"Without the United States, Castro would not be in power today."

Ambassador Earl E. T. Smith (Testimony before U.S. Senate Internal Security Subcommittee)



"Individuals in the State Department and Individuals in The New York Times put Castro in power."

Ambassador Robert C. Hill
(Testimony before U.S. Senate Internal Security Subcommittee)



As a succinct background note on Mr. William Wieland's career in the State Department, we quote from a Report of the Internal Security Subcommittee of the U.S. Senate, the following:

". . . He was appointed (to his post with the State
Department, Ed.) without any security check.

(His appointment actually was effective before he even filled out any form of an application.) (sic)

He falsified his job application by omission.


When he later filled out an expanded personal history form, he falsified that by direct misstatement.

Mr. Wieland had a hand in shaping our policy with respect to Cuba both before and after Castro's takeover."

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BETRAYAL

OPENED THE DOOR TO

by

Luis V. Manrara, President

THE TRUTH ABOUT CUBA COMMITTEE, INC.

RUSSIAN MISSILES IN RED CUBA First Edition - January 1968 5,000 Second Edition - March 1968 5,000

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The author in his capacity of President of the Truth About Cuba Committee, Inc., has prepared this book from the files of the Committee and all proceeds received from the book will be used by the Committee to further its purposes.

Luis V. Manrara

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DEDICATION

October 10th, 1967 Ninety Ninth Anniversary Of

"El Grito de Yara *"

On this very day — almost one century ago! — climaxing the Cubans urge for independence, wealthy, cultured Cuban patriot Carlos Manuel de Céspedes put the flaming torch to his sugar mill, gave freedom to his slaves and proclaimed Cuba's right to be free and independent. Thus started the first major Cuban independence war against the Spanish Metropolis, which lasted 10 long, devastating years.

As a tribute to our valiant ancestors who, like their American counterparts had done one century earlier, pledged their lives, fortunes and sacred honor to liberate their country, this Exposé is humbly dedicated.

Luis V. Manrara

^(★) The Yara (Oriente Province) Call to Arms.

PREFACE

Cuba is a Soviet-occupied country. Only the presence of powerful Soviet military forces prevents the Cuban people from overthrowing the Castro regime.

Two American presidents have condoned and abetted this breach of the Monroe Doctrine. In consequence, all of Latin America is in flames. Soviet strategists can laugh at President Kennedy's promise to prevent the export of Communist revolution from Cuba.

Cuban exiles see their homeland enslaved, their people prostrate under the tyrant's heel. Dedicated men and women work tirelessly to free their country. Patriots like Luis V. Manrara have subordinated every other interest to this cause.

Their chief obstacle is the United States Government. This country, which for almost two centuries gave example and

encouragement to revolutions for freedom in all the world, is now seeking accommodation with tyranny.

It is an ancient gambit. All the dead civilizations of the past were ruled by politicians who believed they could make peace with the conquerors. The very attitude is a sign of decadence which the conqueror cannot mistake. It whets his appetite and builds his confidence.

Today, the United States has no time for patriots. Its obsession is to court the favor of the Communist tyrants. All the enslaved peoples who yearn for freedom know that the United States has defected.

Luis V. Manrara has assembled the record which shows how the game is played. The triumph of Castro, disaster at the Bay of Pigs, aborting the missile crisis — how could the United States so perfectly serve the Soviet interest if firm hands were not charting the course? Was treason at work?

We know, of course, that there are Communists in the United States Government. Even the F.B.I. doesn't know who they are. That is the kind of world in which we live.

Could they have shaped these decisions? Possibly. A MacLean or a Philby (two conspicuous Britishers who spied for the U.S.S.R. and fled to Moscow, Ed.) might have done so. However, I think we should give greater consideration to the alternate hypothesis that we are betrayed not by knaves but by fools.

It is a matter of historical record that declining nations suffer fools gladly. Fools seem better equipped to keep the nation in decline. Moreover, they are very clannish. They repel intelligent intruders.

It is readily discernible that the decline of the United States began with the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt and that it has proceeded without interruption. Men who made policy in the Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower administrations are still making policy today. The persistent predominance of bad policy has become normal.

The augury for freedom is very bad indeed. One hope remains — that the American people are not as decadent as their leaders and that they may yet be aroused to destroy Communism.

Our people have been intimidated by propaganda emanating

trom our own government that a policy of liberating captive peoples means war. That is a lie.

Tyrants are overthrown by revolution from within, not by war from without. The obligation of those who enjoy freedom is to give aid and comfort to those who are in bondage. When the Communist tyranny is condemned in all the free world and exiles are helped in their fight for freedom, Communism will fade away. Today as in all of history, the greatest enemy of the tyrant is the people whom he oppresses.

America has lost faith in freedom. It closes its eyes to reality while it presses a vain quest for accommodation with tyranny. At issue is not only the emancipation of captive peoples but the survival of the United States.

History may yet record that it was the fervent commitment of men like Mr. Manrara who had felt the heel of the tyrant which awakened the American people from their complacency and saved the United States of America.

Thomas A. Lane
Maj. General U.S. Army, Ret.

McLean, Va. Dec. 11, 1967

OUR GRATITUDE

The enclosed book is, in fact, a documented exposé of the Moscow-Washington-Cuba cabal which has deceived Cubans and Americans alike, although it is the writer's opinion that saving Cuba from communism was -- and still is -- the primary responsibility of the Cubans. I am confident that the book will establish, definitely, what is the true situation and, thus, what must be done to correct it.

But the book is not limited to a factual, historical analysis of what happened in Cuba and bow did it happen.

The installation of Russian Missiles in Red Cuba is also fully documented. And this is a present and real threat to the security of the United States.

I feel that making this information available is a way to show our gratitude to the people of the United States and to its Government for the haven offered to those of us who were fortunate to have escaped from communist terror.

Luis V. Manrara

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INTRODUCTION

It seems unnecessary now, after eight long years of unheeded warnings, to insist that communist subversion centered in Cuba will reach the United States of America.

From April 1st to August 2nd, 1967 --in 4 months-- there were 109 (ONE HUNDRED AND NINE) riots of varying intensity in all but 18 States of the Union. (From U.S. News and World Report, August 14, 1967). Communist aggression is no longer 90 miles away and aimed South, it is hitting the United States of America right within its own territory. And it is using two vicious, devastating weapons: racial hatred and urban guerrillas.

The presence and pronouncements of Stokely Carmichael at the Latin American Solidarity Conference (LASO), held in Havana in July 1967, confirm the warnings about racial hatred inside the United States being stirred up by the communists from Red Cuba, which we have been making since February 1962. At that time American negro crypto-communist Robert F. Williams (founder of RAM—Revolutionary Action Movement— author of the book "Negroes with Guns") had just fled to Havana and shortly afterwards begun to broadcast, in English, a violent hate-campaign inciting American negroes to revolt against the whites. Astutely, this program was labeled Radio Free Dixie. Unfortunately, the U.S. Government ignored our warnings; the majority of the mass communications followed suit and, consequently, the American people—the victims—were largely unaware, or ignorant of these dangerous developments.

However, when claims of Soviet long range Missiles in Red Cuba are aired, the U.S. Government denial is immediate and emphatic and the communications media are not remiss. The Administration authorities dogmatically rebuke any testimony —even from eyewitnesses— that Red Cuba is bristling with Russian Missiles which can penetrate deep into the United States territory.

They speak and act as haughtily as though they had never made a mistake and, therefore, could not possibly make one now. They speak and act as though there never was any reason for the expression "credibility gap" to be coined.

They seem to have forgotten that their mistakes and pre-conceived, suicidal, hypothetical theories of Soviet Russia's intentions were proven totally wrong in Red Cuba by the Report of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services -- United States Senate, issued May 9, 1963, entitled **The Cuban Military Buildup**, from which we have quoted the most shocking findings relative to the topic of this Exposé.

In view of the foregoing, and because we are convinced that it is vital and urgent that the people of the United States recognize the peril Red Cuba poses to their security, we have undertaken to make available in this Exposé as much factual, documented, information as possible, for the benefit of our best friends --the American people.

We wish to point out that we do not attempt to expose in this Report the subversive activities carried out by Red Cuba against every country in the American Hemisphere --including the United States-- because this is an undisputed fact.



As we have explained in the past, we are quite aware of the U.S. Government ambivalent position towards the Cubans. From a humane point of view it is our benefactor and we are deeply appreciative for its kindness. Politically, however, as it is well documented in this Exposé, it has been instrumental in the take over of our country by the international socialist/communist conspiracy. Furthermore, since the take over the United States Government has been the most formidable obstacle for the liberation of our unfortunate country. In that respect the U.S. Government has not only been inimical to the freedom-loving Cubans, but to the freedom-loving Americans as well.



This Exposé has been divided in two parts. Part I is devoted to an analysis of the so-called "October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis"

and the aftermath of the Kennedy-Khrushchev Pact (1) which, supposedly, solved the "eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation" and stopped for good the Soviet Missile buildup in Cuba.

The significance of the K-K Pact is that it embodied the Washington-Moscow status quo in regard to Cuba. It was a bold attempt to "legitimize" an unholy alliance. The facts uncovered in this Exposé confirm that the K-K Pact was only another step in the long established directives of the perplexing, incredible history of the U.S.A.-U.S.S.R. entente.

Part II --Russian Missiles in Cuba-- explodes the myth that the communists do not have offensive, long range, Nuclear Missiles in Cuba, in compliance with the K-K Pact On the contrary, after the K-K Pact guaranteed that the United States of America will not permit any armed attack on Red Cuba, the cautious Russians felt secure to proceed, unhampered, their Missile buildup in Cuba, their farthest but most valuable conquest.

Included in this Exposé are selected testimonies of Cuban exiles who have personally seen the Missiles, or who worked in key positions in Red Cuba which permitted them to obtain firsthand information on the Russian Missile buildup. There were other important eyewitness testimonies available which could not be made public because it would endanger the lives of relatives and friends still trapped in Cuba.

Of course, only relatively few individuals have seen the Missiles with their own eyes. The shocking thing is that there are any eyewitnesses at all in view of the extraordinary security precautions taken by the Russians to prevent it. The eyewitness testimonies and the photographs attached are factual, documented confirmations of the thousands of reports volunteered by Cuban refugees --small pieces of the Jigsaw-Missile-Puzzle Cuba is.

⁽¹⁾ Advisedly, we refer to the Kennedy-Khrushchev personal agreement as a "Pact." Our contention is that Kennedy and Khrushchev, individually, actually entered into a "pact."

We know that, as far as the United States is concerned, this Pact is not legally binding, and the same may hold true for the U.S.S.R. However, as individuals, Messrs. Kennedy and Khrushchev could --and did-- enter into a "pact." This conclusion is sufficiently documented in the published letters exchanged between the two parties, reprinted in this Exposé under Appendixes "2-A" and "2-B,"

Surprisingly, we have authentic photographs of Russian Missiles in Cuba which have been reproduced in this Exposé. These we owe to the courtesy --unintentional, I am sure-- of Red Cuba's newspapers EL MUNDO and REVOLUCION. Besides our own research to identify and calibrate the range of the Missiles publicly paraded in Havana and photographed by the communist press, American experts have estimated their range from 700 to 1,500 miles, or Medium and Intermediate Range Cruise or Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs). Probably there are also Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) of longer range in Cuba, but there is no photographic "hard proof" of these, although the length and width of some Missiles reported by eyewitnesses correspond to ICBMs.

When all the bits and pieces are put together the conclusion is inevitable: All these people could not be wrong or lying --THE MISSILES ARE THERE AND AIMED HERE!



Finally, it is a terrible mistake —which may prove fatal to the defense of the United States from the multi-pronged attack of the socialist/communist conspiracy—to consider the take over of Cuba by our deadly enemy as an isolated situation which the United States can control at will. The fact that Cuba is a small island with less than 5% of the U.S. population magnifies the delusion that Cuba's Red regime is not a menace to the big, powerful, U.S.A.

Subversion by instigation and infiltration; defeatist, paralyzing propaganda; guerrilla warfare, but, above all, Nuclear Weapons, have completely changed the balance of power. Sheer numbers and size are no longer decisive. Red China and North Vietnam are good examples.

Even in olden times, the cunning use of a primitive weapon spelled defeat and death to a giant confronted by a puny enemy whom he could have destroyed with his bare hands --of course we all know the Biblical story of David and Goliath.



yet unsettled, this writer taped a program for <u>Life Lines</u> which was broadcast on December 3, 1962. Subsequent events proved that my appraisal of the situation at that early time was almost prophetic. A reprint of this program is attached under Appendix "3".

2. U Thant's Cuba Trip Confirms the Kennedy-Khrushchev Pact and Saves Face of Puppet Fidel Castro

The following are excerpts from U Thant's interview with Fidel Castro and Cuba's puppet President Osvaldo Dorticós when Thant visited Castro in Havana on October 30, 1962. Also present was Thant's military advisor Indian Brigadier Indar Jit Rikhye. U Thant confirmed President Kennedy's promise to protect the communist regime of Cuba from an invasion, either from the U.S.A. or from any other nation:

"...The United States has told me that as soon as this system (of surveillance. Ed.) is put into practice, they would make a public declaration in the Security Council, if this is deemed necessary, that they would not maintain aggressive actions against the Cuban Government and would guarantee the territorial integrity of the nation (Cuba. Ed.). This it has asked me to tell you..."

"... The United States has answered me that if the agreement is reached with the approval of the Cuban Government and the United Nations, not only would it make the declaration before the Security Council but that it would also suspend the blockade..."

TACC Editorial Comment.

In connection with the "validity" of the K-K Pact, notice how U Thant speaks in the name of the United States, and mentions how the United States sought the approval of the "agreement" by the United Nations and even by the Cuban puppet regime of Fidel Castro.

The Acting Secretary General of the United Nations Organization (U.N.O.), did everything within his power to restore Fidel Castro's leader-image, so badly tarnished by Nikita's unilateral handling of the negotiations, and to strengthen Red Cuba's position. He also criticized the United States in typical oblique oriental style—an attitude hardly within the province of a supposedly neutral Mediator. Here are some quotations to that effect:

". . . As you know, Your Excellency (meaning Fidel Castro. Ed.), I said in the Security Council that this blockade has been something out of the ordinary, very unusual, except in times of war. . ."

Fidel Castro then questioned what right the U.S.A. had to ask for on-site and aerial inspection to verify compliance with the terms of the Pact, as follows:

"Castro: What right does the United States have to ask this? I mean to say, is this based on a real right or is it an exigency pressed by force or a position of force?"

"U Thant: This is a point of view that is not a legal right. Something like this can only be done with the approval and acceptance of the Cuban Government."

(All quotations from U Thant's interview with Castro are taken from the full transcript reproduced in our BULLETIN ON CUBA No. 21, of November 5th, 1962. Text monitored November 1, 1962, from Red Cuba's Radio. Ed.)

From the same BULLETIN we quote Fidel Castro's 'Five Demands' to the United States, as his price for accepting the Pact. According to Raúl Castro's speech of October 28, 1962, his brother Fidel Castro had stated that the guarantees given by President Kennedy against an aggression were not acceptable unless, besides the removal of the naval blockade --which had been promised-- the following measures, among others, be adopted:

3. Fidel Castro's Five Demands to the United States of America -- His Price for Acquiescing to the K-K Pact.

"FIRST: Cessation of economic blockade and of all economic pressure which the United States is exerting all over the world against our country.

"SECOND: Cessation of all subversive activities, parachuting and disembarkment of weapons and explosives

by air and sea, organization of mercenary invasions, infiltration of spies and saboteurs; activities which originate in the United States and some accomplice nations.

"THIRD: Cessation of pirate attacks originating from bases existing in the United States and Puerto Rico.

"FOURTH: Cessation of all territorial violations of our air and naval space by North American war planes and ships.

"FIFTH: Elimination of the Guantánamo Naval Base and the return of that Cuban territory occupied by the United States."

With the exception of the fifth demand, the United States has partially or totally complied with the other four.

Have Nikita Khrushchev and Fidel Castro complied with their commitments under the Pact? NYET! (An emphatic NO, in Russian). Part II of this Exposé deals with this most important aspect.

4. Seven Facts that Prove that the United States of America is Complying with the K-K Pact.

The letters exchanged between K and K, published in The New York Times, and the statements made by U Thant in his interview with Fidel Castro, are documentary evidence that K-K's negotiations wound up in the Pact made public.

The fact that neither Castro nor Khrushchev complied with the Pact --as is communism's invariable policy-- and the even more important fact that the President of the U.S.A. is not constitutionally empowered to sign pacts or treaties without the advice and consent of the United States Senate, has not deterred the Government of the United States from compliance with the Pact, as the following faits accomplis prove:

FACT NO. 1. On March 30th, 1963, the United States Department of Justice issued "Notice of Prevention of Departure and Amendment of Conditions of Parole" to all Cuban Freedom Fighters engaged in commando activities against the communist regime of Cuba, as per photocopy shown under Appendix "4".

Photocopy is also attached, under Appendix "5", of the Treasury Department Official Notification, dated January 8, 1964, of the sei-

zure of a 23-foot motor vessel. This was one of many seizures of vessels, ammunition, guns, supplies, etc., obtained through great difficulties by Cuban Freedom Fighters to attack the communist regime that has murdered tens of thousands of our compatriots, imprisoned more than one million and caused the exodus of nearly three quarters of a million, in a country of barely SEVEN MILLION people.

From March 29, 1963, to March 17, 1964, U.S. Federal Authorities made seven confiscations of matériel from COMANDOS "L" -- one of several Cuban patriotic organizations engaged in commando activities-- as described in their accusatory report, "Cuban Exiles" Right to Fight for Freedom." The third confiscation alone was valued at \$26,846. Most of this money, it must be remembered, was donated in dimes and quarters by exiled Cubans, at great sacrifice.

Ever since March 30th, 1963, to this very day, the United States Armed Forces, Intelligence and Immigration Authorities, have relentlessly and, unfortunately, too successfully, thwarted the commando activities of the freedom-loving Cubans who are anxious to risk their lives to attack the Soviet regime, which is also the avowed mortal enemy of the United States of America.

FACT NO. 2. The cooperation of the British Government was sought and obtained by the U.S. Government to prevent any attack against their protectorate, the international communist bastion in the Caribbean.

FACT NO. 3. U.S. "Jupiter" Nuclear Bases in Turkey and Italy were dismantled in January 1963. The explanation given was that these Missiles had become obsolete and that the "Polaris" Missiles, carried by submarines, rendered those bases unnecessary.

It was a surprise to knowledgeable persons that, while the Russians were installing in Cuba Missiles of the "Jupiter" type, the U.S.A. was dismantling them alleging obsolescence.

No mention is made in the published letters exchanged between Kennedy and Khrushchev about the trading of the U.S. Turkey Missile Bases for the Russian Cuban Missile Bases. However, no less than four informed newsmen, in articles "Special to The New York Times," published in the October 29, 1962 edition of that newspaper, referred to the Cuban-Turkish Nuclear Bases swap - their names: Seymour Topping, Max Frankel, E.W. Kenworthy and Seth S. King. King's article, bearing the dateline "London, October 28" quotes from and

comments on a letter written by Prime Minister Macmillan to Khrushchev. The following is a verbatim transcript of a paragraph from King's article:

"In his brief message to the Soviet Premier, Mr. Macmillan said he had made a careful study of the Khrushchev letter yesterday (unpublished, Ed.) saying the Soviet Union would stop work on the Cuban bases if North Atlantic Treaty Organization missile bases (mounted and operated by the U.S.A., Ed.) were removed from Turkey."

It is evident from the above information that Khrushchev demanded dismantling of the Missile Bases in Turkey in his original correspondence with President Kennedy which the U.S. Government has kept classified. Max Frankel mentions in his article that there were "several" letters exchanged between Kennedy and Khruschev, beginning approximately two days after October 22nd, when President Kennedy made the historic "denunciation," quote:

"Beginning in the middle of last week, probably Wednesday, Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev exchanged 'several' (sic) private letters that were fairly sharp in tone but that produced no new formulas for a settlement."

In the same New York Times October 29, 1962, edition --a gem for posterity-- James Reston comes to the rescue of President Kennedy with the following paragraph:

"In the perpetual propaganda dialogue of the 'cold war,' (sic) it has been demonstrated that the United States did not make a deal with the Soviet Union at the expense of Turkey, while the same thing can scarcely be said about the Soviet Union in its relations with Premier Fidel Castro."

Notwithstanding Mr. Reston's officious disclaimer, in less than 90 days the U.S. Missile Bases in Turkey were dismantled --and those in Italy too, for good measure. Actions speak louder than words.

FACT NO. 4. On November 1st, 1966, the legislature of the Republic of Costa Rica unanimously voted to permit Cuban exiles to use their territory to operate against Red Cuba.

No sooner was this Resolution adopted than the President of Costa Rica received word from the American Embassy, and from other official sources, that if the Resolution was implemented Costa Rica's aid money would be cut off. This was plain economic coercion of a friendly, independent and courageous small country for the protection of the communist regime of Cuba.

FACT NO. 5. Confidentially --although it was common knowledge-- the U.S. Government demanded that the Cuban issue be left off the Agenda of the last O.A.S. Presidents' Conference, held in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in April 1967.

FACT NO. 6. The U.S. Government has reiterated that it will not tolerate the organization of a Cuban Government in Exile within its territory, and that it will not recognize it if it were organized elsewhere.

FACT NO. 7. Though it does not maintain diplomatic relations with the Red regime of Cuba, the United States Government in effect recognizes that spurious, criminal regime as the legal government of Cuba, having entered into important negotiations with it. The ransom of the Bay of Pigs prisoners and the Liberty Flights in operation since December 1,1965, entailed long negotiations with Cuba's communist regime, which, incidentally, cost the U.S.A. well over 100 Million Dollars by the time of this writing. Both these negotiations were very favorable to the Red regime of Cuba.

5. One Hundred Million Dollars Unwisely Invested

If 100 Million Dollars had been intelligently invested in defeating Cuba's communist regime all SEVEN MILLION Cubans would have been liberated; the Hemisphere would have been spared crippling attacks and subversion from the communists, and the security of the U.S.A. would have been assured. And last, but not least, the socialist/communist international conspiracy unfounded invincibility myth would have been exploded and their world empire would have begun to crumble. So much is at stake in the liberation of Cuba!

And it is incredible --really unbelievable if the facts were not so conclusive— that the United States, the veritable and ultimate goal of communism, is upholding it.

6. The Monroe Doctrine, Two Congressional Joint Resolutions and the Organization of American States Commitments --All Thrown Overboard

Whether as the result of the K-K Pact, or because there were previous secret agreements between the Washington-Moscow Axis, the data compiled clearly indicates that the United States Government is protecting and safeguarding the Red regime that has enslaved Cuba and is subverting the American Hemisphere, including the United States.

In so doing the U.S. Government has thrown the Monroe Doctrine into oblivion; has conveniently forgotten two Congressional Joint Resolutions --1898 and 1962-- and is trampling upon its international commitments under the Organization of American States. The 1954 Declaration of Caracas, to mention only one of several Covenants of the O.A.S. which have been ignored, anticipated with unbelievable accuracy the situation of Cuba today, viz:

"DECLARES: That the domination or control of the political institutions of any American State by the international communist movement, extending to this Hemisphere the political system of an extra-continental power, would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the American States, endangering the peace of America, and would call for a Meeting of Consultation to consider the adoption of appropriate action in accordance with existing treaties."

(The 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, known as the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, is applicable, and it authorizes the use of armed force. Ed.)

7. The United States Government Admits it has no Philosophical Quarrel with Revolution, Socialism, or Dictatorship Controlling Cuba

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That the United States Government has no quarrel with the political philosophy of the communist regime, nor with the men that tyrannize Cuba, was clearly and precisely defined by Adlai E. Stevenson, its Ambassador before the United Nations Organization, in a historic speech before the Security Council, on October 23, 1962 --barely 24 hours after President Kennedy denounced having "hard evidence" that there were Russian "offensive" Missiles in Cuba. This is a verbatim excerpt from Ambassador Stevenson's speech:

[&]quot;...Let me make it absolutely clear what the issue of Cuba is. It is not an issue of revolution. This hemisphere has seen many revolutions, including the one which gave my own nation its independence.

[&]quot;It is not an issue of reform. My nation has lived happily with other countries which have had thorough-going

and fundamental social transformations like Mexico and Bolivia. The whole point of the Alliance for Progress is to bring about an economic and social revolution in the Americas.

(Note this candid admission of the real goal of the much touted Alliance for Progress. Ed.)

"It is not an issue of socialism. As Secretary of State Rusk said at Punta del Este in February: 'Our hemisphere has room for a diversity of economic systems.'

"It is not an issue of dictatorship. The American republics have lived with dictators before. If this were his his only fault, they could even live with Dr. Castro.

"The foremost objection of the states of the Americas to the Castro regime is not because it is revolutionary, not because it is socialistic, not because it is dictatorial, not even because Dr. Castro perverted a noble revolution in the interests of a squalid totalitarianism. It is because he has aided and abetted an invasion of this hemisphere --and an invasion at just the time when the hemisphere is making a new and unprecedented effort for economic progress and social reform."

The philosophical position of the United States Government explains why the Monroe Doctrine, two Congressional Joint Resolutions and the O.A.S. commitments have all been ignored.

8. The United States Government was Protecting Castro's Communist Regime Long Before the K-K Pact was Signed

As can be verified by the attached excerpts from the sworn testimonies of American Ambassadors to Cuba, Arthur Gardner and Earl E.T. Smith (Appendix "6"), they strongly endorsed the need to build a powerful radio station in Key West to counteract Castro's communist regime attacks on the United States and alert the Cubans. If the U.S. Government, instead of aiding and abetting Fidel Castro and his cohorts, had undertaken a vigorous radio campaign to alert the brainwashed Cuban people, Castro's communist revolution could not have succeeded. Castro admitted in his historical, cynical speech of December 1-2, 1961, that, had the Cuban people known the truth he could not have accomplished his communist objective.

In connection with the urgent need for a radio alert to the Cubans this writer had a personal experience which up to this time has not been publicly disclosed. The fact that the two U.S. Ambassadors to Cuba anteceding Mr. Philip W. Bonsal concurred with this writer as to how Castro's take over could have been thwarted, is an indication that those of us opposing communism knew what should have been done. Unfortunately, those calling the shots were on the enemy's side. It can be safely assumed that if the Cuban people could have been awakened before the communists --shielded and led by Fidel Castro-- had taken absolute control (which was not accomplished until 1961) we could have defeated the socialist/communist conspiracy from within. But we were handcuffed.

At 10 A.M. on Monday, February 29, 1960, this writer was punctually calling on Mr. Philip W. Bonsal at the State Department, complying with an appointment. Mr. Bonsal had one of the most difficult and momentous posts in American diplomacy at that time: Ambassador to Cuba. Mr. Bonsal was in Washington because President Eisenhower had called him in for consultations.

At that time I had great sympathy and respect for Ambassador Bonsal. Like me, most Cubans admired his restraint and composure vis-a-vis Castro's increasing tempo of insults to the United States and deliberate disrespect for its Ambassador. I had met Mr. Bonsal socially in Cuba so I anticipated a friendly reception and, most importantly, the wholehearted support of Washington to our crucial project. It was the only way open to us to combat Castro-communism which was gradually, but firmly, taking control of our country.

Much to my surprise Ambassador Bonsal was courteous but cold as an iceberg.

I visited Mr. Bonsal to inquire, as a matter of courtesy, if Washington had any objection to a group of Cuban anti-communist patriots buying time on American private radio stations to broadcast to Cuba. Castro had absolute control of communications so this was the only possibility we had to awaken the Cuban people to the true communist nature of the Castro regime, uncover and denounce its crimes, and cause its downfall. My associates and I --conspirators against the socialist/communist regime-- also wanted to defend the United States from Castro's constant and vicious slander. We were terribly concerned about the loss of prestige the U.S.A. was suffering because, as far as we knew, Castro's tirades remained unanswered.

