why Admiral Schley was strongly of the opinion that Cervera would put into Cienfuegos was because he knew that port was less than two hundred miles from Havana, and that with the railroad all the available troops of the west end might be rapidly gathered to meet invaders. If Cervera had been in Cienfuegos instead of Santiago the regular army of the United States would have been unable to do the work they accomplished at Santiago, which was isolated, and yet we had no strength to spare in forcing the surrender. One Spanish column of less than three thousand had a sharp struggle in getting to Santiago just too late to hold lines the loss of which was irretrievable. At Cienfuegos, the concentration of forces on both sides must have amounted to fifty thousand men on each side, and the war would have been

protracted. It was one of the things carrying conviction in the first place that Cervera, at liberty to make choice, would prefer Cienfuegos to Santiago, unless he might have believed the very assurance of preference could make the latter port for the Spanish service dangerous, as any American commander would naturally be on the watch at that place. Sampson and Schley were agreed about this for a time, and it is possible Cervera gave himself the benefit of the idea. The retreat of Cervera into Santiago was an admission of the naval incapacity of Spain, unless we can believe that he ran for coal where he thought Americans were unlikely to look for him, and when he was located the American forces followed. Frequently in the congressional debates, banquet and platform speeches, and comments of the press, the idea is advanced that the military lesson of the war is that the regular army should be rigorously reduced to a scanty force, as the fact of efficiency of volunteers developed in a few months proves their reliability. No American who knew enough of his country to warrant him in views of her resources in war ever disparaged volunteers. The truth is we must depend upon them in great wars, but we require enough regulars to handle a sharp sword promptly, to avoid the necessity for hurried and therefore exceedingly exhaustive preparations. We happened to have regulars enough, such was the ease with which men were assembled from remote posts, to deliver a blow that ended the war before the mustering corps of volunteers could be provided with that which they must have to fortify themselves to take the field, and it will always be to the credit of the volunteers that the surrender at Santiago was not so much the result of what had occurred as the visible evidence that the winners of San Juan and El Caney were but the advanced guard of the grand army of the United States. There was no doubt of the ultimate result. Loss of time was loss of life. The army that did the fighting was almost disbanded in the moment of victory. As there were but five hundred and twenty defenders of El Caney, it is clear that if Escario's column of nearly three thousand effectives had arrived three days earlier the army of Shafter could not have carried the hills that were so stoutly held. That would have meant waiting for reinforcements, and by every hour of detention the sacrifice of scores of brave men. The plan of campaign that was to deal the crushing blow with the regular army without waiting for the thorough equipment of the volunteers in great force, could not have succeeded if Spanish reinforcements had got in, until the Americans were also strengthened, and the failure to give the

decisive stroke then would have made certain the loss of thousands of our men where hundreds sufficed. Each week's delay implied disaster for us. On the critical night of the Santiago campaign, when General Wheeler was on the long, thin line held by not more than three thousand men, all extremely weary, needing precisely the encouragement the game old confederate gave them, that the Spaniards were whipped and dared not assume the aggressive, for their losses were greater in proportion than ours, and their exhaustion and privation equal—if the Spaniards could then have had Escario's column massed and sent it forward, the chances were largely in favor of driving us, and regaining the water supply of the city and access to the country for food supplies to supplement rations exclusively of rice. It is a close question whether the continued presence of Cervera's fleet might not alone have postponed the surrender of the city and province of Santiago for an additional month and greatly reduced the moral effect of the final victory of our arms—the deadly climate and the pestilential fevers sweeping away our heroes by thousands. We then should have won Santiago as the British did Havana in 1762, and with like losses. More than half the British and Provincial army perished. After the loss of two fleets and two armies by the Spaniards—it was as clear to all Europe as to ourselves that the Spanish army in Manila could not escape, but must be captives. After the fleet that was essential to its support was annihilated and our troops on the way arrived, the continuance of the war under those misfortunes was impossible for Spain; and she sued for peace, accepting subsequently the terms of unconditional surrender. The debates at Paris were able, but not essential. The policy of the Protocol was after the fall of Santiago. That depended upon the conclusive triumph with the regular army. The event trembled in the balance. We refer to the regulars especially and distinctively, for the military policy of the President turned upon the blow that might be delivered by them. Only three volunteer regiments were at the front at Santiago. The transportation was limited, and the movement on the ragged edge of critical circumstance. The volunteers were eager for the fray, but none knew better than themselves that they needed time to be educated up to the requirements of the high standard they hold in history.

The Aguinaldo war around Manila has but repeated the experiences that give confidence in the volunteer system, but the objection to it is that it can never be ready to meet the grave and sudden emergencies. Time is the most

expensive item in war and the appropriation of money and manhood for the regular army making it equal to abrupt occasions would be economical. There was good fortune as to the time and place of the decision of the war in Cuba. If Cervera had been able to fill his coal bunkers within a few days after arriving in West India waters he might have entered Havana Harbor, and that would have forced us to attack the city, a work too extensive for the regulars—indeed, involving several corps of volunteers. It was the inspiration of the May-day victory of Admiral Dewey that caused the inauguration of the Santiago campaign, and in this relation the beginning and end of the war are closely linked. The President said, in his annual message, of Dewey's battle:

“The effect of this remarkable victory upon the spirit of our people and upon the fortunes of the war was instant. A prestige of invincibility thereby attached to our arms, which continued throughout the struggle. Reinforcements were hurried to Manila under the command of Major-General Merritt, and firmly established within sight of the capital, which lay helpless before our guns.” The “prestige of invincibility” was the thing, and the glory of Dewey is not so much in the fact that when he came within range of the Spanish fleet he destroyed it, because he took all the chances of torpedoes and mines, land batteries and of the disabilities that might be inflicted upon his ships, seven thousand miles from a home port. He found the torpedoes harmless. Fortune favored the brave. If a torpedo had blown up the *Olympia* or one or two of the cruisers, the result of the day might not have been so influential. If several vessels had been disabled, the situation of the admiral could not have been described by any softer term than precarious. The distinguishing points of the war stand out like mountains. It is easy to trace the impulses behind the actions closing in successes that ended the combat. The reinforcements for Dewey were sent with energetic celerity, and the fall of Manila two days after the Spanish surrendered in the Protocol, an event unknown to the combatants, was due to the animation with which the War Department pressed all advantages. The official statement of the President, giving the facts of supporting the navy by the army at the most remote scene of the warfare, is in these terms:

“On the 7th day of May the government was advised officially of the victory at Manila, and at once inquired of the commander of our fleet what troops would be required. The information was received on the 15th of May,

and the first army expedition sailed May 25 and arrived off Manila June 30. Other expeditions soon followed."

When the war was over, the good management, vigilance, precision and strong grasp upon affairs first in order became first in the minds and hearts of the people, and of moment to every fireside, but extensively held to be the commonplace consequence of the lavish use of the resources of the country; and there followed a flood of turbid accusation. The banners bright with victory were clouded with fogs. The origin of these was our unprepared state and the confusion was unavoidable. There was also, owing to imperative haste, a great deal of waste,—and yet the official history of the war can never be read by a citizen of intelligence and temper of justice without surprise that in all departments so much was done so well.

