New York Times
April 19, 1961.  p. 1.

Kennedy Warns Khrushchev on Cuba After Russian Vows Help to Castro; Migs and Tanks Attack Beachhead
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President is Firm
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Tells Soviet U.S. Will Not Permit Meddling--Asks Laos Truce

By Wallace Carrol
Special to The New York Times

        WASHINGTON, April 18--President Kennedy warned the Soviet Union tonight that the United States would tolerate no outside military intervention in Cuba.
        The President reacted in less than ten hours to a threat by Premier Khrushchev to give the Castro regime "all necessary assistance" in repelling attacks by anti-Castro forces.
        In an icily worded message, the President rebuffed Mr. Khrushchev's request that the United States suppress the efforts of the anti-Castro exiles who are trying to maintain a beachhead in Cuba.
        The President also took up the Soviet Premier's implied threat to stir up trouble in other parts of the world. If the Soviet Union sincerely wants to improve the international atmosphere, Mr. Kennedy said, it should accept a cease-fire in Laos, cooperate with the United Nations in the Congo and agree to reasonable proposals for a ban on tests of nuclear weapons.
Communism Rejected
        The President went beyond immediate issues to reject Soviet claims to the inevitable triumph of communism.
        "The great revolution in the history of man, past, present and future is the revolution of those determined to be free." Mr. Kennedy declared.
        Secretary of State Dean Rusk handed the President's message to the Soviet Ambassador, Mikhail A. Menshikov, at 7 P.M. The message answered a communication from Premier Khrushchev that was given to the United States Embassy in Moscow this morning.
        "You are under a serious misapprehension in regard to events in Cuba," Mr. Kennedy told the Premier.
        The Castro dictatorship, he said, is "an alien-dominated regime." This was a restrained reiteration of the American contention that Dr. Castro's Government is under Soviet domination. Many Cubans, the President said, have found the denial of liberties intolerable and have turned to resistance against Dr. Castro.
        "Where the people are denied the right of choice," the President said, "recourse to such struggle is the only means of achieving their liberties."
        The President then replied to Mr. Khrushchev's threat to aid Dr. Castro. Mr. Kennedy said:
        "I have previously stated and I repeat now that the United States intends no military intervention in Cuba.
        "In the event of any military intervention by outside forces we will immediately honor our obligations under the inter-American system to protect this hemisphere against external aggression."
        This was an allusion to the pact of Rio De Janeiro of Aug. 15, 1947, that bound the republics of the hemisphere to consider "an armed attack by any state against an American state . . . as an attack against all the American states." It also pledged the republics to "assist in meeting the attack."
        The implication was that the United States would regard Soviet military intervention on the side of Dr. Castro as an attack on an American state and would answer in kind.
        Although the United States is pledged not to intervene in Cuba, Mr. Kennedy said, "The United States admires the Cuban patriots who wish to establish a democratic system and will do nothing to curb them.
        "The United States Government can take no action to stifle the spirit of liberty," Mr. Kennedy declared.
        The prevailing view among high officials, as well as in the embassies of allied nations, was that the Soviet Union would not risk an armed conflict with the United States over a country so far from its own borders.
        The expectation was that the Russians would continue to give arms and military training to Dr. Castro's forces, but that they would stop short of anything that might draw them into a general war.
        Despite this feeling, there was deep concern that arose mainly from two other circumstances.
U.S. Involvement Noted
        The first was an uneasy awareness in the Government that the good name and prestige of the United States had become entangled in a small military operation carried out by a few hundred Cuban exiles.
        The second was a conviction that Premier Khrushchev, as well as Dr. Castro, had now determined to exploit the Cuban situation to the utmost--by Premier Khrushchev's personal skill in influencing world opinion, by maneuvers to pillory the United States in the United Nations, by mob attacks on American Embassies, and by all the other devices of propaganda.
        All reliable sources here agree that so-called "invasion" of Cuba by the exiles is only a limited operation. One high official said the landing forces might number 300 men. Another said there might be as many as 600, but certainly no more.
        Both agreed that the objective was to carry supplies to the forces on the island already resisting the Castro Government.
        This small-scale effort, however, was magnified from the beginning by exiles in their desire to encourage the Cubans to rise against Dr. Castro.
        Both Dr. Castro and Premier Khrushchev have presumably been aware of the limited size of the landing forces. Thus, it is reasoned here, that they are happy to go along with the exiles in exaggerating the scope of the landings, believing that eventual propaganda effects of a disaster for the anti-Castro forces will be enhanced.
        For the same reason, they are considered eager to heighten the appearance of United States involvement. A disaster for the anti-Castro exiles would then become a deadly blow to United States prestige.
        The President discussed the Cuban situation at his weekly breakfast meeting with the Democratic leaders of Congress. News bulletins on Premier Khrushchev's message arrived while the meeting was going on and the text came in a little later.
Leaders Are Grim
        The leaders as they left the White House were unusually tight-lipped. Sam Rayburn, Speaker of the House of Representatives, said:
        "It's a serious situation down there, and I don't know whether it will work out or not."
        Later the President conferred on his reply with Secretary of State Rusk, McGeorge Bundy, the Presidential Assistant for National Security Affairs, Charles E. Bohlen, one of the State Department's leading specialists on Soviet affairs, and Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.
        One of Premier Khrushchev's principal objectives, it is generally agreed here, is to play the role of protector of the small nations against the "imperialist" West.
        President Kennedy apparently felt that the Soviet Union should be left in no doubt that this country would not tolerate outside intervention in Cuba.