The following is my recollection of the important aspects of the interview, without pretense to offer a verbatim report. I was so shocked that I have very vivid and sad memories of this interview.

Ambassador Bonsal's reply was curt: the United States could not allow anti-communist Cubans to broadcast from U.S. territory against the recognized government of Cuba because that would be an intervention in the internal affairs of a friendly government. He mentioned that the previous month (January 1960), President Eisenhower had clearly defined U.S. policy towards Cuba which was: Non-intervention in the internal affairs of Cuba and respect for self-determination. Indeed, this was the "professed" policy of the United States Government, and I was well aware of it. But I innocently believed that in the United States, a free, democratic country, where freedom of speech and freedom of the press were sacred, the government would not interfere with private individuals who would undertake to broadcast the truth, with due respect to established moral principles and legal regulations.

Furthermore, our project should have been extremely pleasing to the U.S. Government --we naively believed at that early time-- because we were supposed to be allies against international communism, our mutual enemy. We were still under the deep-rooted belief that the U.S.A. was our long and proved friend --the U.S.A. of Teddy Roosevelt, General Leonard Wood, and the Congress which approved the 1898 Joint Resolution proclaiming urbi et orbi that Cuba had the right to be free and independent. How tragically ignorant were we of the pro-socialist philosophy which had taken hold of Washington in the Twentieth Century!

Shocked by Mr. Bonsal's firm negative, but not discouraged, I then suggested to the U.S. Ambassador that his government should build a powerful radio station in Key West, or South Florida, if only to defend itself from the daily violent, false and deriding attacks of Castro's regime. I argued that this was most important, not only to reassure the Cuban people, but even more so to uphold U.S. prestige in Latin America. My contention was that if the United States did not rebuke the red communist slander it would be tantamount to acquiescing.

Mr. Bonsal did not like this suggestion either. First, he said, it it would take three years to build this powerful station and in that time the Cuban situation would have been solved. Secondly, he did not believe this was necessary.

At that time I could not even dream that "simpático" (a nice, likable person) Spanish-speaking Philip W. Bonsal --the affable, dapper, U.S. Ambassador-- on whom the anti-communist Cubans had pinned all their hopes, might have been sympathetic to the Castro-

communist regime. At that early stage of the Cuban tragedy the incriminating testimonies of the four U.S. Ambassadors excerpted in Appendix "6" attached hereto, had not yet been made. From Ambassador Robert C. Hill's testimony we learned —too late, as it is unfortunately usual for anti-communists—that Ambassador Bonsal was a staunch defender of Fidel Castro and his regime. This may explain why he was appointed Ambassador to Cuba during the most critical period of the communist take over.

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It was precisely during Ambassador Bonsal's tenure of office that the Castro regime could have been easily toppled from within. All that was needed was that the U.S. Government had actually been an ally of those of us who were conscious of what was going on and desperately trying to fight Castro. Instead, through affable, inscrutable, Ambassador Bonsal, the U.S. Government posed as our friend and a foe of the communists, while covertly helping and abetting them. As Ambassador Earl E.T. Smith testified (See Appendix "6") there is direct intervention and there is intervention by "innuendo." In other words, there is "active" and "inactive" intervention. Ambassador Bonsal gave the Cubans large doses of the latter while giving his American Colleagues equally large doses of the former.


Ambassador Hill's testimony excerpted under Appendix "6" attached, discloses the vital role played by Ambassador Bonsal in the Cuban disaster which, to my knowledge, has been hitherto unnoticed. Ambassador Whiting Willauer's testimony (not included in this Exposé for the sake of brevity) confirmed Bonsal's position while he was Ambassador to Cuba, as reported in more detail by Ambassador Hill.

Finally, I tried hard to convince Ambassador Bonsal that it was imperative that the United States fight the communist tidal wave of conquest, not only in Cuba but all over the world. I mentioned that all he had to do was look at the map and see how many countries Soviet Russia had swallowed since the end of World War II. And added that, if the U.S.A. stuck to the policy of "wait and see," communism would conquer the world.

Mr. Bonsal astonished me when he replied that was a matter of personal opinion and that, in his opinion, the communists were making no progress at all. After that asinine statement I thanked Ambassador Bonsal for the interview and took leave.

Although I did not realize it when I left the State Department flabbergasted, I now believe Mr. Bonsal planted in me the seed of doubt as to which side the Washington Government was on.

a)




THE FIRST OPERATIONAL AIR-BREATHING CRUISE MISSILE DEVELOPED BY THE GERMANS DURING WORLD WAR II. VON BRAUN WHO COLLABORATED IN ITS DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION INFORMED REPORTER MAURICE LABELLE (THE GUIDE) THAT IT HAD A RANGE OF 200 MILES

& REVOLUCION, enero 4, lunes, 1965

Newspaper REVOL





MODERN RUSSIAN VERSION OF THE GERMAN MISSILE PARADED IN HAVANA BY CASTRO AND PHOTOGRAPHED BY THE CUBAN COMMUNIST NEWSPAPER "REVOLUCION" (JAN. 4/1965).

No Threat to U.S., Experts Say

c) 10-Mile Land Rockets Shown Off by Castro



Russian-Made Land-to-Land Missiles in Havana Parade

Missiles Given by Russians

New Jets Also Go on Parade

HAVANA — (AP) — Prim Minister Fidel Castro displays Saturday Soviet "land-to-ion missiles" and suffi new recomnaissance jet planes which have been added to the array of Soviet military hardware which hax made his army the strong et in Latin America.

The slender, gray recless


The siender, gray rockets about 24 feet long, rolled through Havana's streets in the military parade marking the sixth anniversary of the Castro

The new jets, of an unannounced type, screamed low overbrad an announcers said they were capable of guardleg the Cubun coasts day and

EXAMPLE OF MISINFORMATION GIVEN TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC IS THE ABOVE PHOTOGRAPH. IT IS NOT A LAND-TO-LAND MISSILE. IT IS A SURFACE TO AIR (SAM) MISSILE.

America tocket"; and the ground-air rocket M-2 (below), a copy of the German "Rhine Maiden". Both are being demonstrated at the 40th anniversary of the October revolution in Moscow.





THE SURFACE TO AIR MISSILE-M-2-(SAM) -CORRECTLY IDENTIFIED- PARADED IN MOSCOW.

It was only after a series of similar incidents that I fully comprehended why Cuba had been so easily taken over by the communists. The Bay of Pigs invasion, and President Kennedy's uncanny ability to say with vigor the right thing at the right time about Cuba, with such apparent conviction, and then do precisely the opposite, finally convinced me that Cuba's die had been cast long before the country fell: It was all a matter of waiting for the propitious time to implement the plan. And that moment arrived on January 1st, 1959, with the Washington-Moscow Axis (1) blessings, and the naive enthusiasm of the Cuban people, so blissfully ignorant of the tragedy that had befallen them.

9. What was Soviet Russia Really After when it Threw Open a few Missile Bases in Cuba? --Some New Hypotheses.

The fact that the Russian Missile launching platforms were innocently built in the open, where they could be easily photographed from the air, is one intriguing circumstance that, apparently, has not been aken into account to solve this Russian jigsaw puzzle. The communists are masters of deceit. This open invitation to aerial photography could not have been a mistake, it must have been a gambit, a trap.

Many interpretations have been read into what were Soviet Russia's real intentions.

Claude Monier, in the November 2, 1962, issue of the JOURNAL DE GENEVE, suggested that what Khrushchev wanted was to force the U.S. to promise not to invade Cuba. Monsieur Monier did not contemplate the alternate possibility of openly making Cuba a formidable nuclear power.

In my <u>Life Lines</u> Broadcast mentioned earlier, this writer suggested Khrushchev's plan was conceived so as to accomplish one possibility or the other. Like all communist plans it was loaded: **Heads we win -- Tails you lose**. Good sports these communists!

However, upon reflection, it appears probable that the Russians had good reason to believe the U.S. Government would not suddenly alter its friendly policy and force them out of Cuba, unless the so-

⁽¹⁾ In order to fully understand the important role played by Washington in the socialist/communist take over of Cuba, it will suffice to read the excerpts of the four U.S. Ambassadors' sworn Testimonies which appear under Appendix "6" attached. Ed.

called "liberals" lost control of the Government. Sworn testimonies have proven conclusively that the U.S. Government was well aware of the communist nature of the Cuban revolution. Testifying before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee were four U.S. Ambassadors: Arthur Gardner and Earl E.T. Smith, who served in Cuba in the critical years 1953 through January 20, 1959; Robert C. Hill, who was Ambassador to Mexico, a key post in the crucial period 1957 to 1961; and William D. Pawley, former Ambassador to several Latin American countries, and a recognized expert on Latin American affairs.

The complicity of the U.S. Government in the take over of Cuba by the socialist/communist conspiracy is exposed and proven by these four patriotic, courageous, Americans. Free Cuba will never forget them!

Why, then, this great dramatization labeled "The Cuban Missile Crisis", which the news media built to the hysterical point of supposedly bringing the world to the brink of nuclear annihilation? One can only speculate. Since all the explanations given so far seem to be disproven by known facts we must look for other reasons, even if they may seem far fetched. Sometimes reality is more incredible than fiction. Here are some possibilities which I neither assert nor deny, based on the circumstances prevailing at the time it all happened, and in subsequent events:

One possibility:

A super-secret pact between K and K in order to accomplish one, two or perhaps all, of the following objectives:

- 1. Restablish the confidence of the American people in their Government as the arch-enemy of communism, and restore the morale of the Armed Forces Chiefs.
- 2. Reassure the Free World that the U.S. is its champion and its shield against communism.
- 3. Help the so-called "liberals" to win the November 1962 Congressional elections. If too many patriotic, anti-communist Americans were elected to Congress, the Russo/American entente might be jeopardized, or even broken, and the U.S. would then undertake to really fight communism.

(See Appendix "1", Excerpts from Khrushchev's July 1967 TV interview, where he brazenly claims having elected JFK in 1960, Ed.)

4. Find a formula --plausible to the American peoplethat would guarantee the international communist sanctuary in Cuba for the unhampered subversion of the Hemisphere.

Of one thing I am certain. The only eventuality the Kremlin cannot afford is to allow the American people to wake up in time because that is the ONLY way they may be defeated.

Other Possibilities:

Nikita acted on his own in order to:

- 1. Probe the reaction of the U.S. when faced with nuclear warheads 90 miles from its underbelly.
- 2. Make Red Cuba their most powerful Nuclear Base from which to attack or blackmail the U.S.A. This objective would be obtained whatever the reaction of the U.S. would be. This is a vivid example of the "Heads We Win -- Tails You Lose" communist gambit.

If the U.S.A. took notice of the baiting Nuclear Bases, the Russians would negotiate and continue the build-up covertly and unhampered. If not the buildup would have been done overtly.

Of course, the Russians have given a number of reasons for their challenging action but none of them seems valid. The notion that the Washington Government was going to invade Cuba after the shameful way it betrayed the anti-communist Cubans at the Bay of Pigs is simply preposterous.

It is important to point out that the Bay of Pigs fiasco not only ruined the only armed intent to eradicate communism from Cuba with sufficient Cuban manpower to do it, but also completely destroyed the resistance movement inside the Island. So much went wrong, not only during the invasion but during the training and recruiting period, that it is virtually impossible that all was the result of bungling; one cannot but conclude that it was planned that way.

Ambassador Whiting Willauer was commissioned in December 1960 (the Cuban freedom-fighters were landed in Cuba on April 17, 1961. Ed.) by Secretary of State Herter, personally, to study and report directly to President Eisenhower and to him on the plans made by the CIA for the invasion of Cuba. He was amazed to discover that the plan did not provide the absolutely essential air cover.

Also, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not been consulted. For the full and strange story, and to learn how such a respected personality as Ambassador Willauer was unceremoniously dumped from the invasion plan after President Kennedy took office, see Part 13 of the series "Communist Threat to the United States Through the Caribbean," U.S. Government Printing Office, Document No. 90331. Unfortunately, as it is well known, Ambassador Willauer could not convince those who masterminded the invasion to provide the absolutely essential air cover so the invasion was defeated, as planned.

If all the odds had not been against the courageous Cubans who participated in the invasion, it is the consensus that they would have defeated the Castro regime. Cuba would have been freed without the involvement of U.S. armed forces and practically no American blood shed--save the four brave American aviators who during the invasion valiantly gave their lives for freedom, infuriated because their government had betrayed us. Free Cuba will forever render tribute to: LEO FRANCIS BAKER - WADE CARROL GRAY -- THOMAS WILLARD RAY, and RILEY W. SHAMBURGER, JR., the courageous Americans who exemplify the true spirit of the American people, always ready to render their lives for God, honor and justice.

What a difference victory would have made, not only for Cuba but for the United States and for the whole American Hemisphere! This golden opportunity to defeat international communism and eradicate it from our shores at a negligible cost in money and, above all, in human lives, was turned into a catastrophe for the forces of freedom

After evaluating and digesting what the Bay of Pigs betrayal meant, the extremely cautious Kremlin bosses became convinced that "Cuba was the First Free Territory of America... FOR THEM!! Having confirmed once more the U.S. Government was on their side the distrustful Russians confidently poured into Cuba.

But, even though the Bay of Pigs fiasco reassured the wily Russians, they were also emboldened by their previous experience with the U.S. Government. Washington's collusion in the subversion of Cuba is confirmed by its meek attitude when confronted by the following grave incidents and situations that would have given the mighty United States a good reason --and a legal one in some instancesto intervene and eradicate communism from Cuba before it could have become militarily strong.

FACT NO. 1. A busload of American servicemen stationed at Guantánamo Naval Base, as well as some American civilians and a few Canadians employed by American firms, were kidnapped and held for two weeks in June 1958 by a handful of "revolutionaries" under Raúl Castro's command. As ransom, a number of concessions were demanded from the U.S. Government.

It would have been something akin to a picnic for the Guantánamo forces to destroy the few, disorganized Castro brigands, while liberating their men.

According to Ambassador Smith's book "The Fourth Floor," the Navy, members of Congress, top officials in Washington and himself, wanted to use the Marines to rescue the abducted men, with the approval of the Cuban Government. But the State Department successfully opposed the use of armed force in favor of "negotiations" with the abductors.

FACT NO. 2. In 1958 --prior to the take over-- the U.S. Government embargoed arm shipments to the Cuban Government, but looked the other way 90% of the time when arms and men were sent to Castro from U.S. territory (See Appendix "6," Testimonies by Ambassadors Gardner and Smith).

FACT No. 3. Washington forced Cuba's President Fulgencio Batista to quit, knowing full well the only organized revolutionary force that could take over was communism led by Fidel Castro. (See Ambassadors Smith and Pawley's Testimonies in Appendix "6").

FACT NO. 4. The U.S. Government ignored all factual and documented reports of responsible Cubans denouncing the socialist/communist conspiracy. Notable among them was my good friend, the Ambassador of Cuba to the United Nations, Dr. Emilio Núñez Portuondo, who, for several years --until communism took over Cuba-- demonstrated his friendship and loyalty to the United States at U.N.O., as well as his fearless, unflinching anti-communist position. Dr. Núñez Portuondo told me that he, personally, delivered to the late Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, a report proving by documentary evidence that Fidel Castro was acting for and on behalf of international communism. Also, at Mr. Dulles' request, our Ambassador, personally, gave copies of the same report to Mr. Roy R. Rubottom, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, and to Mr. William Wieland, in charge of Caribbean Affairs. Both, Rubottom and Wieland, belonged to the Fourth Floor of the State Department where, according to Ambassador Earl E.T. Smith's dauntless, patriotic book "The Fourth Floor," foreign policy is originated.

FACT NO. 5. The U.S. Government should not have recognized a regime which its own Ambassadors had reported was communist dominated. Instead, it hastily recognized it 6 days after Batista fled, even before Fidel Castro had arrived in Havana to take over the government.

FACT NO. 6. The U.S. Government failed even to protect its own properties in Cuba, such as the more than One Hundred Million Dollar Nickel Plant, at Nicaro, Oriente Province, whose nickel production was vital to the U.S.A. during World War II and which is now going to Soviet Russia to build its military power. Cuban nickel has exceptional quality.

FACT NO. 7. In 1959, its first year in power, the communist regime led by Fidel Castro invaded FOUR countries in the Caribbean --Panamá, Nicaragua, Haití and the Dominican Republic. In accordance with the Charter, the Covenants and the Treaties of the Organization of American States, the O.A.S. should have landed in Cuba and --by force-- depose the Castro communist regime, spurred by United States leadership.

In 1959 Castro did not have an organized military force, or any-body capable of taking charge of the defense of Cuba. Toppling the regime would have been practically bloodless. But it is well known that the U.S., far from encouraging the O.A.S. to use force against the Red regime of Cuba, has actually opposed the use of force.

FACT NO. 8. The U.S. Government chose to ignore the sworn Testimony that the Castro regime was Communist given on July 14, 1959, before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee by the first and one of the most important defectors from Castro's Armed Forces, Major Pedro L. Díaz Lanz, Chief of Cuba's Air Force and Fidel Castro's private pilot. Major Díaz Lanz fled to the United States when he was horrified to discover that the regime he had so effectively helped to power in his country was communist. He had flown large quantities of arms to the Sierra Maestra Castro camp from the U.S. and from Latin American countries.

Like all anti-communist Cubans, Díaz Lanz had so much confidence in the United States that he was blindly certain that, if the U.S. Government learned Castro's revolution was communist, it would mean the end of communism in Cuba.

His Testimony should have been enough to awaken Washington --if the will had been there. But mounting evidence proves Washington's heart is on the "left."

FACT NO. 9. Finally, there was that tailor-made opportunity for the United States to eradicate international communism from Cuba: the so-called "Cuban Missile Crisis," in October 1962. If ever there was a perfect reason to act, collectively or unilaterally, against the communist regime of Cuba, it was when the long-range Missiles were "discovered."

As in the Bay of Pigs fiasco, this opportunity was not only passed up but the ultimate result of it was another victory for the international socialist/communist conspiracy:

- 1. No invasion guarantee.
- 2. Dismantling of U.S. Missile Bases in Turkey and Italy.
- 3. Reaffirmation of Washington's subservience to Moscow.

It is convenient to bear in mind that three Presidents, two Democrats and one Republican, were in office during the crucial years in which Cuba has been handed over to international communism, but all followed one and the same policy



While one of the closest, most vital areas to the defense and security of the United States has been handed over to the socialist/communist international conspiracy on a silver platter, more than HALF A MILLION AMERICANS are engaged 10,000 miles away from home in a subdued, deceitful war, against the very same international conspiracy which threatens the U.S. from Cuba. And as of the date of this Exposé total casualties in Vietnam officially reported have surpassed 100,000, of which more than 13,600 have given their lives for their beloved country and for the preservation of freedom.

This simply does not make sense.

The official Government explanation: that the U.S.A. was obliged to intervene in Vietnam to honor its Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (S.E.A.T.O.) commitments is inconsistent with their O.A.S. position. If the United States Government feels so committed to S.E.A.T.O. how can it ignore its obligations under the Organization of American States, more important to its security than faraway Southeast Asia?

We concur that the United States has the right and the duty to

fight the communist juggernaut wherever it attacks. So we believe it is proper and patriotic that the United States be fighting in the far East to stop the communist onslaught.

But why not in its own back yards? Why not in Cuba?

The two positions are irreconcilable!

Senator Peter Dominick underscores our thesis on his July 31, 1967 speech: "Another Vietnam in this Hemisphere?" from which we quote:

"The State Department said nothing to alert the American people to the dangers inherent in the Tricontinental meeting, (held in Havana in January 1966. Ed.) just as nothing is being said today about the Havana (LASO. Ed.) meeting. Indeed, the Administration would prefer that the Conference go unreported. For the Administration is pursuing a policy of rapprochement with the very nation --Soviet Russia-- which is the official sponsor of Cuba's querrilla wars."

10. The K-K Pact Fits the Policy

From all the evidence available, from the statements of policy expounded by high Government officials, from an objective appraisal of the historical facts, and from the sworn Testimonies of four U.S. Ambassadors who took a personal, active and direct --although unsuccessful and painfully frustrating-- participation in the events prior and subsequent to the take over of Cuba by the international socialist/communist conspiracy, we must conclude that the K-K Pact was only a natural consequence, one more step in the protracted, ominous, U.S.A.-U.S.S.R. rapprochement. This entente became apparent and began to gather strength when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt granted diplomatic recognition to the U.S.S.R. in 1933.

Why some people have been scandalized by the K-K Pact is incomprehensible, unless they profess to know nothing of contemporary history.

The socialist/communist conspiracy could not have survived had it not been for the invaluable help received from the Free World --but more than from all the rest of the nations put together-- from the United States of America. Communism --said the revered 'Catholic Pope Pious XI-- is intrinsically perverse. It is also --I would like to add-- inimical to human nature. In a great variety of forms, names and disguises, it has been tried and failed so many times and in so many

countries --including the U.S.-- that it is incredible it can still beguile a good number of pseudo "intellectuals," and even some in the clergy.

Of all the known socialist experiments Russia's is the only one that has endured for any length of time. There are several reasons to explain this apparent 'miracle': its fanaticism and efficient conspiratorial organization; the application of scientific methods to deceive and conquer the world, etc., the study of which is beyond the scope of this Exposé. But with all its science, conspiracy and deceit, the Russian experiment would have failed long ago if the United States Government had not been its constant and most unselfish protector and benefactor.

The Russian people would have exterminated the Bolsheviks early, when the regime was poor, unorganized and facing famine and chaos. But good, beffudled Uncle Sam helped the socialist regime tide the crises until it gathered strength.

In World War II the United States saved imperialist Soviet Russia from being conquered by Hitler, its former ally and cohort.

The East Berlin, Poznam (Poland) and Budapest rebellions, and the Bay of Pigs invasion, would have been successful --and probably triggered the downfall of the socialist/communist empire--if Washington had not helped Moscow by denying support to those fighting and dying for God and freedom. These courageous people, like the Cubans, sincerely believed the U.S. would come to their help. It is doubtful that they would have revolted without the expectation of United States help.

Russian Bolshevik imperialists could not have swallowed up Eastern Europe if the U.S. Government had not acquiesced. Let us remember that when Germany, Italy and Japan surrendered, Soviet Russia was in a shambles and the ONLY world power was the United States of America. Furthermore, it was the ONLY nation which had, in operational stage, that new dreadful and destructive weapon: THE ATOM BOMB.

11. The United States of America's Great Moment in History.

It was at this moment that the United States of America had the greatest opportunity history has placed in the hands of any nation to orient the world on the road to peace --real, Christian peace-- and prosperity.

PART TWO

RUSSIAN MISSILES IN CUBA -- PART OF RUSSIA'S APPROACHING NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY OVER THE UNITED STATES

12. The Russian Missile Buildup in Cuba Started Quietly in 1960

The American people have been misled into believing that the Russians started bringing their Missiles, Nuclear Warheads and Long Range Bombers into Cuba only a few months before they were officially discovered. It has been reported, for instance, that Mr. John J. McCone, CIA Boss, warned the President they discovered that Russian Missiles were being introduced into Cuba barely two months before the official announcement was made by President Kennedy on October 22nd, 1962.

Previous reports of Cuban exiles were ignored. As documentary evidence of our much earlier denunciations, a few paragraphs from the first lecture this writer delivered in the United States are quoted below:

- "Several mysterious cargoes have been unloaded at night, under heavy guard, in isolated, sparsely populated harbors. Townspeople were made to stay home until the cargoes were driven away, tightly covered. Could they be Missiles?
- "A few isolated seaports, where there has been feverish activity, have been classified as military restricted zones.
- "The airplanes of the Mexican Aviation Company were ordered to change their normal, shortest route to Havana International Airport.
- "Is Castro building Missile platforms and bases for Russian submarines?

This Paper was written in December 1960 and copies were forwarded to important Americans and to official Security Investigating Organizations.

As early as 1960 Russian scientists and technicians were surveying the Island. General Enrique Lister (of Spanish so-called "Civil War" fame) also arrived in Cuba in 1960 to work on the military fortifications, according to Antonio Apud's testimony, quoted on this Exposé. This is an indication that, long before Cuba was abducted, plans were already made to turn the Pearl of the Antilles into a mighty fortress. This is much in keeping with socialist/communist long-range planning.

Mr. Luis Gastón, who became helicopter pilot for the Cuban Department of Public Works late in 1959, after serving a few months with the Cuban Revolutionary Air Force, personally gave the following information to this writer. Early in 1960 he was assigned to pilot throughout the Island a Russian who spoke no Spanish, accompanied by a Russian interpreter. Gastón was told the unidentified, mysterious, Russian VIP was "an engineer." The Russian surveyed the Island, with special interest in the Province of Oriente and the Zapata Swamps, where, incidentally, the Bay of Pigs is located.

Gastón, like 99.9% of the Cubans, was mesmerized by clever communist propaganda and Castro's unparalleled ability to deceive. Patriotically, he joined the Cuban Revolutionary Air Force in January 1959, at the invitation of its Chief, Major Pedro L. Díaz Lanz. Like all Cubans, he passionately wanted to help "the revolution that --we naively believed-- was going to redeem Cuba from political corruption and to bring peace and a government by law."

Major Díaz Lanz commissioned Luis Gastón to study helicopter piloting in the U.S.A. He was still undergoing training when his Chief defected to the U.S. in June 1959. Upon returning to Cuba Gastón promptly discovered the revolution was a fraud and a communist plot and showed his disappointment. That ended his Cuban Air Force enlistment.

However, through personal inside contacts he learned that Russian heavy helicopters, accompanied by Russian crews, were already arriving in Cuba by the end of 1959. At great personal risk --for there were pro-Castroites spying outside and <code>inside</code> the U.S. Embassy-Gastón reported the arrival of the Russian helicopters and crews to the U.S. Military Attaché in Havana. (For more information on U.S. Embassy infiltration, see Testimonies of Ambassadors Smith and Hill in Appendix "6").

Mr. Gastón boasts an honorable discharge from the U.S. Army where he served as a paratrooper. He volunteered to serve during WW II, returning to his native Cuba after his discharge.

Aside from reports received from its own intelligence, the U.S. Government was amply and spontaneously apprised by patriotic Cübans, long before they took over Cuba, that Castro and his gang were the spearhead of the international socialist/communist conspiracy. The pretense that the U.S. Government was ignorant of the truth about Cuba is a smoke screen that subsequent events and testimonies have disproven.

13. Authoritative Report on the Cuban Missile Crisis by the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services -- United States Senate

On May 9, 1963, the above Subcommittee published its enlightening report "The Cuban Military Buildup," the most authoritative study made of the so-called "October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis," its origin, mistakes and consequences.

It is interesting to note that the Preparedness Subcommittee repeated, almost word for word, the denunciation made in this writer's 1960 Paper, as evidenced by the following paragraph from the Subcommittee Report:

"At the same time, there were human source reports that some of the ships were unloaded at night under rigid security with all non-Soviet personnel being excluded from the dock areas. The practice of unloading at night in small easily guarded ports, remote from large population centers, was known to the intelligence community, although the alleged security conditions ashore could not be confirmed."

In order to realize that with every passing week Russian Nuclear Power aimed at the U.S.A. from Red Cuba is greater and greater, it will suffice to compare what is happening today with the findings and conclusions of the Preparedness Subcommittee study.