There never was a war more speedily conducted to a successful and satisfactory end than that of the United States with Spain; and yet when it was done there was an epidemic of complaint, and the President answered the clamor, which was loud and long enough to show a serious public interest, by appointing a commission. General Dodge was chosen president. The following were the members:

General Grenville M. Dodge, Iowa, President; Col. James A. Sexton, Illinois; Col. Charles Denby, Indiana; Capt. Evan P. Howell, Georgia; Ex-Governor Urban A. Woodbury, Vermont; Brig-Gen. John M. Wilson, Chief of Engineers, U. S. A.; Gen. James A. Beaver, Pennsylvania; Maj-Gen. Alexander McD. McCook, U. S. A.; Dr. Phineas S. Conner, Ohio; Richard Weightman, Secretary; Lieut.-Col. F. B. Jones, Chief Quartermaster of Volunteers, Disbursing Officer; Maj. Stephen C. Mills, Recorder.

The specific duty of this body was "to investigate the conduct of the War Department in the war with Spain." A great mass of testimony was taken, and there were many precautions to get witnesses who would give all the information they possessed, and to find those who could speak from personal knowledge. Three press associations were represented in the reporters present during the proceedings. The Secretary of War, the Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General, and the Surgeon-General were requested to transmit all the complaints received by them touching the administration of their respective departments. This was promptly done. Public invitation was given September 27th to all persons "having knowledge or belief of any official wrong or dereliction"—a most sweeping call—to submit their state-

ments in writing, accompanied by such collateral proof or information as might be at their disposal. This call met with a remarkable response. Hundreds of affidavits, letters, newspaper clippings, editorial articles, and sermons were received, all of which were thoroughly and laboriously examined. The strong purpose of the commission to get all the facts appears in the determination that in the examination of witnesses the strict rules of evidence as applied in legal proceedings should not be adhered to, but considerable latitude allowed. The way investigation of the whitewashing fashion is conducted is by rigid adherence to the rules of evidence, the question perpetually pressed being: What do you know of your own knowledge? That is a tight stopper upon any expression that is excellent in suggestion but not in legal form. There were nearly five hundred witnesses examined. The report of the commission has disposed of the frivolous fad for a time prevalent of challenging the good faith of the members. The commission finds that there was too much "red tape" in the departments, too much "paper work," and recommends that there should be more preparation for future wars by Congress, and also suggests retired officers might be utilized. Summing up the results of the war, the commission gives the official figures of 23 officers and 250 men killed, and 113 officers and 1,464 men wounded in the field, while the deaths from all causes from May 1 to September 30, a period of five months, were 107 officers and 2,803 men. The total strength of the army was 274,717, so that the death rate was a fraction over 1 per cent.

The commission says in the official report of its labors and findings:

"No man or woman who has stated to us that he or she had any material matter touching the subject of our inquiry to communicate has been refused a hearing, and there has been no evidence before us that any one in or connected with the War Department has dishonestly received a dollar.

"We have made persistent efforts to secure the attendance of persons to whose names rumor has attached an allegation that they knew of corruption of officials in the War Department, but these men have either denied the statements attributed to them, or have maintained silence when invited to tell what they know."

This criticism and recommendation are important: "The routine work in the departments, in our opinion, is far beyond what is necessary, and each year seems to increase it. The methods employed make it almost impossible

to transact business promptly. The heads of all departments, officers of large depots, chiefs of staff departments, corps and divisions have necessarily been obliged to give attention to details which should have been given to matters of larger moment. No well-regulated concern or corporation could transact business satisfactorily under such regulations as govern the staff departments, and the fact that every officer of each of the staff departments holding a responsible position has been forced to ignore routine demonstrates the necessity of a new form."

A significant utterance is the following: "For many years the divided authority and responsibility of the War Department has produced friction, for which, in the interest of the service, a remedy, if possible, should be applied. The constitution makes the President commander-in-chief of the army, and he cannot transfer that authority to any other person. The President selects the secretary of war, who has his confidence and is his confidential adviser. The commanding general is assigned to duty as such by the President, and under the military laws of the United States his duties are defined as follows:

"The command exercised by the commanding general of the army, not having been made the subject of statutory regulation, is determined by the order of assignment. It has been habitually composed of the aggregate of the several territorial commands that have been or may be created by the President. The military establishment is under orders of the commanding general of the army in that which pertains to its discipline and military control. The fiscal affairs of the army are conducted by the secretary of war through the several staff departments." (Par. 187, A. R., 1895.)

"All orders and instructions from the President or secretary of war relating to military operations or affecting the military control and discipline of the army will be promulgated through the commanding general. (Par. 188, A. R., 1895.)"

Lieutenant-General Schofield, who has probably had as much experience and given the question as much thought as any one in our country, says in substance:

"Recent experience has served to confirm all the results of my lifelong study and large experiences that the proper position for the senior officer of the army on duty at Washington is not that of the commanding general, a position which is practically impossible, but that of commander-in-chief, which means, in fact, chief of staff to the President. The title of general-in-

chief was a permanent one during the entire history of the country up to the time when General Grant became lieutenant-general.

“When I became commanding general I addressed to the President a letter in which I pointed out to him what had been the result of my study and experience, and saying that the only way was to abandon entirely—which I did during my seven years of service—all pretenses of being the commanding general, and to content myself with acting as the chief of staff of the army under the secretary of war and the President. The result was that perfect harmony prevailed during my time, and I did exercise a legitimate influence in command of the army, this because I did not claim to exercise anything that the law did not give me.

“The President must have the same power of selection of his general-in-chief as he has of his secretary of war. Without this there can be no guaranty that he will give, or that the secretary of war will place in the general-in-chief that confidence which is necessary to perfect harmony.

“Neither the President nor the secretary of war should have in the command of the army an officer who is not working in harmony with him.”

The work of General Corbin attracts the attention of the commissioners. His services were of the greatest importance. He was the engineer of order, the fireman who kept the furnace roaring, raised steam power, and strove with a giant's strength to subjugate chaos. The report says of him:

“The adjutant-general testifies that there had not been a deficiency of one dollar reported on the part of a volunteer staff officer, and that he wished to make it a matter of record that in the distribution of many millions of dollars during this war there was yet to be made the first charge of defalcation against an army officer, regular or volunteer.”

The remarks upon the War Department, referring directly to the Secretary of War, are:

“The records of the War Department, which have been laid before us, show that the Secretary of War extended to all chiefs of bureaus cordial and full support, and promptly responded to every proper demand made upon him by commanding officers.

“No testimony has been presented showing intentional neglect of duty or any attempt to serve personal interests.

“The charges made that the Secretary of War was pecuniarily interested

in contracts, purchases and other transactions of the War Department have been thoroughly investigated and found baseless.

"In the judgment of the commission there was lacking in the general administration of the War Department during the continuance of the war with Spain that complete grasp of the situation which was essential to the highest efficiency and discipline of the army.

