New York Times
April 19, 1961. p. 12.
Soviet Small Arms Chief Assets Of Cuban Units Fighting
Rebels
WASHINGTON, April 18 (AP)--The
Soviet bloc's contribution of small arms and other anti personnel weapons
is Fidel Castro's best asset in combatting the revolutionary forces seeking
his overthrow in Cuba.
Some, although not all of
the recent gifts from the Communist arsenal can be impractical for the
kind of warfare in which the Havana Government is locked.
Essentially this revolution--like
the one Castro staged to topple the regime of Fulgencio Batista--is primarily
an infantry operation.
Automatic arms, light artillery,
grenades and similar weapons--plus ample manpower--are useful.
Tanks Being Emplyed
Rebel sources in New York said
the Government forces were using Soviet-made heavy tanks and MIG jet aircraft.
A report from a New Orleans
priest, who says he is in contact with the revolutinaries, says Premier
Castro's forces were using Soviet-made Stalin tanks. These tanks weigh
about fifty-one tons.
No ordinary bridge can support
their weight, Swampland, such as that southeast of Havana where one of
the major invasion landings has been made, is not suitable country for
such tanks.
On the other hand, tanks
can be used as fixed defensive fortifications along roads.
The MIG jet fighters, which
were landed in Cuba by Soviet merchant ships beginning last year, are useful
as interceptor aircraft. Their high speed makes them less practicable for
operation against ground troops organized in small units and moving through
mountainous terrain or forest cover.
On the other hand, the anti-aircraft
guns given to Dr. Castro by his Soviet friends can be useful if the revolutionary
forces have only older, slower types of planes vulerable to such fire.
Cuban Navy Unreliable
Most of Premier Castro's anti-invasion
efforts must be based on land. The Cuban Navy is tiny and has proved unreliable.
The defection of Navy personnel,
as well as Cuban Air Force men, has been reported in increasing numbers.
Sources in Washington had
no immediate confirmation of a published report that the Soviet Union planned
to send one or more destroyers to Cuba.
Uncertainty about the loyalty
of Cuban crews would raise questions about the use of Communist-contributed
destroyers--unless Soviet seamen were aboard, ostensibly serving as observers
and technical advisers.
Some Soviet naval officers
and technically rated men may have been among the advisers filtering into
Cuba from merchant ships.