All the American intelligence organizations --generally known as "The Intelligence Community" -- and the highest authorities on

the subject under investigation, testified before this Subcommittee. This includes the Central Intelligency Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Intelligence Sections of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of State, the National Security Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

The following are excerpts from this unimpeachable Report which are directly related to the two main topics of this Exposé:

From the Summary of Major Findings:

- "4. Faulty evaluation and the predisposition of the intelligence community to the philosophical conviction that it would be incompatible with Soviet policy to introduce strategic missiles into Cuba resulted in intelligence judgements and evaluations which later proved to be erroneous. Among these were:
- b) The number of Soviet troops in Cuba was substantially underestimated throughout the crisis. On October 22, our intelligence people estimated that there were 8,000 to 10,000 Soviets in Cuba. They now say that, at the height of the buildup, there were at least 22,000 Soviet personnel on the island.
- c) It was not until the photographic evidence was obtained on October 14 that the intelligence community concluded that strategic missiles had been introduced into Cuba. In reaching their pre-October 14 negative judgement the intelligence analists were strongly influenced by their judgement as to Soviet policy and indications that strategic missiles were being installed were not given proper weight by the intelligence community. A contributing factor to this was the tendency on the part of the intelligence people to discredit and downgrade the reports of Cuban refugees and exiles.
- "7. To a man the intelligence chiefs stated that it is their opinion that all strategic missiles and bombers have been removed from Cuba. However, they readily admit that, in terms of absolutes, it is quite possible that offensive weapons remain on the island concealed in caves or otherwise. They also admitted that absolute assurance on this question can come ONLY from penetrating and continuing on-site inspection by reliable ob-

servers and that, based on skepticism, if nothing more, there is reason for grave concern about the matter.

"8. There are literally thousands of caves and underground caverns in the island of Cuba and many of these are suitable for the storage and concealment of strategic missiles and other offensive weapons. Refugee and exile reports continue to insist that they are being so utilized. Military-connected activities have been noted with reference to a number of them but it is the view of the intelligence analysts that the military usage of the caves is for the storage of those weapons which we know are now in Cuba and not for the storage of offensive weapon systems. Admittedly, however, this view is based to a substantial degree on the negative proposition that there is no hard evidence confirming the presence of strategic missiles in Cuba at this time."

From Caption IV-B --Identification of Specific Weapons and Equipment-- we quote the following paragraphs which prove the unreliability of aerial photography if used as the only source of information:

"Photographic reconnaissance was unable to detect precisely how many ballistic missiles were introduced into Cuba. Prior to the Soviet announcement that 42 missiles would be withdrawn, our photographs had revealed a lesser number. It could not be established, therefore, how many ballistic missiles were, in fact, introduced into Cuba or specifically how many the Soviets planned to introduce."

From Caption IV-F --Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally-- we report the position adopted by the intelligence people, which, incredibly, prevails again today, gravely endangering the security of the United States, quote:

"... In addition, the intelligence people apparently invariably adopted the most optimistic estimate possible with respect to the information available. This is in sharp contrast to the customary military practice of emphasizing the worst situation which might be established by the accumulation of evidence."

From the "Summary of Threat Arising from Soviet Presence in Cuba," we only quote, for the sake of brevity, the eleventh Conclusion, viz:

"11. The very presence of the Soviets in Cuba affect adversely our Nation's image and prestige. Our friends

abroad will understandably doubt our ability to meet and defeat the forces of communism thousands of miles across the ocean if we prove unable to cope with the Communist threat at our very doorstep."

In Caption D, "Prospect of Internal Revolt or Invasion" the Subcommittee arrived at this logical conclusion, quote:

"... The continued presence of the Soviet expedition in Cuba can now be seen to be a most effective shield against either internal revolt by native insurgents, or invasion by external forces from any source."

And the final Statement, Chapter VII, is most enlightening. Here are excerpts quoting the substance of the Conclusions of the Preparedness Subcommittee:

- "... The matter of basic and fundamental importance, however, and the source of the real threat; is that international communism now has a firm foothold in this hemisphere and that, if we permit it to do so, it is here to stay.".
- ". . .Communism, of course, operates on a worldwide scale and its methods and techniques are always adapted to the environment in which it operates. With this in mind, the value to the USSR of the occupation of Cuba is apparent. The techniques of Communist subversion may vary from simple infiltration to violent intervention. Whatever its form, however, in Cuba as elsewhere it is conceived, developed, and perfected by the leaders of world communism for the purpose of furthering their concept of world domination."
- "...We must be prepared to take appropriate and positive action in our own national self-interest and in the interest of the collective security of the Western Hemisphere."

[&]quot;. . . The entire Cuban problem, both military and political, should be accorded the highest possible priority by our governmental officials to the end that the evil threat

which the Soviet occupation of Cuba represents will be eliminated at an early date."

To fully understand the U.S.A. predicament today, it will suffice to learn that the above pressing recommendation --made more than 4 years ago-- has been completely ignored by the powers that be.

14. Conclusions Derived from the Findings Exposed in the Above Report

Some very important questions and conclusions are pertinent after studying the authoritative Report quoted above:

First: The Cuban Exiles were telling the truth about the Missile buildup for more than two years before the October 1962 showdown. The logical presumption should be that the Cuban Exiles are still telling the truth.

Why is the U.S. Government making the same mistake today of downgrading and ignoring our reports, so important for the security of their country?

Second: The Russian communists have always lied when it served their purpose.

Why does the U.S. Government insist in accepting Russian promises?

Third: The Cubans (the 2% communist minority excluded) are proven friends and allies of the United States people, while the communists are their avowed mortal enemies.

Why is the U.S. Government protecting the communists and hindering the Cubans.

Fourth: The highest Intelligence authorities of the United States appeared to be wrong so many times that it was shocking:

- a) They erred in their evaluation of the reports received from Cuban refugees and exiles because they had a "philosophical conviction" the Soviets would not dare introduce strategic Missiles into Cuba.
- b) They grossly underestimated the number of Russian fighting men stationed in Cuba at the time of the so-called "Missile Crisis."
- c) They used the most "optimistic" estimate possible to evaluate the information supplied to them, in sharp contrast to military practice.

d) They were of the opinion that there were no offensive Missiles left in Cuba after the K-K Pact, although admitting theirs was a hypothetical opinion, based on negative factors. They readily admitted that foolproof assurance could ONLY be obtained from penetrating, continuing on-site inspection.

It is very improbable that the Intelligence Community could be so clumsy. It seems that they are being sacrificed for hidden reasons.

Fifth: Why has not the U.S. Government implemented the urgent, important recommendations of the Preparedness Subcommittee, based on its findings?

15. Official Governmental "Fibs" During the Cuban Missile Crisis

FIB No. 1-"Hurricane Ella" was the official reason White House sources gave to explain why no aerial photographs of Cuba were taken the first 10 or 12 days in October 1962, after having "discovered" Russian bomber planes landing in Cuba the latter part of September.

Actually, "Ella" was not identified as a tropical storm by the U.S. Weather Bureau until the middle of October.

FIB No. 2 - Source: McGeorge Bundy.

Mr. Bundy, then one of President Kennedy's closest and more influential advisors, unabashedly told the Nation on October 14th (the very day the Missile launching platforms were photographed) in a television program:

- "I know there is no evidence... and no present likelihood that the Cuban and the Soviet Governments would attempt to build a major offensive capability (in Cuba. Ed.)...
- "... So far everything delivered to Cuba is similar to the aid Soviet Russia has been giving to other neutral countries, such as Egypt and Indonesia... That is not going to turn an island of six million inhabitants into a major threat to the United States..."

FIB No. 3 -Source: The Pentagon.

Barely two or three days before President Kennedy made the dramatic announcement that he had "hard proof" that IRBMs were

being openly installed by the Russians, Pentagon sources denied having information that there were 1,500 milerange Missiles in Cuba.

FIB No. 4 - Source: The Department of Defense.

After vast numbers of U.S. Armed Forces were under mobilization, the Department of Defense, again through the Pentagon, informed the Washington press representatives that no alert had been implemented.



We are not so naive as to ignore that, in order to withhold valuable information from the enemy, or, perhaps, to avoid alarming its own people, government officials must disguise the truth at times, or even tell fibs. Therefore, we are not reporting the above four sample cases of governmental fibbing with the intention of defaming the Government and the individuals involved. Perhaps, they were forced by the circumstances to use deception, even if it might have been repulsive to them at the time. The only reason we are spotlighting these four cases of deliberate deception of public opinion is to awaken the citizenry to the fact that, just because a statement is made by a Government official spokesman is not, of necessity, true.

In latter years the deliberate deception of the people has reached such proportions that the term "credibility gap" is frequently used. The agonizing question is: when to believe and when NOT to believe what the Government tells us. The safest, time proven, policy is: hope for the best but prepare for the worst.

We, the Cuban exiles, are telling the truth when we warn our American friends about the enormous and continued Russian Missile buildup in our country. We were proven accurate in October 1962 and all the evidence --much of it contained in this Exposé-- proves that we are accurate again in 1967. But today Russian Nuclear Power in Cuba is many times stronger than what it was in 1962. These five years have given our mutual enemy a tremendous advantage. What will hapen if we give them another five years to bring their Nuclear Power to a point where they have an overwhelming superiority over the United States?

16. The Same "Mistakes" All Over Again.

Today, in the year of our Lord 1967, we are back again to the pre-October 14, 1962, negative official position: See No Evil - Hear No Evil - Speak No Evil. After finding and exposing the perilous "mistakes" incurred in 1962 it was reasonable to expect that more attention and credibility would be given to reports received from

"human sources." That acting on hypothetical, "philosophical conviction" would stop. And that "optimism" would be ended, especially since Cuban exiles have produced in latter years many reports which were unavailable prior to October 14, 1962, from eyewitnesses and others who were in key positions in Red Cuba.

Unimpeachable testimonies quoted in Caption No. 17, together with the revealing photographs reproduced in this Exposé, the attached penetrating and documented articles written by a Miami area newsman, Mr. Maurice LaBelle, and a WGBS-Radio Miami editorial, substantiate my belief that Red Cuba has the greatest concentration of Nuclear Power in the world per square mile of territory. See Index IV—Articles and Editorial.

The "mistakes" made prior to October 14, 1962, uncovered by the Report of the Preparedness Subcommittee, make the Intelligence Community of the U.S.A. look rather incompetent. Let me hasten to clarify that I, personally, do not hold that opinion. My impression is that what has been reported as "mistakes" of the Intelligence Community are, fundamentally, a cover-up for transcendental, highly sensitive political decisions that would affect the status quo if disclosed as such. This writer has the highest regard for the Armed Forces and the Intelligence Community of the United States --for their efficiency, integrity and patriotism.

Paul Bethel, to whose important testimony I refer later in this Exposé, is also of the opinion that the supposedly intelligence "blunders" are really political decisions in disguise. See Appendix "7".

What seems incredible --and shows how stubbornly blindly pro-Russian is, and has been, the United States Government-- is the fact that the U.S. has been cheated, fooled, cajoled and ridiculed --to say nothing of the insults and deadly threats-- so many times by the Russian communists and, yet, Washington still accepts Moscow's word in matters which are vital to the survival of the United States.

To mention the Russian treachery only in connection with the installation of offensive Missiles in Cuba, it is a known fact that, both Premier Nikita Khrushchev and Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko, cynically lied to the U.S. Government and to President Kennedy, when they denied having Offensive Missiles in Cuba. President Kennedy denounced both Khrushchev and Gromyko's lies in no uncertain terms in his October 22, 1962, tense message to the Nation.

Incredibly, one year later -- ONLY ONE YEAR-- President Ken-

nedy was signing in the White House --all smiles and pleasantries-a suicidal Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with the U.S.S.R. And who signed for Russia? ANDREI GROMYKO!!

17. Testimonies that Prove the Missiles are There and Aimed Here

Missiles and Nuclear weapons are a subject on which there are very few experts and almost all the real ones are working for governments, so they are subjected to strict security rules. Therefore, in order to help the reader to appraise the type and caliber of the Missiles described below by eyewitnesses, or photographed, a few pertinent paragraphs from the Report prepared by the Treasurer of our Committee, Mr. Eduardo Ulacia, entitled "The Cruise Missile in Communist Cuba" are quoted below.

Without attempting to pose as an "expert," Ulacia is probably one of the best informed lay individuals on the subject of Missiles, particularly on those which have been paraded in Cuba, whose photographs are reproduced in this Exposé. Mr. Ulacia's Report was read by him, illustrated by photographs and diagrams, to the State Commerce Committee of the Florida House of Representatives, on June 20, 1967, at the invitation of alert State Representative Jack Poorbaugh, quote:

"From the headquarters of the Army comes a pamphlet No. 70-5-11, of October 1963, that you can obtain from the Superintendent of Documents in Washington, D.C. In this pamphlet, from pages 100 to 109, are printed descriptions of what, under the name of Soviet Intelligence Report, was considered as the first complete description of some of the most important Soviet missiles. According to this information, this is the first complete description of Russia's missiles.

Once you study all the missiles described in this report, you naturally will try to sort them out and compare them with those that have a similar appearance and have been militarily paraded in communist Cuba.

The M-2 is immediately recognized. It is described in Cuba and in the Army pamphlet as a SAM (surface to air missile). The others are not that easy to identify.

By a process of elimination, which includes taking into account size, purpose for which it is used, and the vehicle from which it is fired, you can reduce the possibilities to one missile only, the J-3. It has the approximate size and characteristics of those photographed in communist Cuba. It is the only one that does have these characteristics.

Based on this information, it might be convenient for you to know what are the characteristics given for this missile in the Army pamphlet:

J-3:

Service: Navy

Type: Surface-to-Surface IRBM

Status: Operational

Physical Data:

Length: 37.2 ft

Diameter: 4.6 ft, 23.7 ft wing span

Weight: 20,900 lb

Booster: Four solid propellant, 4,000 lb total thrust

Sustainer: Ram Jet, 14,900--lb thrust

Warhead: 2,200 lb nuclear Guidance: Radio/programmed

Remarks:

Range 1,450 mi at Mach 1.15. Used from at least 7 submarines. Also used from cruiser type vessels."



Space prohibits the inclusion of all testimonies and eyewitness accounts in this Exposé. We have selected a few important testimonies, the gist of which is reported below:

Testimony No. 1 -- Antonio Apud - March 7, 1967

Mr. Apud testified under oath before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act, on March 7, 1967.

Until shortly before his departure from Cuba in November 1966, Apud was the third highest ranking official in the Ministry of Industry, headed, until his mysterious disappearance in March 1965, by communist diehard Ernesto (Ché) Guevara.

Mr. Apud testified that in the month of November 1966 he saw four Missiles with his own eyes: "they passed just about the distance that I am from you" -- is the way Apud described it to the committee members sitting across the table from him. These Missiles, according to Apud, have a range of approximately 1,300 miles and he was informed they were marked in Spanish:

Washington Izquierda - Washington Centro - Washington Derecha

(English Translation)

Washington Left - Washington Center - Washington Right



From the February 1967 "Latin America Report" we quote three most valuable eyewitness reports from:

- a) Manuel Vidal
- b) Daniel Figueroa Borroto
- c) José Barroso Castillo

Testimony No. 2 -- a) Manuel Vidal -- January 28, 1967.

"One report on what the Russians are up to is especially intriguing. It comes from Manuel Vidal, a Cuban escapee who arrived in Miami on January 28 (1967. Ed.). Around 2.00 a.m. last December 15 (1966. Ed.), Vidal was driving his battered station wagon from the town of Punta Brava to the town of Caimito, about 30 miles west of Havana. As he rounded a curve, Vidal saw that some 40 feet of guard rails and cement posts at the edge of the highway had been torn out. As he passed, Vidal looked down into a culvert. There lying on its side, said Vidal, 'was an enormous truck-trailer with a huge missile lying on the other side of it'..."

"... Vidal drove a few hundred yards, parked his car, and walked up to a hillock from where he watched the salvage operations...

"... 'Soon, Russian troops and civilians arrived,' Vidal continued, 'and took charge of the removal of the missile.' Two fire engines, cranes, and a Russian tank-truck came to the scene, and the work began. In recalling the scene, Vidal said: 'several cranes on caterpillar tracks pulled the truck-trailer out of the way, then stood the huge missile on end with its nose pointed toward the sky.' There was a moment of panic, said Vidal, 'when the missile began to give off a yellowish-orange vapor,' (a characteristic normally associated with ballistic missiles—Editorial comment of Latin America Report). 'Then the Russian tank-truck was brought into position,' Vidal continued, 'and streams of a milky colored liquid were poured over it.'

"What strikes the observer as particularly significant is the following comment made by Vidal: "Water and milky colored liquid were also sprayed all over the ground in an area about 200 yards around where the missile had fallen. By this time, steam shovels had arrived, and they scooped out a carpet of earth one foot in depth over the entire area, and loaded it with great care into dump trucks which took it away."

"... In any event, the evidence suggests that the missile had the characteristics of a long-range ballistic missile. The fact that it was being transported under the cover of darkness also indicates a desire by the Russians to avoid detection, and recalls that ballistic missiles were moved only at night during the pre-missile crisis period of 1962. Vidal also states that the Russians worked 'cautiously but in frantic haste' to remove the missile before daylight."

Testimony No. 3 -- b) Daniel Figueroa Borroto -- February 5, 1967.

"Coming on the heels of Vidal's testimony is that of Daniel Figueroa Borroto, who escaped from Cuba clandestinely by boat, arriving in Miami on February 5 (1967, Ed.). He told LATIN AMERICA REPORT that he belonged to Military Unit 3565, and had been engaged 'for over a year helping to build missile launching platforms, tubes to house electrical wiring for missile installations and reinforced blocks of concrete for missile silos.'

"Figueroa's unit received specifications for building various components for missile sites from the construction office of the Ministry of Defense. 'It was easy to identify orders intended for the SAMs (the short range surface-to-air missiles),' said the military construction worker. He then added the more arresting comment: 'The size of some of the launching platforms, the enormous size and quantity of reinforced blocks of concrete, and other specifications for some of the orders clearly indicate that they are to mount and to house missiles of great size and range --in short, ballistic missiles capable of reaching Washington.'

"Figueroa's Military Unit 3565 was at all times under close security guard by the CIM (Military Counter-Intelligence). 'Indeed,' he added, 'we worked and lived underground for the greater part of one whole year.' There is reason to believe that Figueroa's escape was managed by anti-Castro agents.

"Figueroa's information is of exceptional interest in that it is the first eyewitness account to come out of Cuba regarding the actual construction of missile sites, and with his testimony, other pieces of the jig-saw puzzle of Russian military construction in Cuba begin to fall into place, as, for example, the mysterious goings-on in Las Villas Province. For months, Las Charcas farm in Las Villas has been placed off limits to Cubans, and large reinforced concrete blocks fitting the description given by Figueroa have been transported there in trucks driven by Russians. Those trucks disappear into the shafts of obsolete naphtha mines --shafts which go horizontally into the hills—widened and built-up by the Russians."

Testimony No. 4 -- c) Jose Barroso Castillo -- January 13, 1967.

"Other reports of underground burrowing by the Russians, the transport of huge blocks of concrete into subterranean chambers, and a security veil lowered over all, comes from Oriente Province.

"On his arrival in Miami on January 13 (1967, Ed.), truck driver José Barroso Castillo told <u>Latin América</u> Report that he transported construction material to an underground Russian base at a place called Los Haticos del Purial, near the city of Holguín. We had to turn

our trucks over to Russian drivers at the entrance to the base, several kilometers from the construction,' he said. The Russians brought the trucks back empty, and the Cubans went back to reload them. 'Cubans are never permitted inside the base,' said Barroso.''

Testimony No. 5 -- CITIZENS COMMITTEE FOR A FREE CUBA -- March 7, 1966, "Latin America Report."

The following is a digest of the essential information contained in this Report:

A recently-arrived escapee from Cuba (who fled clandestinely by small boat) speaks about the mysterious goings-on in San Andres, Pinar del Rio Province. Delfín Acosta Hernández reports from the large farm El Americano, located in the area of vast cave complexes, that the farm is specifically a site of recent underground Russian burrowing.

Residents are told construction is for a surface-to-air missile (SAM) site... Yet the area is cloaked with security precautions not in keeping with a SAM site.

Another suspicious element is that Castro comes to San Andrés often accompanied by high-ranking Soviet officials.

Other escapees from Pinar del Río report that this activity coincided with the arrival in Mariel on February 2 (1966) of 5 Soviet ships with stringent security measures taken in the port area. Those eyewitnesses report that long cylindrical objects were unloaded from the ships.

Testimony No. 6 -- DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIAN-TIL (DRE) -- December 17, 1964, Report.

This was the same organization which reputedly provided Senator Keating with the information on Missiles disclosed by the Senator on October 10, 1962.

U.S. SECURITY STILL THREATENED (by, Ed.) ME-DIUM RANGE MISSILES

"Pedro Borges, who until two weeks ago was the National Director of Cattle-raising in Communist Cuba, has just requested political asylum in Canada, making astonishing statements:

"'Isaw with my own eyes the transportation of a missile about 40 ft. long towards the launching base near Morón, in the Province of Camaguey,' declared Borges, who as a public official of the Cuban regime travelled from one side to another of the Island.

"The existence of this missile base in the city of Morón was denounced by the <u>Cuban Student Directorate</u> prior to the October Crisis in 1962, and its installation dates from the end of 1961...

"Questioned by foreign newspaper correspondents in Canada, Pedro Borges made clear that the missile bases which he says are still in Cuba are of the type which provoked the October crisis, and not of the SAM type (surface-to-air missiles).

"Asked about the existence of Soviet troops in Cuba, Borges asserted: 'I could declare that its number is extraordinarily high. They are seen traveling along the highways, they are seen in the fields and in every important city in Cuba. Cubans despise them.'

Testimony No. 7 -- DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIAN-TIL (DRE) -- September 1st, 1964 Report.

"EXPLOSION IN BASE REVEALS EXISTENCE OF SOVIET MISSILES IN CUBA.

"According to a four-page report from our intelligence inside Cuba, conclusive evidence of the presence of missiles came to light in a spectacular manner the 20th of March of this year (1964)...

"At exactly 9:10 P.M. on March 20 of this year (1964), a fire broke out at La Guatana Base in Pinar del Rio Province. It was followed an hour later by a series of 12 giant explosions which sent debris flying to a height of 3,000 feet, covering an area of several miles. The fireworks themselves were visible for fifteen miles, creating a state of panic throughout the Province.

"The balance of the night, and the day following, great Russian truck-trailers moved a score of missiles from La Guatana to a Russian base located at the Granja Escuela Ludovico S. Noda, a short distance from the provincial capital of Pinar del Río. Only partially covered with tarpaulins, the missiles, ranging in length from 40 to 120 feet, were visible to on-lookers who were quickly dispersed by Cuban militia."

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"Other sources, among them the former proprietor of a farm located next to La Guatana, provided more information. Cuco Vinas (sic) stated that, according to his sources, the tremendous explosions were caused by leakage of liquid oxygen, the propellant used for missiles. The 'payloads' for the missiles are, according to Cuco Vinas, stored in another base, known as the finca (farm. Ed.) 'Cafetal.'

"The importance attached to the explosions at the missile base is attested by the fact that both Fidel Castro and the Russian Ambassador to Havana rushed to the scene of the catastrophe at 11:00 P.M. Castro tried to take charge, but was rebuffed by Soviet officers.

"The following day, heavy-duty cranes were dispatched to nearby farms where they removed parts of missiles and missile equipment which had been hurled there by the force of the explosions. The cranes were accompanied by Russian officers and several companies of Cuban militia whose commanders warned the peasants to say nothing about the missiles upon pain of death."

Testimony No. 8 -- CITIZENS COMMITTEE FOR A FREE CUBA -- August 10, 1964, "Free Cuba News" Report.

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"Dr. Luis Fernández Mendiola, a recent escapee from Matanzas Province, states that IRBMs continue to come into Cuba. The end of the first week of June (1964. Ed.) said Dr. Mendiola, a convoy of Russian truck-trailers bearing missiles passed his clinic in the city of Matanzas. He spoke of the convoy and the extraordinary security precautions surrounding its movement in the following words:

- "'The convoy passed through the city in complete darkness. The authorities cut off all electric current in the city until the convoy was gone. This is exactly the type of security precaution Castro and the Soviets took in the summer and fall of 1962 when missiles were sent into Cuba.'
- "Because of the great length of the missiles, the convoy was forced to traverse the wide thoroughfares of the city. Their diameter was estimated at between six and eight feet by eye-witnesses. Said Dr. Mendiola:
- "'Police cars were placed at all the entrances to the main thoroughfares, and dispersed traffic and the curious on-lookers who were attracted to the scene by the cut-off of electricity and the noise made by the convoy. I could easily tell that the cargoes were missiles, since the convoy passed directly in front of my clinic. The trucks came down the Via Blanca highway from the direction of Havana and went to the Yumurí Valley, near the city of Matanzas. The Russians have been working hard at excavations in that area, and the entrance roads to the valley are sealed off to all but military traffic.'"

Testimony No. 9 -- BUNTE ILLUSTRIERTE Magazine -- April 1966.

"Cologne, Germany -- (UPI) -- The weekly magazine BUNTE ILLUSTRIERTE Saturday reaffirmed the genuineness of an interview with Fidel Castro which it published last week.

"Castro issued a statement Thursday night repudiating the interview (with Belgian free-lancer Wim Dannau. Ed.) in which he was quoted as saying Cuba still has Russian-made missiles which could hit the U.S."

The Magazine said Dannau also was allowed to photograph Russian-made medium-range rockets at a parade in Havana. 'The fact that these rockets are capable of reaching the U.S. coast --apart from Castro having said it in the interview-- is self-evident,' Bunte said.'' (From Miami Herald, April 24, 1966, page 9-A).

Testimony No. 10 -- MANCHESTER (N.H.) UNION LEADER Newspaper -- April 14, 1967

We quote, verbatim, the gist of the perplexing, exclusive article by Arthur C. Egan, Jr., "Missile Buildup in Cuba?"

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"Submarine Query

- "Is it not true the Soviet Union has built and manned two new submarine bases at Santa Clara and French Key, located on the northern coast of Cuba, a scant 100 miles from the Florida coast?" was the question asked by the Union Leader reporter.
- "I am sorry, we cannot comment on this matter. This is a matter of intelligence and we just don't talk about things like that to anyone, was the reply of the Pentagon spokesman.
- "When pressed for more details on the missile sites the spokesman shut off all questions with, 'I have read you the comments of Mr. McNamara and that is all I can do at this time.'
- "The Union Leader first learned of the missile buildup and the new submarine bases from a high ranking officer, veteran of more than a quarter-century of service to his country.

"Officer's Disclosure

"We have been told not to disclose this type of information nor to transmit reports concerning the operations to our military superiors. The word has been filtered down, unofficially of course, that the top politicians know all the details and are well aware of what is going on,' remarked the military man to this reporter."

"Base Pinpointed

"The island of Cayo Largo, off the southern coast of Cuba, was pin-pointed as the site for a huge long-range missile base. It was reported that all Cuban nationals have been removed from this island and it is under the absolute control of Soviet naval personnel.

- "The men, materials and equipment to man this huge missile site is (sic) being shipped in by Russian freighters under the guise of farm equipment and other supplies for the island. Much material is also being brought in by submarine, 'the veteran military officer told this reporter.
- "' 'Our air and sea patrols have spotted these Soviet ships but there isn't a thing we can do about it --we are under orders to mind our own businnes,' said this newspaper's informant.

"Fear for Nation

"Questioned as to why he was revealing this information, and asking that it be given publicity, this military veteran said, 'There is a group of military officers who fear for this country's safety. We have decided to band together --take a chance and contact very trusted friends in the news media and ask them to disclose the high-handed attitude of McNamara and his advisors, who are selling our defenses short...'

"This courageous veteran of 26 years' military service faces a general court martial if his actions are discovered by the Defense Department. . ."

Testimony No.11-- Mr. Paul Bethel-- March 7, 1967.