"The commission has refrained from criticising certain of the heads of bureaus for not having acted with foresight in preparing their various departments for active war before war was declared, because it has appeared that the national defense fund provided by the act of March 9, 1898, was not made available for use except for the navy and for coast defenses and the expenditures incident thereto until after the declaration of war."

The commission has not spared the weak places in the War Department, beginning with paper work, asking for the strengthening of the administration by the employment of retired officers, many of whom are among the most capable in the country and as well fitted in the sixties for the higher responsibilities and performance of the tasks of elucidation and the removal of entanglements as the active service officers between forty and sixty years of age. The sudden multiplication of the numerical force of the army by ten, and the requisition for supplies in the same proportion, the material to be discovered if not created, necessarily involved occasional gorges in the channels, such as occur in rivers that are choked with ice or timber. One of the worst was the gorge at Tampa, and with all the high rank and gilded talent gathered there, the man to clear the way was not found, and we hear from the commanding general of the army, himself present, that his remedy for improper rations of meat was to have droves of cattle shipped to the seat of war. If this had been done it would have been necessary to have sent the steers to Cuba and left the soldiers in Florida to overcome by perfect rest on the sand the waste of physical force by the debilitating atmosphere of the floral peninsula. The commission spares not the lack of transportation, the nerveless slump into a bottomless pit of disorder that prevented promptness in embarkation, reduced dangerously the strength of Shafter's army, notified the Spaniards of our plans and incapacities, and nearly spoiled the expedition, upon which depended the grave decision whether we would have to wait for winter or force the fighting. The commissioners say with a moderation of language that stings where epithets would be found totally

insufficient, that "the condition of the railroad congestion during the early portion of the time Tampa was occupied by troops seems unparalleled, showing an almost inexcusable lack of executive ability on the part of those charged with the loading, unloading and handling of the trains."

It is the judgment of the commissioners that ships should have been "seized," because when the transports had been assembled, supposed to be equal to carrying 25,000 men, it was found that their capacity had been largely overrated, and it was impossible to carry on them, without great discomfort and danger, more than 16,000 men, with their equipments, artillery, ammunition, subsistence, medical supplies, and 2,295 animals, for a voyage of 1,000 miles. It is not, however, even hinted by the commission that a fleet ought to have been impressed to bear burdens of living beef to be cast ashore as wanted by the army! The following from the commissioners' report is full of phrases that imply more than they express:

"In spite of the efforts of the quartermaster's department, many of these vessels were poorly equipped with speeding accommodations; the sinks in many instances were inconvenient and insufficient, and some of the vessels were badly ventilated and filled with disagreeable odors. It has been stated that had the fleet encountered a severe storm while en route for Cuba the discomfort would have been intense, and there might have been loss of life.

"The quartermaster's department ought to have been able to more thoroughly equip these vessels, and surely it should have been more certain of their carrying capacity.

"It has been noticed that the ships were not loaded systematically, as for example, a battery with its guns and horses would be placed on one vessel, and its ammunition on another. The Second, Seventh and Seventeenth Regular Infantry were each divided up, and portions in each case sent on three different vessels."

The expedition was detained until, if we had been opposed by a keen and enterprising enemy, we could hardly have escaped the misfortunes so conspicuously invited. The horrible bungling extended to the handling of the medical supplies, and yet in that department, in spite of manifest omissions, "a vast deal of good work was done by medical officers, high and low, regular and volunteer, and there were unusually few deaths among the wounded and sick." At last Shafter sailed, got away from the sphere of false and foolish rumor, Spanish war ships flitting like the Flying Dutchman, and the steam:

launches and lighters to land the troops and stores, frightfully deficient at the start, lost by the way. The commission points to the facts at the bottom of the muddy pool in this trenchant paragraph:

"That the shortcomings in administration and operation may justly be attributed, in large measure, to the hurry and confusion incident to the assembling of an army of untrained officers and men, ten times larger than before, for which no preparation in advance had been or could be made, because of existing rules and regulations."

If Captain-General Blanco had been a man of aptitudes and initiative equal to decisions in a few hours, and to stimulating the disturbance of the sullen lethargy of his countrymen, and had possessed the quality of illumination from his own brain, he would have acted upon the safe presumption that Santiago was the objective point of the American army. The movement of our war ships had revealed that to the observant, and he should have hurried his best troops to the rescue, and seen to it that the landing of Shafter's army was resisted to the last extremity of the defenders. That was the Spaniards' chance. Such a policy would have given the army tumbled upon unfit vessels infinite trouble, and made the advance upon the land defenses of Santiago for some time impossible. We owe a great debt to the stolidity that amounts often to stupidity in the Spanish commanders. The quality of Spaniards who wait to be attacked, if there are officers who stay with the men when the fire storms beat upon them, is, as our troops found on the Santiago hills, as good as that the infantry of Spain celebrated in the middle ages. The march of Escario's column that reached Santiago a few hours too late makes known that if the young Spaniards are bravely led they will go far, clearing their way through ambuscades swarming with sharpshooters. The manifestations of the manliness of the Peninsulars mean that there is still hope for Spain in her people.

As soon as we have a congress elevated to the understanding of the economy in the efficiency of the army as well as of the navy, and the necessity of preparation for war in time of peace, it will appear in the halls of national legislation that the work of the commission of investigation of the conduct of the War Department during the war is a document of extraordinary nature, full of information that should be the basis of reforms that will amount to reconstruction. The time will certainly come when this will be done, and the longer the delay the greater price we must pay for the indispensable reforma-

tion. In one matter the commission does not seem to have been as incisive, critical and certain in its work, or as comprehensive and accurate in its suggestions as in general. We refer to the "embalmed beef." There must have been present in the minds of the commissioners on that subject a consciousness of the prejudiced motives and questionable methods of the accusers, in regard to the "roast beef" thrown upon the army and thrown into the sea, that imparted a certain reluctance to say anything that would palliate the impropriety apparent in the noisy aggressiveness that sought to inflict personal injuries and promoted reckless exaggerations, detrimental to the public service and hostile to a great American industry, thereby giving aid and comfort to factions at home that cannot be respected as animated by sincerities, and enemies abroad of our export commerce, or those careless of hurting business reputation. The cautiousness of this temperament of care in the commission is to be accepted as far as it goes, but the expression following does not cover the case:

"Many samples of refrigerated beef furnished to the army have been sent by the commission to the chemists of the Agricultural and Interior departments for careful chemical examination. The result of the analysis has been reported to us in twenty-nine cases, and in no specimen examined has either boric or salicylic acid or other deleterious chemicals been found. In view of the facts set forth, the commission is of the opinion that no refrigerated beef furnished by contractors and issued to the troops during the war with Spain was subjected to or treated with any chemicals by the contractors or those in their employ." The veracity of this statement is not to be questioned, for it has obviously limitations of applications, but that it is misleading is shown in the headline under which it appears in a reputable journal—this:

**"WAR COMMISSION HOLDS ARMY REFRIGERATED BEEF TO
BE PURE."**

The word "pure" should be more carefully guarded, and held too precious for doubtful employment.