Mr. Paul Bethel, a native of Idaho, U.S.A., entered the U.S. Foreign Service in 1949. During the crucial period from 1958 to January 3, 1961 when the U.S. withdrew its diplomatic representatives, Bethel served at the U.S. Embassy, in Havana, Cuba. He speaks Spanish fluently.

For several years Mr. Bethel has been the Executive Secretary of the responsible anti-communist, non-profit, all-American organization "Citizens Committee for a Free Cuba." The Truth About Cuba Committee has been in contact with the CCFC since its inception and our relations became much closer when Bethel replaced their first Excutive Secretary, Mr. Daniel James.

Seldom is a non-Cuban civilian so well qualified to make an intelligent appraisal of the Cuban dangerous situation. For this reason, we have chosen to quote extensively from the extraordinarily well docu-

mented sworn Testimony of Mr. Paul Bethel before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act. The following are only the highlights of Mr. Bethel's testimony:

;

- a) "...since 1960 the Russians have literally burrowed their way through the length and breadth of the Island..."
- b) "... Each of Cuba's 6 provinces has subterranean hangars in which military aircraft, including MIG-21's, are stored. They can be adapted to carry bomb loads and can be used to reach the United States..."
- c) "...Reports of the underground military air base in Camaguey first came to light in December 1961...

 They had built underground hangars over a year in advance of the missile crisis..."
- d) "... If they weren't in fact moving Russian missiles from one area to another, then we must assume that they are pouring into Cuba at a fantastic rate, that these are indeed missiles just being brought into Cuba..."
- e) "... In February 1963, I interviewed a defector from Castro's diplomatic service. His name is Hugo Bell Huertas.
 - "...He stated that Soviet missiles were brought in Soviet oil tankers that had no oil in them. He said that the most harmless ship, really, would presumably be a Soviet oil tanker. That no Cuban functionary, not even Fidel Castro, was permitted to step aboard those tankers. (See TACC Editorial Comment "The 'Harmless' Oil Tanker," on Appendix "?").

His testimony is to the effect that the Russians were all prepared underground before they ever showed anything above ground..."

f) "... One (missile) which I am still... checking out is 40 meters long... 150 feet, and that would be an ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile. Ed.)...

"We do have completely credible accounts of missiles between 80 and 100 feet. . ."

- g) Bethel testified the Missiles were strictly under Russian control, while Cubans were already manning the SAMs. He correctly concludes that if the Cubans handle the SAMs and are cordoned off from the areas under exclusive Russian control, the weapons inside those areas under such strict security must be Missiles. What else could they be?
- h) Mr. Bethel made a serious indictment of the desperate efforts of the U.S. Government to suppress from the American people any information about the Missiles in Cuba when he testified:
 - "There is something much more serious (than the news media blackout about the missiles, Ed.) that I have learned from witnesses I have talked to whose names cannot possibly be made public, that there is actual pressure being brought against them not to talk publicly."
- i) The members of the few American families (95 out of 2,000 families) who Castro let out of Cuba recently have also been asked to keep their mouths shut. In this case the precaution was adopted by both the Cuban communistregime and the American Government, Bethel informed.
- j) Upon questioning by Mr. Sourwine, (Chief Counsel for the Internal Security Subcommittee) Mr. Bethel opined that the denial of the existence of deadly, powerful Missiles and Nuclear Warheads in Cuba is a political decision, not a "mistake" of the Intelligence Community.
- k) In reply to Senator Thurmond's question whether, in his opinion, the Russians control Cuba, Mr. Bethel's answer was conclusive: "Oh, absolutely."
- 1) Bethel pointed out two separate, important, events which confirm that Washington is protecting the Red regime of Cuba.
 - 1. The rejection of Washington to even put Cuba on the Agenda of the C.A.S. Presidents' Conference (held in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in April 1967. Ed.). "The U.S. will not discuss Cuba, won't even discuss it," emphasized Bethel.
 - 2. We (U.S.A. Ed.) are trying to restrict arms to countries in Latin America that are now under tremendous attacks from Cuban-based subversion. "...Well, Senator" --Bethel commented-- "this is dishonest... I think you will find the genesis of

this in the agreement that we are not going to permit any country to attack Cuba." "...If one of these (Latin American. Ed.) countries really got mad and decided to retaliate against Cuba, they would have nothing to retaliate with."

TACC Editorial Comment: The sly policy of not selling weapons and matériel to a Nation --always in the "sacred" name of PEACE-- adopted by the United States against staunch anti-communist Chiang-Kai-shek forced him to surrender continental China to the communists headed by "agrarian reformer" Mao-Tse-tung. To General George C. Marshall, then Secretary of State, is attributed the fatidic sentence: "I have defeated Chiang-Kai-shek with a stroke of the pen."

The same policy, with equal success, was applied against the Government of Cuba in 1958. See the authoritative opinions of the two U.S. Ambassadors to Cuba, Arthur Gardner and Earl E.T. Smith, under Appendix "6" attached.

And now, the very same lethal policy is being contemplated for all of Latin America which is in dire need of weapons to fend off intensive communist attacks. If implemented it would spell disaster for Latin America, first, and later for the United States of America. For communism will dominate the Hemisphere south of Rio Grande and, thus, complete the encirclement of the United States, since Canada is already so infiltrated that all it needs is a little push.

m) Mr. Bethel reported that Red Cuba hosted several conferences of atomic and other scientists during 1966 and that in the month of December (1966) 300 scientists from nine Soviet bloc countries gathered in Cuba. Then, on January 15, 1967, members of Russia's State Committee on Atomic Energy showed up in Cuba, including the First Vice-President and an under-Secretary. Mr. Bethel commented: "...it would be naive of us to believe that the Russians are there for peaceful purposes."



On Appendix "7" attached, we quote more extensively excerpts of Mr. Bethel's testimony appropos the subject of this Report. We strongly recommend that, at least, this portion of his enlightening testimony be carefully read and pondered. It would be more useful still to read Bethel's full testimony, which may be obtained from the Government Printing Office, document 68-903 "Communist Threat to the United States Through the Caribbean," Part 16.



Short of physically producing a Missile --corpus delicti-- the Cuban exiles have produced abundant firsthand evidence and eyewitness reports, which are supported by photographs obtained by The Truth About Cuba Committee from Red Cuba's own newspapers. All this documented, unimpeachable evidence should convince anyone --except those who would not hear or see-- that Cuba is bristling with Soviet IRBMs and MRBMs.

But, if miraculously, we could snatch a Missile away from the Russians, our "friends" in Washington might still argue that, after all, perhaps that was the only Missile the Russians brought to Cuba.

If, by an even more miraculous miracle, we brought over to the United States One Hundred Missiles, then, of course, they would find in the large quantity a very good reason to infer that there couldn't possibly be any more missiles left!

There are none so blind as those who will not see!

As the Preparedness Subcommittee reminded us in its Report, the policy of adopting the most optimistic view when confronted with the enemy is contrary to long and well established military practice, and --I would dare add-- common sense.

18. Russia's Ominous Advance Over the United States in Nuclear Weapons and Space Delivery Vehicles

Pursuant to our conviction that Red Cuba is part and parcel --and a very important one-- of Russia's threatening strategy of over-whelming Nuclear Weaponry superiority, we have included in this Exposé a brief but alarming reference to the relative position of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. Nuclear Power.

To visualize graphically what has been the portent of Soviet Russia's deceit --with the U.S. Government's incredible collaboration-- in the life-or-death race for superiority in Nuclear Weapons and Space Delivery Vehicles, see the attached chart "Trends of Total Megatonnage Delivery Capability - All Strategic Weapons - U.S.A. vs U.S.S.R. - 1962 through 1971." This chart is part of the Study "The Changing Strategic Military Balance U.S.A. vs U.S.S.R.," prepared for the House Armed Services Committee by the American Security Council and printed for public distribution in June 1967. This Study was conducted by a special subcommittee of the National Strategy Committee of the American Security Council, with the participation of fourteen retired Generals and Admirals and three civilian experts (1). It is the most authoritative, up to date, report on this vital field for the security of the United States.

The following are excerpts from the introductory paragraphs of the Study:


"... For a half-century, Soviet leaders have time and again repeated that Communism's ultimate objective is world domination. But many in the Free World simply refuse to believe that the Soviet leaders mean what they say.

"In the realm of strategic military weapons, the United States has, in recent years, demonstrated much the same inclination to disbelieve or to discount Soviet achievements and advances. This is particularly so with respect to the new ballistic missile defenses of the Soviet Union and to Soviet boasts of an orbital bomb capability.

"Yet, the available evidence indicates that the Soviet Union has a goal of strategic superiority designed to WIN (sic) a nuclear war rather than merely DETER (sic) one. Once in a war-winning posture, the U.S.S.R. would be ideally situated to practice nuclear blackmail and would not even have to fight a nuclear war. Some strategic analysts assert that this is the ultimate goal

⁽¹⁾ We urge our readers to obtain this informative Study from: American Security Council, 123 North Wacker Dr., Chicago, Illinois 60606 -Price \$1.50.

TRENDS OF TOTAL MEGATONNAGE DELIVERY CAPABILITY ALL STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS -- U.S.A. vs U.S.S.R. -- 1962 THROUGH 1971



FROM A STUDY PREPARED BY THE AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL FOR THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES

of the Soviet Union, and that it depends upon a defense against nuclear retaliation (1).

"The United States has exchanged its goal of a war-winning strategic superiority for a strategy of mutual deterrence. The United States strategy of mutual deterrence is said to increase 'stability' and reduce international tensions. Hence, American officials are striving to convince Soviet leaders that a race to build anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems would be pointless.

"Not only has the Soviet Union already deployed an ABM system, but much evidence indicates that it is driving hard toward a goal of overwhelming superiority in the decisive field of nuclear weaponry."

"On July 4, 1965, Communist Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev declared that the Soviets possess 'orbital rockets'.

"Brezhnev's claim was supported by the display of a three-stage missile in the Bolshevik Revolution Day parade on November 7, 1965. On November 8, 1965, both TASS and IZVESTIYA described it as an orbital missile. This weapon has since been code named SCRAG(sic).

"Subsequently, the Department of State announced that it had asked Moscow, whether, in the light of the Soviet display of an orbital rocket in the Revolution Day parade, the Kremlin still planned to abide by its pledges not to put such weapons into orbit. The Soviet answer was that the agreement did not bar DEVELOPMENT of such weapons.

⁽¹⁾ General Earle F. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made the following statement early in 1967, which coincides with the conclusions of the American Security Council Study:

[&]quot;Should the Soviets come to believe that their ballistic-missile defense, coupled with a nuclear attack on the United States would limit damage to the Soviet Union to a level acceptable to them, whatever that level is, our forces would no longer deter, and the first principle of our security policy is gone."

"While waiting for an official answer from the Kremlin, the Department saw fit to keep our country on record (as reported by UPI):

'The State Department reiterated the U.S. position that although either the United States or Russia could put such a weapon into orbit, there would be no military sense in doing so.'

"The Soviet attitude should have been no surprise to anyone. After an examination of the long history of broken Soviet treaties and agreements, a Senate Internal Security Subcommittee report concluded that:

'It keeps no international agreements at all unless doing so is clearly advantageous to the Soviet Union.'"

Promptly, the "civilian" Pentagon —as Dr. Possony calls it-has resorted to every possible ruse to discredit this Study. Dr. Stefan T. Possony (1) rebuked the Defense Department in the September 18, 1967, issue of the "Washington Report," an excellent, informative weekly publication of the American Security Council.

In defending the Study Professor Possony pointed out that: "...The Pentagon is playing a tricky game of abusing secrecy to mislead the public and silence criticism..." and "...Unfortunately, the Pentagon also resorted to distortion..."

19. Could the United States Avert Obliteration by Surrendering to Soviet Russia?

To the faint-hearted, week-kneed individuals, too prone to surrender, and to those who naively believe the insidious, defeatist communist slogan "Better Red than Dead," I would recommend reading the sagacious but appalling essay Resistance or Death? -- The Perils of Surrender Propaganda, by Professor Stefan T. Possony. For 15 years Dr. Possony was an advisor of the U.S. Air Force Intelligence, and was decorated by the Air Force for having made the cor-

⁽¹⁾ Dr. Possony is one of the three non-military experts who participated in the Study, the other two being Professor James D. Atkinson and atomic scientist Dr. Edward Teller.

rect estimate as to when the Soviet Union would have its first nuclear weapon. Presently Dr. Possony is Director of the International Political Studies Program at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford, California, and a member of the National Strategy Committee of the American Security Council.

In this scholarly essay Professor Possony expounds the terrifying theory that, even if the U.S. Government surrendered without fighting, tens of millions of Americans will be massacred by Russia after the surrender.

On superficial appraisal the theory seems preposterous. However, once you read Possony's solid reasoning you cannot but agree that his thesis is logical.

He contends that no nation is conquered until it is physically occupied by the conqueror. If the United States surrendered without fighting, with its powerful weapons and manpower intact —something unprecedented in history—the Russians would not dare disembark troops, or even civilian Gauleiters. It would be too dangerous. The Russians would want, first, to destroy all U.S. Missile Bases, Bombers and sophisticated weapons, and, secondly, to completely neutralize the people's will to resist, before attempting the occupation.

In order to accomplish these two essential precautions, Professor Possony concludes there is a strong likelihood that, AFTER the surrender, the Russians will demolish U.S. Defenses and Missile Bases with their Nuclear Bombs, and massacre millions of Americans with their Neutron Bombs, which kill but do not destroy.

The following are three brief quotations from Possony's fore-boding essay:

". . . A simultaneous attack on the defender's military force and (sic) his population requires vast quantitative superiority, and therefore presupposes previous unilateral partial disarmament by the defender."

". . . Those who advocate 'rather red than dead' have never thought through the technical aspects of the policy

they are advocating. They are unable to give any assurance that an American surrender would in fact rule out nuclear devastation."

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"...so long as the communists have not abandoned their plans for world conquest, they will be compelled to attack the U.S. with nuclear weapons. Arguments and propaganda weakening U.S. preparedness will merely harden the soviet resolve, and render a communist attack more likely, as well as more costly, to ourselves."

Except otherwise marked all emphasis added.

Miami, Florida, U.S.A. October 10, 1967

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INTERVIEW WITH NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV EXCERPTS FROM NATION-WIDE NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY (NBC) TELEVISION BROADCAST, ON JULY 11th, 1967

"COMMENTATOR: As we mentioned earlier, Khrushchev claims that he elected John Kennedy in 1960 and that he told Mr. Kennedy so when they met in Vienna in June, 1961. Here is the way he tells it today:

KHRUSHCHEV: I told him: The fact that you became President was due to us. We made you President. He asked me how he should understand that. I said. I'll tell you how:

You collected 200,000 more votes than Nixon. Nixon asked us for Powers, the U-2 pilot, to be released and, if we had done it, he would have received half a million votes just for that, because that would have shown that Nixon could have established better contact with the Soviet Union, but we guessed his plans. We decided not to give him any answer and just to give it to you, when you moved into the White House. So, what do you think of that, I asked Kennedy?

He said: I agree with you entirely. If you had not acted the way you did, Nixon would definitely have got his 200,000 votes.

So I said: That is the way I voted for you and our votes pulled you over the lines. And this is a fact, and Nixon wanted it.

There are all sorts of hints. Lodge, Nixon's running mate, told me straight out:

Don't you pay any attention to what we say during the elections. It will all be thrown overboard and we will have an excellent relationship with you.

But I didn't believe it.

COMMENTATOR: Khrushchev said he was asked by Richard Nixon to release Francis Gary Powers, the U-2 pilot, but refused. We asked Mr. Nixon to comment on that story. He declined. As for Henry Cabot Lodge, he says he is sure he could never have made the remark attributed to him by Khrushchev.

Incidentally, it was not Powers, but the captured RB47 flyers Khrushchev released when President Kennedy entered the White House.

In his dacha Khrushchev thinks a great deal about the days when he and President Kennedy were the big two.

KHRUSHCHEV: I had met Kennedy as a Senator in 1959 on a visit to the United States. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a reception in my honor. There Lyndon Johnson introduced me to Kennedy. I was surprised that he could be so young and could be a Senator, so I said, not because I singled him out, I have heard that despite your youth you have a big future ahead of you. Kennedy smiled and silently shook my hand.

And so, in Vienna, I saw this young man in front of me again, but already in the role of President of the biggest capitalist country in the world: the United States. Mr. Kennedy made a very strong impression on me, both as a man and as a statesman. Iliked the way he, unlike Eisenhower, had personal opinions in all questions we discussed. Kennedy was entirely different from Eisenhower and had a precisely formulated answer to every question. Apparently, he had talked them out before and they corresponded to his main line of thought, to his personal point of view. I liked his face, sometimes stern and other times enlightened by a really good-nature smile.

Although in Vienna we came to no concrete agreement, I was pleased with the meeting and understood that, although President Kennedy was young, he was obviously interested in finding ways to avoid conflict with the Soviet Union and somehow to solve those problems which might lead to war. Kennedy was a real statesman. Unfortunately, I did not have a chance to meet him again in the United States nor in our country.

Neither he nor I wanted war, so during the Caribbean crisis we established direct communication between the Kremlin and the White House. Kennedy had a talent for solving international conflicts by negotiation. I have proof of this during the so-called Cuban crisis. I think that if Kennedy had been alive today, we would have had an excellent relationship with the United States, because he would never have let his country get into such a sticky situation as it is now in Vietnam.

COMMENTATOR: During the so-called Cuban crisis you remember that it seemed real enough at the time.

KHRUSHCHEV: When Cuba was invaded (April 1961 - Bay of Pigs, Ed.), I heard about it on the radio, but we didn't know who had done the invading, whether it was the Cuban counter-revolutionaries or America's. But all the same, we thought that no matter under what disguise, the invasion must be taking place with American participation. I would like to explain the situation leading up to the conflict in Cuba.

When we learned that the new socialist state had appeared not far from American shores, I understood that it would not last long if we didn't help

it, so that it would have time to recover its strength and rest from the struggle which it had just gone through. And so I decided, after consulting my colleagues, to send some rocket units to Cuba. Naturally, before doing this, I put the question to the members of the Presidium. I told them: If we don't do this, Cuba will fall. Many thought hard about it and the first to take the floor was Kosygin, thoughtful and an old Marxist and a real Leninist. He said: This is probably a bit adventurous, but I support you, I can't see any other means of supporting Cuba. After him other members of the Presidium took the floor and backed up my suggestion. We were sure the Americans would never leave Cuba alone and let it develop as a socialist country, because Cuba would act as a magnet to the South American countries. Sometime in October of 1962, I don't remember the exact date, the President of the United States took the floor and said that they had better take measures.

Voice of President Kennedy: 'We shall continue the war with Cuban Refugee leaders who are dedicated as we are to that nation's future return to freedom. We shall continue to keep the American people and the Congress fully informed. We shall increase our surveillance of the whole Caribbean area.'

KHRUSHCHEV: They concentrated their Navy and almost surrounded the Island. Then planes were got ready and paratroops and infantry. So they mobilized their huge forces and things began to hum. I must confess that I slept one night in my study fully dressed on the sofa. I did not want to be in the position of one Western minister who during the Suez Crisis rushed to the telephone without his trousers. The following day, when the conflict was over, I slept quietly in my bed at home.

The American Press made a lot of fuss about the Russians bringing rockets to Cuba and planning to capture the United States. Perhaps we shouldn't have done it. But if rockets had not been installed, would there be a Cuba now? NO! --it would have been wiped out. And if that is true, it means that our transportation of rockets was justified. It cost us money but we did not lose a single man. We took our rockets and bombers away in exchange for President Kennedy's promise not to invade Cuba. And this should have gained at least six years' quiet. Because I was sure Kennedy would have been re-elected for a second term.

And I am not a shamed that, as the Newspapers wrote, I made concessions to the American President in order to remove the rockets from Cuba. We told Comrade Castro and the other Comrades that, if Kennedy broke his word, all the means that we had are still in our possession, and that the threat which he, Castro, held against the United States in defense of Cuba, remained in our territory, so that, if the situation required, we could use it.

We must give credit to the United States and, first of all, to President Kennedy, who also showed sense and cool-headedness. He did what he promised—to carry out his part—and we carried out ours. And that's the way we liquidated the possibility of beginning a nuclear war.

After President Kennedy's death, President Johnson, who took over, assured us that he would stick to the promises made by President Kennedy. So far (July 1967. Ed.), they have not been violated.

It is difficult to say what might have happened if we had not shipped the rockets back. Some people say probably there would not have been a war. Probably not, I don't know. I could not give any assurance about that.

So, who was right and who was wrong? What was the American aim? The aim to liquidate socialist Cuba. The invasion by the Cuban immigrators was part of the American plan and our aim was to preserve Cuba, and Cuba still exists. Our action of transporting rockets with nuclear warheads was justified. We brought the breath of war closer to the American warmongers. We also demonstrated a clear understanding of when one can avoid a war and solve the question by negotiation. My prestige increased and this will never fade and, for a long time, people will remember it. And even now, when I receive letters at New Year's and Christmas, people usually underline this part."

(This transcript was excerpted from TACC's monitoring of the NBC-TV broadcast of July 11, 1967.)

TEXTS OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S LETTERS TO DICTATOR KHRUSHCHEV AND OF HIS STATEMENT --VERBATIM, AS PUBLISHED BY THE NEW YORK TIMES ON OCTOBER 29, 1962

"KENNEDY LETTER

"Special to The New York Times

"WASHINGTON, Oct. 27 - Following is the text of a reply by President Kennedy to Premier Khrushchev sent Saturday. It was in reply to a letter sent directly to President Kennedy Friday by Mr. Khrushchev and not made public.

"Dear Mr. Chairman:

"I have read your letter of Oct. 26 with great care and welcomed the statement of your desire to seek a prompt solution to the problem. The first thing that needs to be done, however, is for work to cease on offensive missile bases in Cuba and for all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use to be rendered inoperable, under effective United Nations arrangements.

"Assuming this is done promptly, I have given my representatives in New York instructions that will permit them to work out this week-end --in cooperation with the Acting Secretary General and your representative—an arrangement for a permanent solution to the Cuban problem along the lines suggested in your letter of Oct. 26th. As I read your letter, the key elements of your proposals --which seem generally acceptable as I understand themare as follows:

- "1) You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.
- "2) We, on our part, would agree --upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations, to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments-- (a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba. I am confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.

"If you will give your representative similar instructions, there is no reason why we should not be able to complete these arrangements and announce them to the world within a couple of days. The effect of such a settlement on easing world tensions would enable us to work toward a more general arrangement regarding "other armaments," as proposed in your second letter, which you made public. I would like to say again that the United States is very much interested in reducing tensions and halting the arms race; and if your letter signifies that you are prepared to discuss a detente affecting NATO and the Warsaw Pact, we are quite prepared to consider with our allies any useful proposals.

"But the first ingredient, let me emphasize, is the cessation of work on missile sites in Cuba and measures to render such weapons inoperable, under effective international guarantees. The continuation of this threat, or a prolonging of this discussion concerning Cuba by linking these problems to the broader questions of European and world security, would surely lead to an intensification of the Cuban crisis and a grave risk to the peace of the world. For this reason I hope we can quickly agree along the lines outlined in this letter and in your letter of Oct. 26th.

John F. Kennedy."



"TEXTS OF KENNEDY MESSAGE, STATEMENT

"WASHINGTON, Oct. 28 (UPI) --Following are the texts of a message from President Kennedy to Premier Khrushchev today and Mr. Kennedy's statement on the Soviet proposal to dismantle missile bases in Cuba:

"THE MESSAGE

"Dear Mr. Chairman:

"I am replying at once to your broadcast message of Oct. 28, even though the official text has not yet reached me, because of the great importance I attach to moving forward promptly to the settlement of the Cuban crisis. I think that you and I, with our heavy responsibilities for the maintenance of peace, were aware that developments were approaching a point where manageable. So I welcome this message and consider it an important contribution to peace.

"The distinguished efforts of Acting Secretary General U Thanthave greatly facilitated both our tasks. I consider my letter to you of Oct. 27 and your reply of today as firm undertakings on part of both our Governments which should be promptly carried out. I hope that the necessary measures can at once be taken through the United Nations, as your message

says, so that the United States in turn will be able to remove the quarantine measures now in effect. I have already made arrangements to report all these matters to the Organization of American States, whose members share a deep interest in a genuine peace in the Caribbean area.

"You referred in your letter to a violation to your frontier by an American aircraft in the area of the Chukotsk Peninsula. I have learned that this plane, without arms or photographic equipment, was engaged in an air sampling in connection with your nuclear tests its course was direct from Eielson Air Force base in Alaska to the North Pole and return. In turning south, the pilot made a serious navigational error which carried him over Soviet territory. He immediately made an emergency call on an open radio for navigational assistance and was guided back to his home base by the most direct route.

"Precautions Promised

"I regret this incident and will see to it that every precaution is taken to prevent reoccurrence.

"Mr. Chairman, both our countries have unfinished tasks and I know that your people as well as the United States can ask for nothing better than to pursue them free from the fear of war. Modern science and technology have given us the possibility of making labor fruitful beyond anything that could have been dreamed of a few decades ago.

"I agree with you that we must devote urgent attention to the problem of disarmament, as it relates to the whole world and also to critical areas. Perhaps now, as we step back from danger, we can together make real progress in this vital field. I think we should give priority to questions relating to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, on earth and in outer space, and to the great effort for a nuclear test ban. But we should also work hard to see if wider measures of disarmament can be agreed to and put into operation at an early date.

"The United States Government will be prepared to discuss these questions urgently, and in a constructive spirit, at Geneva or elsewhere.

John F. Kennedy."



"THE STATEMENT

"I welcome Chairman Khrushchev's statesmanlike decision to stop building bases in Cuba, dismantling offensive weapons and returning them to the Soviet Union under United Nations verification. "This is an important and constructive contribution to peace.

"We shall be in touch with the Secretary General of the United Nations with respect to reciprocal measures to assure peace in the Caribbean area.

"It is my earnest hope that the governments of the world can, with a solution of the Cuban crisis, turn their urgent attention to the compelling necessity for ending the arms race and reducing world tensions.

"This applies to the military confrontation between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries as well as to other situations in other parts of the world where tensions lead to the wasteful diversion of resources to weapons of war."



TEXTS OF DICTATOR KHRUSHCHEV'S LETTERS TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND TO U THANT, ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS --VERBATIM, AS PUBLISHED BY THE NEW YORK TIMES ON OCTOBER 29, 1962.

"TEXT OF KHRUSHCHEV'S MESSAGE

"Following is the text of Premier Khrushchev's message yesterday to President Kennedy as transmitted in English by Tass, the Soviet press agency:

"Dear Mr. President:

"I received your message of October 27th, I expressed my satisfaction and thank you for the sense of proportion you have displayed, and the realization of the responsibility which now devolves on you for the preservation of the peace of the world.

"I regard with great understanding your concern and the concern of the peoples of the United States of America in connection with the fact that the weapons you describe as offensive are formidable weapons, indeed.

"Both you and we understand what kind of weapons these are.

"In order to eliminate as rapidly as possible the conflict which endangers the cause of peace, to give assurance to all the peoples which crave peace, to reassure the people of America who, I am sure also want peace, as the peoples of the Soviet Union do, the Soviet Government, in addition to earlier instructions on the discontinuation of further work on weapons construction sites, has given a new order to dismantle them to the Soviet Union.

"Mr. President, I should like to repeat what I had already written to you in my earlier messages, that the Soviet Government has given economic assistance to the Republic of Cuba, as well as arms, because Cuba, the Cuban people, were constantly under the continuous threat of invasion of Cuba.

"A piratic vessel had shelled Havana. They say that this shelling was done by irresponsible Cuban emigrées Perhaps so. But the question is from where did they shoot. It is a fact that these Cubans have no ter-

ritory, they are fugitives from their country, they have no means to conduct military operations.

"Concentration of Ships

"This means that someone had put into their hands these weapons for shelling Havana, for piracy in the Caribbean sea, in the territorial waters of Cuba. It is impossible in our time notto notice a piratic ship, considering the concentration in the Caribbean Sea of American ships from which everything can be seen and observed.

"And in these conditions, pirate ships freely roam around Cuba, shell Cuba, make piratic attacks on peaceful cargo ships. It is known that they had even shelled a British cargo ship.

"In a word, Cuba was under the continuous threat of aggressive forces which did not conceal their intention to invade her territory.

"The Cuban people want to build their life in their own interests without external interference. This is their right and they cannot be blamed for wanting to be masters of their own country, to dispose of the fruits of their own labor.

"The threat of invasion of Cuba and all other schemes for creating tension over Cuba are designed to strike the Cuban people with a sense of insecurity, to intimidate them, to prevent them from peacefully building their new life.

"Mr. President, I should like to say clearly once more that we could not remain indifferent to that and the Soviet Government decided to render assistance to Cuba with the means of defense against aggression, only with means for the purposes of defense. We have supplied the defense means which you describe as offensive means. We have supplied them to prevent an attack on Cuba, to prevent rash acts.

" 'Respect and Trust'

"I regard with respect and trust the statement you made in your message on October 27th, 1962, that there would be no attack, no invasion of Cuba, and not only on the part of the United States, but also on the part of other nations of the Western Hemisphere, as you have said in the same message of yours. Then the motives which induced us to render assistance of such a kind to Cuba disappear.

"It is for this reason that we instructed our officers (these means as I had already informed you earlier are in the hands of the Soviet officers) to take appropriate measures to discontinue the construction of the aforementioned facilities, to dismantle them and to return them to the Soviet Union. As I had informed you in the letter of October 27, we are prepared ro reach agreement to enable representatives of the United Nations to verify the dismantling of these means.

"Thus, in view of the assurances you have given and our instructions on dismantling, there is every condition for eliminating the present conflict.

"I note with satisfaction that you have responded to the desire I expressed with regard to the elimination of the aforementioned dangerous situation as well as with regard to providing conditions for a more thoughtful appraisal of the international situation, fraught as it is with great dangers in our age of thermonuclear weapons, rocketry, spacesships (sic), global rockets and other deadly weapons. All people are interested in the ensurance of peace.

"Would Avoid Perils

"Therefore, vested with trust and great responsibility, we must not allow the situation to aggravate and must stamp out the centers where a dangerous situation fraught with grave consequences to the cause of peace has arisen. And if we, together with you, and with the assistance of other people of good will, succeed in eliminating this tense atmosphere, we should also make sure that no other dangerous conflicts which could lead to a world nuclear catastrophe would arise.

"In conclusion I should like to say something about a detente between NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries you have mentioned. We have spoken about that long since and are prepared to continue to exchange views on this question with you, and to find a reasonable solution.

"We should like to continue the exchange of views on the prohibition of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, on general disarmament and on other problems relating to relaxation of international tension.

"Mr. President, I trust your statement, but on the other hand there are irresponsible people who would like to invade Cuba now and thus touch off a war. If we do take practical steps and proclaim the dismantling and evacuation of the means from Cuba, in doing so, we, at the same time, want the Cuban people to be sure that we are with them and do not absolve ourselves of responsibility for rendering assistance to the Cuban people.

" We Do Not Threaten'

"We are confident that the peoples of all countries like you, Mr. President, would understand me correctly. We do not threaten. We want nothing but peace. Our country is now on the upgrade.

"Our people enjoy the fruits of their peaceful labor. They have achieved tremendous successes after the October revolution, have created the greatest of material, spiritual and cultural values. Our people enjoy these values and want to continue developing their achievements, want to ensure their further development on the way of peace and social progress by their persistent labor.

"I should like to remind you, Mr. President, that military planes of reconnaissance character had violated the borders of the Soviet Union in connection with which there had been conflicts between us, and notes were exchanged. In 1960 we shot down your U-2 plane, whose reconnaissance flight over the U.S.S.R. wrecked the summit meeting in Paris. At that time you took a correct position, having denounced that criminal act of the former United States Administration.

"But already during your term of office as President there occurred another instance of violation of our border by an American U-2 plane in in the area of Sakhalin. We had already written to you about that violation on August 30th. Then you replied that that violation occurred as a result of poor weather and gave assurances that this would not be repeated. We trusted your assurance, because indeed the weather was poor in that area at that time.

"However had not your planes been ordered to fly about our territory, even poor weather could not have brought an American plane into our airspace. Hence, the conclusion that this is being done with the knowledge of Pentagon, which tramples on international norms and violates the borders of other states.

"A still more dangerous case occurred on October 28th when your reconnaissance plane intruded the borders of the Soviet Union in the area of the Chukotka (Chukchi) Peninsula in the north and flew over our territory. The question is, Mr. President, how should we regard this.

"What is this --a provocation? Your plane violates our frontier, at such an anxious time we and you are experiencing, when everything has been put into combat readiness. Is it not a fact that an intruding American plane can be easily taken for a nuclear bomber and this might push us to a fateful step, all the more that the United States Government and Pentagon long since declare that you maintain a continuous nuclear bomber patrol.

"Therefore, you can imagine what responsibility you are assuming especially now, at such an anxious time we are living through.

"Expresses a 'Wish'

"I should ask you to correctly appraise this and to take appropriate measures to prevent this from becoming a provocation for touching off awar.

"I should also like to express the following wish: Of course, it is business of the Cuban people. You do not have diplomatic relations. But through my officers who are on (sic) Cuba I have reports that American planes make flights over Cuba.

"We are interested that there should be no war in the world and that the Cuban people should live in peace. But besides, Mr. President, it is no secret that we have our people on Cuba. "Under a treaty with the Cuban Government we have there officers, instructors who teach Cubans, mostly plain people: specialists, agronomists, zoo-technicians, irrigators, land reclamation specialists, plain tractor drivers and workers. We are concerned about them.

"I should like you to consider, Mr. President, that violation of the airspace of Cuba by American planes could also lead to dangerous consequences. And if you do not want this to happen, it would be better if no cause is given for a dangerous situation to arise.

"Wages Display of 'Sanity'

"We must be careful now and refrain from such steps which would not be useful to the defense of states involved in the conflict, but could only cause irritation and even serve as a provocation for a fateful step. Therefore, we must display sanity, reason and refrain from such steps even more than other peoples.

"We value peace perhaps even more than other peoples because we had gone through a terrible war with Hitler. But our people will not falter in the face of any test. Our people trust their Government and we assure our people and world public opinion that the Soviet Government will not allow itself to be provoked.

"But if the provocateurs unleash a war they will not evade responsibility and the grave consequences the war would bring upon them. But we are confident that reason would triumph, war would not be unleashed and peace and security of the peoples will be ensured.

"In connection with the current negotiations between Acting Secretary General Mr. U Thant and representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the Republic of Cuba, the Soviet Government has sent to New York the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R. V.V. Kuznetsov, to help Mr. U Thant in his noble efforts aimed at eliminating the present dangerous situation.

Respectfully yours,

N. Khrushchev"



"Following is the text of Premier Khrushchev's message yesterday to U Thant, Acting Secretary General of the United Nations, as made public in English by Tass, the Soviet press agency:

"Dear Mr. U Thant,

"I am forwarding to you a copy of the message I sent today to the President of the United States, Mr. J. Kennedy, in order to enable you to familiarize yourself with our position, which we regard as exhaustive and and which will help you to discharge your noble functions.

"In connection with the ne gotiations you are conducting now with representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the Cuban Republic, the Soviet Government has sent to New York the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R., V.V. Kuznetsov to help you in your efforts aimed at eliminating the present dangerous situation.

Respectuflly yours,

N. Khrushchev."



TACC Editorial Comment -- An exposure of two communist tactics.

- a) The communists never miss an opportunity to make propaganda. So, even in the tense situation of the so-called 'Cuban Missile Crisis," Khrushchev boasted about the success of the communist regime (second paragraph of the sub-heading "We Do Not Threaten.").

 Any one who regularly reads Russia's own; blications, such as NEW TIMES and INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, or the speeches of the communist leaders at their congresses, knows that, in many ways, the Russian people—not the New Class, of course—are worse off today than they were in the days of the Czars. And to boast about "the spiritual values" created by the communist revolution is the height of impudence.
- b) The communist tactic of never, never being caught on the defensive is also exemplified in this letter. When supposedly caught red-handed installing long range Missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev counterattacked by demanding an explanation for the violation of the air space over a remote sector of his empire.

Just like when he pounded his shoe on his seat at the United Nations Assembly when accused of invading Hungary and massacring the freedom fighters.

The sad thing is that they get away with it. President Kennedy meekly apologized for the supposed air violation. And the President of the United Nations Assembly suspended the meeting instead of having the insolent Khrushchev expelled for improper conduct and proceeding with the meeting. Khrushchev's shameful conduct should have been read into the record as an admission of guilt and the Assembly should have demanded Russia to immediately withdraw from Hungary and pay reparations for the damage done.

It is not that the communists are so strong -- it is that we are so weak!

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"LIFE LINES" RADIO PROGRAM, BROADCAST ON DECEMBER 3, 1962, THROUGH ITS CHAIN OF 300 STATIONS, FEATURING LUIS V. MANRARA, PRESIDENT OF THE TRUTH ABOUT CUBA COMMITTEE

"This is LIFE LINE, Wayne Poucher from Washington:

One of the subjects most discussed these days is who won or lost what in the recent Cuban crisis. Evaluations at every level of society have been made and many of you have read of the violent reaction on the part of the Cuban exiles living here in America.

In order to bring to LIFE LINE listeners the reasoning of many different segments of society, we have asked Mr. Luis V. Manrara, President of the Truth About Cuba Committee, Inc., to give us the reaction of that organization.

Speaking from Miami, Florida, Mr. Luis V. Manrara:

This radio talk is being prepared on Thursday, November 1st, 1962, and nobody can predict, exactly, what will happen in the interval between today and the day in which it is broadcast. Based on the situation today, I fear that what is being hailed as a tremendous victory over Soviet Russia is only a Pyrrhic victory. In others words, it looks like a victory but, in reality, it is a defeat!

Why is it a defeat? Didn't President Kennedy force the Russians to agree dismantling their missile bases in Cuba? Didn't he stop Russian ships by a "quarantine"? True, but let us analyze the reasons why the Russians built the missile bases.

In my opinion, the missile bases were built to protect and guarantee the security of the most important conquest Soviet Russia has ever made, the island of Cuba. Cuba is in the heart of the American Hemisphere and its possession constitutes a great psychological victory of communism over the U.S.A.

The communists feared an attack that would dislodge them from Cuba. Furthermore, they have known perfectly well that such an attack could only

be launched by the United States or, in any case, by some army sponsored, directed and provided by them with all the necessary hardware.

Cuba is too small to be able to defend itself from a full-fledged armed attack. On the other hand, Russia is too far away to give any material help. A device had to be invented by which the powerful United States would be deterred from destroying the most valuable communist satellite, a beach-head from which the encirclement and ultimate surrender of the United States would be carefully and cunningly contrived by the communists.

What is it that the United States fears the most? Atomic warfare, There was the answer. Let us place atomic weapons in Cuba, reasoned the Russians, and the survival of our communist satellite would be assured. For. if the United States would be foolish enough to let us cover the island with atomic weapons, we would be able to blackmail them, and they would not dare start anything against Cuba or anyone else. On the other hand, if they interfere with our nuclear build-up in Cuba, we would play our hand skillfully. First, we would get insulted. Next, some outrageous demand would be made, hoping that they might fall for it -- trading the Turkish for the Cuban bases. If all fails, then we would play it in the grand manner and pretend that we are a sensible, peace-loving people, incapable of submitting the world to a nuclear holocaust, and would dismantle our Cuban bases, provided -- and there is the catch-- that the United States solemnly promises to the world, before the United Nations, that they would not attack, or in any way interfere, with the "sovereign" Cuban communist state. Furthermore, that they would not permit the building of military forces in their territory, nor in the territory of other neighboring states, designed to invade Cuba. The United States would thus not only commit itself not to intervene in Cuba, but it would become the guardian of the Red satellite in the Caribbean!

In simple language, devoid of all the drama and sensationalism that prevents public opinion from grasping what has really happened, the truth of the matter is that Soviet Russia would have been successful in making impregnable its communist beachhead for the subversion of Latin America and the encirclement of the United States. That was the only reason for the construction of the missile bases. Once again, Russia would obtain its objective without firing a shot or losing a single man --which is a better score than that of the United States, which lost Major Rudolph Anderson, pilot of a reconnaissance plane shot down over Cuba by a Russian ground-to-air rocket.

Communism is not negotiable in the American Hemisphere! This stern and comforting declaration is still ringing in the ears of all those who realize how important it is to keep communism away from the Americas. This has been the declared policy of the United States, voiced by the President and the Secretary of State on several occasions.

However, if the U.S.A. should agree to become the guarantor for the stability of the Red satellite on the Caribbean, in exchange for the dis-

mantling of the missile bases, Soviet Russia would have accomplished its basic objective by "negotiating" the permanence of communism in the American Hemisphere.

The alternative if the Russian proposal was not accepted? The threat of war. A threat which the Russians, astutely, have not defined very precisely. They hint at World War III. At reprisals here and there. At nuclear holocaust. Particularly this last, for they have created a blind, unwarranted, irrational terror of nuclear war.

The American people, with that deeply imbedded feeling of self-preservation, might be led to reason thus: After all, why should we expose ourselves to nuclear holocaust because the Russians have taken control of a small island close to our territory? Didn't we make them dismantle the missile bases? Without missiles communist Cuba poses no threat or peril to us. This reasoning, which seems logical on the surface, is actually completely unrealistic and sophistic because its main premise --that the Russians would unleash a nuclear war-- is absolutely wrong.

We are firmly convinced that Russia will not unleash a nuclear war, nor even a conventional war, since they are much more vulnerable than we are, with millions of people and the enormous territory they would have to police, aside from other important considerations. It is my firm conviction that Russia would only fight if their own territory is invaded, or if they lost the cold war.

The Truth About Cuba Committee has forcefully maintained that the only solution for the Cuban problem is the invasion of that island and the establishment of a democratic government. Only in that way can the United States be sure that the missile threat is ended once and for all, and only in that way can this Western Hemisphere base of subversion be eliminated.

Halfway measures in dealing with communist Cuba are useless. Dismantling the missiles without invasion means nothing. There are thousands of places of concealment and, apparently, they could be set up on twenty-four hours notice. But, aside from the military factor, to leave this cancer in the the Caribbean to spread its deadly virus by its powerful radio stations to the other Latin American nations, by its tons of printed propaganda, by its smuggled arms and guerrillas, by its training of thousands of Latin communist agents for infiltration, by its simply being there --a communist country in a free hemisphere-- is intolerable. This cancer must be removed. The only way that this surgery can be performed is for the island to be militarily occupied. The framework for a military action by the OAS exists. This framework would need the full backing of the United States. It should be a hemispheric action.

But it must be action! And the United States States must lead."



NOTICE OF PREVENTION OF DEPARTURE AND AMENDMENT
OF CONDITIONS OF PAROLE, SERVED ON OCTOBER 30, 1963
TO CUBAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS BY THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Immigration and Naturalization Service, P.O. Box 52-622, Miami, Florida

NOTICE OF FERVENTION OF DEPARTURE and AMENDMENT OF CONDITIONS OF PAROLE

Please be advised that the provisions of Section 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and Presidential Proclemation No. 3004 dated January 17, 1953 relating to the departure of United States citizens and aliens from the United States are in force and effect. This is official notice that you are not to depart from the territory of the United States until further notice.

Failure to comply with this order or the unlawful transportation of a person whose departure is forbidden will subject you to a fine of \$5,000 or imprisonment for not more than five years or both. Penalties also include a seigure of any vessel or sircraft involved in such unlawful transportation.

You are further advised that the conditions of your parole into the United States under Sec. 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Mationality Act are hereby amended to provide that you are to remain within the land limits of Dade County, Florida and failure to comply with these conditions will result in the revocation of your parols.

Served: Thach 30,1963 (date) 5:45 PM

Acting District Director,

Bignature: Kouand F. Manuellistica Service

Title: (Investigator)

Departure Control Officer

NOTIFICATION OF SEIZURE SERVED ON JANUARY 8, 1964, BY THE UNITED STATES TREASURY DEPARTMENT --BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, TO CUBAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS





TREASURY DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS

P. O. Box 2980 Niami, Florida 33101

January 8, 1964

Refer to: Seizure M-2073 ADM-F

You are hereby notified of the seizure by Customs officers at this port, on December 14, 1963, of the following described boat.

1-23 foot motor vessel, name and registration unknown. Bertram hull, Chrysler Model 413 engines. Serial numbers 69685 and 69734.

Total Domestic Value - \$2000.00

Seizure was made under the provisions of Title 22, United States Code, Section 401 as it was established that this vessel was to be used on a raid against a country with whom the United States is at peace. The vessel is subject to forfeiture.

You are informed it is your privilege, under the provisions of Title 19, United States Code, Section 1618, to apply for remission or mitigation of the forfeiture incurred. Should you desire to do so, a petition for relief signed by you containing a statement of all extenuating circumstances should be addressed to the Commissioner of Customs, and submitted to this office in quadruplicate for further handling. Such petition must be submitted to this office within 60 days from the date of this letter.

Sincerely yours,
A. B. ANGLE, COLLECTOR OF CESTORS

By: W. M. Stankierics O Deputy Collector in Charge

SWORN TESTIMONIES OF FOUR UNITED STATES AMBASSADORS WHO SERVED IN CUBA, MEXICO AND OTHER LATIN AMERICAN NATIONS DURING THE CRITICAL YEARS. EXCERPTS THEREOF.

- I. Ambassador William D. Pawley.
- II. Ambassador Arthur Gardner.
- III. Ambassador Earl E.T. Smith
- IV. Ambassador Robert C. Hill.

All testimonies Sworn before the Subcommittee to Investigate the

Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws

of the

Committee on the Judiciary

United States Senate



Series entitled:

"Communist Threat to the United States Through the Caribbean."

1.- EXCERPTS OF SWORN TESTIMONY OF AMBASSADOR WILLIAM D. PAWLEY MADE ON SEPTEMBER 2nd and 8th, 1960

Abstract of Ambassador Pawley's Diplomatic Service Record:

 ★ Ambassador to:

Perú

1945

Brazil

1946-1947

- ➤ Member U.S. Delegation to O.A.S. Conference in Bogotá, Colombia, in April 1948
- ➤ Served State Department in different Positions and Missions until 1954.
- ¥ Was Active in Solving the Communist Problem in Guatemala in 1954
- ➤ Interviewed President Batista in Havana, in December 1958, in a Personal Effort to Avert the Communist Take Over of Cuba.

INDEX OF TOPICS COVERED IN EXCERPT

1. How Washington was Instrumental in Delivering Cuba to Communism.

"MR. PAWLEY: . . . A decision was made, and a very unwise one, and announced to the world, that we, the U.S. Government, would supply no further arms to Batista's government. . . I think that the policy came out of Bill Wieland's office, approved by the Assistant Secretary and later reached the approval of higher officials. . . that policy statement condemned the Batista government to defeat, because the entire hemisphere and the world, but more important, the Cuban Army, and the Cuban people, knew that Batista was finished in the eyes of the American Government. . . "

"MR. PAWLEY: . . . I stated that I thought everything we were doing was wrong.

I told them (a group of prominent American diplomats and a CIA representative, Ed.) that we should now, to try to save the place, to see if we can go down there to get Batista to capitulate to a caretaker government unfriendly to him, but satisfactory to us, whom we could immediately recognize and give military assistance to in order that Fidel Castro not come to power, and they thought it had sufficient merit to justify my coming up with them the next day and have meetings in the State Department and in Central Intelligence Agency.

Foster Dulles was then sick but he was still available to the telephone. I was selected to go to Cuba to talk to Batista to see if I could convince him to capitulate, which I did. I spent 3 hours with him on the night of December 9 (1958. Ed.).

I was unsuccessful in my effort but had Rubottom permitted me to say that 'What I am offering you has tacit approval, sufficient governmental backing,' I think Batista may have accepted it.

I offered him an opportunity to live at Daytona Beach with his family, that his friends and family would not be molested; that we would make an effort to stop Fidel Castro from coming into power as a Communist, but that the caretaker government would be men who were enemies of his, otherwise it would not work anyway, and Fidel Castro would otherwise have to lay down his arms or admit he was a revolutionary fighting against anybody only because he wanted power, not because he was against Batista.

SENATOR KEATING: And the new government would also be unfriendly to Castro?

MR PAWLEY: Yes.

MR. SOURWINE: Who would the new government have been?

MR PAWLEY: The men we had selected and that had been approved and that I could tell Batista, were Colonel Barquín, Colonel Borbonnet, General Díaz Tamayo, Bosch of the Bacardí family, and one other whose name at the moment escapes me. But there were five men, all enemies of Batista.

It came within that close of working, and the only thing in my judgment that made it fail to work was to say -after all, I had known this man 30 years and I could talk to him frankly-- 'If you will do this it will have the approval of the American Government.' All I could say to him was, 'I will try to persuade the U.S. Government to approve.'

SENATOR KEATING: But they wouldn't let you say it, though?

MR. PAWLEY: No, which was tragic in a way because I think it would have avoided the problem.

MR. SOURWINE: Did you know that 6 days after you saw Batista on the 9th of December the American Ambassador saw him and told him that the U.S. Government had lost confidence in his ability to keep peace and that to avoid bloodshed the best thing that could happen would be for him to leave the country?

MR. PAWLEY: No, I did not know that, and had I been privy to that I would have done what I could to have prevented that from happening that way because that is --the only possible result of that would be that Fidel Castro would have immediately come into power. .."



TACC Editor's Notes.

- 1. Headings have been supplied by us for easy identification of subject matter.
- 2. Except otherwise marked all emphasis added by us.

II. EXCERPTS OF SWORN TESTIMONY OF AMBASSADOR ARTHUR GARDNER MADE ON AUGUST 27th AND 30th, 1960

Ambassador to Cuba from 1953 until mid-1957



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1. Economy Booming in Cuba in 1957 and Close Links with the U.S.A.

"SENATOR DODD: ... Now, Mr. Gardner, you say you were appointed, as we know, Ambassador to Cuba, in 1953. Would you tell us briefly but concisely and adequately, what were the economic conditions in Cuba when you went there, in 1953?

MR. GARDNER: Well, they had started to boom. And during the course of the time that I was there the economy rose tremendously. The building boom was sensational. If you had been in Havana 10 years earlier, as I had, and then saw it the day I left (1957. Ed.), you wouldn't recognize the city.

It was due to circumstances. But I think the real reason for it was the feeling of definite security that the Cubans themselves had, politically perhaps not, but financially, yes. . .

... When I left there, it was astonishing to see the improvement, and so far as I was concerned in the entire time I was there I never heard anybody use the word 'Gringo,' or say 'get out of --Yanqui get out,' or anything like that.''

"SENATOR DODD: Mr. Gardner, you have been quoted as referring to Cuba as the show window of Latin America.

MR. GARDNER: I believe that.

SENATOR DODD: Would you tell us what you mean by that?

MR. GARDNER: Because the relationship was so close between Cuba and the United States, we having obtained their independence for them (1), and basically we have always given them that preferential on sugar (2). It made the country feel that the bond between us was stronger than anybody else. In addition to the fact that it was only 90 miles from Key West. And I think that the majority of Cubans felt that this was the one place that they could look to for comfort and support. So that in my opinion, the other countries of the Caribbean, in fact almost all of Latin America, always expected to see us treating Cuba and working with Cuba closer than anybody else. And that is the reason I coined the expression, which has been used a great deal."

TACC Editorial Comment. (1) Cuba's independence was not "given" to us by anybody. We fought for it for over half a century and won it. However, it is historically true that the U.S. helped the Cubans to win sooner, and we are deeply appreciative for their help.

⁽²⁾ The preferential price in sugar was agreed in a bilateral Treaty <u>mutually</u> beneficial.

2. Arms to Pro-Communist Fidel Castro -- SI! Arms to Anti-Communist Government -- NO!

"SENATOR DODD: ... Is it true, or do you know, that shipments of military equipment to Batista were stopped on the New York docks?

MR. GARDNER: That is true. A shipment, I only knew of one.

SENATOR DODD: A shipment. Is it also true that these shipments were ordered under a mutual aid pact?

MR. GARDNER: That is right.

SENATOR DODD: And that Batista had paid cash for them at that time?

MR. GARDNER: Well, I can't guarantee he paid cash, but I know he had the cash to pay for them."

.

"SENATOR DODD: Do you know who stopped those shipments, or that shipment, rather?

MR. GARDNER: Only the common gossip, that Rubottom was the only man who could have stopped it."

.

"SENATOR DODD: Do you know of any --do you have any information concerning the shipment of arms and ammunition from the United States to Castro?

MR. GARDNER: Well, those are things that I mentioned. I said they were being sent down surreptitiously almost every night. I don't believe that the Russians sent them stuff in a submarine. But I knew these shipments were being made.

SENATOR DODD: No. My question rather was, Do you know whether arms were shipped to Castro from the United States?

MR. GARDNER: That is what I think --from up and down the Keys, all of Florida, they were riddled with these expeditions.

SENATOR DODD: From the United States?

MR. GARDNER: From the United States.

SENATOR DODD: So, of course, such shipments were illegal?

MR. GARDNER: Illegal. And that was the reason they indicted, as I told you, this fellow Prio. And he paid a fine of \$5,000."

3. Morale Broken by U.S. Government Pro-Castro Policy.

"SENATOR DODD: It has been said that Batista sent a regiment of troops to put down the Castro rebellion. Do you know, have you any idea, why the Batista government was incapable, on the surface, so it seems, of suppressing this rebellion, of a handful, relatively, of Castro rebels?

MR. GARDNER: Yes. There are many reasons.

No. 1, his troops are not trained for mountain fighting. That is No. 1. No. 2 is that it is like a rabbit running under a cover, or through a field. I mean you can get up in an airplane, and you could not see them, or what they were doing. So his air force could never spot them. And then I think that, thirdly, the troops got so discouraged by the position we had taken about not giving them arms and so on that they just didn't want to fight. . .

SENATOR DODD: Was this largely because it was known or felt that the United States had abandoned Batista and supported Castro?

MR. GARDNER: That is right.

SENATOR DODD: And this was rather common knowledge in the military and other circles in Cuba?

MR. GARDNER: That is right; everybody. There are a great many Cubans, I understand, who paid large sums to Castro, thinking that he was going to make the country over. And now they are the worst disappointed people in the world, of course."

4. The State Department Was Apprised of Communist Danger.

"SENATOR DODD: . . . During these conversations with these several persons whom you have named (Robert Murphy, Loy Henderson and Roy Rubottom --all high officials in State Department. Ed.), did you, from time to time, tell any one of them, or all of them, that Castro talked and acted like a Communist, and should not be supported by the United States?

MR. GARDNER: Yes. But the purpose of these conversations always seemed to be was whether Castro carried a Communist card or not. We all knew --I think everybody knew-- that his brother, Raúl, was a Communist. But they seemed to argue about it as if that was important.

SENATOR DODD: You mean the technicality of party membeship was made a matter of importance rather than his general attitude?

MR. GARDNER: Yes, that is right."

A Spanish Language Radio Station Suggested to the State Department to Alert the Cubans.

"SENATOR DODD: You made a suggestion, sir, that the United States operate a Spanish-language radio station at Key West, or in that area, to

acquaint Cubans, better acquaint Cubans, with the position of the United States, and the attitude of the United States.