The commission says of the canned beef: "Occasionally an inferior article was found. But the records of the army prove that canned beef has been used for many years." The commissioners attempted to confine themselves in the public regard to their actual and not constructive findings in these terms: "In considering questions concerning canned meats it is not the

duty of the commission to inquire into the character, kind or condition of the canned meats that may be in use in this country. Our specific duty is to give an opinion as to the quality of those furnished the soldiers during the recent war with Spain." Delicacies of distinction are not, however, a noticeable feature in the work of the press, exploited with the headlining that advertises news highly seasoned, and presented in a style believed to be alluring, and certainly for sale. A letter is presented showing that the boiled or roast canned meat question was not up in the army during the Spanish war for the first time. The date is October 18, 1897, and the document as follows:

War Department, Adjutant-General's Office,
Washington, D. C., Oct. 19, 1897.

W. Clarke Marshall, Produce Exchange, 6646 Wentworth Ave., Chicago.

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 19th ultimo to the Secretary of War, giving information regarding the proper food to be taken to the sufferers in Alaska, and also for the subsistence of the troops there, and ascribing the sickness in that locality to the use of salt meats, and in reply thereto the Secretary of War desires me to call attention to the following remarks of the Medical Department of the army, in which the major-general commanding the army concurs:

"Canned meats put up by reputable firms are wholesome and have the full nutritive value of the meat contents, and in the absence of fresh meat are to be preferred to any of the three substitutes suggested by the writer. Meat, when salted, loses a certain proportion of its albuminoids and extractives, but what remains is valuable as food, and has no specific influence in the production of scurvy. With hard bread, bacon, pea meal, and an occasional issue of fresh beef, or in its absence canned meat, a dietary of a satisfactory force value can be provided. To these there should be added for the prevention of scurvy occasional issues of potatoes, onions or canned vegetables, or in their unavoidable absence, dessicated vegetables and dried fruit."

Very respectfully,

W. H. CARTER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

All the above in quotation is the indorsement upon the letter of Mr. Marshall, signed by C. Smart, deputy surgeon-general, U. S. A. The indorsement of the major-general commanding is in the following words:

Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C., Oct., 18, 1897.

The major-general commanding concurs in the remarks of the deputy surgeon-general, fourth indorsement.

J. C. GILMORE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

The "major-general commanding" here referred to is Major-General Nelson A. Miles.

The commission reports:

"On the 21st day of December last Major-General Nelson A. Miles, upon the written request of the president of this commission, appeared before it. He refused to be sworn, as all other witnesses had been except one, who affirmed, stating that he would make his statements without being sworn and was responsible for what he said. He proceeded, and for the first time in the history of this investigation the allegation was made that refrigerated beef issued to the troops had been chemically treated.

"In the statement, revised by himself, General Miles said:

" 'There was sent to Porto-Rico 337 tons of what is known as so-called refrigerated beef, which you might call embalmed beef.'

"He proceeded to read a communication from Dr. W. H. Daly, major and chief surgeon, United States volunteers, on his staff, bearing date of September 21, 1898, wherein Dr. Daly stated that:

" 'In several inspections I made in the various camps and troopships at Tampa, Jacksonville, Chickamauga and Porto Rico, I found the fresh beef to be apparently preserved with secret chemicals, which destroy its natural flavor, and which I also believe to be detrimental to the health of the troops.'

"Although Dr. Daly swears that he informed General Miles about the 1st of August, 1898, that he suspected that the refrigerated beef was chemically treated, it does not appear that the general informed the War Department that an officer of his staff had made this discovery, nor does it appear that he at the time ordered any of the officers under his command to probe to the bottom an allegation which, if true, concerned the health of 275,000 soldiers of the United States. It appears from the report of Dr. Daly, which he handed to General Miles October 21 last, that he then specifically stated that the refrigerated beef furnished to the troops was 'apparently chemically treated.'

"It does not appear that when this charge was made, October 21, it having been already made to him in August, 1898, that General Miles communi-

cated to you or the Secretary of War or to the commissary general the belief or suspicion entertained by him that refrigerated meat, dangerous to health, was issued every day to the troops, in failure to do which there was dereliction of duty. It is true that on September 20 he had directed that an order should be issued asking for reports relative to meats issued, but the order specifically mentions 'canned fresh roast beef,' and nothing else, and it was the reports received in answer to this that were presented in abstract by the general at the time of his appearance before the commission and since.

"In his report Dr. Daly does not make the all-important statement that he had already chemically analyzed any meat, although he suggests that such analysis should be made. He does state that in the several inspections made by him at Tampa, Jacksonville, Chickamauga and Porto Rico he 'found the fresh beef to be apparently preserved with secret chemicals.' He said that at Ponce the beef he examined 'was also of the same character, being apparently preserved by injected chemicals.'

"For months, as it appears, Dr. Daly concealed the commission of a crime affecting men under his charge, whom, as an officer and a physician, he was bound to protect."

After setting forth in full force the miscellany of mistakes and the genius displayed for blunders so gross as to add an additional sense of misery to the lot of mankind, in the embarkation of the Shafter expedition, the commission states the result that closed the scenes of that decisive movement, with this paragraph:

"The result of the Santiago campaign was the complete realization of the several objects contemplated—the capture of the city with its fortifications and munitions of war, together with immense supplies of foodstuffs and ammunition (the former estimated by General Wood at 1,200,000 rations); the surrender of the entire province of Santiago de Cuba, with all the troops garrisoning the same, amounting, as already stated, to between 23,000 and 24,000; the destruction of the navy of Admiral Cervera's fleet after its departure from the harbor, and general demoralization of the Spanish forces and the discomfiture of the Spanish government and people, leading almost immediately to overtures for peace by Spain." There is nothing in the splendid story of American soldiers that exceeds this, telling how the valor and fortitude, the patience under privation and hardihood of endurance, tenacious of duty, overcomes even that solid but diversified stupidity

against which, it is a saying of ancient acceptance, even the gods fight in vain.

The commission reports in closing that "notwithstanding the haste with which the nation entered upon the war with Spain, the resulting and almost inevitable confusion in bureau and camp, the many difficulties of arming, assembling and transporting large bodies of hitherto untrained men, the carrying on of active operations in two hemispheres, the people of the United States should ever be proud of their soldiers, who, coöperating with their sailors, in less than three months put an end to Spanish colonial power, enfranchised oppressed peoples, and taught the world at large the strength and nobility of the republic."