Do you know why this has not been done?

MR. GARDNER: I haven't any idea. I have been talking and talking about it.

SENATOR DODD: This would not be a very huge task.

MR. GARDNER: No, they have got plenty of equipment."

6. Support the Cubans and They Will Do the Job

"SENATOR DODD: Finally, sir, Mr. Gardner, what would be your recommendation as to how the United States --what our policy should be, what we should do with respect to Cuba and the Castro government?

MR. GARDNER: I mentioned to you the radio station. If the United States took a strong position against Castro, I think you would find, without any doubt, that the Cubans themselves would perform what has got to be performed sooner or later —we have got to get rid of Castro."

• • • • • •

"MR. GARDNER: I think we ought to morally support any movement of Cubans that is willing to take the job on. And I don't think there is any question that there are such people. . ."



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- 2. For readability's sake some rearrangement of Mr. Gardner's declarations was necessary in order to group together his statements on specific subjects. As is customary in oral testimony, certain topics are bound to come up several times during the questioning and, therefore appear in different places in the verbatim transcript of the testimony.
- 3. Except otherwise marked all emphasis added by us.

III. EXCERPTS OF SWORN TESTIMONY OF AMBASSADOR EARL E.T. SMITH (1) MADE ON AUGUST 27th AND 30th, 1960

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Cuba from June 3, 1957 until January 20, 1959



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⁽¹⁾ In his enlightening book "The Fourth Floor," Ambassador Smith gives a much more detailed account of how all his vigorous efforts to save Cuba from international communism were thwarted by the State Department's Fourth Floor hierarchy.

Published by Random House, Inc. 457 Madison Ave., New York 22, N.Y. \$5.00. Proceeds of the sale of his book were generously donated by Mr. Smith to the relief of Cuban exiles in the U.S.

1 The U.S. Ambassador to Cuba sent to Mr. Herbert Matthews, of The New York Times, for Briefing.

Mr. Matthews Connived with the State Department.

"MR. SOURWINE: Is it true, sir, that you were instructed to get a briefing on your new job as Ambassador to Cuba from Herbert Matthews of the New York Times?

MR. SMITH: Yes; that is correct.

MR. SOURWINE: Who gave you these instructions?

MR. SMITH: William Wieland, Director of the Caribbean Division and Mexico. At that time he was Director of the Caribbean Division, Central American Affairs.

MR. SOURWINE: Did you, sir, in fact see Matthews?

MR. SMITH: Yes; I did.

MR. SOURWINE: And did he brief you on the Cuban situation?

MR. SMITH: Yes; he did.

MR. SOURWINE: Could you give us the highlights of what he told you?"

.

"MR. SMITH: We talked for 2-1/2 hours on the Cuban situation, a complete review of his feelings regarding Cuba, Batista, Castro, the situation in Cuba, and what he thought would happen.

MR. SOURWINE: What did he think would happen?

MR. SMITH: He did not believe that the Batista government could last, and that the fall of the Batista government would come relatively soon.

MR. SOURWINE: Specifically what did he say about Castro?

MR. SMITH: In February 1957, Herbert L. Matthews wrote three articles on Fidel Castro, which appeared on the front page of the New York Times, in in which he eulogized Fidel Castro and portrayed him as a political Robin Hood, and I would say that he repeated those views to me in our conversation."

.

"MR. SOURWINE: Mr. Smith, when you talked with Matthews to get the briefing before you went to Cuba, was he introduced to you as having any authority from the State Department or as being connected with the State Department in any way?"

"MR. SMITH: Oh, no. I knew who he was, and they obviously knew I knew who he was, but I believe that they thought it would be a good idea for me to get the viewpoint of Herbert Matthews, and also I think that Herbert Matthews, is the leading Latin American editorial writer for the New York Times. Obviously the State Department would like to have the support of the New York Times.

MR. SOURWINE: Mr. Matthews was not, as far as you know then, a consultant for the State Department or otherwise connected with the Department?

MR. SMITH: I do not believe that he was ever a consultant or ever employed by the State Department. I believe there was a close connection, though, between the Latin American desk and Herbert Matthews."

"MR. SMITH: ... I would say that Mr. Wieland and all those who had anything to do with Cuba had a close connection with Herbert Matthews.

I will go further than that. I will say that when I was Ambassador (1957 to Jan. 1959. Ed.), that I was thoroughly awared of this, and sometimes made the remark in my own Embassy that Mr. Matthews was more familiar with the State Department thinking regarding Cuba than I was."

2. Arms to Pro-Communist Fidel Castro -- SI! Arms to Anti-Communist Government -- NO!

"MR. SMITH: ... Primarily I would say that when we refused to sell arms to the Cuban Government and also by what I termed intervening by innuendo (which was persuading other friendly governments not to sell arms to Cuba) that these actions had a moral, psychological effect upon the Cuban armed forces which was demoralizing to the nth degree.

The reverse, it built up the morale of the revolutionary forces. Obviously when we refused to sell arms to a friendly government, the existing government, the people of Cuba and the armed forces knew that the United States no longer would support Batista's government."

"MR. SMITH: . . . A decision such as prohibiting the sale of arms to a friendly nation can have devastating effects upon the government in power.

We even did not fulfill our promise to deliver 15 training planes, which had been bought and paid for by the Batista government. In accordance with instructions from the State Department I informed Batista that delivery would be suspended, because we feared some harm might come to the 47 kidnaped Americans. The kidnaping by Raúl Castro of 30 U.S. marines and sailors, 17 American citizens, and 3 Canadians occurred at this time.

After the kidnaped Americans were returned we still refused to deliver these training planes because we feared that bombs could be put on the planes even though they were strictly for training purposes.

I reiterate that decisions such as these may determine whether a government can remain in power.

Although they could buy arms and ammunition from other sources, the psychological impact on the morale of the government was crippling. On the other hand, it gave a great uplift to the morale of the rebels."

"MR. SMITH: We refused to sell arms to a friendly government, and we persuaded other friendly governments not to sell arms to Cuba. Yet on the other hand revolutionary sympathizers were delivering arms, bodies and ammunition daily from the United States. We were lax in enforcing our neutrality laws.

SENATOR EASTLAND: To Castro.

MR. SMITH: Yes, sir, to revolutionaries under Castro."

3. The State Department was Apprised of Communist Danger.

"SENATOR EASTLAND: You had been warning the State Department that Castro was a Marxist?

MR. SMITH: Yes, sir."

"MR. SOURWINE: Former Ambassador Gardner told this committee that during his last year as Ambassador to Cuba (up to mid-1957. Ed.) there had been an endless number of shipments of arms and other things to Castro from the United States.

You testified these shipments continued during your term as Ambassador?

MR. SMITH: The tempo increased.

MR. SOURWINE: And they were not suspended or curtailed when we stopped sending arms and supplies to Batista?

MR. SMITH: The United States did stop and did apprehend certain individuals from time to time, but according to the statement of the revolutionaries themselves, for about every one that the United States apprehended, nine would get through.

It was about a 10-to -1 ratio."

4. The U.S. Embassy in Havana Infiltrated by the Enemy

"MR. SMITH: . . . In my own Embassy there were certain ones of influence who were pro-26th of July, pro-Castro, and anti-Batista.

SENATOR EASTLAND: Who were they?

MR. SMITH: ... I would say the Chief of the Political Section, John Topping, and the Chief of the CIA Section. It was revealed that the No. 2 CIA man in the embassy had given unwarranted and undue encouragement to the revolutionaries. This came out in the trials of naval officers after the Cienfue gos revolution of September 1957."

5. A Spanish Language Radio Station Would be Very Helpful

"MR. SOURWINE: . . . What do you think of the proposal that a Spanish language radio station be established at Key West or some similar point to acquaint the Cubans with the U.S. position?

MR. SMITH: I think that would be very helpful.

6. The U.S. Government's Key Role in Delivering Cuba to Communism.

"MR. SMITH: . . . The Batista government was overthrown because of the corruption, disintegration from within, and because of the United States and the various agencies of the United States who directly and indirectly aided the overthrow of the Batista government and brought into power Fidel Castro."

"MR. SMITH: . . . It is true, in reply to your question, Senator, that the U.S. Government instructed me through the State Department to say that we would not give aid and support to the Rivero Aguero government when installed (President-elect at the heatedly contested November 1958 elections, to have been sworn in in February 1959. Ed.) because we did not feel that he could maintain effective control of the country. As far as the disintegration of the armed forces around the Batista government, the answer to your last question is that this negative action helped shatter the morale of the existing government. The responsibility for the deterioration in the morale of the army, navy, and Cuban Air Force dates back to many other forms of direct and indirect —I use the word 'intervention' advisedly."

"MR. SMITH: . . . It is also (true. Ed.) that, upon instructions, I spent 2 hours and 35 minutes on December 17, 1958, with Batista, and I told him that the United States or rather certain influential people in the United States believed that he could no longer maintain effective control in Cuba, and that they believed it would avoid a great deal of further bloodshed if he were to retire.

SENATOR EASTLAND: That was on instructions of the State Department?

MR. SMITH: An ambassador never would have a conversation like that, sir, unless it was on instructions of the State Department."

MR. SMITH: Without the United States, Castro would not be in power today. I will put it as straight as that to you, sir."



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- 3. Except otherwise marked all emphasis added by us.

IV. EXCERPTS OF SWORN TESTIMONY OF AMBASSADOR ROBERT C. HILL MADE ON JUNE 12, 1961



Abstract of Ambassador Hill's Diplomatic Service Record

- ★ Ambassador To:

 Mexico --April 1957 to January 3, 1961

 Costa Rica

 El Salvador
- Assistant Secretary of State in Charge of Congressional Relations
- ¥ Foreign Service in India.



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TESTIMONY OF AMBASSADOR ROBERT C. HILL

- I. Dr. Milton Eisenhower (President D.W. Eisenhower's Brother. Ed.) and his Advisor, Mr. William WIELAND (1) -- Key man in the Castro-Communist Abduction of Cuba-- Frequent Guests of the Mexican Government.
 - An Interesting Story of how the Painstaking Efforts of Ambassador Robert C. Hill to Expose Communism in Cuba were Sabotaged or Ignored.
 - A Memorable Airplane Trip to Mazatlan that could have Averted the Communist Menace to the United States from Red Cuba.
- "MR. SOURWINE: Are you acquainted with Mr. William WIELAND?
- "MR. HILL: I have met him.

MR. SOURWINE: Who is Mr. WIELAND?

MR. HILL: William WIELAND, at the time I was Ambassador of the United States to Mexico, could be properly classified as my superior because he was in charge of the Cuban-Mexican affairs. It is interesting to note that during the period of time I was Ambassador of the United States in Mexico,

(1) TACC'S EDITORIAL NOTE

As a succinct background note on Mr. William WIELAND's career in the State Department, we quote from a Report of the Internal Security Subcommittee of the U.S. Senate (Government Printing Office document No. 87265) the following:

"... He was appointed (to his post with the State Department. Ed.) without any security check.

(His appointment actually was effective before he even filled out any form of an application.) (sic)

He falsified his job application by omission.

When he later filled out an expanded personal history form, he falsified that by direct misstatement.

Mr. WIELAND had a hand in shaping our policy with respect to Cuba both before and after Castro's takeover."

I heard from Mr. WIELAND only twice by telephone and once or twice through the mail. He did come to Mexico on several occasions, accompanying Dr. Milton Eisenhower, who was there often as a guest of the Mexican Government.

MR. SOURWINE: What has been your experience with Mr. WIELAND?

MR. HILL: It is most unsatisfactory.

MR. SOURWINE: What do you mean by that?

MR. HILL: Well, I did not regard him a competent officer or a man who could be trusted. I was warned by members of the Foreign Service about Mr. WIELAND; that he was an opportunist and a dilettante and that I should be very careful in my dealings with him.

It certainly was verified by the personal experiences I had with him when he accompanied Dr. Eisenhower to Mexico.

MR. SOURWINE: Tell us about this visit he made to Mexico.

MR. HILL: He made several visits, Mr. Sourwine, to Mexico. Which specific one are you interested in?

MR. SOURWINE: You have mentioned a visit which he accompanied Dr. Eisenhower.

MR. HILL: He accompanied the doctor on each of his trips to Mexico. I think the most important visit, where there was some controversy, was the time he came to Mexico with Dr. Eisenhower in August of 1959."

"MR.SOURWINE: Do I understand you correctly that it was your hope that, through briefing Dr. Milton Eisenhower, this situation could eventually be brought to the attention of the State Department and result in some action?

MR. HILL: That is correct.

MR. SOURWINE: Surely, you had some way of getting this information from (sic --Should be "to," Ed.) the State Department other than through Dr. Eisenhower?

MR. HILL: We had the normal, diplomatic channels and we utilized those channels.

MR. SOURWINE: With what result?

MR. HILL: We had no positive results. It concerned us greatly.

MR. SOURWINE: And so you hoped to bring this to the attention of the State Department through a briefing of Dr. Eisenhower?"

"MR.SOURWINE: Did Dr. Eisenhower assent to the briefing you had in mind?

MR. HILL: He was our house guest. I asked the doctor... if he would be willing to take the time to... brief him about the seriousness of the Communist problem in Cuba. The doctor had just returned from his trip to Russia with Vice President Nixon... but when I made the request he said: 'Certainly, Bob, I would be most happy to have the point of view of the American Embassy in Mexico.'

MR. SOURWINE: Was this briefing of Dr. Eisenhower opposed by anyone?

MR. HILL: When the briefing started, it was opposed by Mr. WIELAND because he gave the impression that we were misrepresenting the situation in Cuba.

MR. SOURWINE: When and where was this briefing held?

MR. HILL: As I pointed out, the doctor was there as a guest of the Mexican Government. . . I asked the doctor if I could take along the counselor of the Embassy for political affairs, Mr. Raymond Leddy. . . one of the most knowledgeable men in Latin American affairs in the Department of State. The doctor said, 'By all means.' There were other people that accompanied us on the trip, but Mr. Leddy knew the problem in Cuba firsthand, having lived there as a Foreign Service officer. I asked Mr. Leddy if he would bring with him the documentation to support our position.

MR. SOURWINE: Did he do this?

MR. HILL: He did

MR. SOURWINE: Did the briefing take place on an airplane on the way to Mazatlán?

MR. HILL: It did, sir.

MR. SOURWINE: Tell us about this in as much detail as you remember."

"MR. HILL: . . . Each time Mr. Leddy would say, 'This is Communist dominated' or 'This man is a Communist' he was met with Mr. WIELAND saying 'It is not true.'

In the middle of what turned out to be quite a long discussion, Colonel Glawe, who was the air attaché, came back and joined in the discussion and became involved in supporting Mr. Leddy's point of view. Each time that communism was mentioned and its control of the situation in Cuba, it was discounted by Mr. WIELAND.

Mr. Leddy had an intelligence report for the month of June 1959 which supported many of Mr. Leddy's contentions. It was obvious to me that Mr.

WIELAND had not read the report, although he was directly responsible for the area. But when Mr. Leddy attempted to project the actual documents into the picture, an argument ensued, not a serious one, but I mean men disagreeing on the issue.

Colonel Glawe referred to Mr. WIELAND as either a damn fool or a Communist and, of course, it caused tempers to flare and Dr. Eisenhower said he did not want to hear any more about the situation."

"MR. SOURWINE: Did Mr. Leddy get an opportunity to show Dr. Milton

Eisenhower this intelligence report?

MR. HILL: If I recall correctly, Mr. Sourwine, he took it out of his briefcase, but that was the point that the meeting broke up. The doctor felt that tempers had risen and it would be unproductive to pursue the matter any further.

Dr. Eisenhower was a very attentive participant in this attempt by Mr. Leddy to present the facts. Dr. Eisenhower did not reprimand Mr. WIELAND for his interruptions.

MR. SOURWINE: I want to read to you from your executive session testimony and ask you if, according to your present recollection, this is exactly what happened.

You told us that, after Mr. WIELAND had interrupted the briefing to defend Castro against the charges of communism or Communist connections, you finally turned to Mr. WIELAND and said:

'I do not recall asking you to be in on this conversation. Dr. Eisenhower has agreed to listen to a man of integrity and experience in Latin America.'

MR. HILL: That is correct.

MR. SOURWINE: (reading)

'As far as I can see, you do not qualify because what Mr. Leddy is discussing at the moment comes from the joint intelligence report of June 1959, regarding Communist infiltration in Cuba.'

Mr. WIELAND said, 'There is no evidence of Communist infiltration in Cuba.'

MR. HILL: That is correct."

"MR. SOURWINE: Did Mr. WIELAND assert to Dr. Eisenhower that Castro was not a Communist or was not surrounded or influenced by them?

MR. HILL: In every instance where we tried to present Communist infiltration in the government of Castro it was met with a rebuff by Mr. WIELAND. MR. SOURWINE: Do you remember telling us in executive session, Mr. Hill, that you felt Mr. WIELAND had made efforts to undermine your status as Ambassador?

MR. HILL: There is nothing unusual about that, Mr. Sourwine. I was a political appointee. I had taken a strong stand on various issues involving Latin America. It was well known in the Department. I had been warning my friend, the late Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, since 1953, that Latin America was being lost and that we had to do something about the problem in Latin America consistent with our friendship and respect and agreements with the various countries. If not, we were going to be in serious trouble."

II. Portents of the U.S. Ambassadors' Conference in San Salvadorin April 1959. Ambassador Philip W. BONSAL's Doings --Man with a Mission.

"THE CHAIRMAN: Was there a meeting called in Central America in which an attempt was made to sell Castro?

MR. HILL: I believe you are referring, Senator, to the Ambassadors' Conference in San Salvador.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes

MR. HILL: That was in April 1959, a little over 3-1/2 months after Mr. Castro came into power.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR. HILL: I attended that meeting, sir.

THE CHAIRMAN: I asked, Was the purpose of that meeting an attempt to sell Castro to our ambassadors?

MR. HILL: I have my opinion, Senator, as to the purpose of that meeting.

THE CHAIRMAN: Well, what is your opinion?

MR. HILL: My opinion was that the meeting was designed to set the policy of patience and forbearance in dealing with Mr. Castro.

I took issue with Ambassador BONSAL, because I felt that, despite his excellent presentation --and he is entitled to his opinion, and he was on the ground in Cuba, we were on the ground in Mexico-- that patience and forbearance in dealing with a Communist would lead to disaster for the United States.

THE CHAIRMAN: Tell us what happened at the meeting. Describe it.

MR. HILL: I had just returned to Mexico, Senator Eastland, from a trip to the Iron Curtain countries, when Mr. Cecil Gray showed me a cable saying that there would be an Ambassadors' Conference in San Salvador. I believe the dates were April 9 to 11 or 10 through 12 (1959). I told Mr. Gray at the time I did not want to attend the meeting. He was somewhat concerned. He is a very fine gentleman, a man with a fine Service career. He has served his country with dignity and pride. He said, 'You have to go, Mr. Ambassador.' I said, 'I don't want go to down there because there will be more of this attempt to soft sell on Castro. The sooner the United States recognizes the problem and can get the cooperation from our Latin American neighbors in dealing with this problem consistent with the agreements we have signed, we can start to have the proper relations with Latin America. But if we are going to condone Castro at this meeting, it can lead to very serious problems for the United States.'

Well, the meeting was designed to discuss the problems of Castro and his influence in the Caribbean countries. Naturally, Ambassador BONSAL, who has had many years of experience in Latin America and who was then Ambassador in Cuba, had an opportunity to give his point of view. I complimented him on his presentation but I told him I wanted the record to show that I was 100 percent in disagreement. I told the conference the time to deal with Castro was then. We had the instruments, if we wanted to resort to the Organization of American States, to deal with the problem. I tried very hard to get the Conference to accept a point of view that I thought had some merit; I believed that all evidence of communism in Cuba should be submitted by the United States to the Organization of American States, and that the United States request appropriate action. I had considerable difficulty. I was unable to get that language adopted.

Now the only Ambassador that supported me was Ambassador Willauer from Costa Rica. I think history will judge that was the time for the United States to look at the Communist problem in Cuba realistically. Naturally there were differences of opinion and of quite serious nature expressed at the meeting.

THE CHAIRMAN: What was Mr. BONSAL's position?

MR. HILL: Mr. BONSAL's position, and he certainly was entitled to his opinion, was that Castro was in power; that he had tremendous popular support; that there was considerable support in the Hemisphere for Castro and Castroism, and that we ought to go slow in dealing with him. He said we should be very patient with him despite the fact that he was constantly insulting the United States, our President, our Secretary of State, and our Vice-President practically on marathon TV programs night after night in Cuba criticizing the United States. BONSAL felt that eventually, Castrowould see the light and return to the family of Latin American nations. He said Cuba needed a revolution and Cuba then would start to prosper and make its contribution to the Latin American family. (This is a big communist hoax and it is surprising that Mr. BONSAL --a recognized Latin American expert-- fell for it. Ed.).

As I say, Ambassador BONSAL is entitled to his opinion. I happen to have disagreed with him concerning Castro and his objectives.

SENATOR KEATING: May I ask there, what did Ambassador BONSAL indicate at that time as to Castro's communism?

MR. HILL: The Ambassador (BONSAL. Ed.) pointed out that Fidel Castro had communistic associates. However, he made it clear in his opinion that Castro made the decisions and that he would, if patience was used by the United States in dealing with Cuba and in dealing with Castro, that eventually he would see the light. I don't think communism ever sees the light.

SENATOR KEATING: I want to follow that up with one question. Did he indicate that in his opinion, Castro had some kind of theory on the way to run a country which was neither communism nor our system, but something in between and that he, himself, was not a Communist?

MR. HILL: Ambassador BONSAL did not think Fidel Castro a Communist.

SENATOR KEATING: He indicated to me that Castro was advocating something else.

MR. HILL: A third country position.

SENATOR KEATING: That was his position.

MR. HILL: Communism, our way of life in the United States, and a third country position. Well, I think now we have an opportunity to judge whether it is a third country position or whether it is communism. I say it has been Communist from the start, beginning on January 1, 1959, when he came to power. He completely destroyed the military, one of the first moves, destroyed the bureaucracy. His technicians were from Communist China and Moscow. I assume they weren't there advocating a third country position; that they were there promoting communism.

SENATOR KEATING: The Ambassador (BONSAL. Ed.) must have known when they were there.

MR. HILL: I would assume so.

THE CHAIRMAN: You knew they were there.

MR. HILL: Yes, sir.

THE CHAIRMAN: And our State Department knew they were there.

MR. HILL: If they read the reports, Senator, they would know they were there. We had a policy in the Embassy in Mexico that anything that had to do with Cuba was cabled to the American Embassy in Havana.

THE CHAIRMAN: These were Communist technicians?

MR. HILL: Yes, sir.

SENATOR DODD: Ambassador Hill, was a claim ever made by Ambassador BONSAL, or anyone else who had a different opinion than yours with

respect to Castro, that BONSAL or anyone else had information not available to you?

Is my question clear?

MR. HILL: No, it is not quite clear, Senator Dodd, excuse me.

SENATOR DODD: Well, let me put it this way. You were in a dispute, so to speak, with BONSAL about Castro, weren't you?

MR. HILL: Are you referring to the San Salvador conference?

SENATOR DODD: Yes.

MR. HILL: That is correct.

SENATOR DODD: Did he ever offer as an excuse, or as an explanation of the difference, that he had information which was not available to you?

MR. HILL: No, sir.

SENATOR DODD: Was this also true of others with whom you had differences about our policy with respect to Castro?

MR. HILL: At the San Salvador meeting, the differences of opinion regarding Ambassador BONSAL's approach and mine were restricted pretty much to exchanges between Ambassador BONSAL, Secretary Rubottom, Deputy Under Secretary of State Loy Henderson, and myself. There were comments made by other ambassadors, but the majority of the exchange took place between Ambassador BONSAL and myself. Secretary Rubottom emphasized time and time again the seriousness of the Castro problem and that the U.S. Government and the press in the United States were beginning to be more concerned with the problem in Cuba. He said the purpose of the meeting was to discuss this.

As I have said, Ambassador BONSAL's opinion was that we must be patient; that eventually Castro would return to the family of good neighbors in Latin America. He maintained this position during his tenure of office as ambassador of the United States to Cuba. As a result, he must bear the responsibility as the chief architect of the Cuban disaster.

SENATOR DODD: I understand that. I am trying to pin down what I consider a very important fact here. I can hear some of these people saying tomorrow that Ambassador Hill simply did not have the information.

MR. HILL: I had the same information that Ambassador BONSAL did, because of the way the Department of State communications system is set up, Senator Dodd. Copies flow back and forth between the embassies. Because of the importance of Mexico and the importance of Cuba, the intelligence fraternity in Havana and Mexico had proper liaison. Does that answer your question, sir?

SENATOR DODD: Yes. I was just trying to make the record clear. I knew what your answer would be, but I mean a lot of people in this country feel that some ambassadors have not had enough information.

MR. HILL: We have had so much information on Castro and communism that it grew rather tiring reading about it."

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"MR. HILL: . . . I felt we had the obligation to furnish all evidences of communism in Cuba to the Organization of American States and ask for appropriate action. We have signed treaties at Bogotá, at Caracas and at Rio that deal with this specific problem."

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"MR. SOURWINE: Was Mr. WIELAND present at the discussions in El Salvador which brought out the fact that there was substantial intelligence respecting Castro's communist connections?

MR. HILL: I had no contact other than 'hello,' or 'goodby' with Mr. WIELAND in El Salvador. He was there but not an active participant in the conference.

MR. SOURWINE: Do you remember telling us in executive session that, on the occasion of this airplane trip to Matzatlan (sic), which of course followed the El Salvador conference, that Mr. WIELAND had declared that Castro was an idealist; that he knew Castro personally; that there had been lots of charges and misrepresentations, but that there was no evidence in the State Department files to confirm Mr. Leddy's point of view that Castro was a Communist or surrounded and controlled by Communists?

MR. HILL: I recall the conversation. We referred to the intelligence report of June 1959, to substantiate Mr. Leddy's claim that there was evidence in the files of pro-Communist and communistic associations by Fidel Castro."

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"MR. SOURWINE: Reverting to the occasion of the meeting of ambassadors in El Salvador, do you recall telling us about a proposed communique which was presented immediately after the meeting?

MR. HILL: Yes, I do.

MR. SOURWINE: What was that communique?

MR. HILL: The first day that the meeting opened, within 5 minutes after the conference opened, we were given a communique and asked to agree to it. We had only been in the conference for 5 minutes, and I objected. I said, 'The normal procedure would be to write the communique at the end of the conference, not the beginning.' I took the time to read the communique and it said nothing except platitudes. After my protest the communique was withdrawn.

MR. SOURWINE. Was it subsequently presented again?

MR. HILL: In different form, somewhat stronger."

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"MR. SOURWINE: Was there some difficulty between you and Mr. BONSAL over this communique?

MR. HILL: Yes

MR. SOURWINE: Tell us about it.

MR. HILL: Well, Mr. BONSAL felt that anything in the communique that cast any reflections upon Castro would make his job in Cuba very difficult. He hoped that a diplomatic communique of good will and the importance of the area would be issued rather than anything that would be considered provocative by Fidel Castro. He opposed the inclusion of the modified language that was offered by Ambassador Willauer.

MR. SOURWINE: Do you remember telling us in executive session that after studying the communique, you said you could not go along with it, calling it a whitewash of Castro?

You said you told them:

'You are going to discourage every country in Latin America that fears the Castro menace. There are certain aspects of the communique that are helpful, but I cannot go along with a communique that whitewashes Castro.'

MR. HILL: That was the communique as drawn.

MR. SOURWINE: That is what you said at the time.

MR. HILL: Yes, sir.

MR. SOURWINE: You remember telling us that Mr. BONSAL said to you, 'If you cannot be a team player, why not resign?'