There was taken in the investigation of the varieties of beef prepared with a view of preservation, statements that increased the public feeling about the wrong done soldiers in supplying them with food that was unwholesome. In handling the subject there were introduced remarks supposed to be humorous, to the effect that the regular soldiers were so accustomed to imperfections in rations that their stomachs were prepared for anything, and there were jocose imputations that the volunteers would, as they became veterans, cease to strive against the diet demanded by the "paper work" that is obstructive and establishes conditions of famine in a land of plenty and the midst of abundance. The complaints of soldiers that were not fairly dealt with were very often put in this effective way: "We know that Uncle Sam pays for the things we ought to have, but that there is a way of getting the freight cars on the side track as at Tampa, and sailing away without the necessaries of life." There will sometime be traced to the investigation of the conduct of the War Department in war, and the report of the commission, the existence of laws and regulations promoting the welfare of our citizens who bear arms for the country. The commission does not state along with the notice of the use of canned beef in Alaska, commended on the authority of General Miles, notice of the decisive distinction between the arctic and the tropical climates. It is to be remembered there is no great care necessary for the preservation of meat in Alaska. There is no trouble about refrigeration. The northern end of the earth is extremely frozen. It is different in the Indies. It has come to pass that the word "experiment" as applied to keeping meat fresh is a terror. What "experiment" with the meat of the boys in blue, white or yellow! One might as well "experiment with the bread and butter

of the people!" However, experiments relate closely to experience, and the lamps by which wise men find the paths of safety and keep in them are those that have been tried, that is, experimented with. The canned meats that were good in Old England and New England, excellent on the European continent, were "unfit" in our new possessions of the tropics. The fresh meat in Porto Rico—the island abounds in cattle—was complained of because it was "too fresh." It had to be eaten almost as soon as the life was out of the carcasses, or not at all, for there was no way of cooling it. General Miles could not take refrigerator cars along with him. In a few hours after the butcher had pursued his profession the fresh meat was spoiled. The way the flies pitched upon it to deposit their eggs was something surprising. There were "experiments with beef"—awful as it appears in the newspapers, the fact is substantially undeniable—to cure it so that it would be "fit" for seventy hours. That was all claimed for the stuff that at the end of twenty-four hours had to be turned into the sea. The War Department did not order it. General Egan reported against it. If General Miles got a whiff of it the fact is without official celebration, or any sort of good and regular standing. It is not surprising that there was general confidence in the canned meat of well-known brands, but that failed fast under the tropical test. The notorious investigations into the processes in this country of canning meats will ultimately have a favorable influence in marketing them, for there will be no experiments of preservation untried, and American manufacturers will rise to the occasion in the canning of meats and vegetables good in all climates. The people of the tropics have the advantage over us in their habits of nourishing themselves. They are but light consumers of meat, and a portion of rice, well set up with garlic and pepper, and a banana, is a satisfactory ration. The Cubans and Filipinos want "hot stuff" rather than "heavy" stuff, and do not find out that there is a kind of both hot and heavy food. Americans in the tropics have much to learn in the accommodation of themselves to the conditions of the country so as to be comfortable. The thing is not to abandon the use of meat, but to reduce the quantity of it consumed. One reason for this is the trouble in preservation of fresh meat. If there is ever found a deep and healthful solution of the problem it must be done by Americans. The beef scandals and conundrums, and the whole long list of our recorded trials that were made sore by grievous errors that ought to have been avoidable, and provoking incapacities—putting our armies into the field and failing to provide for

them before going or to help them there, as should have been done on behalf of a great, liberal and loving people—surely that which has been revealed will have the respectful attention of the people and of the Congress, and substantially that which is demanded by the distinguished commission will be done. The army, regular or volunteer, is of the blood, brain and bone of the people, and is for the people.





CHAPTER XXXII.

The Occupation of Our New Possessions.

The Spanish Peninsula too Narrow to Sustain the Crown System Over Continental Colonies—The Loss of Her Archipelagoes Has Been the Logic of Her Experiences—Comparative Expansion of England and the United States—Our Magnificent Growth across the Continent the Greatest of National Triumphs—Our Arms Around the World—Our Bugle Call and British Drum-Beats, Following the Course of the Sun—The Whispering Wires that Unite the Nations—The Malay Revolt Against Liberty for Tyranny—The Ghastly Demagoguery that Meddles with the Army—Pleasing Prospects of Our Possessions Except the Philippines—The Aguinaldo Conspiracy and Tagalo War—The Motives and Malice of It—American Arms without Stain—Our Soldiers without Reproach.

The logic of the war with Spain was that we should possess her American colonies and, of course, occupy them. She had ceased for a generation to hold continental land, outside the western peninsula of Europe, so long contested by the great tribes of adventurous nations, of the earliest periods of which there are histories. The Carthaginians, Romans, Goths, and Moors successively were masters of the extraordinary resources of the country, with a charming climate and fertile valleys, mountains rich in minerals, rivers romantic in story and name, that became the home of one of the most enterprising and dominating races of men. The tragedies of Spain for two thousand years have exceeded even those of Italy. There came to her through Columbus the greatest of new possessions that ever were grasped by any people, the immeasurably endowed Americas. Columbus died neglected and poor, for the greed of the crown of Spain, through the viceroys and their rapacious followers, did not spare the illustrious discoverer or the inoffensive races that were to have been converted to Christianity, but were slaughtered by taskmasters. The American colonies poured wealth into the Peninsula, but the system of governing by the Crown, so that neither the people of Spain nor the natives of the new land they occupied, had rights that were respected, gave up the priceless fortunes conquered or inherited, to favorites of the administrators of the affairs of the kingdom, and their cruelty and profligacy

prepared the way for the horrible wars that established the independence of the Spanish American States; and Spain ultimately gave far more in gold and blood for the lands she ruled beyond her borders than she gained by her mastery of the most opulent portions of the earth. Before we of the United States became greatly interested in the decline of Spain and began to feel that we had duties and destinies involved in the final break-up of her pretensions of dominion and power, the American continents were freed from her rule, and her only hold upon the mainland beyond her boundaries between the Pyrenees and the Atlantic was a penal colony upon the African shore, near Gibraltar. She still held several archipelagoes, the Balearic, Canary, Philippine, Caroline and Ladrone islands, Cuba and Porto Rico.

If the war had lasted another hundred days, the Americans would have taken all the Spanish islands, those European and African as well as American and Asiatic. The beautiful groups in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, off the coast of Africa, would have been possessions for our people, stripping Spain down to the bones of the old Peninsula. The fate of the Spanish colonies is not quotable as an example for nations holding lands abroad, for it is not to be assumed that any of them, the United States least of all, would in a system of administration exclude the people, both at home and abroad, from all rights the officials of the government and their classified assistants need regard. Spain of old was too narrow a basis, both in land and people, to support a colonial expansion that included continents. The wonder is that this pyramid on its apex stood so long. If we had confined our republic to the Atlantic tide-water region, from South Carolina to Massachusetts, and had undertaken to colonize Africa and Australia, the popular contention might well have been that we were attempting a task beyond our strength. We have done a greater work of expansion that any other nation has accomplished—in our increase from the original thirteen colonies of England to the republic that does what no other power can boast—occupies the whole breadth of the American continent between the greater oceans of the globe. If there are exceptions, we name Mexico and Canada, and they hardly, extensive and respectable as they are, can be classed with us. We have also the entire northern line of the central sea of the Americas; and the further we have moved west, the more rapid our growth has been north and south. There has for some years been a feeling among our people who believe themselves conservative that we were hasty in the admission of territories as states,

because we gave some thinly inhabited regions disproportionate power in the national Senate. The specifications of evil anticipated, however, passed away and the fact that our states are continuous across the continent must be hailed as auspicious because the majestic links of statehood make an incomparable bond of union. There is another bond that has been in full view since we assumed the responsibility devolved upon us by the victory of our arms in Asiatic waters—the sentiment that accords with a gigantic nationality has been developed on both the ocean boundaries of the republic where we find ourselves one of the influences that shall shape the future of Asia. That the ages to come will find Asiatic commerce an increasing factor in the progress of the world there is reason to believe. We cross the Pacific on errands to our new possessions, in less time than our grandfathers occupied in Atlantic voyages between America and Europe; and while our troops on the way to Manila are reviewed on parade at Malta, our warships homeward bound through the Mediterranean exchange salutes with the remnants of the Spanish navy, where the thunder of the guns of Trafalgar was heard. The Pacific coast will take on a new growth, and the influence of the states on the Pacific, whatever the transitory aberrations of miscalculating men may be—the Pacific influence will be for the expansion of the foundations of our power in Asia. No European nation, not even England or Russia, is so marked out for domination, according to our wisdom of the appropriation of opportunity, as ourselves. We have three Pacific states, the immense territory of Alaska, the Aleutian Archipelago, that stretches westward far along the Siberian coast, many of the islands most valuable; and now, beyond all question, the Hawaiian group, a splendid acquisition, a part of the Ladrões, and the Philippines, equal alone to all the West Indies. We have in these possessions the potentiality of American civilization in contact with that of ancient Asia. Marco Polo will be famous forever for his stories of the glories of Japan, and the fancy of Columbus, one of the rare adventurers whose imagination became executive, was inflamed by him to sail westward in search of the Indies. Yet he missed in his estimation of the bulk of the world the continents and islands of America. The West Indies were found by ships whose sails were filled with trade winds westward blowing. The Indies west are eastward, not westward, to us. The East Indies were named in the same way, for it was known in the huge vagueness that wrapped the known and the unknown in the same clouds that south and east of Asia were the

Indies. The caravans carried Indian stories, superstitions and merchandise across the Arabian deserts. Palmyra was a green island in a sea of sand, and sprung from trade that found a channel from the further east. The northern Italian cities grew from this golden seed grain, and flourished when the promise of the Cape of Good Hope became a gorgeous realization, and then faded because the oceans were spread not to divide but to unite the great divisions of land. London and Lisbon profited. England took unto herself the empire of India, and bearing "the white man's burden," became sovereign of the mighty waters, master of colossal shores and countless millions, feeding her grandeur with a colonial system that made her capital the greatest of cities, and her trade the despair of the nations. She was enriched by the expansion that made Spain poor. The English speaking races have gained the gift of colonization that the Latin nations lost. The United States waited long to take herself consciously,—and conspicuously before all spectators, the world the stage, humanity the audience,—her own high place among the powers of the world-wide affairs, not in a way that was ostentatious, but with the simple directness that is fitting for strength, the clear purpose power warrants, the majestic graciousness that an open, honorable purpose yields and wields.

An order was cabled two-thirds of the way around the world, facing the sun from Washington, to destroy a fleet that menaced our commerce, and in a week the order was obeyed; and that was literally firing guns around the world. Since that day we have sent our regiments east and west, steaming into the morning skies from New York, and into the sunsets from San Francisco. Our troopships, going opposite ways, have met in Manila. Those that departed eastward will sail on until they come home from the west! This far exceeds the British drumbeat that follows the sun. The American bugles have been heard morning and evening on the Atlantic and Pacific, the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Sea of China. The boys are upholding the faith and honor of the army and the navy, carrying the flag of America, keeping step to her lofty music, extending the beneficence of Americanism, their field that of the apostles,—the world.

The campaign for suitable legislation in Congress to meet the changed relations of the country to the armed nations, was like that at Santiago in the fact it was necessary to do a great deal of arduous work within strict limitations of time or make costly sacrifices. Success at Santiago—and there was a measure of it there, striking in proportion, for there were many chances of failure

—the American victory at the critical point and certain crisis of the war, depended upon the things that must be done in sharply defined hours, or disastrous expenditure of life and treasure would have been demanded, in addition to that which sufficed. Congress expired on the 4th of March. It was important not to have that body convened in extra session. A fashion of extra sessions is to be deprecated, because the industrially productive people need intervals of repose from heated terms of politics, when the National capital should be the scene rather of executive labor than legislative agitation. The President was bound by his convictions of what the public prosperity demanded, to call an extra session, a fortnight after his inauguration, of the Congress, whose house was elected on the same day with his own popular election. There were decisive reasons why it was undesirable to follow the precedent with the second Congress of his term. The protracted debates on the ratification by the Senate of the treaty with Spain were injurious in the mere matter of time lost, and yet more unfortunate because the nature of the discussion raised doubts even among enlightened peoples, as to the stability of the purpose of the government of the United States in regard to the new possessions, while the Tagalo conspirators were encouraged to believe that if they made war upon our troops we would be persuaded that the government of the Philippines should be turned over from the Spaniards to the martial law of Tagalo tyrants, burning to be more desperate and destructive, avaricious and violently oppressive, than the Spaniards. The world is a neighborhood of nations, and a whispering gallery over wires. Dr. Rizal, the ablest and most cultivated of Filipino writers, prepared in the form of a short story a tale of the telephone, the leading idea of which was that long-distance telephonic communication was established between Madrid and Manila and so perfected that the priests in the two cities talked with facility, and the Spanish priests at home were wretched to find that the friars in Luzon were so unworthy, and it was decided by the priests of Spain they should fast and pray for their brethren at the other end of the wire that carried their voices on wings of fire. The representatives of the Tagalos were free, while in Paris in attendance on the treaty commission, to cable by way of Hongkong whatever representations they saw fit of the attitude of the Americans. There have been for several years centers of Philippine hostility to Spain in Paris and Hongkong, and some of those finding employment in planning revolution had a good deal of money, were liberally educated, and employed the cables. When the Treaty

of Peace was signed at Paris the Filipino commissioner appeared in Washington, and of course was still using cables to inform Aguinaldo by way of private Hongkong messages; and if the matter sent was not too flagrant and vicious it passed direct through Manila to the eastward station where the committee that they call an assembly met. That Agoncillo overestimated the influence of the Americans opposed to our ratification of the Spanish treaty, and regarded their utterances as an appeal to the Filipino army to take the offensive, and destroy the steadfastness of the American people, so that congressional and other incendiary talk fanned the embers into a flame to be quenched in blood, is an unexaggerated statement of indisputable fact. The most serious and incurable difficulty that besets us when we are anxious to make peace with the swarming Tagalos is that they have no comprehension of our solicitude for pacification, other than that we are preparing the way for our submission to them. That is precisely the way the paths to peace are obstructed. The very proclamations that the President meant to give assurances of the purpose of our government to deal liberally and generously with the Philippines, and the orders issued by General Otis pursuant to the advices he received of the eminently pacific disposition of the American government, excited the Tagalos, and influenced them, just because the President announced his sense of responsibility, and thereby presumed to question the dictatorship of Aguinaldo. Further, the Filipinos were persuaded that they had only to strike a blow at our army to disturb the peace of this country. The President had shown anxiety to avoid bloodshed, and while the insurgents were intrenching themselves and mounting guns to enfilade our lines, our sentinels were subjected to the grossest insults and taunted night and day. This aggressive effrontery continued until the attack was made in force, and then the Tagalos got a lesson that was a surprise to them. They had been accustomed when they thought they were besieging Manila, to open fire for a few hours, and then to rest, regarding the proceeding heroic and to be resumed at pleasure. The Americans rushed for them, and put them to flight and slaughter. The result of the effervescence of factions in our Congress and country after the war was over except in a legal sense, was to furnish fire for the fuel accumulated with false pretenses by the Tagalos, and substitute a war with the Filipinos for that with the Spaniards, and at the same time cut down and put aside the army bills, thus encouraging Indian disorders, and other manifestations of hatred and contempt for the authorities. It was possible,