MR. HILL: That is correct. I suggested that it was not up to Mr. BONSAL to deal with my resignation. That was up to the President and the Secretary of State.

MR. SOURWINE: Would you say you were successful or partially successful in that communique?

MR. HILL: Partially successful at the time and at a later date unsuccessful because nothing was done."

"MR. SOURWINE: ... Were minutes taken of this meeting of Ambassadors in El Salvador?

MR. HILL: Yes.

MR. SOURWINE: Did you see a copy of these minutes?

MR. HILL: Well, I was under the impression that the meeting was taped. I wrote Secretary Rubottom and asked him if I could have an exact tape recording of the meeting. I received in return more or less a synopsis of what took place. It was a very inaccurate report as far as my position was concerned, so I wrote Mr. Rubottom, who is a friend for whom I have a high regard. I gave him a list of about 10, 12, maybe 14 corrections. I suggested that, if the report was submitted to the Foreign Relations Committee, at least my position should be accurately reported. I have not had a reply."

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"MR. SOURWINE: ... Do you recall telling us of a conversation about you between Ambassador BONSAL and Ambassador Whelan, the former ambassador to Nicaragua, which was subsequently recounted to you?

MR. HILL: I believe diplomacy is like a football game. After you finish the game, you go about your business. Evidently, Ambassador BONSAL did not agree with this approach to life. After the conference in El Salvador was over, he saw Ambassador Whelan at the hotel. He said, 'Mr. Ambassador, I noticed that you did not join in support of Ambassador Hill regarding his position on Castro. You have influence in the Republican National Committee. I hope you will utilize that influence to get rid of Hill.'"

III. The State Department was Apprised of Communist Danger.

"MR. SOURWINE: You say the tenor of this intelligence at all times from 1957 forward and growing stronger as the years progressed, was that Castro was surrounded by Communists and influenced by Communists?

MR. HILL: That is correct.

MR. SOURWINE: In addition to this intelligence which you forwarded, did you see other intelligence reports from the Pentagon, CIA, and from the State Department which had the same purport?

MR. HILL: I read a great many reports from the intelligence community. I would say the best reporting came from the Pentagon. The CIA reports I saw, the reviews that came in from the Department of State—the monthly reviews—often times contained a mass of data without conclusions. Coming from the State Department was biographic data and intelligence data that came on a monthly basis. On some of these reports, I recall taking issue with the Department, because I thought that they were prejudiced and were favorable to the Castro regime. On occasion, I wrote the Department of State, cited my differences of opinion and said I thought it was unfortunate that these pro-Castro documents were being circulated among the embassies around the world, because this man was evil and would cause embarrassment and trouble for the United States."

IV. Raúl Castro Identified in Russia as a Communist in May 1959.

"SENATOR JOHNSTON: How much did you know about his brother?

MR. HILL: In Mexico, the Embassy always considered Raúl Castro a Communist. I recall seeing an official Government document sent by the American Embassy in Moscow to the State Department. One of our second secretaries had attended a lecture. Somehow or other, he was admitted. I believe this was in May 1959, and the Russians themselves identified Raúl Castro as a Communist. I remember sending comments back to the Department that they had been searching for concrete information and here was a Communist document, received from our Embassy in Moscow, showing that a Russian had identified Raul Castro as a known Communist; not a Communist sympathizer, but a known Communist.

... This document was entitled 'Soviet Attitude Toward Latin America' and in there, they identify Raul Castro as a Communist."

V. The State Department Issued Pro-Castro Reports.

"MR. SOURWINE: Mr. Ambassador, do you recall the source or sources of the pro-Castro papers which you say you saw?

MR. HILL: There is an intelligence research section in the Department of State that has the responsibility of reviewing all intelligence that comes in from the field. In my opinion, many of those documents were slanted in favor of Fidel Castro.

I recall one, for instance, that dealt with Castro's first year in power. Now this is a very interesting document, biographic report No. 312, dated March 17, 1960. I thought it treated Castro in a much kinder fashion than this infamous character deserved. I wrote the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Rubottom, and I recall writing down once again on this piece of paper, the following statement. I said:

'Those of us serving in the area of Latin America during this critical time, will have to stand the judgment of history as to whether or not we have done a good job for our country. I do not think that this intelligence report reflects yours or the Department of State's viewpoint accurately.'

MR. SOURWINE: Do you recall telling us in executive session--

SENATOR KEATING: Excuse me. Who prepared that report?

MR. HILL: I believe that was prepared by the Office of Intelligence of the Department of State.

MR. SOURWINE: Was that out of Washington?

MR. HILL: That is correct, sir.

SENATOR KEATING: Not from the field?

MR. HILL: That is correct. We were concerned about these reports. I had each one of them analyzed, when they came in, by competent members of the Embassy in Mexico. The reports, we believed, were not accurately portraying the situation in Cuba. We wrote back to Washington citing our point of view. . . "

VI. The U.S. Embassy in Havana Infiltrated by the Enemy.

"MR. SOURWINE: Do you recall telling us that personnel from the Embassy in Havana and Cubans who came to Mexico City urged you to go to Washington to try to clear up the situation because the Embassy was considered pro-Castro, that is our Embassy in Havana?

MR. HILL: That is correct.

MR. SOURWINE: When was this?

MR. HILL: Late 1959 and 1960. I saw a cable from the Pentagon intelligence as late as September of 1960 saying there was allegedly a pro-Castro cell in the U.S. Embassy in Havana. This was September of 1960.

MR. SOURWINE: What was the source of that?

MR. HILL: Naval intelligence

MR. SOURWINE: And to whom was that addressed?

MR. HILL: It was addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations."

"MR. SOURWINE: Do you recall telling the committee that you had been told by a responsible official of our Embassy in Havana that there was a CIA representative in Havana who was pro-Castro?

MR. HILL: That is correct."

VII. Ambassador Robert C. Hill's Enlightened Comments and Suggestions Regarding Communism in Cuba and in Latin America.

a) Fidel Castro's Movement had Communistic Background

"MR. HILL: . . .When I was assigned to Costa Rica in 1953 and 1954 we knew that Che Guevara was a Communist. He has been one of the most important leaders for promoting communism in Cuba and he was sitting right along with Fidel Castro from the first day that he came into power. . ."

b) Patience and Forbearance Useless

"MR. HILL: I felt that if one did his homework he would be aware of the fact that patience and forbearance which was the U.S. policy, would not work in dealing with Castro. In the past it certainly has proven unsatisfactory in dealing with communism."

c) Efforts to Awaken Officialdom and the Media

"MR. HILL: We brought to the attention of every Congressman, every Senator, every newspaperman and every person of importance that came to Mexico: the seriousness of Castro and the Communist problem in Cuba. We had a briefing session for every important person that came to Mexico from the United States."

d) Mexico's Role in the Communist Abduction of Cuba

"MR. HILL: ... The proximity of Mexico to Cuba was such that the agents coming from Moscow and some from China would go back and forth between the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City and Cuba. Propaganda was flowing into Mexico at this time from Cuba and from behind the Iron Curtain..."

e) The Roles of the State Department and
The New York Times in the Communist Abduction of Cuba.

"THE CHAIRMAN: . . . Now the question I am going to ask you is this: Wasn't it your judgment that the Caribbean desk of the State Department of the United States was pro-Castro?

MR. HILL: Before I went to Mexico?

THE CHAIRMAN: Sir?

MR. HILL: I recall the fact that in the spring of 1957 Earl Smith, who went to Cuba as the Ambassador, came to my office and asked me to talk with him about his preparations for his Cuban assignment.

I had known Ambassador Smith at the Republican conventions held in Chicago and San Francisco. I actually worked with him in 1956 in San Francisco on foreign policy matters.

I said, 'Earl, I am sorry that you are going to Cuba. You might be interested to know that 'Chip' Bohlen was supposed to go to Cuba.' This sort of set him back. He said, 'What do you mean, that Ambassador Bohlen was going to be transferred from Moscow to Havana?' I said, 'That was the plan a few months ago. Then the President and Secretary Dulles decided to send him to Manila. You are assigned to Cuba to preside over the downfall of Batista. The decision has been made that Batista has to go. You must be very careful.' (This was in the Spring of 1957, Ed.)

THE CHAIRMAN: The decision made where?

MR. HILL: I am talking about the corridors of the State Department, Senator

THE CHAIRMAN: But it was your judgment that the decision had been made by the State Department that Batista had to go?

MR. HILL: I am not saying the decision at the top, but the decision down at the lower level."

MR. HILL: . . . It was my judgment at that time that Castro was being assisted into power and that there had been some activity along the corridors in the Department to support his cause.

THE CHAIRMAN: Activity to put him in power?

MR. HILL: To promote Castro's rise to power."

"MR. SOURWINE: Mr. Hill, do you recall telling this committee in executive session 'there is no doubt in my mind that individuals in the State Department, with the help of individuals of the New York Times, put Fidel Castro in power?'

MR. HILL: There is no doubt in my mind that is a true story. Individuals in in the State Department and individuals in the New York Times, put Castro in power."

f) Why Fight Communism in Korea and not in Cuba --Only 90 Miles from the U.S.A.?

"MR. HILL: ... it is interesting for me to note that 14,000 or 15,000 miles away, we lost 150,000 American boys or they were maimed for life or many of them seriously injured and killed in the defense of Korea and in the fight against the Communists. But in Cuba, only 90 miles from the United States, we are unwilling to take affirmative action."

TACC Editorial Comment. Ambassador Hill testified in 1961. The same holds true for Vietnam today. As we said in the Exposé, the Government Officials change but the policy remains inalterable.

a) The U.S.A. Violates its Commitments to the O.A.S.

"MR. HILL: Senator Keating, I had been advocating a complete embargo, air and sea, for many months and to no avail. I have stated it publicly in speeches that I have made in the United States. There is no reason in the world for the United States to allow Communist arms to be shipped into this hemisphere through Havana.

It is in violation of every treaty we have signed with Latin America that deals with the common defense of the area. . ."

h) What Must Be Done

C

"MR. HILL: . . . The most serious foreign policy problem that faces the United States today (1961. Ed.) outside Communist China and Russia is Cuba, if something isn't done about Cuba the freedom of the Western Hemisphere is in serious jeopardy."

MR. HILL: . . . If the United States will show some leadership, reconvene the Organization of American States, then clearly and consistently outline the problem -- the problem of communism-- and suggest that we invoke the Caracas resolution or the Rio resolution, then you can move with your economic sanctions within the prerogatives of the Organization of American States, if the majority agrees.

... If they (Nations members of O.A.S. Ed.) can't see fit to protect what is their own security, then the United States must concern itself with theirs, as well as our security. Then the United States could bring about the total embargo which I believe is necessary in Cuba, stopping all trade with Cuba, recognize a Cuban Government in exile that is not a Fidel government without Fidel. If the Cuban Government in exile requests the United States to intervene or if Castro continues to provoke the United States, we give Mr. Castro 48 hours. At the end of 48 hours if he is still in Cuba, then we go in.

Now I am well aware of intervention and the problems that it presents. If we cannot get our friends in Latin America to join us, we have no other alternative.

I will assure you that Russia will not force a showdown in Cuba and Castro will fall. I would doubt that there would be any loss of life. They recognize the power of the United States. Latin America is looking to the United States to lead and not to be led."



TACC Editor's Notes.

- 1. Headings have been supplied by us for easy identification of subject matter.
- 2. For readability's sake some rearrangement of Mr. Hill's declarations was necessary in order to group together his statements on specific subjects. As is customary in oral testimony, certain topics are bound to come up several times during the questioning and, therefore, appear in different places in the verbatim transcript of the testimony.
- 3. Except otherwise marked all emphasis added by us.

SWORN TESTIMONY OF MR. PAUL BETHEL WHO SERVED AT THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN CUBA DURING THE CRITICAL YEARS. EXCERPTS THEREOF

Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws of the

Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Made on March 6, 1961



Abstract of Mr. Paul Bethel's Diplomatic Service Record:

- ¥ Entered Foreign Service in August 1949.
- * Served in:

Germany 1950-1953 Japan 1953-1957 Cuba 1958-1961



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1. Cuba Turned into an Underground Interconnected Fortress.

"MR. BETHEL: . . . since 1960, the Russians have literally burrowed their way through the length and breadth of the island. They have carved out a mammoth command post in La Gobernadora hills of Pinar del Río Province, and honeycombed it with hundred of kilometers of tunnels, four of which are so large that they accommodate two-way truck traffic."

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"MR. BETHEL: . . . connected as they are with cave complexes within the hills, these tunnels give the Russians the capability of moving heavy weapons, including possibly missiles, for distances up to 45 miles underground in many directions."

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"MR. BETHEL: . . . It is significant that San Cristóbal, one of the missile sites observed at the time of the missile crisis, is located near the exit of one of those tunnels, and the entrance to the vast Los Portales caves, widened and connected by tunnels, is located in those same foothills, to the West of San Cristóbal. These caves were cordoned off as a military zone in 1962 and they stillremain a military zone today...(1967)."

. . .

"MR. BETHEL: . . . Each of Cuba's six provinces has subterranean hangars in which military aircraft, including Mig-21's, are stored. They can be adapted to carry bomb loads and can be used to reach the United States and many countries in Central America and the Caribbean. . . The military airbase at San Antonio de los Banos (sic) in Havana Province contains several underground hangars with ramps which permit Mig-21 aircraft to pop into the air, seemingly from out of nowhere.

Again, we have this tremendous burrowing and tunneling. This base is connected with the underground Army base at Managua." (Some 20 miles to Managua, Russian Headquarters for Havana and Central Cuba. Ed.)



Bethel mentioned unconfirmed reports of a 60-mile tunnel. Mr. Sourwine, the Subcommittee's Chief Counsel is adamant. Mr. Bethel explains:

"MR. BETHEL: But you see, it is facilitated in Cuba because Cuba is almost hollow, really. It has some of the largest cave complexes in the world.

For example, there is an underground lake. . . around 3 miles long. The size and variety of Cuba's caves is just amazing. . ."

• • • • •

"MR. BETHEL: Reports of the underground military air base in Camaguey first came to light in **December 1961**, with reports of the Santa Clara base

following, I think in January or February. They had built underground hangars over a year in advance of the missile crisis."

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"MR. BETHEL: . . . Near this base (Holguín huge underground military airbase. Ed.) are Los Haticos del Purial, the site of Russian excavations which commenced in February 1962 AND CONTINUE UP TO THIS DAY. . . Mayarí Arriba. . . is again the site of another Russian base."

TACC Editorial Comment.

At this point we would like to call attention to the fact that, within a short distance, in the Province of Oriente, are THREE RUSSIAN BASES, one of which --the Holguín Base-- is very big. Who knows --even remotely-- how many combat troops from foreign communist countries are stationed in Cuba TODAY?



2. Powerful Russian Radar System Installed in Cuba.

"MR. BETHEL: The Russians are just now completing five years' work at what must be stupendous cost on completely equipping Cuba with a radar system. . ."

3. Russian Missiles in Cuba.

"MR. BETHEL: ... Now, to begin with facts as regards missiles, missiles of great size are constantly being moved around Cuba under cover of darkness. Their movement is so well organized that sections of cities and towns are systematically blacked out as they pass through."

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"MR. SOURWINE: Have you thought of the possibility that maybe the word 'around' doesn't belong in there and maybe it is only a situation in which missiles of great size are constantly being moved in Cuba under the 'cover of darkness?"

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"MR. BETHEL: The fact, of course, is very illusive. If they weren't in fact moving Russian missiles from one area to another, then we must assume that they are pouring into Cuba at a fantastic rate, that these are indeed missiles just being brought into Cuba."

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"MR. SOURWINE: When you say ballistics (sic) missiles, do you mean a missile designed to wind up or land elsewhere than Cuba?

MR. BETHEL: Yes

MR. SOURWINE: You are not necessarily talking about intercontinental ballistic missiles, or are you?

MR. BETHEL: I'm not talking about ICBM's.

MR. SOURWINE: Are you talking about intermediate range?

MR. BETHEL: Yes; IRBM's

MR. SOURWINE: We thought they had been taken off. We thought the Russians had removed all those.

MR. BETHEL: I don't think they ever removed all of their missiles. I'll develop that as I go along, if I may.

MR. SOURWINE: Go ahead.

MR. BETHEL: It is difficult to check out these stories on missiles in Cuba, because of many reasons.

... Many eyewitnesses are afraid to connect their names publicly with positive identification of IRBM's in Cuba. This is so because Fidel Castro has turned the Cuban airlift (1) into a monstrouos instrument of blackmail..."

"MR. BETHEL: In February of 1963, I interviewed a defector from Castro's diplomatic service. His name is Hugo Bell Huertas. He was in Cuba at the time, and he said. . . Soviet and Czech and East German technicians really did the work in preparing the caves as early as February of 1961. . . He states that the missiles were brought in in Soviet oil tankers that had no oil in them.

He said that the most harmless ship, really, would presumably be a Soviet oil tanker, but that no Cuban functionary, not even Fidel Castro, was permitted to step aboard those tankers.

His testimony is to the effect that the Russians were all prepared underground before they ever showed anything above ground, and since that time, we have had reports, of course, of missiles coming in; a doctor in the port of Matanzas had seen missiles coming in from the port."

⁽¹⁾ TACC's Editorial Note: Daily "Liberty Flights," as they are called, were negotiated between Cuba's Red regime and Washington, to bring to the United States Cuban refugees. The flights commenced on December 1, 1965, and no termination date has been announced. Up to September 30, 1967 --in 22 months of uninterrupted operation-- 81,772 refugees have entered the U.S., an average of 3,717 per month.

4. The "Harmless" Oil Tanker -- A TACC Editorial Comment.

Mr. Bell Huertas' information that Russian oil tankers were the ships used to bring missiles into Cuba coincides with the sworn testimony of Mr. Antonio Apud, another highly placed defector from Red Cuba, who has been quoted in the Exposé. Our readers certainly must remember that the only Soviet vessel that was allowed to go through the October 1962 quarantine without inspection, by orders issued by President Kennedy, was, precisely, A SOVIET OIL TANKER.

5. More on Russian Missiles

"MR. SOURWINE: I am beginning to gather that several different sizes of missiles have been seen. Is that your testimony?

MR. BETHEL: Oh, without question. There are air-breathing missiles.

MR. SOURWINE: Up to how large a size?

MR. BETHEL: One which I am still --I'll take the extreme that I am still checking out-- is 40 meters long. Forty meters long is 150 feet, and that would be an ICBM. . .

We do have completely credible accounts of missiles between 80 and 100 feet. . . $^{\prime\prime}$

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"MR. BETHEL: . . . I have been reading several books on missiles, they look to be the T-2 and T-4 Russian IRBM, which has a range of between 800 and 1,500 miles. . ."

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"MR. BETHEL: . . . Matanzas, a very deep harbor port through which missiles have come before, have come into that area before --suddenly, a group of five Russian ships apparently had come in. . . . the Cuban stevedores were taken away. The whole dock area was cordoned off, and the Russians themselves unloaded missiles.

...It was about 4 hours later, after the lights went out, that in front of his house (the doctor's house. Ed.) came a convoy of five tractor-trailer combinations carrying missiles which he identified as being about 60 to 75 feet long. This was in August, about the first week of August 1963."

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"MR. SOURWINE: Are these missiles still under Russian control?

MR. BETHEL: Oh, yes. No Cubans are permitted anywhere near them... this is an interesting point, by the way, because Cubans are beginning to man the SAM sites. As a matter of fact, four units of surface-to-air missiles with Cuban crews were sent to Vietnam, and they are operating there. But

only the Russians are permitted in these areas that I have referred to, in these cave areas. They are cordoned off and this, and that. Only Russians, and nobody else is permitted in there, which would indicate that they are certainly not SAMS.

Secondly, the SAMS are so well known to be in Cuba that there would be absolutely no reason to be transporting SAMS around under cover of darkness.''

"MR. BETHEL: Well, to a large extent, I think that the missile story has been dead and I think it has been dead for a number of reasons. One is that it has just simply passed out of public consciousness, claims that missiles are in Cuba are uniformly met with a statement from the State Department saying that we have no proof that there are missiles in Cuba. But I would like to say this, or I would like to sort of pose this question in a way. I cannot, myself, state categorically that there are IRBM's or ICBM's in Cuba any more than the State Department can claim categorically that they are not there."

6. The Credibility Gap.

a) A TACC Editorial Comment.

We believe Mr. Bethel took a sound, conservative position when he asserted that the State Department could not categorically claim there are no missiles in Cuba now. The findings of the Preparedness Subcommittee in connection with the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis back Mr. Bethel up. The adoption by the Administration of the same negative position which led to the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis is a serious mistake. This position jeopardizes the security of the United States and might be fatal in the not too distant future, God forbid! (For a triple, simultaneous, denial that there are Russian IRBMs in Cuba by the Defense Department, the State Department and the White House, see the Miami Herald, February 14, 1967 -- Page 20-A not included for brevity's sake.)



After debating with Mr. Sourwine, who questioned Bethel as to why the newspapers did not print the refugees' reports upon which his testimony was based, Bethel made the following statement:

b) Paul Bethel's Opinion -A Word to the Wise.

"MR. BETHEL: . . . There is something much more serious that I have learned from witnesses I have talked to whose names cannot possibly be made public, that there is actual pressure being brought against them not to talk publicly.

MR. SOURWINE: By whom?

MR. BETHEL: By the intelligence community in Miami, apparently on orders from Washington.

MR. SOURWINE: By the U.S. intelligence community?

MR. BETHEL: Yes, they are told not to talk.

As a matter of fact, there are various subterfuges used. They offer them jobs; say, look, keep your mouth shut and so on and we will get you a job, and so on. This is quite often used as a subterfuge to keep them quiet.

MR. SOURWINE: You are telling us there is official intimidation and coercion, inducement, to keep Cuban refugees who know about a missile threat to the United States to tell us what they know?

MR. BETHEL: What I am telling you is that I have credible reports to that effect, yes, sir.

MR. SOURWINE: By credible, that means you believe it?

MR. BETHEL: I do.

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"MR. BETHEL: What has been forgotten is that those 2,000 American families are still in Cuba. They let out, what --95 of them? And every one of them were sworn to absolute secrecy about whatever they know, both by the Cuban government when they let them go, and by the American Government when they arrived." (Upon questioning by Mr. Sourwine Mr. Bethel clarified they were not "sworn" to secrecy by the American Government, but just asked to keep their mouths shut. Ed.).

7. The Intelligence Community on Missiles.

"SENATOR THURMOND: . . . Before we leave this point about missiles, has the Pentagon, State Department, or CIA been notified about these missiles that you talked about today, to your knowledge?"

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"MR. BETHEL: Yes, they have a very large intelligence screening group in Miami that screens the refugees.

SENATOR THURMOND: Who has?

MR. BETHEL: I think all the intelligence people. You have the ONI, CIA, DIA, and so on. They screen them when they come in.

SENATOR THURMOND: So you are confident that this information has gotten to the State Department and the Pentagon and the CIA?

MR. BETHEL: I can say this, that I am confident the information is certainly in the hands of the intelligence community, yes, sir.

MR. SOURWINE: I might be out of place, Mr. Chairman, but with the Chair's permission. I will point out that information being in the possession of the intelligence community and reaching the State Department are not necessarily the same thing. We have had evidence of very important information which we know reached the intelligence community, but apparently never reached anybody in the State Department.

MR. BETHEL: I think, if I am not out of line on this, I think that the decision to make these statements is political.

SENATOR THURMOND: Is what?

MR. BETHEL: I think the decision is political, not just intelligence. If we are moving toward, as we appear to be, an accommodation with the Russian base in the Caribbean, then obviously, any disrupting information might upset this delicate balance. I am certain in my own mind that this is a political decision relating to the whole business of accommodation with the Soviet Union, plus the possibility that they are operating under the threat of nuclear blackmail."

8. Cuba is a Huge Concentration Camp Where God-Fearing Anti-Communists are Murdered Every Day.

"MR. BETHEL: Mr. Sourwine, Cuba is one vast concentration camp in which people are taken out of bed in the middle of the night and propped up against a wall and shot. This is Cuba. There is nothing unusual about that. It has been going on for 5 years." (Actually, it has been going on for over EIGHT years, since January 1959. Probably the digit "5" is a typographical mistake. Ed.).

9. Russia Absolutely Controls Cuba.

"SENATOR THURMOND: Would you say the Russians in Cuba number in the hundreds, in the thousands, or just how would you place them?

MR. BETHEL: Certainly they would number in the thousands. There is not much question of that, perhaps the tens of thousands.

SENATOR THURMOND: They (the Russians. Ed.) control the economy of the whole country?

MR. BETHEL Of the whole country, yes. Cuba is just a figure of speech right now, actually.

SENATOR THURMOND. Is Soviet Russia really controlling the country of Cuba, would you say?

MR. BETHEL: Oh, absolutely. They control the postal system, they control the INRA, the national institute of agrarian reform. They have taken over the metallurgical institute where, incidentally, they have been searching for fissionable material for 2 years. They control the control laboratory, they control the communications. The Russians are just in control, period.

SENATOR THURMOND: In other words, is Castro a figurehead?

MR. BETHEL: Castro is never a figurehead. I think it would be going too far to say that because of the nature of the man. However, he is effectively in the Soviet pocket, yes."

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"SENATOR THURMOND: Who runs the country?

MR. BETHEL: The Russians and the Communist Party, the central committee of the Cuban Communist Party.

SENATOR THURMOND: Under whose direction?

MR. BETHEL: Nominally, Castro is the chairman, occupying a position comparable to this bi-bit (sic) that Breshnev and Kosygyn (sic) have as the first secretary of the Communist Party (and Prime Minister, Ed.). They have the Politburo now, exactly as in Russia. He, of course, has that.

But in terms of general policy direction, we just can't get away from the fact that everything that the Russians have done since they moved into Cuba, and I mean moved in, in 1960 and 1961, has been military in nature. Everybody wears uniforms. Everybody's got rifles. They are training Congolese, they are training Tanzanians in these camps. They are training Eritreans."

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"SENATOR THURMOND: Now, as I construe what you say, the Soviets are calling the shots, giving the orders?

MR. BETHEL: Yes, sir.

SENATOR THURMOND: And they are cracking the whip and their orders are carried out?

MR. BETHEL: Yes, sir.

SENATOR THURMOND: And they are in effect exercising control of the country of Cuba in its economy and its people?

MR. BETHEL: Yes, sir."

Cuba Becomes Headquarters for World Subversion. -- How the K-K Pact Helped.

"SENATOR THURMOND: Now, from the intelligence that you have gathered, and you seem to have gathered a great deal of it, what is Soviet Russia's purpose in being there? Is it to spread communism throughout Central and South America, is it to spread communism throughout the United States, or both?

MR. BETHEL: Well, I think the United States is the ultimate target, the final target. But let's not forget that they not only set up an organization there to carry out subversion of Latin America, but Africa and Asia as well.

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...this is why they call it the tricontinental conference. ... Through this body flows all of the equipment and so forth that the Russians are sending to Cuba and from there, transshipped into Latin America. The soviets provide the propaganda line for radio broadcasts. The Soviets provide --well, they just provide everything. Of course, they stay behind the screen and operate with the Latins in front of what they call the wars of national liberation."

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"MR. BETHEL: . . . What we have, really, is a base for the subversion of the entire world to expand Vietnam-type wars throughout the world, located right in Havana. How is that possible? . . . unfortunately, (it) is because of an exchange of letters between the late President Kennedy and Khrushchev, dated October 27, 1962, in which the United States not only gave guarantees never to invade Cuba, but also to see to it that no other country in this hemisphere did it either."

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"MR. BETHEL: . . . At that same time, we called upon the British in the Bahamas to join with us in preventing any attacks whatsoever on the high seas, which to me is piracy -- I don't believe we have that right-- in any area at all. This policy has not wavered since that time. . ."