however, to save for a time the regular army as it is and give to the discretion of the President power to raise troops enough, as appeared to Congress, to act on the defensive, until the law-making power should come together in regular session or be called by the President, if that seemed the lesser evil. Congress was good enough to provide for an ad interim army. The President was not commanded—that is, not yet—to throw away the weapons the constitution placed in his hands. There is hardly enough of the army to take care of the military property accumulated in the fortifications and camps, seaside and other, and thinly occupy our vast possessions so that the peace and dignity of the United States may not be unfavorably affected. Fortunately the military arm of the nation does not need to be strongly displayed in Porto Rico and Hawaii, and it is a coincidence that the absence of insurgents is in precisely those places in which our authority is not limited as to time. Porto Rico has been ceded to us, the schools opening under the American flag, the people shouting in joyous response to the salutes with which the flag was received, and the band played the Star Spangled Banner. We annexed Hawaii in spite of the outcries of those who had profited by the occupation of the monarchy that was surrounded by as many rings as Jupiter has moons. A ship of war or two and a few companies of regulars are enough to keep order there. The people accept it as a fact, as it is, that the annexation is irrevocable. The way to cause disturbance is to question that fact, but it will not be questioned any more until the army submits to the mob. It will be the duty of Congress to make liberal appropriations for the equipment of the old forts at the principal ports of Porto Rico, with modern artillery,—and as the naval officers agree that the eight and ten inch guns are great enough for battleships, and that the five-inch and small rapid-fire artillery are the most serviceable afloat, we will have and to spare a splendid assortment of our eleven, twelve and thirteen inch thunderers to mount ashore. Porto Rico, the Pacific coast and Hawaii should absorb them. In Cuba we were fortunate not to open the war with Spain by accepting as fact the Key West fiction about the republic of Cuba. That wonderful organization was apparently gotten up expressly for the issue of bonds and postage stamps. There was a coast-guard and postal system, also a capital city, and an army, accounts of which reminded one of that described in the alliteration, “An Austrian army awfully arrayed.” The American statesmen who have used Cuba as a live coal on their brains, thought it important to have the republic recognized to assist in placing loans,

take command of our armies, and accept rations from our hands. The Cuban Assembly was like that in the Isle of Luzon, representative of a clique, a faction, a gang, not at all of the people. Both gangs, that of Cuba and that of Luzon, are representative only of Spanish misgovernment and the deformities of an administration by royal favorites for immigrant stipendiaries. In the character they asserted for themselves, that of representatives of the people, they were self-evident impostors. It was held to be high public policy to disclaim ambition to annex Cuba to the United States, and it seems probable the precaution of that profession was wise, for it does much to smooth the way for the final complete absorption of Cuba in the United States. In no other way than by pursuing the path of American reserve, and respect for the orderly expression of the Cuban people when they emerged from the chaos of war and made themselves felt, could the Assembly have been so discredited as it is by its own acts. That body was so wild with folly as to take issue with the one man whose power of character, will and fame crush them when they charge him with their own faults. They are shattered by the collision, while their animosity inflicted no scratch or stain on the Cuban chief. The intelligence and high-toned public spirit of Martinez Gomez has redeemed the faults of his campaigning, which was that of fighting Spaniards with their own weapons, and burning the fairer places of the island to free it from woes greater than poverty, of hopeless strife with corrupt and venomous oppression. The stand of Gomez for the freedom of the people from false debts was full of the dignity of heroic devotion, sympathy with those really liberated and their true liberators, and scorn for all who would convert the cause of the country into a source of profitableness for pretenders. The future of Cuba too largely depends upon this one-man power, for Gomez is old and worn. The people of the island have acclaimed him one of themselves, though a Dominican, and his leadership is one he cannot abdicate, for there is no hand but his to guide the sorely-stricken Cubans to the peace of a stable government that the people may voice their aspirations with authenticity and efficacy.

There was, in the Congressional debate on the army bill in association with the current events of the Filipino war, many things said by the opposition that would be entirely deplorable if the standard of intelligence was that of the Tagalos, who must be convinced that Americans are, in view of the warfare that engages their attention around Manila, about to engage in a civil

war at home. One member said war with Aguinaldo could have been avoided if the President had stated he was not going to subjugate them, and this congressman had "mused much" upon the "embattled farmers" who "fired the shot heard round the world," and "wondered if there was anywhere out along the firing line around Manila a spot that looked like Concord Bridge." This is a direct instigation of the assassination of American soldiers doing their duty at Manila. This incident occurred when the President cabled within three weeks of the naval battle of Manila that it would be the duty of the commander of the American expedition to "publish a proclamation declaring that we came not to make war upon the people of the Philippines," but to "protect them in their homes, their employments and in their personal and religious rights." The proof is perfect that Aguinaldo was false and malicious, a conspirator, hostile all the while to Americans, seeking to deceive and make use of them, to help him with his followers to take the place of the Spaniards as robbers of the people, and tyrants irresponsible and unappeasable. Mr. Wildman, consul at Hongkong, wrote the State Department that Aguinaldo arrived in that city on the day after Dewey's May-day victory, and added: "It was May 10th before I could obtain permission from Admiral Dewey to allow Aguinaldo to go by the U. S. steamer McCulloch." It was three weeks after the battle when Aguinaldo arrived at Cavite. Just at this time a proclamation was issued at Hongkong by the Philippine insurgents saying: "Where you see the American flag flying, assemble. They are our redeemers!" May 20, Williams, consul, wrote: "General Aguinaldo told me to-day that his friends all hoped that the Philippines would be held as a colony of the United States of America." While Aguinaldo was at Hongkong his "compatriots" there busied themselves getting up statements tendering their allegiance to the United States. Here is an example:

To the President of the United States of America:

Claudio Lopez, merchant and proprietor and vice-consul of Portugal at Iloilo, native of the Philippine Islands, emigrant to this colony of Hongkong for political causes, exposes with great consideration:

Having known the history and constitution of the noblest liberal and rightful nation of the United States of America, he, for the present, adheres to the Government in annexing his country, and considers that it will be for him a great honor to join his country as an additional star to the always vic-

torious flag of the United States of America and to count him as one of its citizens.

Hongkong, 9th May, 1898.

(Signed) CLAUDIO LOPEZ.

This was prepared a week after Aguinaldo's arrival at Hongkong, when the news of Dewey's victory had been received, and a week before he gave permission for the Malay tribesman, who had accepted Spanish money to accept a Spanish peace for his people, to take passage in a United States ship, return to the country he had left for his country's good, as the sequel shows. There was a struggle without intermission to get the State Department and Admiral Dewey to consent to an alliance with Aguinaldo and his "government." This was persistently the policy of our consuls at Hongkong, Manila and Singapore, who were active in the presumed management of the man who had been deported, cash in hand, as the Spanish promised to reform if he would take his share of the country and go away. He knew as well then the nature of the reforms of Spain as he does now. He was, until the American admiral allowed him to appear at Cavite, a professor of Americanism. What he secured through the intervention of our consuls was to advertise himself under the auspices of the United States forces, and the Tagalos presumed he was running the United States. Very soon he became of the opinion that it was his mission to permit and direct the operation of our fleet and army, and he has ever since been violent as an "ally" of the United States, whose "dictatorship" was of such a nature he was called upon to "order and command" all manner of men. The State Department of the United States several times by cable and mailed letters ordered the consuls to omit negotiations. This was before the war. When it was in the air after the war, they were "cordial" with Aguinaldo that they might "influence him for good." He was playing upon them a sinister game. Mr. Wildman, however, had written February 22, 1898, that the Spanish captain-general at Manila was asserting he had pacified the islands, so that he could return to Spain with that to his credit, when the truth was "certain rebel leaders were given a cash bribe of \$1,650,000 to consent to public deportation to China. This bribe and deportation only multiplied claimants, and fanned the fires of discontent." It was Aguinaldo who got the money. The sort of peace he secured was described by his friend, Consul Williams, in these words: "On Friday morning, March 25, a meeting of natives was being

held near my consulate in Manila, the natives being unarmed. The building was surrounded by police and military, the meeting broken up, twelve natives wantonly shot to death, several wounded, and sixty-two taken prisoners. Saturday morning, March 26, the sixty-two prisoners were marched in a body to the cemetery and shot to death, although it was shown that several were chance passers-by or employés in ships adjoining, not being in attendance at the meeting." We quote again from Mr. Williams: "I was in Hongkong September, 1897, when Aguinaldo and his leaders arrived under contract with the Spanish government. They waited until the 1st of November for the payment of the promised money and the fulfillment of the promised reforms. Only \$400,000, Mexican, was ever placed to their credit in the banks." It was on the 3d of November Mr. E. Agoncillo, "late minister of foreign affairs in Aguinaldo's cabinet," tried to make a secret bargain with the United States for arms, and was willing the United States should make some money. "There has been a systematic attempt to blacken the name of Aguinaldo and his cabinet," Mr. Williams wrote later, "on account of the questionable terms of their surrender to Spanish forces a year ago this month." Mr. Williams proceeded to argue that Aguinaldo had not sold himself. This was a part of the "diplomatic dealing" with the conspirator who was at work to use the Americans, civil and military, to further his plan for setting up a dictatorship. Aguinaldo was like the frozen reptile in the fable, found by a woodman, and warmed before the fire, stung his benefactor. This preposterous Tagalo serpent began to show his fangs at an early date. The first United States troops, under General Thomas Anderson, arrived at Manila to reinforce Dewey June 30th, and the second expedition, under General Green, July 22d. July 28th Aguinaldo wrote Anderson:

"I consider it my duty to advise you of the undesirability of disembarking North American troops in the places conquered by the Filipinos from the Spanish, without previous notice to this government, because, as no formal agreement yet exists between the two nations, the Philippine people might consider the occupation of its territories by North American troops as a violation of its rights.

"I comprehend that without the destruction of the Spanish squadron the Philippine revolution would not have advanced so rapidly. Because of this I take the liberty of indicating to your excellency the necessity that, before disembarking, you should communicate in writing to this government the places

that are to be occupied and also the object of the occupation, that the people may be advised in due form and [thus] prevent the commission of any transgression against friendship."

There could not have been anything more insolent than this imagined, but Aguinaldo was soon able to surpass it, expressing astonishment that Americans wanted wood, horses and cattle, and meant to take them if not sold at a fair price. Presently the snaky conspirator, who sought to absorb all the offices of tyranny, claimed it as a virtue that he had "permitted" the Americans in Manila to obtain pure water, and he began his openly aggressive course that culminated in the war he forced. It was, he held, a condescension to say that the Americans had hastened the revolution by destroying the Spanish fleet! As for himself, he and his 14,000 men, which he represented as 37,000, did nothing toward taking Manila. The American fleet silenced the fort by the seashore that was the key of the city, and the American columns, the line of defense broken, entered with slight loss. Then because the Tagalos were not allowed to jointly occupy the place they had not contributed to conquer, there was the claim that we had ill-treated our "ally." The President telegraphed Admiral Dewey, May 26: "You must exercise discretion most fully in all matters, and be governed according to circumstances which you know and we can not know. You have our confidence entirely. It is desirable, as far as possible and consistent for your success and safety, not to have political alliances with the insurgents or any faction in the islands that would incur liability to maintain their cause in the future." This was the product, of course, of the consular correspondence which had gone far in sympathy and flattery. The Admiral replied:

"I thank the Department for the expression of confidence. Have acted according to the spirit of the Department's instructions therein from beginning, and I have entered into no alliance with the insurgents or with any faction. This squadron can reduce the defenses of Manila at any moment, but it is considered useless until the arrival of sufficient United States forces to retain possession. DEWEY."

August 15th Consul Wildman telegraphed State Department:

"The Spanish consul received dispatch Sunday ordering the surrender of Manila. Shall I offer to deliver personally and save more delay? Believe can be of service to Dewey, should Aguinaldo make trouble. WILDMAN."

This telegram from Wildman was thus answered by the Secretary:

"Spanish consul should deliver dispatch in his own way. Take no action respecting Aguinaldo without specific directions from this Department."

Mr. Wildman finally discovered that Aguinaldo, with whom he had labored hard and long, was treacherous, and wanted to take possession of the country and be the reigning tyrant vice the Spaniards, and at last in ignorance and vanity mistaking the character of the American army and people, made war with the swarm of deluded men of his tribe, not for liberty, but to set up a personal despotism. We have to liberate the people of the Philippines twice, from the Spaniards and from the Tagalos. The American arms have not been tarnished in either conflict, but brightened and glorified in the same good cause, keeping clear and shining on high, the faith and honor of the army and navy of the United States and the absolute integrity of the national government. It was not possible to avoid the war with a tribe of Malays who answered generosity with resentment, charity with malice, and forbearance with vindictiveness. They are not fighting for personal or public rights, but for a savage sovereignty, that they may spoil and slay for the sake of robbery and revenge. No reproach rests upon Americans for their conduct at Manila. Under difficult circumstances they have been admirable. There has not been a day since May 1, 1898, when they could have left the Philippines with honor, for they could not provide for peace except by force. The degradation of submissiveness suggested—the abandonment of duty and decency—it is impossible to conceive of our countrymen.



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