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"MR. SOURWINE: Mr. Chairman, may I suggest that we are getting pretty far afield from this committe's jurisdiction?

SENATOR THURMOND: I don't know if we are or not. This concerns the internal security of the United States. If we allow communism to remain in

Cuba and don't permit anybody else to disturb communism there, it seems to me it might affect our security.

MR. BETHEL: There is another thing which relates to our promise not to permit countries in this hemisphere to attack Cuba. That is the absolute failure of the United States, the rejection of the United States, to even put Cuba on the agenda of the upcoming Presidents' conference, which is to take place, I think, in April (1967). The United States will not discuss Cuba, won't even discuss it..."

11. Arms Control Over Latin America -- The same "Coup de Grace" which Helped Deliver China and Cuba to Communism.

"MR. BETHEL: ... No. 2, and perhaps even more 'insidious' --this is a descriptive word— we are trying to restrict arms to countries in Latin America that are right now under tremendous subversion and attacks from every quarter, from Cuban-based subversion. Now, it has been stated that we will not send such things as jet planes and helicopters and things of that type to these countries because of an alleged arms race in Latin America. Well, Senator, this is dishonest. What arms race in Latin America? Who is about to attack whom? Nobody is.

I think you will find the genesis of this in the agreement that we are not going to permit any country to attack Cuba. Now, last week (March, 1967. Ed.), the brother of the Foreign Minister of Venezuela was kidnaped and then shot and Venezuela really blew skyhigh.

The apparent fear, and here I am editorializing, is that they (the U.S. Government. Ed.) do not want to give any of the Latin American countries in the Caribbean weapons of a possible range that could reach Cuba. If one of these countries really got mad and decided to retaliate against Cuba, they would have nothing to retaliate with."

TACC Editorial Comment. The sly policy of not selling weapons and matériel to those who it wishes to destroy --always in the "sacred" name of PEACE-- adopted by the United States against staunch anti-communist Chiang-Kai-shek forced him to surrender continental China to the communists headed by "agrarian reformer" Mao-Tse-tung. To General George C. Marshall, then Secretary of State, is attributed the fatidic sentence: "I have defeated Chiang-Kai-shek with a stroke of the pen."

The same policy, with equal success, was used against the Government of Cuba in 1958. See the authoritative opinions of the two U.S. Ambassadors to Cuba, Arthur Gardner and Earl E. T. Smith, under Appendix "6" attached.

And now, the very same lethal policy is being contemplated for all of Latin America, which is in dire need of weapons to fend off intensive communist attack. Communist weapons are distributed throughout Latin America from Red Cuba. If the Latin America arms embargo is implemented it will spell disaster not only for Latin America, but for the United States as well. For communism will dominate the Hemisphere south of Rio Grande and, thus, complete the encirclement of the United States, since Canada is already so infiltrated that all it needs is a little push.

12. Red Cuba's Nuclear Strike Capability.

"MR. BETHEL: Well, we know that there have been several conferences of atomic and other scientists in Cuba from Soviet bloc countries over the past year. The most recent conference of scientists, and I don't say they are all atomic scientists, surely, was in December (1966) when Cuba hosted 300 scientists from nine Soviet bloc countries. They came to Cuba for very broadly defined, which is to say, obscure, reasons."

"MR. BETHEL: Then on January 15 (1967), we have a hint; Castro's newspaper, Granma, published a picture of members of Russia's State Committee on Atomic Energy. The headline, 'Collaboration Between Cuba and the USSR on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.' . . . They were headed by its First Vice President, a fellow identified by the name of Monojov. . . Also, interestingly enough, it had an Under Secretary for Foreign Relations of the State Committee on Atomic Energy. I think, speaking editorially, it would be naive of us to believe that the Russians are there for peaceful purposes.

Now, the problem seems to be this: the State Department is pushing, has been pushing for quite some time, a treaty for the denuclearization among the nations of the Western Hemisphere. The name of the treaty, 'Treaty for Denuclearization of Latin America,' hints that there is something to denuclearize.

Among the Latin American countries, certainly, Cuba is the only country that has a nuclear strike potential. It seems, therefore, a logical construction to believe that what the State Department is trying to do is to get a treaty denuclearizing the Western Hemisphere and thereby denuclearizing Cuba.

MR. SOURWINE: You say Cuba has a nuclear strike potential? Do you mean that, or do you mean they have a potential for the development of nuclear power?

MR. BETHEL: We think -I think- I think both things, really.

MR. SOURWINE: A strike potential, if you will excuse me, would seem to connote the existence, in being, of nuclear warheads and the method of delivery. Do you think Cuba has that?

MR. BETHEL: Yes; I do...

MR. SOURWINE: You think there are atomic warheads in Cuba?

MR. BETHEL: There would be no other reason, it appears to me, to have missiles of the size and description... unless, indeed, they were capable of doing that. In fact, of course, they do...

Now, the United States, as you know, is preparing to negotiate a pact with the Russians to ban the worldwide spread of nuclear weapons. What they (U.S.A. Ed.) presumably hope is that within the context of this negotiation with Russia, Russia will accept the Latin American treaty.

Now, there <u>in</u> (sic -should be "<u>is</u>", Ed.) one stumbling block to this, of course. That is, that Cuba has consistently refused to sign any treaty which would prevent Cuba from using nuclear weapons, or nuclear energy.

So the way I would construct it is the Russians are using Cuban sovereignty, and I put 'sovereignty' in quotes, to be the 'reluctant dragon' in these negotiations. Apparently, in view of the background of stated Soviet designs on Latin America, I think that expectations that Russia would respect such a treaty would be downright foolish because the treaty itself calls for on-site inspection.

MR. SOURWINE: Mr. Chairman, I don't mean to shut the witness off, but I ask the Chair to consider whether this committee should take testimony on the subject of a treaty. We have no jurisdiction over it.

SENATOR DODD: I think we ought not to get into that. It is not completely within our jurisdiction."



TACC Editor's Notes.

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- Headings have been supplied by us for easy identification of subject matter.
- 2. For readability's sake some rearrangement of Mr. Bethel's declarations was necessary in order to group together his statements on specific subjects. As is customary in oral testimony, certain topics are bound to come up several times during the questioning and, therefore, appear in different places in the verbatim transcript of the testimony.
- 3. Except otherwise marked all emphasis added by us.

III. INDEX OF GRAPHIC INFORMATION

Exhibit		
"1"	' Missiles Publicly Paraded in Havana Photocopy from Red Cuba's Newspaper REVOLUCION, Monday, January 4, 1965	
"2"	Photographic Composition Four Photocopies Showing:	30-31
	 a) First Operational Air-Breathing Cruise Missile Developed by the Germans in WW 11. 	
	b) Modern, Improved, Russian Version of the Original German Missile, Paraded in Havana.	
	c) Russian SAM Missiles Paraded in Havana, Erroneously Described as "10 Mile Land Rockets" by the United States Communications Media.	
	 d) The Same Missiles Paraded in Moscow, Correctly Identified as SAMs by the U.S. Communications Media. 	
"3"	Soviet Surface-to-Surface Cruise Missiles Paraded in Havana January 2, 1966 Estimated Range 1,300 Miles	
"4"	Trends of Total Megatonnage Delivery Capability All Strategic Weapons Systems U.S.A. vs. U.S.S.R 1962 Through 1971. From a Study prepared by the American Security Council for the House Armed Services Committee June 1967	69
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
★NOTE - The four Graphic Exhibits appear in the Page indicated at right.

IV. INDEX OF ARTICLES AND EDITORIAL

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"5"	"Runaway U.S. Missile Crosses Cuba" From The Miami Herald, January 5, 1967	149
"6"	"Can Runaway Castro Missile Reach U.S.? 'No Comment.' " By Maurice LaBelle From The Coral Gables Times, January 12, 1967	151
"7"	"Soviet Offensive Missiles Never Left Cuba, says Exile." By Maurice LaBelle From The Guide, March 2, 1966	153
"8"	"He Pines for Those Hush, Hush Reports Newspapers and Truth." By Maurice La Belle From The Coral Gables Times, March 10, 1966	157
"9"	WGBS-Radio Miami Editorial, by Michael O' Neil, March 15, 1966	159
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Runaway U.S. Missile Crosses Cuba



-United Press International Telephoto

Mace Missile Like This One Fired From Eglin AFB ... photograph made at launch in 1960

By Herald Wire Services

WASHINGTON -- A supersonic jet fighter chased a runaway Air Force missile for 90 miles over the Gulf of Mexico Wednesday in a vain attempt to shoot it down before it passed over Cuba.

A Pentagon spokesman said the F4 Phantom jet hit the unarmed Mace missile — modified as a target drone — with cannon fire.

But the 44-foot, 18,000 pound missile continued southward on an errant course which carried it over the extreme western tip of Cuba and apparently to a harmless impact in the ocean 100 miles south of the island country.

Since the Fidel Castro regime usually scizes upon such incidents for propaganda purposes, the State Department hastily asked the Swiss ambassador in Havana to explain the circumstances of the wayward missile's flight to the Cuban government.

(Cont.)

The missile was an ourdated, air-breathing Mace essentially a robot airplane - that was being used as a target drone.

It was launched from the Grounds Proving Air Eglin Air Force Base near Pensacola in the Florida Panhandle and was flying over the Gulf of Mexico at an altitude of 25,000 feet when ground stations lost control.

An emergency effort to touch off the missile's destruct system failed and it went roaring through the skies unbridled until it expended its fuel.

The Air Force said that based on radar tracking reports and the amount of fuel aboard, it was believed the research vehicle impacted at 11:21 a.m., "about 100 mies south of the southwest coast of Cuba."

The Air Force said the Mace was tracked well beyond the Florida coast but because of the high altitude at which it was flying, wind speeds and other factors, the exact impact area was uncertain.

The Mace was being used as a target drone in a fighterinterceptor test involving F-4 Phantom jets when it went out of control.

Mace flies at 650 mph, and although generally regarded as obsolete, the U.S. still has two squadrons of them on Okinawa and one in Germany. The newer ones have a range of 1,300 miles, powered by a pound thrust jet engine and use a 100,000 pound thrust solid booster rocket for takeoff.

The Mace was not the



-Associated Press Wirephoto

Course Taken by Straying Missile ... veered east and passed over tip of Cuba

first rocket to get away from U.S. missilemen.

Early in the space program, on Dec, 5, 1956, a Snark - another air-breather with a 6,000 mile range got away and was believed to have crashed somewhere in Brazil.


Previously, in July 1956. another Snark streaked out of control and crashed in the South Atlantic, A piece of it washed up on the Island of Jersey, off the English coast, two years later.

More recently, on Nov. 30, 1960, a Thor-Able-Star rocket carrying a satellite was delidestroyed shortly herately after launch from Cape Kennedy and parts of its booster fell on Cuba. Castro complained bitterly and claimed the wreckage killed a cow.

Despite the protests, four Delta rockets carrying weather satellites have flown over Cuba during the past two years en route to polar orbits.

Pentagon Silent

Can Runaway Castro Missile Reach U.S.? 'No Comment'



Russian Air-Breathing Missiles in Cuba

By MAURICE LaBELLE

Pentagon and North American Air Defense spokesmen refused to comment about the ramifications of the Jan. 4 runaway missile incident that saw an "obsolete" U.S. MACE air-breathing missile crash off Cuba in the Caribbean 900 miles from its Eglin AFB launching site.

But they conceded that the same thing could hap-

pen — in reverse — if Castro had the same type of missile — something the Administration has refused to admit despite the fact that they have been paraded in Havanarepeatedly and a Senate sub-committee confirmed their existence earlier.

Squadron Leader Tot Man, public information officer at NORAD headquarters in Colorado Springs, Col., said all queries about the incident were being handled directly at the Pentagon.

"I don't want to get into a hypothetical discussion," said Capt. Marvin Braman, of the Air Force Press Query Desk in the Pentagor.

Braman declined to confirm the existence of the J-3 type Soviet missiles which are among the type paraded in Havana, Cairo and Warsaw as recently (Cont.)

Exhibit "6" (cont.)

as Jan. 1, 1966 and reportedly comparable to the 1,-300-mile Mace in size range and nuclear capability.

Castro said in a speech this year that the parading of the missiles would be passed up this year because of wear and tear on Havana streets.

Pentagon sources consistently refer to the air breathing missiles, squadrons of which are still stationed in Okinawa and West Germany, as "target drones" — used for training and other air defense missions.

The Soviet cruise missiles are consistently misidentified as surface to air missiles (SAM) with a range of no more than 45 miles in Associated Press wirephotos, few of which have ever been published in this country.

According to Cuban refugee and other confidential sources, the missiles in question are operational.

Luis Manrara, president of the Truth About Cuba Committee, said he has no further information about the controversial missiles other than reports that they are firm-

ly in the hands of Soviet technicians.

Eduardo Ulacia, a director, is in Spain and could not be reached for comment.

It was Ulacia's investigation of the reports of Cuban refugees. photos and stories published in the Cuban press, and extensive study of published reports in authoritative iournals that led to the report published in this newspaper two years ago that the missiles had not been removed.

A documentary on the controversy over the missiles in Cuba is being prepared for television.

The missiles, along with Soviet intermediate and medium range ballistic missiles and IL-28 jet bombers were to have been removed from Cuban island following the celebrated confrontation between the late President John F. Kennedy and former Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in October 1962.

The U.S. lifted a short-lived naval blockade of military deliveries to Cuba as a result of agreements by the Soviets to remove all the missiles. There were no on site inspections made, however.

The Senate Internal Security Sub-Committee subsequently conducted an extensive and little publicized investigation that revealed that there was no proof that the balistic missiles had been all removed and that the air breather or cruise missiles remained.

While local U.S. air defense officers have boasted that the Nike-Hercules and Hawk missiles stationed in the area plus Air Force and Navy interceptors could successfully intercept and destroy all such cruise missiles and aircraft launched from Cuba at the U.S., the failure of the Air Force to down the single Mace cruise missile raise some questions about the boast.

All attempts by supersonic Air Force jets to down the errant sub-sonic missile using both cannon fire and "experimental air to air missiles" failed to bring it down.

Capt. Braman said the fact that non-operational air to air missiles were used contributed to the failure.

He refused to speculate on what would happen if a number of cruise missiles were launched from Cuba toward the U.S.



edge by recognized world authorities.

An interesting meeting between this reporter and rocket expert, Dr. Wernher von Braun, took place on Nov. 4, 1965 at the University of Miami where Dr. Von Braun had come to deliver an address.

Later, in an ante room of the Student Union, Von Braun was shown the missile pictures from El Mundo and Revolucion.

Von Braun, who has written extensively about all types of rocket developments, suddenly became very uninformed about the missiles in question.

The recognized rocket expert was apparently unable to identify the various missiles as to type, purpose or range, although he indicated that he believed some were supersonic "drone" or "target" types, probably of short range.

Captions in the Cuban newspapers, translated into English, identified the missiles as surface-tosurface, land, and naval or sub missiles, as well as the surface-to-air SAM.

Finally, Dr. Von Braun was shown a half-track mounted ballistic missile, similar to the U.S. Pershing, which has a range of 700 or more miles and packs a nuclear wallop.

If the missile were comparable to the Pershing, Von Braun said cautiously, its range would be well in the 700-mile class.

Ulacia, who had been unable to get to the ante room, was elated to get this reserved admission later.

Seven hundred miles from Cuba is far from a defensive range, Ulacia



DR. WERNHER VON Braun and reporter, Maurice Labelle, examine blow ups of missiles paraded in Havana and Moscow, Rocket expert was unable to make positive identifica. tion.

beamed, and would place Cape Canaveral, Huntsville and many lower Southern military installations and cities in range.

The search for authoritative information in the face of the official information blackout contin-

Willy Messerschmitt, foremost German rocket expert and pioneer, was contacted, but begged off. He referred the reporter to a private source. No answer has been received.

Attempts to contact high ranking U.S. officers through intermediaries failed

Another German authoritative news service, provided some information - some of it obviously erroneous and, therefore, unreliable.

Missile and Rockets magazine, recognized as the authority and the publication that broke the story of the U-2 espionage overflights over the Soviet Union two years before the Reds shot one down - ignored inquiries about the Cuban missiles.

The same magazine 155

Exhibit "7" (cont.)

was among those which disclosed early that the Soviets had placed ballistic missiles in Cuba before the U.S. government confirmed the fact, resulting in the Missile Crisis of 1962.

One government rocket technician, Ulacia says he cannot identify because of the jeopardy to his job, has confirmed what Ulacia's own long studies indi-

Two of the missiles paraded in Havana as early as January of 1964 are supersonic cruise or aerodynamic in type, of medium or intermediary range, but more important, have nuclear capabil-

One is a naval or submarine type that may also be launched from land sites. It has a reported range of 200 miles.

The larger cruise-type missile, similar in configuration to the Soviet J-3. can be launched from truck mounts or other easily camouflaged platforms.

Range of the nuclear J-3: between 1,250 and 1,-500 miles - the same as the intermediate range ballistic missiles the Soviets brought in, in 1962.

These missiles are outgrowths of the Soviet MIG aircraft development program, according to the German news source.

The half-track mounted ballistic missile has already been described as having a possible range of 700 miles and nuclear capability.

Finally, the last missile shown in El Mundo and Revolucion and the one that received all the puh-

(Cont.)


licity in the American press — the SAM-2 — is a purely defensive anti-aircraft missile comparable to our earlier Nike series and also used in Viet Nam with poor results.

The position, expressed by White House Press Secretary, William Moyers that none of the missiles in Cuba have a range greater than 50 miles is ridiculous on its face, says Ulacia, who has read virtually every book and publication written on the subject.

"The very first missile had a range of 200 miles," Ulacia points out impatiently.

This was the V-1 "Buzz Bomb" used by the Nazis against Great Britain before development of the V-2 ballistic missile which threatened at one point to knock England out of the war before sites and production centers could be destroyed or captured.

That was more than 20 years ago, Ulacia said. It is not reasonable to assume that Soviet



NAVAL TYPE cruise type surface-to-surface missile displayed in Havana and pictured in El Múndo and Revolucion. Sub or land-launched missile has reported range of 150 to 200 miles and nuclear warhead.

science has not marched forward from that point.

The J-3 missiles shown in the photographs and paraded, said Ulacia, are comparable to our own Mace and Matador cruise missile series which have intermediate range and nuclear capability.

The Snark cruise misslie, also developed by the U.S., had a range of 5,000, indicating that none of his claims are beyond reason.

Ulacia is scheduled soon to go before national TV cameras to present his case.

Unlike the famous Mc-Namara public missile crisis briefing of 1962, however, Ulacia's presentation is scheduled to be privately financed and viewed by a limited audience.

That's the plan — unless a more important event takes place between now and then.



(oral (jables ***TIMES



Newspapers

He Pines for Those Hush, Hush Reports

close friend of the late Presi- the FACT that the missiles dent Kennedy, bemoans the fact that he no longer has access to top secret intelligence reports and is now reduced to depending newspaper stories for information.

Sorensen goes on to say he found little correlation between these privileged reports and those found in the press, and he worries about the kind of information being fed the American peo-

There may be something to what Sorensen says.

Certainly there was little correlation between the intel- were there, as had been religence reports of 1962 bethe stories appearing in various segments of the American press.

White House advisor and ment was the last to accept were taken over by the Stra-



TED SORENSON

ported by Cuban exiles, eleintelligence sources.

Although sufficient dence had been gathered by In this dramatic example August 1962, it was not until

Theodore Sorensen, former it seems that the U.S. govern- the CIA-operated U-2 flights tegic Air Command on October 14 that the "PROOF" was obtained.

> By this time the Soviets had already deployed several cruise and medium range ballistic missiles and had all but completed the intermediate range ballistic missile hases

> An interim report of the Senate Preparedness Investigating Committee on the Cuban Military Buildup in May 1963 reveals some interesting explanations for the failure of our intelligence and government to react quickly to the threat.

Throughout the Commitfore the Missile Crisis and ments of the press and other tee report you'll find statements like this one:

> "Faulty evaluation and the predisposition of the intelligence community to the phi-

Exhibit "8" (cont.)

losophical conviction that it would be incompatible with Soviet policy to introduce strategic missiles into Cuba resulted in intelligence judgements and evaluations which later proved to be erroneous...."

Which is another way of stating that we deluded ourselves into believing that the Soviets were sincere about their "peaceful coexistence" propaganda.


And, in effect, we chose to believe the word of our sworn enemies over that of our friends.

President Kennedy, already armed with proof of the missiles, decided on a rocking chair confrontation with Gromyko rather than a public one in which the Soviet ambassador would have had to tell his lie publicly to the whole world.

Today we find ourselves virtually in the same dilemma as reports continue to come in about Soviet missiles in Cuba.

It will be interesting to see if our intelligence agencies and government continue to judge in favor of the belief that the Soviets wouldn't dare do it again or on the side of national security.





WGBS-RADIO MIAMI EDITORIAL, BY MICHAEL O'NEIL, MARCH 15, 1966

Editor's Notebook March 15, 1966

Reliable sources indicate we may again be facing a missile threat from Cuba; that the threat potential is almost beyond argument and that the only real question is whether the threat is immediate. We'll go into that in a moment.

When Fidel Castro flexed his military muscles in another of his verbal deluges this past Sunday night, his threats that he has "magnificent weapons to fight any kind of war... conventional or non-conventional" apparently did not take our intelligence community by complete surprise.

The Communist Cuban leader didn't elaborate on the type of weapons, but there are indications he was talking about more Russian missiles; the type that can carry nuclear war-heads; the type that caused the missile crisis of 1962.

There are several reliable sources who indicate some of these missiles have been in Cuba since 1961. They say Khrushchev removed only the ones our U-2 planes saw in 1962, and that this was Russia's intent all along.

There have been pictures to document that Communist Russian, East Germany, Czechoslovakian and Polish workers have been at work, vastly expanding Cuba's cave network since 1961. Now, reports, indicate: missiles can be moved, underground, in Cuba from a distance of 35 to 90 miles.

Tying-in with these reports is this interesting development: At 5:30PM, March 6th, a radio broadcast, in Portugese, was beamed from Havana, quoting Cuban exiles here in Miami as saying 19-Russian missiles with 2-thousand-mile ranges were operational at Pinar Del Rio province. It is also interesting to note that Portugese is the language spoken in Brazil and West Africa; two targets designated for subversion during the January tri-continental Communist Congress, which established Cuba as the international headquarters for Communist subversion.

Our intelligence people reportedly are aware of this underground activity in Cuba. What they're wondering about is whether the Russian sites have been erected on underground pads.

And, reportedly the belief is that Russia wants no part of a nuclear war with us. However, since Cuba is designated as the international headquarters for subversion, the Soviets simply want to make sure that we never can go into Cuba to contain aggression, as we have in Viet Nam.

Michael O'Neil News Director

Experts Vary'Slightly' on Missile Range

30 Miles or 1,450 Miles?

By MAURICE LABELLE
Guide Managing Editor

The man who insists that the Soviet Union never removed all its offensive nuclear missiles from Cuba has come back with more proof in the face of more denials by U.S. officials.

He is Eduardo Ulacia, a director of the Truth About Cuba Committee, and a resident of Westchester.

Ulacia has found an official report of the investigation by a Senate committee following the 1962 Missile Crisis that found the missiles had not all been removed and revealed further information about intermediate range cruise type missile bases that were not mentioned at the time of the "cyeball to eyeball" confrontation.


Although U.S. intelligence has contacted this newspaper twice since the March 2 story about the missiles, Ulacia says he has not been approached by any intelligence group.

The Administration again on

March 26 denied that offensive missiles are in Cuba and stated flatly to Miami Herald Washington Bureau reporter Lee Winfrey that there are no missiles with a range longer than 30 miles.

"This is ridiculous," said Ulacia, a Cuban exile leader who came up with more photographs of the missiles in question.

Ulacia dug up a copy of the little known investigation into the Cuban missile buildup dated May 9, 1963 by the Preparedness Investi-



Blowup of J-3 type Soviet Missile in Havana
... Can be launched from truck (shown), land, sub.
(Cont.)

gating Sub-Committee five months after the Soviets said they removed all their weapons offensive prove that even the U.S. Senate committee found to the contrary.

Says that report, based upon the testimony of the C.I.A., U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency; U.S. Army and Navy and Air Force intelligence, plus an investigation of 70 witnesses which consumed 45 man-days in the Miami area alone:

"The dramatic events which occurred last October with respect to Cuba are now history. Following photographic confirmation of the fact that strategic and offensive weapons had, in fact, been introduced into Cuba a n d President Kennedy's confrontation with Premier Khrushchev, SUCH STRATE-GIC AND OFFENSIVE WEAPONS WERE OSTEN-SIBLY WITHDRAWN," indicating the committee did not believe all were removed.

Later in the same report: "Photographic reconnaissance was unable to detect precisely how many ballistic mis- missile launching sites . . ." siles were introduced into Cuba. Prior to the Soviet announcement that 42 missiles would be withdrawn, our photographs had revealed a lesser number. It could not be established therefore, how many ballistic missiles were, in fact, introduced into Cuba or specifically how many the Soviets planned to introduce"

Then comes the section of the report with which Ulacia parts company:

"There are four cruise missile sites, with missiles of a of the coastal defense system feet. of Cuba, which is normal employment of these weapons. They are manned by Soviet in World War II more than

Service: Navy Type: Surface to Surface IRBM Status: Operational Physical Data Length: 37.2 ft Diameter: 4.6 ft, 23.7 ft wing span Weight: 20,900 lb Booster: Four solid propellant, 4000ib total thrust Sustainer: Ram jet, 14,900-lb thrust Warhead: 2200 lb nuclear Guidance: Radio/programmed Remarks Range 1450 mi at Mach 1.15. Used from at least 7 submarines. Also used from cruiser type vessels.

Department of Army Data on J-3 ... Startling Facts or Fiction?

naval crews. As an added feature of these missles, there are at least 150 of them in Cuba.

far more than could be logical ly associated with the known

Three type - not one of cruise, air-breathing or aerodynamic were introduced, Ulacia points out, one a small, short-range type, but two others, similar to the Soviet J-3 configuration, launched from either a land or truck launcher that authoritative sources say has a range of 1,400 miles and nuclear capability.

All three have been paraded in Havana.

To say that the J-3 cruise range of about 30 to 40 miles missile has a range of but 30 from their ground launchers, miles would be like saying that The missiles are placed as part the B-52 has a range of only 50 645 m.p.h.

The V-1, used by Germany

20 years ago, Ulacia points out, had a range of 150 to 200 miles.

Soviet scientists improved on the V-1, "Buzz Bomb" called it the J-1.

According to Albert Parry. Russian rocket authority in as book, "Russian Rockets and Missiles," the J-1 had a range of 370 miles and a speed of 519

Missiles and Rockets magazine, another authority, gives the obsolete J-1 the same range.

Parry states that the J-2. another sub-sonic version of the V-1, had a range of 500 to 525 miles. Missiles and Rockets agrees and places its speed at

Latest source of information for the supersonic. swept back wing J-3 is the (Cont.)

Exhibit "10" (cont.)

Department of the Army and Aerospace Management Magazine, in Oct. 1963.

According to those sources the J-3 has an intermediate range of 1,450 miles, a speed of Mach 1,15 and a 2,200 pound nuclear warhead.

Unlike the United States, Ulacia points out, which has

scarpped its Mace and Matador cruise missiles and is phasing out its manned bomber fleet, the Soviets are not putting all their eggs in one basket with ICBMs. They have developed a versatile striking force.

This was alluded to in a recent hour-long speech by

Fidel Castro, who boasted that his forces could wage any kind of war — conventional, which means with long range nuclear weapons, Ulacia says.

But, as in 1962, the administration continues to deny the reports.



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